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00:30During the mass of Allied combined air raids on Hamburg, Window, the tiny strips of aluminum
00:38that mimicked airplanes, rendered the German radar ineffective.
00:42But neither the British nor even the Germans could have guessed that almost immediately
00:48a new and more effective system of night fighting would evolve.
00:52The code name Wildsau, German for Wildsau, was derived from a slang term meaning roughly
00:59the same as loose cannon in English.
01:05The great advocate for Wildsau tactics was Major H.U. Herrmann, himself a loose cannon
01:11by any standards of military discipline.
01:14He regarded the German Himmelblatt radar system as too limiting.
01:19He preached that standard single-seat day fighters could be flown at night against the
01:23Allied bomber formations.
01:30He tested his theory.
01:33In borrowed BF-109s and FW-190s he waded into the British bomber stream, ignoring the German
01:39flag.
01:41He found that bombers were vulnerable to the day fighters if the searchlights caught
01:45them for as little as 30 seconds.
01:48It was risky.
01:50Nighttime takeoffs and landings were difficult in the German fighters.
02:01Exploding German flag did not distinguish between enemy bomber and friendly fighter.
02:26Twin engine fighters J.U. 88s and BF-110s were introduced to the new system.
02:44The day fighters combined with the radar equipped night fighters to present the British with a
02:49new defensive problem.
02:52In 1943, the American Eighth Air Force could only put 250 to 300 bombers into the air on
02:58a mission, but it remained determined to push its bomber offensive into Germany.
03:11There was no long-range fighter to escort the bombers.
03:15Spitfires and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts were only useful for sweeps over France.
03:29The Lockheed Lightning became available later in 1943.
03:33It could reach 600 miles when equipped with drop tanks, but the Lightning was never highly
03:38regarded as an air superiority fighter in European skies.
04:03General Aker was under increasing pressure to obtain results.
04:07General Hap Arnold sent message after message criticizing the level of effort by the Eighth.
04:13He demanded to know why more was not being done.
04:16He made unfavorable comparisons with the performance of other units.
04:21The aggressive Brigadier General William Kepner took over the Eighth Fighter Command.
04:30Brigadier General Frank Armstrong took over Eighth Bomber Command.
04:37On July 24, 1943, the Eighth Air Force began what became known as Blitz Week.
04:44One of the strikes was a 1,900-mile roundtrip attack on targets in Norway.
04:49It was the longest bombing raid up to that time.
04:53There were also attacks on German targets Kiel, Hanover, Hamburg, Kassel, and Vornemunde.
05:00One thousand seven hundred twenty sorties were flown in the week.
05:04Eight point five percent of the 330 aircraft were lost.
05:08With other aircraft damaged, Eighth Bomber Command was whittled down to less than 200 heavy bombers.
05:18The Eighth was also expected to conduct raids outside the European theater.
05:22It contributed two bomb groups to take part with the Ninth Air Force in the low-level raid on Ploesti, Romania.
05:28The oil fields at Ploesti provided Germany with 66 percent of its crude oil.
05:38The raid on August 1st was marred by lack of secrecy and inaccurate navigation.
05:44The columbus
06:12Damage to the oil fields was severe but easily repaired.
06:42Follow-up attacks were too long in coming.
06:49Almost a third of the attacking planes were lost.
07:03On August 17th, a double strike was made on the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt
07:08and the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg.
07:11Almost nothing went well.
07:13Both the first and the fourth bombardment wings ran into continuous, well-disciplined fighter
07:18opposition.
07:18The fourth was strung out in a 15-mile column.
07:29The fourth was strung out in a 15-mile column.
07:44It had only one group of P-47s as escort.
07:52The Germans began their attacks over Belgium.
07:54They concentrated on the rear units.
08:01This is a German fighter pilot's view of the last seconds in the life of an 8th Air Force
08:06B-17 and its crew.
08:13It was a Spanish fighter pilot's view of the last 10-mile program.
08:16The most famous fighter pilot of the year after a meeting is from the last two weeks ago.
08:20They had a flight to the same ship and it wasn't forloriating to its crew if it's dry.
08:25But 127 aircraft of the fourth bombardment wing
08:55hit the target.
08:57It was precision bombing of the first order.
09:00300 tons of bombs devastated the Messerschmitt works.
09:03Production of BF-109s was disrupted for five months.
09:18Perhaps even more important,
09:20the fuselage jigs for the Messerschmitt Me-262 jet fighter
09:24were destroyed.
09:27But when Curtis LeMay led his force on over the Alps
09:30to land in North Africa,
09:3124 aircraft, almost 19% of the wing, had been lost.
09:44Meanwhile, the first bombardment wing put 183 bombers
09:48over the Schweinfurt factories.
09:50Opposition was heavy all the way in and all the way out.
09:53Thirty-six aircraft were lost, almost 20%.
09:57Schweinfurt was a significant victory for the Luftwaffe.
10:01Sixty aircraft were shot down.
10:03Another 30 had to be left in North Africa
10:05because of battle damage.
10:07Twenty-eight of those that got back to England
10:09were heavily battered.
10:10The German air force had shown that it was still a dangerous opponent.
10:23On the night of August 17th,
10:25the RAF made a devastating attack on Pienermunde,
10:28where the secret development of the German V-1
10:30and V-2 vengeance weapons was taking place.
10:33A diversion by eight RAF mosquitoes
10:38tricked the Nazi air defense system
10:40into ordering 200 fighters to Berlin
10:42and made the task of the attacking force easier.
10:47Göring was infuriated by the trick.
10:51He blasted his chief of staff, Yershonek,
10:53holding him personally responsible.
10:56Yershonek shot himself.
10:57His suicide note said,
11:00I cannot work with Göring anymore.
11:03Long live the Führer.
11:07The Eighth Air Force losses
11:09at Regensburg and Schweinfurt
11:11slowed the rate of attacks.
11:13But in the second week of October 1943,
11:16precision bombing came into its own.
11:18In three days,
11:26more than 1,000 bombers
11:28were dispatched against targets in Germany.
11:30At Marienburg,
11:31every bomb landed in the target area.
11:34None hit the town.
11:41On October 14th,
11:42the Eighth Air Force went back to Schweinfurt.
11:44When their P-47 escort turned back,
11:50the Luftwaffe attacked the bomber stream
11:52all the way to the target
11:54and back to the coast.
11:58The Luftwaffe expertly coordinated
12:01rocket attacks with air-to-air bombing
12:03and massed attacks by cannon-armed fighters.
12:06They savaged the Eighth Formations.
12:09A total of 60 aircraft
12:11were shot down out of the 229 attacking.
12:14It was an unbearable loss rate
12:17of 26.5 percent.
12:20No Air Force could sustain such losses.
12:23The Luftwaffe had achieved
12:24day-air superiority.
12:26The Allied commanders were stunned
12:39by the defeat.
12:40The Luftwaffe was not being worn
12:42into the ground.
12:43It was getting stronger by day
12:44and by night.
12:47The Allies had underestimated
12:49German aircraft production capacity.
12:51They had overestimated the claims
12:53of German aircraft destroyed in battle.
12:55Air superiority had to be won back
12:57from the Germans.
12:59It could only be done with the help
13:00of a long-range escort fighter.
13:02Bad weather halted deep penetrations
13:15into Germany by the Eighth Air Force
13:17for the remainder of 1943.
13:19The invasion of Europe depended
13:21on securing air superiority
13:23from the Luftwaffe.
13:24But the Germans were achieving
13:25a production miracle
13:27that would see 44,000 airplanes
13:29produced in 1944.
13:37The improved versions of the FW-190
13:40and the BF-109
13:42were the equal of the best
13:44American fighters.
13:45They had proved themselves deadly
13:47against the bombers.
13:53New training methods were improving
13:55the quality of German pilots.
13:57All of this had an effect
13:59on the American leadership.
14:10On December 23rd,
14:13General Aker was relieved
14:14as commanding general
14:15of the Eighth Air Force.
14:17He was given a more prestigious position,
14:19but he knew he was being kicked upstairs.
14:21Aker fought hard against the move,
14:27coming as it did,
14:28just as his resources
14:29were beginning to increase.
14:31But a good soldier to the end,
14:33he accepted the position
14:34of commander,
14:35Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
14:39Meanwhile, in the fall of 1943,
14:42Allied troops,
14:43fresh from victories
14:44in North Africa and Sicily,
14:45had moved well up
14:46the Italian peninsula toward Rome.
14:48General Hav Arnold decided
14:59to split the 12th Air Force
15:01into two parts.
15:04On November 1st, 1943,
15:06Major General James Doolittle
15:08was given command
15:09of the 15th.
15:1212th Bomber Command
15:13became the 15th Air Force,
15:15strategic,
15:16a heavy bomber unit.
15:1812th Fighter Command
15:19became the 12th Air Force,
15:21tactical.
15:22Arnold reasoned
15:23that England
15:24was already overcrowded
15:25and would have difficulty
15:26supporting more aircraft.
15:28Bases in Italy
15:29would offer better weather.
15:36Winston Churchill
15:38had long called
15:39for airstrikes
15:39against Berlin.
15:42Sir Arthur Harris
15:43and General Karl Spatz
15:44believed that if Berlin
15:45were destroyed,
15:46it would not be necessary
15:47to invade the continent.
15:49They may well find it
15:50impossible to recover.
15:51Remember, bomb aimers,
15:53the pilots are defending
15:54on you
15:54to take them right
15:55into the aiming point.
15:57RAF Bomber Command
15:58began its preliminary offensive
15:59against Berlin
16:00in late August 1943.
16:04Bomber Command's strength
16:05was about twice
16:06that of the American
16:078th Air Force
16:08and it was growing fast.
16:09The state of government
16:11got out of an egg tonight.
16:27Tactics had been improved.
16:29The bomber stream
16:30was no longer
16:30an endless 300-mile
16:32smorgasbord of targets.
16:34It had become a dense wedge
16:35three miles across
16:37and 70 miles long
16:38able to cross a city
16:40in 22 minutes.
16:43New electronic countermeasures
16:45could pick up emissions
16:46from an enemy
16:47nightfighter's radar.
16:49British radio operators
16:50fluent in German
16:51gave false instructions
16:52to Luftwaffe nightfighters.
17:00But the results
17:01of the first heavy raids
17:02on Berlin
17:02in the late summer
17:03of 1943
17:04were not encouraging.
17:06The Luftwaffe
17:08had recovered
17:09its nightfighting prowess.
17:12It was now supplementing
17:13the wild sow tactics
17:14with tame sow methods.
17:17Twin-engined nightfighters
17:18were inserted
17:19into the bomber stream
17:20to acquire targets
17:21on their own radar sets.
17:24The ground-based observer corps
17:25became much more important.
17:28It was provided
17:29with modern radar
17:30to help with a new
17:31plotting and control system.
17:32This is a captured
17:35Heinkel HE-219
17:37owl nightfighter.
17:39It handled superbly,
17:41was fast
17:41and had excellent radar.
17:43It was heavily armed
17:44with six 20mm cannon.
17:47In the end
17:47only 268 were built
17:49but those that reached
17:51squadron service
17:52brought havoc
17:53on the bomber streams.
17:54The heavy losses
17:59in the August raid
18:00on Berlin
18:00had not deterred
18:01Sir Arthur Harris.
18:03On November the 3rd
18:04he wrote to Churchill.
18:06We can wreck Berlin
18:08from end to end
18:09if the USAAF
18:11will come in on it.
18:12It will cost between
18:13400 and 500 aircraft.
18:16It will cost Germany
18:17the war.
18:18But the 8th Air Force
18:20was still in shock
18:21from its losses
18:22at Schweinfurt
18:22which Harris
18:23must have known.
18:25Bomber command
18:26began its battle
18:27of Berlin
18:27on the night
18:28of November the 18th,
18:301943.
18:31It continued
18:32until March 1944.
18:43All the while
18:44there was a struggle
18:46between Sir Arthur Harris
18:47and the air staff.
18:49Harris virtually ignored
18:50the point blank directive
18:52and concentrated
18:53on the destruction
18:54of German cities.
18:56His boss Portal
18:58wanted to fire him
18:59but didn't dare.
19:01Harris had the support
19:02of Winston Churchill.
19:03He had relished
19:04the destruction
19:04of Hamburg
19:05and wanted the same
19:06for Berlin.
19:10Between November
19:11and March
19:11bomber command
19:12would fly
19:1320,224 sorties.
19:16almost half of them
19:18were against Berlin.
19:20Almost 2,700 aircraft
19:22were shot down
19:23or heavily damaged.
19:25Berlin
19:25was a more difficult
19:27target than Hamburg.
19:29Its area
19:29was almost 30 times
19:30larger.
19:32It was out of range
19:33of the British G
19:34and Oboe navigation
19:35and targeting systems.
19:37The weather over Germany
19:38was miserable
19:39for the entire winter.
19:40The bombers
19:42fought high winds
19:43heavy icing
19:44and the constant concern
19:45over night fighters.
19:53In the night bombing raids
19:55the importance
19:56of crew camaraderie
19:57intensified.
19:59The pitch black night
20:00was illuminated
20:00by bursting flak
20:01and exploding aircraft.
20:03But a system
20:04of denial grew up.
20:06A belief
20:06that the Germans
20:07were firing
20:07scarecrow shells
20:09that looked like
20:10exploding bombers.
20:12They were not.
20:17The German night fighters
20:19were stalkers
20:20which would edge
20:21toward their quarry
20:22totally invisible
20:23until they fired
20:24at point blank range.
20:26despite its losses
20:38bomber command strength
20:39grew throughout
20:40the bleak winter.
20:42Lancasters were being
20:43mass manufactured.
20:45Air crew were pouring
20:46in from the hundreds
20:47of training schools
20:47scattered around the world.
20:52When Harris took over
20:54bomber command in 1942
20:55he had 59 heavy bombers.
21:00By March 1944
21:02he had more than a thousand.
21:09But bomber command's
21:11losses were high.
21:17The air staff
21:18was staggered
21:19when 72 aircraft
21:20were lost over Berlin
21:22on March 24th.
21:23A week later
21:25976 heavy bombers
21:27and 15 mosquitoes
21:28were launched
21:29on a raid
21:29on Nuremberg.
21:3196 aircraft
21:32were shot down.
21:34960 crew members
21:36were lost
21:36in a raid
21:37that resulted
21:37in 138
21:39German deaths.
21:40It was an impossible
21:43situation
21:43even for Harris.
21:45But fate was about
21:46to intervene
21:47on two fronts.
21:49Politically
21:49the requirements
21:50for Operation Overlord
21:51the invasion of Europe
21:52took precedence.
21:55Harris was forced
21:55to place bomber command
21:56under General Eisenhower's control.
21:58While bomber command
22:01had been bleeding
22:01itself white
22:02in the night skies
22:03over Germany
22:04the USAAF
22:06had done
22:06what many considered
22:07to be impossible.
22:09It had fielded
22:10increasing quantities
22:11of a long-range
22:12escort fighter
22:12the North American Mustang.
22:14It had wrested
22:15air superiority
22:16from the Germans
22:17and created
22:18an entirely new climate
22:19for the air war.
22:20Before America
22:27entered the war
22:27the Anglo-French
22:28Purchasing Commission
22:29invited North American
22:31aviation
22:31to become
22:32a second source
22:33for building
22:33Curtis P-40 fighters.
22:36Designer Edgar Schmood
22:37believed he could
22:38create a more
22:39modern aircraft
22:40that could be put
22:41into production
22:41as quickly
22:42as the P-40.
22:46Schmood sold the idea
22:47to his boss
22:47Dutch Kindleberger.
22:49Within five weeks
22:51Kindleberger
22:52had a contract
22:52for 320 aircraft.
22:55The prototype
22:56was completed
22:56in just 102 days.
22:59It was soon evident
23:00that North American
23:01had produced
23:01the best American
23:02fighter to date
23:03but the US Army Air Forces
23:06only bought two
23:07for test purposes.
23:09The Mustang's
23:09Allison engine
23:10handicapped its performance
23:11at high altitude.
23:14When it entered service
23:16with the RAF
23:17in 1942
23:17it operated
23:19as a high speed
23:20low altitude
23:20reconnaissance aircraft.
23:22It was considered
23:23by its pilots
23:24to be far smoother
23:25in all maneuvers
23:26than a Spitfire
23:27which was high praise
23:28indeed.
23:33It was recommended
23:34that the Mustang
23:35be fitted
23:35with the Rolls-Royce
23:36Merlin engine.
23:38It was a marriage
23:39made in heaven.
23:40The Merlin gave
23:41the Mustang
23:41outstanding
23:42high altitude performance.
23:43It was faster
23:45than the FW-190
23:47and the BF-109
23:48at all heights
23:49but it was still
23:51not a long range
23:52escort fighter.
23:53Even with drop tanks
23:55it could not fly
23:55the Berlin mission.
24:00An 85 gallon tank
24:02was installed
24:03squeezed in
24:04behind the pilot.
24:05This made the Mustang
24:06unstable
24:07until some fuel
24:08had been burned off
24:09but it now had
24:10endurance of
24:11seven and a half hours
24:12enough for the round trip
24:13to Berlin.
24:21The first long distance
24:23escort to Germany
24:24was flown on
24:25December 13th, 1943.
24:27It was a round trip
24:28of almost a thousand miles
24:30escorting 710 bombers.
24:32The Mustang
24:33had arrived.
24:38The USAAF
24:40made the mistake
24:41of having its
24:41escort fighters
24:42fly in close formation
24:44with the bombers.
24:45Their first duty
24:46was to bring
24:46the bombers back alive.
24:50When General Doolittle
24:52took over the
24:528th Air Force
24:53in January 1944
24:54he released the fighters.
24:57His philosophy
24:58was that
24:58the first duty
24:59of 8th Air Force
25:00fighters
25:01is to destroy
25:02German fighters.
25:04The newfound freedom
25:05was applied gradually.
25:06One of the best wings
25:08of one of the best divisions
25:10of one of the best
25:11air forces
25:11in the world.
25:13It was soon found
25:14that sweeps
25:15as much as 50 miles
25:16from the main bomber stream
25:17could catch the Luftwaffe units
25:19at their most vulnerable time
25:20as they were forming up
25:22for an attack.
25:23The hunters
25:24suddenly became
25:25the hunted.
25:27One of the benefits
25:28of the new tactic
25:29was the virtual elimination
25:30of the slower
25:31twin-engine German fighters
25:33that fired deadly rockets
25:34into the bomber formations.
25:36They were now
25:36easy prey
25:37for the Mustangs.
25:38Operation Argument
25:56called for the elimination
25:57of the Luftwaffe
25:58by continuous attrition
26:00and by attacks
26:01on German fighter
26:02and component production.
26:04Bad weather
26:05hindered the initiation
26:06of argument.
26:07Twice Doolittle
26:08recalled bombers.
26:09There was a very real prospect
26:11that if a mission
26:12was launched
26:13and weather shut down
26:14the English bases
26:15the entire force
26:16would be lost.
26:21After the second recall
26:22General Spatz
26:23gave Doolittle
26:24a severe dressing down.
26:26He said
26:27I wonder if you've got
26:28the guts
26:28to lead a big air force.
26:30If you haven't
26:31I'll get someone
26:31who has.
26:33It was the first
26:34and probably
26:35the last time
26:35anyone had ever
26:36questioned Doolittle's guts.
26:39On February 19th, 1944
26:42the weather over Germany
26:44began to clear.
26:45Operation Argument
26:46was put into play
26:47with an intensive series
26:48of attacks
26:49on German aircraft
26:50related factories.
26:51Bomber Command
26:56joined the 8th
26:57and 15th Air Forces
26:58in this series
26:59of attacks.
27:00The weight
27:01of the Allied effort
27:02was demoralizing
27:04to the Germans.
27:05They were kept up
27:06all night
27:07by the RAF.
27:08Then,
27:09by day
27:09they had to witness
27:10the spectacle
27:11of a thousand
27:12American aircraft
27:13on one mission.
27:14Contrails
27:15streaming behind
27:16the combat boxes
27:17of bombers
27:17surrounded by fighters.
27:21The Mustangs
27:41reached out
27:42to strike
27:43the German fighters
27:43as their formations
27:45assembled.
27:46Then,
27:46they dropped
27:47to the ground
27:47to strafe
27:48parked aircraft.
27:49The German pilots
27:51now faced attack
27:52at all times
27:53from takeoff
27:54to landing.
28:00It was the realization
28:01of an impossible dream
28:03a fighter
28:04with enough range
28:05to escort bombers
28:06and enough speed
28:07and maneuverability
28:08to defeat
28:08the German fighters.
28:09The period
28:12between February 19th
28:14and February 25th
28:15was called
28:16Big Week.
28:17When it was finished,
28:1910,000 tons
28:20of bombs
28:20had been dropped,
28:21more than the eighth
28:22had dropped
28:22in the whole
28:23of its first year
28:24of operations.
28:28The fighters
28:29had flown
28:303,673 sorties.
28:33Their loss rate
28:33was less
28:34than 1%.
28:35The German air force
28:40was defeated.
28:42It lost more
28:42than 2,000 aircraft
28:44in February alone.
28:46In March,
28:46it lost almost
28:47the same number.
28:49Even the tremendous
28:50German production effort
28:51could not redress
28:52losses of this magnitude
28:53because of the
28:54staggering aircrew losses.
28:57After March,
28:57there was an obvious
28:58decline in the quality
28:59of the Luftwaffe pilots.
29:01And there was not
29:02enough fuel
29:03to adequately train
29:04replacements.
29:11The Luftwaffe's
29:12night fighters
29:13would continue
29:14to fight
29:15and win
29:15the Battle of Berlin.
29:17But they were soon
29:18overwhelmed as well.
29:20Allied strength
29:21grew every day,
29:22both in quantity
29:23and quality.
29:25From February on,
29:26the Luftwaffe
29:27declined to oppose
29:28daylight bombing
29:29on a full-scale basis.
29:31By April,
29:32it was clear
29:33that the objective
29:34of operations
29:35point-blank
29:35and argument
29:36had been achieved.
29:38The Allies
29:38had the air superiority
29:39needed to permit
29:40an invasion.
29:43Air superiority
29:44had been won
29:44by the long-range
29:45fighter,
29:46using the bomber
29:47formations
29:47to entice
29:48the Luftwaffe
29:49to fight.
29:50air force.
29:51The build-up in Allied air
29:56power was still
29:57plagued by
29:57organizational
29:58difficulties.
30:00Below the top
30:01level of command,
30:02there was controversy
30:03over territory
30:03and personality
30:04clashes between leaders.
30:07Air Chief Marshal
30:08Sir Trafford Lee Mallory
30:09was notorious
30:09for being difficult
30:10to work with.
30:11He was air commander
30:15of the Allied
30:17Expeditionary Air Force.
30:19This was made up
30:20of the RAF's
30:21second tactical air force
30:22and fighter command
30:24and the U.S.
30:25ninth air force.
30:29Lee Mallory
30:29also demanded control
30:30of both bomber command
30:31and the eighth air force.
30:34This was resisted
30:35by Sir Arthur Harris
30:36and General Karl Spatz.
30:39But their quarrel
30:40was diverted
30:40by other considerations.
30:43Spatz considered
30:44German oil production
30:45to be the most
30:46vulnerable target.
30:47He believed
30:48that he now had
30:48the forces
30:49to destroy
30:50synthetic oil production
30:51in Germany
30:51and bring the country
30:53to its knees.
30:56Harris didn't believe
30:57that the oil industry
30:58was a better target
30:59than any other.
31:00But he certainly
31:00preferred it
31:01to the alternative
31:02Lee Mallory supported,
31:03concentration on the
31:04German transportation system.
31:06The idea came
31:12from Professor
31:13Solly Zuckerman.
31:14He was an academic
31:16arguing against
31:17two of the most
31:18accomplished bomb
31:18commanders in history.
31:20But he prevailed.
31:22Eisenhower and Tedder
31:23accepted Zuckerman's proposal.
31:26They were convinced
31:27that percussion attacks
31:28made on 75 selected
31:29railway targets
31:30in Germany and France
31:31would make a crucial difference
31:33to the success
31:34of the invasion of Europe.
31:36On April 14th, 1944,
31:41Bomber Command
31:42and the 8th Air Force
31:43were placed directly
31:44under General
31:45Eisenhower's control.
31:46He elected to proceed
31:47with Zuckerman's plan,
31:49known in bomber circles
31:50as Zuckerman's folly.
31:55Bomber Command's
31:56precision bombing
31:56techniques had improved.
31:58The achievement
31:59of air superiority
32:00had led to a decline
32:01in loss rates
32:02and had improved conditions
32:03for daylight
32:04precision attacks.
32:05On D-Day, June 6th, 1944,
32:30Allied forces returned
32:31to Europe.
32:35In the weeks
32:36after D-Day,
32:38the Allied air forces
32:38demonstrated the extent
32:40of their crushing
32:41air superiority.
32:43They flew almost
32:44half a million sorties.
32:47The Luftwaffe
32:47was almost totally suppressed.
32:50It was confined
32:51to isolated attacks
32:52that had no measurable effect.
32:55The Allied advance
33:01swept the German
33:02radar line back.
33:04By the end of August 1944,
33:06Luftwaffe night fighters
33:07had no early warning network.
33:15The Allied attack
33:17on Germany's
33:18fuel supplies
33:18took effect.
33:20After July,
33:21the Luftwaffe's
33:22day and night operations
33:23were severely curtailed.
33:32Air superiority
33:34permitted Allied truck
33:35convoys to move
33:36in closely packed arrays
33:37on European roads.
33:39They could be confident
33:40that any aircraft
33:41that appeared overhead
33:42was a friend.
33:45Air support parties
33:47were assigned
33:47to each tank column.
33:49Soon,
33:49every tank column
33:50was covered
33:50by a flight
33:51of four fighter bombers
33:52as advanced reconnaissance.
34:00In August,
34:01the Luftwaffe buildup
34:02in France
34:02threatened General
34:03George Patton's
34:04Third Army.
34:06It was part of
34:07Hitler's last
34:07desperate attempt
34:08to throw the Allies
34:09out of France
34:10with a counterattack
34:11by German troops
34:12and panzers.
34:14The German forces
34:15were halted
34:15attacked by fierce
34:16American resistance
34:17on the ground
34:17and the combined
34:19assaults of hundreds
34:20of British
34:20and American
34:21fighter bombers.
34:22Their rockets
34:23destroyed the German
34:24tank and vehicle
34:25concentrations.
34:26The German forces
34:37were almost encircled
34:38in the Falaise Argentin
34:39pocket.
34:40They made a densely
34:42packed target
34:42for the concentration
34:43of Allied air power
34:44overhead.
34:46It was so thick
34:46that formations
34:47had to wait in line
34:48for their turn
34:49to dive in and attack.
34:51German infantrymen
34:52complained
34:53that their opposite numbers
34:54were unwilling to fight
34:55until they'd received
34:56overwhelming
34:57fighter bomber support.
34:59They were right.
35:00The Allies had the power
35:01and they flaunted it.
35:10The Germans finally
35:12abandoned their equipment
35:13and fled on foot.
35:19In the meantime,
35:21strategic bombing
35:22went on day and night.
35:23At last,
35:24concentration was
35:25on the oil industry.
35:27The Ploesti oil fields
35:28were destroyed.
35:30By September 1944,
35:32they were occupied.
35:47German production of oil
35:48was down to 23%
35:50of what it had been
35:51only six months before.
35:52But the Germans
35:54had become expert
35:55in the reconstitution
35:56of the synthetic
35:57oil plants
35:58and refineries.
36:00They eliminated
36:01old safety procedures
36:02in the interest
36:03of turning out product.
36:06The Americans
36:07and the British
36:08at last combined forces.
36:10The 8th and 15th air forces
36:12hit synthetic oil plants.
36:14Bomber command
36:15hammered targets
36:16in the Ruhr,
36:17where benzol was produced.
36:19In the process,
36:20an argument was settled.
36:21Precision bombing
36:23using the Norden bombsite
36:24could do more damage
36:25with 250 tons of bombs
36:27than a radar attack
36:29with 1,000 tons.
36:33Incredibly,
36:34despite the damage,
36:35German oil production rose.
36:38The Germans could have
36:39a destroyed complex
36:40working again
36:41within a month.
36:42by December,
36:54the focus of the bombing
36:56was shifted
36:56from the synthetic oil industry
36:58to stopping the German offensive
37:00in the Ardennes.
37:01But that very offensive
37:03was doomed
37:03by a shortage of gasoline.
37:05Even as all Germany
37:11was going up in flames,
37:13the German motor vehicle industry
37:14reached new peaks
37:15of production.
37:17But like the aircraft industry,
37:19the armoured vehicle industry
37:20was dispersed.
37:24Another path
37:25to halting production
37:26was to destroy
37:27the rail and canal networks
37:29that linked subcontractors
37:30to the main assembly plants.
37:32The strategic bombers
37:34took on the rail centers.
37:42The tactical fighter bombers,
37:44known to the Germans
37:45as JABOs,
37:46from Jagdbomber,
37:47cut the rail lines
37:48and attacked trains,
37:50canal traffic
37:50and motor transport.
37:59Yet incredibly,
38:01amid the rain
38:01of bombs
38:02and bad news
38:03in 1944,
38:04German production rose
38:05and with it,
38:06German inventiveness.
38:09The Luftwaffe's
38:10fighter arm
38:10had seen a vast increase
38:12in the numbers
38:12of aircraft
38:13available to it.
38:15The Jägerstab
38:16was set up
38:17under Albert Speer's
38:18Ministry for Armaments
38:19and War Production.
38:21Under Speer's aegis,
38:23monthly fighter production
38:24shot up,
38:25reaching 3,000
38:26in September 1944.
38:28Most of the German fighters
38:30were improved models
38:31of the aircraft types
38:32that had begun the war.
38:34A few new models
38:35had been introduced.
38:37The most important
38:38was the Focke-Wulff 190.
38:43For a long time,
38:44sensible development
38:45of aircraft
38:46had been held back
38:47by the inapt leadership
38:49of Colonel General
38:50Ernst Udet.
38:50He had been totally
38:53unqualified
38:53to lead the technical
38:55department
38:55of the State Ministry
38:56of Aviation.
38:58His department
38:59produced some
39:00terrible planes,
39:02but it was capable
39:03of producing
39:03the most advanced
39:04aircraft of the war.
39:07The Messerschmitt
39:08Me 262 jet fighter,
39:11with its swept wings,
39:12heavy armament,
39:13and 540 miles an hour
39:15top speed,
39:16was easily the best
39:17fighter of the war.
39:18It was a beautiful aircraft,
39:28but its pilots liked it
39:29for more than
39:30aesthetic reasons.
39:32By the time
39:32it began to appear
39:33in service
39:34in late 1944,
39:36the Allies
39:36dominated the air.
39:38The Me 262
39:40gave Luftwaffe pilots
39:41at least a slim chance
39:42for survival.
39:44About 1,433 Me 262s
39:47were delivered
39:48to the Luftwaffe,
39:49but only about 300
39:51got into operation.
39:53The rest were destroyed
39:54on the production lines
39:56or on their way
39:57to the combat units.
40:01Production of the 262
40:03was delayed
40:03because of the difficulty
40:05of producing
40:06a satisfactory number
40:07of the radical
40:08new jet engines.
40:09There's no question
40:11that if the utmost priority
40:13had been placed
40:14on the development
40:14of the jet engine
40:15in 1939,
40:17the 262 could have
40:18entered service
40:19in mid-1943.
40:22If it had,
40:24the air war over Europe
40:25would have been
40:25vastly different.
40:27The Allies would not
40:28have won air superiority,
40:30nor would they have
40:31invaded Europe
40:31in 1944.
40:32Another German
40:38engineering triumph
40:39was the Arado
40:40AR-234 Blitz.
40:43It was the first
40:43operational jet bomber
40:45and a superb
40:46reconnaissance plane.
40:47It was almost
40:48as fast as the Me 262
40:51and it had
40:52a greater range.
40:52The most radical
41:01German aircraft
41:01was the Messerschmitt
41:03ME-163 Comete.
41:05It was a rocket-powered
41:06flying wing interceptor.
41:17It flew at 624 miles
41:20an hour in 1941.
41:21That was such
41:23a fantastic feat
41:24that any self-respecting
41:25Allied spy
41:26would have refused
41:27to believe it.
41:29The liquid rocket motor
41:30used extremely
41:31volatile fuels.
41:33Any mishap,
41:34even a bounced landing,
41:35could cause an explosion.
41:37300 Cometen were built,
41:39but they achieved
41:40only nine kills in combat,
41:42including two probables.
41:43The Luftwaffe maintained
41:54its recovery powers
41:55to the very end.
41:56It could still put on
41:58brilliant performances,
41:59displaying the old
42:00initiative and skills.
42:02But the war was lost,
42:04and the continuing bravery
42:05and elan of the Luftwaffe pilots
42:07could do nothing
42:08to change things.
42:17By March 1945,
42:20the collapse of the Luftwaffe
42:21left the defense of Germany
42:22virtually in the hands
42:24of 60 Messerschmitt
42:25ME-262s
42:26of JG-7.
42:27By this stage of the war,
42:35the range of talent
42:36among German jet pilots
42:38varied widely.
42:40Some were experts
42:42with thousands of hours
42:43of flying time,
42:44others were fresh
42:45from flying school.
42:48A few were ACES,
42:50well-experienced
42:51in the ME-262.
42:54A special ME-262 unit
42:55of ACES Jagdverband 44
42:57was formed.
42:59It got into action
43:00quickly and scored
43:01some victories,
43:02but not even the ME-262
43:04could redress the balance.
43:06Time had at last
43:07run out for the Luftwaffe.
43:14The Luftwaffe was defeated
43:16because it had not
43:17been conceived
43:17on a scale grand enough
43:19for the gigantic combat
43:21in which Hitler embroiled it.
43:25It caught the design tide
43:27and had the best aircraft
43:28available when the war started.
43:31But it missed
43:32the production tide
43:33by two vital years.
43:36When aircraft production
43:37rose to its peak
43:38in 1944,
43:40it was too late.
43:42The Luftwaffe
43:42was also ill-served
43:43by its leadership.
43:45Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring
43:47was derelict
43:48in his direction
43:49of the Luftwaffe
43:49after 1939.
43:51Colonel General Ernst Udet
43:54was incapable
43:55of performing
43:56the duties
43:56assigned to him.
43:58Colonel General
43:59Hans Jeschonnek
44:00was too immature
44:01for his responsibilities.
44:03With such leaders,
44:04even the brilliant
44:05Eart Milch,
44:06Adolf Galland
44:07and Wolfram von Richthofen
44:09could not prevent
44:10the Luftwaffe's defeat.
44:11All the heroism
44:14of the many aces,
44:15all the selfless duty
44:17of the mechanics
44:18and the factory workers,
44:19and all the stoic heroism
44:21of the civilian populace
44:23were wasted.
44:26Dresden,
44:27a city of 600,000 people,
44:29had been little touched
44:30by the war.
44:32Its center
44:32was a warren
44:33of timber houses
44:34ready to be burned.
44:37Many Dresdeners
44:38came to assume
44:38that it was Allied policy
44:40to spare a city
44:41of such immense
44:42cultural value.
44:44This was naive,
44:45to say the least.
44:53With remorseless efficiency,
44:56Bomber Command
44:56launched 855 planes
44:58against Dresden
44:59on the night
45:00of February the 13th, 1945.
45:03The 8th Air Force
45:04would attack
45:04on the two following days
45:05with a total
45:06of 521 bombers.
45:08Massive fires erupted.
45:23The German
45:24and neutral press
45:25protested
45:26at the extensive damage
45:27and loss of life.
45:29Official German
45:30police records
45:31eventually calculated
45:32somewhere between
45:3335,000
45:34and 60,000
45:36killed
45:37or missing.
45:44The 8th Air Force
45:46was unaware of
45:47or insensitive to
45:48the brewing controversy.
45:50It raided Dresden
45:51twice more
45:52before the end
45:52of the war.
45:54It focused the attacks
45:55on the railroad
45:56marshalling yards,
45:57which were unquestionably
45:58legitimate military targets.
46:00There was an eruption
46:04of criticism
46:04from critics
46:05of Sir Arthur Harris's
46:06area bombing policy.
46:14Harris,
46:15the scapegoat of choice,
46:16was quick to point out
46:17that the Joint Chiefs
46:18of Staff
46:18had designated Dresden
46:20as a primary target
46:21because it was
46:22a key transportation centre.
46:24The decision to bomb
46:26was officially supported
46:26by Stalin,
46:28Roosevelt,
46:29Churchill,
46:29and Eisenhower.
46:31It is important
46:32to recall the psychology
46:33of the time.
46:35Germany was a dreaded enemy.
46:38Even though Germany
46:39lay in ruins,
46:40the Fuhrer,
46:41Adolf Hitler,
46:42commanded the loyalty
46:43and respect of his nation
46:44and the absolute obedience
46:46of his soldiers.
46:47No one knew
46:48how long the war
46:49would go on
46:49or how many thousands
46:51of people would be killed.
46:53Dresden was a military target
46:54because it had crucial rail,
46:56governmental,
46:56and industrial facilities.
46:58The Soviet Union
46:59wanted it bombed
47:00to help the advancement
47:01of its armies.
47:03Only when Portal
47:04and Churchill
47:04sensed the public outrage
47:05did they attempt
47:06to distance themselves
47:07from the decision
47:08to bomb Dresden.
47:17The uproar over Dresden
47:19finally convinced
47:21Bomber Command
47:21that it had run out
47:23of targets.
47:24Area bombing
47:25was formally ended
47:26on April 16, 1945.
47:30The last major attack
47:31by the 8th Air Force
47:32occurred on April 25.
47:34It was a raid
47:34on airfields,
47:35rail targets,
47:36and the Skoda armament
47:37orcs in Czechoslovakia.
47:39In the days following,
47:41leaflet dropping
47:41and supply missions
47:42were flown.
47:44The 8th engaged
47:45in evacuating
47:45liberated prisoners
47:46of war.
47:48Then it stood down
47:49to prepare itself
47:50to move on
47:51to the Pacific
47:51for the assault
47:52on Japan.
48:00The air war
48:01was over in Europe.
48:03All the major
48:04German military figures
48:05said unequivocally
48:07that Allied air power
48:09was chiefly responsible
48:10for Germany's defeat.
48:16war from the
48:24at the Middle East.
48:26He was trying to
48:26avoid the war
48:28but the early
48:29cano had a
48:29to be taken
48:30by the title
48:30of the novel.
48:31He was on
48:32the Atlantic
48:33for the future.
48:33He was on
48:34the air
48:34and the new
48:35the new
48:35war.
48:36He was on
48:36the other
48:36and the new
48:37from the
48:381967.
48:38He was on
48:39the hill.
48:39He was on
48:40the way,
48:41He was on
48:41the way to go.
48:42Transcription by CastingWords