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00:32The Allied bombing campaign of World War II began in 1939. At first it was just an ineffectual pecking around the perimeter of enemy defenses.
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00:50It grew slowly for the first three years, then accelerated in late 1944 and early 1945.
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01:04At the end of the war, it reached a degree of frightfulness that the world had never dared to contemplate.
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04:24Precision daylight bombing would have been preferred by British and American leaders.
04:28It would have meant easier navigation, better target identification,
04:32more harm to the enemy, and less need for a return trip.
04:40But even the most well-intended bombing meant a shower of bombs from a moving mass
04:45that could not be less than 1,800 feet wide.
04:49Bombs could easily be released too soon or too late, 5,000 feet or more off target.
04:54Bombs could easily be released.
05:00Then there was the weather, and the German countermeasures from fighters to electronics.
05:05Instead of bombing as they wished, the Allies had to bomb as they could.
05:10For the most part, this meant area bombing.
05:18Before the war, most leaders thought that bombing civilian targets
05:21would be an effective, war-winning strategy.
05:24But no one had any idea of the immense effort required to conduct a successful bombing campaign.
05:33Nor did they realize the tremendous resilience and strength
05:37possessed by a modern industrial country like England or Germany
05:40or the endurance of their populations.
05:42On July the 8th, 1940, just as the Battle of Britain was building,
05:53Winston Churchill wrote that he could see only one path to winning the war.
05:58An absolutely devastating, exterminating attack on the Nazi homeland.
06:02We must be able to overwhelm him by this means, without which I do not see a way through.
06:08When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June the 22nd, 1941,
06:21Churchill promised Stalin that he would visit a terrible winter of bombing on Germany.
06:26The night bombing offensive was accelerated.
06:33It was the only thing Churchill could or wanted to offer Russia in the form of a second front.
06:38But two political elements intervened to prevent air power from defeating Germany by itself.
06:48As the bombing offensive built in intensity, the United States eclipsed Britain in strength
06:57and began to dictate the course of the war.
06:59The American leadership wanted to invade the continent.
07:09The British leadership did not.
07:12There was also the growing realization that an invasion was necessary
07:15to contain the Russians in Eastern Europe.
07:18This was an often overlooked influence on the bombing campaign.
07:22An invasion required air superiority.
07:25The only way to get air superiority was to defeat the German air force in the air.
07:29and on the ground.
07:31The only way to do that was by bombing critical targets.
07:51The British learned the hazards of daylight bombing in one mission.
07:55On December the 18th, 1939, 24 Vickers-Weddington twin-engined bombers
08:01made an armed reconnaissance of Wilhelmshaven in Germany.
08:05The Wellingtons were the best RAF bombers of the time.
08:07German fighters shot down ten Weddingtons into the sea,
08:16two more ditched, and three crashed on landing.
08:21The lesson was clear.
08:22Unescorted aircraft could not bomb in daylight and live.
08:25British training and doctrine were destroyed at a stroke.
08:38Very little effort had been devoted to night navigation or bombing.
08:42Few crews were capable of finding the large Ruhr region in the dark,
08:46let alone a city or a factory.
08:48Hello, Mac, where are we now?
08:53There's no you're likely to know.
08:56I can't find where we are.
08:58We'll come to Carroll's room.
08:59Give us for its breweries, you know.
09:00Good old Mac.
09:02Let's go down and spit us bread.
09:07Yet the war had to be fought.
09:09The British turned to night raids.
09:11And he did amazingly well,
09:13at least according to their reports.
09:15Reports were made of great fires caused by the raids.
09:40Wishful thinking translated tons of bombs dropped
09:42into acres of destroyed factories.
09:45The crews believed their reports.
09:49RAF leaders based further actions on them.
09:52Churchill directed his war economy
09:54to the service of a massive bombing campaign.
09:59In autumn 1940,
10:01Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
10:03became Chief of the Air Staff.
10:06Portal created a plan for Target Force E.
10:094,000 bombers were to win the war
10:12by killing one million Germans
10:14and making 25 million homeless.
10:18I hope I haven't kept you waiting, sir.
10:20Good Lord, now.
10:21What does it do?
10:21But aircrew were optimists.
10:24This was reflected in reported accuracy in bombing,
10:27in the numbers of aircraft shot down,
10:29and in the effect on enemy actions.
10:34As a result, Air Force reports came to be discounted and ignored
10:41to the point that any real efficiency of the bombing
10:43was never appreciated.
10:45Yes, that was the big one.
10:47Yes, there was a smasher right onto it.
10:49Of course, they have a great big fire.
10:51Buckets of smoke.
10:53Visible 50 miles away.
10:55In August 1941,
10:57DMB Butt of the British War Cabinet Secretariat
11:00was asked to make a statistical analysis
11:03of the results of British bombing in Germany.
11:07Butt's report was shattering.
11:10It revealed that, on average,
11:11only one in three aircraft of those attacking
11:13got within five miles of the target.
11:16Butt reported that bombing was severely affected
11:19both by ambient light and weather.
11:22On a moonlit night,
11:23the overall average was two in five
11:25reaching within five miles.
11:27On a moon last night,
11:29it degraded to one in 15.
11:30The RAF, particularly Bomber Command,
11:34refused to believe the report.
11:36But the facts were indisputable.
11:39The RAF did not possess the means
11:41to navigate to the target area.
11:43Nor did it have the means to bomb accurately
11:46if the target were found.
11:50On the night of November the 7th, 1941,
11:54400 aircraft were dispatched to attack targets
11:57from the Ruhr in Germany to Oslo in Norway.
12:00The entire attack was a disaster.
12:04Many aircraft were lost.
12:06Few completed their attacks.
12:08The damage to targets like Berlin was minimal.
12:11Many aircraft ran out of fuel and had to ditch.
12:15Air Marshal Pierce, the head of Bomber Command,
12:18blamed the weather and inexperienced crews.
12:20After two years of warfare,
12:24this was an unacceptable admission.
12:26Pierce had to go.
12:28He was replaced by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris.
12:31...this war under the rather childish delusion
12:35that they were going to bomb everybody else,
12:38and nobody was going to bomb them.
12:42At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw...
12:44Harris was a good friend of Portal,
12:47and Churchill also took a liking to him.
12:50Harris was big, gruff, and outgoing.
12:54He had a fighting instinct that Churchill always admired.
12:58There are a lot of people who say
13:00that bombing can never win a war.
13:04Well, my answer to that
13:06is that it has never been tried yet,
13:08and we shall see.
13:09Here's your plug-in lead.
13:16All right, thank you.
13:17Operations tonight, fellas.
13:19How do you know?
13:21Oh, I'll get around. I'll get all the gents.
13:29Harris found Bomber Command in sad shape.
13:31It only had 378 serviceable aircraft and crews.
13:36Only 69 of these aircraft were heavy bombers.
13:39British heavy bomber production
13:45had so far failed miserably.
13:47New models were having development problems.
13:55The three principal Royal Air Force medium bombers
13:58were workman-like examples
13:59of the first generation of modern,
14:02all-metal-enclosed cockpit aircraft.
14:04What they lacked in sophistication,
14:06they made up for in good old aerodynamic virtues.
14:09The Vickers Wellington made its first flight
14:19on June the 15th, 1936.
14:21It was the principal RAF bomber
14:23until the four-engined heavies came along.
14:26It had a range of 2,200 miles
14:29and could carry 4,500 pounds of bombs.
14:32It was a remarkable aircraft for its time,
14:35but far from adequate for Harris's needs.
14:38Wellington was supplemented by two smaller aircraft.
14:51Wellington was supplemented by two smaller aircraft.
14:54The Handy-Page Hampton was nicknamed the frying pan
14:57because of its unusual tail-boom arrangement.
14:59The other was the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley,
15:03affectionately called the Flying Barn Door
15:06because of its slab sides.
15:07In order to help shorten its take-off run,
15:11the Whitley's wing was given a very high angle of incidence.
15:14As a result, the Whitley flew in a peculiar nose-down attitude.
15:18In October 1938, the British Air Ministry began Programme L,
15:29calling for the delivery of 3,500 heavy bombers by April 1942.
15:36Programme L called for 1,500 short sterlings,
15:39500 Handley-Page Halifaxes and 1,500 Avro-Manchestors.
15:44The Stirling first flew on May the 14th, 1939.
15:52It entered combat on February the 10th, 1941,
15:55with an attack on Rotterdam.
15:58In spite of its clumsy appearance, it was highly manoeuvrable,
16:03but it had a limited ceiling that made its operations
16:05increasingly hazardous as anti-aircraft fire improved.
16:09It was used in bombing raids until September 1944.
16:14The Handley-Page Halifax was the second bomber of Programme L.
16:21It would make up 40% of Bomber Command's strength
16:24at the height of the bomber offensive.
16:25The third bomber in Programme L was the Avro-Manchester.
16:40Like the Halifax, it was planned with two engines,
16:43and when they proved unreliable,
16:45it was redesigned with four Rolls-Royce Merlins.
16:48The revised model was named the Lancaster,
16:51and became the best British bomber of the war.
16:59It was a handsome aircraft with a top speed of 287 miles an hour.
17:04Its bomb capacity was its major feature.
17:07It could carry a normal load of 14,000 pounds.
17:11An American B-17 could carry 4,000.
17:16Eventually, the Lancaster would be modified
17:18to carry the 22,000-pound Grand Slam,
17:21the heaviest bomb of the war.
17:23The Lancaster was rushed into production
17:27even before its first flight.
17:30It gave Arthur Harris the plane he needed for Bomber Command.
17:34He bought it in quantity.
17:35Eventually, almost 7,500 would be built.
17:39The Lancaster was a highly capable aircraft.
17:54But it would have been little more than useless
17:55without the navigation and bombing equipment
17:57that allowed it to deliver its huge load to the proper targets.
18:01I want to impress upon you
18:06that this equipment is most secret and completely new.
18:10From the Telecommunications Research Establishment Laboratories
18:13would come a major series of developments
18:15to assist in navigation and bombing.
18:18One was called G.
18:21The letter G referred to the grid map used with the system.
18:25Originally, it was developed as an aid to instrument landings.
18:28It permitted a navigator to determine his position easily and accurately
18:33without making any transmissions from his aircraft
18:35that might reveal its position.
18:38It consisted of three ground transmitters
18:40far apart from each other
18:41transmitting pulse signals simultaneously.
18:45It was a tremendous improvement
18:46over conventional navigation systems
18:48but the curvature of the earth
18:50limited its range to about 350 miles.
18:53And the Germans soon learned to jam it.
18:58The aircraft flies out onto this track
19:02and is controlled along it
19:03by means of dots and dashes rather like this.
19:08Oboe was a ground-to-air blind bombing system.
19:12Two ground stations calculated the range
19:14and track of the aircraft.
19:16They guided the pilot by musical notes
19:18that sounded like an oboe.
19:21It was used successfully for the first time
19:23in February 1943.
19:24This rotating aerial is a part
19:29of a new radar system called H-2S.
19:32H-2S was an airborne intercept radar.
19:36A radar scanner carried within the aircraft
19:38gave a rough picture of the terrain below.
19:41When features were quite distinct like a shoreline,
19:44the picture was easy to interpret.
19:45Some navigators were better than others
19:49in interpreting the subtle signals of H-2S.
19:52It required a special sort of personality,
19:55the 1940s equivalent of today's computer hacker.
19:58The area surrounding it is the land
20:04and the brightest bit above at the bottom
20:07is the town itself.
20:10After the Battle of Britain,
20:12the RAF continued to build its fighter defenses.
20:16At the time, most German fighter activity
20:18had moved to the Soviet Union.
20:20The RAF found itself in the embarrassing position
20:22of having a large and powerful force
20:25not being actively employed.
20:31Missions were undertaken
20:33to force the Luftwaffe to fight.
20:36Some sweeps called rhubarb
20:37were made by fighters only.
20:40Others, called circuses,
20:41were combined fighter and bomber missions.
20:44In the summer of 1941,
20:46rhubarbs and circuses melded
20:48into what the British called
20:49a non-stop offensive.
20:52But the Germans could elect to fight or not.
20:56German radar and radio intelligence services
20:59gave ample warning of incoming RAF flights.
21:02They could be met by an appropriate force.
21:07The new Messerschmitt BF-109 fighters
21:10were an equal match to the intruding Spitfires.
21:12The new Focke-Wulff FW-190
21:25was clearly superior.
21:27It was the only Luftwaffe fighter
21:29to use a radial engine.
21:31It was about 30 miles an hour faster
21:33than the Spitfire 5
21:34up to 25,000 feet.
21:36It had the fastest roll rate
21:38of all fighters in World War II.
21:47British fighters were badly needed
21:49in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia.
21:52Veteran RAF pilots
21:53were sent to fill that need.
21:55That left less experienced pilots
21:57to fight the seasoned Luftwaffe veterans.
22:00The British offensives failed miserably.
22:19Through 1943, the Luftwaffe
22:21achieved an almost 4 to 1 victory ratio.
22:23Britain would probably have stopped the attacks,
22:31but something needed to be done
22:32to take the pressure off the Russians
22:34on the Eastern Front.
22:36The RAF was forced to continue a campaign
22:38that it would gladly have halted.
22:42Attention! Attention!
22:43They're coming!
22:44They're in the cellar!
22:46The main result of the RAF offensive
22:49was the gradual improvement
22:51in German defences by the spring of 1942.
22:55Freya early warning radars
22:56were placed all along the coast.
22:59They were supplemented
23:00by an increasingly expert radio intercept service.
23:04There was another chain
23:05of Freya stations well inland.
23:13The science of night flying
23:15had been neglected in Germany.
23:17Germany relied almost entirely on Flak,
23:20anti-aircraft fire,
23:21for air defence at night.
23:28The pre-war German searchlights,
23:31target predictors and guns
23:32were excellent for their time.
23:35The Flak units were considered
23:36to be an elite.
23:39The Germans believed that Flak
23:41could put up an almost impenetrable shield
23:44against intruding aircraft.
23:45But British incursions over Germany
23:48soon made it apparent
23:50that night fighters were necessary.
23:53In July 1940,
23:54Oberst Josef Kammhuber
23:56was given command
23:57of the new 1st Night Fighter division
23:59in Brussels.
24:01His night fighters and searchlights
24:03were linked by radars
24:05to a ground control.
24:06The fighters could be controlled
24:13and vectored to the incoming bombers,
24:15which were illuminated
24:16by the searchlights.
24:22The concept was called
24:23Helle Nachtjacht,
24:25illuminated night fighting.
24:27It made maximum use
24:35of existing equipment
24:36to match the British
24:37Bomber Command's potential.
24:44By early 1943,
24:47the Messerschmitt Bf 110
24:48came into its own
24:50as a night fighter.
24:52They bore the brunt
24:53of the night fighting
24:54through 1943.
25:00By the summer of 1943,
25:02the system had acquired
25:03a deadly expertise.
25:06The Flak and the radar-controlled
25:07searchlights
25:08were feared
25:09by all the bomber crews.
25:10The American 8th Air Force
25:18in Britain
25:18consisted of a bomber command
25:20and a fighter command.
25:22In February 1942,
25:24it had six men
25:25and no airplanes.
25:27By June 1944,
25:29it would have
25:30400,000 officers and men
25:32and 8,000 aircraft.
25:34The growth was only possible
25:36through the generosity
25:37and courtesy
25:38of the Royal Air Force,
25:39which put everything,
25:40from porters
25:41to secretaries
25:42to laborers
25:43at America's disposal.
25:45The buildup of the 8th
25:46was limited both
25:47by slow arrival
25:48of aircraft
25:49and their reassignment
25:50to other theaters.
25:58General Ira Aker
25:59tried to get
26:00the maximum effect
26:01from them.
26:02He sent all
26:03that he had available
26:04whenever weather
26:05made daylight-precision
26:06bombing possible.
26:07For the most part,
26:08the bombing targets
26:09were in the occupied territories.
26:17The first 8th bomber command raid
26:20on Germany
26:20took place
26:21on January 27, 1943.
26:24The target
26:24was Wilhelmshaven.
26:26Bombing was not
26:27particularly effective,
26:28nor were the German defenses.
26:31But this minor effort
26:32was the start
26:33of a campaign
26:33that would bring Germany
26:34to its knees.
26:47For the next 30 months,
26:49the 8th Air Force
26:50fought the best
26:51the Germans had to offer
26:52in the way of fighters
26:53and flack.
26:56For most of that time,
26:58it was criticized
26:59for not doing enough.
27:05The critics at the top
27:06were unaware
27:06of the massive difficulties
27:08of getting crews
27:09trained for combat
27:10in bombing,
27:10formation fly,
27:11and gunnery.
27:24Maintenance was another problem.
27:25At one point,
27:2749% of Akers' planes
27:28were grounded
27:29because of a shortage
27:30of spare parts,
27:31tools,
27:32and air crews.
27:37The weather was bad.
27:39Sometimes it allowed
27:40only five bombing days
27:41a month.
27:46Weather became
27:47increasingly important
27:48as the numbers
27:49of aircraft grew.
27:50By 1944,
27:52as many as 2,000 aircraft
27:54would be taking off
27:55to climb through the clouds
27:56over England
27:57with only the most primitive
27:58procedures
27:59to avoid collisions.
28:01There were many.
28:13The February 16th,
28:151943 raid
28:16on Saint-Nazaire
28:17showed early on
28:18just how difficult
28:19daylight precision bombing was.
28:2865 bombers
28:29attacked the submarine pens,
28:31six were shot down,
28:32and two more
28:33were lost in a collision.
28:35At that loss rate,
28:36the total force
28:37would be wiped out
28:38in just eight missions.
28:40On a 25-mission tour of duty,
28:42a 4% loss rate
28:43would mean that statistically,
28:45no one would live
28:46to complete the tour.
28:49Even if the loss rate
28:51dropped to only 2%,
28:52the crews had only
28:54a 50% chance
28:56of surviving.
29:00But by early 1943,
29:02the Eighth Air Force
29:03was averaging
29:03an 8% loss rate.
29:052 fighters 6 o'clock up,
29:09coming in,
29:09diving out of teeth.
29:11B-70 in trouble,
29:12out of 2 o'clock,
29:13watching.
29:14And an engine on fire.
29:15This meant that,
29:16on average,
29:17no one could expect
29:18to complete
29:19his 13th mission.
29:21There's two more
29:22diving through the 94.
29:23Three planes,
29:249 o'clock,
29:24coming around.
29:25Keep your eye on the board.
29:26Coming around the 10.
29:29The situation demanded
29:37new leaders
29:38and new tactics.
29:40Both emerged.
29:45Colonel Curtis E. LeMay
29:47was only 35 years old.
29:49He was a brilliant leader.
29:51His laconic manner
29:52and ability
29:52to make hard decisions
29:53earned him the nickname
29:54Iron Ass.
29:55He was the commander
29:59of the 305th Bomber Group.
30:02LeMay insisted
30:03on intense training.
30:05He personally supervised it,
30:07flying in the top turret
30:08of a B-17
30:08and calling out instructions
30:10to his aircraft commanders.
30:17With Brigadier General
30:18Lawrence Kuter,
30:19LeMay developed
30:20the combat box
30:21and combat wing formations.
30:23They were intended
30:24to intensify
30:25defensive firepower
30:26and improve
30:27bombing accuracy.
30:32Each combat box
30:34had 18 to 21 bombers
30:36in a group.
30:37Three groups
30:37formed a combat wing.
30:39The lead group
30:40flew slightly ahead
30:41of the other two.
30:43Another flew
30:431,000 feet higher
30:45and to one side.
30:46The third flew
30:471,000 feet lower
30:48to the other side.
30:50With 54 bombers
30:51in a formation,
30:52an attacking German fighter
30:54would be covered
30:54by up to 540 machine guns.
31:04LeMay selected
31:05the best bombardiers
31:06and navigators
31:06to fly with highly trained
31:08crews and lead the missions.
31:16Instead of each aircraft
31:18bombing separately,
31:19now all the aircraft
31:20in the formation
31:21dropped when the lead crew did.
31:23This ensured
31:24a far higher
31:25average accuracy.
31:34LeMay's insistence
31:35that the last minutes
31:36of a bomb run
31:36be flown straight
31:37and level
31:38gave the German gunners
31:39a more predictable target.
31:41But bombardiers
31:42could stabilize
31:42their sights
31:43and bombing targets
31:44were hit more frequently
31:45than in the past
31:46with greater accuracy.
32:02Success in precision bombing
32:03in spring 1943
32:05relieved the pressure
32:06to convert to night bombing.
32:08But in the next nine months,
32:10the 8th would grow slowly
32:11and suffer terrible losses.
32:17The Luftwaffe was learning too.
32:20As its strength
32:21and skills grew,
32:22the 8th Air Force
32:23would be defeated
32:24in the skies over Germany.
32:26Meanwhile,
32:32in May 1942,
32:33bomber Harris
32:34sought his first
32:35great victory
32:36for bomber command
32:36in the 1,000 aircraft
32:38area bombing raid
32:39against the German city
32:40of Cologne.
32:42Harris's intention
32:43was as much
32:44to impress his critics
32:45in England
32:45as his enemy in Germany.
32:48He knew that the public
32:49was thirsting
32:50for a victory.
32:50Harris had already
33:02damaged the German cities
33:03of LĂ¼beck and Rostock
33:04in March and April.
33:06Josef Goebel's
33:07propaganda machine
33:08called for retribution
33:09against English
33:10cultural centers.
33:16By desperate efforts
33:18straining all of
33:19bomber command's resources,
33:20Harris mustered
33:211,043 aircraft.
33:25More than half
33:26were Wellingtons,
33:26but he also had
33:27some of the new
33:28four-engine bombers,
33:29the Halifaxes,
33:30Lancasters,
33:31and Stirlings.
33:4235% of the aircraft
33:43were manned
33:44by instructors
33:44and students
33:45from the operational
33:46training units.
33:48This was a risk.
33:49If training crews
33:50were destroyed,
33:51the bomber offensive
33:52would be set back
33:53for a year
33:53until they were
33:54built up again.
34:06On the night
34:06of May the 30th, 1942,
34:08the weather was good
34:09from takeoff
34:10to landing.
34:11The chosen target,
34:34Cologne,
34:35was bathed in moonlight.
34:36Harris used saturation
34:46used saturation tactics.
34:49Within 90 minutes,
34:50898 aircraft dropped
34:52more than 1,500 tons
34:54of bombs on the ancient city.
34:57Enormous fires were started.
34:59They continued to rage
34:59until the following day.
35:01More than 600 acres
35:03of the city
35:03were destroyed.
35:08Target skipper.
35:09Harris had achieved
35:10his aims.
35:12His opponents
35:12in Parliament
35:13were silenced.
35:18In the long run,
35:20England's resources
35:20were tipped
35:21towards Harris's mission.
35:23One-third of Great Britain's
35:25manufacturing effort
35:26went to support
35:27the bomber offensive.
35:33By the time
35:34major doubts
35:35about the effectiveness
35:36and morality
35:36of area bombing
35:37surfaced again,
35:38it was too late.
35:40After Cologne,
35:41there was no turning back.
35:43The British Empire
35:44was committed
35:45to Harris's strategy.
35:53The German reaction
35:54to the raid
35:55was ineffective.
35:57Hermann Göring
35:58refused to believe
35:59the damage reports.
36:00If they were correct,
36:01it meant
36:02that his defenses
36:03had failed.
36:04It also meant
36:05that the RAF
36:06had reached a strength
36:07unattainable
36:08by the Luftwaffe.
36:12Göring told Hitler
36:14that only 70 planes
36:16had been involved
36:16and 40 of them
36:18had been shot down.
36:20But Hitler
36:20soon found out
36:21the truth
36:21and Göring's fall
36:23from grace
36:23was accelerated.
36:27The devastation
36:29in Cologne
36:30was tremendous.
36:38Intense photo
36:39reconnaissance
36:40was conducted
36:40to see what could be learned.
36:43The photos showed
36:44that each tonne
36:45of high explosive
36:45destroyed about
36:46one and three-quarter acres
36:48of built-up property.
36:50But each tonne
36:50of incendiary bombs
36:51destroyed three and a quarter acres.
36:53There were two other
36:57thousand bomber raids
36:58in the next month,
36:59but they could not
37:00be sustained.
37:02For bomber command,
37:04the raids masked
37:05the underlying problem
37:06of aerial bombing.
37:08The Allied leaders
37:09continued to confuse
37:10the results of a raid
37:11with its effectiveness.
37:12In all these raids,
37:20the result
37:20was obvious destruction
37:22and damage.
37:23But in fact,
37:24the early bombing
37:25all the way
37:26through the war
37:27to the middle of 1943
37:28had little effect
37:29on German production
37:30and less upon morale.
37:37In many of the cities
37:39struck,
37:39production of war materials
37:41was back to normal
37:42within a few days.
37:43In some cases,
37:44patriotic resentment
37:46would drive
37:46production levels higher.
37:53In this climate
37:54of overestimation
37:55of results,
37:56there was a failure
37:57to make repeat raids.
37:59Hard-hit targets
38:00were left alone
38:01to recover.
38:02The bombers
38:02turned their attention
38:04elsewhere.
38:06As the efficiency
38:06of German night fighting
38:08increased,
38:09it made the British raids
38:10more and more costly.
38:12of the war.
38:15But even as
38:16Harris took satisfaction
38:18in the damage
38:18to German cities
38:19and began
38:20a fateful assault
38:21on Berlin,
38:22the German night
38:23fighter force
38:23was preparing
38:24to win a victory
38:25in the spring
38:26of 1944.
38:27all through 1943,
38:43the 8th Air Force
38:44continued to grow.
38:46But there was
38:47a growing cost
38:47to its operations
38:48as the 8th plunged
38:50forward into Germany
38:51without an adequate
38:52long-range fighter escort.
38:53B-17 out of control
38:58at 3 o'clock.
39:04Come on, you guys
39:05get out of that plane.
39:05Bail out.
39:06There's one.
39:07He come out
39:07of the bomb bay.
39:08Yeah, I see him.
39:09There's a tail gunner
39:10coming out.
39:10Watch out for fighters.
39:11In July 128,
39:15four-engine bombers
39:16were shot down.
39:171,280 crewmen
39:19were removed
39:19from the war.
39:21The cost to Germany
39:22was only 40 fighters.
39:23Come on,
39:24the rest of you guys.
39:25Get out of it.
39:2525 to 50%
39:30of all aircraft
39:31returning from
39:32a deep penetration
39:32of Germany
39:33suffered damage
39:34from fighters
39:35and flack.
39:36The burden
39:37on repair establishments,
39:38replacement aircraft
39:39and spare parts supply
39:41became intolerable.
39:48While the 8th Air Force
39:50battled the German
39:51day fighters,
39:52RAF Bomber Command
39:53was fighting
39:53a similar battle
39:54at night.
39:55For 10 long months
39:57in 1943,
39:58it attacked
39:59the German
39:59industrial heartland
40:00in the Ruhr.
40:25The most intense period
40:27was March through June
40:28when 26 heavy attacks
40:30were made.
40:32These included
40:33the famous
40:34Dam Buster Raids.
40:43The Ruhr was hotly defended
40:45by flack and night fighters.
40:48It became evident
40:48to Bomber Command
40:49and the 8th Air Force
40:50that the German fighter force
40:51had to be destroyed
40:52if bombing operations
40:54were to continue.
40:58In May 1943,
41:00the date for the allied invasion
41:02of France,
41:03Operation Overlord,
41:04was set for May 1st, 1944.
41:07This gave Bomber Harris
41:09and Ira Aker 12 months
41:10to accomplish the objectives
41:12of Operation Point Blank.
41:14Point Blank was the combined
41:19bomber offensive.
41:21Allied air superiority
41:22was essential
41:23if the invasion of France
41:24was to succeed.
41:26It was clear
41:27that air superiority
41:27could only be established
41:29if the Luftwaffe
41:29was forced to fight.
41:31This was only possible
41:32if the bombing
41:33of vital targets
41:34could be sustained.
41:36It meant that the 8th Air Force
41:38and Bomber Command
41:38had to throw themselves
41:39upon the German sword
41:41to blunt it.
41:42It would be a bloody
41:43and costly process.
41:52By the late spring of 1943,
41:55the Luftwaffe
41:56was increasing its strength.
41:58The number of fighters
41:59defending the Reich
42:00was growing.
42:03But there was a cost.
42:06Strengthening the Reich
42:07weakened air operations
42:08on the Eastern Front
42:10against Russia.
42:11Defending Germany
42:14against bombing attacks
42:16cost the Reich
42:17air superiority
42:18in Russia.
42:20And the concentration
42:21on production
42:21of fighters
42:22meant the virtual elimination
42:24of the Luftwaffe's
42:25bombing force.
42:34Operation Point Blank.
42:36The combined offensive
42:37by Bomber Command
42:38and the 8th Air Force
42:39was directed against
42:4076 targets.
42:41It was fully recognized
42:45that this wholesale attack
42:46was dependent
42:47on destroying
42:47German fighter strength
42:49either before
42:50or during the attack.
42:52The Luftwaffe
42:53was to be destroyed
42:54in the air,
42:55on the ground,
42:56and in the factories.
42:58General Aker
43:00began a faithful execution
43:01of the directive.
43:02Sir Arthur Harris
43:09continued on his own way.
43:10He was convinced
43:11that area bombing
43:12was still what was needed.
43:15Hamburg
43:16was Germany's
43:17second largest city.
43:19It was home
43:20to a major submarine base,
43:21an oil refinery,
43:23and more than
43:233,000 factories.
43:26The decision to bomb it
43:27was made
43:28when Sir Arthur Harris
43:28had been in command
43:29just over a year.
43:32In that year,
43:33his force had been
43:34largely equipped
43:35with four-engine bombers.
43:40Harris reluctantly agreed
43:42to the formation
43:42of what he called
43:43a Pathfinder Force.
43:45Two aircraft
43:52would use
43:52the G navigation system
43:54to lay down flares
43:55on either side
43:56of a target.
43:57Then other aircraft
43:58called illuminators
43:59would outline
43:59the target area
44:00in red flares.
44:02Finally,
44:03marker aircraft
44:03would drop incendiaries
44:05to start fires
44:06in the target area.
44:15The biggest problem
44:17was that
44:18if the Pathfinders
44:19missed the target,
44:20everybody missed
44:21the target.
44:23Also,
44:24there was a tendency
44:24for each succeeding
44:25wave of bombers
44:26to drop early
44:27to avoid the flak.
44:29Gradually,
44:30the center of bombing
44:30would creep backwards,
44:32sometimes out
44:33of the target area.
44:37But Pathfinder techniques
44:38improved with experience.
44:40A master bomber
44:41was introduced
44:42to act as
44:43on-scene commander.
44:44And we'll direct
44:45the main force
44:46onto the aiming point.
44:48Hortop to all crews.
44:49Hortop to all crews.
44:52Begin bombing
44:52on the red markers.
44:55They are accurate.
44:56They are accurate.
44:57Bomb upon the red markers.
45:00Harris planned
45:00to drop 10,000 tons
45:02of bombs on Hamburg
45:03over a period
45:04of several days.
45:05He had an interesting
45:06new weapon
45:07up his sleeve.
45:09Window.
45:09Window was the simplest
45:11of all electronic
45:12countermeasures.
45:13small pieces
45:14of metal-coated paper
45:16or foil strips
45:17each showed up
45:18on German radar
45:18as a target.
45:20They confused
45:21enemy radar scopes
45:22and blinded them
45:23to the real targets,
45:24the bombers.
45:29On the night
45:30of July 24th, 1943,
45:32Harris launched
45:33791 bombers
45:35against Hamburg.
45:47The first window
45:48was dropped
45:49by Pathfinder aircraft
45:50as they approached
45:51the German radar.
45:52It became impossible
45:58for the German radar operators
45:59to distinguish
46:00real from false targets.
46:03No meaningful directions
46:04could be given
46:05to the night fighters.
46:06Tons of explosive
46:07and incendiaries
46:09rained down.
46:13On the night
46:14of July the 27th,
46:15Bomber Command
46:16put 729 aircraft
46:18across Hamburg
46:18in 45 minutes.
46:21They dropped
46:221,200 tons
46:24of incendiaries.
46:25Many fires
46:27were still smouldering.
46:28The incendiaries
46:29combined with the weather
46:30to create
46:31a new phenomenon,
46:32the man-made firestorm.
46:34The multiple fires
46:43in Hamburg
46:44became a single holocaust.
46:46Temperatures reached
46:471,000 degrees Celsius.
46:49They created
46:50an enormous tornado
46:51of fire
46:51that uprooted
46:52huge trees,
46:54set street asphalt
46:55to light
46:55and sucked human beings
46:57into the heart
46:57of the storm.
46:59As many as
47:0050,000 people died.
47:02It was by far
47:03the worst bombing
47:04disaster of the war
47:06to date.
47:07Germany was shaken
47:08by a wave of horror.
47:12Albert Speer,
47:13Hitler's armaments minister,
47:14estimated that
47:15similar attacks
47:16on six more
47:17German cities
47:18would bring
47:18the war to a halt.
47:20But Adolf Hitler,
47:22the only man
47:23who could have
47:23changed things,
47:24was not moved
47:25by his people's suffering.
47:27He was confident
47:28that the German people
47:29would continue
47:30the war
47:31no matter what.
47:33He ordered Speer
47:33to straighten out
47:34the production problems,
47:36which he did.
47:37The people of Hamburg
47:38returned to work.
47:40Their morale
47:41did not break,
47:43even when
47:43bomber command
47:44struck again
47:45on July 29th.
47:5350,000 people
47:54had been killed.
47:55900,000 people
47:57were homeless.
47:58Thousands of buildings
47:59were destroyed.
48:00Yet the German people
48:02rallied quickly.
48:03After the war,
48:04it was estimated
48:05that the raids
48:06had cost Germany
48:06only two months'
48:07production
48:08from its Hamburg factories.
48:10And as the people
48:11recovered to fight on,
48:13so did the Luftwaffe.
48:14the landmacht
48:16were destroyed.
48:20And as the other
48:24people were
48:25on the front
48:26column
48:26there
48:27were
48:27all
48:28in the
48:28war.
48:29And as you
48:30did not
48:30bring the
48:31people
48:31and
48:32on the
48:32ground
48:32that
48:32in the
48:33power.
48:35And as you
48:36said,
48:36there was
48:36a lot of
48:37letting
48:37know
48:37this
48:37be
48:38the
48:38world
48:39that
48:40happened.
48:40And as you
48:41mentioned,
48:42the
48:43To be continued...