- 4 minutes ago
We should 'salute' Ukraine for military campaign against Russian diesel infrastructure
NATO is involved in US-convened talks in Abu Dhabi about the future security settlement for Europe as part once the Russia - Ukrainian war ends. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander says it remains to be seen whether Russian President Putin is serious about peace.
READ MORE : http://www.euronews.com/2026/11/11/we-should-salute-ukraine-for-military-campaign-against-russian-diesel-infrastructure
Subscribe to our channel. Euronews is available on Dailymotion in 12 languages
NATO is involved in US-convened talks in Abu Dhabi about the future security settlement for Europe as part once the Russia - Ukrainian war ends. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander says it remains to be seen whether Russian President Putin is serious about peace.
READ MORE : http://www.euronews.com/2026/11/11/we-should-salute-ukraine-for-military-campaign-against-russian-diesel-infrastructure
Subscribe to our channel. Euronews is available on Dailymotion in 12 languages
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, John Stringer,
00:03thank you very much for joining us on Euronews.
00:05Great to be here.
00:06Well, I want to ask you a bit about what's happening in Abu Dhabi today.
00:09We see your boss, the Supreme Allied Commander General Grinkovich there.
00:13People would say that they very much welcome,
00:16certainly the Ukrainians, his influence on the talks.
00:20What do you hope can come out of these talks this week?
00:22So my boss gets to wear two hats.
00:26So I would just emphasise that he's in Abu Dhabi
00:29wearing his hat as Commander of US European Command.
00:34But in terms of the talks, I mean,
00:36everybody wants to see an end to the war in Ukraine,
00:39but it can't be on unfair terms after the brutal
00:45and illegal invasion of a sovereign state.
00:47So Ukraine's interests have to be paramount in this discussion.
00:51And of course, we as NATO, through initiatives like
00:55ENSATI for support, the Bison training,
00:58are absolutely supportive of Ukraine
01:01and have been since February 2022 and before.
01:05Yeah, but indeed, and I suppose with his hat in terms of European forces,
01:08you'd even imagine more that he could try to influence this
01:11in a way that's supportive of Europe,
01:13because we have seen concerns from the Europeans
01:16that the American side have said that they've basically equalised
01:21the Russian and the Ukrainians, their priorities.
01:24We heard from Jared Kushner, one of the US envoys,
01:27saying that both need to be acknowledged equally.
01:29That's obviously a concern,
01:31given that one illegally invaded the other.
01:33So I won't put words in other people's mouths,
01:36you'll understand that.
01:37As I said, we as NATO, the nations in NATO,
01:41absolutely focused on a right and just ending to this conflict.
01:45Okay.
01:46What we've heard so far is that Russia is saying
01:49that they want an agreement for the Ukrainians
01:52to give up those key areas in the eastern part of the country,
01:56Ersan, Donetsk, Lansk and so on.
01:58But that's obviously a non-starter.
02:00So what can be achieved?
02:02So we all know the Russian demands
02:06have been maximalist from the start.
02:09I hope, but I say hope,
02:12that they enter into negotiations
02:14in a genuine spirit of seeking resolution here
02:19and that it's not just, frankly,
02:21a restatement of demands that, as I said, go back to 2022.
02:26So let's see how serious Russia is here.
02:30And in terms of territory,
02:32it is absolutely one for the Ukrainians.
02:35As I said, sovereign nation invaded in 2022,
02:38having had Crimea annexed in 2014.
02:42So Ukrainian interests here have to be paramount.
02:46Indeed.
02:47What indications are there?
02:49Because obviously NATO is formally represented by officials like before,
02:53like the Miami format.
02:54So what indication does NATO have or do you have that Russia is being genuine here?
03:01Because at the end of the day,
03:02why waste people's time going all the way to Abu Dhabi,
03:05unless there's some inkling that they are genuine in ending this war?
03:09So, I mean, as I said, I hope,
03:12I hope that Russia is serious and that the time it's invested,
03:17and let's not forget the time that everybody else is investing in this,
03:20actually moves the dial, moves the process on.
03:25Any idea that they, whether they are or not,
03:27do you have any inclination that there's something might actually materialise
03:30from Abu Dhabi this week?
03:31So no, and it would be quite wrong with me to try and sort of second guess anything there.
03:36I'm kind of focused on the day job of making sure that a billion citizens
03:41and 32 nations remain safe and secure.
03:44Okay, we will move on to that,
03:45because obviously that is about the hybrid war.
03:47But just before I let you go and move on from Abu Dhabi,
03:50what do you think may be achieved at this point in time?
03:54Could we look at maybe something of a genuine ceasefire,
03:57a prisoner swap like we've had before?
04:00And also, can you tell me a little bit about the deeper discussions
04:03around post-conflict resolutions, humanitarian tracks and so on?
04:08So first part is I suspect, I suspect that those areas you've noted
04:15may be in discussion, may be in play, but I will leave that for others
04:19in terms of what is or is not being discussed out in the talks at the moment.
04:24In terms of what has to be there for a lasting peace,
04:28kind of all of the above and then some.
04:31You know, Ukrainian interests, as I said, are paramount here
04:35in terms of what that means for Ukrainian territory
04:38and what it means for, as you say, post-conflict resolution,
04:42including what this means for a return
04:48to a better security dynamic in continental Europe.
04:52Are you fearful, though, that we could be another year
04:55talking about having this conversation this time next year
04:57and again, Russia is not being genuine?
04:59Well, that's entirely possible.
05:01But you need to ask that question in Moscow.
05:03Tell us a little bit about how Europe is prepared for,
05:06in the event of a genuine settlement,
05:09and how the Coalition of the Willing is prepared
05:12to be there for Ukraine in terms of security guarantees.
05:16So there's two bits here, which I should emphasise.
05:19So the Coalition of the Willing is a separate thing.
05:23It's not a NATO organisation.
05:25So again, I won't speak to that
05:27because whilst we are aware of discussions, etc.,
05:32and activity, it's not a NATO thing.
05:34In terms of where NATO then takes the discussions,
05:37I'm obviously very much on the military side of the house,
05:40and this will be very much a political discussion and debate.
05:47At some point, of course, the two come together.
05:49So where that takes us in terms of future posture of forces,
05:54let alone Ukraine status,
05:58again, that is one that's going to be bottomed down,
06:00I think, in the period that would follow any resolution to the conflict.
06:04Can you tell us about what happens, though,
06:06when these issues are coming together
06:09in terms of playing out what it might look like?
06:12What type of planning goes into it?
06:14Do you feel confident that Europe is ready to take on that responsibility?
06:18So I think one of the short answers to your question, yes.
06:23Longer answer is what you have seen from European nations really since February 2022.
06:30We can argue whether we could have anticipated stuff beforehand,
06:36but in terms of NATO nations absolutely delivering on sort of two things, really.
06:41One being that notion of NATO 3.0,
06:44an alliance that has had to get back, sadly,
06:48into the business of collective defence over the 32 nations.
06:51And the second is the European nations absolutely standing up
06:57in terms of the capabilities, resources that they're putting in.
07:01And, of course, the Ankara Summit reaffirmed the 5% declaration
07:07that all nations have signed up to.
07:10What we are really now focused on is ensuring that that extra percentage
07:14you spend is being turned into proper military capability.
07:18And before we move back on to Ankara,
07:20I just want to ask you a little bit about,
07:24well, let's move on to Ankara, actually,
07:26because one of the issues that we are looking at
07:28is the lack thereof of interceptors for Ukraine,
07:31which is an urgent issue.
07:32And we saw at the end of the Ankara Summit
07:35that there could have been a negotiation
07:37between the US and Ukraine
07:38to produce and manufacture Patriot Interceptors.
07:42That hasn't come to pass.
07:44Can you tell us a little bit why that might be?
07:47So on the specifics of that,
07:50I can't, but that's kind of not my part of the ship.
07:55What I can say, though,
07:56is if you look at everything that was on the PEARL,
07:59the prioritised urgent Ukrainian requirements list,
08:02those deliveries continue to flow.
08:05When we look at industrial capacity to physically make stuff,
08:10I sort of kind of come back to what I was saying about NATO 3.0.
08:14We know that we have to increase the size
08:17of a transatlantic industrial base,
08:19a defence industrial base.
08:21So the means of production through to repairing
08:23and upgrading systems has very, very sharp focus.
08:27It has sharp focus for myself and Saka.
08:29It has sharp focus across the alliance and with the nations.
08:33So one of the things we will need to do
08:35is increase that capacity in the coming months and years.
08:39And somewhere in that will fit, I'm sure,
08:44enhanced flow of interceptors to Ukraine.
08:47But even if I could be drawn on numbers,
08:49I wouldn't be able to say that in public.
08:51But in relation to the interceptor issue,
08:55President Zelensky said they're waiting over a month
08:58for delivery of patriots to Ukraine.
09:03He said that all that's required is a signature
09:05from the US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth.
09:08On top of that, the Finnish defence minister,
09:10Antti Hakkinen, said last week that political willingness
09:14is required for those patriots to be transferred to Ukraine.
09:18So the issue is that there are patriots paid for
09:22through the pro system, but just haven't been delivered
09:24because of a lack of political will.
09:27So I would frame it differently, if I may.
09:30First off, I obviously can't talk for the US
09:33and Finnish governments, let alone ministers.
09:36But one of the things that you are seeing
09:38is we know the urgency of patriots and other systems,
09:42by the way, it's not just patriots.
09:44Some of it we won't be able to talk about,
09:46but those are absolutely flowing.
09:49Patriots, understandably, are in high demand globally,
09:52hence my point on increasing the overall size
09:55of the industrial base.
09:57And a number of discussions have been held
10:00and are ongoing with a number of nations
10:02about how we might increase the flow
10:05of patriot interceptors to Ukraine.
10:08But they're obviously sensitive discussions,
10:11and I can't really talk about them in public.
10:14Indeed, but can you understand, I suppose,
10:15countries like Finland, which is sort of a model country
10:20when it comes to defence, deterrence and so on,
10:23and is also paying into Pearl,
10:25saying that the money is there, there's no issue.
10:29And we know that there's obviously a global shortage,
10:30but that there's a political issue that's an obstacle there.
10:34So, Shona, I'll leave the political side to the politicians on this one,
10:39but rest assured that Saka and myself
10:42and the very top of the military part of the alliance
10:45is absolutely focused on where we can increase the taps for the patriots.
10:50And from that, there are a number of countries within NATO
10:53that do have patriots.
10:56And Saka and yourself are trying to sort of persuade some of them
11:00to give up some of their patriots to give to Ukraine,
11:03but they're seeking guarantees, I assume,
11:06that those stockpiles then will be replenished,
11:09and they can't get those guarantees
11:10because of the production capacity issue
11:12and the stockpile issue.
11:13Is that right?
11:14What I would say is there are a number of options,
11:16and they are being actively pursued.
11:19Do you think that there will be any results from that,
11:22that those sort of options that are being put on the table anytime soon?
11:27Again, I won't be drawn on where nations may be
11:31or aren't in that particular discussion.
11:33What I would say is a lot of energy is going into them.
11:35So, there's no timeline then
11:37as to see when Ukraine might get access to those?
11:41Well, not that I'm able to share.
11:44And as I said, because discussions are ongoing,
11:46trying to kind of nail this one down in public at the moment,
11:50we're unable to do.
11:51But they're at a deep level, these discussions.
11:53And have been ongoing for some time.
11:55Yeah.
11:56Just on the issue of the global shortage,
12:01is that really mainly because of the war in Iran?
12:04Or tell us a little bit about why we're seeing such a shortage
12:07when Europeans, I suppose,
12:10thought that the flow of patriots might be something they could rely on.
12:14So, I think there's probably two bits.
12:15I think, yes, you know, clearly a lot of patriots
12:20and other weapons have been used in the Middle East.
12:24And that is having an impact on delivery, stockpiles, etc.
12:30That, you know, would be odd if it wasn't.
12:33But I think, as I said earlier,
12:35one of the things that you're also seeing
12:37is an industrial base that nations didn't have to worry about.
12:41You know, we came out of 1990, 1991,
12:45and we'd, hey, we won the Cold War.
12:47And also, we had had 15 to 20 years of very bloody,
12:53but, you know, contingency operations at range from Europe.
12:58What we are seeing is a bunch of nations now re-gearing
13:02for the needs of collective defence.
13:04And what that means is the industrial base
13:06and the defence industrial base being re-geared.
13:09But you can't do that overnight.
13:11And therefore, there is an inevitable lag in the system.
13:14Tell us a bit about the impact
13:16on the sort of changes to the NATO force model
13:19from the United States withdrawing
13:20pretty high-level capabilities from use for NATO allies.
13:26And whether or not that's been replenished
13:28or replaced by European and Canadians.
13:31Yeah, so one of the key parts of my job
13:35is actually engaging with nations
13:37to do what we call force sourcing.
13:39So actually going to them and making sure
13:42that we can fill what's required in the NATO force model.
13:46So what I would highlight here, actually,
13:48is how European nations and Canada really stepped up.
13:52It's actually a part of that generating,
13:54not just talking about a NATO 3.0,
13:57and being a stronger Europe in NATO,
14:00not just talking about it.
14:01And so if you look at what I would call the backfill,
14:04the replacement for some systems and platforms
14:07that were being, you know, removed from the order of battle
14:13by the US.
14:17This actually is a story
14:18that should be quite heartening for people
14:20because if you look at the number of nations
14:23who supplied additional fighter jets,
14:25who put maritime patrol aircraft,
14:28who put a whole bunch of other things into the mix.
14:30So actually that bit was done really quickly
14:33and we've been able to fill
14:36basically all of what was removed.
14:40There are some areas
14:41where NATO allies don't have the same
14:44as what the US has.
14:46So we've looked at using other options
14:49to generate, again, horrid military phrase,
14:53but the effects that some certain US platforms would deliver,
14:57delivering in a different way.
14:58Well, let's talk sort of, not hypothetically per se,
15:02but where there are precision weapons
15:04delivered by a platform,
15:07actually if I can deliver those precision weapons
15:09by other means
15:11to ensure that I can still have the same effect,
15:14then that actually,
15:15that is backfill in action.
15:18That's us actually being able to
15:19put into the plans,
15:21put into the force model what's required.
15:23And we've done that in a number of areas.
15:26And in a few weeks time,
15:27Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State,
15:28will be here for the meeting of foreign ministers.
15:32And it's likely,
15:33well, it's maybe likely,
15:34that he will give an update
15:36on the global force review of the United States.
15:40And what do you expect from that?
15:42I mean, what we heard from Pete Heggs
15:44at the Secretary of Defense
15:45was that there will be a significant withdrawal
15:48of US troops from NATO territory.
15:51Well, first off, we don't know, do we?
15:53So, you know, the analysis has been done.
15:57Obviously, US effort,
16:00that has gone back into Washington.
16:04And ultimately, this will be,
16:06as you intimate,
16:08it will be a political decision.
16:09Me being drawn on that is pointless
16:11because it is business
16:13that's quite rightly being done by the US.
16:16But again, you know,
16:18where my boss now wears his hat
16:20as the boss of US European command,
16:24he's clearly had a key role in that.
16:27Yeah.
16:27Oh, so he's working with the US military
16:29on what that will look like.
16:31And he would have an idea
16:33of the number of troops
16:34that are being withdrawn.
16:35Well, as commander of European,
16:38sorry, American forces in Europe,
16:39it would be slightly strange if he didn't.
16:42But of course,
16:43he's well aware of what this also means
16:45in the wider NATO context.
16:47So I will leave others to make their calls
16:50on that very good military advice
16:53will have been offered.
16:54I'll now leave it to others.
16:55And what does happen then
16:56when the number of troops is known?
16:59What does NATO do then to fill them?
17:03Or tell us what this sort of procedure is
17:04after a decision like that?
17:07OK, so, well,
17:08you've seen kind of the example
17:10from May, June of this year,
17:12which we were just talking about.
17:14So again, without prejudging anything
17:16that falls out of that review,
17:18we would take,
17:21we would look at anything
17:22that came out of it,
17:24work out what that means
17:25for the plans themselves,
17:27and then work out
17:29whether we are able to do
17:30a direct like-for-like replacement,
17:33or whether, as I said,
17:35we would do something different
17:36but would generate
17:37the same level of effect.
17:39But this is, at the moment,
17:41a kind of hypothetical,
17:42not a hypothetical discussion,
17:43but because we don't know
17:45what will come out,
17:46I can set out the sort of
17:47the lines of how it would be approached,
17:52but I'll wait for others
17:53to make a call
17:53on what it actually looks like.
17:55The number of hybrid war
17:59incursions all across NATO territory
18:01is increasing,
18:02and as we've heard,
18:02becoming more kinetic,
18:04more dangerous.
18:05There are some countries,
18:06in particular the Baltic countries,
18:08who believe that
18:09maybe NATO should have
18:10a little bit more
18:11of a stronger response to them.
18:12What's your own assessment
18:14of where we stand
18:15with these drone incursions,
18:18or balloon incursions,
18:19in the case of Lithuania,
18:20or arson attacks,
18:22sabotage, and so on?
18:23Yeah, so I think
18:24there's probably
18:24a number of bits to this.
18:27The first is,
18:28I think,
18:29President Putin's
18:31risk appetite
18:32is now in areas
18:34probably more reckless
18:35than it was,
18:36and that might be
18:37saying something.
18:38His three-day
18:38special military operation
18:40is now in its fifth year,
18:42and things are not
18:43going well for Russia,
18:45so we absolutely know that.
18:47In terms of
18:49the response of nations,
18:51I kind of draw on
18:53the classic
18:54and much reproduced
18:56British slogan
18:57from World War II,
18:59which says,
18:59is a kind of
18:59keep calm
19:01and carry on here.
19:02The worst thing
19:03we could do
19:03is overreact,
19:05be overly alarmed,
19:08turn into
19:09a slightly sort of
19:10frozen approach
19:11to it,
19:11and almost
19:13do,
19:14in this case,
19:15what President Putin
19:16would want us to do.
19:17Actually,
19:18what we need people
19:18to do
19:19is be calm,
19:20measured,
19:21resolute.
19:22It won't surprise you
19:24that a lot of effort
19:25is going on
19:26at information sharing
19:27across nations,
19:28where we are
19:30confident
19:31of attribution
19:32by anybody,
19:34we will call
19:35that out,
19:36and of course
19:37what the military does
19:38is only part
19:39of a set of responses
19:40open to nations,
19:42either singly,
19:43multilaterally,
19:44or,
19:45you know,
19:45in the case of NATO,
19:47at 32 nations.
19:48There is more
19:49than just
19:50a military response
19:51that can be applied here.
19:53But we have also
19:54looked at some
19:55of the structural
19:55things we do
19:56as NATO.
19:58So,
19:59our approach
20:00to integrated
20:01air and missile
20:02defence
20:03has been
20:03significantly
20:05overhauled
20:06and continues
20:06to be overhauled.
20:07We went from
20:0920-odd years or so
20:10where we could
20:11call things
20:11air policing,
20:12because of course
20:13it was peace in Europe,
20:14wasn't it?
20:15And we're kind of
20:15returning to,
20:17no,
20:17we need to be
20:17more hard-nosed
20:18about air defence,
20:19particularly to pick
20:20up your point,
20:21where we now
20:22look at the threat
20:23that comes
20:23at the cheaper
20:24but far more
20:25multiple end
20:26of the spectrum
20:28from uncrewed
20:29air systems
20:30through to,
20:31as Ukraine,
20:32sadly you're seeing
20:33in most days,
20:34ballistic missiles
20:35of various types.
20:36So,
20:37adjusting how NATO
20:38stands to that,
20:39bringing in the new
20:40systems that we need,
20:41and the overall
20:42kind of,
20:43the architecture,
20:44for want of a better phrase,
20:45that has had
20:46a significant
20:47evolution,
20:48even in the space
20:49of the last year
20:50or so.
20:50And I say this
20:52having been
20:52for the last
20:53five months
20:54or so
20:54in my previous job,
20:56NATO's air
20:56and missile defence
20:57commander.
20:58And I mean,
20:59as you mentioned there,
21:00obviously Russia's
21:00not doing well
21:01five years into
21:02a supposedly
21:02five-day
21:04attack
21:04on the whole
21:05of Ukraine.
21:07Partly,
21:08though,
21:08would you agree
21:08that the
21:11Ukrainians
21:11have been able
21:12to strike
21:13into Russian
21:13territory,
21:14in particular
21:15at the
21:16diesel
21:16infrastructure?
21:17Would you agree
21:18that this is
21:19a legitimate,
21:21obviously it's
21:22legitimate,
21:22but would you
21:23agree that this
21:24needs to continue
21:25in order to
21:26stop the
21:26access that
21:28Russia has
21:29to money
21:29through its
21:30oil production
21:31and exportation?
21:32So,
21:33quite rightly,
21:34the Ukrainians
21:35are running
21:36their campaign.
21:37But you're
21:38absolutely right
21:39in the sense
21:39that what
21:41they have
21:42done against
21:42Russian oil
21:44and gas
21:44has had a
21:46demonstrable
21:46impact on
21:47the Russian
21:48economy.
21:49It is
21:50economic
21:50warfare in
21:512026,
21:53and it is
21:54a key
21:56element,
21:57obviously,
21:57you need to
21:58look at it
21:58from outside,
21:59a key element
21:59in the
22:00Ukrainian
22:00campaign.
22:02So,
22:03it's hurting
22:03Russia,
22:03I will leave
22:04it to the
22:05Ukrainians as
22:05to how
22:07they prosecute
22:09that campaign
22:10in the future.
22:10but it
22:11does
22:11underline
22:12my point.
22:13This is
22:13hurting
22:14Putin.
22:14He thought
22:15he was
22:15going to
22:15roll in,
22:16establish
22:17a new
22:17security
22:17architecture
22:18in Europe
22:19that started
22:20in Ukraine
22:21in early
22:2222,
22:23and he's
22:23been sorely
22:25disabused
22:26on that
22:26one.
22:27And what
22:28Ukraine has
22:29been able
22:29to do
22:30through
22:30imagination,
22:31innovation,
22:31and will
22:32is quite
22:33incredible,
22:33and we
22:34should salute
22:35it.
22:35Okay,
22:35and just
22:36before I
22:36let you
22:36go,
22:37General
22:38Grinkovich's
22:38theory of
22:39victory
22:39strategy which
22:40he outlined
22:41recently in
22:42Warsaw,
22:43the
22:46blunt,
22:47the first
22:48part again?
22:48Block,
22:48block,
22:49blunt,
22:49and break.
22:50Sorry.
22:52Why did he,
22:53not obviously,
22:54I know he's been
22:54working on it for a
22:54long time,
22:55but why did he
22:56tell us about it
22:58at that moment?
22:58Is it because
22:59there's been
23:00concerns about
23:01NATO's
23:01deterrence effect?
23:03So two reasons.
23:04The first
23:05one is we
23:07wanted to
23:08reassure the
23:09citizens and
23:10the 32
23:11nations that
23:12we've got
23:12this.
23:13The second
23:14to your
23:14point is we
23:15want to make
23:15sure that any
23:16adversary who
23:17looks and
23:18thinks they're
23:19going to try it
23:19on with NATO
23:20looks at us
23:21every day and
23:22thinks today is
23:23not the day.
23:24So setting out
23:26in broad
23:27terms what as
23:28a defensive
23:29alliance,
23:30a defensive
23:31alliance,
23:31not an
23:32offensive one,
23:32would do to
23:34protect our
23:35people is
23:36absolutely key
23:37to us and
23:38leaving no doubt
23:39in any
23:40adversary's mind
23:41as to how
23:42resolute we
23:42would be in
23:43defence and
23:44deterrence and
23:45if necessary in
23:46any fight to
23:47protect that.
23:48Okay, Deputy
23:48Supreme Allied
23:49Commander of
23:50Europe, John
23:51Stringer, thank
23:51you very much
23:52for joining us
23:52on Euronews.
23:53Thank you very
23:54much.