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Every German commander on the Western Front knew what American artillery could do. They'd seen the wreckage. They'd read the after-action reports. They'd buried the dead.
And yet — from the deserts of Tunisia in 1943 to the frozen forests of the Ardennes in 1944 — they kept launching counterattacks straight into the same killing ground. Fresh troops, veteran divisions, elite SS Panzer formations, factory-new Panthers with shipping grease still on the turrets. Different commanders, different terrain, different stakes. The same result. Every single time.
The question isn't what destroyed them. It's why the best army in Europe couldn't stop doing the one thing that guaranteed its own destruction — even after it understood exactly what was happening.
That answer begins not on a battlefield, but in an Oklahoma classroom in 1931. A full decade before Pearl Harbor.
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Every German commander on the Western Front knew what American artillery could do. They'd seen the wreckage. They'd read the after-action reports. They'd buried the dead.
And yet — from the deserts of Tunisia in 1943 to the frozen forests of the Ardennes in 1944 — they kept launching counterattacks straight into the same killing ground. Fresh troops, veteran divisions, elite SS Panzer formations, factory-new Panthers with shipping grease still on the turrets. Different commanders, different terrain, different stakes. The same result. Every single time.
The question isn't what destroyed them. It's why the best army in Europe couldn't stop doing the one thing that guaranteed its own destruction — even after it understood exactly what was happening.
That answer begins not on a battlefield, but in an Oklahoma classroom in 1931. A full decade before Pearl Harbor.
Subscribe for forgotten WW2 stories ▶️ https://www.youtube.com/@ww2dossierr
Like if you think this story deserves to be remembered.
Comment below — where are you watching from?
#worldwar2 #ww2 #militaryhistory #ww2stor
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LearningTranscript
00:00August 7th, 1944. 4.30 in the morning.
00:04A column of Panther and Panzer IV tanks from the 2nd SS Panzer Division
00:09rolled west through the village of Morton, France,
00:12their engines shaking the walls of stone farmhouses.
00:16Behind them, panzer grenadiers of the 17th SS moved in half-tracks,
00:21rifles across their knees.
00:23This was Operation LĂĽtisch,
00:26Hitler's personal order to cut the American breakout in half
00:29and drive straight back to the coast at Avanche.
00:33The Germans expected to hit a single American infantry division.
00:37They expected speed, shock, confusion.
00:40They expected what had worked on the Eastern Front a thousand times,
00:44the GegenstoĂź, the immediate counterattack,
00:48the armored fist that strikes before the enemy can dig in.
00:52By dawn, they had overrun the town.
00:55SS tanks rolled past Morton toward the coast road.
01:00And then, on a rocky hilltop 600 feet above the valley,
01:04a 24-year-old American lieutenant named Charles Bartz
01:09pressed the transmit button on his SCR-610 radio
01:13and read six digits into the handset.
01:17Three minutes later, the road below erupted.
01:20Not a barrage that built slowly the way artillery usually works,
01:25first a ranging shot, then a correction, then fire for effect.
01:29This was simultaneous.
01:32Dozens of shells from batteries miles apart
01:34struck the same stretch of road in the same second.
01:38Tanks that had been rolling at 15 miles an hour were suddenly burning.
01:43Panzer grenadiers, who had been sitting upright in their half-tracks,
01:46were gone.
01:48The column behind them stopped.
01:50The column behind that one bunched up.
01:53And Bartz read another six digits.
01:57He could see everything.
01:59Hill 314, some maps called it 317,
02:03was the highest ground in the sector,
02:05with a clear view of every road the Germans needed to use.
02:10Bartz, and a second forward observer,
02:122nd Lieutenant Robert Weiss,
02:14both from the 230th Field Artillery Battalion,
02:18sat within a few feet of the summit.
02:20They had been there since the evening before,
02:23and they had already done something the Germans did not expect.
02:27They had registered their artillery on every approach road,
02:30every crossroads,
02:31every piece of open ground a tank column might use,
02:34before a single German engine started.
02:38The Germans did not know it yet,
02:40but they had just walked into a trap.
02:43If this story told you something new,
02:45or if you want to see more like it,
02:47a like and a subscribe are the best ways to help this channel
02:50keep finding stories that deserve to be told.
02:53Here is why what happened at Morten matters.
02:57It was not a lucky break.
02:58It was not a one-time ambush.
03:00It was not a clever trick by one resourceful officer
03:03on one fortunate hilltop.
03:06It was a pattern.
03:08Sixteen months earlier,
03:09the German 10th Panzer Division
03:11had counterattacked American positions
03:13at a place called El Guitart in Tunisia,
03:15and walked into the same thing.
03:18In September of 44,
03:20fresh Panzer Brigades,
03:22with brand new Panthers straight from the factory,
03:24counterattacked Patton's 3rd Army in Lorraine,
03:27and walked into the same thing.
03:29In December of 44,
03:31elite SS Panzer Divisions
03:33counterattacked during the Battle of the Bulge
03:35on a frozen Belgian ridge called Elsenborn,
03:38and walked into the same thing.
03:41Every single time the German army launched a counterattack
03:44against American forces,
03:46from the deserts of North Africa
03:47to the forests of the Ardennes,
03:49it walked into the same trap.
03:52And here is the part I want you to hold on to,
03:55because it is the thread that runs through this entire story.
03:59The Germans knew.
04:00After Tunisia, they knew.
04:03After Normandy, they certainly knew.
04:06They had interrogated captured American forward observers.
04:10They had studied the wreckage of their own columns.
04:13They understood, at least in broad terms,
04:16what was killing them.
04:17And they kept coming anyway.
04:19The question this video will answer
04:21is not just what the trap was,
04:23though that story begins in a classroom in Oklahoma in 1931,
04:27a full decade before Pearl Harbor.
04:29The deeper question is the one that turns this
04:32from a story about artillery
04:33into a story about how armies think.
04:37Why couldn't the best army in Europe
04:39stop walking into a trap it could see?
04:42That answer starts in a place where the trap did not exist,
04:46where German tanks hit American lines
04:49and the Americans shattered,
04:51completely, catastrophically,
04:53in a route so total that it nearly ended careers
04:57and destroyed the reputation of an entire army.
05:01February 1943.
05:03The Atlas Mountains of Tunisia.
05:05A place called Kasserine Pass.
05:08What happened there,
05:09and what changed in the four weeks that followed,
05:12is where the trap was born.
05:14February 14th, 1943.
05:16Sidi Bouzid, Central Tunisia.
05:20The sun had barely cleared the eastern ridgeline
05:23when 50 tanks of the German 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions
05:27came through Faid Pass in two columns,
05:30one from the north, one from the south,
05:32moving fast across the flat desert floor
05:34toward the American positions.
05:36The Americans had been in North Africa for three months.
05:39Most had never heard a shot fired in anger.
05:42Their tanks, M3 Lees and early Shermans,
05:46were scattered in small groups across a wide front,
05:49parceled out in penny packets
05:50the way a nervous commander spreads his chips across the table.
05:54Their artillery batteries were assigned individually
05:57to infantry units,
05:58each one firing on its own,
06:00adjusting its own shots,
06:02talking only to its own infantry.
06:03There was no unified fire plan.
06:06There was no centralized control.
06:08There was no trap.
06:10What there was, was chaos.
06:13The German pincers closed in hours.
06:17Two American tank battalions were surrounded on a hill
06:20and destroyed almost to the last vehicle.
06:2254 tanks, gone.
06:26American artillery batteries caught in the open
06:28without infantry protection
06:30were overrun one by one.
06:33Some fired their last rounds point-blank
06:35at approaching panzers
06:36before the crews were killed or captured.
06:40Five days later,
06:41Rommel's Afrika Korps pushed through Kasserine Pass itself,
06:45scattering the defenders,
06:46green troops from the 34th Infantry Division
06:49who had never seen a German tank,
06:51across 30 miles of desert.
06:54The numbers were staggering.
06:55In less than two weeks,
06:57the United States Army in Tunisia
06:59lost 6,500 men,
07:02183 tanks,
07:04208 artillery pieces,
07:05and 512 trucks and jeeps.
07:09Almost half the men lost were prisoners,
07:11soldiers who had thrown down their weapons and surrendered,
07:14or been overrun so fast
07:16they never had a chance to fight.
07:18The British, watching from the flanks,
07:20were not surprised.
07:21They had been skeptical about American fighting ability
07:24since the day the first G1s arrived in England,
07:27and Kasserine confirmed every doubt.
07:30After the battle,
07:31British officers openly questioned
07:33whether their allies had the stomach for this war.
07:36One British general's assessment was blunt.
07:38The Americans were brave enough individually,
07:41but as an army,
07:42they did not know how to fight.
07:44And here is what matters for this story.
07:46The Germans drew their own conclusion from Kasserine.
07:49The counterattack had worked.
07:51The reflex had held.
07:54You hit the Americans fast,
07:55you hit them with armor,
07:57and they broke.
07:58Just like the Poles,
08:00just like the French,
08:01just like every army the Wehrmacht
08:03had rolled over since 1939.
08:06German after-action reports
08:08noted weak American coordination,
08:10poor use of artillery,
08:11and an officer corps
08:13that did not seem to understand
08:14how to concentrate force.
08:16The 10th Panzer Division's commander
08:18reported that he had defeated
08:20an enemy with more men,
08:22more guns,
08:23and more tanks,
08:24simply by attacking
08:26before they were ready.
08:27Remember that conclusion.
08:30Because the Germans carried it forward
08:31for the rest of the war.
08:33And it killed them.
08:34What happened next
08:36took exactly 26 days.
08:38On March 6th,
08:40George Patton took command
08:41of the American 2nd Corps.
08:43He arrived in a staff car
08:44with a siren,
08:45wearing his famous
08:46ivory-handled pistols,
08:48and a scowl
08:49that frightened his own officers
08:51more than the Germans did.
08:52Within 48 hours,
08:54he had fired three commanders,
08:56imposed a dress code
08:57that required neckties
08:58and leggings
08:59in the combat zone,
09:00and fined any soldier
09:02caught without a helmet,
09:03including men
09:04using the latrine.
09:06But Patton's real change
09:07was not about discipline.
09:09It was about
09:10how the artillery fought.
09:11He demanded
09:12that artillery battalions
09:14stop operating
09:15as isolated batteries
09:16attached to infantry companies.
09:18He wanted massed fire.
09:21He wanted speed.
09:23He wanted any forward observer
09:25on the front line
09:26to be able to call down
09:27every gun within range
09:29on a single point,
09:30and he wanted it in minutes,
09:32not hours.
09:34This was not Patton's invention.
09:36The tools already existed,
09:38developed in a classroom
09:39at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
09:40by a small group of officers
09:42whose names almost nobody
09:43outside the artillery community
09:45has ever heard.
09:46What Patton did
09:48was force a broken corps
09:49to actually use them
09:51under fire
09:52in four weeks.
09:54And on March 23, 1943,
09:57the 10th Panzer Division,
09:59the same unit
10:00that had shattered
10:00the Americans at Kasserine,
10:02gathered 50 tanks
10:04east of a small town
10:05called El Gitar
10:06and prepared to do it again.
10:08They had every reason
10:10to believe it would work.
10:12The Americans
10:13they were about to hit
10:14were the same
10:151st Infantry Division
10:16that had been mauled
10:17weeks earlier.
10:18The terrain favored armor,
10:20a wide valley
10:21with open approaches.
10:23German intelligence
10:23reported weak defenses.
10:26What German intelligence
10:27did not report,
10:28because no German
10:29intelligence officer
10:30in 1943
10:31had ever seen it before,
10:33was what was waiting
10:34for those 50 tanks
10:36at the far end
10:36of that valley.
10:376 in the morning,
10:38March 23, 1943,
10:41the El Gitar Valley,
10:43central Tunisia.
10:4450 tanks
10:45of the 10th Panzer Division
10:47emerged from the Eastern Pass
10:49in a wide formation.
10:50Panzer IVs in the center,
10:53martyr tank destroyers
10:54on the flanks,
10:55half-tracks loaded
10:56with panzer grenadiers
10:57trailing behind.
10:59They moved
11:00with the confidence
11:01of men
11:01who had done this before.
11:03Four weeks ago,
11:05at Kasserine,
11:06the Americans
11:06had crumbled in hours.
11:09The plan was simple.
11:10Hit the American line,
11:12break through to El Gitar,
11:14roll up the flank.
11:16GegenstoĂź,
11:17the doctrine
11:18that had never failed.
11:20The first American
11:21infantry positions
11:22were overrun in minutes.
11:24German tanks
11:26pushed through
11:26the forward line
11:27almost without slowing.
11:29Half-tracks
11:30dropped their infantry,
11:31who swept through
11:32abandoned foxholes
11:34and waved the armor forward.
11:36Six miles of open valley
11:38lay between the pass
11:39and the town.
11:40The panzer commander
11:42could see El Gitar
11:43in the distance.
11:44And then,
11:45the column slowed.
11:48Across the valley floor,
11:50hidden under a thin layer
11:51of sand and gravel,
11:52American engineers
11:53had laid a minefield.
11:55Not a thick one,
11:56but enough to make
11:57the lead tanks stop
11:58and the ones behind
11:59bunch up.
12:01For perhaps 60 seconds,
12:03the forward edge
12:03of the 10th Panzer Division
12:05was stationary,
12:06in an open valley
12:07with no cover.
12:08That was all it took.
12:10From a ridge
12:11overlooking the valley,
12:12an American forward observer,
12:14a lieutenant with a radio
12:15and a set of binoculars,
12:17read a grid coordinate
12:18into his handset.
12:20The coordinate went
12:21not to one battery,
12:22but to a fire direction center,
12:24a tent behind the ridge
12:25where a plotting officer
12:26pulled a pre-computed tape
12:28from a filing cabinet,
12:29stretched it between
12:30two points on a map,
12:32and read the firing data
12:33printed along its edge.
12:35Within 90 seconds,
12:36that data had been relayed
12:38to every gun in range.
12:40This is the thing
12:41I need you to understand,
12:43because it is the hinge
12:44of this entire story.
12:46In 1943,
12:48every army on earth
12:49adjusted artillery fire
12:51the same way
12:51the armies of 1918 had.
12:54A battery commander
12:55watched where his shells landed,
12:57estimated the correction,
12:58gave a new order,
12:59and fired again.
13:01Each battery talked
13:02to its own observer.
13:03Each observer talked
13:05to his own battery.
13:06If you wanted to concentrate
13:08the fire of ten batteries
13:09on one target,
13:10ten separate conversations
13:12had to happen,
13:13ten separate corrections
13:14had to be calculated,
13:15and by the time
13:16the tenth battery
13:17was on target,
13:18the first battery's shells
13:19were falling on a position
13:21the enemy had already left.
13:23Every army,
13:24except one.
13:26In 1931,
13:28at the Field Artillery School
13:29at Fort Sill,
13:30a major named Carlos Brewer
13:32had demonstrated something
13:33no other army possessed.
13:36By placing all batteries
13:37on a single firing chart
13:39located by survey
13:40on a common grid
13:41and centralizing fire commands
13:43through one fire direction center,
13:45a single observer
13:47could bring an entire battalion
13:48onto the same target
13:49with a single radio call.
13:52His successor,
13:53Major Orlando Ward,
13:55refined the system further.
13:57Precomputed tapes
13:58eliminated the math.
13:59A trained crew
14:00could process a fire mission
14:02in under two minutes.
14:04The guns fired,
14:05the shells flew,
14:06and three minutes
14:07after the observer
14:08pressed his transmit button,
14:09the target ceased to exist.
14:12The Germans in that valley
14:13never had three minutes.
14:16American artillery,
14:1732 guns from three battalions,
14:20hit the stalled column simultaneously.
14:23Not sequentially,
14:24the way a barrage builds.
14:26Simultaneously.
14:27Shells from howitzers
14:29at different distances,
14:30fired at slightly different times,
14:32calculated to arrive
14:33in the same three-second window.
14:36The Americans called it
14:37time on target.
14:39No other army in the world
14:41could do it.
14:42The first rounds
14:43were the only warning,
14:44and by the time a man heard them,
14:46he was already inside
14:47the blast radius.
14:48Eight tanks died
14:50in the minefield.
14:51The artillery killed
14:52the rest of the lead company.
14:54Vehicles behind them
14:56tried to reverse
14:56and collided with vehicles
14:58still pushing forward.
15:00The panzer grenadiers,
15:01out in the open,
15:03dismounted,
15:04exactly where the doctrine
15:05said they should be,
15:06were caught in a killing ground
15:08with no cover
15:09and no exits.
15:11The American guns
15:12shifted to them
15:13with a speed
15:13that German survivors
15:14later said
15:15they could not comprehend.
15:17By nine in the morning,
15:1930 of the 10th panzer division's
15:2050 tanks
15:21were burning
15:22or abandoned.
15:24The division pulled back
15:25through the pass.
15:27That afternoon,
15:28the Germans tried again.
15:30Fresh infantry,
15:31a second approach,
15:33a different angle.
15:34American artillery
15:35intercepted them
15:36before they reached
15:37the minefield.
15:38George Patton
15:39watched the second attack
15:41from a trench
15:41on high ground.
15:43He had a pair of binoculars
15:44and a grim expression.
15:46As the shells
15:48tore through
15:48the advancing panzer grenadiers,
15:50men in the open,
15:51running into coordinated fire
15:52they could not suppress
15:53and could not outrun,
15:55Patton lowered the binoculars
15:57and said five words
15:58that would have been
15:59unthinkable
15:59a month earlier.
16:01What Patton said
16:03and what those five words
16:04revealed
16:05about the thing
16:05the Germans
16:06had just walked into
16:07changes the meaning
16:09of every battle
16:10that followed.
16:11Because El Gitar
16:12was not the end
16:13of the lesson.
16:14It was the first exam.
16:16And the Germans
16:17had already failed
16:18to learn
16:19the only thing
16:20that could have saved them.
16:23Patton said it quietly,
16:24almost to himself.
16:26The officers around him
16:27barely heard it
16:28over the sound
16:28of the guns.
16:29My God,
16:31it seems a crime
16:32to murder good infantry
16:33like that.
16:34Hold those words.
16:36Because they contain
16:37a recognition
16:38that no German officer
16:39in Tunisia
16:40ever arrived at.
16:42Patton,
16:43watching his own artillery
16:44dismantle
16:45an attacking force
16:45in the open,
16:46understood instantly
16:47what had just changed.
16:49This was not
16:50a fair fight.
16:51This was not
16:52two armies
16:53exchanging blows.
16:54This was a system
16:56that turned
16:57the enemy's own doctrine
16:58into a death sentence.
17:00The Germans
17:01were doing exactly
17:02what their training
17:02told them to do.
17:04Advance,
17:04close,
17:05counterattack.
17:06And the faster
17:07they did it,
17:08the more efficiently
17:09they died.
17:10But here is what
17:11the Germans concluded
17:12after El Gitar.
17:14They blamed
17:15the minefield.
17:16They blamed
17:17the terrain.
17:18They blamed
17:19the specific
17:19tactical errors
17:20of the 10th Panzer's
17:22commander,
17:22who had pushed
17:23into a valley
17:24without adequate
17:24reconnaissance.
17:26What they did not
17:27blame,
17:28because they could
17:29not see it,
17:30was the three-minute
17:31loop.
17:32The forward observer
17:33on the ridge,
17:34the fire direction
17:35center behind the hill,
17:36the pre-computed tapes,
17:38the simultaneous impact.
17:40None of this
17:41appeared in German
17:41after-action reports
17:43from Tunisia.
17:44The phrase
17:45that did appear
17:46again and again
17:47was one that revealed
17:49everything about
17:50how the German army
17:51processed what had
17:52just happened to it.
17:54Heavy enemy
17:55artillery fire.
17:57Three words.
17:58No further analysis.
18:01As if American
18:02artillery were simply
18:03louder than expected.
18:05A weather condition,
18:06not a weapons system.
18:08German officers noted
18:09that American artillery fire
18:11was intense
18:12and well-placed
18:13and then moved on
18:14to discuss
18:15what they considered
18:16the real problem.
18:17How to counterattack
18:18more effectively
18:19next time.
18:21This is the moment
18:22I need you to see clearly,
18:24because it explains
18:25everything that follows.
18:27From Normandy
18:28to the Ardennes.
18:29From June of 44
18:30to the end of the war.
18:33The German army
18:34could not stop
18:35counterattacking.
18:36Not because its officers
18:38were stupid.
18:39Not because they failed
18:40to notice that their men
18:41were dying.
18:42But because the
18:43GegenstoĂź,
18:44the immediate counterattack,
18:46was not a tactic.
18:47It was the operating system.
18:50German defensive doctrine
18:51had been built
18:52on this principle
18:53since 1917.
18:55When the enemy
18:56takes ground,
18:56you counterattack
18:57immediately.
18:59Before he can dig in.
19:00Before he can register
19:01his artillery.
19:03Before he can bring up reserves.
19:05Speed is everything.
19:07Hesitation is fatal.
19:09Even if you have
19:10only one platoon
19:11and one tank,
19:13you attack.
19:14Those were not suggestions.
19:15That was doctrine.
19:17Printed in field manuals.
19:18Drilled into every officer
19:20from lieutenant
19:21to field marshal.
19:23Von Melanthen,
19:24who fought on every front
19:25the Wehrmacht had,
19:26wrote it plainly.
19:28Counterattack at once.
19:29Counterattack strongly.
19:31A delay of an hour
19:32may mean frustration.
19:33A delay of a few hours
19:35will mean a major catastrophe.
19:37And for three years
19:39it had worked.
19:41Against the Poles in 39.
19:43Against the French in 40.
19:45Against the British in the desert.
19:47Against the Soviets
19:48on the eastern front.
19:50Every army the Germans had fought
19:52reacted to a counterattack
19:53the same way.
19:54With confusion.
19:56Delay.
19:57Retreat.
19:58An immediate counterattack
20:00recaptured lost ground
20:01before the enemy
20:02could consolidate.
20:03And the line held.
20:04The doctrine was self-reinforcing.
20:07It worked.
20:08Therefore it was correct.
20:10Therefore you did it again.
20:12What no one
20:13in the German command structure
20:14understood.
20:15What they could not understand
20:17because nothing in their experience
20:18had prepared them for it.
20:20Was that the American artillery system
20:22had been designed
20:23almost by accident
20:24to exploit exactly this reflex.
20:27Think about what a counterattack
20:29looks like to a forward observer
20:31sitting on a hilltop
20:32with a radio.
20:33It is the most visible thing
20:34on a battlefield.
20:36Troops massing in an assembly area.
20:39Vehicles moving from concealment
20:41onto roads.
20:42Infantry forming up in the open
20:44behind the line.
20:46Tanks advancing across fields
20:47toward a position
20:48they have just lost.
20:50Every element of a counterattack
20:52the assembly
20:53the movement
20:54the approach
20:55happens in exactly the places
20:57that a forward observer can see
20:59and exactly the formations
21:01that massed artillery can destroy.
21:03The faster the counterattack comes
21:06the less time the attacking force
21:08has to disperse
21:09to use cover
21:10to stagger its approach.
21:13And German doctrine demanded speed
21:15above all else.
21:16The Germans had built a doctrine
21:18that was a perfect target
21:20and the Americans
21:21had built a system
21:22that could hit perfect targets
21:24in three minutes.
21:26Fourteen months after El Gitar
21:28new theater
21:29new divisions
21:30better tanks
21:31lessons supposedly learned
21:33Adolf Hitler
21:34personally ordered
21:35the largest German counterattack
21:37on the Western Front
21:38since D-Day.
21:40Four panzer divisions
21:41aimed at a single
21:42American infantry division
21:44holding a small French town
21:46called Mortin.
21:47The objective was the coast.
21:49The stakes
21:50were the entire Normandy campaign.
21:53And on a hilltop
21:54above that town
21:55two young lieutenants
21:57with a radio
21:58were already waiting.
21:59August 6th, 1944
22:01the evening before the attack
22:03Mortin, Normandy.
22:06Colonel Hammond Burks
22:07of the 120th Infantry Regiment
22:10arrived in the small hilltop town
22:12to find the shops open
22:13the bars full
22:14and French civilians
22:16celebrating their liberation.
22:19His regiment
22:19had just relieved
22:20the 1st Infantry Division
22:22the same big red one
22:24that had crushed
22:25the 10th Panzer
22:26at El Gitar
22:2616 months earlier.
22:29The sector was quiet.
22:31The front line felt far away.
22:33It was not far away.
22:36Ultra Intercepts
22:37decoded German radio traffic
22:39had already told
22:40American commanders
22:41that a major counterattack
22:43was coming.
22:44General Omar Bradley knew.
22:46He had studied the map.
22:48And the first thing he did
22:49was look at the terrain
22:51around Mortin
22:51and find the high ground.
22:54Hill 314
22:55A rocky promontory
22:57600 feet above the valley floor
23:00with an unobstructed view
23:01of every road
23:02between Mortin
23:03and the coast.
23:05A forward observer
23:06sitting on that hilltop
23:07could see 8 miles
23:09in every direction.
23:11Bradley understood
23:12what that meant.
23:13If American troops
23:14held that hill
23:15and kept a radio working
23:17no armored column
23:18could move through
23:19the valley below
23:20without being seen
23:21and anything that could be seen
23:23could be killed.
23:25On the evening of August 6th
23:27roughly 700 men
23:29of the 2nd Battalion
23:30120th Infantry
23:31dug in around the summit.
23:33With them were
23:34two forward observers
23:35from the 230th
23:37Field Artillery Battalion.
23:381st Lt. Charles Bartz
23:40and 2nd Lt. Robert Weiss.
23:43They were young.
23:44They carried radios,
23:46binoculars,
23:46and maps marked
23:48with grid coordinates.
23:49And before the sun went down
23:50they did the thing
23:52that would matter
23:52more than any weapon
23:53on that hill.
23:55They pre-registered
23:56their artillery
23:57on every approach.
23:59Every road junction.
24:01Every stretch
24:02of open ground.
24:03Every avenue
24:04a tank column
24:05might use.
24:07Each point received
24:08a reference number.
24:10When the time came
24:11Bartz or Weiss
24:12would not need
24:13to calculate coordinates
24:14or call-in adjustments.
24:16They would transmit
24:17a reference number
24:18and the word
24:19fire.
24:20The shells would already
24:21know where to go.
24:23Remember the 3-minute loop
24:25from El Guitar.
24:26Observer sees target,
24:28calls fire direction center,
24:29FDC pulls the tape,
24:32batteries fire,
24:33shells land.
24:34Three minutes.
24:36At Mortin,
24:38Bartz and Weiss
24:38had cut that time further.
24:41Pre-registered targets
24:42meant the FDC
24:43already had
24:44the data computed.
24:45For a target
24:46on the reference list,
24:47the loop was closer
24:48to 90 seconds.
24:51Shortly after midnight
24:52on August 7th,
24:53the 2nd SS Panzer Division
24:55struck.
24:57Two armored columns,
24:58one north of Mortin,
25:00one south,
25:01surged west
25:02in the darkness.
25:03SS tanks rolled
25:05through the town itself,
25:07overrunning the battalion
25:08command post
25:08and cutting off the men
25:09on Hill 314
25:11from the rest
25:11of the regiment.
25:13By dawn,
25:14the 700 Americans
25:15on the hilltop
25:16were surrounded.
25:17No reinforcement
25:19was coming.
25:20No resupply.
25:22No retreat.
25:23But the radio still worked.
25:26Bartz and Weiss
25:26could see the German columns
25:28on the road below.
25:29Tanks nose-to-tail,
25:31half-tracks,
25:32supply trucks,
25:34everything the 2nd SS Panzer Division
25:37needed
25:37to reach Evranche
25:38and the coast.
25:40They began calling
25:41fire missions.
25:43What happened next
25:44lasted five days.
25:46Every time a German vehicle
25:48moved on the roads
25:48below Hill 314,
25:50artillery found it.
25:52Every time
25:53panzergrenadiers
25:54of the 17th SS
25:56massed for an assault
25:57on the hilltop itself,
25:59shells hit their assembly area
26:00before they could step off.
26:02The Germans tried
26:03three night attacks,
26:05believing that darkness
26:06would blind the observers.
26:08It did not.
26:10Bartz and Weiss
26:11had pre-registered
26:12those approaches
26:13in daylight.
26:13They fired by reference
26:15number alone.
26:16The shells fell
26:18exactly where the Germans
26:19were,
26:20in the dark,
26:21and the attacks collapsed
26:22before they reached
26:23the American perimeter.
26:25Meanwhile,
26:26on the hilltop,
26:27the 700 were dying slowly.
26:30Ammunition ran low.
26:32Food ran out entirely.
26:35The wounded lay
26:36among the rocks
26:37without morphine.
26:38The airdrop on August 10th
26:39missed the perimeter,
26:40and the medical supplies
26:42fell into German hands.
26:43Men searched
26:44the bodies of their dead
26:45for rifle magazines
26:47and canteens.
26:48Captain Reynold Erickson,
26:50the senior surviving officer,
26:52organized the defense
26:53with what he had left.
26:54But the radio
26:55never stopped transmitting.
26:57And as long as it transmitted,
26:59the road below
26:59was a graveyard.
27:01By August 12th,
27:02the German offensive
27:03was finished.
27:04Over a hundred tanks
27:05lay destroyed
27:06or abandoned
27:07across the Mortain sector.
27:08The 2nd SS Panzer Division,
27:11which had been ordered
27:12to reach the sea,
27:13had advanced
27:14less than five miles.
27:16Hitler's last chance
27:17to cut the American breakout
27:18in half
27:19had been stopped
27:20not by a fortified line,
27:22not by a tank battle,
27:23but by two lieutenants
27:25on a hilltop
27:25with a radio
27:26and a system
27:27that could turn six digits
27:29into a hundred
27:30simultaneous explosions.
27:33On August 13th,
27:34the 300 men
27:35still alive
27:36on hill 314,
27:38300 out of 700,
27:40walked off the summit.
27:42Barthes and Weiss
27:43walked with them.
27:44And in the German command structure,
27:46a familiar process
27:47was already underway.
27:49After-action reports
27:51blamed the Luftwaffe
27:52for failing to suppress
27:53American air power.
27:54They blamed fuel shortages.
27:56They blamed Hitler
27:57for ordering the attack
27:59in the wrong sector.
28:00What they did not question,
28:02what they never questioned,
28:04was the decision
28:05to counterattack
28:06in the first place.
28:07Six weeks later
28:09and 400 miles
28:10to the east,
28:11a German general
28:12named Hasso von Manteufel
28:14was assembling something
28:15the Wehrmacht
28:16had not possessed
28:17since 1941.
28:19A fresh,
28:20armored force.
28:22Three brand-new
28:23panzer brigades,
28:25equipped with
28:25factory-new
28:26panther tanks,
28:27crewed by men
28:28who had never seen combat.
28:31262 tanks
28:32and assault guns.
28:33Their mission
28:34was a massive
28:35counterattack
28:36against Patton's
28:37Third Army
28:37near a small town
28:39in Lorraine.
28:40The town
28:41was called
28:41Aricourt.
28:42And the trap
28:44was already set.
28:45September 18,
28:471944.
28:48The rolling hills
28:49of Lorraine,
28:50northeastern France.
28:52A thick autumn fog
28:54covered the fields
28:55around the village
28:55of Aricourt,
28:56cutting visibility
28:57to a few hundred yards.
28:59Somewhere inside
29:00that fog,
29:0245 panther tanks
29:03of the 113th
29:04panzer brigade
29:05were moving south
29:06in a column,
29:07their long
29:0875-millimeter guns
29:10pointed forward,
29:11their crews
29:12straining to see
29:13through the gray.
29:15These were not
29:16the exhausted
29:16remnants of Normandy.
29:18These were new machines,
29:20assembled in German
29:21factories in August,
29:22painted in September,
29:24loaded onto trains,
29:25and shipped west.
29:27The Panthers
29:28still had shipping grease
29:29on their turret rings.
29:31Their crews
29:31had trained together
29:32for less than three weeks.
29:34But the tanks themselves
29:36were the best
29:37Germany could build.
29:39Faster than a Sherman,
29:40better armored,
29:41with a gun
29:42that could kill
29:43at 2,000 yards.
29:45General Hasso von Manteufel
29:47had taken command
29:48of the 5th Panzer Army
29:50just eight days
29:51before the attack.
29:52His orders were direct.
29:54counterattack the American
29:56spearhead east
29:57of the Moselle River,
29:58recapture the city
29:59of Lunaville,
30:00and collapse the bridgehead
30:02before Patton
30:02could push into Germany.
30:04He had three fresh
30:05panzer brigades,
30:07the 111th,
30:08112th,
30:09and 113th,
30:10with a combined strength
30:12of 262 tanks
30:14and assault guns.
30:16Facing him
30:17was Combat Command A
30:18of the American
30:194th Armored Division.
30:21On paper,
30:22the odds heavily favored
30:24the Germans.
30:24But the fog
30:25that hid the Panthers
30:27also hid the thing
30:28that would kill them.
30:29American forward observers
30:31could not see
30:31through the fog either.
30:33But they did not need to see.
30:35The 4th Armored Division's
30:37artillery battalions
30:38had been in the area
30:39for days.
30:40They had registered
30:41their guns
30:42on every road,
30:43every ridge,
30:44every tree line.
30:46And the Sherman crews
30:47of Combat Command A,
30:48outnumbered,
30:50outgunned,
30:50in a straight duel,
30:51did something
30:52the Germans
30:53did not expect.
30:54Instead of standing
30:55and fighting at range
30:57where the Panthers'
30:57superior gun
30:58would dominate,
30:59they used the fog.
31:00They moved.
31:02They flanked.
31:03They appeared
31:04out of the mist
31:05at 300 yards,
31:06close enough
31:07that a Sherman 75
31:08could punch through
31:09a Panther's
31:10thinner side armor,
31:11fired,
31:12and vanished.
31:14The German crews,
31:15blinded by fog,
31:17trained for only weeks
31:18and operating
31:19without adequate
31:20reconnaissance,
31:21could not find
31:21an enemy that refused
31:22to stay in one place.
31:24And every time
31:25a Panther stopped moving,
31:27to scan for targets,
31:28to regroup,
31:29to wait for the column
31:30behind it,
31:31the American artillery
31:33found it.
31:34This is where
31:35the pattern deepens
31:36into something
31:37more than repetition.
31:38At El Gitar,
31:40the trap had caught
31:41veterans,
31:42the 10th Panzer Division,
31:43seasoned in North Africa,
31:45confident from Kasserine.
31:47At Mortin,
31:48it had caught
31:49elite SS formations,
31:51the 2nd SS Panzer,
31:53hardened on the
31:53Eastern Front,
31:54executing Hitler's
31:55personal order.
31:57At AeroCorp,
31:58it caught something
31:59different.
32:00Brand new units,
32:02factory fresh equipment.
32:04Crews who had
32:05never fought Americans,
32:06never experienced
32:07time on target,
32:09never heard the sound
32:10of a hundred shells
32:11arriving in the same
32:12second.
32:12It made no difference.
32:14On the 19th of September,
32:17German tanks broke
32:18through American outposts
32:19and pushed close to
32:20Combat Command A's headquarters.
32:23For a few hours,
32:24it looked like the
32:25counterattack might succeed.
32:27Then the fog thinned.
32:29American P-47 Thunderbolts
32:31from the 19th Tactical Air Command
32:33found the German columns
32:35in the open.
32:36And behind them,
32:37American artillery,
32:39already registered,
32:40already waiting,
32:41began the systematic destruction
32:43of the 113th Panzer Brigade.
32:46The pattern repeated
32:48for 11 days.
32:50Each morning,
32:51if fog covered the fields,
32:52the Germans attacked.
32:54Each time,
32:55they gained a few hundred yards.
32:57Each time,
32:59the fog lifted,
33:00or the Americans flanked them,
33:01or the artillery caught them
33:02in the open.
33:03And the day's gains
33:04evaporated along with the tanks
33:06that had paid for them.
33:08By September 22nd,
33:10after four days of fighting,
33:11Combat Command A
33:12had lost 14 Shermans.
33:15The Germans had lost
33:16over 50 tanks,
33:17Panthers and Panzer IVs,
33:19that could not be replaced,
33:21crewed by men
33:22who could not be retrained.
33:24By the 29th,
33:25it was over.
33:27Of the 262 armored vehicles
33:29Montefel had committed,
33:30roughly 200 were destroyed
33:33or disabled.
33:34The 4th Armored Division's
33:36losses for the entire battle.
33:3825 tanks.
33:40And once again,
33:41I want you to see this clearly,
33:43because it is the same sentence
33:44with different names.
33:46The German after-action reports
33:48did not question
33:49the counterattack itself.
33:51They blamed the inexperience
33:53of the new Panzer Brigades.
33:54They blamed the fog
33:56for clearing at the wrong moments.
33:58They blamed the lack of air cover.
34:02They blamed Manteufel
34:03for attacking
34:04before his units
34:05had trained together.
34:06What they could not
34:07bring themselves to right
34:08was the simpler truth.
34:10That the counterattack,
34:11the GegenstoĂź,
34:13the sacred reflex,
34:14the thing that made
34:15the German army
34:16the German army,
34:18had become the mechanism
34:19of its own destruction.
34:21That every time
34:22they massed for an assault,
34:24they made themselves visible.
34:25That every time
34:26they advanced in the open,
34:28they entered a killing ground
34:29measured in grid coordinates.
34:31That every time
34:32they did what their doctrine demanded,
34:35a young American lieutenant
34:36with a radio
34:37and a pre-computed firing chart
34:39killed them faster
34:40than they could close the distance.
34:42Three months after Aero Corps,
34:44in the frozen forests
34:45of the Ardennes,
34:47the German army
34:48would launch
34:48the largest counterattack
34:50of the entire Western Front.
34:52Half a million men,
34:54three full armies,
34:55a thousand tanks.
34:58The objective,
34:59split the Allied line,
35:01seize the bridges
35:02over the Meuse,
35:03take Antwerp.
35:04Hitler called it
35:05Wacht am Rhein.
35:07The Americans would call it
35:09the Battle of the Bulge.
35:11And on a frozen ridge line
35:13on the northern shoulder
35:14of the offensive,
35:15in a place
35:16the 6th SS Panzer Army
35:18had to take
35:19and could not bypass,
35:20the trap was about
35:22to deliver its verdict.
35:23December 16th, 1944,
35:265.30 in the morning,
35:28the Ardennes Forest,
35:29eastern Belgium.
35:30An artillery barrage,
35:32German this time,
35:34erupted along an 80-mile front,
35:36shaking the frozen ground
35:37and splintering pine trees
35:39into wooden shrapnel.
35:41Behind the barrage,
35:42three German armies
35:43surged forward.
35:45250,000 men
35:47in 28 divisions,
35:49including the cream
35:50of what remained,
35:51the 1st SS Panzer Division
35:53Leibstandarte,
35:54the 12th SS Panzer Division
35:57Hitlerjugend,
35:58and the freshly rebuilt
35:59Volksgrenadier Divisions
36:01that Hitler had scraped together
36:02from hospitals,
36:03training depots,
36:04and boys who should have been in school.
36:07The plan required speed.
36:10Five roads,
36:10the Germans called them
36:12Rollbahns,
36:13ran west through the Ardennes
36:15toward the Meuse River.
36:16The 6th SS Panzer Army,
36:19under Sepp Dietrich,
36:20needed at least two of them.
36:22And two of the five
36:24ran directly through
36:25a stretch of high ground
36:26called Elsenborn Ridge.
36:29On that ridge,
36:30dug into frozen earth
36:31along a 2,000-yard front
36:33near a tiny hamlet
36:34called Dombutgenbach,
36:35sat the 2nd Battalion
36:37of the 26th Infantry Regiment,
36:391st Infantry Division,
36:41the Big Red One.
36:43The same division
36:44that had watched
36:45the 10th Panzer die
36:46at El Gattar.
36:47The same division
36:48that had stormed
36:49Omaha Beach.
36:51The battalion commander
36:52was Lieutenant Colonel
36:53Daryl Daniel.
36:55He had roughly 600 men,
36:57a handful of tank destroyers,
36:59and the full weight
37:00of the 1st Division's
37:01artillery behind him,
37:02the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion,
37:05the 413th Anti-Aircraft Battalion,
37:08and every gun
37:09that 5th Corps could reach.
37:11And Daniel had done
37:13the same thing
37:13that Bartz and Weiss had done
37:14on Hill 314 at Mortan.
37:17Before the first German shell fell,
37:20his forward observers
37:21had pre-registered
37:22their artillery
37:22on every approach,
37:24every tree line,
37:25every road junction,
37:27every piece of open ground
37:28between Dombutgenbach
37:30and the German positions.
37:32The 12th SS Panzer Division
37:34hit them on the morning
37:36of December 17th.
37:38Panzerfors and Panthers
37:39came out of the forest
37:40supported by SS Panzergrenadiers,
37:43young, fanatical,
37:45attacking in waves.
37:47The American infantry
37:48on the ridge
37:49could hear them
37:50before they could see them.
37:51Then the forward observers
37:53called fire.
37:54The result was El Gattar
37:56at 10 times the scale.
37:59American artillery,
38:00not one battalion,
38:01but an entire Corps concentration,
38:04pounded the German assembly areas,
38:06the approach roads,
38:08the open fields
38:09south of Dombutgenbach.
38:11Shells fell so fast
38:13and so accurately
38:14that tank crews
38:15who survived the first volley
38:17could not determine
38:18where the fire was coming from.
38:21SS Panzergrenadiers
38:22who dismounted
38:23to assault the ridge on foot
38:24were caught between the tree line
38:26and the American foxholes
38:28in ground that had been
38:29pre-registered to the yard.
38:31The Germans attacked
38:33on the 17th
38:34and failed.
38:35They attacked on the 18th
38:37with the full weight
38:38of the 12th SS Panzer
38:40and managed to get tanks
38:42into the village of Roscherath
38:43and were thrown back
38:45by artillery firing from the ridge.
38:48They attacked on the 19th.
38:49They attacked on the 20th.
38:52On December 21st,
38:54SS Panzergrenadiers
38:56supported by
38:57Navalwerfer rocket launchers
38:59and heavy artillery
39:00slammed into Daniel's positions
39:02at Dombutgenbach
39:04in the heaviest assault yet.
39:06The battle lasted all day
39:09and into the night.
39:10SS troops penetrated
39:12the American lines repeatedly.
39:14Each time,
39:15artillery drove them back.
39:17On December 22nd alone,
39:19the guns supporting
39:21Dombutgenbach
39:22fired 10,000 rounds.
39:24Think about that number
39:26for a moment.
39:2710,000 shells
39:29in a single day
39:30falling on a frontage
39:32of roughly 2,000 yards.
39:34That is a shell
39:35every nine seconds
39:36for every yard of front
39:38for every hour of daylight.
39:41Survivors of the 26th Infantry
39:44later said
39:44that while German tanks
39:46broke through the line
39:47more than once,
39:48not a single SS Panzergrenadier,
39:51not one,
39:52reached the American foxholes
39:54on foot.
39:55The artillery killed them all
39:57in the open ground
39:58between the tree line
39:59and the ridge.
40:00On December 26th,
40:02the 246th Volksgrenadier Division,
40:05the last German reserve
40:07in the sector,
40:08launched a final attack
40:09against Elsenborn Ridge.
40:11American artillery destroyed it
40:13at the moment of its start.
40:16The division did not reach
40:17the American wire,
40:18and that was the end.
40:20The 6th SS Panzer Army,
40:22Hitler's strongest armored force,
40:24the spearhead of his last
40:26strategic gamble,
40:28never took the ridge,
40:29never captured the two
40:30roll bonds it needed.
40:32The entire northern shoulder
40:34of the bulge held,
40:35and it held for the same reason
40:36the line had held
40:37at El Guitart,
40:38at Mortin,
40:40at Aricor.
40:41Because German troops
40:43massed for a counterattack,
40:45moved into the open,
40:46advanced toward a position
40:48held by Americans
40:49with radios,
40:50and died in grid squares
40:51that had been registered
40:53before they arrived.
40:5522 months of war
40:56on the Western Front,
40:58four major counterattacks,
41:00Tunisia, Normandy,
41:02Lorraine, the Ardennes.
41:03Fresh troops,
41:05veteran troops,
41:07SS troops,
41:08Volksgrenadiers,
41:10factory new Panthers,
41:11battle-worn Panzer IVs.
41:14Different commanders,
41:16different terrain,
41:17different weather,
41:18different stakes.
41:19The same result.
41:21Every single time.
41:24The question from the beginning
41:25of this story,
41:26why couldn't the best army
41:28in Europe stop walking
41:30into a trap it could see,
41:32has an answer.
41:33And the answer
41:34is not about artillery.
41:36It is about something
41:37far harder to change
41:38than a weapons system.
41:40It is about what happens
41:42when a doctrine
41:43becomes an identity.
41:45After the war,
41:46Allied intelligence teams
41:47sat down with
41:48captured German officers
41:49and asked them
41:50to assess the American army.
41:52Dozens of generals
41:54and colonels,
41:55men who had commanded
41:56divisions and corps
41:57on the Western Front,
41:58were interviewed
41:59in a systematic debriefing
42:01that produced thousands
42:02of pages of testimony.
42:04The questions covered
42:05everything from
42:06American infantry tactics
42:08to logistics
42:09to air power.
42:10On one subject,
42:12the Germans were
42:12nearly unanimous.
42:14American artillery,
42:16they said,
42:17was the best in the world,
42:19better than the British,
42:20better than the Soviet,
42:22better, they admitted,
42:23than their own.
42:24They praised its accuracy,
42:27its volume,
42:28its terrifying speed.
42:29They described the experience
42:31of being on the receiving end
42:33of time-on-target fire,
42:35shells arriving without warning
42:36from every direction
42:37with no time to take cover,
42:40as something no training
42:41could prepare a soldier for.
42:43One officer said
42:45that a single American
42:46forward observer
42:47with a working radio
42:49was more dangerous
42:50than a company of tanks,
42:52because the observer
42:53could summon in minutes
42:54a weight of fire
42:55that the tanks
42:56could never deliver.
42:58But when the interviewers
43:00asked the obvious
43:01next question,
43:02if you knew this,
43:03why did you keep
43:04counterattacking into it?
43:06The answers revealed
43:07the thing that no German officer
43:09could see from the inside.
43:11They said there was
43:12no alternative.
43:14They said that if you
43:15did not counterattack
43:16immediately,
43:17the enemy consolidated,
43:19brought up reinforcements,
43:21registered his own artillery,
43:23and the position
43:24was lost forever.
43:26They said that
43:27to abandon the GegenstoĂź
43:29was to abandon
43:30the only advantage
43:31a defender had,
43:32the ability to strike
43:34before the attacker
43:35was ready.
43:36They said that
43:37the doctrine worked,
43:38that it had always worked,
43:41that the problem
43:42was not the counterattack itself,
43:43but the specific conditions
43:45under which it was executed,
43:47insufficient air cover,
43:49insufficient armor,
43:50insufficient surprise.
43:51They were still saying it
43:53in 1946.
43:56In the interrogation rooms,
43:58in the memoirs
43:59they began writing,
44:00in the lectures they gave
44:01to American officers
44:02at Fort Leavenworth.
44:04The counterattack was correct.
44:07It was everything else
44:08that had failed.
44:09This is the answer
44:11to the question
44:11in the title of this video,
44:12and it is simpler
44:14than it looks.
44:15The German army
44:16could not stop
44:17walking into the trap
44:18because the trap
44:20was built
44:20from the one thing
44:21they could not change,
44:23their own doctrine.
44:25The GegenstoĂź
44:26was not a tool
44:26they could pick up
44:27or put down
44:28depending on circumstances.
44:30It was the grammar
44:31of how they fought.
44:33It was taught
44:34at every level,
44:35reinforced by every success,
44:37from Poland
44:37to France
44:38to Russia,
44:40embedded so deeply
44:41in the culture
44:41of the officer corps
44:42that questioning it
44:44was like questioning gravity.
44:46You do not argue
44:47with gravity.
44:48You do not ask
44:50whether gravity still applies.
44:51You counterattack.
44:53In the American system,
44:55the forward observer,
44:56the fire direction center,
44:58the pre-computed tapes,
45:00the three-minute loop,
45:01the simultaneous impact,
45:03had turned that gravity
45:04into a killing floor.
45:06Every reflex
45:07the German army had,
45:09every instinct
45:10its officers trusted,
45:11every lesson
45:12its doctrine taught.
45:14All of it drove men
45:15into the open,
45:16into assembly areas,
45:18into approach routes
45:19that a 24-year-old lieutenant
45:21had already marked
45:22on a map.
45:23The Germans were not
45:24walking into a trap
45:25the Americans had set.
45:26They were walking
45:27into a trap
45:28their own doctrine
45:29had built for them.
45:31The Americans
45:31had simply learned
45:32to stand at the other end
45:33of it and wait.
45:35On the morning
45:36of August 13, 1944,
45:39Lieutenant Charles Bartz
45:40walked off Hill 314
45:42with the survivors
45:43of the 2nd Battalion.
45:45He was 24 years old.
45:47He had spent five days
45:49on a hilltop
45:50without food,
45:51calling fire
45:52on a road he could see
45:53from his foxhole,
45:54watching columns
45:55of German armor
45:56burn below him
45:57while mortar rounds
45:58fell around his position.
46:00He and Robert Weiss
46:01were later awarded
46:02the Distinguished Service Cross.
46:04The 230th Field Artillery Battalion
46:07received a Presidential Unit Citation.
46:10The 30th Infantry Division,
46:12Old Hickory,
46:13the National Guard Division
46:14from Tennessee and Georgia
46:16and the Carolinas,
46:17held Mortin
46:18and broke Operation Lutich
46:20with a force
46:20that was outnumbered
46:21in every category
46:22except one.
46:24They had a radio.
46:26And at the other end
46:27of that radio,
46:28they had a system
46:29that no other army
46:30on earth possessed.
46:31A system born
46:33in an Oklahoma classroom
46:34in 1931,
46:36tested in a Tunisian desert
46:38in 1943,
46:39and perfected
46:40on the frozen ridges
46:41of Belgium
46:42in the last winter
46:43of the war.
46:44The Germans came
46:46with tanks,
46:47with doctrine,
46:48with courage,
46:49with the best army
46:51Europe had produced
46:52in a century.
46:53The Americans came
46:54with a radio
46:55and three minutes.
46:57Three minutes
46:58was enough.
47:01If this story
47:02helped you understand
47:03something about the war
47:04that you did not know before,
47:06or if it reminded you
47:07of something you did,
47:08I would be grateful
47:09if you would hit
47:10the like button.
47:11It is the single best way
47:13to help this video
47:14reach other people
47:15who care about these stories.
47:17If you are not subscribed yet,
47:18I hope you will consider it,
47:20and the bell icon
47:21makes sure you never miss
47:22a new one.
47:23I would love to know
47:24where you are watching
47:25from today.
47:26And if someone in your family
47:27served in the Second World
47:28War,
47:29in the artillery,
47:30in the infantry,
47:31in any branch,
47:32in any theater,
47:34I hope you will tell us
47:35about them in the comments.
47:36These stories belong to them.
47:39Thank you for being here.
47:40thank you for being there.
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