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00:00:00There's a particular kind of power that reveals itself not in what a leader does,

00:00:04but in what a leader no longer has to do.

00:00:06For most of the past decade, Xi Jinping has exuded that power

00:00:10by largely stopping foreign travel, and the world came to him instead.

00:00:14Foreign leaders flew into Beijing, sat through the choreography, and flew home again.

00:00:19According to figures compiled by the Asia Society,

00:00:22Xi averaged around 14 overseas trips a year between 2013 and 2019,

00:00:27then cut that to roughly six a year between 2022 and 2025.

00:00:33In 2020, he left the country only once.

00:00:36In 2021, he didn't leave at all, ostensibly due to the COVID crisis,

00:00:40but the signal was unmistakable.

00:00:43The center of geopolitical gravity had moved, and it sat in Beijing,

00:00:47waiting for everyone else to arrive.

00:00:49So when Xi boarded a plane to Pyongyang at the start of June 2026,

00:00:55the destination rocked the news.

00:00:56This was his first visit to North Korea in seven years,

00:00:59and his first overseas trip of the entire year.

00:01:02It was a stunning switch.

00:01:04Xi, the man who makes the world come to him, instead,

00:01:07went to none other than Kim Jong-un.

00:01:10To understand why a leader who hoards his own movement so carefully

00:01:13could be tricked into spending that capital,

00:01:16traveling to the most isolated regime on Earth,

00:01:18we have to follow a chain of leverage.

00:01:20And that chain doesn't begin in Pyongyang or in Beijing,

00:01:24but on the artillery lines of eastern Ukraine.

00:01:26Let's start with the cage Kim Jong-un used to live in.

00:01:30For decades, North Korea was the textbook junior partner,

00:01:34and China held the keys.

00:01:35Estimates of Pyongyang's trade dependence on China vary,

00:01:38but they all point in the same direction.

00:01:41The National Committee on North Korea put it as high as 95% in a 2022 estimate.

00:01:46Another tally cited in 2026 still placed it above 90%.

00:01:51Whatever the precise figure,

00:01:52the implication is that North Korea was sanctioned,

00:01:55isolated, and economically tied to a single partner.

00:01:59Notably, trade represented a tiny portion of the country's economy

00:02:02due to sanctions forcing it to produce whatever it can domestically.

00:02:06But there's only so much you can make,

00:02:08and oil reserves are not something that North Korea has.

00:02:11Instead, many of the resources it relied upon came from China.

00:02:15Beijing would have two levers on North Korea.

00:02:18There was the economic one,

00:02:19the simple fact that it could tighten the flow of energy imports and trade,

00:02:23on which North Korea depended,

00:02:25limiting the country's ability to import critical goods

00:02:28and export its products abroad.

00:02:30And there was the diplomatic one,

00:02:32the denuclearization issue,

00:02:34which China could raise or lower as a way of managing its unruly neighbor

00:02:38and signaling to Washington that it had influence worth bargaining with.

00:02:42Kim had exactly one tree to hang from,

00:02:45and Beijing owned the tree.

00:02:47It's worth pausing to closer examine

00:02:49how hollowed the so-called alliance underneath all this always was,

00:02:53because it explains why China can't simply order Pyongyang to fall in line.

00:02:57On paper, the bond looks ironclad.

00:03:00Using the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Corporation, and Mutual Assistance,

00:03:04whose 65th anniversary falls this year,

00:03:07is the only formal military alliance treaty China still maintains with anyone,

00:03:11and it contains a clause obliging each side to come to the other's defense if attacked.

00:03:16But the lived reality has been far frostier than the document suggests,

00:03:20marked by long stretches of mutual suspicion.

00:03:23There's also a structural contradiction baked into the relationship

00:03:26that no treaty can paper over.

00:03:28Beijing has always wanted a North Korea that's obedient and stable,

00:03:32a buffer it can manage,

00:03:34not a North Korea that's genuinely powerful and unpredictable on its border.

00:03:38Pyongyang, for its part,

00:03:39has always wanted unconditional backing without strings,

00:03:42and has treated Chinese meddling in its internal affairs

00:03:45and its weapons program as a kind of soft intrusion to be resisted.

00:03:49As the International Crisis Group noted,

00:03:52Beijing has long been wary of helping build up North Korea's military,

00:03:55precisely because a militarily emboldened Pyongyang

00:03:58is a source of instability rather than an asset.

00:04:01And those two visions were always in tension.

00:04:04The war in Ukraine became an opening for Kim Jong-un

00:04:07to test the barriers of those visions

00:04:09and see how much China values having North Korea in its corner.

00:04:13And the reason for that is that Russia came into the war

00:04:15fully expecting not to need nearly as many resources as it did.

00:04:19But as you very well know,

00:04:21the invasion of Ukraine turned into a grinding artillery war,

00:04:24the kind that devours shells faster than a wartime economy can produce them.

00:04:29Moscow found itself short,

00:04:30and it went looking for ammunition wherever it could find it.

00:04:33The scale of what followed can even be followed through open-source evidence.

00:04:38The Open Source Centre, a UK-based research group,

00:04:41worked with Reuters to track the shipments using satellite imagery,

00:04:45and the Royal United Services Institute summarized the findings.

00:04:48Between roughly August 2023 and the spring of 2025,

00:04:53a small fleet of Russian-flagged vessels made on the order of 64 voyages

00:04:58falling around 15,800 shipping containers

00:05:01from the North Korean port of Rajin to Russia's Far East.

00:05:04Estimates suggest that the containers totaled between 4.2 and 5.8 million artillery rounds.

00:05:10By early 2026, that number went to a staggering 33,000 containers

00:05:15and an estimated 15 million rounds of 152mm shells.

00:05:20To put that number in perspective,

00:05:22Western and Ukrainian officials believe Russia's own factories

00:05:25produced no more than 2.3 million shells domestically in 2024.

00:05:30When we extrapolate this to the duration of the war and possible production,

00:05:34North Korea could have been supplying potentially around 40% of the ammunition Russia was firing.

00:05:39And some individual Russian artillery units,

00:05:42according to documents reviewed by Reuters,

00:05:44were running on between 50% and 100% North Korean rounds.

00:05:48But while this might all sound like background noise

00:05:51in the realm of the actual war in Ukraine,

00:05:53the industrial side of the feat is what makes it vital for North Korea-China relations.

00:05:58North Korea had a sanction-starved defense sector

00:06:00that the outside world had written off as a rusting Cold War relic.

00:06:05And suddenly, it had a guaranteed mega-customer

00:06:07with a practically bottomless appetite.

00:06:09The result is that the war in Ukraine,

00:06:11and the resulting need for ammunition were a stimulus program

00:06:14for the North Korean military industrial base,

00:06:17a reason to run the shell lines at full capacity,

00:06:19refurbish old plants,

00:06:21keep workers employed,

00:06:22and most importantly,

00:06:24get a stock of foreign currency.

00:06:25The war is also a live-fire laboratory.

00:06:28Every system North Korea ships east,

00:06:30and every soldier it rotates through the front,

00:06:32comes back in principle,

00:06:34with battlefield feedback

00:06:35that no amount of peacetime testing could buy.

00:06:37The production figures here are inferred from the export volumes,

00:06:41rather than measured directly inside North Korea,

00:06:44which remains one of the most opaque states on Earth.

00:06:46But the direction is clear.

00:06:48The war did for Pyongyang's arms industry,

00:06:50but no domestic policy ever could.

00:06:53And speaking of live-fire testing,

00:06:55there's also the tiny matter of North Korean soldiers,

00:06:57as they're part of the same upgrade.

00:06:59North Korea rotated troops into the theater,

00:07:01with outside estimates suggesting between 14,000 and 15,000 troops

00:07:06over the course of the war.

00:07:08Of those,

00:07:09it was estimated that North Korea lost a staggering 6,000 of them at least.

00:07:13And the very presence of North Korean troops

00:07:15in one of the most technologically-assisted wars

00:07:17has been poked fun at relentlessly.

00:07:20But beyond the grim reminder

00:07:21that they were used as frontline expendables,

00:07:24the deployments are a training pipeline,

00:07:26and a way for North Korea to get real-time insight

00:07:28into how military tactics worked in the 21st century.

00:07:32Remember, while technically in a frozen conflict with South Korea,

00:07:36North Korea's army hasn't been in a war since the 1950s

00:07:39and had no real way to train with modern militaries.

00:07:42And through all these,

00:07:43Kim got paid in a few different currencies at once.

00:07:46The first was cash,

00:07:47and the numbers floated by Seoul are striking.

00:07:50South Korea's Institute for National Security Strategy,

00:07:53a government-funded body,

00:07:54has estimated that Moscow may have paid North Korea

00:07:57as much as $14.4 billion for troop deployments and arms.

00:08:01The same analysis also suggests Pyongyang

00:08:04may have received only between $580 million

00:08:06and $1.5 billion of it in the form of actual goods,

00:08:10with the rest suspected to be equal trade

00:08:12of sensitive military technology.

00:08:15Analysts suggest technology transfers

00:08:17may have formed part of the compensation package,

00:08:19and it may matter more than money.

00:08:21The exact contents of the transfer are murky,

00:08:24and much of what circulates is informed speculation

00:08:26rather than confirmed fact.

00:08:28But the categories observers point to are consistent

00:08:31and include satellite and space launch assistance

00:08:33and air defense help.

00:08:35The third currency ties directly into why North Korea

00:08:38could suddenly break free from China's chokehold, oil.

00:08:42Before the war, China was the one and only supply of oil

00:08:45and petroleum products to North Korea,

00:08:47supplying the friendship pipeline

00:08:49so North Korea could run its one oil refinery

00:08:51for domestic needs.

00:08:52But a joint investigation by the outlets

00:08:55iStories and OCCRP,

00:08:57working again with the open-source center,

00:08:59found that in 2024,

00:09:01Russia covertly transported roughly 1.5 million barrels

00:09:05of petroleum products into North Korea,

00:09:07which is around triple the annual cap

00:09:09of the United Nations, had set for Pyongyang.

00:09:11These were paltry figures compared to Russia's oil exports

00:09:15and refining capacities,

00:09:16but it meant North Korea could get a vital boost in petroleum

00:09:19rather than relying on its official partner.

00:09:22The last currency is the one that breaks the old system entirely,

00:09:25and it's political.

00:09:26Russia has effectively walked away from the sanctions regime

00:09:30it once helped uphold,

00:09:31shielding North Korea at the United Nations,

00:09:33and in practical terms,

00:09:34treating it as a fellow nuclear weapons state.

00:09:37That recognition is worth more to Kim

00:09:39than any single shipment,

00:09:41because it validates the very arsenal

00:09:43that used to define his isolation.

00:09:45Days before Xi arrived,

00:09:47Kim's sister, Kim Yo-jong,

00:09:49publicly described the country's nuclear status

00:09:51as irreversible.

00:09:52By outside estimates,

00:09:54North Korea had somewhere around 60 warheads

00:09:56in mid-2026,

00:09:57and on the eve of the summit,

00:09:59Kim was photographed touring what state media billed

00:10:01as a weapons-grade nuclear materials facility

00:10:04and a uranium enrichment site.

00:10:06This is a regime that has stopped asking permission.

00:10:09Which brings us to the core of the story

00:10:11and where the lever of leverage turned.

00:10:14But before we get into the gritty details,

00:10:16make sure to subscribe to the military show

00:10:18to keep up with all the news in global geopolitics.

00:10:22Back to Kim Jong-un.

00:10:24China's economic grip on North Korea

00:10:26only ever worked because Pyongyang

00:10:28had nowhere else to go.

00:10:29It really didn't matter that North Korea's external trade

00:10:32was a fraction of its economy,

00:10:34but that most of that trade was funneled

00:10:36to a single country that could any point stop

00:10:38and leave it completely isolated.

00:10:40But for the first time since Kim took power in 2011,

00:10:44he now had an alternative.

00:10:45Russia can supply grain, fuel, cash, technology,

00:10:49and diplomatic cover.

00:10:50The leash that Beijing spent decades tightening went slack.

00:10:54Not because China did anything wrong,

00:10:56but because a second patron walked onto the field.

00:10:58And the moment a second buyer exists,

00:11:01the first buyer loses the ability to dictate terms.

00:11:04This is what reversed the polarity between Xi and Kim.

00:11:07Beijing's nightmare scenario

00:11:08is not that North Korea fires another missile.

00:11:11It's that North Korea drifts permanently into Russia's orbit

00:11:14and decouples from China for good,

00:11:17leaving Beijing with a nuclear-armed neighbor

00:11:19it no longer has any line into.

00:11:21Suddenly, it's China that needs the relationship stabilized,

00:11:24since it can actually lose globally

00:11:26from neglecting a neighbor that is at times

00:11:28too trigger-happy for its own good.

00:11:31And Kim has read into that anxiety precisely

00:11:33and can now charge for the privilege of soothing it.

00:11:36All he has to do was host the summit,

00:11:38allow a few warm lines into a joint statement,

00:11:41and let Xi return home with the ability

00:11:42to claim that Beijing still influences Pyongyang.

00:11:46In exchange, the analysts watching this

00:11:48expect the tangible things Kim actually wants.

00:11:51The telling part is that North Korea

00:11:53now has more connections to the world,

00:11:55as China resumed a six-year block

00:11:57on the cross-border railway service

00:11:58between Beijing and Pyongyang in March 2026.

00:12:02That train carries passengers,

00:12:04but it also carries currency and geopolitical insight

00:12:07into one of the most powerful nations in the world.

00:12:10Which brings us to the visit itself

00:12:12and why it was so important.

00:12:14Xi was the one who traveled.

00:12:16A leader who has spent years making the world come to him

00:12:19got on the plane and went,

00:12:21and he went largely on Kim's terms.

00:12:23Notably, nowhere in the visit was the discussion

00:12:25on North Korea's nuclear armament

00:12:27and possible demilitarization.

00:12:30The Brookings Institution analyzed the summit

00:12:32and noted that while Chinese officials

00:12:34still say denuclearization remains the official line,

00:12:37Beijing has stopped emphasizing it in public.

00:12:40This is precisely because Pyongyang

00:12:42has flatly rejected it,

00:12:43and Russia has supported North Korea

00:12:45as a nuclear-armed nation.

00:12:47Pushing the denuclearization issue

00:12:49only risks alienating Kim

00:12:51at the worst possible moment.

00:12:53For the Kim regime,

00:12:54the takeaway is that Beijing

00:12:55is no longer willing to make the relationship

00:12:57conditional on the nuclear question.

00:13:00Instead, China is basically going to need

00:13:02to find another way to curb its smallest neighbor

00:13:04into submission.

00:13:05That alone is a major strategic win for Pyongyang.

00:13:09The fact that Xi chose North Korea

00:13:11as his first foreign destination of the year

00:13:13was itself suggested as an endorsement,

00:13:16a gift of legitimacy handed to Kim

00:13:18both at home and abroad.

00:13:20There is a symbolic shift buried in the language, too.

00:13:23The old framing of this relationship

00:13:24leaned on the imagery of comrades and brothers,

00:13:27with an unmistakable hierarchy underneath it,

00:13:29an elder and a junior.

00:13:31The reporting around this summit

00:13:32increasingly describes something flatter,

00:13:35a strategic partnership between actors

00:13:37who mind their own interests.

00:13:38If we look past the verbiage,

00:13:40it's actually a demotion for Beijing.

00:13:42It's no longer an older brother

00:13:44to a dependent North Korea,

00:13:46but a strategic partner for a nation

00:13:48that now has economic opportunities,

00:13:50whether those were created

00:13:51by its own ambitions or not.

00:13:53But while the China-North Korea relations

00:13:55dynamics have changed,

00:13:57it's also important to discuss

00:13:59how that affects global geopolitics,

00:14:01particularly with the US.

00:14:03Part of what Beijing has historically gotten out

00:14:05of the North Korea relationship

00:14:07is a chip to play against the United States.

00:14:09As a trading partner,

00:14:11it was one power that could restrain Pyongyang,

00:14:13and therefore a partner

00:14:14Washington needs to keep on side.

00:14:16But that chip works only if China

00:14:18can actually deliver restraint.

00:14:20After Xi met with President Donald Trump

00:14:22earlier in 2026,

00:14:24the American and Chinese accounts

00:14:26of what was discussed diverged tellingly

00:14:28on exactly this issue,

00:14:30with Washington keeping the language

00:14:31of denuclearization front and center,

00:14:34while Beijing's framing pushed it to the margins.

00:14:36If Xi wants to keep using North Korea

00:14:38as leverage with the Americans

00:14:40but can't actually control that leverage,

00:14:42then a visit to Pyongyang

00:14:43serves a purpose beyond bilateral warmth.

00:14:46It's a performance of influence

00:14:48staged partly for an audience in Washington.

00:14:50The trouble is that performing influence

00:14:52and possessing it are not the same thing,

00:14:54and Kim knows the difference better than anyone.

00:14:57And just so the point wouldn't be missed,

00:14:59Kim made one with hardware.

00:15:01North Korea carried out a salvo

00:15:02of short-range ballistic missiles in late May,

00:15:05shortly before the visit was even announced.

00:15:08This fits a long-running pattern in the playbook,

00:15:10the habit of firing something into the sea

00:15:12right before a major meeting,

00:15:14as if to communicate that North Korea

00:15:15keeps its own schedule,

00:15:17whether the guest comes or not.

00:15:19If China had more control of North Korea,

00:15:21it could postpone the visit

00:15:22or force it to stop the showcase

00:15:24of its missile armament.

00:15:26But since China needed Korea's assistance,

00:15:28the entire thing was swept under the rug.

00:15:30So does the title hold up?

00:15:32Did Kim fool Xi?

00:15:34The honest answer is more interesting

00:15:36than a simple yes.

00:15:37There was no real con

00:15:38where Kim tricked Xi with a false promise.

00:15:41What instead happened was that

00:15:42by the time Xi sat down in Pyongyang,

00:15:44there was no good move left to make.

00:15:46North Korea now had all the leverage,

00:15:48accumulated from Russia sending vital supplies

00:15:51and giving North Korea's industry

00:15:52something to export to someone other than China.

00:15:55However, it's important to note

00:15:57that it's not that China simply lost.

00:16:00The Russia windfall has a ceiling

00:16:01and it may be approaching.

00:16:03By late 2025,

00:16:04Ukrainian military intelligence was reporting

00:16:07that North Korean shell deliveries

00:16:08had fallen sharply.

00:16:10The report suggested that Pyongyang's reserves

00:16:12had fallen to the point

00:16:13where the country couldn't keep up

00:16:15with its domestic production

00:16:16and maintain the stockpile.

00:16:18We should note that this is

00:16:19a Ukrainian government assessment

00:16:21and later reports indicated

00:16:22that the transport has reached higher levels

00:16:25in early 2026.

00:16:27But this points to the fact

00:16:28that an economy built on selling shells

00:16:30into someone else's war

00:16:31is hostage to that war.

00:16:33Russia's progress in the war

00:16:35completely stalled in 2026,

00:16:37with March being the first month

00:16:39since Ukraine's 2023 counter-offensive

00:16:41that Kyiv managed to take more territory

00:16:43than it lost.

00:16:45Russia is faced with a degradation

00:16:46of its artillery capabilities,

00:16:49stemming from either losing

00:16:50or wearing out artillery systems.

00:16:52If there's nothing to fire the artillery,

00:16:54there's no need to import as much

00:16:56from North Korea,

00:16:57and Kim's leverage decreases as a result.

00:16:59North Korea understands this,

00:17:01which is why it's reportedly shifting

00:17:03toward drone production

00:17:04and sending workers to Russian factories.

00:17:06It's trying to convert

00:17:08a one-time artillery ammunition deal

00:17:10into something more durable.

00:17:12From there,

00:17:13North Korea's economy

00:17:14could become inadvertently entwined

00:17:16with Russia's military-industrial complex

00:17:18as a whole.

00:17:18And the Russian effort

00:17:19will keep running on all cylinders

00:17:21regardless of how the war goes,

00:17:23since it literally can't afford to stop

00:17:25and give the impression

00:17:26that it will concede to Ukraine,

00:17:28a country that it invaded.

00:17:30The second caveat

00:17:31is that Putin is not Kim's friend either.

00:17:33He uses North Korea

00:17:35as much as Beijing once did,

00:17:37and there are analysts

00:17:37who suspect Moscow is happy

00:17:39to dangle Pyongyang in front of China,

00:17:41partly to keep Beijing off balance.

00:17:43Kim is balancing between two larger powers

00:17:46that both want to use him,

00:17:47and that balancing act

00:17:48is precarious by nature.

00:17:50The whole strategy depends

00:17:51on keeping both patrons convinced

00:17:53they can't afford to lose him,

00:17:55and that's a difficult posture

00:17:56to hold indefinitely.

00:17:58And the third caveat

00:17:59is that some analysts

00:18:00framed the meeting

00:18:01as one where both leaders

00:18:02walked away with something.

00:18:04Kim got legitimacy

00:18:05and a relationship

00:18:06freed from the nuclear condition.

00:18:08Xi got to reassert

00:18:09that China remained Pyongyang's

00:18:11indispensable economic partner,

00:18:13and to remind Washington,

00:18:14after his own recent meetings

00:18:16with Trump and Putin,

00:18:17that Beijing is still

00:18:18a central player in the region.

00:18:20China is effectively

00:18:21maintaining the status quo,

00:18:23and it would take

00:18:23something extraordinary

00:18:24for North Korea

00:18:25to be able to nudge that balance

00:18:27beyond symbolic gestures.

00:18:29So where does this triangle

00:18:30go from here?

00:18:31The next move is already visible

00:18:33if you know where to look.

00:18:35The first signal arrives

00:18:36in July 2026.

00:18:38That's when the 1961 treaty

00:18:40marks its 65th anniversary,

00:18:42and the question is

00:18:43whether Beijing puts

00:18:44anything concrete

00:18:45behind the warm words.

00:18:46Anything from an arms sale,

00:18:48an air defense package,

00:18:49or a joint naval drill,

00:18:51something that China

00:18:52particularly likes

00:18:52performing now and again.

00:18:54All of those would shift

00:18:55the balance toward China

00:18:56being Korea's main host,

00:18:58but the absence of it

00:18:58would be equally telling.

00:19:00The second signal

00:19:01is the rhythm

00:19:02of North Korea's missile tests.

00:19:04If Kim keeps launching

00:19:05on his own schedule,

00:19:06it suggests Beijing's influence

00:19:08is still more performance

00:19:09than substance.

00:19:09And the deepest question

00:19:11is one the war itself

00:19:12will answer,

00:19:13whether Kim can convert

00:19:14a one-time artillery windfall

00:19:16into something durable

00:19:17before the fighting winds down

00:19:19and the Russian dividend deflates,

00:19:21which is exactly why

00:19:22those North Korean workers

00:19:23reportedly heading

00:19:24to Russia's drone plant

00:19:25may matter more

00:19:26than any single summit photograph.

00:19:29China's military expansion plans

00:19:31continue to progress

00:19:32at a remarkable rate,

00:19:33with Beijing desperate

00:19:34to close the gap

00:19:35between itself

00:19:36and the United States

00:19:37ahead of a possible conflict

00:19:38between the two superpowers.

00:19:40It's built both the largest navy

00:19:42and the largest army on Earth

00:19:44and regularly shows off

00:19:45its latest and greatest innovations

00:19:47from AI-integrated swarm drones

00:19:49to hypersonic missiles.

00:19:51But as Beijing scrambles

00:19:52to catch up,

00:19:53the US isn't simply standing still.

00:19:55It's making some major improvements

00:19:57of its own

00:19:58to maintain its status

00:19:59as the world's

00:20:00mightiest military power.

00:20:02One of those improvements

00:20:03represents a massive problem

00:20:04for China's record-setting navy

00:20:06as the US just transformed

00:20:08the B-2 spirit

00:20:09into an invisible fleet destroyer,

00:20:11with the power to cut

00:20:12Beijing's naval force

00:20:13down to size

00:20:14from literally hundreds of miles away.

00:20:16As arguably the most iconic bomber

00:20:18ever created,

00:20:20the B-2 requires little introduction.

00:20:22Its distinctive flying wing silhouette

00:20:24is instantly recognizable

00:20:25around the globe,

00:20:26and its extraordinary stealth capabilities

00:20:28have made it

00:20:29one of the most fearsome

00:20:30and effective aircraft of all time.

00:20:33Capable of penetrating enemy airspace

00:20:35without being seen,

00:20:36this aircraft has proven its worth

00:20:38on countless occasions,

00:20:39having played a leading role

00:20:40in numerous conflicts

00:20:42since entering service in 1997.

00:20:44It was used in the Kosovo War

00:20:46in 1999, for example,

00:20:49as well as the wars in Iraq,

00:20:50Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen,

00:20:52and more recently in Iran.

00:20:54For much of its time in service,

00:20:56however,

00:20:56the B-2 has generally been used

00:20:58to strike land-based targets

00:20:59like Serbian military infrastructure

00:21:01in Kosovo,

00:21:02Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan,

00:21:04and underground nuclear facilities in Iran.

00:21:07It's proven remarkably effective

00:21:09when it comes to destroying

00:21:10the likes of bunkers, bases,

00:21:12and air defenses.

00:21:13Yet,

00:21:14it was never regarded

00:21:15as a serious anti-ship asset.

00:21:17Even though it had the potential

00:21:19to wipe out warships

00:21:20and other naval assets,

00:21:21thanks to its vast payload capacity,

00:21:23impressive range,

00:21:24and stealth capabilities,

00:21:25there was always one big issue

00:21:27holding the B-2 back,

00:21:28a lack of maritime munitions.

00:21:30If the U.S. wanted to bomb a warship

00:21:32with a B-2 in years gone by,

00:21:34it would have had to rely

00:21:35on gravity-driven smart bombs

00:21:37like the GBU-31 J-DAM.

00:21:39And if a B-2 wanted to hit

00:21:41a moving warship with a J-DAM,

00:21:43it would have had to fly

00:21:43almost directly over its target

00:21:45before dropping its payload.

00:21:47Even though the B-2

00:21:48has such advanced stealth features,

00:21:50flying so close to enemy vessels

00:21:52could still be an incredibly risky maneuver,

00:21:54potentially exposing the bomber

00:21:55to an array of radars

00:21:57and integrated air defense systems.

00:21:59What's more,

00:22:00even though they're incredibly accurate

00:22:02against fixed targets,

00:22:03J-DAMs lack the necessary components

00:22:05like infrared seeker heads

00:22:07and active radar systems

00:22:08to actively track and home in

00:22:10on enemy vessels at sea.

00:22:12Because of these limitations,

00:22:14the B-2 was largely relegated

00:22:15to a backseat role

00:22:16when it came to counter-maritime missions,

00:22:18with the likes of the B-1B Lancer

00:22:20being used instead.

00:22:22In 2025, however,

00:22:24the U.S. military flipped the script.

00:22:26A test took place

00:22:27sometime in late April

00:22:28near Eglin Air Force Base

00:22:30in northwest Florida,

00:22:31in which a B-2 bomber dropped

00:22:33a 500-pound quicksync maritime weapon.

00:22:36Quicksync is a modified J-DAM

00:22:38designed specifically

00:22:39to deal with naval targets.

00:22:41The way it works

00:22:41is remarkably effective.

00:22:43First, a target is identified,

00:22:45typically with the aid

00:22:46of maritime patrol

00:22:47and reconnaissance aircraft,

00:22:49at the P-8 Poseidon,

00:22:50which then relays the target's coordinates

00:22:52to the strike aircraft,

00:22:54like a B-2 bomber.

00:22:55The bomber then closes distance

00:22:57on its target

00:22:57and drops its payload from above.

00:22:59Just like a standard J-DAM,

00:23:01the quicksync then relies

00:23:02on its built-in GPS

00:23:03and inertial navigation systems

00:23:05to travel towards

00:23:06the target's last known location.

00:23:09Once it enters range,

00:23:10the bomb's

00:23:10weapon-open systems architecture,

00:23:13WOSA,

00:23:13imaging infrared seeker,

00:23:15kicks in

00:23:15to help it home in

00:23:16on its target.

00:23:18It scans the surrounding area,

00:23:19looking for a ship

00:23:20with the same dimensions

00:23:21and thermal signature

00:23:22as the one it's aiming for,

00:23:24then provides real-time

00:23:25course corrections

00:23:26to track the vessel

00:23:27as it moves.

00:23:28But the quicksync

00:23:29doesn't simply collide

00:23:30with the side of its target

00:23:31or strike it from above.

00:23:33Instead,

00:23:34it actually dives down

00:23:35into the water

00:23:35beside the ship

00:23:36using a delayed action fuse

00:23:38to detonate

00:23:39right beside the hull.

00:23:40The resulting blast

00:23:41generates a large shockwave,

00:23:42which is typically strong enough

00:23:44to lift the ship's hull

00:23:45out of the water

00:23:46and blow a hole in its base.

00:23:47In effect,

00:23:48it breaks the ship's back,

00:23:50which generally leads

00:23:51to its sinking

00:23:51in a matter of seconds,

00:23:53hence the quicksync name.

00:23:54This was huge news

00:23:55at the time,

00:23:56with General David Alvin,

00:23:58the US Air Force's

00:23:59chief of staff,

00:24:00writing on X,

00:24:01We unleashed a new

00:24:02quicksync weapon,

00:24:03which significantly enhances

00:24:04our ability

00:24:05to strike stationary

00:24:06or moving surface vessels.

00:24:08This is a true game-changer

00:24:10for the Department of Defense

00:24:11and is exactly what

00:24:12President Donald Trump

00:24:13means by peace

00:24:14through strength.

00:24:15It clearly solved

00:24:16the pre-existing problem

00:24:17of the B-2

00:24:18being unable to reliably

00:24:19strike moving targets at sea

00:24:21and it was a significant

00:24:22upgrade to the bomber's

00:24:23capabilities.

00:24:24Even at the time,

00:24:25however,

00:24:26some expert observers

00:24:27question how effective

00:24:28the quicksync could be

00:24:29against the Chinese Navy,

00:24:31given its vast size

00:24:32and advanced air defense

00:24:33capabilities.

00:24:34Tom Sugart,

00:24:35for example,

00:24:36a former US Navy

00:24:37submarine warfare officer

00:24:38and senior fellow

00:24:40at the Center

00:24:40for a New American Society,

00:24:42wrote online

00:24:42that he would be pretty

00:24:43surprised if the US military

00:24:45would risk flying a B-2 bomber

00:24:46close enough to Chinese warships

00:24:48to drop a bomb of this kind,

00:24:50adding,

00:24:51Are we a thousand percent

00:24:52sure that their air defense

00:24:53systems aren't going to get a sniff?

00:24:55That same question

00:24:56was echoed by many other

00:24:58military experts,

00:24:59who were generally thrilled

00:25:00to see the B-2 expand

00:25:01its arsenal,

00:25:02but also concerned

00:25:03that it might not provide

00:25:04much value

00:25:05in a hypothetical conflict

00:25:06with China,

00:25:07given that each B-2

00:25:08is valued at approximately

00:25:092 billion dollars

00:25:10and there are only 19

00:25:11of these bombers

00:25:12in service today,

00:25:13it stands to reason

00:25:14that the Air Force

00:25:15would be reluctant

00:25:16to put such a rare

00:25:17and valuable asset

00:25:18into an unnecessarily risky situation

00:25:20when other more sensible

00:25:21alternatives still existed.

00:25:23In short,

00:25:24the addition of the quicksync

00:25:25was undoubtedly a step

00:25:27in the right direction,

00:25:28but perhaps not quite a large enough

00:25:29step to make a real difference.

00:25:32Fortunately,

00:25:32the US wasn't done there.

00:25:34Behind the scenes,

00:25:35the military was working

00:25:36on another arsenal addition

00:25:37to the B-2 Spirit,

00:25:39one that would elevate

00:25:40its capacities

00:25:40to far greater heights.

00:25:42One that would take

00:25:43this already legendary aircraft

00:25:45to an even greater level

00:25:46of operational excellence

00:25:47and transform it

00:25:48into the perfect counter

00:25:49for China's rapidly

00:25:51expanding naval force.

00:25:52The AGM-158C

00:25:55long-range anti-ship missile

00:25:57L'Erasm,

00:25:58an air-launch

00:25:59anti-ship cruise missile

00:26:00that was developed

00:26:01by the Defense Advanced

00:26:02Research Projects Agency

00:26:04DARPA in the 2010s,

00:26:06and entered service in 2018

00:26:08with the US Air Force and Navy.

00:26:10Measuring up at an estimated

00:26:1114 feet or 4.26 meters in length,

00:26:15with a wingspan of 8 feet 10 inches

00:26:17or 2.7 meters

00:26:18and a weight of 2,760 pounds

00:26:21or 1,250 kilograms,

00:26:24the L'Erasm is one of the most advanced

00:26:26anti-ship munitions

00:26:27in existence today.

00:26:28It's powered by a Williams F-107

00:26:31WR-105 turbofan engine,

00:26:33which allows it to reach

00:26:34high subsonic speeds

00:26:36of around Mach 0.9 690 miles per hour

00:26:39or 1,111 kilometers per hour,

00:26:42and it boasts an operational range

00:26:44of up to 500 nautical miles

00:26:46or 926 kilometers.

00:26:48With GPS and inertial navigation systems,

00:26:51combined with infrared

00:26:52and electro-optical sensors

00:26:54plus AI guidance technology,

00:26:56the L'Erasm is extraordinarily precise,

00:26:59capable of striking

00:27:00within less than 10 feet

00:27:01or 3 meters of its target

00:27:03every time.

00:27:04And since it's fitted

00:27:05with a whopping 1,000 pound,

00:27:07453 kilogram WDU-42B

00:27:10He-Blast Fragmentation Warhead,

00:27:13it packs more than enough firepower

00:27:14to eliminate even the largest

00:27:16modern warships,

00:27:17including cruisers and destroyers.

00:27:19On top of all this,

00:27:20the L'Erasm also incorporates

00:27:22the kind of stealth technology

00:27:23seen on aircraft like the B-2 itself.

00:27:26It boasts a low-observable airframe

00:27:28with a minimized radar cross-section

00:27:30to help it evade detection

00:27:31as it travels through hostile airspace

00:27:33and also uses passive electronic

00:27:35support measures

00:27:36and radio frequency sensors

00:27:38to help it home in on its targets

00:27:39without emitting easily detectable signals

00:27:42on its approach.

00:27:43All of these features

00:27:44make the L'Erasm

00:27:45one of the biggest threats

00:27:46to even the strongest

00:27:47naval fleets on the planet,

00:27:48but for the first several years

00:27:50of its existence,

00:27:51it could only be launched

00:27:52by a small selection of platforms,

00:27:54including the B-1 Lancer,

00:27:56the F-A-18EF Super Hornet

00:27:58and the F-35 Lightning II.

00:28:00In June 2026,

00:28:02the B-2 Spirit officially joined the list.

00:28:04But before we get into

00:28:05how that happened

00:28:06and what it means,

00:28:08the military show

00:28:08brings you the full picture,

00:28:10not just the headlines.

00:28:11Hit subscribe

00:28:12to stay ahead of the curve.

00:28:13On June 29, 2026,

00:28:17the United States Air Force

00:28:18Global Strike Command,

00:28:19published an astonishing report

00:28:21revealing that the Pacific Air Forces

00:28:23had conducted a live-fire sinking exercise

00:28:25using the B-2 Spirit

00:28:27and a long-range anti-ship missile.

00:28:29The exercise took place

00:28:30just north of the Mariana Islands,

00:28:32not far from the U.S. island territory of Guam,

00:28:35one of America's most crucial strategic hubs

00:28:37in the Western Pacific.

00:28:39It was part of the Valiant Shield 26 exercise,

00:28:42the latest edition

00:28:43of the Valiant Shield War Games,

00:28:45which are among the largest

00:28:46U.S. military exercises

00:28:47to take place in the Pacific Ocean

00:28:49and have been running since 2006.

00:28:52According to detailed reports of the event,

00:28:54the exercise involved the B-2 firing

00:28:56a single lorasm at the USS Juno,

00:28:59an Austin-class amphibious transport dock

00:29:01that was laid down in 1965

00:29:03and launched a year later in 1966.

00:29:06Nicknamed the Mighty J,

00:29:08the Juno completed numerous deployments

00:29:10during the Vietnam War

00:29:11and was also involved

00:29:12in both Operation Desert Shield

00:29:14and Operation Desert Storm

00:29:15during the Iraq War.

00:29:17After decades of service,

00:29:18this amphibious transport dock

00:29:20was officially decommissioned in 2008

00:29:22and in 2026,

00:29:24it was selected as a target ship

00:29:26to be sunk in Valiant Shield.

00:29:27It was struck by a Harpoon missile,

00:29:30fired by a Navy P-8A Poseidon,

00:29:32as well as a torpedo launch

00:29:33from a Japanese submarine

00:29:34in addition to the B-2's lorasm

00:29:37and sank to the briny depths of the Pacific,

00:29:39never to be seen again.

00:29:41This was a huge leap forward for the B-2

00:29:43and it's incredibly encouraging

00:29:45from a U.S. perspective

00:29:46to see that this test was successful.

00:29:49It proves not only that the B-2

00:29:51can be equipped with lorasm

00:29:52but it can be trusted to use them effectively

00:29:54to disable and destroy naval targets.

00:29:57And that's so vital

00:29:58when it comes to helping the U.S. prepare

00:30:00for a possible confrontation with China.

00:30:03As General Kevin B. Schneider,

00:30:05commander of the Pacific Air Forces, notes,

00:30:07the B-2's impressive performance

00:30:09underscores the U.S. military's commitment

00:30:11to adaptability and flexibility

00:30:12in the face of emerging security challenges.

00:30:16By prioritizing counter-maritime strike operations,

00:30:19we can maintain a decisive edge over adversaries,

00:30:21protect our national interests,

00:30:23and ensure the free and open Pacific

00:30:25that underpins our global security.

00:30:27This is a far bigger upgrade

00:30:29than the Quicksync for several key reasons.

00:30:31Arguably the most important of them all is range.

00:30:34The issue with Quicksync and other bombs

00:30:36is that they have to be dropped

00:30:37from relatively close distances to the target.

00:30:40Even with a stealthy aircraft like the B-2,

00:30:43the closer you get to the enemy,

00:30:44the greater the risk becomes

00:30:45of them being able to detect you and fire at you.

00:30:48The lorasm removes that risk entirely.

00:30:50Since it has a massive operational range

00:30:53of up to 500 nautical miles,

00:30:55it can be launched from safe standoff distances.

00:30:58Theoretically, for example,

00:31:00the U.S. Air Force could deploy its B-2 bomber fleet

00:31:02to reasonably safe locations

00:31:04hundreds of miles off the coast of China,

00:31:06above the likes of the South China Sea,

00:31:08East China Sea, or even the Philippine Sea,

00:31:11and fire lorasm directly

00:31:12at any of the People's Liberation Navy's

00:31:14three-fleet command headquarters,

00:31:16which are situated in Qingdao to the north,

00:31:19Ningbo in the east,

00:31:20and Zhangjiang to the south.

00:31:22Since the B-2 is virtually invisible in the air,

00:31:24China's radars and defenses

00:31:26would have an immensely tough time

00:31:27spotting these aircraft

00:31:28as they make their approach.

00:31:30Then, upon releasing their payloads,

00:31:32the B-2s could swiftly retreat,

00:31:34vanishing from view in the blink of an eye,

00:31:36and heading back to Guam

00:31:37or other American air bases

00:31:38in locations like Japan, South Korea,

00:31:41and the Indian Ocean territory of Diego Garcia.

00:31:43Of course, the issue of launching missiles

00:31:45from so far away

00:31:46is that it can give the enemy

00:31:48more time and opportunities to react,

00:31:50using their own radars and air defenses

00:31:52to detect and disable the munition

00:31:54before it reaches its target.

00:31:56Fortunately, the lorasm is well-equipped

00:31:58to counteract that challenge as well.

00:32:00Its low observable stealth profile

00:32:03gives it a greater-than-average chance

00:32:04of bypassing even relatively dense anti-access

00:32:07and aerial denial networks,

00:32:09while its autonomous capabilities

00:32:11and passive sensor technology

00:32:13makes it harder to spot

00:32:14as it closes the distance on its targets.

00:32:17Often, these missiles don't emit

00:32:18any major detectable signals

00:32:20until the terminal phase of their flight,

00:32:22and by that point,

00:32:23it's usually already too late

00:32:25for the enemy to do anything about it.

00:32:27Beijing does boast some of the most advanced

00:32:29air defense systems in the world,

00:32:31though their reliability

00:32:31has been called into question in the past,

00:32:34so they may still be able to spot

00:32:36and eliminate some of these missiles

00:32:37before they collide with PLA warships.

00:32:40However, experts estimate

00:32:42that the B-2 could carry up to 16 lorasmus at a time,

00:32:45thanks to its vast internal weapons base.

00:32:48That would enable a single bomber

00:32:50to threaten 16 separate warships at once.

00:32:52A single salvo could wipe out an entire PLA surface action group.

00:32:57Alternatively, multiple missiles could be fired

00:33:00at particularly high-value targets,

00:33:01like the Type O-55-class destroyers,

00:33:04which are ranked among the very best in the world,

00:33:06boasting a staggering 112 vertical launch cells,

00:33:10or one of Beijing's growing collection of aircraft carriers.

00:33:13Again, even if some of those missiles

00:33:15were intercepted en route,

00:33:16there's an extremely high chance

00:33:18that others would manage to make it through,

00:33:19thanks to their advanced sensors and AI guidance systems

00:33:22that allow for mid-air course corrections

00:33:24and evasive maneuvers.

00:33:26When launched in groups,

00:33:28lorasmus are even able to effectively communicate

00:33:30with one another,

00:33:31sharing data via a secure data link

00:33:33in order to fine-tune their flight paths

00:33:35and avoid enemy defenses.

00:33:37They also follow sea-skimming flight profiles

00:33:39during the final stages of their approach,

00:33:42which makes them even more difficult

00:33:43to detect and eliminate,

00:33:44and thanks to their infrared imaging,

00:33:46they're also able to strike

00:33:47the most vulnerable parts of enemy vessels,

00:33:50meaning that every successful impact

00:33:51has the highest possible chance

00:33:53of causing a ship to sink.

00:33:55According to statistics

00:33:56from the U.S. Department of Defense,

00:33:58China operates approximately 370 warships,

00:34:01and its fleet continues to expand

00:34:03with each passing year,

00:34:04with projections of around 435 ships by 2030.

00:34:08But if that fleet comes against

00:34:10American B-2 bombers

00:34:11loaded with full complements

00:34:12of long-range anti-ship missiles,

00:34:14its numbers could go down incredibly quickly.

00:34:17And the U.S. is already taking steps

00:34:19to ensure it has more than enough

00:34:21of these missiles to threaten

00:34:22not just part of Beijing's fleet,

00:34:24but its entire navy.

00:34:26In April of 2026,

00:34:28news reports revealed that the navy

00:34:29was looking to spend close to a billion dollars

00:34:32on lorasm production.

00:34:33And this wasn't a one-off,

00:34:35it was part of a broader trend.

00:34:37The navy's FY2026 budget request

00:34:40included roughly a billion dollars

00:34:41to procure 200 lorasmis,

00:34:43a sharp increase from the 91 missiles

00:34:45it procured in FY2024.

00:34:48To be more precise,

00:34:49the FY2027 budget request

00:34:51submitted to Congress

00:34:52included funding for 177 of these missiles

00:34:56at a cost of around $907 million.

00:34:58That's three consecutive years

00:35:00of buying some of the world's

00:35:01most capable anti-ship missiles

00:35:03in substantial quantities.

00:35:05That sends a message,

00:35:06loud and clear,

00:35:07to Beijing and America's other enemies

00:35:09around the world.

00:35:10It doesn't matter how many warships you build,

00:35:12how big your navies become,

00:35:14how much power you try to project

00:35:16across the ocean waves,

00:35:17the US military will always have the upper hand.

00:35:20It will always have the munitions it needs

00:35:22to send your vessels to the ocean floor,

00:35:24and there's nothing you can do to stop that.

00:35:26Even if you invest in bigger and better defences,

00:35:29these missiles are smart enough to evade them.

00:35:31Even if you layer those defences,

00:35:33the US has enough missiles to overwhelm them.

00:35:35Even if you try to target the launch platforms

00:35:38and prevent the missiles from being fired

00:35:40in the first place,

00:35:41the US can now launch them

00:35:42from one of the greatest stealth bombers ever made,

00:35:45which is almost impossible to detect,

00:35:47even when it's in your own airspace.

00:35:49In short,

00:35:49the US military has thought of everything.

00:35:52It covered every base

00:35:53and countered every possibility.

00:35:55In combining a world-leading missile

00:35:57with a world-leading launch platform,

00:35:59it's created the ultimate fleet destroyer.

00:36:01And the most astonishing part is

00:36:03that it could still take this concept

00:36:05to even greater levels,

00:36:06as there's every possibility

00:36:07that the B-2's successor,

00:36:09the B-21 Raider,

00:36:10could also have the capability

00:36:12to fire the very same long-range

00:36:13anti-ship missiles too,

00:36:15giving the Air Force

00:36:16even more launch platforms

00:36:18with even greater stealth technologies.

00:36:20For years,

00:36:21fears had been rising

00:36:22about China's naval expansion

00:36:23and the fact that the US

00:36:25seemingly couldn't keep up

00:36:26with Beijing's remarkable rate of shipbuilding.

00:36:28For decades,

00:36:30China has poured billions upon billions of dollars

00:36:33into modernizing its military.

00:36:35It's done everything in its power

00:36:36to construct a fighting force

00:36:38that could be capable

00:36:39of challenging its greatest rival,

00:36:41the United States of America.

00:36:43Its officials regularly show off

00:36:45their latest missile systems

00:36:46and boast of their world-leading forces,

00:36:49hoping to strike fear

00:36:50into the hearts of their enemies

00:36:51and intimidate any nation

00:36:53that might dare to defy them.

00:36:55But beneath Beijing's bluster and bravado

00:36:58lies a far harsher truth.

00:37:00China's military is nowhere near as strong

00:37:02as it's made out to be.

00:37:04And without even firing a single shot,

00:37:06the US has repeatedly dismantled

00:37:08China's military strategies

00:37:10and shaken its confidence,

00:37:11forcing Beijing back to the drawing board

00:37:14time and time again.

00:37:15It happened in the 1990s,

00:37:17it happened in the 2000s,

00:37:19and it's happening again as we speak.

00:37:22That's the argument put forward

00:37:23in a damning report written by Miles Yu,

00:37:26senior fellow and director

00:37:28of the China Center at Hudson Institute.

00:37:31Having served as China policy advisor

00:37:33to the US government

00:37:34and dedicated his life

00:37:35to the study of Chinese military

00:37:37and strategic culture,

00:37:39Yu is one of the world's preeminent experts

00:37:41in this particular field.

00:37:43When he talks, people listen.

00:37:45And in March of 2026,

00:37:47he concluded that Chinese military decisions

00:37:50are reactive, not proactive.

00:37:52He argued that instead of Beijing

00:37:54acting on its own initiative,

00:37:56its entire defense investment strategy

00:37:58is directly linked to the actions

00:38:00of the United States.

00:38:02Every time the US demonstrates

00:38:04military superiority,

00:38:05Beijing suffers a subsequent period

00:38:07of panic, purge,

00:38:08and absolute instability

00:38:10as it realizes how far behind

00:38:13it actually is.

00:38:14As Yu puts it,

00:38:15From the Persian Gulf War

00:38:17to more recent confrontations

00:38:18involving Iran and Venezuela,

00:38:21American battlefield dominance

00:38:22has repeatedly exposed

00:38:24systemic weaknesses

00:38:25in China's military-industrial complex,

00:38:28forcing cycles of hurried modernization,

00:38:30internal crisis,

00:38:31and political purges.

00:38:33In other words,

00:38:34the US doesn't even need

00:38:36to attack China directly

00:38:37to prove how much stronger it is.

00:38:39It simply goes about its business,

00:38:41conducting operations in locations

00:38:43like Latin America and the Middle East,

00:38:45achieving its objectives swiftly,

00:38:47and putting its military innovations

00:38:49into real-world combat conditions

00:38:51to demonstrate their value

00:38:53beyond any shadow of doubt.

00:38:55China, meanwhile,

00:38:56observes these events as they unfold.

00:38:58It watches as the sheer weight

00:39:00of American military might

00:39:02overwhelms every enemy in its path.

00:39:04It sees US forces operate

00:39:06with such remarkable efficiency

00:39:08that they often suffer

00:39:09only the most minimal of losses,

00:39:11even while carrying out

00:39:12offensive operations

00:39:13in the most hostile of territories,

00:39:15like the 2026 war in Iran.

00:39:18And when Beijing sees all of that,

00:39:20it gets frightened.

00:39:22Yu cites several notable examples

00:39:24of this pattern in action.

00:39:25The first is the 1991 Gulf War.

00:39:28China played no notable role

00:39:30in that conflict.

00:39:31After the war was over,

00:39:33it was found to have violated

00:39:34United Nations resolutions

00:39:36by taking steps to rearm Iraq.

00:39:38But during the war itself,

00:39:40China strongly condemned

00:39:41Iraq's invasion of Kuwait

00:39:43and showed support

00:39:44for the coalition forces,

00:39:45which included the US,

00:39:47United Kingdom, France,

00:39:48and numerous other Western nations,

00:39:50as well as countries

00:39:51from various other parts of the world.

00:39:53Yet, even though it didn't have

00:39:55its own troops on the ground,

00:39:57China closely observed the conflict

00:39:58and learned lessons

00:39:59that would shape its military

00:40:01in the years to follow.

00:40:02Because when the war began,

00:40:04most of the world,

00:40:05China included,

00:40:06expected a long and drawn-out conflict.

00:40:09Iraq had a huge army,

00:40:10thousands of tanks,

00:40:12an enormous air defense network,

00:40:13and years of combat experience

00:40:15after its war with Iran.

00:40:17It was supposed to be

00:40:18an incredibly tough nut to crack,

00:40:20even for the combined might

00:40:21of the US and its allies.

00:40:23What happened next shocked everyone,

00:40:25as the US ushered in

00:40:26a whole new age of warfare.

00:40:28Its state-of-the-art stealth aircraft

00:40:30slipped by the Iraqi defenses

00:40:32without being seen.

00:40:33Precision-guided weapons

00:40:34struck their targets

00:40:35with incredible accuracy.

00:40:37Within almost no time at all,

00:40:39countless Iraqi assets

00:40:40were wiped out,

00:40:42while the US relied

00:40:42on advanced technologies,

00:40:44satellites, surveillance planes,

00:40:46and command networks

00:40:47to exert an unparalleled level

00:40:49of control across the battlefield.

00:40:51Within weeks,

00:40:52one of the world's strongest

00:40:53militaries at the time

00:40:55was effectively disabled.

00:40:57And back in Beijing,

00:40:58Chinese officials

00:40:59watched on in horror.

00:41:00not because they had any stake

00:41:02in what happened to Iraq,

00:41:04but because they were witnessing

00:41:05a type of warfare

00:41:06they were simply not ready

00:41:07to deal with.

00:41:08The US had abandoned

00:41:09the Cold War tactics

00:41:10of the past,

00:41:12constructing more modern

00:41:13and efficient strategies

00:41:14on the foundation

00:41:15of precision weapons,

00:41:16stealth systems,

00:41:17and real-time situational awareness.

00:41:20All of a sudden,

00:41:21war was no longer a matter

00:41:22of whichever side

00:41:23has the most troops

00:41:24or best tanks

00:41:25will most likely win.

00:41:26It had transformed

00:41:27into something

00:41:28far more complex

00:41:30and information

00:41:30was at the heart of it.

00:41:32The US was proving

00:41:33that it was possible

00:41:34to dominate the battlefield

00:41:36through data.

00:41:37China came to a clear

00:41:38and obvious conclusion.

00:41:40Its People's Liberation Army,

00:41:42PLA,

00:41:43had been built for a world

00:41:44that no longer existed.

00:41:45And if it ever had to face off

00:41:47with the US,

00:41:48it would have almost zero hope

00:41:49of any sort of success.

00:41:51It had to change fast.

00:41:52So in the years that followed,

00:41:55just as Yu's theory states,

00:41:57China responded to America's actions

00:41:59by launching

00:41:59a massive modernization campaign.

00:42:02It began researching

00:42:03and developing

00:42:04more powerful

00:42:04and precise missiles.

00:42:06It poured large parts

00:42:07of its defense budget

00:42:08into electronics

00:42:09and cyber warfare capabilities.

00:42:11It did what it needed to do

00:42:13to try to close the gap

00:42:15with the US.

00:42:16And this was not

00:42:16a one-off,

00:42:17isolated incident.

00:42:19Indeed,

00:42:20as Yu goes on to note,

00:42:21the 1999 US bombing

00:42:23of the Chinese embassy

00:42:24in Belgrade

00:42:25and the 2001 EP3 incident

00:42:28further reinforced

00:42:29the PLA's vulnerability,

00:42:31accelerating investments

00:42:32in aerospace,

00:42:33cyberspace

00:42:34and anti-access capabilities.

00:42:36Time and again,

00:42:38when the US succeeded

00:42:39in any sort of major

00:42:40military action

00:42:41or operation,

00:42:42the Chinese response

00:42:43was always the same.

00:42:44It tried to play catch-up.

00:42:46From the outside,

00:42:47Beijing's efforts

00:42:48appeared both ambitious

00:42:49and admirable.

00:42:50As the years passed,

00:42:52we saw large new warships

00:42:53launch from Chinese ports,

00:42:55advanced fighter jets

00:42:56entered service,

00:42:57and ballistic missile programs

00:42:59set new performance benchmarks.

00:43:01Whole branches of the military

00:43:03were reorganized

00:43:04and restructured

00:43:05to meet the changing needs

00:43:06of modern warfare.

00:43:07The PLA went from

00:43:09an outdated force

00:43:10focused purely on manpower

00:43:11and fleet sizes

00:43:12to a much more sophisticated army,

00:43:15equipped with seemingly

00:43:16state-of-the-art missile systems

00:43:18and ever-evolving cyber capabilities.

00:43:20But according to Yu,

00:43:22there were several fundamental flaws

00:43:23with how China went about

00:43:25obtaining these improvements.

00:43:27The first is that China

00:43:28has always been in such a hurry

00:43:30to rush its military modernization

00:43:32that it didn't want to take time

00:43:33developing new capabilities

00:43:35domestically and organically

00:43:37over the years.

00:43:38It didn't want to put in

00:43:39the necessary time and effort,

00:43:41as the US does,

00:43:42to plan and perfect its designs,

00:43:44withstanding years of trial and error,

00:43:46and accepting failure

00:43:47as part of the process.

00:43:49In short,

00:43:50it wanted to fast-track

00:43:51its innovation.

00:43:52To do that,

00:43:53it relied heavily on practices

00:43:55like acquiring foreign technologies

00:43:57or reverse-engineering

00:43:58existing designs.

00:44:00In some cases,

00:44:01Beijing even resorted

00:44:02to underhanded tactics

00:44:04like industrial espionage

00:44:05to learn about

00:44:06foreign military assets

00:44:07and then try to copy them.

00:44:09This meant that,

00:44:10at least on the surface,

00:44:12it was able to close those gaps

00:44:13between itself and America

00:44:15at a relatively rapid rate.

00:44:17But there's a big difference

00:44:18between acquiring technology

00:44:20and mastering it,

00:44:21which leads us to the second flaw

00:44:23Yu highlighted in his report.

00:44:25China may have had fancy new missiles,

00:44:27jets, and other assets

00:44:28to show off at its military parades,

00:44:31but it didn't necessarily have

00:44:32what Yu calls

00:44:33the underlying engineering precision

00:44:35and materials science

00:44:36required for consistent performance.

00:44:39In other words,

00:44:40it had the technology,

00:44:41but not the knowledge

00:44:42to truly make the most of it.

00:44:44Now, the third issue

00:44:45relates to the Chinese

00:44:46military-civil fusion

00:44:48policy,

00:44:49which was designed

00:44:50to bridge the gaps

00:44:51and break down the barriers

00:44:53between the country's

00:44:54civilian research,

00:44:55commercial sectors,

00:44:56and its military-industrial complex.

00:44:58On paper,

00:44:59again,

00:45:00this is a smart idea,

00:45:01with one of its key objectives

00:45:03being to ensure

00:45:04that almost all

00:45:04civilian-level innovations

00:45:06like AI,

00:45:07quantum computers,

00:45:08and semiconductors

00:45:09can be repurposed

00:45:11for military operations.

00:45:12It also means

00:45:13that all organizations

00:45:14operating in China,

00:45:16no matter whether

00:45:17they're state-owned,

00:45:18private,

00:45:18or even foreign entities,

00:45:20are legally required

00:45:21to share data

00:45:22with the military,

00:45:22if asked.

00:45:23In reality,

00:45:24this policy has,

00:45:26according to Yu,

00:45:27fostered corruption

00:45:28and inefficiency

00:45:28across the defense sector,

00:45:30leading to the most

00:45:31devastating consequence

00:45:32of all,

00:45:33the questionable credibility

00:45:34of PLA weapons quality

00:45:36and reliability.

00:45:37Now,

00:45:38quick side note,

00:45:39before we go any deeper,

00:45:41you're watching

00:45:41The Military Show,

00:45:43and if you haven't subscribed yet,

00:45:44now's the time.

00:45:46While the MCF policy

00:45:47was supposed to make

00:45:48China's military bigger

00:45:50and better than ever,

00:45:51it's instead introduced

00:45:52poisonous new problems

00:45:53that have proven

00:45:54almost impossible to solve,

00:45:56with damaging,

00:45:57long-lasting consequences

00:45:58for the country's security

00:46:00and power projection

00:46:01moving forward.

00:46:02Here's why.

00:46:03When China effectively

00:46:04united the military

00:46:05and civil sectors,

00:46:07it brought politics

00:46:08into the PLA

00:46:09much more heavily

00:46:10than before.

00:46:10And in centralized

00:46:11political systems,

00:46:13bad news is dangerous.

00:46:14Those at the top

00:46:15of the food chain

00:46:16don't want to hear

00:46:17about flaws and failures,

00:46:18they want to hear

00:46:19about progress and success.

00:46:21As a direct consequence

00:46:22of this,

00:46:23a culture then begins

00:46:24to form in which

00:46:24problems are covered,

00:46:26shortcomings are downplayed,

00:46:28and leaders receive reports

00:46:29that only focus

00:46:30on the things

00:46:30that are working well,

00:46:32completely omitting

00:46:33any mention of challenges

00:46:34and deficiencies.

00:46:35In the military world,

00:46:37that sort of culture

00:46:38is incredibly dangerous.

00:46:40A new weapons system

00:46:41might be developed

00:46:42that shows some promise,

00:46:43but still has numerous flaws

00:46:45in its design

00:46:46that could render it

00:46:46completely useless

00:46:47in real-world combat conditions.

00:46:49But because people

00:46:50are too frightened

00:46:51to tell their bosses

00:46:52about anything

00:46:53even slightly negative,

00:46:55they ignore all those issues.

00:46:56They share glowing reports instead.

00:46:58They claim that the system

00:47:00is perfect,

00:47:00revolutionary,

00:47:02and world-beating,

00:47:03ready to deploy

00:47:03on the battlefield

00:47:04to demonstrate

00:47:05the unrivaled might

00:47:06of the PLA.

00:47:07Then what happens

00:47:08is that these hyped-up

00:47:10but imperfect systems

00:47:11are introduced

00:47:12to military service

00:47:13or sold to other countries,

00:47:14and when they're actually deployed,

00:47:16all their flaws

00:47:17are revealed

00:47:17for the world to see.

00:47:19As Yu himself writes,

00:47:20A political system

00:47:22built on propaganda

00:47:23encourages inflated claims

00:47:25and self-deception,

00:47:26masking real deficiencies

00:47:27until they're exposed

00:47:29under operational conditions.

00:47:30And when those deficiencies

00:47:32are at last exposed,

00:47:34China always seems

00:47:34to react the same way,

00:47:36with a purge.

00:47:37If a system

00:47:38that was supposed

00:47:39to be groundbreaking

00:47:39is revealed to be subpar,

00:47:42the CCP initiates investigations

00:47:44which are often framed

00:47:45around the idea

00:47:46of weeding out corruption

00:47:47in the country's defense sector.

00:47:49Inevitably,

00:47:50after weeks or months

00:47:51of these investigatory measures,

00:47:53people in power

00:47:54are suddenly stripped

00:47:55of that power.

00:47:56Military officers

00:47:57are made to resign

00:47:58or forcefully remove

00:47:59from their posts.

00:48:00Defense executives

00:48:01vanish from public view

00:48:02overnight,

00:48:03and what could have been

00:48:04a serious investigation

00:48:05into systemic issues

00:48:06within the CCP and PLA

00:48:08becomes little more

00:48:09than a witch hunt

00:48:10for the government's

00:48:11latest scapegoat.

00:48:12As Yu explained,

00:48:14this creates a cycle

00:48:15in which political purges

00:48:17replace technical reform.

00:48:19Instead of addressing

00:48:20the root cause

00:48:21of the issue,

00:48:22the CCP simplifies

00:48:23a few people

00:48:24and goes right back

00:48:25to doing things

00:48:26the exact same way

00:48:27until the next big failure

00:48:28comes along

00:48:29and they do it

00:48:30all over again.

00:48:31It's not only

00:48:32a ridiculous cycle

00:48:33but a destructive one.

00:48:34Every time the CCP

00:48:36does one of its purges,

00:48:37even if it may remove

00:48:38some corrupt officials

00:48:39here and there,

00:48:40it's also getting rid

00:48:41of people with years

00:48:42or even decades

00:48:43of experience

00:48:44and expertise.

00:48:45And in doing so,

00:48:46it undermines

00:48:48its own capacity

00:48:48for learning

00:48:49and improvement.

00:48:50The more this cycle

00:48:51perpetuates,

00:48:53the worse it gets.

00:48:54With Yu writing

00:48:54that innovation

00:48:55becomes riskier,

00:48:56not safer,

00:48:57truth becomes

00:48:58more dangerous

00:48:59than error.

00:49:00This is why America

00:49:01doesn't need to fire

00:49:02a single shot

00:49:03to pile pressure

00:49:03on the PLA.

00:49:04It doesn't need

00:49:05any sort of direct

00:49:06confrontation with Beijing

00:49:08to flex its military muscles.

00:49:10It simply needs

00:49:11to continue demonstrating

00:49:12its superiority

00:49:13at every given opportunity,

00:49:15knowing that China's system

00:49:16will spiral into panic

00:49:17and cannibalize itself

00:49:19in the aftermath.

00:49:20And in 2026,

00:49:22the US has demonstrated

00:49:23its superiority

00:49:24on several occasions,

00:49:25and we've seen

00:49:26the Chinese self-destructive cycle

00:49:28play out right on cue.

00:49:30In January,

00:49:30for example,

00:49:31the US carried out

00:49:32Operation Absolute Resolve.

00:49:34In the span

00:49:35of a single night,

00:49:36in under three hours

00:49:37to be more precise,

00:49:38US forces bombed

00:49:39infrastructure

00:49:40across northern Venezuela,

00:49:41eliminated air defense systems,

00:49:44and captured

00:49:44the country's president,

00:49:46Nicolas Maduro,

00:49:47from a fortified compound

00:49:48in Caracas.

00:49:49To crown this achievement,

00:49:51not a single American life

00:49:52was lost in the process.

00:49:54Then in February,

00:49:55in conjunction with Israel,

00:49:57the US launched

00:49:57a war with Iran.

00:49:58It carried out

00:49:59one of the fastest

00:50:00and most impactful

00:50:01bombing campaigns

00:50:02the world has ever seen,

00:50:03killing large parts

00:50:04of the country's leadership group,

00:50:06including its former

00:50:07supreme leader,

00:50:08as well as wiping out

00:50:09numerous air defense systems,

00:50:10missile bases,

00:50:11and other high-value targets.

00:50:13It went on

00:50:14to enforce

00:50:14a naval blockade

00:50:15of the Strait of Hormuz,

00:50:17wiping out large parts

00:50:18of Iran's military forces

00:50:19and repelling numerous attacks

00:50:21while suffering

00:50:22only minimal losses.

00:50:23In both of these conflicts,

00:50:25America's opponents,

00:50:26Venezuela and Iran,

00:50:28were relying,

00:50:28in part,

00:50:29on China-supplied assets,

00:50:31including missile platforms,

00:50:32radars,

00:50:33and air defense networks.

00:50:34As Yu notes,

00:50:36these assets

00:50:36repeatedly failed

00:50:37to perform

00:50:38when confronted

00:50:38with advanced

00:50:39U.S. stealth

00:50:40and electronic warfare

00:50:41capabilities.

00:50:42These are the very same systems

00:50:44that were promoted

00:50:44in China

00:50:45as being able to cope

00:50:46with the latest

00:50:47and greatest threats,

00:50:48even under intense pressure.

00:50:50Yet,

00:50:50one by one,

00:50:51they fell at the first hurdle.

00:50:53The flagship HQ-9B

00:50:55air defense system,

00:50:56reportedly used in Iran,

00:50:57for example,

00:50:58failed to intercept

00:50:59American or Israeli aircraft.

00:51:02China's YLC-8B radars

00:51:04also proved

00:51:05relatively worthless

00:51:06and were quickly wiped

00:51:07off the map.

00:51:08And even when Iran

00:51:09deployed Chinese-made

00:51:10supersonic CM-302

00:51:12anti-ship missiles,

00:51:13they failed to strike

00:51:14their targets.

00:51:15Seeing these failures,

00:51:17the CCP could

00:51:18and perhaps should have

00:51:19carried out a serious review

00:51:20into how and why

00:51:21these weapon systems

00:51:22had been rated so highly,

00:51:24yet failed to live up

00:51:25to expectations.

00:51:26Instead,

00:51:27it did what it's always done,

00:51:29another purge.

00:51:30As Yu explained,

00:51:32large numbers of senior

00:51:33PLA commanders

00:51:34have been made non-persons,

00:51:36and disappeared

00:51:36from public view,

00:51:38including figures

00:51:38at the highest levels

00:51:39of command.

00:51:40Many experienced

00:51:41military generals

00:51:42have simply disappeared

00:51:43from public appearances

00:51:45and political gatherings,

00:51:46and an estimated

00:51:47two-thirds of the country's

00:51:49Central Military Commission,

00:51:50the highest military

00:51:51command authority

00:51:52in China,

00:51:53have been removed

00:51:53from their posts

00:51:54since the start of the year.

00:51:56In the scientists

00:51:56and industrial sector too,

00:51:58the purge

00:51:59has taken its toll.

00:52:00Yu cites examples

00:52:01like Hu Yongming,

00:52:03one of the leading scientists

00:52:04in the naval aviation

00:52:05and carrier development industry,

00:52:07and Yang Wei,

00:52:08one of China's top

00:52:09advanced fighter aircraft designers.

00:52:11Other key figures

00:52:12to have been purged

00:52:13include

00:52:13Hu Yiyin,

00:52:14a defense missile researcher,

00:52:16and Wu Manqing,

00:52:17a radar

00:52:18and counter-stealth specialist.

00:52:19Some officials

00:52:20have even been

00:52:21severely prosecuted,

00:52:23like Tan Rui Song,

00:52:24chairman of the Aviation Industry

00:52:26Corporation of China,

00:52:27who was given

00:52:28in a suspended death sentence

00:52:29on charges of corruption.

00:52:31Other figures

00:52:32have died

00:52:32in mysterious circumstances,

00:52:34like Fang Dining

00:52:35and Yang Hong,

00:52:37who were both

00:52:37hypersonic weapons researchers

00:52:39with years of experience.

00:52:40All of this

00:52:41is a direct result

00:52:42of America's military triumphs,

00:52:44which,

00:52:45as Yu explains,

00:52:46have had a dual effect

00:52:47on China's weapons development.

00:52:49On the one hand,

00:52:50the US's successes

00:52:51have forced China

00:52:52to adapt,

00:52:53pursuing its fast-track

00:52:54modernization campaigns

00:52:55and upgrading its capabilities,

00:52:58pouring huge amounts

00:52:58of funds and resources

00:53:00into developing new weapons,

00:53:01vehicles,

00:53:02vessels,

00:53:02and defensive systems

00:53:04to show off to the world.

00:53:05At the same time,

00:53:07American operations

00:53:08in places like Iran

00:53:09and Venezuela

00:53:10have also served

00:53:11as stress tests

00:53:12for China's advancement.

00:53:13And,

00:53:14unfortunately for Beijing,

00:53:16it's repeatedly

00:53:17failed those tests.

00:53:18Its assets

00:53:19have been exposed

00:53:20as weak,

00:53:20faulty,

00:53:21and utterly unable

00:53:22to live up

00:53:22to their lofty expectations.

00:53:24This, in turn,

00:53:25has triggered

00:53:26a torrent of turmoil

00:53:27within the CCP itself,

00:53:28with officials purged

00:53:30across the length

00:53:30and breadth

00:53:31of the Chinese defense

00:53:32and research sectors.

00:53:34The end result

00:53:35is described

00:53:35as a paradox by Yu,

00:53:37one in which

00:53:38the CCP's drive

00:53:39to rival

00:53:39or even surpass the US

00:53:41fuels it to pursue

00:53:42increasingly ambitious

00:53:43military programs.

00:53:45Yet,

00:53:45the very same system

00:53:46that enables those programs

00:53:48also prevents them

00:53:49from fulfilling

00:53:50their true potential.

00:53:51If China had

00:53:52a more rational,

00:53:53grounded system,

00:53:54or more of a clear divide

00:53:55between its politics

00:53:56and its military,

00:53:57then perhaps this sort of thing

00:53:58wouldn't happen.

00:53:59The country would be able

00:54:00to put in the necessary time

00:54:02and effort

00:54:02to achieve its military ambitions,

00:54:05enduring the same highs

00:54:06and lows

00:54:06as other major military powers,

00:54:08embracing failure

00:54:09not as something

00:54:10to be ignored or punished,

00:54:12but as something

00:54:12to be embraced,

00:54:13a vital part

00:54:14of the learning process.

00:54:16Instead,

00:54:17China has built a system

00:54:18that erases

00:54:18the very capacity

00:54:19for true innovation.

00:54:21Thus,

00:54:21progress remains uneven

00:54:23and dangerously fragile.

00:54:25Concluding,

00:54:26Yu notes,

00:54:27As long as this dynamic persists,

00:54:29each new demonstration

00:54:30of US military superiority

00:54:32will not only challenge

00:54:33China externally,

00:54:34but also destabilize it internally,

00:54:37reinforcing the very gap

00:54:38it seeks to close.

00:54:39So,

00:54:40even though it isn't directly

00:54:42facing China

00:54:42on the battlefield,

00:54:44Washington continues

00:54:45to maintain an edge

00:54:46over Beijing.

00:54:47Each military operation

00:54:48serves to demonstrate

00:54:49US dominance,

00:54:51repeatedly disrupting

00:54:52and destabilizing

00:54:53the strategies

00:54:53of its greatest global rival.

00:54:562027 is drawing near.

00:54:58The year that some believe

00:55:00will be pivotal

00:55:00in Chinese President

00:55:02Xi Jinping's

00:55:03invasion plans for Taiwan

00:55:04is mere months away.

00:55:06China's resources

00:55:07will be in place.

00:55:09Its military will be strong enough

00:55:10for what Xi wants to do,

00:55:12but China has a problem.

00:55:13There is something in the water

00:55:15that has killed

00:55:16China's Taiwan invasion plans

00:55:18before they've even

00:55:18gotten off the ground.

00:55:20Taiwan has a brilliant plan

00:55:22for halting China

00:55:23and it involves something

00:55:24that nobody saw coming,

00:55:26doing nothing.

00:55:28Why?

00:55:28Because China doesn't have

00:55:30the military strength

00:55:30that it needs to take Taiwan

00:55:32and it all comes down

00:55:33to the water

00:55:34that China needs to cross.

00:55:36Now,

00:55:37we know this sounds crazy,

00:55:38especially when you look

00:55:39at the raw numbers.

00:55:40There is no area

00:55:41in which Taiwan

00:55:42has the advantage

00:55:42if we simply stack up

00:55:44its military against China's

00:55:45to see who comes out on top.

00:55:47China's 2.035 million

00:55:50active military personnel

00:55:51absolutely dwarf

00:55:53Taiwan's 230,000.

00:55:55And even if you throw

00:55:56Taiwan's 1.657 million

00:55:58reserves into the mix,

00:56:00China has 510,000 reserves

00:56:02to bring to the fight,

00:56:03maintaining a clear

00:56:04manpower advantage.

00:56:06China spends 10 times

00:56:07the amount that Taiwan

00:56:08does on its military each year.

00:56:10It has over 3,529 aircraft

00:56:13versus Taiwan's 720,

00:56:15a naval fleet

00:56:16that is varying close

00:56:17to 10 times the size of Taiwan's

00:56:19and, of course,

00:56:19plenty of missiles.

00:56:21It looks like China

00:56:22holds all of the cards,

00:56:23but it doesn't.

00:56:25Now,

00:56:25you might think

00:56:26that we're about to say

00:56:26that the US getting involved,

00:56:28along with other major

00:56:29Indo-Pacific powers,

00:56:30would signal the death

00:56:31of Xi's plans,

00:56:32but we aren't going to say that.

00:56:33All of those factors

00:56:34may come into play,

00:56:36especially if China threatens

00:56:37the key piece of leverage

00:56:38that Taiwan has over

00:56:39the rest of the world.

00:56:40However,

00:56:41even without the involvement

00:56:42of other nations,

00:56:43China's plan for Taiwan

00:56:44isn't going to work.

00:56:46Taiwan can defend itself

00:56:47on its own,

00:56:48and there's a clear reason why.

00:56:50To conquer Taiwan,

00:56:52China has to pull off

00:56:53the single,

00:56:53largest amphibious assault

00:56:55in modern military history,

00:56:56and it doesn't have

00:56:57the experience to do it.

00:56:59Let's take a trip back in time

00:57:01to Operation Overlord

00:57:02during World War II.

00:57:04Launched in 1944

00:57:05and often known as D-Day,

00:57:08Operation Overlord was,

00:57:09and still is,

00:57:10the largest amphibious invasion

00:57:12in the history of warfare.

00:57:13The statistics tell the full story.

00:57:16The Allies used well over 5,000 ships

00:57:18to conduct landings

00:57:19on five beaches in Normandy,

00:57:21over 150,000 troops landing,

00:57:24and there were 1.4 million

00:57:26American servicemen

00:57:27stationed in the UK,

00:57:28ready to provide logistics

00:57:30and a continuous flow of troops

00:57:32into France

00:57:32once the landings were completed.

00:57:35Add all other Allies into the mix

00:57:37and the UK was to host

00:57:382 million troops from 12 countries,

00:57:41all ready to take the fight

00:57:42back to Germany.

00:57:43The Allies already had air supremacy

00:57:45ahead of the landings,

00:57:46allowing the Allies to fly

00:57:48around 14,000 sorties

00:57:49to support the amphibious operation.

00:57:51And still,

00:57:52these landings were incredibly bloody,

00:57:55costing the Allies

00:57:55around 10,500 casualties

00:57:58when it was all said and done.

00:58:00Why are we telling you all of this?

00:58:01Well, the whole point is

00:58:02that Operation Overlord

00:58:03was conducted from a position

00:58:05of relative strength

00:58:06by the Allies.

00:58:07China doesn't have that position

00:58:08as it gears up

00:58:09for its amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

00:58:11The numbers may be in favor

00:58:13of the People's Liberation Army,

00:58:14but the Chinese Navy,

00:58:15in particular,

00:58:17doesn't have what it needs

00:58:18to conduct a similar sort of operation

00:58:19that would be required

00:58:21to move soldiers into Taiwan.

00:58:22For a start,

00:58:23the 2 million man army

00:58:25isn't what it seems.

00:58:26Sure, we could pretend

00:58:27that China would focus

00:58:28all 2 million of its soldiers

00:58:29on Taiwan,

00:58:30but the reality is that it won't.

00:58:32China needs to keep soldiers

00:58:33stationed on the border with India

00:58:35to maintain its position there.

00:58:37Around 25,000 soldiers

00:58:38are in that region right now.

00:58:40Throughout China itself,

00:58:41soldiers are stationed

00:58:42to protect Xi

00:58:43and his domestic interests.

00:58:45The point here is

00:58:46that the manpower advantage

00:58:47isn't all that it seems

00:58:48to be from the start.

00:58:49But China's much larger problem

00:58:51isn't the number of men

00:58:52it can dedicate.

00:58:53It's getting those soldiers

00:58:54into Taiwan.

00:58:56That's where the water comes in.

00:58:58Operation Overlord

00:58:59saw hundreds of thousands

00:59:00of troops sail

00:59:01across the relatively calm

00:59:03English Channel into France.

00:59:05That channel separates

00:59:06England and France

00:59:07by around 35 kilometers

00:59:08at its narrowest point.

00:59:10And Operation Overlord

00:59:11didn't have to concern itself

00:59:12too much

00:59:13with difficult weather conditions.

00:59:14But China?

00:59:16It has to cross the Taiwan Strait

00:59:18just to stand a chance

00:59:19of landing troops

00:59:20on the territory of its enemy.

00:59:21And that's a difficult prospect

00:59:23for many reasons.

00:59:25For a start,

00:59:26there's the distance.

00:59:27Chinese troops

00:59:27would have to travel

00:59:28about five times the distance

00:59:30by ship to reach Taiwan

00:59:31than the Allies did

00:59:32to storm the beaches of Normandy.

00:59:34That distance creates time.

00:59:36And that time can be used

00:59:37by Taiwan to launch

00:59:38surface-to-air missiles

00:59:40against Chinese aircraft,

00:59:41deploy submarines

00:59:42to cripple ships,

00:59:43and send anti-ship missiles

00:59:45on drones

00:59:45in the direction of anything

00:59:46that China sends.

00:59:48That's not to mention

00:59:49Taiwanese air power.

00:59:50Remember the Allies

00:59:51had air supremacy

00:59:52ahead of Operation Overlord?

00:59:54China doesn't have that

00:59:55over Taiwan.

00:59:56So it's not like China

00:59:57can batter the beaches

00:59:58and Taiwan's coastal defenses

00:59:59from the sky

01:00:00with impunity.

01:00:01But all of this requires

01:00:02Taiwan to actually do something.

01:00:05We told you that Taiwan

01:00:06wouldn't have to do anything.

01:00:07And the reason for that

01:00:08is that the Taiwan Strait

01:00:10is an absolutely

01:00:10merciless body of water.

01:00:12The English Channel is calm,

01:00:14but the lethal Taiwan Strait

01:00:16is incredibly difficult

01:00:17to navigate

01:00:18at the best of times

01:00:19due to the weather.

01:00:20Between June and August

01:00:21and again between November

01:00:22and February,

01:00:23the Taiwan Strait

01:00:24has frequent monsoons

01:00:25and even typhoons,

01:00:27which make amphibious operations

01:00:28next to impossible.

01:00:30At best,

01:00:31China would have to accept

01:00:32sacrificing dozens of ships

01:00:33and thousands of soldiers

01:00:35if it attacked

01:00:36during any of these months.

01:00:37So China is limited

01:00:39in when it can attack,

01:00:40and that means Taiwan

01:00:41is able to prepare

01:00:42for the months

01:00:42when the Taiwan Strait is calm.

01:00:44Even if China does attack

01:00:46during the rain-logged summer months,

01:00:48the delays would just

01:00:48create more opportunities

01:00:49for Taiwan to hit Chinese ships

01:00:51before they ever get

01:00:52close to the coast.

01:00:53And let's say that China

01:00:55manages to weather

01:00:56these very literal storms.

01:00:57What then?

01:00:58In Operation Overlord,

01:00:59the Allies had their pick

01:01:00of the beaches in Normandy.

01:01:02Yes, those beaches

01:01:03were fortified,

01:01:04but the combination

01:01:04of all the factors we mentioned,

01:01:06especially the air supremacy,

01:01:07means that the Allies

01:01:08were in a great position

01:01:09for storming those beaches.

01:01:11Taiwan is a whole different story.

01:01:14Taiwan's mountainous geography

01:01:15massively complicates

01:01:17a Chinese amphibious landing.

01:01:19Around 60% of Taiwan

01:01:20is covered in mountains.

01:01:22Despite Taiwan

01:01:23having several dozen

01:01:24available beaches,

01:01:25Newsweek points out

01:01:26that China will be limited

01:01:27to attempting to land troops

01:01:28on fewer than 20

01:01:29of what have been identified

01:01:31as red beaches.

01:01:33All of those beaches

01:01:34and their coastlines

01:01:35are being fortified,

01:01:36and China still faces

01:01:37the prospect of navigating

01:01:38near-impossible terrain

01:01:40to get to Taipei,

01:01:41where urban combat

01:01:42will be triggered,

01:01:43and the trickle

01:01:43of Chinese troops

01:01:44making it through

01:01:45will be at a severe disadvantage.

01:01:48That brings us back

01:01:49to manpower.

01:01:49We mentioned earlier

01:01:51that Taiwan's military

01:01:52doesn't have as much manpower

01:01:53as China's,

01:01:54even when taking reserves

01:01:55into account.

01:01:56But those are just

01:01:57the raw numbers.

01:01:58In reality,

01:01:59China needs to hold back

01:02:00hundreds of thousands

01:02:01of troops

01:02:01for domestic defense,

01:02:03and Taiwan has over

01:02:041.6 million reserves

01:02:06on top of its active military,

01:02:07who would all have

01:02:08the singular purpose

01:02:09of protecting their country.

01:02:10China has to try

01:02:12to match those numbers,

01:02:13and the conditions

01:02:14in the Taiwan Strait

01:02:15make that practically impossible.

01:02:18After all,

01:02:18it's not just landing troops

01:02:19that is an issue,

01:02:21it's keeping them supply.

01:02:22Building stable supply routes

01:02:24into Taiwan,

01:02:25even if China can establish itself

01:02:26on the few red beaches,

01:02:28is a logistical nightmare.

01:02:30Taiwan has anti-ship

01:02:31and surface-to-air missiles,

01:02:33very advanced missiles

01:02:34thanks to its relationship

01:02:36with the United States.

01:02:37Combine their usage

01:02:38to take out supply ships

01:02:39and cargo planes

01:02:40with the fact that

01:02:41China can barely use

01:02:42the Taiwan Strait

01:02:43for six months out of the year,

01:02:45and you get a logistical catastrophe

01:02:47just waiting to happen.

01:02:48China may indeed be able

01:02:50to land 100,000 soldiers

01:02:51on Taiwan,

01:02:52but the odds are

01:02:53those soldiers

01:02:54will be cut off from supplies,

01:02:55base almost impossible geography,

01:02:57and have to deal

01:02:58with a fully mobilized

01:02:59Taiwanese army

01:03:00that is far larger

01:03:02than what China

01:03:02can actually bring to bear,

01:03:04despite its on-paper

01:03:05manpower advantage.

01:03:07Admiral Li Xi-min,

01:03:09who was the chief

01:03:09of the general staff

01:03:10of Taiwan's armed forces

01:03:11until 2019,

01:03:13sums it up perfectly

01:03:14when speaking

01:03:15to The Economist in 2023.

01:03:17This is their soft spot,

01:03:18Li tells the outlet.

01:03:20If Taiwan doesn't surrender,

01:03:21once you've landed,

01:03:22you still have to fight

01:03:23for a period of time,

01:03:24maybe one week

01:03:25or two weeks or whatever.

01:03:26Where are your logistics?

01:03:28Your logistics support

01:03:29needs to come in

01:03:29across the strait,

01:03:30but ours don't have to.

01:03:31We fight in our own yard.

01:03:33Nothing has changed

01:03:34since 2023.

01:03:35And what this means

01:03:36for Xi and China

01:03:38is that the route

01:03:38to a Chinese victory

01:03:39is tiny,

01:03:40even if we disregard

01:03:41the likely involvement

01:03:42of other nations

01:03:43coming to Taiwan's defense.

01:03:45But it goes even deeper

01:03:46than that.

01:03:47Xi's Taiwan invasion

01:03:48wouldn't just be a story

01:03:49of something in the Taiwanese

01:03:50water ruining his plans.

01:03:52China's military

01:03:53is not what it seems.

01:03:54The country's economy

01:03:56is veering close to collapse,

01:03:57and not even a missile-laden

01:03:59strategy chosen ahead

01:04:00of an amphibious invasion

01:04:01would work.

01:04:02Why?

01:04:03Before we answer

01:04:04those questions,

01:04:04this is a quick reminder

01:04:05that you are watching

01:04:06The Military Show.

01:04:07This is why we make videos

01:04:09to show how power really moves.

01:04:11If you haven't subscribed yet,

01:04:12take a second

01:04:13to hit the button

01:04:14to see more like this.

01:04:16So, China's military.

01:04:18It doesn't just face

01:04:19the absolute nightmare

01:04:20that is crossing

01:04:21and maintaining supply routes

01:04:23through the Taiwan Strait.

01:04:24China also has to deal

01:04:25with all of that

01:04:26while having a military

01:04:27that, though massive on paper,

01:04:28doesn't have any real combat experience.

01:04:31Former U.S. Defense Secretary

01:04:33and CIA Chief Robert Gates

01:04:34pointed that out

01:04:35in a May interview

01:04:36with CBS's Face the Nation,

01:04:38stating,

01:04:39There isn't one single

01:04:40Chinese general or admiral today

01:04:42that has one day

01:04:43of combat experience.

01:04:44The last time

01:04:45these guys fought

01:04:46was 1979,

01:04:47and the North Vietnamese,

01:04:49the Vietnamese,

01:04:49gave them a bloody nose.

01:04:51All those generals

01:04:52are long gone,

01:04:53having been purged by Xi.

01:04:54And that's another problem

01:04:56that China faces.

01:04:56The country's defense ministry

01:04:58is in shambles.

01:05:00Back in May,

01:05:01two former Chinese defense ministers,

01:05:03Wei Feng Ge

01:05:04and Li Shang-Fu,

01:05:05were given suspended

01:05:06death sentences,

01:05:08supposedly due to bribery,

01:05:09but just as likely

01:05:10because they didn't agree

01:05:11with Xi on certain issues.

01:05:13Both had been purged

01:05:14by China's president,

01:05:15and they now face

01:05:16the most severe punishment

01:05:17that China has handed out

01:05:18during the years-long

01:05:19purge of its military.

01:05:20And that mention

01:05:21of such a massive purge

01:05:23is an issue in its own run.

01:05:25Stability isn't a thing

01:05:26in the People's Liberation Army.

01:05:28For all of its size

01:05:29and the scale

01:05:30of China's investment,

01:05:31corruption and purges

01:05:32run roughshod

01:05:33through any serious

01:05:34strategic planning

01:05:35that China could have

01:05:36in place for Taiwan.

01:05:37Back in October 2025,

01:05:39the Chinese Communist Party

01:05:40expelled nine

01:05:41of the country's top generals

01:05:43in a sweeping crackdown

01:05:44on corruption.

01:05:45Not that it matters.

01:05:46China's military,

01:05:47outside of the manpower machines,

01:05:49is rotten to the very core.

01:05:50That's what the National Interest

01:05:53said in January 2026,

01:05:55as it pointed out

01:05:56that corruption

01:05:56is so endemic

01:05:57in the Chinese military

01:05:58that even some

01:05:59of the liquid-fueled missiles

01:06:01that China would want

01:06:02to use against Taiwan

01:06:03are actually filled

01:06:04with water.

01:06:05They won't be going anywhere

01:06:07when the launch orders

01:06:08are made,

01:06:08so we see China crippling

01:06:09itself from the inside

01:06:10when it comes to

01:06:12an invasion of Taiwan.

01:06:13Again,

01:06:14Taiwan doesn't have

01:06:15to do anything.

01:06:16This is a problem

01:06:17all of China's own making,

01:06:18and the destabilization

01:06:20that has resulted

01:06:20will only spell more issues

01:06:22for an amphibious invasion

01:06:24that is already

01:06:24fraught with danger.

01:06:26And the purges

01:06:27go even deeper

01:06:27than you think.

01:06:28The China Power Project

01:06:30at the Center for Strategic

01:06:31and International Studies

01:06:32points out

01:06:33that more than 100 senior officers

01:06:35from the People's Liberation Army

01:06:37have received their marching orders

01:06:38since 2022,

01:06:40which amounts to

01:06:41a complete restructuring

01:06:42of the upper echelons

01:06:43of the Chinese military

01:06:44in the five years

01:06:45up to the anticipated

01:06:462027 invasion.

01:06:47Again,

01:06:49corruption is often blamed

01:06:50for these purges,

01:06:51but there is a second layer

01:06:52of corruption

01:06:53beyond water in missiles

01:06:54and bribes.

01:06:55There are dual chains

01:06:56of command

01:06:57in the People's Liberation Army,

01:06:59military and political.

01:07:00On the latter side,

01:07:02reliability,

01:07:02which translates to

01:07:03a willingness to agree

01:07:04to anything that Xi says,

01:07:06is valued more heavily

01:07:07than acumen

01:07:08and strong decision-making.

01:07:09So,

01:07:10the Chinese military

01:07:11essentially has to deal

01:07:12with an internal power struggle

01:07:14that is the result of Xi

01:07:15trying to control everything.

01:07:16As for the soldiers,

01:07:18they aren't trusted

01:07:19to make decisions

01:07:20for themselves,

01:07:21meaning any invasion of Taiwan

01:07:22would have to deal

01:07:23with the issue

01:07:24of inexperienced automatons

01:07:26having no real idea

01:07:27of what they're supposed

01:07:28to be doing.

01:07:28It's a disaster

01:07:29waiting to happen.

01:07:31But what if China

01:07:32just cuts out

01:07:32the manpower aspect

01:07:33and goes with

01:07:34a missile-heavy strat?

01:07:36Bombarding Taiwan

01:07:37from afar

01:07:37would solve some

01:07:38of the problems

01:07:39posed by corruption

01:07:40and the Taiwan Strait.

01:07:41And China certainly

01:07:42has enough missiles

01:07:43for such a strategy.

01:07:45As the U.S. Army

01:07:46University Press notes,

01:07:47China's military

01:07:48has over 2,200

01:07:50conventionally-armed

01:07:51ballistic and cruise missiles,

01:07:53along with enough

01:07:54anti-ship missiles

01:07:55to launch an attack

01:07:55against the entire U.S. Navy.

01:07:57Even if we take out

01:07:59the waterlogged missiles

01:08:00we mentioned earlier,

01:08:01that's still plenty

01:08:02of firepower

01:08:02to bring to bear

01:08:03against Taiwan.

01:08:04However,

01:08:05China can't really

01:08:06use those missiles

01:08:07to hit the heart of Taiwan.

01:08:08Why?

01:08:10Semiconductors.

01:08:10These chips are essential

01:08:13for the entire

01:08:14global economy

01:08:15and more importantly

01:08:15they're required

01:08:16for every modern missile

01:08:17and piece of military

01:08:18equipment in the world.

01:08:20And Taiwan is the heart

01:08:21of the global

01:08:22semiconductor industry.

01:08:24Global Taiwan Institute

01:08:25reports that the country's

01:08:26semiconductor testing

01:08:27and packaging industries

01:08:28alone

01:08:29captured 50%

01:08:30of the market

01:08:31in 2023.

01:08:32Right now,

01:08:33Taiwan produces

01:08:3490% of the most

01:08:36advanced chips

01:08:36and accounts for

01:08:3770% of the

01:08:38semiconductor foundry market.

01:08:40The technological

01:08:41lifeblood

01:08:42of the entire world

01:08:43beats through

01:08:43the Taiwanese chip heart

01:08:45and China is just

01:08:46as beholden

01:08:47as anyone else.

01:08:48The Council on Foreign

01:08:49Relations highlights

01:08:50this,

01:08:50noting that China

01:08:51imports $400 billion

01:08:53worth of semiconductors

01:08:54per year

01:08:55and has only reached

01:08:5616% self-sufficiency

01:08:58in this area

01:08:59despite having a goal

01:09:00of hitting 70%

01:09:01in 2025.

01:09:03And worse than that,

01:09:03China doesn't build

01:09:04the semiconductors

01:09:05used in advanced weaponry.

01:09:07Taiwan does.

01:09:08Of course,

01:09:09this is one of the reasons

01:09:10that China wants Taiwan.

01:09:11If you control semiconductors,

01:09:13you control the world

01:09:14in a way that many

01:09:15underestimate.

01:09:16That's what makes

01:09:17a missile-heavy strategy

01:09:18so dangerous for China.

01:09:20It could launch missiles

01:09:21at Taipei for weeks

01:09:22and weeks, sure,

01:09:23but it only takes

01:09:24one of those missiles

01:09:25going astray

01:09:26to take out the world's

01:09:27advanced semiconductor supply.

01:09:29Taiwan knows it

01:09:30and it may even have

01:09:31a silicon shield plan

01:09:33that would cause it

01:09:34to destroy,

01:09:35or at least threaten

01:09:36to destroy,

01:09:36its own semiconductor industry

01:09:38if China threatens

01:09:39to invade.

01:09:40We mentioned other powers

01:09:42getting involved

01:09:42a few times already.

01:09:44This is why those powers

01:09:45would want to get involved.

01:09:46If Taiwanese chip boundaries

01:09:48go down,

01:09:49by China's hand

01:09:50or Taiwan's own,

01:09:51it would spark

01:09:52a catastrophe

01:09:53that would cripple

01:09:54military supply

01:09:54and arguably

01:09:55the entire world.

01:09:57This is what leverage

01:09:58looks like.

01:09:59Taiwan only has to threaten

01:10:01to blow it all up

01:10:01and it takes the entire world's

01:10:03electronics down with it.

01:10:05That threat alone

01:10:06would be enough

01:10:06to turn the world's attention

01:10:08toward China,

01:10:09leading to intense pressure

01:10:10that would force Xi

01:10:11to back off.

01:10:12But Taiwan might not

01:10:13even have to go so far.

01:10:15Take water,

01:10:16military incompetence,

01:10:17corruption and chips

01:10:18and you get a poisonous

01:10:19recipe for Xi

01:10:20and his Taiwan plans.

01:10:22But adding to all of this

01:10:23is another problem

01:10:24that would hamper

01:10:24any long-term military engagement

01:10:26that China looks to launch.

01:10:28China's economy

01:10:29is in trouble.

01:10:30A housing bubble

01:10:31is on the verge of popping

01:10:32and it would cripple China's ability

01:10:34to sustain a Taiwan invasion.

01:10:36The Atlantic Council

01:10:37said in January

01:10:38that China's housing market

01:10:40had entered its fifth year

01:10:41of being in a slump.

01:10:42There are 80 million

01:10:44unsold homes

01:10:45on the Chinese market,

01:10:46the think tank says.

01:10:47And it says that

01:10:48one Chinese economist

01:10:49even believes

01:10:50that 80% of developers

01:10:51and construction firms

01:10:53in China

01:10:53are going to

01:10:54exit the market

01:10:55in the coming years.

01:10:56China has entire ghost cities

01:10:58that have been built up

01:10:59but remain mostly unpopulated,

01:11:01slowly turning into

01:11:02the rotting carcasses

01:11:03of investment excess

01:11:04into an industry

01:11:06that China wanted to believe

01:11:07would never stop growing.

01:11:09DW adds that

01:11:10China's housing bubble

01:11:11had already pushed

01:11:12property prices

01:11:13to over 17 times

01:11:14the average salary,

01:11:15which is simply

01:11:16unaffordable for most.

01:11:18And it demonstrates

01:11:18why the ghost cities

01:11:19exist in the first place.

01:11:21The Chinese housing bubble

01:11:22is about as large

01:11:23as it can get.

01:11:24Soon it's going to go pop.

01:11:26And when it does,

01:11:27China's entire economy

01:11:28will follow.

01:11:29You could argue

01:11:30that the bubble

01:11:31has already burst

01:11:31as China is already

01:11:33in a slump

01:11:33and shows little sign

01:11:34of recovering.

01:11:35But as things get worse,

01:11:37China's economic weaknesses

01:11:38will come to the forefront.

01:11:40Beyond housing,

01:11:41China's economy relies

01:11:42heavily on exports.

01:11:43Japan,

01:11:44the US,

01:11:45South Korea,

01:11:45and Taiwan

01:11:46account for 21.31%

01:11:48of China's exports.

01:11:49If China invades Taiwan,

01:11:51all four could stop buying

01:11:53and China would have

01:11:53serious problems.

01:11:55The European Union,

01:11:56as a collective,

01:11:57is another major customer.

01:11:58It could stop buying,

01:11:59putting even more pressure

01:12:00on China.

01:12:01And in the Indo-Pacific

01:12:02and surrounding regions,

01:12:04countries like the Philippines

01:12:05and Vietnam

01:12:06might also stop buying,

01:12:07as they are already

01:12:08contesting mineral rights

01:12:09and the control

01:12:10of small islands

01:12:11in the South China Sea,

01:12:12meaning a moment

01:12:13of economic weakness

01:12:14for China

01:12:14will be pounced upon.

01:12:16And China can't do much

01:12:17about any of this.

01:12:18It has a product-based economy

01:12:20and barely any natural resources,

01:12:21such as oil and gas,

01:12:23that it can rely on

01:12:24to prop things up

01:12:25the same way

01:12:25that Russia

01:12:26has been able to do

01:12:27to establish a shadow economy

01:12:28to keep its war

01:12:29in Ukraine going.

01:12:30The money would simply

01:12:31stop coming in.

01:12:33And as more is pushed

01:12:34into military spending

01:12:35once the Taiwan invasion

01:12:37is launched,

01:12:37that problem gets worse.

01:12:39The housing crisis expands

01:12:40and China sends itself

01:12:42down the same road

01:12:43to economic ruin

01:12:44that we see in Russia

01:12:45right now.

01:12:46We're going to state

01:12:47the obvious here.

01:12:48China needs money

01:12:49to keep an invasion

01:12:49of Taiwan going.

01:12:51If its economy crumbles,

01:12:52aided by other powers

01:12:53putting trade pressure

01:12:54on China,

01:12:55that would be the death knell

01:12:56for an invasion

01:12:57that already carries

01:12:58so much risk

01:12:59from the very start.

01:13:01And again,

01:13:01Taiwan would have little to do

01:13:02except stop buying

01:13:03and selling to China

01:13:04and then lean on

01:13:05its chip industry

01:13:06and the importance of that

01:13:07to convince allies

01:13:08to pile on the pressure.

01:13:10And so,

01:13:11Taiwan's plan

01:13:11for a Chinese invasion

01:13:12is simple.

01:13:13Let them come.

01:13:15Taiwan's combination

01:13:16of geography,

01:13:17modern military tech

01:13:18and geopolitical importance

01:13:19means it can weather

01:13:20the storm.

01:13:21China can't,

01:13:22quite literally,

01:13:23in terms of the Taiwan Strait,

01:13:24but also economically,

01:13:26militarily

01:13:27and when it comes

01:13:28to the geopolitical

01:13:29hellscape

01:13:29that China would find itself

01:13:31in if Xi follows through

01:13:32on his plans.

01:13:33The invasion is over

01:13:34before it even starts.

01:13:36Taiwan holds all of the cards.

01:13:38Now imagine this.

01:13:40What if Ukraine gets involved?

01:13:41Having established itself

01:13:42as the world's drone experts,

01:13:44it's no stretch

01:13:45to imagine that Ukraine

01:13:46would offer Taiwan

01:13:47maritime drones

01:13:48that would make the Taiwan Strait

01:13:49even more dangerous.

01:13:51Euromiden Press reports

01:13:52that Ukraine is already

01:13:53making drone overtures

01:13:55to Taiwan

01:13:55and those drones,

01:13:57maritime or aerial,

01:13:58are more than dangerous enough

01:13:59to cause even more problems

01:14:01for China in the Taiwan Strait.

01:14:02You want to see why?

01:14:04Or check out our video

01:14:05where we cover

01:14:06Ukraine's world-first attack

01:14:07against the Russian Navy.

01:14:08And if you like this video,

01:14:10remember to subscribe

01:14:11to see more from the military show.

01:14:13And thank you as always

01:14:14for watching.

How Kim Just FOOLED Xi | Other War Stories

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