A ship the Navy called "expendable" satisfit the most lethal anti-submarine patrol in history.
In May 1944, USS England — a destroyer escort one-quarter the size of a fleet destroyer — received orders to hunt Japanese submarines north of the Solomon Islands. The crew had never sunk anything larger than a practice target. Their weapon was a mortar system most captains considered experimental garbage.
What happened over the next twelve days rewrote every anti-submarine warfare manual in the U.S. Navy. And eighty-two years later, no warship in any navy has matched what England accomplished.
This is the story of codebreakers who found the enemy, a weapon nobody trusted, and a crew that proved everyone wrong.
Subscribe for forgotten WW2 stories ▶️ https://www.youtube.com/@ww2dispatchh
Like if you think this story deserves to be remembered.
Comment below — where are you watching from?
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In May 1944, USS England — a destroyer escort one-quarter the size of a fleet destroyer — received orders to hunt Japanese submarines north of the Solomon Islands. The crew had never sunk anything larger than a practice target. Their weapon was a mortar system most captains considered experimental garbage.
What happened over the next twelve days rewrote every anti-submarine warfare manual in the U.S. Navy. And eighty-two years later, no warship in any navy has matched what England accomplished.
This is the story of codebreakers who found the enemy, a weapon nobody trusted, and a crew that proved everyone wrong.
Subscribe for forgotten WW2 stories ▶️ https://www.youtube.com/@ww2dispatchh
Like if you think this story deserves to be remembered.
Comment below — where are you watching from?
#worldwar2 #ww2 #militaryhistory #ww2stories #ww2dispatch
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LearningTranscript
00:00At 1.35 p.m. on May 19, 1944, Lieutenant Commander Walton Pendleton stood in the cramped
00:07Combat Information Center of USS England, watching his sonar operator track a contact
00:13moving at four knots beneath the black waters north of the Solomon Islands.
00:17Forty-six years old, twenty-three years in the Navy, zero submarine kills.
00:23Fleet Radio Unit Pacific had intercepted a Japanese message three days earlier.
00:27Submarine I-16 was carrying rice supplies to Japanese troops at Bowen.
00:33The codebreakers at Pearl Harbor had cracked the schedule, the position, even the route.
00:38USS England was a Buckley-class destroyer escort, 1,400 tons, 306 feet long,
00:46one-quarter the size of a fleet destroyer. The Navy had built these ships to escort convoys,
00:51not to hunt submarines. The brass called them expendable, cheap warships for cheap missions.
00:57England carried a weapon most Navy officers considered experimental garbage, the Hedgehog,
01:03a mortar system that fired 24 spigot bombs ahead of the ship in a circular pattern. Each projectile
01:09weighed 65 pounds, with a 35-pound Torpex warhead, contact fuse. If the bomb missed,
01:16nothing happened. If it hit, the submarine died. Traditional depth charges had a kill ratio of 60
01:23to 1, 60 attacks for every confirmed sinking. The Hedgehog had managed 6 to 1 in limited trials.
01:29But most captains preferred depth charges. At least depth charges made noise, created turbulence,
01:36made submariners afraid. The Hedgehog just plopped into the water and sat there waiting to hit something.
01:42Pendleton had practiced hedgehog attacks for four months. His executive officer, Lieutenant John Williamson,
01:48had drilled the crew relentlessly. Fire control, sonar tracking, range calculation, attack patterns.
01:55England had never fired a hedgehog in combat, never sunk anything larger than a practice target.
02:01The Imperial Japanese Navy had deployed 25 submarines across the Pacific in May 1944. Seven of those
02:08boats formed a picket line designated N.A., positioned between the Admiralty Islands and Truck, waiting to
02:14detect American carrier movements, waiting to ambush Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet. American Codebreakers
02:20knew the entire plan, every submarine position, every patrol sector, every communication schedule.
02:26Commander Hamilton Haynes had ordered a three-ship hunter-killer group to roll up the Japanese line
02:31from south to north. USS George, USS Raby, USS England.
02:37England was the smallest ship in the group, the newest, the least experienced. George and Raby had been hunting
02:42submarines for six months. England had been escorting cargo ships. The sonar contact held steady, range closing.
02:50I-16 was running submerged at periscope depth. Standard evasion pattern for a supply submarine,
02:55trying to avoid detection. Pendleton ordered the first hedgehog attack at 1341. 24 projectiles arced
03:02through the air, splashed into the Pacific in a circle 200 feet across, sank toward the submarine
03:08at a steep angle. Nothing happened. The bombs missed. The submarine continued on course. Pendleton ordered
03:14a second attack. The hedgehog fired again. One projectile struck I-16 at a depth of 130 feet. A single
03:21detonation. Then silence. Pendleton ordered a third attack. Missed. The pathometer showed I-16 had gone
03:28deeper, 325 feet, below the assumed depth. The submarine commander was good, experienced. He knew
03:35how to evade. The fourth attack missed. I-16 outmaneuvered the pattern. 45 minutes had passed since first
03:42contact. Pendleton had fired four hedgehog salvos. 96 projectiles. Zero kills. If you want to see how
03:49England's unconventional weapon turned out, please hit that like button. It helps us share more forgotten
03:54stories from the Pacific War. Subscribe if you haven't already. Back to England. Pendleton ordered a fifth
04:00attack at 1433. 24 more projectiles. The sonar operator reported breaking up noises three seconds
04:08after impact. Four to six detonations. Then, a massive underwater explosion lifted England's stern
04:15and knocked men off their feet. I-16 was gone. 1,700 tons of steel and 57 Japanese submariners settling
04:24toward the ocean floor. England had her first kill, but five attacks to sink one submarine was not
04:29efficient. Not fast enough. Not good enough. Seven more Japanese submarines waited ahead on the NA line.
04:36Pendleton knew the codebreakers would find them. He knew Commander Haynes would send England to attack.
04:41And he knew the next submarine commander might be better than the last.
04:47Lieutenant John Williamson assembled the fire control team in England's wardroom at 2100 hours on
04:53May 19th. Five attacks to kill I-16. Ninety-six hedgehog projectiles expended. Only four to six hits.
05:01The math was brutal. Williamson spread the attack charts across the table. Each hedgehog salvo created
05:07a circular pattern approximately 200 feet in diameter. But the pattern varied with ship speed,
05:13sea state, and roll angle. The first attack had landed too far ahead. The second caught I-16 at
05:19shallow depth. The third and fourth missed because the submarine went deep and the range calculation
05:25was wrong. The problem was timing. Sonar could track a submarine until the range closed to about 400
05:31yards. Then the contact entered the blind spot. The echo merged with the transmission pulse. The
05:38submarine disappeared from sonar exactly when England needed tracking data most. Traditional doctrine
05:44called for dropping depth charges when the submarine passed under the ship. But the hedgehog fired
05:49forward while sonar still held contact. The projectiles landed 250 yards ahead. Hit the water before
05:56the submarine reached the impact zone. If the submarine changed course or depth during those critical
06:01seconds, the attack failed. Williamson calculated the solution. Fire earlier. Tighten the pattern. Reduce the
06:09interval between sonar contact and weapon impact. Give the submarine less time to maneuver.
06:15Pendleton approved the new attack procedure. But changing doctrine was easy. Executing it in combat
06:21against experienced submarine commanders was different. The hedgehog mechanism itself presented
06:27problems. Each spigot mortar sat in a steel cradle on England's foredeck. The launcher could rotate to
06:33track the target bearing, but the elevation was fixed. The projectiles always fired at the same angle,
06:39always landed at roughly the same range. The only variables England could control were ship speed,
06:45course, and firing timing. Change any of those parameters by even a few seconds, and the entire
06:51pattern shifted. Hit the wrong wave angle during launch, and half the projectiles scattered outside the
06:57effective zone. Williamson drilled the crew on the new procedure. Sonar operators practiced tracking
07:03shallow contacts. Fire control teams rehearsed range calculations. Helmsman learned to hold steady
07:09course during the attack run, despite submarine evasion tactics. 24 hedgehog projectiles cost
07:16approximately $6,000. One torpedo cost $10,000. But torpedoes required fire control solutions,
07:24gyro angles, depth settings. The hedgehog just needed the submarine to be in the circle when the bombs
07:29arrived. The weapon had another advantage depth charges lacked. Silence. When a hedgehog salvo missed,
07:36nothing exploded. The water remained calm. Sonar performance stayed clear. England could fire again
07:43immediately without waiting for turbulence to settle. But when a hedgehog hit, the result was catastrophic.
07:50A 65-pound projectile traveling at terminal velocity punched through a submarine's pressure hole like a
07:56rifle round through sheet metal. The 35-pound Torpex warhead detonated inside the hole. At 300 feet
08:03depth, seawater flooded through the breach at 400 gallons per minute. Most submarines sank in under 90
08:10seconds. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific transmitted another decoded intercept on May 20. The Japanese 7th
08:17Submarine Squadron had established the N.A. picket line exactly where the codebreakers predicted.
08:22Seven RO-class submarines. RO-104, RO-105, RO-106, RO-108, RO-109, RO-112, RO-116. Spaced at
08:36intervals across a
08:37route Admiral Halsey had used twice before. Commander Haynes ordered the hunter-killer group north.
08:43England would sweep the line from south to north. Find each submarine. Kill it. Move to the next position.
08:50Pendleton knew the tactical problem. Seven submarines across 200 miles of ocean. Most of
08:56them would be running submerged during daylight. Surfaced only at night to recharge batteries.
09:01England would need to catch them during the narrow window when they were vulnerable.
09:05The RO-class boats were smaller than I-16. 765 tons submerged. Crews of 54 men. Top speed,
09:148 knots underwater. They carried contact mines and 4 torpedo tubes. Their mission was reconnaissance and
09:21early warning, not direct combat. But small submarines were harder to detect, generated less
09:27noise, created smaller sonar signatures. And their commanders knew American hunter-killer groups were
09:33operating in the area. They would be cautious, alert, ready to evade. Williamson reviewed the crew
09:39assignments one final time. Every man knew his position. Every station had been drilled until
09:45the procedures became automatic. England had proven the hedgehog could kill submarines.
09:50Now they needed to prove they could do it consistently. At 03.50 on May 22nd, USS George's radar detected
09:58a
09:58surface contact 11,000 yards north of the Admiralty Islands. The contact submerged immediately when George
10:06illuminated it with searchlights. Commander Haynes ordered England to attack. RO-106 was waiting below.
10:15England regained sonar contact on row 106 at 4.25 a.m. on May 22nd. Range, 1,800 yards. The
10:25submarine was
10:25running at periscope depth, trying to determine what had triggered the radar contact, whether the Americans
10:31knew its position. Pendleton ordered the first hedgehog attack using Williamson's modified procedure.
10:37Fire earlier. Tighter timing. Less interval between sonar contact and weapon impact. The hedgehog's
10:44salvo missed. 24 projectiles splashed into the Pacific and sank without detonating.
10:50Row 106's commander had changed course the moment the submarine submerged. Standard evasion. The pattern
10:57landed in empty water. Pendleton ordered a second attack at 5.01. England's sonar operator called out
11:04the range. Bearing. Depth estimate. Williamson calculated the firing solution in his head.
11:10Adjusted for the submarine's last known course change. 24 projectiles arced forward. The pattern
11:16landed perfectly. Three detonations. Then four more. Row 106's pressure hull ruptured in seven places
11:24simultaneously. The submarine imploded at 260 feet. A massive underwater explosion followed three
11:31seconds later as the batteries shorted and ignited. England had killed her second submarine. Two
11:37attacks instead of five. 48 projectiles instead of 96. Williamson's procedure worked. Oil and debris
11:45surfaced after sunrise. A massive slick spread across three square miles. USS George and USS Raby formed a
11:53search line with England. 16,000 yards between ships. Scanning for the next contact on the N.A.
12:00picket line. Japanese submarine Row 104 was positioned 40 miles northeast. Lieutenant Commander
12:06Takashi Hashimoto commanded the boat. 17 years in the Imperial Navy. Eight war patrols. He had survived
12:14depth charge attacks off Guadalcanal. Evaded American destroyers near Rabaul. He knew the Americans were
12:20hunting the N.A. line. He knew row 106 had stopped transmitting. Hashimoto kept RO-104 deep during
12:27daylight. 300 feet. Running silent. Minimal speed. Listening for propeller noise. Sonar pings. Anything
12:35that indicated American warships approaching. At 7.17 a.m. on May 23rd, USS George detected RO-104 on sonar.
12:44Commander Haynes ordered George to attack. The first hedgehog salvo missed. George fired again at
12:507.30. Missed. Another attack at 7.45. Missed. Two more salvos by 8.10. Both missed. George had
12:58expended 120 hedgehog projectiles. Five attacks. Zero hits. Hashimoto was good. He changed depth and
13:06course unpredictably. Stayed inside George's sonar blind spot. Evaded every pattern. Commander Haynes
13:12ordered England to take over the attack. Pendleton brought the destroyer escort around to the attack
13:17heading. Williamson stood next to the sonar operator. Tracking the contact. Calculating the
13:23geometry. Hashimoto had established a pattern. Deep dive after each attack. Level off. Change course.
13:30Wait for the water to settle. Surface slightly to check for pursuers. England's first hedgehog attack
13:35missed. Hashimoto went deep again. But Williamson had predicted the evasion. He knew where the submarine
13:41would level off. Knew the approximate depth. Knew the bearing Hashimoto would choose. Pendleton ordered
13:47the second attack at 8.34. The hedgehog fired. 24 projectiles dropped into the predicted zone.
13:5410 detonations. Then 12. The sound echoed across the water like a string of firecrackers.
14:00Underwater microphones picked up the noise of RO-104's hull breaking apart. Bulkheads collapsing.
14:06Pressure hull fracturing. A major explosion followed three minutes later. Debris appeared on the surface
14:12at 10.45. Oil. Cork insulation. Wooden fragments. Personal items. 54 Japanese submariners gone.
14:20England had killed three submarines in four days. The new attack procedure was proving consistent.
14:26But Commander Haynes faced a problem. USS George had failed five consecutive attacks against RO-104. USS
14:33Raby had not successfully prosecuted a single submarine contact since the operation began.
14:39England was carrying the entire hunter-killer group. The remaining submarines on the NA line
14:45would know the Americans were coming. Radio silence had been broken. RO-106 and RO-104 had missed their
14:52scheduled transmissions. Japanese submarine headquarters at Truk would assume the worst.
14:57Would warn the surviving boats. Would order them to abort the picket line and scatter. But Fleet Radio
15:03Unit Pacific intercepted another message on May 24. RO-116 was maintaining position. Still waiting
15:10to detect American carrier movements. Still following orders despite the missing submarines.
15:16The Japanese command either did not believe the Americans could roll up the entire line,
15:21or they considered the intelligence mission too important to abandon. USS George detected RO-116 on radar
15:28at 1.20 a.m. on May 24. Surface contact. The submarine dove immediately. Commander Haynes ordered England
15:36to attack. Pendleton was already calculating the approach. England made sonar contact on row 116
15:45at 1.50 a.m. on May 24. Range, 2,000 yards. The submarine was running shallow, trying to reach
15:53deeper
15:53water before the Americans could establish an attack pattern. Pendleton ordered the first hedgehog attack
15:59at 2.14, the modified procedure Williamson had developed. Early firing. Tight timing. Predicted
16:06evasion zone. Twenty-four projectiles landed in a perfect circle. Three detonations. Then five more.
16:13Row 116's pressure hull fractured. The submarine went down with all 56 crew. Breaking up noises followed
16:20immediately. But no major explosion. The battery compartment remained intact during the descent.
16:26England had killed four Japanese submarines in six days. Four successful hedgehog attacks out of
16:32eight attempts. Fifty percent kill ratio. Traditional depth charge operations achieved less than two percent.
16:39A small oil slick appeared after sunrise at 7.02. The slick expanded to several square miles by the
16:45following day. Commander Haynes transmitted the results to 3rd Fleet headquarters. Admiral William
16:51Halsey forwarded the report to Pearl Harbor. To Admiral Chester Nimitz. To the Chief of Naval Operations
16:57in Washington. The Navy had been skeptical of the hedgehog since its introduction in 1942. Most destroyer
17:04captains considered the weapon unreliable. Preferred proven depth charge tactics. But England's performance
17:10was changing opinions rapidly. Destroyer escort commanders throughout the Pacific began requesting
17:15hedgehog installation. Ships that already carried the weapon started practicing the attack procedures
17:20Williamson had developed. Fire control officers studied England's attack geometry. Sonar operators
17:27analyzed the timing intervals. The Bureau of Ordnance in Washington received requests for additional
17:32hedgehog projectile production. Ammunition depots across the Pacific reported increased demand.
17:38Ships that had ignored their hedgehog launchers for months suddenly wanted spare parts. Training
17:43ammunition. Technical manuals. But England was not finished hunting. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific had
17:49decoded another intercept. RO-108 was maintaining position 110 nautical miles northeast of Seadler Harbor
17:56at Manus Island. The submarine was following the original operational plan, waiting for American carriers.
18:03Unaware that four submarines on the NA line had already been destroyed,
18:06USS Raby gained radar contact on RO-108 at 2303 on May 26th. Surface contact at 15,000 yards. The
18:17submarine
18:17dove before Raby could close the range. England detected the submerged contact at 2320. Commander Haynes
18:24decided to give Raby the attack. England had killed four submarines. George and Raby had killed none. The crews were
18:31becoming demoralized, questioning their training, their equipment, their ability to prosecute contacts
18:36effectively. Raby fired the first hedgehog's salvo. Missed. The submarine evaded the pattern. Raby attacked again. Missed.
18:45Commander Haynes watched from USS George, counting the attacks, watching Raby struggle with the same problems George had faced against
18:52RO-104. After Raby's second miss,
18:55Haynes ordered England to finish the attack. Pendleton brought the destroyer escort into position. Williamson
19:01calculated the firing solution. The crew executed the attack procedure they had practiced dozens of times.
19:07England fired at 2323. The hedgehog pattern landed precisely. Four detonations, then six more. RO-108
19:17imploded at 300 feet. Fifty-three Japanese submariners died. England had killed five submarines in eight days.
19:24The Japanese 6th Fleet Intelligence Section at Truk intercepted American radio transmissions on May 27th.
19:31The broadcasts described multiple submarine sinkings north of the Admiralty Islands. The intelligence
19:36officers decoded enough fragments to understand what was happening. American forces were systematically
19:42destroying the N.A. picket line. 6th Fleet Headquarters transmitted warnings to the surviving submarines.
19:48Row 112 and Row 109 received the message. Both boats immediately abandoned their patrol sectors.
19:55Row 112 moved west toward the Philippines. Row 109 headed south. Both submarines would survive until 1945,
20:04before being sunk by other American forces. But one submarine on the N.A. line did not receive the
20:09warning in time. Row 105 had sortied from Saipan on May 14th, under Lt. Junichi Inoue. The boat carried the
20:17commander of Submarine Division 51, Captain Rionosuke Kato. A flag officer embarked for tactical
20:24oversight. Row 105 was the most experienced submarine remaining on the N.A. line. Inoue had evaded American
20:31torpedoes in August 1943, had fired on USS Columbia without success in September, had rescued downed
20:39Japanese aviators on multiple occasions. Captain Kato had commanded submarine operations throughout the
20:45Solomon Islands campaign. The American radio transmissions described as increasingly jubilant
20:50by Japanese intelligence were accurate. Admiral Halsey sent a personal message to Commander Haynes.
20:56Continue the sweep. Find the remaining submarines. Destroy them. England had proven the hedgehog could
21:02kill consistently. Had demonstrated that destroyer escorts could hunt submarines as effectively as fleet
21:08destroyers. Had shown that proper training and modified tactics could overcome equipment limitations.
21:14But Row 105 was different. Two senior officers aboard. 17 years combined submarine experience. A crew
21:22that had survived repeated American attacks. And a captain who knew the Americans were coming.
21:29Row 105 surfaced at 310 a.m. on May 31st, 1944. Lt. Inoue brought the submarine up to periscope depth
21:38first.
21:38Scanned the horizon. Listened for propeller noise. The ocean appeared empty. Dark. Silent. The submarine's
21:45batteries needed recharging. 17 days at sea. Constant submerged operations. The electric motors had drained
21:52the battery banks to 30% capacity. Inoue needed at least four hours on the surface, running diesel
21:58generators to restore full power. Captain Kato stood in the conning tower, reviewing the intelligence warnings
22:04from 6th Fleet. Five submarines confirmed. Destroyed between May 19th and May 26th. All killed by the
22:12same American weapon. Something called a hedgehog. A forward firing mortar that detonated on contact
22:18with the hull. Kato had studied American anti-submarine tactics throughout the war. Depth charges required the
22:24attacking ship to pass over the submarine. Created turbulence. Gave the submarine time to evade between
22:30attacks. But this hedgehog fired forward while the American ship still held sonar contact. Landed in
22:36a pattern ahead of the submarine's projected position. If the submarine maintained course, the weapon killed
22:42it. If the submarine evaded, the American ship could fire again immediately. The tactical solution was
22:48simple. Stay deep. Change course randomly. Never surface in areas where American warships operated. But Row 105
22:55needed to recharge batteries. Needed to transmit position reports. Needed to maintain the patrol
23:01station despite the warnings. USS Hazelwood detected Row 105 on radar at 1.56 AM while the submarine was
23:09still on the surface. The destroyer immediately radioed the contact to Commander Haynes aboard USS George.
23:15Haynes ordered the hunter-killer group to intercept. But Haynes made a decision that would extend the hunt
23:20by 25 hours. He ordered England to hold back. To remain in reserve. USS Hazelwood would make the first
23:27attack. Then USS Spangler. Then USS Raby. Then USS George. England would only attack if all four ships
23:34failed. The reasoning was political. England had killed five submarines. The other ships in the task
23:40group had killed none. Morale was collapsing. Crews were questioning their abilities. Officers were requesting
23:46transfers. Haynes needed the other ships to prove they could execute successful attacks. USS Hazelwood
23:52prosecuted the contact first. Dropped depth charges in a standard pattern. The explosions created massive
23:58turbulence. Roiled the water. Destroyed sonar contact for 15 minutes. When the water cleared,
24:04Row 105 had vanished. Inoue had used the turbulence to escape. Dove to 400 feet. Changed course 90 degrees.
24:11Reduce speed to two knots. Let the submarine drift silently while the Americans searched the wrong
24:17sector. USS Spangler gained contact six hours later. Fired a hedgehog salvo. Missed. The pattern
24:24landed 200 yards ahead of where Row 105 had been three minutes earlier. Inoue had changed depth and
24:30course again. Spangler fired three more times. All missed. USS Raby attacked next. Seven hedgehog salvos between
24:38noon and 1600 hours on May 30th. Every attack missed. Inoue was using every evasion technique
24:45the Imperial Navy had developed. Random depth changes. Unpredictable course alterations.
24:50Speed variations. Silent running between maneuvers. USS George tried four attacks. All failed.
24:57Commander Haynes had now watched four American warships fire 21 hedgehog salvos and multiple depth
25:03charge patterns without scoring a single hit. 504 projectiles expended. Zero kills. The problem
25:10was predictability. Every American attack followed the same sequence. Gain sonar contact. Calculate
25:16firing solution. Launch hedgehog. Wait for detonation. When the attack missed, the ship repositioned and tried
25:23again. Inoue recognized the pattern. Understood the timing. Knew exactly when to maneuver. But England's
25:29attack procedure was different. Williamson had modified the timing. Changed the firing intervals.
25:35Predicted evasion zones instead of tracking current position. Five successful kills and eight attacks
25:41proved the method worked. At 0700 on May 31st, after 25 hours of failed attacks, Commander Haynes
25:49transmitted a message to USS England. Four words. Direct. Frustrated. Born from watching his task group
25:56fail repeatedly, while the smallest ship succeeded consistently. The message became famous in Pacific
26:02Fleet communications logs. Widely quoted in postwar submarine warfare analysis. Referenced in
26:09anti-submarine warfare training manuals for decades. Commander Haynes sent,
26:14Oh hell. Go ahead, England. Pendleton ordered his crew to battle stations. Williamson reviewed the attack
26:20geometry one final time. The sonar operator began tracking row 105's position. The submarine was
26:26running at 320 feet, deeper than any previous contact, moving at four knots, changing course every
26:34eight minutes. Captain Cato knew England was coming. Knew this destroyer escort had killed five submarines
26:40in 12 days. Knew the American crew had perfected techniques the other ships could not execute.
26:46He ordered Inoue to dive to maximum depth, to use every evasion pattern simultaneously, to survive the next 30
26:53minutes. England began the attack run at 7.35 a.m. Pendleton held steady course. Williamson calculated the
27:01firing solution. The hedgehog launcher rotated to the target bearing. Twenty-four projectiles waited in their
27:07steel cradles. England fired the hedgehog at 7.36 a.m. on May 31st. Twenty-four projectiles arced forward.
27:17The pattern landed in the zone where Williamson predicted row 105 would be, eight seconds after
27:23launch. Not where the submarine was when England fired. Where it would be when the projectiles
27:28arrived. Six detonations. Then four more. The sound echoed differently than previous attacks. Deeper.
27:35More sustained. Row 105 was at 320 feet. The deepest kill England had attempted. The pressure at that depth
27:43magnified the explosive force. Breaking up noises followed immediately. Bulk heads collapsing.
27:49Hull plates fracturing. Internal compartments flooding. At 7.41, exactly five minutes after the
27:56hedgehog detonations, a massive underwater explosion erupted. The batteries had shorted. The diesel fuel
28:03ignited. Row 105 disintegrated. Oil and debris surfaced within 30 minutes. Life jackets. Wooden fragments.
28:12Personal effects. Fifty-four Japanese submariners and Captain Ryan Osuke Kato were dead. USS England had
28:20killed six Japanese submarines in 12 days. May 19th through May 31st, 1944. No other warship in naval
28:29history had achieved that record. Not in World War I. Not in World War II. Not in any conflict before
28:35or since.
28:36Six confirmed submarine kills by a single ship in 12 days remained unmatched eight decades later. The
28:44British Royal Navy's HMS Starling had sunk six German U-boats in 19 days during February 1944. But
28:52Starling operated as part of a six-ship hunter-killer group. The kills were shared across multiple vessels.
28:58England had operated with George and Raby, but England alone had scored every successful hedgehog attack.
29:04Commander Haynes transmitted the results to Admiral Halsey at 3rd Fleet headquarters. Halsey forwarded
29:10the report to Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. Nimitz sent it to Washington. To the Chief of Naval Operations.
29:16To Admiral Ernest King. King had been skeptical of destroyer escorts since their introduction.
29:22Considered them cheap substitutes for real destroyers. Expendable convoy escorts without the speed or firepower
29:28for serious combat operations. But England's performance forced a reassessment. Admiral King
29:34sent a personal message to USS England on June 2nd. The message was brief, direct. It became the most
29:41famous quote associated with destroyer escort operations in World War II. King wrote,
29:46There'll always be an England in the United States Navy. The promise was sincere. The Navy commissioned
29:52a second USS England in 1963. A Lahey-class guided missile cruiser, designated DLG-22,
30:00later reclassified as CG-22. That ship served through Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm before
30:07decommissioning in 1994. But no third USS England has been commissioned since 1994. Admiral King's promise
30:15remained unfulfilled 32 years later. The name England disappeared from the active fleet roster.
30:20The record remained. The promise did not. USS England received the Presidential Unit Citation
30:26for the May 1944 operation. One of only three destroyer escorts in World War II to earn that
30:33recognition. Lieutenant Commander Pendleton received the Navy Cross. Lieutenant Williamson received commendation
30:39for developing the modified attack procedures. The Bureau of Ordinance increased hedgehog projectile
30:44production by 40 percent in June 1944. Destroyer escorts throughout the Pacific requested installation
30:51priority. Attack procedure manuals based on England's tactics were distributed fleet-wide. Anti-submarine
30:57warfare training incorporated the lessons learned from the Na Line operation. The Japanese 6th Fleet
31:03abandoned submarine picket line tactics after losing six boats in 12 days. The Imperial Navy had deployed
31:1025 submarines across the Pacific in May 1944. By the end of June, 17 were destroyed. American codebreakers,
31:18hedgehog weapons, and aggressive hunter-killer tactics had eliminated Japan's submarine early warning system.
31:25The remaining Japanese submarines shifted to supply runs, transporting ammunition and food to isolated
31:31garrisons, evacuating wounded personnel, mining harbor approaches. The offensive submarine warfare campaign
31:38effectively ended. Japan's submarine force spent the rest of the war avoiding contact,
31:44rather than seeking it. USS England continued anti-submarine patrols through the summer of 1944,
31:50escorted convoys between Manus and Ulithi, supported the invasions of Leyte and Okinawa. The ship never
31:57achieved another submarine kill. Six submarines in 12 days remained the peak. But England's war was not
32:03finished. On May 9, 1945, while on radar picket duty off Okinawa, three Japanese dive bombers attacked the
32:11ship. England's anti-aircraft guns shot down the first bomber. The aircraft crashed in flames into
32:17England's starboard side just below the bridge. The plane's bomb exploded on impact. Thirty-seven
32:22crew members were killed or missing. Twenty-five were wounded. England sailed to Leyte for temporary repairs,
32:29then to Philadelphia for permanent reconstruction. But the war ended before the work was completed.
32:34USS England was decommissioned on October 15, 1945, sold for scrap on November 26, 1946. The most
32:43successful anti-submarine warship in history lasted less than two years in commission. Lieutenant Commander
32:49Pendleton left England in September 1944 with a promotion to commander. He commanded an escort division
32:56in Alaska until the war ended. Retired in January 1947 with the rank of Captain. Died December 9, 1972,
33:04buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Lieutenant Williamson took command of USS England in September
33:101944, the best reward the Navy could offer, command of the ship he had helped make legendary.
33:18The official recognition extended beyond Admiral King's message and the Presidential Unit's citation.
33:24The Navy Department in Washington studied England's attack reports in detail, analyzed every hedgehog
33:31firing sequence, examined every sonar track, reviewed every tactical decision Williamson and Pendleton had made.
33:38The Bureau of Ships established new destroyer escort construction priorities in July 1944. All future
33:45Buckley-class ships would receive hedgehog installations during initial fitting out. Existing destroyer escorts
33:51ships without the weapon received retrofit priority. Ships in Pacific anchorages, ships undergoing repairs,
33:58ships between deployments. By September 1944, 214 destroyer escorts carried hedgehog systems. By December,
34:08that number increased to 341. The weapon England had validated became standard equipment across the
34:14anti-submarine warfare fleet. The tactical procedures Williamson developed became doctrine. The Pacific Fleet
34:21Anti-Submarine Warfare School at Pearl Harbor incorporated England's attack geometry into training
34:27curricula. Sonar operators learned the modified timing intervals. Fire control officers practiced the
34:33prediction calculations. Commanding officers studied the attack reports. Destroyer escort kill ratios
34:40improved immediately. Ships that had struggled for months to achieve successful attacks began sinking
34:45submarines consistently. The hedgehog success rate across the Pacific Fleet increased from 6% in April 1944
34:53to 23% by October. Still below England's 50% performance, but substantially better than traditional
35:00depth charge operations. The intelligence component received equal recognition. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific had
35:07provided the operational intelligence that made England's success possible. The codebreakers had identified
35:13I-16's route. Had decoded the NA picket line positions. Had given Commander Haynes the exact coordinates
35:19where Japanese submarines would be waiting. Admiral Nimitz authorized expansion of fruit pack operations.
35:25In June 1944, additional cryptanalysts, more radio intercept stations, faster decoding procedures. The
35:33codebreakers had proven their value at Midway in 1942. England's operation in May 1944 demonstrated that
35:41tactical intelligence could enable small warships to achieve strategic results. The Japanese submarine force
35:47never recovered from the May losses. Seventeen submarines destroyed in six weeks. Nearly half the boats
35:53deployed across the Pacific. The Imperial Navy had planned to use submarines for early warning and
35:59reconnaissance. To detect American carrier movements. To position the combined fleet for a decisive battle.
36:05But the Americans knew Japanese submarine positions before the Japanese commanders did.
36:10Codebreakers intercepted the deployment orders. Hunter killer groups prosecuted the contacts.
36:16The hedgehog killed the submarines. The entire Japanese submarine strategy collapsed. By August 1944,
36:23Japanese submarines operated under strict defensive protocols. Avoid American warships. Minimize radio
36:30transmissions. Abandon patrol stations if threatened. Transport supplies to isolated garrisons.
36:35The offensive submarine campaign was finished. The impact extended to the broader Pacific strategy.
36:42American carrier task forces operated with reduced submarine threat. Admiral Halsey could move the 3rd
36:48fleet without concern for submarine picket lines. The invasions of the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa
36:54proceeded with minimal submarine interference. Destroyer escorts proved their worth beyond convoy protection.
37:00These cheap warships, designed for expendable missions, had demonstrated they could hunt and kill
37:06submarines as effectively as fleet destroyers, could operate independently, could execute complex tactical
37:12operations, could achieve strategic objectives. The Navy's construction priorities shifted accordingly. Destroyer
37:19escort production accelerated. More Buckley-class ships. More Cannon-class ships. More Edsel-class ships.
37:26By war's end, the United States had commissioned 563 destroyer escorts. Many equipped with hedgehog
37:34systems. Many trained using procedures developed aboard USS England. Lieutenant Commander Pendleton's Navy Cross
37:41Citation specifically mentioned the tactical innovations England had pioneered. The modified attack timing. The
37:48prediction-based firing solutions. The aggressive prosecution of contacts, despite equipment limitations.
37:55The citation became required reading at the Naval War College. But recognition could not change certain
38:00realities. Thirty-seven men died when the kamikaze hit England on May 9, 1945. The crew members who had executed
38:09those six perfect hedgehog attacks. Who had tracked submarines through blind spots. Who had maintained
38:15equipment under combat conditions. Many of them were gone. The survivors carried the legacy forward. Returned to
38:22civilian life with stories of twelve days in May 1944 when their small destroyer escort had achieved something
38:29no warship before or since had matched. Six submarines. Twelve days. A record that stood unbroken. The hedgehog
38:38weapon itself evolved. The Royal Navy developed the Squid Mortar in late 1943. A three-barreled system that fired
38:46larger depth charges with proximity fuses. The United States developed the Weapon Alpha in the 1950s. Then,
38:54the ASROC anti-submarine rocket. Each generation built on lessons learned from England's May 1944 operation.
39:02Modern anti-submarine warfare relies on homing torpedoes. Sonar arrays that detect submarines
39:09hundreds of miles away. Helicopters that deploy acoustic sensors. Nuclear-powered attack submarines
39:15that hunt their diesel-electric counterparts. The technology has advanced far beyond the hedgehog
39:20mortar. But the fundamental principle remains unchanged. Find the submarine. Attack while still holding
39:27contact. Kill before it can evade. USS England proved that principle worked when executed with
39:33precision and courage. The question that remained eight decades later was whether the Navy would
39:38honor Admiral King's promise. Whether a third USS England would join the fleet. Whether the name
39:44that represented the most successful anti-submarine operation in naval history would return to active
39:50service. Or whether the record would stand alone. Unmatched. Unforgotten. But without a ship to carry the
39:56legacy forward. The physical artifacts of USS England's 12-day operation are scattered across
40:05museums and archives. The National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, Texas, preserves
40:11England's action reports. The detailed attack logs. The sonar tracking charts. The hedgehog firing sequences
40:18that demonstrated how a small destroyer escort achieved what larger warships could not. The Naval History
40:24and Heritage Command in Washington maintains England's presidential unit citation. The original
40:30document signed by Navy Secretary James Forrestal. The citation text that describes six submarine kills in
40:3612 days as an unmatched achievement in anti-submarine warfare history. Arlington National Cemetery holds the
40:44grave of Captain Walton Barclay Pendleton. Section 30. Site 766A. The headstone lists his service dates,
40:51his rank, his decorations, the Navy Cross. But nothing on the stone mentions the 12 days in May 1944,
40:59when his ship rewrote anti-submarine warfare doctrine. Lieutenant John Williamson survived the war,
41:06commanded USS England until decommissioning, returned to civilian life. The Navy records show his subsequent
41:12assignments, his promotions, his commendations. But the trail goes cold in the 1950s. No public records
41:19detail his later life. No interviews preserve his perspective on those 12 days. The crew members who
41:25survived England's entire deployment, scattered across America after demobilization, returned to farms in
41:32Iowa, machine shops in Michigan, fishing boats in Massachusetts. Most never spoke publicly about their
41:38service, never gave interviews, never wrote memoirs. The 12 days that made naval history became private
41:44memories held by men who had no interest in public recognition. The Japanese submariners who died aboard
41:51I-16, row 106, row 104, row 116, row 108, and row 105 are commemorated at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.
42:03328 men,
42:0414 officers. The Imperial Navy Submarine Service lost 77% of its personnel during World War II,
42:12the highest casualty rate of any Japanese naval branch. The hedgehog weapon that made England's
42:17success possible exists in museum collections worldwide. The Imperial War Museum in London
42:23displays a complete launcher assembly. The National Museum of the United States Navy in Washington exhibits
42:29hedgehog projectiles. The USS Slater Museum ship in Albany, New York, maintains a functional hedgehog
42:36installation on deck. But no museum displays artifacts specifically from USS England's May 1944
42:42operation. No hedgehog projectiles recovered from the submarine kills. No equipment salvaged before the
42:48ship was scrapped. The physical evidence of the most successful anti-submarine patrol in naval history was
42:54cut apart and melted down in 1946. The second USS England served honorably for 31 years. Deployed to
43:02Vietnam. Participated in Operation Desert Storm. Earned multiple commendations. But that ship never
43:08achieved the fame of the first England. Never set records. Never rewrote doctrine. The name carried the
43:14legacy without matching the achievement. Admiral King's promise that there would always be an England in
43:19the United States Navy lasted until January 21st, 1994. The second England decommissioned that day.
43:26The name disappeared from the active fleet roster. 32 years passed. No third England was commissioned.
43:32The record stands unbroken. Six submarines destroyed by a single warship in 12 days. May 19th through May 31st, 1944.
43:42No ship in any navy has matched that achievement in the 82 years since. Not in World War II. Not
43:48in Korea.
43:49Not in the Cold War. Not in modern anti-submarine operations. The tactical innovations USS England
43:56pioneered remain relevant. Forward-firing weapons that maintain sonar contact during attack.
44:02Prediction-based, firing solutions that anticipate submarine evasion. Aggressive prosecution of contacts
44:08despite initial failures. Modern anti-submarine warfare incorporates these principles in systems far
44:15more sophisticated than the hedgehog mortar. The intelligence methods that enabled England's success
44:20evolved into the signals intelligence infrastructure that supported American naval operations through the
44:26Cold War and beyond. Fleet radio unit Pacific became the foundation for modern cryptologic warfare.
44:33The codebreakers, who decoded Japanese submarine positions in May 1944, established procedures still used
44:40eight decades later. But the human element cannot be replicated. Pendleton's leadership, Williamson's
44:46tactical innovation, the crew's discipline under combat conditions, the courage to attack when other
44:52ships failed, the precision to kill six times in eight attacks when the weapon was considered
44:57experimental. That combination of factors occurred once. In May 1944, aboard a 1,400-ton destroyer escort
45:06that the Navy considered expendable. If this story moved you the way it moved us, do us a favor,
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45:27sailors and destroyer escorts who rewrote the rules of submarine warfare with courage and precision. Real ships,
45:34real heroism. Drop a comment right now and tell us where you're watching from. Are you watching from the
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45:54someone in your family served aboard destroyer escorts. Tell us if you've heard of USS England before this
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46:05and her crew don't disappear into silence. These sailors deserve to be remembered, and you're helping make that happen.
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