Can you really hijack a drone just by messing with its GPS? How close did Constanța come to disaster? Join us as we break down wild tech, spy games, and a near-miss that could’ve rocked Europe! Discover how GPS jamming and spoofing work, and what almost went wrong. Subscribe for more mind-blowing stories and tell us in the comments what shocked you most! #technology #drones #science #news #security
👉 This channel was created in collaboration with https://www.youtube.com/@presura
0:00 - Introduction and Overview
0:59 - Russian GPS Jamming in Europe
3:54 - Impacts of GPS Jamming and Testing
6:39 - Consequences for Civil and Critical Systems
8:36 - How GPS Systems Work and Spoofing Explained
13:28 - Constanța Drone Incident and Theories
19:22 - Military and Public GPS Protection Measures
21:24 - Incident Analysis and Catastrophe Risks at Constanța
👉 This channel was created in collaboration with https://www.youtube.com/@presura
0:00 - Introduction and Overview
0:59 - Russian GPS Jamming in Europe
3:54 - Impacts of GPS Jamming and Testing
6:39 - Consequences for Civil and Critical Systems
8:36 - How GPS Systems Work and Spoofing Explained
13:28 - Constanța Drone Incident and Theories
19:22 - Military and Public GPS Protection Measures
21:24 - Incident Analysis and Catastrophe Risks at Constanța
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00Is it possible to take control of a drone by spoofing the GPS signal it receives?
00:05How big was the disaster we narrowly avoided in Constanza?
00:10A few days ago, I gave an interview for Egil Agilpress.
00:13I talked about how recently it was discovered that Russia tested a military system that can jam all GPS signals
00:19from space.
00:21You can watch the first part of this interview.
00:23In the second part, I invited Octavian Bertianu, the former head of the Environmental Guard, to explain what he thinks
00:30happened in Constanza.
00:31Honestly, my discussion with him scared me.
00:33I realized that we were only 20 or 30 meters away from a huge disaster.
00:39Only the fact that the drone wasn't controlled well enough and ended up turning left a few dozen meters earlier
00:45saved us from a truly major disaster.
00:48I invite you to watch both parts and if you're not interested in the first part, you can skip directly
00:54to the second part, the disaster we narrowly avoided.
00:59This new article reveals that the public GPS signal systems in Europe, as well as in Canada and North America,
01:07are, how should I put it, vulnerable.
01:13Or that they can be affected by jamming carried out by Russian satellites.
01:20The article shows how the measurements were taken at many stations, in many locations across Europe, including Romania.
01:29And that jamming was observed at the same time, in the same way at all the stations.
01:34And from there, it was possible to precisely deduce the source of the jamming.
01:40And the researchers normally expected the jamming to come from the ground, because methods like that have existed.
01:48The signal would normally come from radio sources, radio antennas, yes, transmitters on the ground.
01:55But this time it was coming from space.
01:58And it couldn't have come from the ground, because that signal reached both Canada and Europe.
02:07A ground source with such a wide reach was unlikely.
02:11And anyway, they were able to locate the source.
02:14The source was from space, and not only that.
02:17Knowing when that event took place, there were several such events, if I'm not mistaken, about 75 events.
02:23But in some of them, they were able to locate the source.
02:27As you said, where and when in space, with an accuracy, if I'm not mistaken, of a few meters.
02:34And then they searched the satellite databases and discovered a Russian satellite that travels in a very elliptical orbit.
02:43That means it gets close to Earth from time to time.
02:46And that satellite was at that location at that time.
02:50That's where the suspicion came from, indeed, now very strong about what they tried to do.
02:54The Russians tried to test this jamming system against public GPS systems in Europe, Canada, and America.
03:00With that, tell it.
03:05First of all, it must be said that Russia did not exaggerate.
03:09That jamming only lasted a few seconds.
03:11Yes, and it wasn't at a very high level, meaning not much higher than the interference that happens during solar
03:18eruptions,
03:19which lasts much longer, sometimes up to 100 seconds.
03:25The jamming done by Russia was stronger, but how should I put it?
03:29It was kind of like a signal you used to test if the system works, right?
03:35Then you make it very short, a few, four seconds, three seconds.
03:40Yes, that jamming.
03:41So that in general, yes, those of us who were driving cars through Europe, for example,
03:46maybe we lost the signal for three or four seconds.
03:49It's like we were driving under a passage or inside a tunnel.
03:54So they made sure not to affect us too much because, of course, if it had affected us too much,
03:59there would have been conflicts.
04:01Diplomatic, but on the other hand, it's clear what Russia is trying to do.
04:05And once again, I don't know if they are the only ones trying because I suspect that the Americans might
04:10also try or the Chinese.
04:11Anyone with an army would want to see how well this jamming system would work.
04:19So that they can then use it in case of a war and how should I say an economic war,
04:24maybe, and so on.
04:25Yes.
04:26So it's about testing a new military technique, because that's what we're talking about.
04:30Jamming from space this time, not from the ground.
04:33Yes.
04:33And testing this military technique, not to use it now,
04:37but to have it in your portfolio of military techniques that you could use in the future,
04:42of course, with much greater efficiency.
04:48It depends a lot on technology.
04:51And you realize that for me, for example, or for an ordinary citizen,
04:54it won't affect us very much, except maybe we might lose our way.
04:58Because we rely on GPS, but we're people who drive cars.
05:01And if the GPS signal disappears, we don't know where to go anymore.
05:05But we keep, how should I say, following the traffic laws.
05:10I mean, we're careful where we go, even if we lose our direction.
05:15Yes.
05:16And if we don't get to the area where we need to be at the time, we need to be
05:19there.
05:19It's not a big problem.
05:21If we're talking, for example, about ambulance systems that need to reach an area at a specific time,
05:27of course, they will be delayed because people, drivers rely on ambulance systems.
05:32And that's the case with all systems.
05:34If we think, for example, about smart cars, you realize that smart cars also rely heavily on GPS.
05:41I imagine they have a safety feature, meaning that when the GPS signal disappears,
05:46self-driving cars will probably pull over to the side so they don't go in a direction they don't know.
05:52If we think, for example, about airplanes, well, civilian airplanes, to be honest,
05:56I don't think they rely on just one GPS system because there are several GPS systems.
06:00So they probably use multiple systems, safety systems that are close to the military ones.
06:09For example, they use signals from three GPS systems.
06:12And if one is jammed, you rely on the other two or at least two,
06:16or you rely on something else for navigation besides GPS because you have onboard instruments to navigate.
06:22Right. You have altimeters, you have a compass and so on.
06:26So I think from system to system in some situations, especially when we always rely on the GPS signal and
06:32rely on it a lot,
06:33that's where most of the problems will be.
06:38I would say this, that first and foremost, yes, we are not in a situation where Europe has,
06:45or Russia is so aggressive towards Europe that it would want to use this system against the public system in
06:51Europe.
06:51Right. Because that would be first and foremost, a political statement, meaning a political attitude,
06:58a direct war against countries that are part of NATO.
07:01Right. I don't think Russia wants something like that.
07:04So we were just dealing with a test of a system that could be used in the future.
07:11But if it will be used, yes, where will the biggest impact be and where will the greatest danger be?
07:18Essentially, that's your question.
07:20And I think the first thing we need to realize is, how should I put it, the impact on public
07:26opinion?
07:28So just by the fact that Russia could use this system to disrupt ordinary citizens driving their cars,
07:35forcing them to buy maps and navigate like in the old days with the map in front of the car,
07:40right?
07:42This will annoy a lot of European citizens.
07:45So first and foremost, it will have an impact on the ordinary citizen and the citizen will say,
07:50but what are we doing? We want to live in peace.
07:53On the other hand, of course, it could affect systems where GPS is essential.
08:01Here, what can I say?
08:03I don't know.
08:03Maybe we're talking about drones, for example.
08:05But in Western Europe, we don't rely too much on drones, at least not yet.
08:09In the future, we might use drones for home package delivery, but otherwise we don't rely on them.
08:14And I think, on the other hand, Europe also realizes, yes, that it needs to prepare for such an event.
08:23So, at least they know that such things exist, and then they will probably move into critical systems.
08:29Whether we're talking about healthcare, ambulances, or, I don't know, airplanes, as I said, towards military GPS systems.
08:36Are military GPS systems essentially more resistant to such attacks?
08:44We should first understand how a GPS system works, like the one we have in our car, right?
08:51We're talking about three or four satellites that are somewhere in space, right?
08:55And they know exactly where they are because as they move around the Earth,
08:59at any moment, they know their exact location, right?
09:03And they send a signal at the speed of light all over the surface of the Earth.
09:08Each one sends signals at the speed of light all over the surface of the Earth.
09:13When we're in a car, we actually receive, or not us, but the GPS, of course, receives the signal from
09:19all four satellites.
09:21But, pay attention, if the car is a little more to the left,
09:24then the signal coming from the satellite on the right will arrive later.
09:28And vice versa.
09:30That means, if the car moves more to the left or more to the right, the delay between the signals
09:36is different.
09:37And that signal carries not only the delay, because the delay is actually measured by the GPS,
09:42but that signal also carries the location of the satellites.
09:47And then, what happens is what, well, mathematicians call a triangulation process.
09:53That is, just like you have a triangle from which three signals are sent,
09:57you look at how quickly the signal from each one reaches you,
10:01and if some signals arrive faster than others, you know you're more to the left or more to the right.
10:06You know where the signals were sent from since that's included, so you know your location, right?
10:11Now, what do jamming and interference mean?
10:14It means that on that frequency band where you receive your signals,
10:18you simply send random signals, a lot of signals.
10:22And then, your receiver can no longer distinguish real signals from what was sent, and it gets lost.
10:28Basically, it doesn't know which are the original signals coming from the satellites anymore.
10:33So, in that case, you say, okay, I've lost the signal.
10:36Yes, that's jamming, falsification or spoofing is something completely different and much more subtle.
10:43So, how does this happen? It's usually done from the ground.
10:47I haven't seen reports of satellites spoofing from afar.
10:50But from the ground, there are transmission stations, be careful, that send signals simulating GPS.
10:57Yes, so basically, your receiver is again receiving three signals.
11:02Yes, be careful.
11:03The signals are from the same simulator and come from another direction, but the receiver can't tell their source.
11:09Because in GPS systems, normally, the receiver doesn't know where the signals are coming from.
11:14The receiver only knows when the signals arrive and information about the location of the signals.
11:19Well, in a spoofing system, a falsification system, we have a GPS simulator that sends three signals simulating the satellites
11:28on exactly the same frequency band.
11:30But pay attention, it intensifies.
11:33The intensity of the simulation is higher than the intensity of the signal.
11:38And then, the receiver listens to the real satellites and suddenly sees how a signal on the same frequency band
11:45becomes, let's say, much stronger.
11:46And it starts to track that one naturally because the signal is stronger.
11:50And by tracking that one, it starts to believe that the signals being sent are the real ones.
11:55But the signals being sent are simulated.
11:58Yes, that means they falsify the satellite's real positions and send other positions of the satellites.
12:06In such a way that the GPS signal, yes, considers that it is one meter to the left of where
12:13it actually was.
12:14And they do it so well that if, let's say, the car should go 100 meters forward by manipulating these
12:22simulated signals, you can tell the GPS system,
12:26OK, do you want to go 100 meters forward?
12:29It changes that location 100 meters ahead and puts it to the left.
12:34And then you say that the front is to the left and you go to the left exactly where you
12:39want it to go.
12:39Well, the spy wants it, so to speak.
12:41The one who is falsifying the data wants it.
12:43So, in other words, falsification means intentionally giving the GPS system a wrong map.
12:54And pay attention, if you somehow know where that car wants to go, then you change the location.
13:02He knows he wants to get to Bucharest, right?
13:05But in the simulator, you send the Piteshti location instead of Bucharest.
13:09He thinks he's headed to Bucharest, but he'll end up in Piteshti.
13:12So, if you know where the drone or let's say that car is going through this simulation, you make it
13:19arrive at another location, exactly where you want it to go.
13:23This is simulation or, well, spoofing in English.
13:28Yes, from what I've read, and I especially read what Octavian Berchanu, the former head of the Environmental Guard, wrote.
13:37There are a lot of theories, right?
13:40Personally, I don't believe in...
13:42No, no, no, let's put it this way.
13:45First of all, the question is whether in Constanza it was jamming or it was falsification.
13:51If we follow one of the drones, because I understand there were four drones, one exploded very close in the
13:58port.
13:59Close to two things that are very dangerous, namely a nitrate tank, something like that, which could have exploded and
14:06was very dangerous.
14:09Or very close to an oil tank or so, a petroleum tank.
14:13And there were two more that exploded 150 kilometers from Constanza and a fourth drone that exploded somewhere else.
14:21So, there were four.
14:22But note, the one that managed to reach the port, if indeed the trajectory I saw on the internet is
14:29correct,
14:30it seems that it intentionally went to that specific port area because you can see how it heads toward Constanza,
14:36enters, enters the port, and then continues inside the port.
14:41Inside, it follows that port until it reaches a location that is very close, just a few hundred meters,
14:48from two areas that would be very dangerous if there were explosions, right?
14:53If we look at that trajectory, essentially, we should already deduce that it's not jamming.
14:59Because if you jam them, those drones no longer know where to go and they start moving randomly in one
15:05direction or another.
15:07And they couldn't have such a dangerous trajectory.
15:10So, then we probably have to talk, as most people say, right?
15:14That it's most likely a case of signal spoofing.
15:19Now, however, what does signal spoofing mean?
15:21It means that the Russians or the Russian army somehow took control of this drone and took it to a
15:28location where they wanted it to go.
15:30That is between the two military targets where the explosions could have been very large.
15:35Now, however, how can I take control?
15:37Note, you don't necessarily have to use that method with satellites, right?
15:42Essentially, essentially, it can be used if you know where that Ukrainian drone was headed.
15:49So, if the Russians had known where that Ukrainian drone was going, they could have changed the coordinates so that
15:55it would end up exactly where they wanted, right?
15:58And they could have carried out this spoofing, but only with ground stations.
16:04Because I don't remember there being GPS simulators capable of such simulations from space.
16:09I mean, I haven't read about anything like that.
16:11So, we're not talking about satellites.
16:12We're talking about ground-based simulators.
16:16Now, I don't know if the ground-based simulators are powerful enough for the Russians in Crimea to have used
16:23these simulators on that drone to change its direction.
16:28The military should know this because they should have seen, how should I put it, these effects of the simulation
16:34in other signals as well.
16:36On the other hand, there are other explanations that could be, let's say, simpler.
16:41One could be a spy, right?
16:42Within the Ukrainian army.
16:44Who, as I read, that Ukrainian drone was supposedly waiting for some Russian ships that had unloaded oil in Konstantin,
16:52which in itself raises a question mark, and were about to leave the port.
16:57So, basically, those Ukrainian drones were supposed to attack these ships that would have left the port.
17:04Or, if the Russians had known, okay, they want to attack these ships leaving the port, so they probably would
17:09have known the location and time, then they could have used that method.
17:13But, on the other hand, it could also be simpler things.
17:16For example, they could have taken control because many of these drones are not necessarily programmed from scratch to the
17:23target, you know?
17:24They can travel hundreds of kilometers and hit a target with an accuracy of about 3 to 10 meters.
17:32And, essentially, they are programmed to do the first part of the journey on their own.
17:37But, as they get closer to the target, you know, they are generally controlled because there are video cameras.
17:43You can see which direction you're going.
17:45You can identify the target.
17:46And then, in the final phase, you want to go directly toward the target.
17:50Or, it could be that the Russian army intervened on this communication channel and took direct control of the drone.
17:57Yes, that they took control using conventional methods, so to speak.
18:02Yes.
18:03So, again, we're not talking about them distorting the GPS signal.
18:06No, the GPS signal wasn't distorted.
18:09We wouldn't have had those GPS signal simulators.
18:12And, simply, the drone would have been controlled through classic channels by the Russian army.
18:18Again, I don't know if this is true, but, again, it's a possibility.
18:22So, the idea is that there are many classic possibilities, not necessarily yes, to immediately think about distorting and falsifying
18:31the GPS system, which, as I said, can still be done.
18:34It can be done with ground stations when the signal is known.
18:37From a military point of view, I'm thinking of a few solutions.
18:44But, how should I put it?
18:46I believe that this very logic of military confrontation, yes, it's something that should be avoided.
18:53Because we are a technological civilization and we are becoming more and more dependent on technology, yes.
19:00And, without wanting to, we are entering the area of the Cold War and nuclear bombs.
19:05I mean, as long as we depend on technology, somewhere on the other side, there will be someone who can
19:10infiltrate that technology and cause a lot of harm.
19:13Right?
19:14But, leaving aside this, how should I say, problem, which essentially is social, is about war, is political, right?
19:22Once we are in this system of confrontation, where we are facing an enemy, in this case, Russia, they should
19:29be looking for military measures.
19:33Well, and if we're talking about military measures, I should think, what could they do, right?
19:37Well, in this case, the public system needs to get closer and closer to the military one.
19:43I mean, the first measure is for the GPS system to use at least two sources, because we have several
19:50satellite constellations that send GPS systems, right?
19:55GPS signals.
19:56We also have Galileo, the European one.
19:59We have the American one.
20:00We have the American military one, and so on.
20:02So, public systems, if we want to defend ourselves, must rely on several such
20:12constellations of satellites to avoid jamming on a single channel.
20:16Of course, after that, opponents will want to jam on multiple channels.
20:21When it comes to GPS signal spoofing, so basically, as I told you, to change where places appear to be.
20:30Then we can use another thing that's done in the military system, namely data encoding.
20:35Because the data coming from the original satellite in the military GPS system has its own security code.
20:45And then the receiver, which in this case is essentially a military receiver, checks the security code.
20:50But the other side, the opponent, in this case Russia, in order to trick the GPS system, they would also
20:58have to send that security code.
21:00And you realize that this is almost impossible.
21:03It's already at a different security level, and breaking through it would be very difficult, right?
21:08So, when public systems also implement these security codes in their systems that are transmitted,
21:15then again, public systems in Europe are more resistant to these data spoofing attacks.
21:24After I did the interview for Egger Press, I called Octavian Bersianu, the former head of the Environmental Guard.
21:29I wanted to know what he thinks happened with Alevara in Constanza.
21:33I'll let you watch the interview.
21:35Honestly, I was scared by how disastrous it could have been there if the system the Russians used to take
21:41control of the drone
21:42hadn't failed just a few dozen meters away.
21:45How I see the picture given by the incident with the drone that exploded at dock 78 in the port
21:52of Constanza on June 5th.
21:55Let's go back a week and see that three Turkish cargo ships were targeted on May 29th by a drone
22:02attack in the Black Sea off the northern coast of Turkey.
22:09This attack was foiled.
22:11We're talking about three cargo ships, three oil tankers, James, the second one under the Palau flag,
22:18and Altura and Velora, both under the Sierra Leone flag.
22:23They somehow managed to avoid a drone attack from Ukraine.
22:30On June 5th, when the incident happened, there was already another vessel unloading in the port of Constanza, which is
22:39under embargo.
22:45And the consequences are only handled by the Ukrainian authorities.
22:49It's about the safe in Elona, which left media port, media terminal, sometime after 9 in the morning at 9
22:57.20.
23:04Exactly at the time the drone was supposed to explode, an hour before.
23:09Off the coast during the night, I assume this ship was being awaited by a pack of drones, at least
23:16four drones,
23:18which were supposed to destroy it after it left the port.
23:22Somewhere offshore, at 140, 150, 160 kilometers, why offshore, and why then, because they couldn't destroy it.
23:31If it was destroyed while loaded, carrying oil, it would have triggered a huge international scandal, especially with the Romanian
23:39side.
23:40And I think the interest was for this small catastrophe to be covered up,
23:46and for the effects of the oil pollution not to be visible from the shore.
23:54They probably remain somewhere out in the Black Sea.
23:59Unfortunately, it's likely that the Russian forces are being played,
24:04as we've seen by this activity of the Ukrainian army, to destroy Russian ships.
24:11And that operation might have been played out by intercepting the drones with special Russian equipment,
24:18which took over the electronic control of the drones.
24:25From what I understand, the command can be taken over through the satellite system,
24:31a Russian satellite jamming and interception system that is quite well developed.
24:36But it could just as easily be taken over by systems that are located on land or at sea.
24:42In our case, it's likely that these jamming and takeover systems are found on a commercial cargo ship,
24:50on a commercial vessel.
24:52In our case, these jamming and takeover systems are likely to be found on a commercial vessel.
25:04In our case, these jamming and takeover systems are likely to be found on a commercial cargo ship,
25:17on a commercial vessel, to enter the port of Constanza.
25:28But it failed miserably just a few dozen meters away when it had to turn left toward the oil terminal.
25:37Why do we say oil terminal?
25:39Because after it turned left, after Dock 78, where that drone got stuck in the floating barrier system,
25:48which somehow limits any pollution with petroleum products,
25:52the actual oil terminal facility was located right in the area between Dock 77 and Dock 79.
26:02And what would have been the consequences if that drone had reached there?
26:08First of all, we need to talk a bit about the drone.
26:11It's a Sea Baby, a drone that can carry 850 to 1000 kilograms of very powerful explosives on board,
26:20so that it can break a commercial ship the moment it hits it.
26:26What should also be noted is that these drones are equipped with fairly modern navigation systems,
26:33systems that allow them to navigate even when they lose signal and they also have a system for
26:41self-destruction so that these drones don't fall into the hands of an adversary.
26:47The self-destruction system means using a much smaller amount of the total explosive charge to destroy and disintegrate the
26:55drone,
26:56and not to disintegrate a commercial ship or a much larger target.
27:01Why is this system needed? Precisely because of what we've seen before.
27:06Drones can be taken over by enemies or can reach places where they generate
27:12unwanted effects for those who initially operated the drone.
27:23We return to the intention of entering the Constanza port into the oil terminal with a large explosive payload.
27:32Let's look at what the effects of an explosion there would have been.
27:35First of all, we need to consider a few things. In that area, there are terminals for the import and
27:42export of grains,
27:43and in our case, in just over a month, for the export of grains coming from Ukraine.
27:48Constanza port is the largest port on the Black Sea that can provide economic support to Ukraine
27:55through the direct export of grains. Secondly, oil terminal is also located there,
28:02through which Ukraine can be supplied with fuel. And thirdly, we have the port area,
28:07which also serves other commercial units, including a nearby ammonium nitrate warehouse.
28:15At the time of the explosion, according to sources, there were about 1,000 tons of ammonium nitrate
28:22in the port of Constanza nearby. When we say nearby, we don't mean a few dozen meters,
28:29but rather a few hundred meters up to one or one and a half kilometers.
28:34Why was CFL Ilona targeted? Because it was specifically authorized to export petroleum hydrocarbons.
28:44But Ukraine wants this export, which may be based on Russian oil, to be destroyed.
28:54In Constanza, if this area had reached the Lukoil terminal, Lukoil at the oil terminal,
29:02then it probably would have suffered quite significant damage from an explosion
29:10within the range of the docks in that area.
29:14What is important to mention is that at that time, near the oil terminal area, there was also a cargo
29:23ship
29:23carrying 8,500 tons of methanol, which is an extremely powerful, toxic and destructive substance when
29:38it explodes when it reacts.
29:43What would it have meant? The explosion of the existing tank at the port dock would have led to a
29:51chain
29:51explosion of the installations at the oil terminal.
29:57It would have generated a fireball strong enough to destroy any structure within at least a kilometer around.
30:11Within a radius of a kilometer, maybe a bit more, we had an excess of ammonium nitrate, ammonium 1000 tons.
30:17And the combination of the two explosions and the two sources of explosion, extremely powerful,
30:25would have been equivalent to almost two kilotons of TNT.
30:29When we say two kilotons of TNT, we're talking about a bomb, a tactical, so powerful that it would have
30:42simply wiped out the entire infrastructure of Constanza port. It probably would have brought down apartment buildings.
30:49It would have created huge craters and would have made port activity non-existent for the next few years.
30:57By a rough calculation.
31:01The equivalent, 1000 tons of ammonium nitrate. That means about 400 tons of TNT and those 8,500 tons of
31:10methanol means somewhere around 1500 tons of TNT stacked together. That's nearly two kilotons of TNT.
31:19That would have simply destroyed the city of Constanza. Everything that means port infrastructure,
31:26it would have destroyed the infrastructure as well.
31:31The administrative area, everything that means the inhabited zone and the blast from this explosion
31:38would have been felt for 7.78 kilometers. Most likely we would have been talking about hundreds or
31:46thousands of victims in that area.
31:50That's pretty much my view that a small atomic bomb just passed right by us and we pretended not to
31:57see it.
31:58We totally ignored and are still ignoring a possible mass destruction.
32:05The damages would have been in the medium and long term in the tens to hundreds of billions of euros
32:12for Romania.
32:14Dear friends, this was today's video. To be honest with you, it kind of scared me.
32:20I realized that we really are on the border of a war where tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of
32:26people are dying. And that what happened in Constanza could have been very serious.
32:32If that system the Russians used to control the drone hadn't failed just a few dozen meters away,
32:37I'll leave you with that thought as well. And I thank everyone who subscribed on Patreon or who are members
32:44here on the YouTube channel. Those of you who haven't subscribed to this channel yet can do it right now
32:50by clicking the subscribe button. Until next time, I'm Christian Pressura,
32:54Physica Povestita. You are cool. I wish you all the best. Goodbye.
Comments