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  • 11 hours ago
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00:00I think the Iranians do have leverage with the upper hand, but only in the short run.
00:04So, for example, if Iran wants to choke the Shred of Hormuz for a longer time, it's naturally
00:08going to run counter to many of the consensus building efforts involved in seeing this MOU
00:14through.
00:15It also will lead to a limiting of guardrail, something which Iran is really aware of, because
00:20if you look at Iran's behavior over the past four months, it has resorted to closing the
00:23Shred of Hormuz when it has felt that, you know, either negotiations or Iran's entire
00:28this artificial narrative around self-defense attacking Gulf countries were called into
00:32question, it can resort to that.
00:34But the idea behind negotiating in a 60-day framework is that all these things are conditional.
00:39If Iran wants to celebrate, for example, billions coming out of Qatar, and there are many other
00:42countries around the world where Iranian frozen assets are kind of concentrated, U.S. Treasury
00:47controls play a huge role in greenlighting or in some ways even reversing those assets.
00:52So I think I would not look at Iranian triumphs or leverage in a disconnect from U.S. leverage
00:59over Iranian control, something which has endured over the years.
01:02So yes, Iran will have a degree of leverage in the short run, but in the longer run, I
01:06feel the U.S. have the contours, the instruments, be it military, be it diplomatic, be it economic,
01:12to turn Iranian leverage into a liability should the Iranians offer enough reason for the U.S.
01:17to tell them everything.
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