- 21 hours ago
Triumph of the Nerds
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00:00The story so far.
00:02In 1975, Ed Roberts invented the Altair personal computer.
00:07It was a pain to use until 19-year-old pre-billionaire Bill Gates
00:10wrote the first personal computer language.
00:13Still, the public didn't care.
00:15Then two young hackers, Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak,
00:19built the Apple computer to impress their friends.
00:22We were all impressed, and Apple was a stunning success.
00:25By 1980, the PC market was worth a billion dollars.
00:30Now, view on!
01:00We are nerds.
01:03Most of the people in the industry were young
01:05because the guys who had any real experience
01:08were too smart to get involved in all these crazy little machines.
01:13It really wasn't that we were going to build billion-dollar businesses.
01:16We were having a good time.
01:18Wee, wee, wee, wee.
01:19I thought this was the most fun you could possibly have with your clothes on.
01:23When the personal computer was invented more than 20 years ago,
01:26it was just that, an invention.
01:28It wasn't a business.
01:30These were hobbyists who built these machines
01:33and wrote this software to have fun.
01:35But that has really changed.
01:38And now, this is a business.
01:39This is a big business.
01:44Power Center!
01:50It just goes to show you that people can be bought.
01:54If you're really an exciting audience...
01:58I want to see a blue over our waters.
02:00If you got that...
02:01How the personal computer industry grew from zero to 100 million units
02:05is an amazing story.
02:07And it wasn't just those early funky companies of nerds and hackers
02:11like Apple that made it happen.
02:13Most of this transformation from hobby to big business
02:16can be linked to three letters.
02:18I. B. M.
02:23IBM was and is an American business phenomenon.
02:27Over 60 years, Tom Watson and his son, Tom Jr.,
02:30built what their workers called Big Blue
02:32into the top computer company in the world.
02:34But IBM made mainframe computers for large companies,
02:38not personal computers, at least not yet.
02:40For the PC to be taken seriously by big business,
02:43the nerds of Silicon Valley had to meet the suits of corporate America.
02:52IBM never fired anyone,
02:54requiring only undying loyalty to the company
02:57and a strict dress code.
03:00IBM hired conservative hard workers straight from school.
03:03Few IBMers were at the summer of love.
03:09Their turn-ons were giant mainframes and corporate responsibility.
03:14They worked 9 to 5 and on Saturdays, washed the car.
03:29This is intergalactic HQ for IBM,
03:32the largest computer company in the world.
03:33But in many ways, IBM is really more a country than it is a company.
03:37It has hundreds of thousands of citizens.
03:39It has a bureaucracy.
03:40It has an entire culture.
03:42Everything, in fact, but an army.
03:48Okay, Sam, we're ready to visit IBM country.
03:50Obviously, we're dressed for the part.
03:52Now, when you were in sales training in 1959 for IBM,
03:56did you sing company songs?
03:57Absolutely.
03:58Well, just to get us in the mood, let's sing one right here.
04:01You're kidding.
04:01We have the IBM, the songs of the IBM,
04:04and we're going to try for number 74,
04:07our IBM salesman, sung to the tune of Jingle Bells.
04:11IBM, happy men, smiling all the way.
04:15Oh, what fun it is to sell our products night and day.
04:19IBM, Watson men, partners of TJ.
04:23In his service to mankind, that's why we are so gay.
04:28Now, gay didn't mean what it means today then.
04:31Remember that.
04:32Right.
04:32Okay?
04:32Okay, let's go.
04:33Okay.
04:35I guess it was okay.
04:36Perfect.
04:37Yeah.
04:42When I started at IBM, there was a dress code
04:45that was an informal oral code of white shirts.
04:49You couldn't wear anything but a white shirt,
04:51generally with a starch collar.
04:53I remember attending my first class,
04:57and a gentleman said to me as we were entering the building,
05:00are you an IBMer?
05:01And I said, yes.
05:02He had a three-piece suit on.
05:04Vests were of the Vogue.
05:07And he said, could you just lift your pants leg, please?
05:11I said, what?
05:12And before I knew it, he had lifted my pants leg,
05:15and he said, you're not wearing any garters.
05:18I said, what?
05:20He said, your socks.
05:21They're not pulled tight to the top.
05:23You need garters.
05:25And sure enough, I had to go get garters.
05:30IBM is like Switzerland.
05:32Conservative, a little dull, yet prosperous.
05:34It has committees to verify each decision.
05:37The safety net is so big that it's hard to make a bad decision,
05:40or any decision at all.
05:42At which we announced a new organizational structure.
05:45Rich Seidner, computer programmer and wannabe Paul Simon,
05:48spent 25 years marching in step at IBM.
05:51He feels better now.
05:55I mean, it's like getting 400,000 people to agree what they want to have for lunch.
06:00You know?
06:00I mean, it's just not going to happen.
06:01It's going to be lowest common than, you know, it's going to be, you know, hot dogs and beans.
06:05So, um, so what are you going to do?
06:08So IBM had created this process,
06:10and it absolutely made sure that quality would be preserved throughout the process,
06:14that you actually were doing what you set out to do
06:17and what you thought the customer wanted.
06:19At one point, somebody kind of looked at the process to see,
06:22well, you know, what's it doing, and what's the overhead built into it?
06:26And what they found is that it would take at least nine months to ship an empty box.
06:32By the late 70s, even IBM had begun to notice the explosive growth
06:36of personal computer companies like Apple.
06:39The Apple II. Small, inexpensive, simple to use.
06:43The first computer...
06:44What's more, it was a computer business they didn't control.
06:47In 1980, IBM decided they wanted a piece of this action.
06:52There were suddenly tens of thousands of people buying machines of that class,
06:58and they loved them, and they were very happy with them,
07:01and they were showing up in the engineering departments of our clients
07:05as machines that were brought in
07:07because you can't do the job on your mainframe kind of thing.
07:11JB wanted to know why I'm doing better than all the other managers.
07:15It's no secret, I have an Apple.
07:17Sure, there's a big computer three flights down,
07:20but I won't test my options, do my charts, or edit my reports like my Apple.
07:24People who'd gotten it were religious fanatics about them.
07:28So the concern was we were losing the hearts and minds,
07:32and give me a machine to win back the hearts and minds.
07:38In business, as in comedy, timing is everything,
07:42and time looked like it might be running out for an IBM PC.
07:45I'm visiting the IBMer who took up the challenge.
07:51In August 1979, as IBM's top management met to discuss their PC crisis,
07:57Bill Lowe ran a small lab in Boca Raton, Florida.
08:00Hey, Bill, nice to see you again.
08:03Yeah, I tried to match the IBM risk code.
08:05How did I do?
08:06That's terrific. That's terrific.
08:07He knew the company was in a quandary.
08:09Wait another year, and the PC industry would be too big even for IBM to take on.
08:14Great. Thanks a lot.
08:15Chairman Frank Carey turned to the department heads and said,
08:19Help!
08:21He kind of said, Well, what should we do?
08:24And I said, Well, we think we know what we would like to do
08:28if we were going to proceed with our own product.
08:30And he said, No.
08:31He said, At IBM, it would take four years and 300 people to do anything.
08:36I mean, it's just a fact of life.
08:38And I said, No, sir.
08:39We can provide you a product in a year.
08:42And he abruptly ended the meeting.
08:44He said, You're on, Lowe.
08:45Come back in two weeks and tell me what you need.
08:48An IBM product in a year? Ridiculous.
08:51Down in the basement, Bill still has the plan.
08:54To save time, instead of building a computer from scratch,
08:58they would buy components off the shelf and assemble them,
09:01what in IBM speak was called open architecture.
09:06IBM never did this.
09:08Two weeks later, Bill proposed his heresy to the chairman.
09:11And frankly, this is it.
09:13Now, the key decisions were to go with an open architecture.
09:20Non-IBM technology, non-IBM software, non-IBM sales, and non-IBM service.
09:27And we probably spent a full half of the presentation
09:33carrying the corporate management committee into this concept
09:36because this was a new concept for IBM at that point in time.
09:40Was it a hard sell?
09:40Well, Mr. Carey bought it.
09:45And as a result of him buying it, we got through it.
09:50With the backing of the chairman, Bill and his team then set out to break all the IBM rules
09:56and go for a record.
09:57All right, we'll put it in the IBM section here.
10:00Once IBM had decided to do a personal computer,
10:03and to do it in a year, they couldn't really design anything.
10:06They just had to slap it together.
10:08So that's what we'll do.
10:09You have a central processing unit, and let's see.
10:13You need a monitor or display and a keyboard.
10:21Okay, a PC, except it's not.
10:24There's something missing.
10:26Time for the cringely crash course in elementary computing.
10:31A PC is a box full of electronic switches, a piece of hardware.
10:35It's useless until you tell it what to do.
10:37It requires a program of instructions.
10:39That's software.
10:40Every PC requires at least two essential bits of software in order to work at all.
10:45First, it requires a computer language.
10:48That's what you type in to give instructions to the computer, to tell it what to do.
10:52Remember, it was a computer language called BASIC that Paul Allen and Bill Gates adapted
10:56to the Altair, the first PC.
10:58The other bit of software that's required is called an operating system.
11:01That's the internal traffic cop that tells the computer itself how the keyboard is connected
11:06to the screen or how to store files on a floppy disk instead of just losing them when you
11:11turn off the PC at the end of the day.
11:14Operating systems tend to have boring, unfriendly names like Unix and CPM and MS-DOS.
11:20But though they may be boring, it's an operating system that made Bill Gates the richest man
11:24in the world, and the story of how that came about is, well, pretty interesting.
11:31So the contest begins.
11:33Who would IBM buy their software from?
11:36Let's meet the two contenders, the late Gary Kildall, then age 39, a computer science PhD,
11:42and a 24-year-old Harvard dropout, Bill Gates.
11:49By the time IBM came calling in 1980, Bill Gates and his small company, Microsoft, was
11:55the biggest supplier of computer languages in the fledgling PC industry.
12:00Many different computer manufacturers are making the CPM operating system standard on most models.
12:06For their operating system, though, the logical guy for the IBMers to see was Gary Kildall.
12:12He ran a company modestly called Intergalactic Digital Research.
12:16Gary had invented the PC's first operating system, called CPM.
12:20He'd already sold 600,000 of them, so he was the big cheese of operating systems.
12:26In the early 70s, I had a need for an operating system myself, and it just was a very natural
12:32thing to write, and it turns out other people had a need for an operating system like that.
12:35And so it was a very natural thing.
12:38I wrote it for my own use, and then started selling it.
12:40In Gary's mind, it was the dominant thing, and it would always be the dominant, because,
12:45you know, Bill did languages, and Gary did operating systems.
12:48And he really honestly believed that would never change.
12:52But what would change the balance of power in this young industry was the characters of the two protagonists.
12:59So I knew Gary back when he was an assistant professor at Monterey Post Grad School, and I was simply
13:04a grad student.
13:05And went down, sat in his hot tub, smoked dope with him, and thoroughly enjoyed it all, and commiserated and
13:13talked nerd stuff.
13:14He liked playing with gadgets, just like Woz did and does, just like I did and do.
13:20He wasn't really interested in how you drive the business.
13:25He worked on projects, things that interest him.
13:28He didn't go rushing off to the patent office and patent CPM and patent every line of code he could.
13:35He didn't try to just squeeze the last dollar out of it.
13:38Gary was not a fighter.
13:42Gary avoided conflict.
13:44Gary hated conflict.
13:47Bill, I don't think anyone could say, backed away from conflict.
13:54Nobody said future billionaires have to be nice guys.
13:58Here at the Microsoft Museum is a shrine to Bill's legacy.
14:02Bill Gates hardly fought his way up from the gutter.
14:05Raised in a prosperous Seattle household, his mother was a homemaker who did charity work,
14:10his father a successful lawyer.
14:12But beneath the affluence and comfort of a perfect American family, a competitive spirit ran deep.
14:19I ended up spending the Memorial Day weekend with him out on his grandmother's house on Hood Canal.
14:26She turned everything into a game.
14:29It was a very, very, very competitive environment.
14:33And if you spent the weekend there, you were part of the competition.
14:37And it didn't matter whether it was hearts or pickleball or swimming to the dock.
14:42And there was always a reward for winning and there was always a penalty for losing.
14:46One time it was funny.
14:47I went to Bill's house and he really wanted to show me his jigsaw puzzle that he was working on.
14:53And he really wanted to talk about how, like, he did this jigsaw puzzle in, like, four minutes.
14:58And, like, on the box it said, if you're a genius, then you would do the jigsaw puzzle in, like,
15:01seven.
15:02And he was into it.
15:03He's like, you know, I can do it.
15:04And I said, no, you know, I believe you.
15:05You don't need to break it up and do it for me.
15:07No.
15:09Bill Gates can be so focused that the small things in life get overlooked.
15:14If he was busy, he didn't bathe, he didn't change clothes.
15:17We were in New York and the demo that we had crashed the evening before the announcement.
15:25And Bill worked all night with some other engineers to fix it.
15:28Well, it didn't occur to him to take ten minutes for a shower after that.
15:32It just didn't occur to him that that was important.
15:35And he badly needed a shower that day.
15:43The scene is set.
15:45In California, laid-back Gary Kildall, already making the best-selling PC operating system, CPM.
15:51In Seattle, Bill Gates, maker of BASIC, the best-selling PC language,
15:56but always prepared to seize an opportunity.
16:00So IBM had to choose one of these guys to write the operating system for its new personal computer.
16:06One would hit the jackpot.
16:07The other would be forgotten.
16:09A footnote in the history of the personal computer.
16:11And it all starts with a telephone call to an eighth-floor office in that building.
16:16The headquarters of Microsoft in 1980.
16:22At about, oh, about noon, I guess, I called Bill Gates on Monday
16:27and said I would like to come out and talk to him about his products.
16:31Bill said, well, how's next week?
16:33And they said, we're on an airplane.
16:34We're leaving in an hour.
16:35We'd like to be there tomorrow.
16:37Well, hallelujah, right on.
16:40Steve Ballmer was a Harvard roommate of Gates.
16:42He had just joined Microsoft and would end up its third billionaire.
16:47Back then, he was the only guy in the company with business training.
16:50Both Ballmer and Gates instantly saw the importance of the IBM visit.
16:56And Bill said, Steve, you better come to the meeting.
16:58You're the only other guy here who can wear a suit.
17:00So we figured, okay, the two of us will put on suits.
17:01We'll put on suits and we'll go to this meeting.
17:04We got there roughly 2 o'clock.
17:09And we're waiting in the front.
17:11And this young fellow came out to take us back to Mr. Gates' office.
17:15I thought he was the office boy.
17:17And, of course, it was Bill.
17:19He was quite decisive.
17:20We popped out the non-disclosure agreement, the letter that said that he wouldn't tell anybody we were there
17:25and that we wouldn't hear any secrets and so forth.
17:28And he signed it immediately.
17:31IBM didn't make it easy.
17:32You had to sign all these funny agreements that sort of said,
17:35IBM could do whatever they wanted whenever they wanted
17:38and use your secrets however they felt.
17:42But, so it took a little bit of faith.
17:45Jack Sams was looking for a package from Microsoft
17:48containing both the basic computer language and an operating system.
17:52But IBM hadn't done their homework.
17:55They thought we had an operating system.
17:57Because we had this soft card product that had CPM on it,
18:01they thought we could license some CPM for this new personal computer
18:04they told us they wanted to do.
18:05And we said, well, no, we're not in that business.
18:09When we discovered we didn't have the, he didn't have the rights to do that
18:13and that it was not, he said, but I think it's ready.
18:15I think Gary's got it ready to go.
18:18I said, well, no time like the present to call up Gary.
18:21So Bill, right there with them in the room,
18:23called Gary Kildall at Digital Research,
18:25said, Gary, I'm sending some guys down.
18:27They're going to be on the phone.
18:28Treat them right.
18:29They're important guys.
18:31The men from IBM came to this Victorian house
18:34in Pacific Grove, California,
18:36headquarters of Digital Research,
18:38headed by Gary and Dorothy Kildall.
18:40Just imagine what it's like having IBM come to visit.
18:43It's like having the Queen drop by for tea.
18:45It's like having the Pope come by looking for advice.
18:48It's like a visit from God himself.
18:50And what did Gary and Dorothy do?
18:52They sent them away.
18:54Gary had some other plans.
18:56And so he said, well, Dorothy, you'll see you.
19:00And so we went down, the three of us.
19:02IBM showed up with an IBM nondisclosure.
19:04And Dorothy made a decision which I think,
19:07it's easy in retrospect to say, was dumb.
19:10Well, we popped out our letter that said,
19:14please don't tell anybody we're here
19:15and we don't want to hear anything confidential.
19:17And she read it and she said, I can't sign this.
19:20She did what her job was.
19:22She got the lawyer to look at the nondisclosure.
19:23The lawyer, Jerry Davis, who's still in Monterey,
19:28threw up on this nondisclosure.
19:31It was uncomfortable for IBM.
19:33They weren't used to being waiting.
19:35And it was an unfortunate situation.
19:38Here you are in a tiny Victorian house
19:40that's overrun with people and chaotic.
19:43So we spent the whole day in Pacific Grove
19:46debating with them and with our attorneys
19:48and her attorneys and everybody else
19:50about whether or not she could even talk to us
19:54about talking to us.
19:56And we left.
19:58This is the moment digital research dropped the ball.
20:02IBM, distinctly unimpressed with their reception,
20:05went back to Microsoft.
20:07Bill Gates isn't the man to give a rival a second chance.
20:11He saw the opportunity of a lifetime.
20:14Digital research didn't seize that.
20:15And we knew it was essential.
20:17If somebody didn't do it,
20:18the project was going to fall apart.
20:19So we just got carried away and said,
20:21look, we can't afford to lose the language business.
20:23That was the initial thought.
20:24We can't afford to have IBM not go forward.
20:26This is the most exciting thing
20:27that's going to happen in PCs.
20:29And we were already out on the limb
20:30because we had licensed them not only basic,
20:33but Fortran, COBOL, Assembler,
20:37Typing Tutor, Adventure.
20:38And basically every product the company had,
20:41we had committed to do for IBM
20:43in a very short time frame.
20:45But there was a problem.
20:46IBM needed an operating system fast,
20:49and Microsoft didn't have one.
20:51What they did have was a stroke of luck,
20:54the ingredient everyone needs to be a billionaire.
20:57Unbelievably, the solution was just across town.
21:00Paul Allen, Gates' programming partner since high school,
21:03had found another operating system.
21:05There's a local company here in Seattle
21:08called Seattle Computer Products,
21:10a guy named Tim Patterson.
21:11And he had done an operating system,
21:14very rudimentary operating system
21:15that was kind of like CPM.
21:17And we just told IBM,
21:18look, we'll go get this operating system
21:20from this small local company.
21:21We'll take care of it.
21:22We'll fix it up.
21:23And you can still do a PC.
21:25Tim Patterson's operating system,
21:27which saved the deal with IBM,
21:29was, well, adapted from Gary Kildall's CPM.
21:33So I took a CPM manual
21:35that I'd gotten from the retail computer store,
21:36$5 in 1976 or something,
21:39and used that as the basis
21:41for the application programming interface,
21:45the API for my operating system.
21:47And so using these ideas
21:50that came from different places,
21:51I started in April,
21:53and it was about half time for four months
21:57before I had my first working version.
21:59This is it, the operating system Tim Patterson wrote.
22:03He called it QDOS,
22:05the quick and dirty operating system.
22:07Microsoft and IBM called it PCDOS 1.0.
22:10And under any name,
22:12it looks an awful lot like CPM.
22:14On this computer here,
22:15I have running PCDOS and CPM86.
22:18And frankly, it's very hard
22:19to tell the difference between the two.
22:20The command structures are the same,
22:22so are the directories.
22:23In fact, the only obvious external difference
22:25is the floppy drive is labeled A in PCDOS
22:29and C in CPM.
22:32Some difference,
22:33and yet one generated billions in revenue
22:35and the other disappeared.
22:36As usual in the PC business,
22:38the prize didn't go to the inventor,
22:40but to the exploiter of the invention.
22:42In this case, that wasn't Gary Kildall.
22:44It wasn't even Tim Patterson.
22:47There was still one problem.
22:49Tim Patterson worked for Seattle Computer Products,
22:52or SCP.
22:53They still owned the rights to QDOS,
22:56rights that Microsoft had to have.
22:58But then we went back and said to them,
23:01look, you know, we want to buy this thing.
23:05And SCP was, like most little companies,
23:07they, you know, always needed cash,
23:09and so that was when they went into the negotiation.
23:14And so ended up working out a deal
23:16to buy the operating system from him
23:20for whatever usage we wanted for $50,000.
23:24Hey, let's pause there
23:26to savor an historic moment.
23:30For whatever usage we wanted for $50,000.
23:34It had to be the deal of the century,
23:36if not the millennium.
23:37It was certainly the deal
23:38that made Bill Gates and Paul Allen
23:40multi-billionaires,
23:42and allowed Paul Allen to buy toys like these,
23:44his own NBA basketball team and arena.
23:47Microsoft bought outright for $50,000
23:50the operating system they needed,
23:52and they turned around
23:53and licensed it to the world
23:54for up to $50 per PC.
23:57Think of it.
23:57100 million personal computers
23:59running MS-DOS software,
24:01funneling billions into Microsoft,
24:03a company that back then
24:04was 50 kids managed by a 25-year-old
24:07who needed to wash his hair.
24:09Nice work if you can get it.
24:10And Microsoft got it.
24:17There are no two places
24:18further apart in the USA
24:20than southeastern Florida
24:21and Washington State,
24:23where Microsoft is based.
24:24This, this is Florida.
24:26Boca Raton,
24:27and this building right here
24:28is where the IBM PC was developed.
24:32Here, the nerds from Seattle
24:34joined forces with the suits
24:36of corporate America,
24:37and in that first honeymoon year,
24:39they pulled off
24:40a fantastic achievement.
24:42After we got a package
24:43in the mail
24:44from the people down in Florida.
24:45As August 1981 approached,
24:48the deadline for the launch
24:49of the IBM Acorn,
24:50the PC industry held its breath.
24:53Supposedly, maybe at this very moment,
24:56IBM is announcing
24:57their personal computer.
24:58We don't know that yet.
24:59In companies across America,
25:02software writers like Dan Bricklin,
25:03the creator of the first spreadsheet,
25:05waited with his staff
25:06for news of the announcement.
25:09This is a moment of PC history.
25:12IBM Secrecy had codenamed the PC
25:14the Floridian Project.
25:16Everyone in the PC business
25:17knew IBM would change
25:19their world forever.
25:20They also knew that
25:21if their software was on the IBM PC,
25:23they would make fortunes.
25:25Please note that the attached information
25:26is not to be disclosed
25:28prior to any public announcement.
25:30It's on the ticker.
25:32It's on the ticker?
25:33Okay, so now you can tell people.
25:34What we're watching
25:36are the first few seconds
25:37of a $100 billion industry.
25:43After years of thinking big,
25:46today IBM came up
25:47with something small.
25:48Big Blue is looking for a slice
25:50of Apple's market share.
25:52IBM...
25:52Bits and bikes mean nothing.
25:54Try this work.
25:55Money.
25:56Now they're going to sell
25:57$1,000 computers
25:58to millions of customers.
25:59...piece of the five.
26:00I have seen the future,
26:02said one analyst,
26:03and it computes.
26:07Today, an IBM computer
26:10has reached a personal...
26:11Nobody was ever fired
26:12for buying IBM.
26:13Now companies could put PCs
26:15with a name they trusted
26:16on desks from Wall's End
26:18to Wall Street.
26:19What IBM said was,
26:21it's okay, corporate America,
26:22for you to now start buying
26:23and using PCs.
26:25And if it's okay
26:26for corporate America,
26:27it's got to be okay
26:28for everybody.
26:30Your own IBM personal computer.
26:32For all the hype,
26:34the IBM PC wasn't much better
26:35than what came before.
26:37So while the IBM name
26:38could create immense demand,
26:40it took a killer application
26:41to sustain it.
26:45The killer app for the IBM PC
26:47was yet another spreadsheet.
26:48Based on VisiCalc,
26:50but called Lotus 1-2-3,
26:52its creators were the first of many
26:53to get rich on IBM's success.
26:55Within a year,
26:57Lotus was worth $150 million.
26:59Wham, bam, thank you, IBM!
27:01It's time to rock!
27:03Time for fun!
27:04Yeah!
27:05They're working!
27:06IBM had forecast sales
27:08of half a million computers
27:09by 1984.
27:11In those three years,
27:12they sold two million.
27:14Yeah!
27:17Euphoric, I guess is the right word.
27:18Everybody was believed
27:20that they were not going to...
27:22At that point,
27:24two million or three million,
27:25you know,
27:26they were now thinking
27:26in terms of 100 million.
27:28I mean, they were probably
27:28off the scale
27:29in the other direction.
27:32What did all this mean
27:33to Bill Gates,
27:34whose operating system, DOS,
27:36was at the heart
27:37of every IBM PC sold?
27:39Initially, not much
27:40because of the deal with IBM.
27:42But it did give him
27:43a vital bridgehead
27:44to other players
27:45in the PC marketplace,
27:46which meant trouble
27:47in the long run
27:48for Big Blue.
27:50The key to the structure
27:52of our deal
27:53was that IBM
27:54had no control
27:55over our licensing
27:57to other people.
27:58The lesson of the computer industry
27:59in mainframes
28:01was that over time,
28:03people built compatible machines
28:05or clones,
28:06whatever term you want to use.
28:07And so really,
28:08the primary upside
28:10on the deal we have
28:11with IBM,
28:12because they had a fixed fee,
28:13we got about $80,000,
28:15and we got some other money
28:16for some special work we did,
28:19but no royalty from them.
28:22And that's the DOS
28:23in BASIC as well.
28:26And so we were hoping
28:27a lot of other people
28:28would come along
28:29and do compatible machines.
28:33There were other PCs
28:35that were sort of like the IBM PC,
28:37kind of like it,
28:38but IBM now had 50% market share
28:41and was defining
28:42what a PC meant.
28:43What the public wanted
28:44was IBM PCs.
28:46So to be successful,
28:48other manufacturers
28:49would have to build computers
28:50exactly like the IBM.
28:53They wanted to copy the IBM PC,
28:56to clone it.
28:57How could they do that legally?
28:59Well, welcome to the world
29:01of reverse engineering.
29:19This is what reverse engineering
29:21can get you
29:22if you do it right.
29:24It's the modest
29:25Aspen, Colorado,
29:26ski shack of Rod Canyon,
29:28one of the founders of Compaq,
29:30the company set up
29:31to compete head-on
29:32with the IBM PC.
29:33Back in 1982,
29:35Rod and three fellow engineers
29:36from Texas Instruments
29:38sketched out a computer design
29:39on a placemat
29:40at the House of Pies restaurant
29:41in Houston, Texas.
29:43They decided to manufacture
29:45and market
29:46a portable version
29:47of the IBM PC
29:48using the curious technique
29:49of reverse engineering.
29:52Reverse engineering
29:53is figuring out
29:54after something's already
29:55been created
29:56how it ticks,
29:57what makes it work,
29:58usually for the purpose
29:59of creating something
30:00that works the same way
30:01or at least does
30:02something like
30:03the thing you're trying
30:04to reverse engineer.
30:09Here's how you clone a PC.
30:12IBM had made it easy
30:13to copy.
30:14The microprocessor
30:15was available
30:15off the shelf
30:16from Intel
30:17and the other parts
30:18came from many sources.
30:19Only one part
30:20was IBM's alone,
30:21a vital chip
30:22that connected
30:23the hardware
30:23with the software.
30:28Called the ROM BIOS,
30:30this was IBM's own design,
30:32protected by copyright
30:33and by Big Blue's
30:34army of lawyers.
30:36Compaq had to somehow
30:37copy the chip
30:38without breaking the law.
30:41First, you have to decide
30:43how the ROM works.
30:47So what we had to do
30:48was have an engineer
30:50sit down with that code
30:51and through trial and error
30:52write a specification
30:53that said,
30:54here's how the BIOS ROM
30:55needs to work.
30:56It couldn't be close,
30:57it had to be exact.
30:58So there was a lot
30:58of detail testing
30:59that went on.
31:01You test how that
31:02all-important chip behaves
31:03and make a list
31:04of what it has to do.
31:06Now it's time
31:06to meet my lawyer,
31:07Claude.
31:08I've examined
31:10the internals
31:11of the ROM BIOS
31:11and written this
31:13book of specifications.
31:14Now I need some help
31:15because I've done
31:16as much as I can do
31:18and you need to explain
31:20what's next.
31:21Well,
31:22the first thing
31:23I'm going to do
31:23is I'm going to go through
31:24the book of specifications
31:25myself,
31:25but the first thing
31:26I can tell you, Robert,
31:27is that you're out of it now.
31:28You are contaminated,
31:30you are dirty.
31:31You've seen the product
31:32that's the original
31:33work of authorship,
31:34you've seen the target product.
31:35So now,
31:36from here on in,
31:37we're going to be working
31:38with people who are not dirty.
31:39We're going to be working
31:40with so-called virgins
31:41who are going to be operating
31:41in the clean room.
31:42I certainly don't qualify there.
31:44I imagine you don't.
31:45So what we're going to do
31:46is this.
31:47We're going to hire
31:47a group of engineers
31:49who have never seen
31:50the IBM ROM BIOS.
31:52They have never seen it,
31:53they've never operated it,
31:54they know nothing about it.
31:55Have you ever before
31:56attempted to disassemble,
31:58decompile,
31:59or to in any way,
32:00shape, or form,
32:01reverse engineer
32:01any IBM equipment?
32:03Oh, no.
32:03Have you ever tried
32:04to disassemble or...
32:06This is the Silicon Valley
32:07virginity test,
32:08and good virgins
32:09are hard to find.
32:11You understand
32:11that in the event
32:12that we discover
32:13that the information
32:13you're providing us
32:14is inaccurate,
32:15you're subject to discipline
32:16by the company,
32:16and that can include
32:18but not be limited
32:18to termination immediately.
32:19Do you understand that?
32:20Yes, I do.
32:21Okay.
32:22After the virgins
32:23are deemed intact,
32:23they are forbidden contact
32:25with the outside world
32:26while they build
32:27a new chip,
32:28one that behaves exactly
32:29like the one
32:30in the specification.
32:31In Compaq's case,
32:32it took 15 senior programmers
32:34several months
32:35and cost $1 million
32:36to do the reverse engineering.
32:38In November 1982,
32:40Rod Canyon unveiled the result.
32:43What I've brought today
32:44is a Compaq portable computer.
32:46When Bill Murto,
32:47another Compaq founder,
32:48got a plug on a cable TV show,
32:50their selling point was clear,
32:52100% IBM compatibility.
32:54It turns out
32:54that all major
32:55and popular software
32:57runs on the IBM
32:57personal computer
32:58or the Compaq
32:59portable computer.
33:00That extends through
33:01all of the software
33:02for IBM.
33:03Yes.
33:04It all works
33:04on the Compaq.
33:05Compaq was an instant hit.
33:07In their first year,
33:08on the strength
33:09of being exactly like IBM
33:10but a little cheaper,
33:11they sold 47,000 PCs.
33:14In our first year of sales,
33:16we set an American
33:17business record,
33:18I guess maybe
33:18a world business record.
33:20Our largest first year
33:21sales in history
33:21was $111 million.
33:28So Rod Canyon
33:29ends up in Aspen,
33:30famous for having
33:31the most expensive
33:32real estate in America.
33:33And I try not to look envious
33:35while Rod tells me
33:36which executive jet
33:38he plans to buy next.
33:39And finally picked
33:40the Lear 31.
33:41Oh, really?
33:42Now that,
33:43that was a fun airplane.
33:44Oh, yeah.
33:44Poor Big Blue.
33:46Suddenly,
33:47everybody was cashing in
33:48on IBM's success.
33:49The most obvious winner
33:51at first was Intel,
33:52maker of the PC's
33:53microprocessor chip.
33:54Intel was selling chips
33:56like hotcakes
33:56to clone makers
33:57and making them
33:58smaller, quicker,
33:59and cheaper.
34:00This was unheard of.
34:01What kind of an industry
34:03had Big Blue
34:03gotten themselves into?
34:06Things get less expensive
34:07every year.
34:08People aren't used to that
34:09in general.
34:10I mean,
34:10you buy a new car,
34:11you buy one now,
34:12four years later,
34:13you go buy one
34:13and it costs more
34:14than the one
34:15you bought before.
34:16Here's this magical
34:18piece of an industry.
34:19You go buy one later,
34:20it costs less
34:22and it does more.
34:23What a wonderful thing.
34:25But it causes
34:26some funny things
34:26to occur when you
34:27think about an industry,
34:29an industry where prices
34:30are coming down,
34:31where you have to sell it
34:32and use it right now
34:33because if you wait later,
34:34it's worth less.
34:39Where Compaq led,
34:41others soon followed.
34:42IBM was now facing
34:44dozens of rivals.
34:45Soon-to-be familiar names
34:46began to appear
34:47like Amstrad,
34:49AST and Dell.
34:50It was getting
34:51spectacularly easy
34:52to build a clone.
34:53You could get
34:54everything off the shelf,
34:55including a guaranteed
34:56Virgin ROM bias chip.
34:58Each new clone maker,
35:00free of IBM's big overhead,
35:02took another bite
35:02out of Big Blue's business.
35:05Well, they really hit
35:07with a vengeance in 85.
35:08The prices were going down
35:10on the competitive products
35:12at about 30%
35:14every six months.
35:16Terror would be a good
35:19phrase.
35:19Terror?
35:20Oh, of course.
35:21I mean, we were able
35:22to sell a lot of products,
35:23but it was getting
35:24difficult to make money.
35:25And where did every clone maker
35:27buy his operating system?
35:29Microsoft, of course.
35:30By the mid-80s,
35:31it was boom time for Bill.
35:33The teenage entrepreneur
35:34had predicted a PC
35:35on every desk
35:36and in every home
35:37running Microsoft software.
35:39It was actually coming true.
35:42As Microsoft mushroomed,
35:44there was no way
35:44that Bill Gates
35:45could personally dominate
35:46thousands of employees,
35:48but that didn't stop him.
35:49He still had a need
35:51to be both industry titan
35:52and top programmer.
35:54So he had to come up
35:55with a whole new
35:55corporate culture
35:56for Microsoft.
35:57He had to find a way
35:58to satisfy both
35:59his adolescent need
36:00to dominate
36:00and his adult need
36:02to inspire.
36:04From the beginning,
36:05Microsoft recruited
36:06straight out of college.
36:07They chose people
36:08who had no experience
36:09of life in other companies.
36:11In time,
36:12they'd be called
36:12microserfs.
36:14And so a lot of young,
36:17I say people,
36:18but mostly it was young men
36:19who just were out of school,
36:21saw him as this incredible
36:24role model or leader,
36:27almost a guru, I guess.
36:29And they could sit
36:30and spend hours with him.
36:32And he valued
36:34their contributions.
36:36And there was just
36:37a wonderful camaraderie
36:38that seemed to exist
36:39between all these young men
36:41and Bill.
36:43And the strength
36:44that he has
36:45and his will
36:46and his desire
36:47to be the best
36:48and to be the winner.
36:49And he is just
36:51like a cult leader, really.
36:56As the frenzied 80s
36:58came to a close,
36:59IBM reached a watershed.
37:00They had created
37:01an open PC architecture
37:03that anyone could copy.
37:04This was intentional,
37:05but IBM always thought
37:07their inside track
37:08would keep them ahead.
37:09Wrong.
37:10IBM's glacial pace
37:11and high overhead
37:12put them at a disadvantage
37:13to the leaner clone makers.
37:15Everything was turning
37:16into a nightmare
37:17as IBM lost
37:18its dominant market share.
37:20So in a big gamble,
37:21they staked their PC future
37:22to a new system,
37:24a new line of computers
37:25with proprietary
37:26closed hardware
37:27and their very own
37:28operating system.
37:30It was war.
37:32Start planning
37:33for operating system 2 today.
37:35IBM planned to steal
37:37the market from Gates
37:38with a brand new
37:38operating system
37:39called, drum roll please,
37:42OS2.
37:46IBM would design OS2,
37:48yet they asked Microsoft
37:49to write the code.
37:51Why would Microsoft
37:52help create
37:53what was intended
37:53to be the instrument
37:54of their own destruction?
37:56Because Microsoft knew
37:57IBM was the source
37:58of their success
37:59and they would tolerate
38:00almost anything
38:01to stay close
38:02to Big Blue.
38:03It was just part of,
38:05as we used to call it
38:06at the time,
38:06riding the bear.
38:08You just had to try
38:08to stay on the bear's back
38:10and the bear would twist
38:11and turn
38:11and try to buck you
38:12and throw you,
38:13but darn,
38:14we were going to ride
38:15the bear
38:15because the bear
38:16was the biggest,
38:17the most important.
38:18You just had to be
38:19with the bear.
38:20Otherwise,
38:21you would be under the bear
38:22in the computer industry
38:23and IBM was the bear
38:24and we were going to
38:25ride the back of the bear.
38:27But it's easy
38:27for people to forget
38:28how pervasive
38:29IBM's influence
38:31over this industry was.
38:33When you talk to people
38:34who've come into
38:34the industry recently,
38:35there's no way
38:36you can get that
38:37into their head.
38:39That was the environment.
38:41The relationship
38:42between IBM
38:43and Microsoft
38:44was always a culture clash.
38:46IBMers were
38:47buttoned-up
38:48organization men.
38:51Microsofties
38:51were obsessive hackers.
38:54With the development
38:54of OS2,
38:55the strains
38:56really began to show.
38:58In IBM,
38:59there's a religion
38:59in software
39:00that says you have
39:01to count K-locks.
39:02And a K-lock
39:03is a thousand
39:03line of code.
39:05How big a project
39:06is it?
39:07Oh, it's a 10-K-lock project.
39:09This is a 20-K-locker.
39:10And there's a 50-K-locks.
39:13And IBM wanted
39:14to sort of make it
39:15the religion
39:15about how we got paid,
39:18how much money
39:19we made off OS2,
39:19how much they did,
39:20how many K-locks
39:21did you do?
39:22And we kept
39:23trying to convince them.
39:24Hey, if we have a developer
39:25who's got a good idea
39:26and he can get something
39:27done in 4-K-locks
39:29instead of 20-K-locks,
39:31should we make less money?
39:32Because he's made
39:33something smaller
39:34and faster,
39:35less clocks.
39:36Oh, K-locks,
39:37K-locks,
39:38that's the methodology.
39:39Yeah, anyway,
39:41it almost makes
39:42my back just crinkle up
39:45at the thought
39:46of the whole thing.
39:47When I took over in 89,
39:49there was an enormous
39:49amount of resources
39:50working on OS2,
39:52both in Microsoft
39:53and the IBM company.
39:55Bill Gates and I met
39:55on that several times.
39:58And we pretty quickly
39:59came to the conclusion
40:00together that that was
40:01not going to be a success
40:02the way it was being managed.
40:09It was also pretty clear
40:10that the negotiations
40:12and the contracts
40:13had given most of that
40:14control to Microsoft's.
40:18It was no longer
40:20just a question of styles.
40:22There was now a clear
40:23conflict of business interest.
40:25OS2 was planned
40:26to undermine the clone market
40:28where DOS was still
40:29Microsoft's major moneymaker.
40:31Microsoft was DOS.
40:33But Microsoft was helping
40:34develop the opposition?
40:36Bad idea.
40:38To keep DOS competitive,
40:39Gates had been pouring resources
40:41into a new program
40:42called Windows.
40:45It was designed to provide
40:46a nice, user-friendly facade
40:48to boring old DOS.
40:50Selling it was another job
40:52for shy, retiring Steve Ballmer.
40:55How much do you think
40:56this advanced operating
40:57environment is worth?
40:58Wait just one minute
40:59before you answer.
41:00Watch as Windows integrates
41:02Lotus 1-2-3
41:03with Miami Vice.
41:04Now we can take this for all...
41:06Just as Bill Gates
41:07saw OS2 as a threat,
41:09IBM regarded Windows
41:10as another attempt
41:11by Microsoft
41:12to hold on
41:13to the operating system business.
41:15We created Windows
41:16in parallel.
41:17We kept saying to IBM,
41:19hey, Windows is the way to go,
41:20graphics is the way to go.
41:22And we got virtually
41:23everyone else
41:24enthused about Windows.
41:25So that was a divergence
41:27that we kept thinking
41:29we could get IBM
41:30to come around on.
41:32It was clear
41:33that IBM had a different vision
41:35of its relationship
41:36with Microsoft
41:37than Microsoft had
41:38of its vision with IBM.
41:40Is that Microsoft's fault?
41:44You know, maybe some,
41:46but IBM's not blameless
41:48there either.
41:49So I don't view any of that
41:52as anything but just
41:53poor business
41:54on IBM's part.
41:59Bill Gates
42:00is a very disciplined guy.
42:02He puts aside
42:03everything he wants to read
42:04and twice a year
42:05goes away
42:05for secluded reading weeks.
42:07The decisive moment
42:08in the Microsoft-IBM relationship
42:10came during just such a retreat.
42:12In front of a log fire,
42:13Bill concluded
42:14that it was no longer
42:15in Microsoft's
42:16long-term interest
42:17to blindly follow IBM.
42:19If Bill had to choose
42:20between OS2,
42:22IBM's new operating system
42:23and Windows,
42:24he'd choose Windows.
42:25We said,
42:26ooh, IBM's probably
42:27not going to like this.
42:28This is going to threaten OS2.
42:30Now, we told them about it.
42:31Right away,
42:31we told them about it.
42:32But we still did it.
42:34They didn't like it.
42:35We told them about it.
42:36We told them about it.
42:36We have to license it to them.
42:38We always thought
42:39the best thing to do
42:41is to try and combine
42:43IBM promoting the software
42:45with us doing the engineering.
42:47And so it was only
42:48when they broke off communication
42:50and decided to go their own way
42:52that we thought,
42:53okay, we're on our own.
42:54And that was definitely
42:56very, very scary.
42:57And we were
42:58in a major negotiation
42:59in early 1990,
43:00right before the Windows launch.
43:02We wanted to have IBM
43:04on stage with us
43:05to launch Windows 3.0,
43:06but they wouldn't do
43:07the kind of deal
43:08that would allow us
43:09to profit.
43:11It would allow them,
43:12essentially,
43:12to take over Windows from us.
43:14And we walked away
43:15from the deal.
43:16Switch to CD-ROM.
43:18Jack Sams,
43:19who started IBM's relationship
43:21with Microsoft
43:21with that first call
43:22to Bill Gates in 1980,
43:24could only look on
43:25as the partnership disintegrated.
43:28Then they,
43:29at that point,
43:30I think they agreed
43:30to disagree
43:32on the future progress
43:33of OS2 and Windows.
43:38And internally,
43:39we were told,
43:40thou shalt not ship
43:41any more products
43:42on Windows.
43:44and about that time,
43:45I got the opportunity
43:46to take early retirement,
43:48so I did.
43:53Bill's decision
43:54by the fireplace
43:55ended the 10-year
43:56IBM-Microsoft partnership
43:57and turned IBM
43:59into an also-ran
44:00in the PC business.
44:01Did David beat Goliath?
44:04The Boca Raton,
44:05Florida,
44:06birthplace
44:06of the IBM PC
44:07is deserted,
44:08a casualty
44:09of diminishing market share.
44:23Today, IBM is again
44:24what it was before,
44:25a profitable,
44:26dominant mainframe
44:27computer company.
44:29For a while,
44:30IBM dominated
44:31the PC market.
44:32They legitimized
44:33the PC business,
44:35created the standards
44:37most of us now use,
44:38and introduced the PC
44:39to the corporate world.
44:41But in the end,
44:42they lost out.
44:43Maybe it was to a faster,
44:45more flexible business culture.
44:47Or maybe they just
44:49threw it away.
44:50That's the view
44:51of a guy
44:51who's been competing
44:52with IBM for 20 years,
44:54Silicon Valley's
44:55most outspoken
44:56software billionaire,
44:57Larry Ellison.
44:59I think IBM
45:00made the single worst mistake
45:02in the history
45:02of enterprise on Earth.
45:03Which was?
45:04Which was
45:05the manufacturer,
45:07being the first manufacturer
45:08and distributor
45:08and distributor
45:08of the Microsoft Intel PC,
45:10which they mistakenly
45:11called the IBM PC.
45:13I mean,
45:14they were the first
45:14manufacturer and distributor
45:15of that technology.
45:16I mean,
45:16it's just simply astounding
45:17that they could
45:21basically give a third
45:22of their market value
45:23to Intel
45:24and a third
45:24of their market value
45:25to Microsoft
45:26by accident.
45:29I mean,
45:29no one,
45:30you know,
45:30no one out of those
45:30two companies today
45:31are worth
45:32close to,
45:33you know,
45:34approaching $100 billion.
45:36I mean,
45:37not many of us
45:37get a chance
45:37to make a $100 billion
45:38mistake.
45:40As fast as IBM
45:41abandons its buildings,
45:43Microsoft builds
45:44new ones.
45:45In 1980,
45:47IBM was 3,000 times
45:48the size of Microsoft.
45:50Though still
45:50a smaller company,
45:52today Wall Street
45:52says Microsoft
45:53is worth more.
45:55Both have faced
45:56antitrust investigations
45:57about their
45:58monopoly positions.
46:00For years,
46:01IBM defined
46:02successful American
46:03corporate culture
46:04as a machine
46:05of ordered bureaucracy.
46:07Here in the corridors
46:08of Microsoft,
46:09it's a different style.
46:11It's personal.
46:12This company,
46:13in its drive,
46:14its hunger to succeed,
46:15is a reflection
46:16of one man,
46:17its founder,
46:18Bill Gates.
46:19Bill wanted to win.
46:24Incredible desire
46:25to win.
46:26And to beat
46:27other people.
46:28At Microsoft,
46:30the whole idea
46:31was that we would
46:32put people under.
46:36And unfortunately,
46:40that's happened a lot.
46:42Bill Gates is special.
46:44You wouldn't have
46:45had a Microsoft
46:46take a random other person
46:48like Gary Kildall.
46:49On the other hand,
46:50Bill Gates was also lucky.
46:53But Bill Gates knows that,
46:55unlike a lot of other people
46:56in the industry.
46:57And he's paranoid.
46:58Every morning he gets up
46:59and he doesn't feel secure.
47:01He feels nervous about this.
47:02They're trying hard.
47:03They're not relaxing.
47:05And that's why
47:06they're so successful.
47:07And I remember
47:08I was talking to Bill once
47:10and I asked him
47:12what he feared.
47:14And he said
47:15that he feared
47:15growing old
47:16because once you're
47:18beyond 30,
47:19this was his belief
47:20at the time,
47:21once you're beyond 30,
47:22you don't have
47:22as many good ideas anymore.
47:24You're not as smart anymore.
47:25If you just slow down
47:26a little bit,
47:28who knows who it'll be?
47:29Probably some company
47:31that may not even exist yet.
47:33But, you know,
47:34someone else can come in
47:35and take the lead.
47:36I said, well, you know,
47:37you're going to age.
47:38It's going to happen.
47:39It's kind of inevitable.
47:40What are you going to do about it?
47:41And he said,
47:41I'm just going to hire
47:42the smartest people
47:43and I'm just going to surround myself
47:45with all these smart people.
47:46You know?
47:47And I thought that was
47:48kind of interesting.
47:48It was almost,
47:49it was like he was like,
47:50oh, you know,
47:50I can't be immortal,
47:51but like maybe this is
47:53the second best
47:53and I can buy that.
47:57If you miss what's happening,
47:59then the same kind of thing
48:00that happened to IBM
48:02or many other companies
48:04could happen to Microsoft
48:05very easily.
48:06So no one's got
48:07a guaranteed position
48:08in the high technology business.
48:09And the more you think about,
48:11you know,
48:11how could we move faster?
48:12What could we do better?
48:14Are there good ideas out there
48:15that we should be going beyond?
48:18It's important.
48:19And I wouldn't trade places
48:21with anyone,
48:22but the reason I love it
48:24like my job so much
48:25is we have to constantly
48:26stay on top of those things.
48:30The Windows software system
48:32that ended the alliance
48:33between Microsoft and IBM
48:35pushed Gates past all his rivals.
48:38Microsoft had been working
48:40on the software for years,
48:41but it wasn't until 1990
48:43that they finally came up
48:44with a version
48:45that not only worked properly,
48:46it blew their rivals away.
48:48And where did the idea
48:50for this software come from?
48:51Well, not from Microsoft,
48:53of course.
48:57It came from the hippies
48:59at Apple.
49:00Lights, camera, boot up.
49:02In 1984,
49:03they made a famous TV commercial.
49:05Apple had set out
49:07to create the first user-friendly PC
49:09just as IBM and Microsoft
49:11were starting to make
49:11a machine for businesses.
49:13When the TV commercial aired,
49:15Apple launched the Macintosh.
49:17Secure from the pests
49:19of an incompetent...
49:21The computer and the commercial
49:23were aimed directly at IBM,
49:25which the kids in Cupertino
49:26thought of as Big Brother.
49:28But Apple had targeted
49:29the wrong people.
49:31It wasn't Big Brother
49:32they should have been
49:33worrying about.
49:33It was Big Bill Gates.
49:36Our enemies shall talk
49:37themselves to death
49:38and we will bury them
49:40with our own confusion.
49:43We shall prevail.
49:47We shall prevail.
49:54What are you doing?
49:56What are you doing?
49:58What are you doing?
50:11What are you doing?
50:36What are you doing?
50:40What are you doing?
50:41What are you doing?
50:43What are you doing?
50:43What are you doing?
50:44What are you doing?
50:45What are you doing?
50:45What are you doing?
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