Ukraine’s greatest weapon against Russia may not be a missile, tank, or drone—it’s adaptation. Drawing on insights from retired U.S. Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, this video explores how Ukraine’s ability to innovate, exploit weaknesses, and evolve faster than its opponent has helped it regain momentum in the war. From drone warfare and precision strikes to strategic thinking and battlefield flexibility, discover why adaptability could prove decisive in determining Ukraine’s future.
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00:00Ukraine has a secret weapon in its war against Russia, and it's not what you might think.
00:05The term secret weapon might suggest a brand new stealth missile that Russian air defenses
00:11can't detect, let alone bring down.
00:13Or a new air defense system that can bring down Russian drones and missiles that cost
00:18many times more.
00:20Maybe it even brings to mind cutting-edge AI-enabled battlefield intelligence systems
00:25that give Ukrainian commanders a complete picture of the battlefield before their Russian counterparts
00:30have poured their first shot of vodka for the day.
00:33All those systems are already in the works.
00:36But according to one retired high-ranking US general, Ukraine's secret weapon is something
00:41much simpler and more profound.
00:44Adaptation.
00:45In a recent op-ed for the respected US journal The Bulwark, Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, retired,
00:51makes a compelling case that Ukraine's ability to outthink Russia and innovate accordingly
00:56has allowed it to regain the strategic initiative in the fifth year of the war.
01:01Here's how Hertling analyzes the situation and what it implies for the outcome of the conflict.
01:06Now, Hertling is far from your average armchair expert.
01:10He was commander of US Army Europe from 2011 to 2012.
01:14He also commanded the 1st Armored Division in Germany and multinational Division North
01:19forces during the surge in Iraq from 2007 to 2009.
01:23So he knows a thing or two, not just about the Eastern European theatre, but about how
01:29wars are actually fought and won, operationally and strategically.
01:33And it's precisely this vast hands-on experience that he draws upon to construct this argument.
01:39There are many reasons why Ukraine has regained the strategic initiative, but they all come
01:44down to the same principle, adaptation, he writes.
01:48It's long been recognized that battle plans rarely go according to, well, plan.
01:53This conclusion is probably best summed up in the famous quote by Prussian Field Marshal,
01:59Helmut von Moltke, the Elder, although often mistakenly attributed to his compatriot, General
02:05Karl von Clausewitz.
02:06No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy
02:12forces, Moltke wrote in 1871.
02:15Only the layman believes that in the course of a campaign, he sees the consistent implementation
02:20of an original thought that's been considered an advance in every detail and retained to
02:25the end.
02:26As a result of this basic truism, Hertling says,
02:30Military leaders have always spent enormous effort thinking about how to outmaneuver opponents
02:35and gain an advantage, because warfare is never static.
02:38One side always falters or becomes complacent, which allows the other side to adjust.
02:43Every battlefield evolves, every new technology creates both opportunities and risks, and every
02:49enemy at some point presents vulnerabilities.
02:52So victory, to a great extent, depends on which set of commanders is best able to recognize
02:58changing conditions promptly, discard outdated assumptions, and adapt decisively before the
03:04enemy does.
03:05These adaptations often involve comprehensive shifts in strategies and their implementation.
03:11A good example is Ukraine embracing drone warfare at scale to overcome its great disadvantage
03:17in manpower and conventional battlefield weaponry, at least compared to Russia.
03:22As we'll discuss a bit later, this move fundamentally changed and continues to shape the course of the
03:28war.
03:29But sometimes even subtle adaptations in the information space can make a massive difference
03:34to how things play out on the front lines, as demonstrated by this example.
03:39Hertling says that during his time in Iraq, US commanders realized that the phrase is being
03:44used in communications, both with the US public and the Iraqis, needed to evolve.
03:50Initially, the US leaned heavily on the phrase, winning hearts and minds, which had been successful
03:55in garnering support domestically and in the operational space during previous US military
04:00operations against insurgencies.
04:03However, according to Hertling, we realized Iraqis didn't want Vietnam-era slogans, and
04:09they certainly didn't want to be like us.
04:11Instead, they wanted security, reliability and partnership.
04:14We shifted our thinking toward the phrase, gaining trust and confidence, with both Iraqi soldiers
04:20and civilians, and we showed it by fighting alongside them rather than merely operating
04:25around them.
04:26This subtle shift in mindset, language and operational approach went a long way toward winning the
04:32trust of the Iraqi people.
04:33It's a poignant example of how subtle changes can make a massive difference to the eventual
04:38outcome of a conflict.
04:40But the US was also forced to make much more visible and kinetic adaptations on the actual
04:46battlefield compared to its original plans.
04:49Because the US wielded incomparable force compared to the various militias it faced in Iraq,
04:55the insurgents quickly figured out the hard way that they couldn't fight fire with fire.
04:59So they changed the game.
05:01They switched to asymmetric tactics, for which the US wasn't prepared.
05:06They began to employ decentralized attacks, roadside bombs, and information operations
05:11designed to undermine public support and operational momentum.
05:15And for a while, the strategy worked.
05:18Hurtling says the initial US responses lagged behind the evolving threat, in some cases,
05:23for years.
05:24Eventually, however, US commanders and soldiers adjusted successfully.
05:28Intelligence was integrated more closely with operations.
05:32Counter IED technologies were developed and deployed, decentralized operations and electronic
05:38warfare were introduced, and closer partnership with local forces were established.
05:43In the end, as Hurtling puts it, success came because American forces eventually learn faster
05:49than the enemy.
05:50But it's not always the case that the larger force ultimately prevails.
05:54With better thinking and faster adaptation, a smaller, less powerful force is capable of overcoming
06:01larger forces that are slower to adapt.
06:04And that's exactly what Hurtling says is happening in Ukraine.
06:07There are numerous historical examples of how this kind of strategic adaptability has upended
06:13the status quo in the disadvantaged side's favour.
06:16The most famous is arguably the Battle of Thermopylae in 4080 BCE, where a small coalition of Greek
06:23forces, famously anchored by 300 Spartans, led by King Leonidas I, held off the vastly larger
06:31invading army of Xerxes I of Persia.
06:34The story was immortalized, with some fictional liberties, in the hit 2006 Zack Snyder-directed
06:40movie 300.
06:42Although the Greeks were ultimately defeated in a tactical loss, the heroic stand inflicted
06:46heavy casualties on the Persians, inspired Greek unity, and delayed the Persian advance.
06:52This delay allowed Greek forces to regroup, leading to decisive victories at the Battle
06:57of Salamis and the Battle of Plataea, effectively ending the Persian invasion.
07:02But the passage of millennia hasn't blunted the effectiveness of small, adaptive forces
07:06overcoming larger, slower ones, if the right strategies and tactics are adopted timelessly.
07:12And more recent examples bear this out.
07:15Hurtling points out to the Vietnam War.
07:17While he says the Tet Offensive in 1968 was an abject military failure for the North Vietnamese,
07:24that effectively extinguished the Viet Cong as a fighting force, the Viet Cong adapted,
07:29avoiding essentially suicidal pitched battles against the much stronger US forces, and turning
07:34instead to guerrilla tactics.
07:36In the end, these early asymmetric tactics caused the war to drag on for too long, and the cost
07:42to become too high for the US leadership to sustain politically.
07:46The US was compelled to withdraw.
07:48Vietnam remains under communist leadership to this day, albeit with a thriving socialist-oriented
07:53market economy and a healthy relationship with the US.
07:57Much closer to home in terms of Ukraine, Hurtling also cites the example of Finland during the
08:02Winter War of 1939 to 1940.
08:05The Finns used asymmetric tactics like winter camouflage, ski-based mobility, and improvised
08:12weapons like Molotov cocktails to fight the massive Soviet Red Army.
08:16Hurtling calls the result a draw, which is perhaps overstating the case somewhat.
08:21The war ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty, in which Finland ceded about 11% of its territory
08:27to the Soviet Union, including Karelia, part of the Seymar, and islands in the Gulf of Finland.
08:32That's technically a military defeat.
08:35But Finland had managed to inflict heavy losses on the Soviets, and more importantly, retained
08:40its independence.
08:41National unity was greatly bolstered, and Finland gained international prestige, while the Soviet
08:47Union was expelled from the League of Nations for its aggression.
08:50In that sense, a draw is probably a fair description, and the parallels with today's conflict in Ukraine
08:56are striking.
08:57Hurtling correctly points to the flaws in judging the state of war primarily in terms of territorial
09:02gains.
09:04Of course, the question of territory is important.
09:07Russia has occupied around 20% of Ukraine's territory, and Ukraine's ultimate aim is to
09:12expel the Russians from all of it and reclaim it.
09:16But warfare has changed dramatically.
09:18And in Ukraine, judging the state of war purely in terms of square miles gained by either side,
09:24ignores the reality of what's actually happening on the battlefield and behind it.
09:29For starters, vast areas of the front lines in eastern Ukraine today can't be held with
09:33certainty to be under the control of one side or the other.
09:37In reality, they're massive grey zones, where whatever control either side has is at best
09:42tenuous.
09:43Ubiquitous FPV drones with a range of dozens of miles on both sides have meant that the armoured
09:49manoeuvres of the past have become unsustainable.
09:52With rare exception, neither side plunges into headlong assaults with columns of armoured vehicles
09:57and tanks to capture new territory these days.
10:00More often than not, such tactics simply result in burnt-out columns of vehicles, which the
10:05other side can flaunt in videos.
10:07Now, less is more.
10:10Both sides now tend to advance with small infantry groups covered by artillery and drones.
10:15A village, or what remains of it, said to be held by one side is often only held by a
10:20handful
10:21of troops.
10:21And the territory just beyond held villages still contains troops on the other side, even though
10:27battle maps may show the areas as under one army's control.
10:31These small group tactics, combined with the sheer length of the frontlines and a shortage
10:36of manpower on both sides, mean that a limited number of infantrymen are able to sometimes
10:41penetrate deep behind the advanced positions of the enemy and dig in, with regular supplies
10:47arriving by drone that can hold these positions for months, effectively destroying any notion
10:52of secure control over the area for the enemy.
10:55The ubiquitous use of drones means that the frontlines are never really set in stone, but
11:00drones have also effectively drawn the so-called near-rear into the battlefield itself.
11:05Gone are the days when an army could advance with columns, establish new advanced positions,
11:10and then maintain those positions using secure logistics and warehousing stretching dozens
11:15of miles into the rear.
11:17Today, with satellite and drone surveillance, and an array of precision-strike missiles and shells
11:22in operation, the near-rear isn't anywhere near as safe as it used to be.
11:27Indeed, for both sides, degrading logistics, disrupting command and control, and destroying
11:32supplies in the near-rear seems to have become as high a priority as attacking advancing frontline
11:38forces.
11:39Hurtling argues that Ukraine has adapted to these new battlefield realities much faster and more
11:45effectively than Russia has.
11:46Its strategy of employing drones, precision strikes, electronic warfare, and attacks on industrial
11:52infrastructure far from the frontlines, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's long-range
11:57sanctions has allowed Ukraine to regain the initiative in the war.
12:01As proof, he points to recent assessments from the Institute for the Study of War, or ISW,
12:07that claim Russian forces experienced a net territorial loss across the theater in April
12:122026 for the first time since Ukraine's Kursk incursion in 2024.
12:18Now, just a quick reminder to subscribe to the channel, if you haven't done so already.
12:23On the military show, we provide daily updates on the most important military developments
12:28and deep dives into what those developments mean, so hit that subscribe button so you never
12:33miss out.
12:34Now, depending on where you get your news, that ISW figure is the subject of some debate.
12:40The ISW's claim that Ukraine managed to claw back a net 72 square miles of territory during
12:46April has been widely publicized in Western and Ukrainian media, but there's unfortunately
12:51not much independent corroboration, at least yet.
12:54The Economist's war tracker suggests that this year, it, Russia, has suffered small but
13:00sustained territorial losses for the first time since October 2023, but without confirming
13:06the scale.
13:06And that's about it.
13:07For their part, the Russians are painting a very different picture.
13:12Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, recently stated that Russian forces
13:17had seized more than 1,000 square miles of territory, captured 80 settlements, and liberated
13:23the last remaining settlements in Luhansk Oblast during 2026.
13:28Geolocated footage appears to corroborate at least the last part of that statement.
13:33Hurtling describes this massive difference in claims as the widening gap between Kremlin
13:37claims and battlefield reality, but who knows what's really going on.
13:42As we've explained, for either side, describing territory as under full control until the front
13:48lines have moved dozens if not hundreds of miles further into enemy territory is likely
13:52disingenuous at best.
13:54Most of it is, in reality, a grey zone, where control is never fully secure and positions can change
14:00hands, sometimes multiple times within the same day.
14:04Hurtling doesn't see it like that.
14:06In his view, senior military leaders who exaggerate success often reveal deeper institutional weaknesses.
14:13In authoritarian systems, civilian and military leaders frequently attempt to shape reports
14:18to satisfy expectations rather than operational realities.
14:22Over time, those actions distort military and political decision making, weaken adaptation,
14:29and cause strategic dysfunction.
14:30It's been happening in Russia since before the full-scale invasion, and it appears to be
14:35happening still.
14:36He's probably right, but it's a dangerous argument.
14:40While Russia has been caught multiple times providing what Russian military bloggers sarcastically
14:45referred to as beautiful reports, Ukraine hasn't been immune to beautifying its reports either.
14:51In April 2026, the commanders of the 14 separate Mechanized Brigade and the 10th Army Corps were
14:58dismissed after an investigation revealed that they had concealed critical supply failures.
15:03Soldiers were found severely emaciated due to a lack of food and water, and positions were lost.
15:09The general staff stated that the previous command had concealed the real state of affairs.
15:14Previously, in late 2025, the commanders of the 54th Mechanized Brigade and the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade
15:22were fired for systematically falsifying reports.
15:25They lied about holding positions around Siversk that their troops had already abandoned,
15:30leading to the city's capture by Russian forces with minimal resistance.
15:34Unfortunately, these are far from isolated incidents.
15:38As Ukrainian filmmaker and battalion commander Ole Sentsov told the Ukrainska Pravda outlet,
15:44the amount of lying in our state is enormous, and in the army, it has simply some immeasurable volume.
15:50By Hurtling's logic, that would make Ukraine, like Russia, an authoritarian system, and that's certainly
15:56not the point he's trying to make. His point is that while Russia is lying about territorial gains and
16:01floundering, Ukraine continues evolving tactically and operationally. The second part of that statement is
16:08undoubtedly true. As Hurtling explains,
16:11Ukrainian commanders have always understood they cannot indefinitely trade artillery shells,
16:16armored vehicles, and soldiers against a larger adversary with deeper reserves.
16:20So, instead of attempting to match the Russian quantitative advantage, Ukraine has increasingly
16:26shifted toward attacking vulnerabilities across the broader Russian military-industrial system.
16:31Instead of focusing on frontline attrition, Ukraine has shifted to more asymmetrical tactics.
16:37Specifically, by greatly increasing its stockpiles of long-range attack drones and missiles,
16:43it's increasingly targeted the infrastructure, logistics, energy production, navigation systems,
16:49and industrial facilities that sustain Russian combat operations. And there seems little doubt that
16:55these attacks are taking a heavy toll. A growing portfolio of verified footage confirms that increasing
17:01numbers of major oil refineries, fuel depots, explosive facilities, and plants connected to Russian drone
17:08and missile production are being hit, and ever more frequently. Ukrainian attacks recently damaged the
17:14Kirishi oil refinery near St. Petersburg, one of Russia's largest refining facilities. In recent weeks,
17:21they've also struck the VNIIR Progress Plant in Chuvasia, which manufactures navigation and electronic
17:28warfare-resistant guidance systems used in Russian drones and missiles. And those are just two examples among
17:34many. For Hurtling, these attacks reflect increasingly sophisticated intelligence collection and targeting
17:41priorities aimed at disrupting the connective tissue of Russia's military machine. Like Ukraine, Russian air
17:47defences bring down the vast majority of these drones, but the high number of drones flying into Russia these days
17:53means that more and more leakers are finding their mark. And not just anywhere, but in Moscow and St. Petersburg,
18:00Russia's most prized and well-protected locations. Western intelligence assessments claim that, as a result,
18:06Russian authorities have increased security measures around Vladimir Putin and key Russian leadership
18:11facilities. Other reports claim that Ukrainian attacks, particularly on Moscow, have forced Russian
18:17authorities to reposition air defense systems to protect elite leadership facilities and critical
18:23infrastructure. Hurtling doesn't dispute that some of this reporting may be somewhat overstated,
18:28but their accuracy, he suggests, is ultimately less important than the broader strategic reality they
18:34reflect. Ukraine has succeeded in bringing the war home to Russia. And you can see it on the faces of
18:40ordinary Russians, or rather on their phones. The government has restricted access to the telegram
18:46app in Russia in an apparent effort to limit negative news about the war. In fact, you'll struggle to find
18:52a single Russian active channel where displeasure at this move isn't voiced. Combined with rising costs and an
18:58economy under serious pressure, this move has undoubtedly worsened the mood considerably inside Russia.
19:04According to the Russian state pollster Vatsayim, Putin's approval rating fell to 65.6% in late April
19:112026, marking the lowest level recorded since the beginning of the war against Ukraine. That's a
19:17significant decline of over 12 percentage points from December 2025, which prompted the state-controlled
19:23polling agency to revise its survey methodology to soften further blows. Of course, those are polling numbers
19:30many Western leaders can only fantasize about. According to recent US polls, President Donald
19:36Trump is still polling at around 39% approval rating, but there's a steady downward trend. Of Ukraine's
19:42biggest allies in Europe, Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Mertz is the most popular, with an approval rating of
19:48just 19% and a disapproval rating of 76%. France's Emmanuel Macron trails him slightly, with an 18% approval
19:57rate and 75% disapproval rate. And UK Prime Minister, Sakhir Starmer, whose Labour Party was recently
20:04humiliated in local elections, is odds-on to be ousted in the near future. Only 11% of Britons believe
20:10he's
20:11been good or a great Prime Minister, and nearly 60% believe he's been poor or terrible, according to polling
20:17by YouGov. Still, a roughly 12% drop for Putin in just one quarter is a strong indicator that Ukraine's
20:24asymmetric strategy is working. Now, Hurtling makes a strong case for how Ukraine is using its adaptability
20:31and asymmetric advantages to seize back the initiative. But unlike some other commentators, he doesn't come to
20:37the conclusion that this has put Ukraine firmly on a path to victory, or that the war is near an
20:42end.
20:43Russia remains dangerous and capable of inflicting enormous destruction, he states.
20:48He also acknowledges Ukraine's severe manpower issues, the fact that it's completely dependent on
20:53foreign aid to remain functional as a state, and that it's at a major disadvantage in what's becoming
20:58a grinding war of attrition. Russia is taking heavy losses, but it has a greater capacity to withstand
21:04them simply due to its much larger size, economy and population. It's also worth noting that the
21:10Pentagon's official assessment of the state of the war doesn't share Hurtling's assessment that Ukraine
21:16has seized the strategic initiative as a result of its innovative tactics and greater adaptability.
21:21In its May 2026 report to Congress on Operation Atlantic Resolve, the Pentagon's Special Inspector
21:28General assesses that Russia almost certainly retains a more effective command and control system than
21:34Ukraine. It also almost certainly retains a higher ability to conduct persistent,
21:39high-tempo offensive maneuvers and holds the advantage in direct fires, logistics,
21:43force generation and force protection. Russia has also achieved parity in tactical drone deployment,
21:50although Ukraine probably retains a more effective tactical,
21:53battlefield-focused intelligence capability than Russia. Still, as the 300, the Viet Cong,
21:59and the steadfast Finns in World War II have ably demonstrated, victory doesn't always mean vanquishing
22:05your enemy on the battlefield. At the beginning of the war, very few would have predicted that
22:10Ukraine would still be standing strong after four years of grinding, murderous war, but there it stands
22:16proudly for all to see. However, there's a slight chance Ukraine's escalations might backfire
22:21spectacularly. The increased pressures in Russia aren't leading to increased calls for capitulation or
22:27Putin's head. Instead, they seem to be having the opposite effect, with ever louder calls for a much
22:32tougher response to Ukraine from the public and influential leaders alike. Since it's highly
22:37debatable how much more Russia actually has in its conventional locker with which to deal such blows,
22:43there's the ominous prospect that Russia might resort to something more lethal, tactical or even
22:49strategic nuclear weapons. The threat grows stronger each day. A nuclear war would likely remove
22:55Ukraine's major centers from the map and render the entire territory unlivable, along with potentially
23:00much of Europe, Russia and even the US. But if it can be avoided, there's a very strong chance that
23:06Ukraine's stubborn resistance and mastery of adaptation are precisely what will ultimately
23:11preserve its sovereignty, dignity and future, exactly as Hurtling suggests. We'll of course keep you
23:18updated as the situation develops. This war twists and turns daily. But just in case Russia decides to
23:24go nuclear, check out this video about the safest places in the US to wait it out.
23:29If you want to see more, please get more information.
23:29Thanks for watching.
23:30Bye bye.
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