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‘Afghanistan 1979: the war that changed the world’, is a French documentary about the Sovjet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. It was one of the most crucial events of the 20th century, and changed the world forever. This documentary gives a good insight in the Afghan-Russian war ; the alliance between the Russian and Afghan communist governments ; Islamic resistance ; the support of America for the resistance and its consequences on the war.
Directed by Gulya Mirzoeva
Directed by Gulya Mirzoeva
Categoria
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AprendizadoTranscrição
00:08This is Kabul in 1978.
00:11These images remind us of an era when East and West confronted each other for world domination.
00:18Today, the Cold War has given way to a new confrontation, which opposes the Muslim and
00:23Western worlds.
00:24And it was in this country, Afghanistan, that this transformation took place.
00:30This is the story of the bloody Ten Year War, which pitted the Soviet superpower against
00:35the Afghan resistance.
00:37A war whose after-effects continue to make headlines every day.
00:42This is the story of an absurd war that changed the world.
01:03To understand how the war in Afghanistan turned into a major conflict with global implications,
01:09we must go back in history.
01:11The USSR and Afghanistan had always been the best of friends.
01:15Russia was the first major power to recognize the state of Afghanistan in 1919, just as Afghanistan
01:22would be the first country to recognize Soviet Russia in 1921.
01:27Throughout the 20th century, relations between the two countries were excellent, and Soviet
01:32leaders were at great pains to pamper Afghanistan.
01:35This buffer state, with its strategic location at the heart of Central Asia, wedged between
01:40the USSR to the north, Iran to the west, and China and Pakistan to the east.
01:46In the 1970s, Afghanistan was a liberal republic run by President Daoud Khan, who got on marvellously
01:54with the Soviets.
01:55At the time, Moscow was Kabul's main economic partner.
01:59The USSR was actively involved in the country's construction drive, and hundreds of Soviet advisers
02:05were sent to Afghanistan.
02:08The honeymoon between the two countries paradoxically came to an end the day the communists seized
02:13power in Kabul on the 27th of April, 1978.
02:46There was no
02:46and accepted it at the beginning.
02:58The people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, led by Nur Mohamed Taraki, seized power by means of a bloody coup d
03:05'etat.
03:06Despite Taraki's communist credentials, the Soviets were furious.
03:11It took the Kremlin several months to accept this ill-timed revolution.
03:15The Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev,
03:19finally did so to escape the disapproval of other socialist powers around the world.
03:23In December 1978, eight months after seizing power,
03:27President Taraki finally arrived in Moscow to sign a friendship treaty between the two countries,
03:32an economic and military treaty which secured Soviet aid for the new communist regime in Afghanistan.
03:37What the Russians had not seized, in my opinion, is how the Communist Party, the Halk, was revolutionary.
03:45They really had a vision, an ideology of a transformation of a society said feudal to a socialist.
03:53The transition from feudal to socialist society was to be brought about by agrarian reform.
04:00This was the Afghan communists' first failure.
04:03This excessively brutal reform, which failed to take ancestral traditions into account,
04:08was not well received by landowners in the provinces.
04:10The second stumbling block was educational reform.
04:14The government in Kabul decreed that school was compulsory for girls.
04:18The religious authorities violently opposed this measure.
04:22The mullahs, who opposed the communists, were cracked down on harshly.
04:27Attacking religious leaders can be very dangerous, as the Soviets knew only too well.
04:31Especially as in February 1979, a revolution in neighbouring Iran had just brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power.
04:40Right on Afghanistan's doorstep, a veritable theocracy was being established,
04:45an Islamic Republic run by the mullahs.
04:47At the Kremlin, events in Iran were observed very closely.
04:51This revolution was a real slap in the face for the American enemy,
04:55as it brought down the Shah's regime, which was supported by Washington.
05:01As a Hitler team was the rogue of Jews in Afghanistan,
05:02the Soviets repeatedly tried to calm the anti-religious fervour of the Afghan communists,
05:06but to no avail.
05:09We took a test of the people of the democracy,
05:12Afghan customs who this anti-religious fervour of the Afghan communists,
05:13are not afraid from those people,
05:19I think that there is a religion in Afghanistan and the spirit of them and the way they are not
05:27able to bring themselves into their lives.
05:30We have a lot of people in the community. They have a lot of people in the community.
05:35They have a lot of people in their lives.
05:41And in this case, a dictatorial government started to respond to the people's freedom.
05:51No one wanted to listen to the radio, no one wanted to listen to the news,
05:57no one wanted to listen to the news, and no one wanted to listen to the communists.
06:09In Baharat, a town in the west of the country, an entire division of the regular Afghan army rebelled.
06:15It was under the command of Captain Turan Ismail, who would thereafter become famous under the name Ismail Khan,
06:22as a warlord of the Afghan resistance.
06:24We had a few figures that were inside the Urdu, Afghanistan.
06:32We had the relationship between the Islamic and the religion,
06:38and the peace of the country that we had.
06:42For a long time, we realized that all the real things that were inside the Urdu,
06:46that were outside the other side of the pan.
06:47When we were to ask ourselves about this,
06:49we would have to ask ourselves about our people.
06:53We decided to ask ourselves about our ownaye and their own
07:25The Herat uprising in which 30,000 died was a serious concern for President Taraki.
07:32He phoned the USSR Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin.
07:35The conversation, conserved in the Kremlin's secret archives, is an edifying one.
07:41Nur Mohamed Taraki requested Soviet military aid, advocating a discreet intervention by the Red Army on Afghan soil.
07:49Kosygin was very reticent.
07:53I don't want to annoy you, but it's very difficult to intervene discreetly.
07:56The whole world would find out, and within a couple of hours everyone would be screaming that the Soviet Union
08:01had invaded Afghanistan.
08:04But President Taraki was not short of convincing arguments and ideas.
08:09Just send in tanks driven by Soviet soldiers from Central Asia.
08:12Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmenis.
08:14There are lots of these people in Afghanistan.
08:17If they put on Afghan army uniforms, they won't be noticed.
08:20President Taraki's idea took root.
08:22The KGB and the GRU, Foreign Military Intelligence, started to round up Soviet soldiers to form a battalion,
08:29which would later become famous as the Muzbat, the Muslim Battalion.
08:33When I arrived in the position, I was surprised that my personal staff
08:43представляed of themselves, in the first of all, in the first of all,
08:46people from the Middle East.
08:47In general, in their mass, they were tajiki, uzbeki, some turkmen.
08:52First of all they started to show,
08:56first of all, when they hired an Odesta with marks of the uncertainty.
09:00It was very interesting and veryيد.
09:03For which reasons and for what they were gathered?
09:06First of all, in early 1979, it would be very clear that the组SIW Chillies
09:19The secret formation of the Muslim battalion in May 1979 shows that the KGB was starting
09:25to get ready.
09:26But ready for what?
09:28At the time, no one knew, but they were sure of one thing.
09:31The situation in the Afghan provinces was becoming extremely serious, especially close
09:36to the Pakistan border, where a large number of anti-communist combatants had taken refuge.
09:40It was at this point that this still undeclared war drew in new protagonists, the United States
09:46and its ally, Pakistan.
09:49The head of the ISI, General Akhtar, came to us with a request for assistance.
09:55This is in the middle of 79, and in order to conduct a covert action abroad in modern times,
10:04you have to have the authorization of the president, which is contained in what is called a presidential
10:09finding, which he signs.
10:11And he signed the finding, that was Jimmy Carter, in the summer of 79, to give non-lethal
10:17aid to the Mujahideen, who were in contact with the ISI and they were revolting against
10:23the Communist Party rule, which had begun in 78.
10:29At that moment-là, the Islamic militants who were in Peshawar began to come back.
10:32And there, they found a situation that was broken.
10:35They came back with weapons, or not many, and then, I would say, a certain military training,
10:40quite superficial.
10:41And they began to open the fronts, for example, the Panjshir with Masoud.
10:55Already by the summer of 1979, Afghanistan was in a state of total civil war.
11:01In Kandahar, Herat and Panjshir, all through the provinces, resistance groups were in a state
11:07of readiness.
11:07But it was in Kabul, at the heart of Communist power, that the next act of this tragedy would
11:12play out.
11:13Look at these two men, President Taraki and his Prime Minister, Havitsula Amin.
11:18Two friends and comrades in arms, two Marxist leaders, who believed they could establish
11:23a socialist state in record time.
11:26On the 11th of December 1979, Taraki returned from a trip to Moscow.
11:30He was welcomed by his Prime Minister Amin, visibly very happy to see the President home again.
11:36Three days later, the same Amin had Taraki suffocated by Secret Service officers.
11:40Amin seized power without giving Moscow any warning.
11:44He was henceforth at the helm of a country plunged in civil war.
11:48The purges that followed were brutal.
11:50Amin had all high-ranking officers loyal to Taraki either imprisoned or executed.
11:55It was at this point that the Soviets started to wonder who this Havitsula Amin really was.
12:05I think it was probably part of the drama that was playing out in Moscow.
12:11They came up with a list of things that the Americans were doing, one of them that Amin
12:15was their guy, that the Americans were going to move short-range missiles into Afghanistan.
12:22And any number of other embellishments simply weren't true.
12:26I don't think anybody in Washington or in the United States government paid much attention
12:32to Afghanistan at that time.
12:33But there is no evidence at all that Amin actually was connected with the CIA.
12:40There is an evidence that Amin was trying to play both against each other,
12:44because he felt his position was very precarious and his position was not stable.
12:50Was Amin an agent of the Americans or the Chinese, or quite simply a loose cannon?
12:56At KGB headquarters in Moscow, everything was being considered.
13:00Agents in Kabul described a situation which was daily getting worse.
13:04Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, passed on some very alarming memos to Leonid Brezhnev.
13:12One of the memorandum which was very, very important for Brezhnev,
13:17where Andropov essentially creates this sense of urgency,
13:22where we have to do something now before Amin's government turns to the Americans.
13:28In 1979, Brezhnev was already in such a state,
13:33that he, of course, couldn't take political decisions.
13:36He could speak more than 13 or 15 minutes.
13:41And, of course, some decisions were made by Brezhnev.
13:45But, probably, he could still put a sign.
13:50Yet it was Leonid Brezhnev, who, as Secretary-General of the Communist Party,
13:54embodied supreme power.
13:56It was up to him to take the most important decisions of state,
14:00especially as regards foreign policy.
14:08On the 12th of December, a select Politburo meeting took place.
14:13It was at this meeting that the decision was taken to eliminate the Afghan leader,
14:17Havitsullah Amin, whom they judged to be out of control.
14:20At the time, the young Mikhail Gorbachev was just a deputy member of the Politburo,
14:25and had no say in the decisions of the Supreme Office.
14:29It was not a Politburo, but a group inside the Politburo.
14:35The older friends.
14:41You can't leave a song.
14:43That means they were just an English one.
14:45And, you will get that.
14:46And here's the old guard.
14:47Youstinov, Minister of Defence.
14:50Andropov, Head of the KGB.
14:52And Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
14:54It was their decision, and theirs alone, to commit the Red Army to this disastrous enterprise.
15:00For the previous ten years, the so-called Detente had been in place between the Soviet Union
15:06and the United States.
15:07Brezhnev was very attached to it.
15:09and most of the Politburo understood that the slightest military intervention could shatter this fragile equilibrium.
15:15Yet these three men managed to rally the other members to their cause,
15:19which consisted of carrying out a coup d'etat against Amin
15:22and sending in a contingent of the Red Army to prop up the new power regime.
15:28This is the document confirming the decision to intervene in Afghanistan.
15:32A quite unique piece of paper.
15:34It's just one handwritten sheet, something unheard of for a document of such importance.
15:40Furthermore, the decision itself is worded very vaguely,
15:43merely conferring on the three men the power to take the necessary measures for restoring order in Afghanistan.
15:50Yet even the word Afghanistan does not appear, the country being designated simply by the letter A.
15:56Drawn up on the 12th of December 1979,
15:58it was only countersigned on the 26th of that month by the other members of the Politburo,
16:04with the exception of Kosygin, who never approved of it.
16:07The coup d'etat aimed at eliminating President Amin could now go ahead.
16:11่ br browz novel
16:12practically весь декабрь я просидел около дворца Амина в составе мусульманского батальона.
16:17И мы...
16:18Мы нас...
16:19Мы нас переодели в афганскую форму.
16:20Легенда была такая, что мы являемся еще одним батальоном бригады,
16:26Национальной гвардии, которая охраняла сам дворец, правительство и Амина.
16:30Our main task was not to stop the approach of the counter-revolutionary forces to the palace.
16:40We were afraid of the revolution.
16:43We were afraid of the revolution.
16:45It turned out that we were prepared to complete the main task for the liquidation of the government.
16:58We tried to kill them.
17:00A chef was introduced in his system.
17:02It was not a problem.
17:04It was such a trustee to the Soviet people, to the diplomats, to the doctors,
17:10that there was no problem for a chef.
17:13It was very popular in Afghanistan.
17:17We didn't have it yet.
17:19It was a very heavy drink that destroyed everything, including the blood.
17:25And those who drank cola, the effect of this food,
17:31it was almost on the level of drinking.
17:35Thanks to Coca-Cola, Amin survived the poisoning attempt.
17:39So the KGB decided to launch a military assault on the presidential palace.
17:44Operation Storm was launched at 7.15pm.
17:47Its aim to finish off the job and eliminate Amin.
17:58What was there in these 45 minutes?
18:01Well, to speak, it's hard to say.
18:03There was a lot of shooting.
18:07There was a lot of shooting.
18:09It was, you know, a bathroom.
18:10It was a gotch in the house.
18:14It was a big thing.
18:15It was a big thing.
18:20It was a big thing.
18:21It was a big thing.
18:22It was a big thing.
18:24of Amina, and only after that I told him in the center that Amina is not in the lives.
18:32Concretely, I have to say that it's the end.
18:33I tried to find a document that Amin is an agent of C.R.U.,
18:42but I know exactly that a group of people, who were in my group on 4-4
19:01In the night of the 27th to the 28th of December,
19:04100,000 Red Army soldiers poured into Afghanistan.
19:08According to the official wording, it was a limited contingent,
19:12aimed at upholding the communist regime in Afghanistan.
19:15It was this man, Babrak Karmal, who took the reins of power.
19:19Chosen by Moscow, he patiently awaited his moment in a military base.
19:28At night, we announced that Carmel came to Afghanistan.
19:35It was a hard night, and then after that,
19:38I saw the S.R.U.I.R.I.R.I.D.
19:39that in the village, in the village, in the village, in the village,
19:43in the village, in the village,
19:44there was a lot of thought that the people of Afghanistan changed.
19:48And my own person, who, before I was told,
19:51I thought that they changed everything in my life.
19:55I thought that was a huge thing.
19:56I thought that the Russians were there.
19:58I thought that the Russians were there.
20:00They were there.
20:00They were there.
20:01They were there to replace a communist regime which was
20:03that was out of control,
20:05a pro-Soviet regime which was supposed to be a moderate regime.
20:09and, let's say, peace with the Afghan population.
20:13How could the Kremlin old guard have believed that sending in troops
20:17would improve the chances of peace with the Afghan people?
20:20The result would be the exact opposite,
20:23with an eventual knock-on effect around the world.
20:26The time that the country he could are deeply distracted,
20:30it's the right to claim against them,
20:34and the right to claim against them.
20:37And it is now available for the people of Afghanistan.
20:38According to the texts of the Italian Quran,
20:43they are facing the Ant Excellency of the Siaq.
20:48The people of Afghanistan speak against the Islamic Republic.
21:03It was at exactly this moment as foreign troops entered the country that the situation took
21:08on a new dimension.
21:09What had been an Afghan civil war was now declared a holy war, affecting the entire
21:15Muslim world.
21:19No one in the USSR was aware of what was going on.
21:22Pravda published a simple dispatch, announcing that in response to a request from the Afghan
21:28government, Soviet troops had entered the country to repel foreign aggression.
21:32The communique ended with the following words, having been judged by his people, Amin was sentenced
21:37to death and executed.
21:41Until that morning of the 28th of December, no one in Moscow had even known the operation
21:46was underway.
21:47We knew my friend, Shvarnaza.
21:50I arrived to live in Pitsundu.
21:59I arrived there, to visit the person who came to Gрузia.
22:06We talked a lot about him.
22:10We woke up in the morning, we woke up.
22:15We woke up in the morning and everyone.
22:22We woke up.
22:24And he was on the day before that.
22:25We were talking about the borders of the extender of the one with Afghanistan.
22:53A few days after the troops entered the country on the 4th of January 1980, American President
22:59Jimmy Carter, reacted publicly with a televised address.
23:03This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.
23:10It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic
23:17people.
23:18Jimmy Carter felt, I think, a huge personal insult from Brezhnev, whom he thought he had
23:27gotten to know a little bit.
23:29So when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter made the unfortunate statement,
23:36looking very naive, saying, I've learned more about the Soviet Union in the past 24 hours
23:41than I've learned in my entire lifetime.
23:43Carter was rather relaxed about the Soviet Union and believed naively that he could go
23:53to the bargaining table and sort things out in a way that would, if not end the Cold War,
24:01or at least ameliorate it and make it safer.
24:06The reaction around the world was unanimous.
24:10In January 1980, the USSR was condemned by the majority of the member countries of the
24:15UN, including those Muslim nations not traditionally aligned as allies of the Soviets.
24:21Carter froze the ratification of treaties.
24:29And very quickly, Carter said, OK, we're going to not go to the Moscow Olympics next year.
24:38We're going to cancel some consular agreements and some grain deals.
24:42And that was sort of the overt thing.
24:46And then he told CIA, OK, it's time for you to get to work over there and provide—and this
24:56is the change—lethal assistance to the Afghan resistance.
25:03Just five years earlier, we'd ended our own Vietnam nightmare.
25:09This idea of comparing the nightmare of Vietnam to that of Afghanistan came from Jimmy Carter's
25:15defense advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, known as a fierce anti-communist.
25:22I remember the day the Soviets walked into Kabul and occupied Afghanistan.
25:29I gave the president a memo, which had the sentence in it,
25:34we now have the opportunity to give the Soviet Union its Vietnam.
25:39And we acted accordingly for the first time in the history of the entire Cold War.
25:44Brzezinski came in and completely muddled that policy because he was so
25:49anti-Soviet, with his own East European background.
25:53So the origins of that were in January of 1980.
26:00Then Brzezinski goes out and talks to Mohamed Zeal Haq, the president of Pakistan,
26:08and he goes up to Michny Point, looking into Afghanistan there from the Khyber Pass.
26:15And he picked up that Kalashnikov and sort of pointed into Afghanistan.
26:23And at that moment, the American commitment was vividly demonstrated.
26:30That land over there is yours, you'll go back to it one day because your fight will prevail
26:37and you'll have your homes and your mosques back again because your cause is right and God is on your
26:44side.
26:49He wanted to be known as one who's in charge of this operation.
26:55And at the level of the La Haute Politique, he was in charge.
27:00But in reality, operationally, it was the CIA that was running it.
27:04We had no presence in Afghanistan.
27:08Who had the presence and the access to the Afghanis themselves?
27:15It was the Pakistani.
27:17When we approached the Pakistanis, we said, we're with you on this thing and we'll pull together a team.
27:26Like-minded countries, the Saudis, the Chinese, the Egyptians, the British, the Americans.
27:34And the Pakistanis.
27:36The first thing we did was we bought a huge number of Enfield 303 rifles from the British.
27:44And within a couple of months of the invasion, we had delivered these into Pakistan.
27:50And at that time, it was the preferred weapon of an Afghan.
27:55And so that began it.
27:57And it began with $10 million here.
27:59And then Congress started getting involved.
28:02And then another $20 million there.
28:04And it grew over the years.
28:07The CIA's program for arming the Afghan Mujahideen was given the codename Operation Cyclone.
28:13The Pakistani president, Zia Ul Haqq, a sworn enemy of the USSR,
28:18agreed to let his secret services act as intermediaries for the CIA.
28:22But he insisted on absolute secrecy.
28:25There were to be no American boots on the ground inside Afghanistan.
28:30All the logistical assistance and training of the Mujahideen in Pakistan had to be provided by the Pakistanis,
28:36the CIA merely financing and overseeing the operation.
29:06It was just over the Afghan border in Pakistan itself.
29:10where thousands of refugees flooded, that the resistance was organized.
29:14For better or worse, they were the ones that basically chose the group together to comprise a seven-party group.
29:27And that meant people like Gulbuddin, Hekmatiyah, as well as a more moderate group.
29:32But these were, from the Pakistani's point of view, the ones that could be militarily effective.
29:38And it's true.
29:40The Afghan resistance was split into seven political groups, represented by their commanders,
29:46the most radical of whom were Hekmatiyah, Sayaf and Rabani,
29:50all members of the Muslim Brotherhood and backed by Saudi Arabia.
29:54They were also the main beneficiaries of American aid, since they were the Pakistanis' favorites.
29:59The CIA had no choice but to comply with Islamabad's choices.
30:25The other group, of course, Masood, was favored by us and by the British,
30:33who had a direct contact with them.
30:36The Sayaf group, which is, I think, the third group, was mainly financed by the Saudis.
30:42We tried to monitor independently what was going to these various groups, but it was difficult.
30:49You know, the bulk of the fighting and the brunt of the fighting was born by the Afghan themselves.
30:55So in that sense, it was an indigenous resistance, assisted by outside powers,
30:59in terms of technology, in terms of resources, in terms of weapons, in terms of training.
31:07But even without these inputs, the resistance would have carried on.
31:13This is a point that most people seem to miss.
31:16They believe that it was the provision of assistance, and the technology, and the resources,
31:23and the training, and the money that did the job. No.
31:26The increasingly well-armed and trained Mujahideen were starting to pose serious problems for the Red Army.
31:33The Soviet soldiers were surprised by the effectiveness of the resistance in the provinces.
31:41The Soviet soldiers were in the military.
31:42Nobody wanted to fight, and the task of fighting was not to fight.
31:45The soldiers were in the military for the service of the army to provide help and protect the objects.
31:52It was the main task.
31:53It was the last ten years of the war.
31:57The loyalty of the Afghan people, which was held on 10 years,
32:01was in one year-old for one year-old.
32:04It changed on 180 degrees.
32:08Why? Because no one loves the Afghan people.
32:11And what kind of people love them?
32:12That they bring to them with all the best wishes.
32:16The whole population says that if not the Soviet army would be
32:19they would figure out the Afghan army in 5 seconds.
32:21The leaders of Afghanistan decided their political questions
32:26based on our backs.
32:29Why? Because the army needs to be prepared,
32:33the shots, the weapons, the weapons.
32:34And here everything is.
32:37And so the army was involved in these battles.
32:41In the end, we got a lot of work.
32:43The more we fight, the more the more the people of the army
32:49are in front of the enemy.
32:51This is a small-scale dialect.
32:56In Moscow in early 1980,
32:59preparations were underway for the Olympic Games that summer.
33:02A genuine source of pride and joy for the Soviet citizens.
33:06They were already aware that the United States
33:08and 65 other countries were going to be boycotting the Games.
33:12But no one really knew why.
33:14This was because officially, there was no war in Afghanistan.
33:17For the moment, the secret was still well under wraps.
33:51The great hero of the Soviet Union for successful actions
33:53in the tactical battle of the Soviet Union for a strategic battle.
33:59It was so written in the sphere.
34:01That's not what it was written in Afghanistan.
34:02It doesn't say that I was in Afghanistan.
34:03That I was in Afghanistan, that I was in Afghanistan.
34:06That I was in Afghanistan.
34:06That was an ideology.
34:07But the Soviet ideology was also in the future.
34:09But in Moscow, one solitary voice dared to break the silence.
34:13The voice belonged to Andrei Sakharov, winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics.
34:55Andrei Sakharov's open letter drew an angry reaction from the Kremlin, and he was sent into
35:00internal exile to the town of Gorky.
35:02A few years later, having been elected a deputy of the people, Sakharov reaffirmed the reasons
35:07for his earlier action loud and clear.
35:37And according to the rule, we're going to take the AKM, we're going to take the AKM, and we're going
35:43to take the AKM.
35:44We're going to take the night in the plane in the plane, when the earth was in Afghanistan, when the
35:51earth was in Afghanistan.
35:51Afghanistan, приказом воля занесла Афганистан, красивый горный дикий край, приказ простой.
36:04Вставай, иди и умирай, но как же так?
36:09Ведь на земле весна давно, а сердце режет мечты и горести полно.
36:38Афганистан, проклятый горный дикий край, приказ простой.
36:44Вставай, иди и умирай, но как же так?
36:48В народе отношения были просто горькие.
36:53Столько людей, вовсе, их ребят берут, иногда даже не подготовленных туда.
37:00Эти гробы из Афганистана, это было такое потрясение для всей страны вообще.
37:07Как с неба свалилось.
37:10Но, как с неба свалилось, они начали отражать, были как ничего, чем в одиночестве.
37:15Но, как с неба свалилось, они не были вновленностью.
37:18В полном поле, в последние несколько месяцев,
37:21Субтитры подошли в области, с военными войсками,
37:24Смирные граждане уже в них десятилетия.
37:52The war was now spilling well beyond Afghanistan's borders.
37:56As the call to jihad against the infidels resounded throughout the world.
38:00Spurred on by this man, Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian scholar and advocate of global jihad,
38:07recruitment centers for voluntary combatants opened in many countries.
38:11From his base in Pakistan, Azzam coordinated the network of jihadist fighters drawn from all over the world.
38:18Some people came from outside to fight alongside the Mujahideen.
38:24People came from the Philippines, the Moros, and people came from Middle East.
38:30People came from India, and people came from America itself, the Muslims of America, and Europe, and the Far East.
38:39But they were few and far between.
38:42The Arabs who came from general were Salafis, so they came not only to do the jihad against the Soviets,
38:49but for them there was an element of predication.
39:10And so the Afghan resistance became the breeding ground for worldwide jihad.
39:16It was in the Afghan mountains that a certain Osama bin Laden, from a wealthy Saudi family, cut his battle
39:22teeth fighting infidels.
39:28At the time, Washington wasn't in the least bit concerned about jihad.
39:33On the contrary, in 1983, Ronald Reagan decided to go public about the United States' involvement in the war in
39:40Afghanistan.
39:40From the Afghanistan freedom fighters, a young lady underwent torture for four months while being held by the Soviets.
39:51There was a man here whose wife was killed in front of their two children, a former justice of the
39:57Supreme Court in Afghanistan.
39:59And they're here to try and tell the outside world, the free world, what's really going on in Afghanistan.
40:04And then, at that point, Reagan broke the secrecy and he just announced that we're going to give the Mujahideen
40:11everything they wanted.
40:12And so it no longer became a secret that the U.S. was doing that.
40:17The rules had changed.
40:19And we weren't just fighting to bleed the Soviets.
40:22We were to give them their own Vietnam.
40:25We decided that President Reagan, after he took office, and Bill Casey, who was the director of the CIA, said,
40:32let's go win this thing.
40:34And so Casey called me to his office and said, you're going to Afghanistan, or to Pakistan, and we're going
40:42to try to win.
40:44The two blocs were back in Cold War mode, fighting a war of influence and communications.
40:50The Americans were arming the rebels, while the Soviets were ordering the Afghan leaders to organize anti-American protests in
40:57Kabul.
41:03You have to understand that Brezhnev invaded, promptly died, and Andropov took over and promptly died, and Shabrikov took over
41:18and promptly died.
41:19And then Gorbachev, Gorbachev wasn't even among the signatures on sending the limited contingent into Afghanistan.
41:30In the three years between 1982 and 1985, the leadership at the Kremlin changed three times, and the warmongering old
41:39guard of the Politburo all but disappeared.
41:42Coming to power in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was convinced that Soviet society was in need of rapid reform.
41:49The period of perestroika was just getting underway, and Gorbachev was prepared to take a whole series of economic and
41:56political measures in this direction.
41:58But the most urgent measure of them all concerned Afghanistan.
42:01I had a letter, in which there were several records, to not forget and forgets.
42:13They were short.
42:16The first record was to establish a realistic policy in relation to Afghanistan, to prepare for the release of the
42:30troops.
42:36So Gorbachev found himself in a really, really tough situation.
42:41He was losing money, he was losing people, he was losing domestic support for the war, because now with glassness
42:48everybody heard about terrible things that were going on in Afghanistan.
43:16The first effect of perestroika was the freeing up of public opinion in the USSR.
43:22Previously muzzled, the Soviet people were now free to express themselves, and were gradually becoming aware that this war was
43:28a catastrophe.
43:29Gorbachev knew he had to bring it to an end.
43:31He also knew to whom he had to speak about it first.
43:34No official. I told him about it to Reagan to meet him in Geneva.
43:40I said to him that we should tell him that as a president, we need to leave Afghanistan.
43:48We are going to do this.
44:06But the United States was very uncooperative, because within the United States, especially
44:12when Reagan came to power, people who wanted to bleed the Soviet Union in Afghanistan prevailed.
44:21And so the Reagan administration was not interested in the Soviet withdrawal.
44:26What it wanted to achieve is the defeat, decisive defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
44:33By the time I was called in to go take over the program in 1986, on very short notice,
44:42I was called to Bill Casey's office and he said, I want you to go over there and I want
44:46you to win.
44:47I'll give you a billion dollars.
44:49Is that enough?
44:49And I thought, what is it?
44:50A billion dollars?
44:51Sounds like a lot of money in 1986.
44:54He says, you can have the Stingers, which were already approved, and I want you to—we're
45:02going to win now.
45:05The famous Stingers, which according to some changed the course of the war, were ground
45:09to air missiles fired from ultralight shoulder mounted launchers, enabling a single man to
45:16bring down an enemy helicopter or fighter plane.
45:21While the Soviets had clearly announced their intention to withdraw, the Americans delivered
45:26from 500 to 2,000 Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen.
45:34The first Stingers were used at Jalalabad in September 1986, and they downed three Russian
45:42helicopters.
45:42And overall, the Russians suffered great losses in helicopters.
45:46I think it was something like a thousand.
46:03American deliveries of Stingers helped the Mujahideen inflict a first battlefield defeat
46:08on the Red Army.
46:18In 1986, Moscow decided to replace President Karmal by a man who seemed better suited to
46:24the situation, Mohammad Najibullah.
46:30Gorbachev thought he could impose his own version of perestroika in Afghanistan, and launched
46:34the idea of a national reconciliation of the Afghan people.
46:39We used the right tactics of national reconciliation.
46:44We gathered the Loi and Jirgu and said to them, that it was your country, that it was your country,
46:50that it was your country, that you would agree, and so on.
46:52And the information was, that we were leaving.
46:54And slowly we started to deliver the equipment, prepare them.
46:58And three years we prepared the intelligence of Afghanistan, the intelligence of Afghanistan, the intelligence of the
47:03forces and the population, that we were leaving.
47:06And then I was invited to the Jirgu, and in a conversation in Tashkent, I told them, you have to
47:17know.
47:17And they told others, you have to know, that we are going to leave Afghanistan, and I will do it
47:26before you,
47:27so that you were prepared to take it all for yourself.
47:31And they said, you have to know, that we are going to leave Afghanistan, and they said, you have to
47:38leave Afghanistan, and we will not participate in the war.
47:48I have to know.
47:50So that you have to have to leave Afghanistan, and I have to fight for the war.
47:55So that you don't care for the war.
47:56Because of the war, you have to take it all.
47:58All the relations were violated with religious, spiritual, and other people.
48:07It was very important. This conversation was so difficult.
48:12The Soviets were trying to bring the moderate opposition into the government.
48:18The Soviets were negotiating with Shah Massoud,
48:22who was the commander, legendary commander of the northern territories in Afghanistan, northern part of Afghanistan.
48:30The United States supported the most radical, the most fundamentalist forces among the Mujahideen.
48:38In other words, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan did not receive the approval of Dr. Najibullah.
48:51It was because of the fact that the war began.
49:13I think not everything was done to improve the relationship with the opposition forces.
49:22Although we were talking with all our political forces.
49:28We were talking with India, with Pakistan, with Iran.
49:36We were talking with the Americans.
49:38The Americans were clear.
49:39It was not a conference.
49:40It was a conference.
49:41The conference took its own document.
49:44So it was all seriously done.
49:46It was not in the way.
49:47It was necessary to do it.
49:49It was necessary to do it.
49:49So that we did not go to the trap of a horse.
49:55At the UN in Geneva in 1988, negotiations were concluded.
50:00Despite the reticence of the Americans, the regional powers managed to hammer out a series of treaties
50:05regarding the resolution of the situation in Afghanistan.
50:08It was now official the Soviet troops would be leaving the country.
50:12We were putting the Soviet Union and what we now know were its last days under a great deal of
50:19pressure.
50:19And the ignominious defeat in Afghanistan was certainly part of that.
50:26It was psychologically significant.
50:29It was politically significant.
50:31On the ground, the Soviet generals had long understood that the war was unwinnable
50:36and had secretly begun negotiating with certain resistance chiefs,
50:40especially with Commander Masoud, who was master of the entire north of the country,
50:44the territory through which the withdrawing Soviet troops would have to pass.
50:48The Soviet Union and the U.S.
50:51The U.S.
50:53The U.S.
50:58The U.S.
51:06The U.S.
51:13The Soviet Union was the next time for the Channel.
51:18The U.S.
51:23The U.S.
51:24The U.S.
51:24The U.S.
51:26It was with 50 military vehicles and I wanted to talk to them.
51:32And there were 14 types of types of types.
51:36One of them was that the types of types of types of types of types of types,
51:43and the types of types of types of types of types of types.
51:47Despite the Afghan army's show of strength,
51:50President Najibullah was extremely worried.
51:53He knew that once the Soviets had withdrawn,
51:55he would have to face the resistance chiefs,
51:58who had now become fearsome political adversaries.
52:02Although the Soviet generals had managed to negotiate a ceasefire
52:05with Commander Massoud for the duration of the troops withdrawal,
52:09they now received a contrary order to deliver a killer blow to him.
52:13It was an order from the politicians.
52:16As far as I know,
52:18by the request of Najibullah
52:21through Chevarna, the minister of foreign affairs,
52:24there was a request to actually reduce the group of Ahmad Shah.
52:28Najibullah understood,
52:29that when we leave him,
52:31he would have to enter into a direct resistance with Ahmad Shah.
52:37He was then the most authoritarian politician,
52:40who had enough power.
52:43They were against each other –
52:46командующий army,
52:48командири полков,
52:48дивизий,
52:50комбаты,
52:51солдаты,
52:51and then we left,
52:53and we had to leave them,
52:55and we had to make a decision
52:56to just
52:56make them out of their heads.
52:58We were,
52:59as they were,
53:00we agreed with them,
53:03we had to share,
53:03we had a coffee,
53:06we were going to speak,
53:09we were going to say,
53:10I'm happy to stay here, and in a wonderful morning, we killed them.
53:15But the rule is the rule, the decision is the decision, and we did it.
53:20When the military was against all levels,
53:24and the politicians stood up in the request of the Džibulli,
53:29I'm a pure example, an expert of these events and a participant of this battle.
53:37For 48 hours, from the 24th to the 26th of January 1989,
53:43the Red Army carried out Operation Typhoon,
53:46shelling Commander Masoud's positions and killing over 600 of the Mujahideen.
53:51Yet Masoud patiently bore this deluge of fire,
53:54not reacting to this final attack by the Red Army.
53:59They had a necessary job for the army,
54:01and they had a job for the enemy.
54:02In the US, it was a powerful attack.
54:08It was a powerful attack,
54:09and they had a strong attack from the border.
54:13But the enemy had a strong attack of the Mujahideen.
54:16They had a strong attack from the U.S.
54:32It was a big mistake, not in the military, not in the military, not in the military, not in the
54:37military.
54:38Of course, it was a very bad decision.
54:42It was impossible to do that.
54:48Even after that, they did not have a resistance.
54:51They just gave us all of it.
55:11The main thing was that it had to end with this war.
55:15It was a mistake, a mistake for the invasion of the army.
55:25And the decision about the release of the invasion of the army.
55:33It was extremely important and right.
55:42The figures from this war are staggering.
55:451,200,000 dead on the Afghan side, 15,000 on the Soviet and 6 million refugees.
55:53A country in total ruin.
55:55And today, the never-ending conflicts still continue in Afghanistan.
55:59A land known since time immemorial as the graveyard of empires.
56:04It was the war that changed the world.
56:06And was the starting point for yet another war.
56:09The outcome of which no one yet knows.
56:54It was the cause of that the life of theление against the city.
56:55It was difficult to秭めた saying around everyone that's really won't be able toimmcribe it.
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