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00:14Yitzhak Rabin's stunning election victory brought the Labour Party back into power.
00:20Rabin had promised to accelerate peace talks with the Arabs.
00:27I believe that agreement will be reached within less than one year.
00:32You can say nine months, less, or between nine and twelve.
00:39Israel's old enemy, Yasser Arafat, still claimed to lead the Palestinian people.
00:46But exiled in Tunis and cut off from his homeland,
00:49Arafat was more willing to compromise with the Israelis.
00:58In London in December 1992, a PLO representative from Tunis was on assignment.
01:11I had never met an Israeli before. Not one.
01:20All the way to the meeting, I was looking left and right, and behind me, I was afraid of being
01:26seen.
01:29The Israeli who initiated the meeting was waiting for him.
01:34He was an academic with unofficial connections to Israel's new Labour government.
01:39It was a moment of truth. Meeting a PLO man was against the law.
01:48The Israeli's cover for meeting a member of the PLO was provided by a fellow social scientist from Oslo.
01:57I simply suggested that Hirschfeld and myself at breakfast and then that when Abu Allah arrived in the lobby,
02:06I should simply discreetly slip away from the table and Abu Allah should take my place.
02:13We spoke about the conflict, which had no end in sight. It had been raging for the whole century. So
02:22how could we end it?
02:28PLO headquarters in Tunis awaited his report.
02:35Abu Allah told us what had happened. I said, if they ask you to go again, go.
02:42He asked, what's the point of talking to these people? I said, well, there must be something behind it.
02:50At the same time, official peace negotiations begun in Madrid continued in Washington,
02:56where a delegation of West Bank Palestinians were getting nowhere.
03:04Bypassing the delegation to talk directly to the PLO was thought by some Israelis as a better way around the
03:10impasse.
03:14But even the PLO did not speak for all Palestinians.
03:28The fundamentalist group Hamas had just kidnapped an Israeli police officer and murdered him.
03:39We have to take a measure that will speak, not by words, but by deeds.
03:46Rabin ordered Israeli security forces to round up and deport 415 Hamas activists.
03:55The expulsion from the West Bank created a crisis in Washington.
04:02If they do deport the Palestinians this morning, then I don't think the Israeli delegation tomorrow morning
04:10will find a Palestinian delegation to negotiate with.
04:12The public opinion at home was boiling. It was so volatile that we knew we couldn't proceed with the discussions,
04:23with the negotiations.
04:25The Palestinian delegation walked out of the Washington talks.
04:33Arafat now had no links to the Israelis. He sent for the Norwegian social scientist who had set up the
04:40secret breakfast in London.
04:43Arafat told me that the talks in Washington were completely stuck.
04:49And that was why he felt there was a need of a back channel.
04:53And thought that the research institute in Oslo, which I was heading, should be the sort of front organization for
05:00the talks,
05:01because both the PLO and Israel needed deniability for having such talks.
05:05The fish was hooked and they were off to Oslo.
05:17We were nearly arrested when we landed. We didn't have visas. Nobody met us.
05:25Instead of being treated as VIPs, we were grilled for two hours by the Norwegians.
05:32We had to be so careful that we did not even inform the Norwegian secret police about their arrival.
05:42Abu Allah, with two fellow Palestinians, was driven through the snow to a country mansion near Oslo.
05:50Here, he and the Israeli professor got down to business.
05:54I said to Abu Allah, we must focus on topics where agreement is possible.
06:04We must put to one side subjects we know we can't resolve.
06:11In dispute were the Palestinian territories ruled by Israel, Gaza and the West Bank.
06:18And most disputed of all, Jerusalem.
06:24I said, we won't agree about Jerusalem.
06:27He talked about Palestinian control of the entire West Bank.
06:32I said, listen, we won't agree to that.
06:35Let's focus on Gaza first.
06:42Every Palestinian was suspicious about Gaza first.
06:47The Israelis wanted to get rid of Gaza.
06:50For them, Gaza was just a factory of problems and the Intifada.
06:58Back in Tunis after the first Oslo meeting, Abu Allah voiced his concern about the idea of Gaza first.
07:08Abu Mazen said, if any Palestinian land is offered, we should take it. Why reject Gaza?
07:16Then Arafat said, I want Jericho as well.
07:20I asked him, why Jericho?
07:24He said, to get a foothold in the West Bank.
07:29Gaza is a dead end.
07:31But Jericho leads somewhere.
07:37Jerusalem, the Israeli's capital, had always been claimed by the Palestinians as their capital too.
07:46The PLO indicated that they now saw the wisdom of deferring their demand.
07:52But Israel's Prime Minister had not yet been told about the Oslo talks.
07:59It's pointless talking to Arafat and the PLO.
08:06The only Palestinians we deal with are the delegation in Washington.
08:14The foreign ministry decided it was time to tell Rabin about the secret back channel.
08:20Though skeptical, Rabin thought it could be useful.
08:23The Palestinian delegation was still boycotting the Washington talks,
08:28and he was determined to force them back to the negotiating table.
08:35We had orders for the next session in March.
08:38As we left Oslo, we told Abu Allah we wouldn't be coming back
08:42unless the Washington talks were resumed.
08:45It was an ultimatum.
08:51Arafat now had to resuscitate the Washington negotiations.
08:55He summoned Hanan Ashrawi and her colleagues to tell them they must go back.
09:06He said, we cannot afford to pay the price of walking out.
09:13Don't live in your small worlds.
09:15You want to be the heroes.
09:16You are considering only yourselves.
09:18You don't consider the Palestinians, six million Palestinians.
09:21You don't consider the peace process.
09:22If you don't go, you break the peace process.
09:24You break your people.
09:25Come on, get down to earth.
09:27And he stood up and he left us.
09:29He walked on us.
09:30So we followed him.
09:32That's the room.
09:33He was so furious.
09:36Abu Allah told me later, you really set the cat among the pigeons.
09:42Arafat and I had to talk the whole Washington team round.
09:46He said, they were all against going back.
09:49We couldn't tell them why they had to.
09:52We gave them lots of reasons, all completely fictitious.
09:58We came back, buy clear-cut orders from Arafat.
10:03Go.
10:06Soon afterwards, Israel's Oslo team brought home a draft,
10:10which the two sides called a declaration of principles.
10:15They came back very excited and said, we have a draft.
10:19It was obviously still rough, but they said, look, the PLO are willing to play ball.
10:29But with the Washington talks resumed, Rabin had no further use for the Oslo talks
10:34and ordered them suspended.
10:36The foreign ministry, desperate to keep them going,
10:40placed the Oslo declaration before a lawyer Rabin trusted.
10:46I thought that the document was lousy and needed to be started from scratch.
10:55I said to him, look, the real breakthrough in Oslo
11:00is that the PLO have agreed to go one step at a time.
11:04This means that we retain Israeli control.
11:09Yossi Beylin drove with his boss, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, to see Rabin.
11:16I was squeezed between the two of them.
11:20And as we were driving, Yossi Beylin whispered into my ear.
11:26He said, well, I don't want to put you under too much pressure,
11:31but you should know that the entire fate of the Oslo negotiations now is on your shoulders.
11:44And with this statement ringing in my ear, we entered Rabin's office.
11:52At the beginning, the drafts were very, very bad to Israel.
12:01He was suspicious that the PLO was using the Oslo track
12:07in order to somehow trick Israel into concessions
12:12and then using what was said in Oslo against Israel in Washington.
12:18I said, Yitzhak, forget Washington.
12:23Maybe the PLO was trying to tell us that they were prepared to be more flexible
12:31than the official positions expressed in Washington.
12:35I had my doubts, but I said, go ahead, try.
12:44Rabin asked the lawyer to join the talks in Oslo,
12:47alongside a top government official appointed to show the PLO
12:51that Israel now meant business.
12:59Joel arrives and starts to cross-examine Abu Allah.
13:07I asked them, there are the settlements.
13:10I mean, in the agreement, you wrote that you will have jurisdiction all over the West Bank.
13:15This is what is written here.
13:17Now, what about the settlements?
13:19Do you intend to go into the settlements to send your tax collectors into the settlement
13:27and collect taxes?
13:29They said, no, we wouldn't do that.
13:33I said, do you intend to use Palestinian teachers to teach the Israeli kids in the settlement schools under Palestinian
13:45curricula?
13:46They said, no, no, no, no.
13:49So I said, so you mean that the settlements will not be under your authority?
13:55They said, certainly not.
13:58I said, okay, not the settlements.
14:01Now, as to Jerusalem, will Israel continue to govern Jerusalem?
14:07They said, yes.
14:09I said, okay, it was not clear in the document.
14:12Joel said, let's say we leave your towns.
14:16We will have to move our troops somewhere.
14:19He said, is it clear that only we can decide where they go
14:23and only we can define the security zones?
14:28All those questions were really about their security.
14:32Even when we discussed the transfer of powers, it was always against the background of security.
14:38How they would control security.
14:41Everything was about security.
14:45And Abu Allah says, yes, as long as you don't make the whole West Bank a security zone.
14:51And when they came out of that meeting, Abu Allah came up to me and said, they've turned the declaration
14:56of principles completely upside down.
14:58This is absolutely crazy.
15:01This is absolutely crazy.
15:01We cannot continue like this.
15:03But then also, he smiled at the end of his outburst and he said, but I learnt a hell of
15:11a lot from those questions.
15:15At the next session, the lawyer handed back to the Palestinians the declaration of principles, with all their verbal concessions
15:22spelled out in cold print.
15:27I told Singer straight out, you seem to have come with a mission.
15:31You are here to destroy the peace process.
15:34You are full of hostility to Palestinians.
15:38You are living in the past.
15:40You have a fear complex.
15:43You are still living in the ghetto.
15:44You can't make the break and see the way forward.
15:51His eyes were shining with anger.
15:55And I said, listen, everything that I added, I took from your answers to my question.
16:03These are your words.
16:04Look at your notes.
16:06Next, the Norwegian foreign minister, Johan Holst, accompanied by Terje Larsen, flew to Tunis to visit Arafat.
16:15It was now Arafat's turn to raise the stakes.
16:19He went into a side room and got out a map of Gaza, West Bank and Israel,
16:29and started pointing at different border lines that we were discussing.
16:34And then at a certain point in time, he said, and I want kissing points.
16:38And I couldn't really... I thought, what does he mean?
16:43And I turned to Holst, and I saw that he was completely puzzled.
16:46So Holst said, then, you mean crossing points or checkpoints, maybe?
16:52No, no, no, said Arafat. I mean kissing points, like...
16:55And what he really meant was that it should be a kissing point between Gaza and the West Bank.
17:02There had to be an interconnection by way of communication.
17:08To my surprise, Arafat now came up with a tougher stance.
17:13It did not reflect the current compromise.
17:18He asked for a road from Gaza to the West Bank.
17:22He revived old PLO demands, which reopened issues we had already agreed to in Oslo.
17:34The Palestinian-controlled road between Gaza and the West Bank that Arafat was asking for would cut Israel in two.
17:43And now Arafat wanted not just Jericho, but the surrounding district as well.
17:49He also insisted that Jerusalem be put back on the agenda.
17:54Arafat always thought that if he was getting something, he might as well ask for more.
18:01I told Arafat at the end of the meeting,
18:03all right, I shall do as you ask.
18:05But I know these people. They won't accept it.
18:09If we proceed with this line, the Israelis will end the talks.
18:13But Arafat insisted on his stand.
18:16He said, these are my instructions. They can take it or leave it.
18:21They can take it or leave it.
18:22They can take it or leave it.
18:24They can take it or leave it.
18:30Back in Norway, the Palestinian-Israeli relationship was strained by the new demands.
18:36Abu Allah, the chief PLO negotiator, presented the new hard line.
18:40The Israelis were stunned.
18:44I said, gentlemen, you are pulling it all apart.
18:48All that you promised. All we negotiated.
18:51You know the ground rules we agreed to.
18:54But if we take your proposals back to Jerusalem, we can kiss the peace talks goodbye.
19:01And I was about to put my things away.
19:04Suddenly, Abu Allah asked us to remain seated at the table.
19:08He wanted to make a personal announcement.
19:21I informed them that I would be resigning.
19:24I hoped my brothers in Tunis would continue with Oslo.
19:30If they did, I wish my replacement every success.
19:37Goodbye, my friends. I will always remember you.
19:45We all wondered whether this experienced negotiator was pulling some kind of trick.
19:51Or whether he meant it.
20:00Abu Allah walked out into the surrounding woods.
20:04He had hurt his foot, so I got a stick for him with a silver handle.
20:11So he was walking around with an Arab superiority towards the Israelis, refusing to talk to them.
20:20And then he came over to me and said, it's all over.
20:24This was the moment of crisis, when you either pull the plug or do something drastic.
20:29We decided to try something drastic.
20:34The Israelis had prepared an alternative idea for just such a moment.
20:43I said, listen, the fact that we are talking with the PLO will eventually leak out.
20:49I think that we should have another agreement,
20:53in which the PLO undertakes to do a number of things,
20:59and in return, Israel recognizes the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.
21:09Singer's point was that if you negotiate with the PLO, you are virtually recognizing them.
21:17the PLO is the PLO.
21:18Recognition was the key.
21:19It would put the PLO on the map.
21:25Now in Oslo, the moment to raise the issue of recognition had come.
21:30The Israeli found Abu Allah in a small drawing room.
21:38Abu Allah was leaning on a stick, like this.
21:43He raised his eyes to me and I asked him, how are you?
21:48And he said, very bad, very bad.
21:55I wasn't acting.
21:57I was genuinely angry.
21:59If you've been negotiating for six or seven months,
22:02and people suddenly start coming up with new ideas,
22:05it's impossible to go on.
22:09I said, listen, Abu Allah,
22:11if we can't have our modest agreement,
22:15let's go for something really big.
22:17He looked up and said, what do you mean?
22:27Uri raised the idea of mutual recognition between the PLO and the Israeli government.
22:34He dictated some conditions.
22:37The main points were that the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist,
22:42renounce terrorism and violence,
22:44and change the PLO charter to reflect the new reality.
22:51I said, listen, if you persuade Mr. Arafat to accept all these conditions,
22:58I promise I'll try to persuade our Prime Minister and our Foreign Minister
23:02to recognize the PLO.
23:09And then these two gentlemen, Uri Savir and Abu Allah,
23:12came suddenly bursting out of the room, laughing and joking,
23:18and they had solved the basic problem.
23:23It was the breakthrough they were looking for.
23:25It seemed the PLO would now become an official partner in the peace process.
23:32Who knows?
23:33If they will elect me, I will be the president again of this Palestinian state.
23:40If not, I would like to return back to work as a civil engineer.
23:45It was now up to Prime Minister Rabin to decide whether to accept the Oslo agreement.
23:50His chief military advisor argued instead for a deal with Syria.
23:58I advised him to try for peace with Syria first,
24:02and then go to the Palestinians.
24:05Peace with Syria would bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end.
24:14If Syria could be persuaded to sign a peace treaty, its client state Lebanon would follow,
24:20and the Palestinians and Jordan would have little choice but to fall in line.
24:28It was in the interest of both us and the Syrians,
24:31and it would reduce the Palestinians' scope for haggling.
24:36An agreement with Syria will make a positive strategic difference to Israel.
24:42An agreement with the Palestinians would just be public relations.
24:50Since the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel had occupied a strategic corner of Syria,
24:57the Golan Heights, overlooking northern Israel.
25:01Successive Israeli leaders had refused to withdraw without peace.
25:06We know that Syria would not make a deal with Israel,
25:09would not make peace with Israel for less than full withdrawal.
25:12And, of course, for any Israeli Prime Minister,
25:16for Rabinia in particular to make the decision to go for full withdrawal,
25:20was agonizing, was wrenching.
25:23But before making the decision,
25:26that Prime Minister had to know what was being given in return,
25:30what the Syrian package consisted of.
25:33At this moment, a new American Secretary of State came to Jerusalem.
25:42We were trying to give some propulsion, some momentum,
25:45to the track involving the Syrians.
25:50Christopher came to meet with Rabin.
25:56The four of us came into the room and sat clustered around a small table.
26:03And after some give-and-take, Rabin suddenly surprised us all with a very dramatic ambit.
26:12He did give me a very important message to take to Syria, to take to President Assad.
26:19And that was, he said,
26:20Ask Assad, if I am able to give him what he needs, will he really go all out for peace?
26:29In other words, if Rabin withdrew from the Golan Heights,
26:33would President Assad accept alternative ways to safeguard Israel's border?
26:38Would Syria agree to full peace, stop support of terrorism from Lebanon,
26:43and establish diplomatic and trade relations with Israel.
26:48Christopher left the room with the knowledge that he was holding a very significant mandate in his pocket.
26:58When he arrived in Damascus,
27:00Christopher presented Israel's offer of withdrawal to President Assad.
27:08His mistrust of the Israelis was such that he always took every concept and turned it over,
27:13and looked at it from all different sides.
27:16And that's what he was doing with the concept of withdrawal.
27:18And he did it by asking me questions, not impolite questions, but very aggressive questions.
27:24Now you have to tell me, Mr. Christopher, what the Prime Minister means by withdrawal.
27:30That's just an empty term. I really know what it means.
27:34Christopher then shuttled back to Jerusalem.
27:40I met with the Prime Minister again.
27:42He was disappointed that Assad had not been more forthcoming,
27:47had not shown more appreciation for Rabin's willingness to consider full withdrawal.
27:53On almost every detail, there was an essentially negative answer
27:58or an answer that suggested that a very protracted process of bargaining would have to begin.
28:06Rabin could not wait for President Assad.
28:09He had promised his voters a peace agreement within a year.
28:12So he now settled for the deal that was available with the PLO in Oslo.
28:19But premature disclosure could ditch the deal,
28:22and the media were getting close to the story.
28:26Is the stage being set for a meeting between yourself and the PLO leadership?
28:32Perhaps even with Arafat himself?
28:35Not in the foreseeable future.
28:44Before the next election, at least?
28:47I hope not.
28:50Rabin had to act fast.
28:52He gave the go-ahead to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.
28:58Shimon Peres told me,
29:00Yoel, take all your documents, come with me,
29:03we're going to conclude the agreement.
29:08Peres set off for Scandinavia.
29:10To clinch the deal, he needed a smokescreen.
29:13He met Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst secretly in Stockholm,
29:17and asked him to be his mouthpiece,
29:19in case anyone was listening in as they telephoned Arafat in Tunis.
29:26I called Arafat, and I got him immediately on the line,
29:31and I told him that in the code we used at the time,
29:36Abu Ammar, which is Arafat's nom de guerre,
29:40I have the two fathers here, that was the code for foreign ministers,
29:46my father and the other father, and he immediately understood what I meant,
29:51and I said, and they want to finish everything tonight.
29:56We went through the last disputed points, one by one.
30:03The phone's loudspeaker was turned on,
30:06so all of us could hear Holst on the other end.
30:12I was listening in for perhaps four or five hours.
30:20At around midnight, Shimon Peres went to sleep,
30:24and he told me,
30:26if you need my approval, if you want to go beyond the general instructions
30:31that we have agreed on with Rabin back at home, wake me up.
30:37At issue were the withdrawal of Israel's military government,
30:41and how and when they would deal with difficult issues like Jerusalem.
30:47Twice, I had to wake Shimon Peres up.
30:50The second and last time he woke Peres up
30:53was over the issue of who would control the bridges between the West Bank and Jordan.
31:01We wanted to be able to control people entering and exiting from the autonomous areas
31:08to see that they are not, you know, concealing weapons and the like.
31:15We wanted the crossing points to be under our control.
31:21I said to Holst, tell him we will not retreat from our positions.
31:26Tell them if we don't settle it tonight, it might never get settled.
31:36We agreed that the crossing points be jointly controlled.
31:46It was five o'clock in the morning.
31:48After seven hours on the telephone, they finally had an agreement.
31:53I think the phone bill was paid by the Swedish government.
31:58We still owe them the money.
32:01President Clinton agreed to host a signing ceremony.
32:06Then, with everyone gathering in Washington and on their way to the White House,
32:10Yasser Arafat noticed something missing from the document.
32:13The name PLO.
32:18He said, I cannot sign this document.
32:22I'm the chairman of the PLO, not the head of the Palestinian delegation.
32:28And Israel has recognized the PLO.
32:31So what are the Israelis up to?
32:33Sort it out.
32:39Ahmed Tibi rang me.
32:41He said, there's a small matter to be sorted out.
32:45If it isn't sorted out, the ceremony is off.
32:49And the chairman is going home.
32:58I saw Arafat ordering the plan to be ready to leave Washington
33:01if they don't accept the PLO.
33:05I said, listen.
33:07All the documents are printed and ready.
33:11It's just an hour before the signing.
33:15Less than half an hour before the signing ceremony,
33:18Peres called Arafat's representative to his hotel.
33:21He suggested that the phrase, the PLO team, be added to the document.
33:30I said, I'll ring Arafat.
33:33I said to Arafat, Peres says, how about the PLO team?
33:38Arafat said, in all of the text?
33:41I said, in all the text.
33:43He said, okay, two kisses, one for you and one for Peres.
33:50Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Council
33:54of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
33:57His Excellency Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel,
34:01the President of the United States.
34:06The moment I saw Arafat walking out from the White House,
34:12with Rabin next to him and Clinton and so on,
34:16imagine this White House that said,
34:19bye-bye to the PLO, that branded Arafat as a terrorist.
34:23Rabin, the Chief of Staff, occupied the West Bank and Jerusalem,
34:27and it was electrifying.
34:43Rabin didn't want to look at Arafat.
34:46It was terrible.
34:47The whole world is watching his body language
34:50and he keeps moving his head not to look at Arafat.
34:58And I did not think that they were Sheikha.
35:02He hesitated a little bit, but I insisted
35:07and I continued stretching my hand to him.
35:12And then the way President Clinton pulled it,
35:16it was evident that wasn't planned.
35:24Arafat just wouldn't let go of his hand.
35:27He's a great expert at such things.
35:32It was a moment that we recalled as long as we left, I think.
35:40After he finished shaking his hands, Rabin turned to me.
35:44He whispered, now it's your turn.
35:48He went through this hell, now it was my turn.
35:56But the agreement did not bring peace.
36:01In the occupied territories, a large number of Palestinians vowed to continue the fight.
36:08In Israel, too, the opposition was fierce.
36:11We think that this endangers Israel,
36:13and what I would do as Prime Minister is to do anything responsible within the rule of law
36:18to stop and nullify the dangers that emanate from this agreement with the PLO to Israel security.
36:33What Arafat led now was not quite a state,
36:36but for the first time in history, the Palestinians had a government of their own.
36:46Among the Arab countries, now Jordan would join Egypt in making a deal with the Israelis.
36:52King Hussein was at last able to sign the peace treaty he had wanted.
36:56What we have accomplished, and what we are committed to,
37:01is the end of the state of war between Jordan and Israel.
37:10But between Syria and Israel, the state of war continued.
37:15In an effort to broaden the Middle East peace, President Clinton came to Damascus.
37:21President Clinton told President Assad that,
37:25well, Rabin presented to you full withdrawal to the line of fortune,
37:30and we expect from you two now to move the next step.
37:35Clinton pressed Assad to send his top military commander to meet his Israeli counterpart,
37:41and work out the practicalities of ending their state of war.
37:45It was a big decision for Syria to send our chief of staff for the first time in history
37:52to meet the Israeli chief of staff.
37:54It's a very heavy and big decision.
37:59Assad held back.
38:01First, he wanted his ambassador to Washington to meet the Israeli chief of staff.
38:09We wore wigs so that we wouldn't be recognized in the LL flight.
38:13We arrived at the meeting place in Washington.
38:16Only then could we breathe freely.
38:18Take off our wigs.
38:20I took a last look at myself in the mirror.
38:25Whenever I wear a wig, I look like my mother.
38:36The Israeli commander began the meeting by speaking of a military withdrawal,
38:41without specifying the precise frontier.
38:44I insisted that withdrawal has to be to the line of 4 June 1967.
38:52I repeat this word more than 20 times during the talk with Barack.
38:58Like a parrot, he repeated their demand to withdraw to the June 4th border.
39:07The Israeli wanted a more informal exchange.
39:13During breaks, we walked in the garden.
39:17There, we were off the record.
39:20And we spoke frankly whether they are committed to settlement with Syria or not.
39:31Whether they understand what it requires.
39:38Or not.
39:39On the patio, there were these arched doorways.
39:45I compared peace between us to the keystone of the arch.
39:53At the end you feel that he wants to make it.
39:59He wants to find a solution.
40:01He wants to give his blessing.
40:04This encouraging start led Assad to send his chief of staff to join the talks.
40:09They discussed military safeguards.
40:12For example, the future of Israel's early warning station in the Golan.
40:16Talks progressed in fits and starts.
40:25On the night Syria and Israel agreed to begin a new round of talks,
40:28the Israeli peacemakers held a rally in Tel Aviv.
40:43We sang, the three of us, the singer Miri Aloni, Yitzhak and myself.
40:49Yitzhak and I are not such great singers.
40:52He had the words of the peace song on a sheet of paper.
40:56After we sang out of tune, Yitzhak folded it and put it in the pocket of his jacket.
41:05On the way to his car, he was shot dead by an Israeli extremist.
41:12Three bullets went through his heart and through the song.
41:23The government of Israel, with shock and sorrow,
41:27announces the death of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
41:30who was murdered by an assassin tonight in Tel Aviv.
41:38Why? Why? Why have they done this?
41:41I am very sad and very shocked for this awful and terrible crime
41:53against one of the brave leaders of Israel and the peacemakers.
42:07We went to the room where he was lying on the bed.
42:12His body was covered with a sheet up to here.
42:16On his face was an expression of peace and maybe irony.
42:22It was his typical Rabin smile.
42:26I kissed his forehead and said goodbye.
42:34PĂ©rez now became Prime Minister.
42:37President Clinton was determined to see that Rabin's commitment
42:41to seeking peace with Syria didn't die with him.
42:45The Americans still wanted Israel to keep Rabin's promise
42:48to withdraw from the Golan Heights.
42:51Rabin had held the Syrian track rather closely to himself.
42:56So when he was assassinated, all of a sudden it became very important
43:00to pass on to now Prime Minister PĂ©rez what had been happening.
43:07President Clinton said,
43:09here are the promises Yitzhak gave.
43:11He asked if these promises committed me.
43:14I said, whatever Yitzhak was committed to, I am committed to.
43:22PĂ©rez asked the Americans to arrange a summit with President Assad
43:26Assad, so that PĂ©rez could repeat his Oslo triumph
43:29and bring the negotiations with Syria to a quick conclusion.
43:35I told him to ask Assad, do you want to fly high and fast or low and slow?
43:41We are ready to fly high and fast in one condition,
43:45to know when we land and where we land.
43:49President Assad, in my judgment, missed a historic opportunity
43:52because he wasn't prepared to take a greater risk for peace.
43:58PĂ©rez had set a date for the next general election.
44:02But then, four days later, Palestinian terrorist attacks
44:06changed Israel's political landscape.
44:09It was a ferocious blast.
44:11The suicide bomber detonated 10 kilos of explosives
44:14in the middle of a crowded commuter bus.
44:18Twenty-four Israelis were killed.
44:22A week later, a Palestinian terrorist planted another bomb on a bus.
44:26This time, 19 died.
44:30The promises of peace and reconciliation seemed hollow.
44:35As new elections approached,
44:37many voters cared more about security than peace.
44:42These terrorist attacks lost us 20% in the polls.
44:46It was catastrophic.
44:49I knew another bomb would end the whole thing.
44:53The terrorists struck again.
44:56In Tel Aviv's busiest shopping street,
44:5914 died and over 100 were injured.
45:08Together, the Israeli electorate and Palestinian extremists
45:11had brought forth a new, more mistrustful Israeli leader.
45:18The major decision took place before the elections,
45:22when I said that I would honor the Oslo Accords,
45:24even though I thought they were...
45:26they contend many flaws.
45:29Nevertheless, Netanyahu agreed to partial Palestinian control of Hebron.
45:34But for 18 months afterwards, the peace process was paralyzed.
45:40In October 1998, under considerable American pressure,
45:46Israelis and Palestinians met in a hotel outside Washington.
45:50On the table was a proposal for an Israeli withdrawal
45:54from additional territory on the West Bank,
45:57in return for new security guarantees
46:00and the annulment of all clauses in the Palestinian Charter
46:03calling for the destruction of Israel.
46:09One peacemaker was General Ariel Sharon,
46:12whose fierce reputation as a warrior
46:14helped provide credibility to the process.
46:19Nine days of diplomatic urging, cajoling, intervening,
46:23and arm-twisting by President Clinton,
46:26finally produced results.
46:28This agreement is good for Israel's security.
46:31The commitments made by the Palestinians were very strong,
46:34as strong as any we have ever seen.
46:37We are more secure today
46:41because for the first time since the signing of the Oslo Accords,
46:46we will see concrete and verifiable commitments carried out.
46:56This agreement is good for the political and economic well-being of Palestinians.
46:59It significantly expands areas under Palestinian authority
47:04to some 40% of the West Bank.
47:09We will never go back.
47:11We will never leave the peace process,
47:14and we will never go back to violence and confrontation.
47:18No return to confrontation and violence.
47:25To support the agreement,
47:27King Hussein left his hospital bed where he was being treated for cancer.
47:32He went right to the heart of the matter.
47:39We quarrel.
47:41We agree.
47:42We are friendly.
47:44We are not friendly.
47:46But we have no right
47:50to dictate through irresponsible action
47:54or narrow-mindedness
47:55the future of our children and their children's children.
48:00There has been enough destruction.
48:03Enough death.
48:05Enough waste.
48:10And it's time that together we
48:14occupy a place beyond ourselves,
48:18our peoples,
48:20that is worthy of them under the sun.
48:22the descendants of the children of Abraham.
48:28After 50 years of war and suffering,
48:31a halting, tentative partition of Palestine
48:35was underway.
48:58being with all those,
49:01in the rain,
49:01they brought me back to the shelter it last year,
49:07and describe it all how our time they walked in the mud.
49:13...
49:21It must be we turn to the shelter there.
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