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00:02Controllers in Islamabad watch as Air Blue Flight 202 head straight towards a massive hill.
00:09He's not turning.
00:14They issue urgent warnings.
00:17Turn left immediately.
00:18But fail to prevent a disaster.
00:20You're going down!
00:30It's the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history.
00:36When investigators listen to the CVR, they hear the pilots realize they're in danger.
00:42Terrain, sir!
00:45Took steps to avoid it.
00:47Turning left.
00:49But were unable to save the lives of 152 people.
00:54Why aren't we turning left?
00:56The crew knew what they had to do.
01:00They had reported that they were doing what they were supposed to do.
01:04And yet, the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction.
01:10BD, BD!
01:14Oh, fuck!
01:17I need a one-zero gravity.
01:18I need a one-zero gravity.
01:19I need a one-zero gravity.
01:34Air Blue Flight 202 begins its early morning descent towards Islamabad, Pakistan.
01:46There are 146 passengers and six crew on board the Airbus A321.
01:57A-blue 202, expect arrival to Isles Runway 30, followed by circling approach to Land Runway 12.
02:05Understood.
02:05It'll be Isles down to Minima, and then left downwind.
02:10okay
02:13captain pervez chowdhury is one of the airlines most experienced pilots
02:20najam koreshi is a former air blue pilot who flew with captain chowdhury
02:26captain chowdhury had a lifetime of experience flying with the pakistan international airline
02:31he had a very successful carrier and he was pretty much approaching the end of his carrier
02:45first officer syed ahmed has less commercial experience he's a former f-16 fighter pilot
02:52and squadron leader in pakistan's air force air blue two zero two clear to three nine hundred for
03:00ILS two three zero clear to descend to three nine hundred
03:11he had about three hundred hours on the time so just brain-new learning the differences
03:15between the a force line and the commercial line
03:20pakistan's capital Islamabad is a city of more than eight hundred thousand people it's surrounded
03:27by the himalayan foothills to the north and northeast
03:34the mountainous terrain means the only approach to Islamabad's runway is from the south due to the
03:42wind direction today planes are landing on runway one two they must circle the airport and make a visual
03:49approach to the other end of the runway
03:54it is always safer to land with a headwind as compared to a tailwind
03:59when the winds change beyond a certain limit the air traffic controller will switch the runways
04:05that will ensure the plane lands in a headwind
04:11thick clouds envelop the airport making landings difficult
04:16China southern is going around and diverting back to Urumqi
04:20China southern confirming diverting back to Urumqi
04:24attention all landing aircraft
04:27China southern is diverting due to weather
04:31if at any point you lose sight of the airfield
04:35you should abandon the approach completely and carry out the missed approach procedure
04:44flight 202 is now less than 10 minutes from landing
04:54you're down
05:04the plane reaches the minimum altitude to which the pilots can descend without the runway in sight
05:12as soon as you see the runway
05:14you turn right
05:15and then after that you're supposed to keep the runway in sight
05:19commencing right turn
05:21heading 352
05:25call it in
05:28air blue
05:292-0-2
05:30maintaining
05:30200
05:32and turning right
05:33heading
05:33352
05:35air blue
05:352-0-2
05:36confirming
05:362-0-2
05:39turning right
05:39heading
05:395-2
05:46Captain Chowdhury initiates
05:48the first turn of the circling approach
05:51air blue 2-0-2
05:53continue on the circle for landing on runway one to caution low clouds and
05:58visibility maintain visual with the airport even in the poor weather it's
06:05up to the pilots to decide whether they should continue the approach or not
06:09depending whether they have it on the inside the controller expects to see the
06:18lights of the airbus as it flies past the airfield
06:33he's approaching the no flies or not of the airfield instruct him to turn left
06:37immediately flight 202 is much further north than expected and needs to turn
06:46left for the approach to runway one to a blue two zero to turn left heading one
06:52eight zero confirm he has visual with the ground if not instruct him to climb and
07:00execute a missed approach a blue two zero to confirm you have airfield in sight the
07:08controllers had radar they could see what the aircraft was doing they could see
07:13that the aircraft was not doing what the procedure said they should be doing
07:19ask again air blue two zero to please confirm you have visual with the ground
07:37he's confirming visuals
07:41he's not turning controllers can see that flight two zero two is rapidly approaching the hills north of the airport
07:56in the cockpit the pilots are struggling to turn their plane away from the mountains ahead
08:03when we're turning left
08:14why aren't we turning left
08:16why is that turning left
08:17terrain ahead
08:19pull up
08:21terrain ahead
08:24pull up
08:26instruct him to turn left immediately
08:28me. The controllers can't believe what they're seeing. Here's a guy with 25,000 hours and
08:37he's flying directly towards a mountain. In the cabin, passengers have become aware
08:44that something's not right. They're approaching the 5,000-foot Magala hills.
08:56Terrain ahead, pull up. Sir, we are going down. Terrain, terrain.
09:01We're going down. The message from radar turn left immediately. Terrain ahead, pull up.
09:06We're going down. Pull up.
09:21Flight 202 has crashed into the Magala hills, seven miles from the airport.
09:29The wreckage lies at an altitude of nearly 3,000 feet. It will be difficult for rescuers to reach the
09:36site.
09:41We couldn't get access to it with a car or a truck. Even with helicopters, there was no place to
09:48set
09:49down. So the only way to get to the accident site was with a long, slow climb.
09:58It takes more than half an hour for rescuers and volunteers to make their way up the steep hill
10:04to the crash site in hopes of finding survivors.
10:17When crews do reach the site, they find a scene of complete devastation.
10:33152 people died in this accident. It's the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history.
10:45Why did a modern airplane fly into well-known mountains north of the airport in Islamabad?
11:00Investigators arrive at the accident site to study the wreckage of Air Blue Flight 202.
11:09When an aircraft flies into mountains, there are really two areas that we're looking at in terms of the root
11:15cause.
11:17One is a sudden and unexpected loss of control.
11:23The other would be the aircraft has actually stayed in control of the pilots
11:27and still somehow been flown into a mountain.
11:34An analysis of the engines shows that they were fully functional at the time of impact
11:39and capable of producing maximum thrust.
11:46Okay, good work, everyone. Start heading back down.
11:50Right. So the stabilizer was set at 3.5 degrees nose up.
11:55Landing gear was down. Engines at climb power.
12:00So configured for landing, but climbing at full power.
12:06In examination of the electrical and mechanical components that we could find,
12:11there was no obvious damage or mechanical failure.
12:16They were trying to land here.
12:20But then they slam into the Margulah Hills, seven miles north of the runway.
12:27How did they get so far off course?
12:32For an approach that was supposed to be a very tight approach
12:37because of the existence of the hills, that is extraordinary.
12:44They were approaching from the southeast for a landing here on runway 12.
12:56Scattered clouds, rain.
13:00Visibility was at 3.5 kilometers.
13:04Challenging conditions.
13:08Could the cloudy conditions have been a factor in the accident?
13:14When an aircraft flies into high ground,
13:17one thing that is almost certainly a factor is poor visibility.
13:23Low cloud, fog, call it what you will.
13:28Visibility would have been an issue.
13:30But you don't need to see the Margulah Hills to know that they're there.
13:39Everyone knows towards the north, east of the runway, there are mountains.
13:43They're clearly marked on the maps.
13:46Terrain ahead.
13:47Start with it going down!
13:49Pull up.
13:51Pull up.
13:57Can the controller explain why the crew of Flight 202 couldn't avoid the mountains?
14:04Radar control informed him he'd be doing the circling approach to runway 12.
14:09A blue 202 expect arrival at ILS 30,
14:12followed by a circling approach to land runway 12.
14:17And he understood the approach?
14:19Yes, sir. He did.
14:22Understood.
14:23It'll be ILS down to minima,
14:26and then left downwind.
14:30And then?
14:31That's when I assume control.
14:34As he began the right turn to the circling approach.
14:41The circling approach involves four carefully timed turns.
14:46The first to the right,
14:48followed by a left turn that takes the plane parallel to the runway.
14:53The two final turns line the plane up for the landing on runway 12.
14:59Pilots must keep the runway in sight for the duration of this approach.
15:07After about a minute,
15:09I expected to see him fly by.
15:13But he never did.
15:16I asked the crew if they had the runway in sight,
15:19and they confirmed that they did.
15:21Air blue 202, please confirm you have visual with the ground.
15:28Air blue 202, visual with the ground.
15:32But he kept flying further and further away from the airport.
15:36Directly towards the hills.
15:40After breaking off from the approach,
15:43they were supposed to turn after 30 seconds.
15:45Instead, they kept going for almost two minutes.
15:49We tried to stop him
15:51several times.
15:54It was too late.
15:57Message from radar.
15:58Turn left immediately.
16:08We couldn't prevent
16:13what happened.
16:20It's all here on the radar track.
16:28The crew knew what they had to do.
16:32They reported that they were doing
16:35what they were supposed to do.
16:37And yet, the aircraft
16:38continued to fly in the wrong direction.
16:42Terrain ahead.
16:45Pull up.
16:47How could the pilots have ended up
16:49so dangerously off course?
16:58Investigators look into the background
17:00of Flight 202's pilots
17:03to determine if the approach
17:04into Islamabad was mishandled.
17:09The captain had years of experience
17:11with major airlines.
17:15Captain Chowdhury has been flying
17:17for more than 40 years.
17:19He has accumulated
17:21more than 25,000 flying hours
17:24throughout his career,
17:25but only about 1,000 of those
17:27were on the airbus.
17:33The first officer, however,
17:35is a whole different story.
17:38First officer, Syed Ahmed,
17:41had far fewer hours
17:42than the captain.
17:43The former fighter pilot
17:45had recently joined the airline
17:47and had accumulated
17:48only 286 hours
17:51on airbus A320 airplanes.
17:56Two very different pilots.
17:59One,
18:00during the end of his career
18:01with thousands of hours
18:03of experience,
18:04and the other,
18:05just starting off
18:06his commercial career.
18:08But neither of them
18:09had a ton of experience
18:10with the airbus A321.
18:16did the pilot's lack
18:17of experience
18:18on this type of plane
18:20play a role
18:21in the accident?
18:25Experience is generally
18:27considered to be
18:28an asset.
18:29The only potential downside
18:31is that, of course,
18:32if you've got a lot
18:33of experience
18:34of one particular thing,
18:36it actually might be
18:37more difficult
18:38to learn how to operate
18:39this new type of aircraft.
18:48Okay.
18:50So they're supposed
18:51to perform their approach
18:52within this area.
18:54Anything beyond this
18:55is outside the airport's
18:564.3 mile protection zone.
19:00Okay.
19:01Let's see his track.
19:04Investigators examine
19:05Flight 202's radar track
19:08to see how the pilot
19:09set up their approach.
19:11All right.
19:13So they make
19:15their first turn here
19:19and then head straight
19:21out of the protection zone.
19:24And this left turn
19:26takes them directly
19:27into the Mahala hills.
19:31The radar track shows
19:33that the pilots
19:34flew closer and closer
19:36to the mountains
19:37surrounding Islamabad.
19:38wouldn't they have
19:40gotten a warning
19:40that they're approaching
19:41the hills?
19:49Yes, sir.
19:50It should have sounded
19:5160 seconds before impact.
19:56The enhanced ground
19:58proximity warning system
20:00looks downward
20:02to see the height
20:03that you're at
20:04above ground,
20:05but it also looks ahead
20:08to see any terrain
20:10that you're flying towards.
20:14If they got a warning,
20:17why didn't they try
20:18to pull up
20:19or turn
20:21to avoid it?
20:25Did the pilots
20:27of Flight 202
20:28get any warning
20:29of an impending collision?
20:32The crew would have been
20:33given pictures
20:34on their navigation display
20:36of the approaching terrain
20:38and they would have been
20:39given oral warnings.
20:42So since they flew
20:44directly into the terrain,
20:46has the enhanced ground
20:48proximity warning system
20:49completely failed?
21:01Don't leave me in suspense.
21:03Did they get any
21:04ground proximity warnings?
21:07They sure did.
21:15The cockpit data
21:16shows that
21:17in the final minute
21:18of the flight,
21:19the crew got
21:2021 separate warnings
21:22about the rising terrain
21:23ahead.
21:29Okay.
21:31So that answers that.
21:34Over 21 times
21:36we saw
21:37terrain, terrain,
21:38pull up,
21:38terrain ahead,
21:40pull up.
21:40There's no way
21:41that the captain
21:42missed that warning.
21:44The enhanced ground
21:45proximity warning system
21:46was working properly.
21:48Terrain ahead.
21:50If the warning system
21:51was operating,
21:52why would the pilots
21:53ignore it
21:54and allow the accident
21:56to happen?
21:56Terrain ahead.
21:57Pull up.
21:58If you hear
21:59a full terrain
22:00pull up warning
22:01from the EGPWS,
22:03the reaction
22:04should be immediate.
22:05It should be to
22:06apply full power,
22:08pull the nose
22:08of the aircraft up,
22:09get it moving
22:10away from the ground
22:11and that should be done
22:12before any questions
22:13are asked.
22:19Why didn't the crew
22:20of Air Blue
22:21Flight 202
22:22act on terrain warnings
22:24and steer their plane
22:26away from the mountains?
22:28Islamabad,
22:29Air Blue 202.
22:31Investigators
22:31listen to the cockpit
22:32voice recording.
22:34What are current
22:34conditions, please?
22:36Air Blue 202,
22:37visibility is now
22:383.5 kilometers
22:39with rain,
22:40wind 16 knots,
22:42050 degrees,
22:44runway 12 currently
22:45in use.
22:47They focus on
22:48how the crew
22:49set up for landing.
22:51It'll be runway 12.
22:53Yes,
22:54and visibility is correct.
22:58The weather
22:59was marginal
23:00and marginal
23:01weather
23:01makes you nervous
23:02because you don't
23:03know whether you're
23:04going to be able
23:05to see anything
23:05at all
23:06and the captain
23:08clearly was nervous
23:09about this approach.
23:13Did the captain
23:14proceed with an
23:15approach he wasn't
23:16comfortable with?
23:18Set waypoints
23:19for runway 12,
23:21radial 026,
23:23five miles abeam.
23:32Mate,
23:33stop.
23:35Why is he asking
23:36him to input
23:37a course to the runway?
23:40This is supposed
23:40to be a visual approach.
23:45It didn't make
23:46any sense
23:46for the captain
23:47to be entering
23:48waypoints
23:48into the flight
23:49management system.
23:51The circling approach
23:52is by definition
23:53a visual approach,
23:54so there is no way
23:56that any pilot
23:57would normally
23:58do this.
24:01Then,
24:02just two miles
24:03from the airport,
24:04the pilots
24:05of Air Blue
24:06Flight 202
24:07hear of a flight
24:08landing ahead of them.
24:10Be advised
24:10that a TIA-737
24:12has landed
24:13on runway 12
24:14safely.
24:17Commencing
24:18right turn.
24:20heading 352.
24:23That could have
24:24caused the pilot
24:25to say,
24:25hey,
24:26if they can get in,
24:27we can get in too.
24:29Wait,
24:29stop, sir.
24:30So,
24:31he starts his turn
24:33later than usual,
24:35half a mile
24:36from the runway.
24:42instead of breaking off
24:43early,
24:44they had to continue on
24:45because of the low
24:46visibility
24:46and low ceilings,
24:48and they did not
24:49break off to the right
24:49until the last
24:50possible point,
24:52which was at the end
24:52of the runway.
24:55Concerned with
24:55poor visibility,
24:57Captain Chowdhury
24:58makes a baffling
24:59decision.
25:00switch into nav mode
25:02for managed approach
25:03to runway 12.
25:05There he goes,
25:06switching to nav mode.
25:07He can't be visual.
25:11Carrying out
25:12the circling approach
25:13using the autopilot
25:14to navigate
25:15is a violation
25:16of procedures.
25:20As soon as you
25:21select the nav mode,
25:22the plane starts
25:23to fly
25:24the pre-programmed
25:25waypoints,
25:27and at this point,
25:28Captain Chowdhury
25:29is normal flying
25:30the visual approach.
25:31Okay, sir.
25:35But,
25:37are you visual?
25:40I have a visual.
25:44Chowdhury insists
25:46he can see
25:46the runway,
25:47but investigators
25:49are certain
25:49he could not.
25:51They can't see
25:52the airfield any longer
25:53because they've just
25:54got to the far side of it.
25:55There is no airfield
25:57in sight.
25:59So,
26:00instead of turning left
26:02to fly parallel
26:04with the runway,
26:06he keeps flying
26:07in this direction,
26:08moving further
26:09and further
26:09from the airport.
26:13Sir,
26:13we're reaching
26:14higher ground.
26:16Terrain ahead.
26:19Terrain ahead.
26:20Sir,
26:20there's terrain ahead.
26:22Sir,
26:23turn left.
26:25Terrain ahead.
26:28It should be turning.
26:30Terrain ahead.
26:31As the captain
26:32struggles to turn
26:33away from the hills,
26:35Terrain ahead.
26:36Controllers
26:36become concerned.
26:38Airblue 202,
26:39confirm you have
26:41airfield in sight.
26:42What should I tell him,
26:44sir?
26:45Terrain ahead.
26:46Tell him.
26:47Tell him.
26:48Pull up.
26:49The crew doesn't reply
26:50straight away.
26:52Probably,
26:52because the first officer
26:54knows full well
26:55that no,
26:55they don't have visual
26:56contact with the airfield,
26:57but he waits for his captain
26:59to tell him what to say.
27:01Airblue 202,
27:02please confirm you have
27:03visual with the ground.
27:04Terrain ahead.
27:06Pull up.
27:06Airblue 202,
27:08visual with the ground.
27:11In the end,
27:13the crew tells
27:14air traffic control
27:15that they are
27:16in visual contact
27:17with the ground.
27:18Now,
27:19that's not untrue,
27:21but it's not the same thing
27:22as being visual
27:22with the airfield.
27:23It feels more like
27:25a reply designed
27:26to get air traffic control
27:27off their backs.
27:28Terrain ahead.
27:28Sir,
27:29we are approaching
27:30terrain ahead.
27:31Yes, I know.
27:32We are turning left.
27:33Pull up.
27:34Pull up, sir.
27:35Sir,
27:36pull up.
27:37The captain says
27:38he's turning left,
27:40but he keeps flying
27:43directly towards the hills.
27:48Investigators are unable
27:49to explain
27:50why Captain Chowdhury
27:51could not alter his course
27:53and steer away
27:54from the mountains.
27:58Terrain ahead.
28:00Sir,
28:01turn left.
28:02Pull up.
28:03The final minute
28:03of the CVR
28:04reveals a picture
28:05of chaos
28:06and confusion.
28:08Pull up, sir.
28:10Sir, pull up.
28:14They're applying power.
28:16Trying to claim.
28:19Marine ahead.
28:20Sir, pull up, sir.
28:23Pull up.
28:24Investigators hear
28:25First Officer Ahmed
28:26pleading with his captain
28:28to pull up.
28:29Why aren't we turning left?
28:32Pull up.
28:35Terrain ahead.
28:37Pull up.
28:38Terrain, sir.
28:41Terrain ahead.
28:43Sir, we're going down.
28:45Pull up.
28:46Message from radar.
28:47Turn left immediately.
28:48Pull up.
28:50Sir, we're going down.
28:52Pull up.
29:01All they had to do
29:03was turn away
29:05from those hills.
29:09Despite reacting
29:10to the terrain warnings,
29:12the pilots could not
29:13steer their plane
29:14away from the mountains.
29:18I think they knew
29:19what was happening.
29:20I think they knew
29:22that they had to turn left.
29:23For some reason,
29:24the aircraft
29:25didn't turn left.
29:28Will Flight 202's
29:30flight data recorder
29:31explain why
29:32Captain Chowdhury
29:33didn't or couldn't
29:35turn and avoid
29:36the mountains?
29:37Can we see
29:38the altitude, please?
29:41The minimum altitude
29:42is 2,500 feet.
29:47Investigators can see
29:48that Chowdhury
29:49dialed in an altitude
29:50below what's permitted.
29:52There's only one reason
29:54it would drop below that.
29:58Commencing right turn.
30:00Heading 3, 5, 2.
30:07There's no earthly reason
30:09for doing it
30:09because the minimums
30:10are there
30:11for a very good reason.
30:13The only reason
30:14why they ever
30:15break the minimums
30:16is because they can't
30:17see the ground properly
30:18and they want to get
30:19closer to it.
30:21Can we see the flight path?
30:25You see?
30:27He's way off course,
30:29in heavy fog,
30:30and has clearly
30:31lost visual.
30:33Let's see the autopilot modes.
30:38So, he asks the automation
30:41to take over.
30:46More than four miles
30:48off course,
30:49Captain Chowdhury
30:49makes his biggest error
30:51by switching modes
30:53on his autopilot.
30:56The captain switched
30:57from heading mode
30:58to nav mode
31:00and the aircraft
31:01turned left
31:02to heading of 3, 0, 0.
31:08Towards the mountain.
31:11The airbus now makes
31:13a left turn
31:14towards a predetermined
31:15waypoint,
31:16bringing the flight
31:17dangerously close
31:18to the mountains.
31:21He's approaching
31:22the no-fly zone
31:23north of the airfield.
31:26From this point on,
31:27air traffic control
31:28continued to urge
31:29the flight to turn left
31:30because they knew
31:32they were in the vicinity
31:33of the high mountainous terrain.
31:35Terrain ahead.
31:38Ablo 202,
31:39turn left,
31:40heading 180.
31:40Terrain ahead.
31:41Why aren't we
31:42turning left?
31:43Pull up.
31:46Can we see
31:47what he's selecting?
31:51He's dialing
31:52in a left turn.
31:59Captain Chowdhury
32:00uses his heading knob
32:02to turn the plane
32:03sharply left
32:04away from the hills.
32:08But the plane,
32:09it keeps flying
32:10in the same direction.
32:12It's not turning.
32:24He's still in nav.
32:28Investigators realized
32:29the captain forgot
32:30that his plane
32:31was in navigation mode
32:33and not heading mode
32:35which is required
32:36to turn the aircraft.
32:38If the aircraft
32:39is flying in nav mode,
32:41it will keep on flying
32:43on its predetermined course.
32:45Whether or not
32:47the crew
32:47change the heading select.
32:50Terrain ahead.
32:51Why aren't we
32:52turning left?
32:53Pull up.
32:55Captain Chowdhury
32:56doesn't realize
32:57that his inputs
32:58are futile.
32:59Pull up.
33:02In order to get
33:03from nav mode
33:04into heading mode,
33:05you pull the knob out
33:06and that engages
33:07heading mode.
33:08Pull up.
33:09He forgot
33:10to pull it out.
33:12He realizes his error
33:14and pulls the knob here
33:16at 40 seconds
33:18before impact.
33:28When Captain Chowdhury
33:30tries to correct
33:31his error,
33:32he only makes
33:32a bad situation
33:34worse.
33:36Sir,
33:36turn left.
33:38Why, sir?
33:39Turn left.
33:45Captain Chowdhury
33:47has dialed in
33:47so many left turns
33:49that his last input
33:51is now to the plane's right.
33:53The Airbus
33:54takes the shortest route
33:56to get to that heading,
33:58directly towards
33:59the Margala hills.
34:05He's in heading mode
34:06for the rest of the flight.
34:13The flight
34:14is in heading mode.
34:14The flight
34:15is in heading mode.
34:16that he was trying
34:17to turn the aircraft
34:18to the left,
34:20asking why the aircraft
34:21wasn't turning
34:22to the left,
34:22but he didn't even
34:24use his side stick
34:25and actually turn
34:26the aircraft
34:26to the left manually.
34:28Why aren't we
34:29turning left?
34:30Terrain ahead.
34:32Investigators
34:32now know why
34:33Captain Chowdhury
34:34was unable
34:35to turn left
34:36and avoid the mountains.
34:37But one question remains.
34:40Why didn't the first officer
34:41recognize the mistakes
34:43and do something
34:44to correct them?
34:45Sir, we're going down!
34:47Slow up.
34:51100 knots.
34:54Check.
34:55Investigators find
34:56a possible explanation
34:57for the first officer's
34:59puzzling behavior
35:00V1.
35:01At the very start
35:03of flight 202
35:04Rotate.
35:07As it took off
35:08for Islamabad.
35:10The flight starts
35:12with the pilots
35:13working efficiently
35:14as a crew.
35:15Positive rate.
35:18Gear up.
35:23Gear up.
35:27The takeoff
35:28from Karachi
35:29is textbook.
35:33From initial
35:35pushback startup
35:36and all of it
35:37to takeoff,
35:38everything seemed
35:39normal.
35:42We are clear
35:43to climb to flight level.
35:44Explain to me
35:45why that is blue
35:47but the other symbols
35:48are white.
35:50The pilot's cordial
35:52relationship soon changes.
35:56Sir?
35:57There, on your display.
35:58Why is that symbol blue
36:00but the others are white?
36:02You should know
36:03why that is.
36:05I believe it's because
36:07the flight plan
36:08defers from the
36:08current route.
36:09No, that's wrong.
36:10It's because it's
36:11the one being
36:12navigated towards
36:13basic.
36:15Do you know
36:16how to modify
36:16this point?
36:19From the main menu?
36:21Oh, you don't
36:21need to return
36:22to the main menu.
36:23You can do it
36:24on the screen.
36:26What did they teach
36:27you in that
36:28so-called training
36:29of yours?
36:31Captain Chowdhury
36:32is heard quizzing
36:33and berating
36:34his first officer.
36:37This wasn't
36:38normal behaviour.
36:39It seems it was
36:41only really
36:41for the purpose
36:42of putting
36:43his first officer
36:44in his place,
36:46making sure
36:47he knew
36:47who was in charge
36:48and to do
36:50as he was told.
36:52What's he doing?
36:55If you don't know
36:56how to use
36:57the flight management
36:58system,
36:59then what use
37:00are you in the
37:00cockpit?
37:01You might as well
37:02go back and help
37:03the girls serve
37:04tea.
37:07Yes.
37:09Sorry, sir.
37:18What about
37:19maximum thrust
37:20available for climb?
37:21Can you at least
37:22tell me what that is?
37:23This has been
37:24going on for nearly
37:25an hour now.
37:26Told ya.
37:30Radio ahead
37:30to Islamabad
37:31for the weather.
37:34Do you know
37:34how to use
37:35the radio?
37:35Yes.
37:40Captain Chowdhury
37:40is a very
37:41experienced pilot.
37:42He should know
37:44that this is not
37:45how we behave
37:46on the flight
37:47deck of an airliner.
38:02investigators wonder
38:03why Captain Chowdhury
38:05would act so
38:06aggressively
38:06towards his
38:07first officer.
38:08He was recently
38:10treated for diabetes
38:11and hypertension
38:13but deemed
38:14fit to fly.
38:17anything?
38:18Pilots who flew
38:19with him
38:20said he was
38:20demanding
38:21sometimes difficult
38:24but nothing
38:25at this level.
38:27Maybe it had
38:28more to do
38:28with him.
38:31Could the
38:32first officer's
38:33background
38:34have affected
38:35his captain's
38:36attitude
38:36towards him?
38:41In Pakistan
38:42there has been
38:43a hidden
38:43rivalry
38:43between
38:44Air Force
38:45pilots
38:46and the
38:47people
38:47who are
38:48in the
38:48commercial
38:48side
38:49already.
38:50They feel
38:51that
38:51Axe Air Force
38:52guys
38:52they are
38:52taking
38:53away
38:53their
38:53opportunities.
38:58Investigators
38:59believe
38:59that the
39:00captain's
39:00abusive
39:01behavior
39:01might explain
39:02one of the
39:03mysteries
39:03of this
39:04tragedy.
39:04why
39:05first officer
39:06Ahmed never
39:07took control
39:08of the
39:08plane.
39:12All the
39:12first officer
39:13had to do
39:13was to take
39:14manual control
39:15of the
39:15aircraft
39:15and fly it
39:16away from
39:17the mountain.
39:20Investigators
39:21scrutinize
39:22first officer
39:22Ahmed's
39:23actions
39:24leading up
39:24to the
39:24crash
39:25of flight
39:25202.
39:27His first
39:27officer
39:28tells the
39:28captain
39:28to pull
39:29up three
39:29times
39:30and to
39:31turn left
39:32twice.
39:33but he
39:34never
39:34says
39:35he's
39:35taking
39:35control.
39:40If I
39:41were the
39:42first
39:42officer
39:42I'd
39:43take
39:43over
39:43the
39:44control
39:44pull
39:45back
39:45on the
39:45side
39:46stick
39:46to
39:46create
39:47the
39:47max
39:47performance
39:48maneuver
39:48and keep
39:50climbing
39:51until I'm
39:52clear of
39:52the
39:52hills.
39:54The
39:55team
39:55believes
39:55the
39:56captain's
39:56behavior
39:57earlier
39:58in the
39:58flight
39:58explains
39:59why
40:00the
40:00first
40:00officer
40:01allowed
40:01him
40:01to
40:02mishandle
40:02the
40:02approach.
40:03If you
40:04don't
40:04know
40:04how
40:05to
40:05use
40:05the
40:05flight
40:06management
40:06system
40:07then
40:07what
40:08use
40:08are
40:08you
40:09in
40:09the
40:09cockpit?
40:12We
40:13have
40:13the
40:13captain's
40:14behavior
40:14which
40:14was
40:15so
40:15overbearing
40:16so
40:16autocratic
40:17so
40:18nasty
40:20that
40:21it
40:21served
40:21to
40:21completely
40:22shatter
40:22the
40:23self
40:23confidence
40:23of
40:23the
40:24first
40:24officer
40:25first
40:26officer
40:27Ahmed
40:27allows
40:28procedures
40:28to be
40:29set
40:29aside
40:30switch
40:31into
40:31nav
40:32mode
40:32for
40:33managed
40:33approach
40:34to
40:34runway
40:34one
40:35two
40:35okay
40:37sir
40:39and
40:40then
40:40fails
40:41to
40:41take
40:41control
40:42when
40:42his
40:43captain
40:43flies
40:44the
40:44plane
40:44directly
40:45towards
40:45the
40:45mountains
40:46he
40:47was
40:47so
40:47worn
40:48down
40:48by
40:48the
40:48captain's
40:49harsh
40:49behavior
40:50that
40:50he
40:51just
40:51couldn't
40:51stand
40:51up
40:52he
40:53became
40:53a
40:54bystander
40:59the
41:00first
41:00officer
41:01clearly
41:01knows
41:02that
41:02what
41:02they're
41:02doing
41:02is
41:02wrong
41:02he
41:03knows
41:04that
41:04his
41:04captain
41:04is
41:05disoriented
41:06that
41:07the
41:07aircraft
41:07is
41:08on
41:08a
41:08collision
41:09course
41:09with
41:09a
41:09mountain
41:09and
41:11yet
41:11somehow
41:12he
41:12doesn't
41:13have
41:13it
41:13in
41:13him
41:14to
41:14intervene
41:18sir
41:19we
41:20are
41:20going
41:20down
41:22three
41:23and a
41:23half
41:24minutes
41:24after
41:24the
41:25start
41:25of
41:25the
41:25approach
41:28the
41:28airbus
41:29slams
41:29into
41:30the
41:30hills
41:33killing
41:33everyone
41:34on
41:34board
41:41this
41:41is
41:42one
41:42of
41:42the
41:42most
41:43extraordinary
41:44accidents
41:45I've
41:45seen
41:48there
41:48were
41:49no
41:49technical
41:50factors
41:50in
41:51this
41:51accident
41:53there
41:54was
41:54nothing
41:55wrong
41:55with
41:56the
41:56aircraft
41:56there
41:57was
41:57nothing
41:57wrong
41:57with
41:58the
41:58engines
41:58it
41:59was
41:59all
42:00a
42:00matter
42:01of
42:01human
42:02misjudgment
42:02and
42:03human
42:03error
42:10if
42:11he
42:11doesn't
42:11try
42:11the
42:11approach
42:12in
42:12nav
42:12mode
42:13there's
42:14no
42:14accident
42:16all
42:17the
42:17warning
42:17signs
42:18were
42:18there
42:19telling
42:19them
42:19what
42:19to
42:20do
42:22it
42:22should
42:22have
42:23been
42:23easy
42:23to
42:23recover
42:25very
42:27if
42:27he
42:27hadn't
42:27taken
42:28his
42:28first
42:28officer
42:28out of
42:29the
42:29picture
42:29different
42:32outcome
42:32absolutely
42:35incredible
42:41it's
42:42hard
42:42to
42:43believe
42:43that
42:43somebody
42:44of
42:44his
42:44experience
42:45would
42:46make
42:46so
42:47many
42:47errors
42:47and
42:49mishandling
42:50of
42:50the
42:51aircraft
42:52it
42:53just
42:54defies
42:55logic
42:58the
42:59final
42:59report
43:00into
43:00the
43:00crash
43:01of
43:01Air
43:01Blue
43:01Flight
43:01202
43:02makes
43:03several
43:04recommendations
43:04to
43:05Pakistani
43:05airlines
43:06including
43:07better
43:08briefings
43:08on
43:09the
43:09circling
43:09approach
43:10procedures
43:10and
43:11better
43:12crew
43:12management
43:13training
43:15this
43:16accident
43:16shows
43:17that
43:17cockpit
43:17management
43:18and
43:19the
43:19atmosphere
43:19in
43:19the
43:19cockpit
43:20that's
43:20set
43:20by
43:21the
43:21captain
43:21is
43:22just
43:22as
43:22important
43:23as
43:23an
43:23operating
43:24aircraft
43:24and
43:25operating
43:25engines
43:25and
43:27in
43:272018
43:28the
43:29airport
43:29in
43:29Islamabad
43:30is
43:30replaced
43:31with
43:31a
43:31more
43:31modern
43:32airport
43:32with
43:33two
43:33runways
43:33that
43:34are
43:34well
43:34away
43:35from
43:35the
43:35hills
43:35that
43:36claimed
43:36the
43:36lives
43:37of
43:37the
43:37152
43:38people
43:38on
43:39board
43:39flight
43:39202
43:44as
43:45I
43:45learned
43:45more
43:45I
43:47really
43:47felt
43:47extremely
43:48bad
43:51I
43:52felt
43:52very
43:52sad
43:53about
43:54that
43:54loss
43:59it
43:59was
43:59a
44:00preventable
44:00accident
44:01I
44:01I
44:01I
44:03had
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