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00:00V-1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algerie Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria,
00:09Gear up.
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:24102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:51Let go. Take your hand away. I let go. I let go.
00:54But with each other.
00:55Which one of them is actually flying the plane?
00:59Mayday, mayday.
01:03Oh, fuck.
01:20It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara Desert in Algeria.
01:25The crew of Flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrassit-Aguenar airport.
01:36Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:39There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:49Seatbelts. Seatbelts.
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now that instrument transfer switches.
02:10Normal.
02:13Normal.
02:13In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly-owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline because it is the face and name of the
02:42country as it goes all around the world.
02:486289 passengers, weather.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm. Temperature 23. Q&H 1020. QFE 965.
02:58Copy. We'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria.
03:19Which would be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight, Lynn Ripplemeyer knows what it's like to blaze
03:33a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is in some cases a boys' club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States,
03:50maybe it's like it was for her, that it was unusual.
03:59Taman Rasset, 6289. We request clearance for Khardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Bualam.
04:11Hey.
04:12We've got some Taman Rasset football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1948-year-old captain Bualam Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:25A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:29The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years,
04:32and then flown all kinds of aircraft from small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:386289 Taman Rasset.
04:40Go.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:52Okay, before I start checklist.
04:54Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps.
05:02On.
05:05Flight 6289 is a Boeing 737-200,
05:09an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world,
05:21and there are different variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737,
05:30so it's an older model,
05:32and it's not as highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 6289 will be departing from Taman Rasset,
05:46with a scheduled stop in Gardaia,
05:49and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:52The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01There is a taxi, Air Algiersi, 6289.
06:066289, Taman Rasset.
06:08Taxi onto runway 02 and backtrack.
06:11Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 6289.
06:22As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready, 6289.
06:446289, Taman Rasset.
06:45Clear for takeoff runway 02, wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Clear for takeoff on runway 02 at Ajeri 6289.
06:545, 2, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 7, 8, 8, 9, 8, 9, 8, 9, 9,
07:029, 9, 9, 9, 10, 9, 10, 10.
07:03You have 90 knots.
07:06100 knots.
07:23V1, rotate.
07:29But seconds after takeoff...
07:32Gear up.
07:35A loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:43Bismillah, what's going on?
07:45The pilots assess the situation.
07:48Let's go, let's go.
07:49I let go, I let go.
07:53Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:58We have a small problem, 6289.
08:016289, come advance.
08:06The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:166289, are you in emergency?
08:26Don't think.
08:27Don't think.
08:29Don't think.
08:30The pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft.
08:36But their efforts are in vain.
08:39The plane goes into a freefall.
08:42The passengers brace themselves.
08:54The plane bursts into flames and skids across the desert just outside Tamanrasset Airport.
09:03Emergency response is immediately activated and firefighters rush to the scene.
09:15The impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft.
09:24But then, against all odds, rescuers discover a survivor, not within the wreckage, but lying in the distant sand, clinging
09:34to life.
09:35A gentleman seated all the way in the back that didn't have a seatbelt on, so when the airplane crashed
09:41and broke apart, he was thrown free.
09:45He shows only faint signs of life, as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition.
09:53Defying all expectations, the man's condition soon stabilizes and he begins to recover.
09:59This passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time.
10:08He is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew.
10:13While the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad, Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones and
10:23soon demand answers.
10:29The investigation into the crash of Flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian Ministry
10:39of Transport.
10:40They receive support from several international agencies, including the NTSB, America's National Transportation Safety Board.
10:51I was the U.S. accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians.
10:56Initially, I wasn't going to travel to the scene.
10:58However, the U.S. ambassador to Algeria requested our assistance.
11:05While Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues, they interview the Taman Rasset air traffic controller.
11:16Did the pilots indicate that there was an issue?
11:21The first officer called only seconds after takeoff.
11:30Pilots typically are hesitant to call Mayday Mayday or announce some type of emergency, particularly if they really don't know
11:40what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is.
11:45And what was the problem?
11:48They didn't say, but I heard something that sounded like an explosion.
11:54Seconds later, the plane was falling out of the sky.
11:59You said an explosion.
12:02That's what it sounded like.
12:05Like a bomb?
12:10Couldn't say.
12:15So in 2003, Algeria was not the safest place.
12:18There was bombings and terrorist activities because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war.
12:26When the plane fell, was it in one piece?
12:29Yes, it was.
12:32Investigators found the airplane intact.
12:34There are no claims of responsibility by terrorists, so it pretty much ruled out that there was some type of
12:41nefarious means to bring the aircraft down.
12:45Can you describe how the plane fell?
12:48It was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20.
12:57The controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb, had a nose-high pitch attitude, and
13:06then impact the ground.
13:09Eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled to gain enough lift to remain airborne, an indication it was in a stall.
13:18One week after the incident, Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB.
13:27Air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a storm, and one witness remarked that the landing gear was down.
13:36If the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb, it creates a lot of drag
13:43on that airplane.
13:44It takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain the climb, to overcome all that drag
13:50from the landing gear.
13:52That would affect a plane's ability to climb, but that alone wouldn't cause a stall.
13:58That has to mean something else.
14:00Do you have to load sheets?
14:01Yes, right here.
14:04One of the big questions is about the aircraft weight, because if you're too heavy, you won't climb as well
14:10as if you're within the weight envelope.
14:14Investigators review the plane's load sheet to see if the plane was overweight before takeoff.
14:20Looks like the first officer made some corrections here.
14:24While reviewing the load sheet, the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong, and changes it from 8,800
14:32kilograms to the correct amount of 9,800 kilograms.
14:42So, with those corrections, the weight at takeoff would have been 48,708 kilograms.
14:48And the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms.
14:54The first officer noticed that there was a 1,000 kilo difference, and passenger count was a little bit off,
15:01which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance, but did show that she was
15:06very attentive in her duties.
15:09The aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight.
15:13Even though it was heavy, the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much.
15:19What mechanical failure?
15:21I'll get the maintenance reports.
15:26Investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean, and the aircraft has a clean bill of health prior to the
15:31flight.
15:35It was up-to-date in its maintenance cycle.
15:38No work deferred, no technical exemptions.
15:42The maintenance reports provide no leads.
15:46Maybe there was an environmental factor at play.
15:50Take a look at this.
15:53Did the location of the airport have something to do with the stall?
15:59Temperature is 23 degrees Celsius, so it's hot.
16:03Tamarissat is in a harsh desert climate, and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft's performance and climb.
16:11And the airport sits at 4,518 feet above sea level.
16:16At this altitude, the air is already thin.
16:19If you factor in the heat, it's high-density altitude that affects the performance of the airplane,
16:26so it's generating much less lift over the wings, so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne.
16:32So just a few pounds below max takeoff weight, high elevation airport, high temperature, landing gear extended.
16:40That could definitely cause a plane to stall.
16:44But that doesn't explain the explosion.
16:47Right.
16:48What are we missing?
16:56Investigators study the crash site of Flight 6289 for evidence that could explain the explosion heard seconds after takeoff.
17:06So, the first point of impact is here.
17:135,396 feet from the takeoff point.
17:17Skidded through the airport perimeter fence, across the road, and came to rest here, less than 300 feet outside of
17:25the airport.
17:34Planes destroyed by the fire, but the main wreckage is practically in one piece, except for the rear section.
17:40And look at this debris.
17:43This was on the runway, right about here.
17:49Engine debris.
17:52On the runway, we found a large quantity of engine debris, which is indicative of an engine shelling.
17:56When a large quantity of engine blades are thrown out the back end of an engine.
18:04It's an old adage in accident investigation, what fails first, falls first.
18:12So, if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage, then they know that happened prior to the accident.
18:18So, one of the engines blew out.
18:20That must have been the explosion the controller heard.
18:24What caused the engine failure?
18:29We needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why it failed.
18:35Investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines, starting with the right one.
19:00If the right engine was operating on impact, then did the left engine fail?
19:10These turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine.
19:14Looks like it was barely moving.
19:17The hot section is completely torn apart.
19:21In an engine's hot section, fuel is ignited in a combustion chamber,
19:26generating a powerful stream of hot air that spins the turbine blades.
19:33The damage is evidence that the left engine failed.
19:37We knew that the failure was in the hot section,
19:40so we had to follow every lead that we could to determine where the failure occurred.
19:51There's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section.
19:55The missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway.
19:59We found that the hot section was basically corncobbed, as we say.
20:04There was not many blades left in the hot section, and there was metal all over the place.
20:10What caused the blades to break?
20:13Let's get some of these parts out on the table.
20:16We wanted to further tear down the engine.
20:19We wanted to look at the failures under the microscope.
20:22We wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure.
20:24We wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike.
20:28Investigators begin by examining components from the hot section,
20:32in search of pre-existing defects.
20:36Manage to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein.
20:45Nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine, causing them to spin.
20:59Interesting.
21:14Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes.
21:19Investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes.
21:26This type of cracking occurs over time, and as the engine ages,
21:30these cracks get slightly larger, and eventually they will fail,
21:34and it will destroy the entire engine.
21:39If this was a progressive failure, why wasn't it caught earlier?
21:45This type of cracking is typical of an older engine, and it's a progressive failure.
21:49So that gets us into the question of what was the maintenance history,
21:52what was the inspection criteria that was used by the operator.
21:57Investigators look into the engine's repair history.
22:02It looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago.
22:07When would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:11During the hot section maintenance inspection, which was last year.
22:16Any mention of cracking?
22:17Any work done on that either?
22:21Inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks.
22:25So why weren't these found?
22:28Since this was an Algerian-registered aircraft,
22:31it falls under the authority of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority
22:35for oversight of the inspection,
22:37not the FAA, which typically has more stringent requirements.
22:42The crack formed at some point.
22:44It was missed during the inspection last year.
22:47It grew and grew until a point of failure,
22:49and then blew out at takeoff.
22:51That explains why the engine failed.
22:54Not why the plane stalled.
22:57Pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:00to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing
23:05where they've lost an engine.
23:07Investigators examine the crew's training records
23:10to determine if they knew how to handle
23:12a single engine failure on takeoff.
23:17The first officer's last exercise in engine failure during takeoff
23:21was four months ago.
23:22The captain's training was even more recent,
23:24only two months before the crash.
23:26They both should have known what to do in this situation.
23:31They've got the airplane veering to the left.
23:35There's no way they didn't know that engine failed.
23:39So what did they actually do?
23:46Investigators prepare to listen to the cockpit voice recorder
23:49from Air Algerie Flight 6289.
23:54It was very important for us to listen to the CVR
23:56to determine how the pilots dealt with this engine failure.
24:00Got it queued up to right before I take off.
24:05V-1, rotate.
24:15Gear up.
24:19They hear the sound of the engine failing
24:22five seconds after takeoff.
24:25Bismillah.
24:26What's going on?
24:29Let go, let go.
24:30I let go, I let go.
24:35They transferred control in the middle of an emergency.
24:38That didn't even sound like a proper transfer.
24:41He just took the controls.
24:43For another pilot to take control
24:46from the pilot who is flying,
24:49the pilot needs to say, I've got it.
24:51Taking control of the airplane
24:53without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse for him
24:56and for the first officer.
24:58The captain is the pilot monitoring.
25:00He shouldn't be taking over.
25:01He should be diagnosing the problem.
25:03So, do either of them identify a left engine failure?
25:10After handing over control to the captain,
25:12the first officer realizes
25:14they aren't properly configured
25:16to climb with only one engine.
25:20Get up or are we okay?
25:22But there's no response from the captain.
25:27We have a small problem, 62-89.
25:2962-89, come and ask them.
25:34Just seconds after the engine failure,
25:36the situation deteriorates
25:38as the plane begins to stall.
25:45There are no attempts by the pilots
25:47to work together to identify
25:49or troubleshoot the problem.
25:51Let go, take your hand away.
25:53I let go, I let go.
25:54Let go, take your hand away.
25:56I let go.
25:57Don't sink.
25:59Seconds later,
26:00the ground proximity warning activates,
26:02indicating the plane
26:03is getting dangerously close to the ground.
26:08Please, take your hand away.
26:11Both pilots really didn't know
26:13what the other was doing,
26:14didn't know what the other expected of them,
26:16and may well have been working
26:18at cross purposes.
26:19And as a result of that,
26:21the team performance broke down.
26:25Don't sink.
26:27Don't sink.
26:32I don't hear a single mention
26:33of engine failure.
26:35And why was he telling her
26:36to let go so many times?
26:38Was she trying to take back
26:38control of the plane?
26:40Which one of them
26:41is actually flying the plane?
26:43When all is said and done,
26:45the pilots did not work together.
26:47Without more information
26:48from the flight data recorder,
26:49we really don't know
26:50exactly what they did
26:52to control the airplane.
26:54Investigators turned
26:55to the flight data recorder,
26:57or FDR,
26:58from Flight 6289
27:00to determine how the pilots
27:01tried to recover
27:02from the loss of the left engine.
27:05Flight data recorders
27:06are important to investigators
27:08because it gives them information
27:10on how the pilots
27:12were operating the airplane
27:13and how they were managing
27:15the critical situation
27:17they were in.
27:19Not much here.
27:21Older plane,
27:22older FDR.
27:25It doesn't actually tell us
27:26how the pilots
27:26were handling
27:27the engine failure.
27:30Because we only had
27:31five parameters
27:32on the FDR,
27:33we had to go to Boeing
27:34and ask for a detailed
27:36aircraft performance analysis
27:37to determine
27:38what happened
27:40on this accident flight.
27:43Using the FDR's
27:45limited data,
27:46Boeing's performance study
27:48includes a reconstruction
27:49of engine operations
27:51and flight controls
27:52in the final moments
27:53of the flight.
27:56So,
27:57there is the left engine
27:59losing its thrust
28:00after it blows out.
28:02That's odd.
28:03The data
28:04from the fully functioning
28:06right engine
28:07shows something unexpected.
28:10Look at the thrust
28:11from the right engine.
28:12Yes,
28:13it seems to be going
28:13up and down.
28:15But we know
28:15it was working fine.
28:17That can only mean
28:18one thing.
28:23Bismillah.
28:24What's going on?
28:26The team finds evidence
28:27of thrust being added
28:29to the right engine.
28:31Let's go,
28:32let's go.
28:32And then pulled back.
28:34I let go,
28:35I let go.
28:37When one engine fails,
28:39what you need
28:40is maximum power
28:41on the other engine,
28:43not reduce it.
28:45So,
28:45thrust is pulled
28:46down,
28:47then back up,
28:49then down,
28:50then back up again.
28:53We have a small problem,
28:5462-89.
28:5562-89,
28:57come at last.
29:02Let go.
29:06It's as if they were
29:07having some sort
29:09of a tug of war.
29:10They shouldn't have been.
29:12First officer did
29:13the right thing
29:14by increasing the power
29:15of the right engine.
29:17What likely happened
29:18is that the captain
29:19wasn't fully aware
29:20of which engine
29:21had failed.
29:22However,
29:22the first officer
29:23knew that the left engine
29:25had failed
29:26and was trying
29:26to push up the throttle
29:28on the right engine
29:28to keep them
29:30from stalling.
29:34Let go.
29:34Take your hand away.
29:35I let go.
29:36I let go.
29:36Let go.
29:37Take your hand away.
29:38Let go.
29:39I let go.
29:40Don't think.
29:41Don't think.
29:44The captain's basically
29:45telling the first officer
29:46to get out of his way,
29:48to leave him alone,
29:49to let him
29:52be in charge
29:53of the airplane
29:53by himself,
29:54which he was.
29:56Knowing that the left
29:57engine had failed,
29:58the first officer
29:58might have been trying
29:59to help things out
30:00by increasing the power
30:01on the right engine.
30:03Please.
30:04Take your hand away.
30:11The moment the captain
30:12reduced the thrust
30:13on the right engine
30:14and never returned it
30:15to takeoff thrust,
30:17with the gear down,
30:18it doomed the flight.
30:22Pilots should have been
30:22able to work together
30:23to recover the plane.
30:25These planes are designed
30:27to fly with a team.
30:29Pilot flying,
30:30pilot not flying,
30:31both have very specific
30:33roles that they are trained
30:34to do,
30:37but especially in emergencies.
30:39They stay in their roles,
30:40they help each other,
30:42they work as a team,
30:42and this crash
30:44could have been avoided
30:45if they would have done that.
30:48Why didn't the crew
30:49of Air Algerie
30:51Flight 6289
30:52work together
30:53to prevent the loss
30:55of 102 lives?
30:59Okay,
31:00I'll queue it up
31:01to the pre-flight preparations.
31:05Investigators returned
31:06to the cockpit voice recording
31:08of Flight 6289
31:10to understand
31:11why there was a lack
31:12of coordination
31:13between the two pilots.
31:16Northern instruments
31:18transfer switches,
31:19normal.
31:21Yard damper,
31:23on.
31:26They listen
31:27as the first officer
31:28works through
31:29the pre-flight checklist.
31:30They're surprised
31:32by what they don't hear.
31:35Where's the captain?
31:37Is she doing
31:38the flight preparation
31:39by herself?
31:42Mysterization mode selector,
31:44auto.
31:45Okay,
31:46flight instrument.
31:48We found that
31:49the first officer
31:50was actually
31:51in the cockpit
31:52by herself,
31:53conducting most
31:53of the pre-flight work
31:55without the captain.
31:59It's unusual
32:01for the captain
32:02not to be present
32:03during the pre-flight
32:04because there are
32:04responsibilities
32:05that the captain has
32:07to get his side
32:08of the airplane ready.
32:09It's just inappropriate
32:11for the captain
32:12not to be
32:13in the cockpit
32:14during the pre-flight.
32:16And it's actually
32:16kind of rude.
32:18It's only after
32:19the first officer
32:20completes the pre-flight
32:22preparations
32:22that the captain
32:24enters the cockpit.
32:25The last Q&H,
32:261019.
32:281019, Roger.
32:30Good afternoon, Captain.
32:32How are we looking?
32:33Good.
32:34I completed
32:35the pre-flight checklist.
32:36I tested your oxygen
32:37and everything
32:39is set to go.
32:40Good, good.
32:43Captain Benwisha
32:44is late,
32:45leaving his responsibilities
32:47to the first officer.
32:48When the captain
32:49showed up,
32:50he was not
32:51in the mindset
32:51of getting
32:53brought up to speed
32:54or being part
32:55of the team
32:55of setting the cockpit
32:56up for the flight.
33:01Heading.
33:02020.
33:04Altitude.
33:07Investigators
33:07then hear the pilots
33:08performing their
33:09before-start checklist.
33:11280.
33:12You know,
33:13I could have been
33:14on the team
33:15with those boys
33:16back there.
33:16Give me a break.
33:18Who's the third voice?
33:20Flight attendant.
33:23The only male flight attendant
33:24is the chief flight attendant.
33:28Okay, takeoff speeds.
33:31As part of the checklist,
33:33the first officer
33:33reviews the takeoff speeds.
33:38V1, 144 knots.
33:41VR, 146 knots.
33:43You're saying
33:43you were good enough
33:44to turn pro?
33:46Yeah.
33:46Yeah.
33:47I was a good footy player.
33:49You and the scout
33:50come watch me play.
33:50Yeah, they were
33:51scouting you
33:52to mow the pitch.
33:56V2, 150 knots.
33:57Okay, that's enough.
33:58I understand.
33:59Can we go?
34:01I got it.
34:02I got it.
34:02Let's go.
34:08So the captain
34:09is just carrying on
34:09a conversation
34:10with his friend
34:10while they're doing
34:11their before start checklist.
34:13What is even worse
34:14is he cuts her off
34:14before they could
34:15even finish it.
34:18One of the most
34:19important parts
34:20of the information
34:21that she was trying
34:22to give
34:23were the takeoff speeds
34:24and then there
34:26should have been
34:26a briefing
34:28of an engine
34:29failure departure
34:30at this airport
34:32that was a special
34:34departure
34:34that needed
34:34to be briefed.
34:35It was ignored.
34:39Did the captain
34:40become more focused
34:42once they began
34:43to taxi?
34:44Roger.
34:45Taxi for runway
34:46at zero two.
34:48What investigators
34:49find most shocking
34:50is what they hear next.
35:16During critical phases
35:18of flight
35:18extraneous conversations
35:20and non-essential
35:20conversations
35:21between the crew members
35:22are prohibited.
35:23Not only is the captain
35:24dismissing the first officer,
35:26he has this casual attitude
35:28about basic safety practices.
35:31It's possible
35:32he was more interested
35:33in talking
35:33to the flight attendant
35:35than reviewing
35:36the briefing
35:36with the first officer.
35:38It's possible
35:39that he had been
35:40through so many
35:41pre-flight
35:42takeoff briefings
35:42that at that time
35:43he felt
35:44it was unnecessary.
35:49Bismillah.
35:50What's going on?
35:55Let's go, let's go, let's go.
35:56I let go, I let go.
35:57As a result
35:58of his dismissive attitude,
36:00the captain
36:00is unprepared
36:01to properly respond
36:03when the crisis occurs
36:04shortly after takeoff.
36:10Had the pilots completed
36:11their pre-flight
36:12safety briefing,
36:13their response
36:14to the engine failure
36:15might have been
36:16very different.
36:24Gear up.
36:28Engine failure,
36:29left engine.
36:30Fly V2 plus 25.
36:33Lowering the nose
36:34to 12 degrees.
36:36V2.
36:37Gear up.
36:39Once the plane
36:40was stabilized,
36:41the pilots
36:42could have returned
36:43safely to the airport.
36:44Engine failure
36:46is actually
36:47a relatively
36:47common occurrence.
36:49Every pilot
36:49needs to be prepared
36:50and trained.
36:52So instead
36:53of letting
36:53the first officer
36:54fly the plane
36:55while he diagnoses
36:56the issue,
36:57he tries to do
36:57everything himself.
36:58And transferring control
36:59during an emergency
37:00situation?
37:02There was never
37:03a positive transfer
37:05of control.
37:06The captain
37:06just took
37:07the control yoke
37:08away from
37:09the first officer.
37:11So he injected
37:13himself in the emergency.
37:18Let go, let go.
37:20I let go, I let go.
37:22The captain
37:23took control
37:24at the worst possible time
37:26when he was out
37:27of the loop.
37:27And by not assigning
37:29responsibility to her,
37:30he gave himself
37:31the responsibility
37:32of doing two things
37:33at once,
37:33diagnosing the nature
37:35of the engine problem
37:36and then flying
37:37the airplane.
37:40Please!
37:41By trying
37:41to fly the plane
37:43and diagnose
37:44the problem
37:44on his own,
37:45the captain
37:46took on too much.
37:49It put the first officer
37:50in a very difficult position.
37:53She's now
37:54in the supportive role,
37:56the non-flying role,
37:57waiting to be told
37:59what to do.
38:00And he's not giving
38:01any helpful orders
38:03other than let go.
38:07Why would an experienced
38:09captain so brazenly
38:11dismiss his first officer's help,
38:13risking the lives
38:14of everyone on board?
38:21Investigators look
38:22into the pilot's backgrounds
38:23in an attempt to understand
38:25why the captain
38:26took over
38:27from his first officer
38:28in the midst
38:29of an emergency.
38:31So the captain
38:32actually had twice
38:33as many flying hours
38:34as the first officer.
38:36The captain
38:37was both qualified
38:38as a captain
38:39on a 737,
38:40but also as a first officer
38:41on a 767.
38:44Perhaps his attitude
38:45was that flying
38:46the 737
38:47was not that big
38:48of a deal
38:49because I fly
38:50a 767,
38:51which is much more
38:52sophisticated
38:53and highly technical.
38:55But she
38:56had more hours
38:57on the 737.
38:58Not only did she
38:59have more experience
39:00flying the 737,
39:01that's the only plane
39:02that she was flying.
39:05I think there's
39:06a good chance
39:06that had she been
39:07left alone,
39:08she would have flown
39:09the airplane
39:10out of the scenario
39:11that we saw
39:12in this accident.
39:13The question is,
39:15would he have reacted
39:16the same way
39:16if the first officer
39:17was a man?
39:20In 2003,
39:22at the time
39:22of this crash,
39:23here in the States,
39:25female airline pilots
39:26only constituted
39:27less than 6%
39:28of the pilot population.
39:30And it really
39:31hasn't changed
39:32that much
39:32in the 20 years
39:34since then.
39:35The first officer
39:37was Algeria's
39:38first female
39:39commercial airline pilot.
39:41My friend,
39:43male pilots
39:44in this part
39:44of the world
39:46aren't used
39:47to sharing
39:48a cockpit
39:48with women.
39:51I think Algeria
39:52is becoming
39:52fairly westernized,
39:53but in some cultures
39:55there is the feeling
39:56that a man
39:56has to be up
39:57in the cockpit
39:57in case anything
39:58goes wrong.
40:01Why did this captain
40:02take control
40:02from the first officer
40:04when she was doing
40:05an okay job
40:05at that point?
40:06And I think
40:07you can't rule out
40:08the possibility
40:09that there may have
40:09been some gender
40:11stereotyping
40:12on his part
40:13that played
40:14a role in it.
40:16Sadly,
40:17this accident
40:17was totally
40:18preventable.
40:24Investigators
40:25now have
40:26a clear picture
40:27of what led
40:28to the crash
40:28of Flight 6289.
40:32V1, 144 knots.
40:36VR, 146 knots.
40:38You're saying
40:38you were good enough
40:39to turn pro?
40:39After arriving late
40:41and allowing
40:42the flight attendant
40:43into the cockpit,
40:44the captain
40:44interrupted
40:45a crucial
40:46pre-flight
40:47safety briefing.
40:49V2,
40:50150 knots.
40:51Okay,
40:52that's enough.
40:52I understand.
40:54Can we go?
40:55I got it,
40:56I got it.
40:56Let's go.
40:56The captain
40:58demonstrated
40:59a lax attitude
41:00towards cockpit
41:01protocols.
41:04Fatigue cracks
41:05in a nozzle
41:06guide vane
41:06in the plane's
41:07left engine
41:08were reaching
41:09their braking
41:09point.
41:10And when the
41:11guide vane
41:12failed,
41:13it set off
41:14a chain reaction.
41:16High-speed
41:17metal fragments
41:18ripped the
41:18engine apart.
41:21Let's go,
41:21let's go.
41:22I let go,
41:22I let go.
41:23When crisis
41:24struck,
41:25the captain
41:26decided he
41:27needed to be
41:27the one
41:28to handle
41:28the controls
41:29and took
41:30over flying
41:31from his
41:31first officer
41:32before even
41:33identifying the
41:34problem.
41:36The engine
41:36failure alone
41:37was not the
41:38cause of this
41:38accident.
41:39Engines fail
41:40and pilots
41:41are trained
41:42to handle
41:43those emergencies.
41:46Failing to
41:47retract the
41:47landing gear
41:48after the
41:49engine failure
41:50made recovery
41:51more difficult.
41:52Let go,
41:53take your hand
41:53away.
41:54I let go,
41:54I let go.
41:55Let go,
41:56take your
41:56hand away.
41:57I let go.
42:05It was the
42:06captain's
42:06assumption of
42:07patrol of the
42:08aircraft without
42:09properly identifying
42:10the nature of the
42:11emergency,
42:12his failure to
42:13raise the landing
42:14gear and his
42:15lack of adherence
42:16to standard
42:17operating procedures
42:18that eventually
42:20doomed the
42:21flight.
42:23As a result of
42:25this accident,
42:26Algeria's
42:27commission of
42:27inquiry makes
42:28several
42:29recommendations.
42:31They recommend
42:32that Air
42:33Algerie, along
42:34with other
42:34operators,
42:35ensure that
42:36their crew
42:36resource management
42:37training programs
42:39emphasize the
42:40importance of
42:40handover procedures
42:42and task sharing
42:43in the cockpit.
42:45But in the
42:461980s,
42:47they had
42:47captains who
42:48were trying
42:49to fly a
42:49team airplane
42:50solo.
42:53So a lot of
42:54training went
42:54into it to
42:55teach that
42:56your best
42:57resource is
42:58your team.
42:59You support
42:59each other
43:00and work
43:00together as
43:02a team for
43:03the safety
43:03of the
43:04airplane.
43:05The fact
43:05that the
43:06captain insisted
43:06on taking
43:07over control
43:08of the
43:08airplane at
43:09that critical
43:09moment cost
43:12everybody on
43:13that airplane
43:13their lives.
43:17I felt
43:18particularly
43:18affected when
43:20I saw that
43:21the accident
43:22was preventable.
43:23And I think
43:24the investigators
43:24did the best
43:25job they could
43:26trying to
43:26discover why
43:27the crew made
43:28the errors that
43:28they did.
43:29The next time
43:30that happens,
43:30people won't die
43:31as a result of
43:32that.
43:34For Lynn
43:35Rippelmeyer,
43:36it's one more
43:37example of why
43:38the industry
43:38needs to
43:39continue evolving.
43:41The airlines
43:42now are much
43:44more open to
43:45hiring women,
43:46to not having
43:48gender bias,
43:49realizing that
43:50women do have
43:51a lot to
43:51contribute to
43:52the industry.
43:55And I think
43:56it's up to
43:56women now to
43:57step up to
43:57the plate and
43:58take the
43:59opportunities that
44:00the career
44:00offers.
44:01They're amazing.
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