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00:02Controllers in Islamabad watch as Air Blue Flight 202 head straight towards a massive hill.
00:09He's not turning.
00:14They issue urgent warnings.
00:17Turn left immediately.
00:18But fail to prevent a disaster.
00:21They're going down!
00:30It's the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history.
00:36When investigators listen to the CVR, they hear the pilots realise they're in danger.
00:42Terrain, sir!
00:45Took steps to avoid it.
00:48Turning left.
00:49But were unable to save the lives of 152 people.
00:54Why aren't we turning left?
00:56The crew knew what they had to do.
01:00They had reported that they were doing what they were supposed to do.
01:04And yet, the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction.
01:08ini's death, in the Northland response.
01:10Worsham Eye, near me!
01:14Worsham Eye!
01:17Worsham Eye!
01:18Worsham Eye!
01:20Where the next?
01:33Air Blue Flight 202.
01:37Worsham Eye!
01:37It's early morning descent towards Islamabad, Pakistan.
01:46There are 146 passengers and 6 crew on board the Airbus A321.
01:57A-Blue 202, expect arrival to ILS runway 30, followed by circling approach to land runway
02:0312.
02:04Understood.
02:05It will be ILS down to minima and then left downwind.
02:10Okay.
02:14Captain Parvez Chowdhury is one of the airline's most experienced pilots.
02:20Najam Qureshi is a former AirBlue pilot who flew with Captain Chowdhury.
02:26Captain Chowdhury had a lifetime of experience flying with the Pakistan International Airline.
02:32He had a very successful carrier and he was pretty much approaching the end of his carrier.
02:37A-Blue 202 clear to 3900 for ILS approach to runway 30, followed by circling approach to land on 1
02:43-2.
02:45First officer Syed Ahmed has less commercial experience.
02:49He's a former F-16 fighter pilot and squadron leader in Pakistan's Air Force.
02:56AirBlue 202 clear to 3900 for ILS 230, clear to descend to 3900.
03:10He had about 300,000 the type, so just brand new, learning the differences between the Air Force flying and
03:17the commercial flying.
03:20Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, is a city of more than 800,000 people.
03:26It's surrounded by the Himalayan foothills to the north and northeast.
03:34The mountainous terrain means the only approach to Islamabad's runway is from the south.
03:41Due to the wind direction today, planes are landing on runway 1-2.
03:46They must circle the airport and make a visual approach to the other end of the runway.
03:54It is always safer to land with a headwind as compared to a tailwind.
03:59When the winds change beyond a certain limit, the air traffic controller will switch the runways.
04:05That will ensure the plane lands in a headwind.
04:11Thick clouds envelop the airport, making landings difficult.
04:17China Southern is going around and diverting back to Urumqi.
04:20China Southern confirming, diverting back to Urumqi.
04:25Attention all landing aircraft.
04:27China Southern is diverting due to weather.
04:31If at any point you lose sight of the airfield,
04:36you should abandon the approach completely and carry out the missed approach procedure.
04:44Flight 202 is now less than 10 minutes from landing.
05:03The plane reaches the minimum altitude to which the pilots can descend without the runway in sight.
05:12As soon as you see the runway, you turn right, and then after that you're supposed to keep the runway
05:17in sight.
05:19Commencing right turn, heading 352.
05:24Call it in.
05:27Air Blue 202, maintaining 2500 and turning right, heading 352.
05:35Air Blue 202 confirming at 2500, turning right, heading 352.
05:46Captain Chowdhury initiates the first turn of the circling approach.
05:51Air Blue 202, continue on the circle for landing on runway 12.
05:56And to caution low clouds and visibility, maintain visual with the airport.
06:03Even in the poor weather, it's up to the pilots to decide whether they should continue the approach or not,
06:09depending whether they have the runway in sight.
06:15The controller expects to see the lights of the airbus as it flies past the airfield.
06:29Radar, I can't see Air Blue 202.
06:31What's his current location, please?
06:33He's approaching the no-fly zone north of the airfield.
06:36Instruct him to turn left immediately.
06:41Flight 202 is much further north than expected,
06:45and needs to turn left for the approach to runway 12.
06:50Air Blue 202, turn left heading 180.
06:56Confirm he has visual with the ground.
06:58If not, instruct him to climb and execute a missed approach.
07:01Air Blue 202, confirm you have airfield in sight.
07:07The controllers had radar.
07:09They could see what the aircraft was doing.
07:12They could see that the aircraft was not doing what the procedure said they should be doing.
07:19Ask again.
07:21Air Blue 202, please confirm you have visual with the ground.
07:33Air Blue 202, visual with the ground.
07:37He's confirming visual.
07:41He's not turning.
07:45Controllers can see that flight 202 is rapidly approaching the hills north of the airport.
07:56In the cockpit, the pilots are struggling to turn their plane away from the mountains ahead.
08:03Why aren't we turning left?
08:10Why aren't we turning left?
08:16Why is I turning left?
08:18Terrain ahead.
08:20Pull up.
08:23Terrain ahead.
08:23Terrain, sir.
08:24Pull up.
08:26Instruct him to turn left immediately.
08:30The controllers can't believe what they're seeing.
08:34Here's a guy with 25,000 hours, and he's flying directly towards a mountain.
08:41In the cabin, passengers have become aware that something's not right.
08:51They're approaching the 5,000 foot Magala hills.
08:56Terrain ahead.
08:58Pull up.
08:58Sir, we are going down.
09:00Terrain, terrain.
09:02Messages from radar turn left immediately.
09:05Terrain ahead.
09:06Pull up.
09:06We're going down.
09:07Pull up.
09:21Flight 202 has crashed into the Magala hills, seven miles from the airport.
09:30The wreckage lies at an altitude of nearly 3,000 feet.
09:34It will be difficult for rescuers to reach the site.
09:41We couldn't get access to it with a car or a truck.
09:46Even with helicopters, there was no place to set down.
09:51So the only way to get to the accident site was with a long, slow climb.
09:58It takes more than half an hour for rescuers and volunteers to make their way up the steep hill to
10:04the crash site in hopes of finding survivors.
10:17When crews do reach the site, they find a scene of complete devastation.
10:34152 people died in this accident.
10:36It's the worst accident in Pakistan's aviation history.
10:45Why did a modern airplane fly into well-known mountains north of the airport in Israel?
10:57It's Islamabad.
11:00Investigators arrive at the accident site to study the wreckage of Air Blue Flight 202.
11:09When an aircraft flies into mountains, there are really two areas that we're looking at in terms of the root
11:15cause.
11:17One is a sudden and unexpected loss of control.
11:23The other would be the aircraft has actually stayed in control of the pilots and still somehow been flown into
11:29a mountain.
11:34An analysis of the engines shows that they were fully functional at the time of impact and capable of producing
11:41maximum thrust.
11:45The other would be the first.
11:46OK. Good work, everyone. Start heading back down.
11:50Right. So the stabilizer was set at 3.5 degrees nose up.
11:55Landing gear was down.
11:57Engines at climb power.
12:00So configured for landing, but climbing at full power.
12:06An examination of the electrical and mechanical components that we could find.
12:11There was no obvious damage or mechanical failure.
12:16They were trying to land here, but then they slammed into the Margulah Hills, seven miles north of the runway.
12:27How did they get so far off course?
12:32For an approach that was supposed to be a very tight approach because of the existence of the hills, that
12:41is extraordinary.
12:44They were approaching from the southeast for a landing here on runway 12.
12:56Scattered clouds, rain.
13:00Visibility was at 3.5 kilometers.
13:04Challenging conditions.
13:09Could the cloudy conditions have been a factor in the accident?
13:14When an aircraft flies into high ground, one thing that is almost certainly a factor is poor visibility.
13:23Low cloud, fog, call it what you will.
13:28Visibility would have been an issue.
13:30But you don't need to see the Margulah Hills to know that they're there.
13:39Everyone knows towards the northeast of the runway, there are mountains.
13:43They're clearly marked on the maps.
13:46Terrain ahead.
13:47We're going down.
13:49Pull up.
13:51Pull up.
13:56Can the controller explain why the crew of flight 202 couldn't avoid the mountains?
14:05Radar control informed him he'd be doing the circling approach to runway 12.
14:09ABLU 202 expect arrival at ILS 30, followed by circling approach to land runway 12.
14:17And he understood the approach?
14:19Yes sir, he did.
14:22Understood.
14:24It'll be ILS down to minima, and then left downwind.
14:30And then?
14:31That's when I assumed control.
14:34As he began the right turn to the circling approach.
14:41The circling approach involves four carefully timed turns.
14:46The first to the right, followed by a left turn that takes the plane parallel to the runway.
14:52The two final turns lined the plane up for the landing on runway 12.
14:59Pilots must keep the runway in sight for the duration of this approach.
15:07After about a minute, I expected to see him fly by.
15:13But he never did.
15:16I asked the crew if they had the runway in sight, and they confirmed that they did.
15:21Air Blue 202, please confirm you have visual with the ground.
15:28Air Blue 202, visual with the ground.
15:32But he kept flying further and further away from the airport.
15:36Directly towards the hills.
15:40After breaking off from the approach, they were supposed to turn after 30 seconds.
15:45Instead, they kept going for almost two minutes.
15:49We tried to stop him several times.
15:54But it was too late.
15:57Message from radar, turn left immediately.
16:08We couldn't prevent what happened.
16:20It's all here on the radar track.
16:28The crew knew what they had to do.
16:32They had reported that they were doing what they were supposed to do.
16:37And yet, the aircraft continued to fly in the wrong direction.
16:42Terrain ahead.
16:45Pull up.
16:47How could the pilots have ended up so dangerously off course?
16:53As first.
16:58The aircraft continued.
16:59The aircraft continued.
16:59Investigators look into the background of Flight 202's pilots,
17:03to determine if the approach into Islamabad was mishandled.
17:09The captain had years of experience with major airlines.
17:15Captain Chaudhury has been flying for more than 40 years.
17:19He has accumulated more than 25,000 flying hours throughout his career, but only about 1,000 of those were
17:28on the Airbus.
17:33The first officer, however, is a whole different story.
17:38First officer Syed Ahmed had far fewer hours than the captain.
17:43The former fighter pilot had recently joined the airline, and had accumulated only 286 hours on Airbus A320 airplanes.
17:56Two very different pilots.
17:59One, during the end of his career, with thousands of hours of experience, and the other just starting off his
18:06commercial career.
18:08But neither of them had a ton of experience with the Airbus A321.
18:16Did the pilot's lack of experience on this type of plane play a role in the accident?
18:25Experience is generally considered to be an asset.
18:29The only potential downside is that, of course, if you've got a lot of experience of one particular thing,
18:36it actually might be more difficult to learn how to operate this new type of aircraft.
18:49So they're supposed to perform their approach within this area.
18:54Anything beyond this is outside the airport's 4.3-mile protection zone.
19:00Okay, let's see his track.
19:04Investigators examine Flight 202's radar track to see how the pilots set up their approach.
19:31The radar track shows that the pilots flew closer and closer to the mountains surrounding Islamabad.
19:39Wouldn't they have gotten a warning that they're approaching the hills?
19:49Yes, sir.
19:50It should have sounded 60 seconds before impact.
19:56The enhanced ground proximity warning system looks downward to see the height that you're at above ground,
20:06but it also looks ahead to see any terrain that you're flying towards.
20:14If they got a warning, why didn't they try to pull up or turn to avoid it?
20:25Did the pilots of Flight 202 get any warning of an impending collision?
20:32The crew would have been given pictures on their navigation display of the approaching terrain,
20:38and they would have been given aural warnings.
20:41So, since they flew directly into the terrain,
20:46has the enhanced ground proximity warning system completely failed?
21:01Don't leave me in suspense.
21:03Did they get any ground proximity warnings?
21:15The cockpit data shows that in the final minute of the flight,
21:19the crew got 21 separate warnings about the rising terrain ahead.
21:29Okay, so that answers that.
21:34Over 21 times, we saw terrain, terrain, pull up, terrain ahead, pull up.
21:40There's no way that the captain missed that warning.
21:44The enhanced ground proximity warning system was working properly.
21:48Terrain ahead.
21:50If the warning system was operating,
21:52why would the pilots ignore it and allow the accident to happen?
21:56Terrain ahead.
21:57Pull up.
21:58If you hear a full-terrain pull-up warning from the EGPWS,
22:03the reaction should be immediate.
22:05It should be to apply full power,
22:08pull the nose of the aircraft up,
22:09get it moving away from the ground,
22:11and that should be done before any questions are asked.
22:19Why didn't the crew of Air Blue Flight 202 act on terrain warnings
22:24and steer their plane away from the mountains?
22:28Islamabad, Air Blue 202.
22:31Investigators listen to the cockpit voice recording.
22:34What are current conditions, please?
22:36Air Blue 202 visibility is now 3.5 kilometers with rain.
22:40Wind 1, 6 knots, 0, 5, 0 degrees.
22:44Runway 1, 2 currently in use.
22:47They focus on how the crew set up for landing.
22:51It'll be runway 1, 2.
22:53Yes, invisibility is crap.
22:58The weather was marginal,
23:00and marginal weather makes you nervous
23:02because you don't know whether you're going to be able to see anything at all,
23:07and the captain clearly was nervous about this approach.
23:13Did the captain proceed with an approach he wasn't comfortable with?
23:18Set waypoints for runway 1, 2.
23:21Radial 0, 2, 6.
23:23Five miles a beam.
23:32Mate, stop.
23:35Why is he asking him to input a course to the runway?
23:40This is supposed to be a visual approach.
23:45It didn't make any sense for the captain to be entering waypoints
23:48into the flight management system.
23:51The circling approach is by definition a visual approach,
23:54so there is no way that any pilot would normally do this.
24:01Then, just two miles from the airport,
24:04the pilots of Air Blue Flight 202 hear of a flight landing ahead of them.
24:10Be advised that a TIA-737 has landed on runway 1, 2 safely.
24:17Commencing right turn, heading 3, 5, 2.
24:23That could have caused the pilot to say,
24:25hey, if they can get in, we can get in, too.
24:29Wait, stop, sir.
24:30So, he starts his turn later than usual,
24:35half a mile from the runway.
24:42Instead of breaking off early,
24:44they had to continue on because of the low visibility and low ceilings,
24:48and they did not break off to the right until the last possible point,
24:51which was at the end of the runway.
24:55Concerned with poor visibility,
24:57Captain Chowdhury makes a baffling decision.
25:00Switch into lab mode for managed approach to runway 1, 2.
25:05There he goes, switching to nav mode.
25:07He can't be visual.
25:11Carrying out the circling approach using the autopilot to navigate
25:15is a violation of procedures.
25:20As soon as you select the nav mode,
25:22the plane starts to fly the pre-programmed waypoints,
25:27and at this point,
25:29Captain Chowdhury is normal flying the visual approach.
25:31OK, sir.
25:36But, are you visual?
25:40I have a visual.
25:45Chowdhury insists he can see the runway,
25:47but investigators are certain he could not.
25:51They can't see the airfield any longer
25:53because they've just got to the far side of it.
25:55There is no airfield in sight.
25:59So, instead of turning left
26:02to fly parallel with the runway,
26:05he keeps flying in this direction,
26:08moving further and further from the airport.
26:12Sir, we're reaching higher ground.
26:16Terrain ahead.
26:19Terrain ahead.
26:20Sir, there's terrain ahead.
26:22Sir, turn left.
26:25Terrain ahead.
26:28It should be turning.
26:30Terrain ahead.
26:31As the captain struggles to turn away from the hills,
26:35Terrain ahead.
26:36controllers become concerned.
26:39Airblue 202, confirm you have airfield in sight.
26:42What should I tell him, sir?
26:45Terrain ahead.
26:46Tell him.
26:47Tell him.
26:48Pull up.
26:49The crew doesn't reply straight away.
26:52Probably because the first officer knows full well
26:55that no, they don't have visual contact with the airfield,
26:57but he waits for his captain to tell him what to say.
27:01Airblue 202, please confirm you have visual with the ground.
27:04Terrain ahead.
27:06Pull up.
27:06Airblue 202, visual with the ground.
27:11In the end, the crew tells air traffic control
27:15that they are in visual contact with the ground.
27:19Now, that's not untrue,
27:21but it's not the same thing as being visual with the airfield.
27:23It feels more like a reply designed to get air traffic control
27:27off their backs.
27:28Sir, we are approaching terrain ahead.
27:31Yes, I know.
27:32We are turning left.
27:33Pull up.
27:34Pull up, sir.
27:35Sir, pull up.
27:36The captain says he's turning left,
27:40but he keeps flying directly towards the hills.
27:48Investigators are unable to explain
27:50why Captain Chowdhury could not alter his course
27:53and steer away from the mountains.
28:02The final minute of the CVR reveals a picture of chaos
28:06and confusion.
28:08Pull up, sir.
28:10Sir, pull up.
28:14They're applying power, trying to claim.
28:23Sir, we're going down.
29:01All they had to do
29:04was turn away from those hills.
29:09Despite reacting to the terrain warnings,
29:12the pilots could not steer their plane away from the mountains.
29:18I think they knew what was happening.
29:21I think they knew that they had to turn left.
29:23For some reason, the aircraft didn't turn left.
29:28Will Flight 202's flight data recorder
29:31explain why Captain Chowdhury didn't or couldn't turn
29:35and avoid the mountains?
29:37Can we see the altitude, please?
29:41The minimum altitude is 2,500 feet.
29:47Investigators can see that Chowdhury dialed in an altitude
29:50below what's permitted.
29:52There's only one reason it would drop below that.
29:58Commencing right turn.
30:01Heading 3, 5, 2.
30:07There's no earthly reason for doing it
30:09because the minimums are there for a very good reason.
30:13The only reason why they ever break the minimums
30:16is because they can't see the ground properly
30:18and they want to get closer to it.
30:21Can we see the flight path?
30:25You see?
30:27He's way off course,
30:29in heavy fog,
30:30and has clearly lost visual.
30:33Let's see the autopilot modes.
30:37So,
30:39he asks the automation to take over.
30:46More than 4 miles off course,
30:49Captain Chowdhury makes his biggest error
30:51by switching modes on his autopilot.
30:56The captain switched from heading mode
30:58to nav mode.
31:00And the aircraft turned left
31:02to heading of 3, 0, 0.
31:08Towards the mountain.
31:11The airbus now makes a left turn
31:14towards a predetermined waypoint,
31:16bringing the flight dangerously close
31:18to the mountains.
31:21He's approaching the no-fly zone
31:23north of the airfield.
31:26From this point on,
31:27air traffic control continued to urge
31:29the flight to turn left
31:31because they knew they were in the vicinity
31:33of the high mountainous terrain.
31:35Terrain ahead.
31:37Pull up.
31:38Ablo 202, turn left, heading 180.
31:41Terrain ahead.
31:42Why aren't we turning left?
31:43Pull up.
31:46Can we see what he's selecting?
31:51He's dialing in a left turn.
31:59Captain Chowdhury uses his heading knob
32:02to turn the plane sharply left
32:04away from the hills.
32:08But the plane,
32:09it keeps flying in the same direction.
32:12It's not turning.
32:14It's not turning.
32:24He's still in nav.
32:28Investigators realised
32:29the captain forgot
32:31that his plane was in navigation mode
32:33and not heading mode,
32:35which is required to turn the aircraft.
32:37If the aircraft is flying in nav mode,
32:41it will keep on flying
32:43on its predetermined course.
32:45Whether or not the crew
32:47changed the heading select.
32:50Terrain ahead.
32:51Why aren't we turning left?
32:53Pull up.
32:55Captain Chowdhury doesn't realise
32:57that his inputs are futile.
32:59Pull up.
33:01Pull up.
33:02In order to get from nav mode
33:04into heading mode,
33:05you pull the knob out
33:06and that engages heading mode.
33:08Pull up.
33:09He forgot to pull it out.
33:12He realises his error
33:14and pulls the knob here
33:16at 40 seconds before impact.
33:26Ah.
33:28When Captain Chowdhury
33:30tries to correct his error,
33:32he only makes a bad situation worse.
33:36Sir, turn left.
33:37Oh.
33:38Why is I turning left?
33:45Captain Chowdhury
33:47has dialed in so many left turns
33:49that his last input
33:51is now to the plane's right.
33:53The airbus takes the shortest route
33:56to get to that heading,
33:58directly towards the Margala hills.
34:05He's in heading mode
34:06for the rest of the flight.
34:13The investigation saw
34:14that the captain
34:15was so reliant on the automation
34:16that he was trying
34:17to turn the aircraft to the left,
34:20asking why the aircraft
34:21wasn't turning to the left,
34:22but he didn't even use
34:24his side stick
34:25and actually turn the aircraft
34:26to the left manually.
34:27Why aren't we turning left?
34:30The rain is ahead.
34:32Investigators now know
34:33why Captain Chowdhury
34:34was unable to turn left
34:36and avoid the mountains.
34:37But one question remains.
34:40Why didn't the first officer
34:41recognize the mistakes
34:43and do something
34:44to correct them?
34:46Sir, we're going down!
34:51100 knots.
34:54Check.
34:55Investigators find
34:56a possible explanation
34:57for the first officer's
34:59puzzling behavior
35:00V1
35:01at the very start
35:03of flight 202
35:04Rotate
35:06as it took off
35:08for Islamabad.
35:10The flight starts
35:12with the pilots
35:13working efficiently
35:14as a crew.
35:15Positive rate.
35:17Gear up.
35:23Gear up.
35:27The takeoff
35:28from Karachi
35:29is textbook.
35:33From initial
35:35pushback startup
35:36and all of it
35:37to takeoff,
35:38everything seemed
35:39normal.
35:42We are clear
35:43to climb to flight level.
35:44Explain to me
35:45why that is blue.
35:47but the other
35:48symbols are white.
35:50The pilot's
35:52cordial relationship
35:53soon changes.
35:56Sir?
35:57There,
35:58on your display.
35:59Why is that symbol
36:00blue but the others
36:01are white?
36:02You should know
36:03why that is.
36:05I believe it's because
36:07the flight plan
36:08defers from the
36:09current route.
36:09No,
36:10that's wrong.
36:10It's because
36:11it's the one
36:12being navigated
36:13towards basic.
36:15Do you know
36:16how to modify
36:17this point?
36:19From the main menu?
36:21Oh,
36:21you don't need
36:22to return
36:22to the main menu.
36:23You can do it
36:24on the screen.
36:26What did they teach
36:28you in that
36:28so-called
36:28training of yours?
36:31Captain Chowdhury
36:32is heard quizzing
36:34and berating
36:34his first officer.
36:37This wasn't
36:38normal behaviour.
36:39It seems
36:40it was only
36:41really for the
36:42purpose of
36:43putting his
36:44first officer
36:44in his place,
36:46making sure
36:47he knew
36:47who was in charge
36:48and to do
36:50as he was told.
36:53What's he doing?
36:55If you don't
36:56know how to
36:56use the
36:57flight management
36:58system,
36:59then what use
37:00are you in
37:00the cockpit?
37:02You might as
37:02well go back
37:03and help
37:03the girls
37:04serve tea.
37:07Yes.
37:09Sorry,
37:10sir.
37:18What about
37:19maximum thrust
37:20available for
37:20climb?
37:21Can you at least
37:22tell me what
37:22that is?
37:23This has been
37:24going on for
37:25nearly an hour
37:25now.
37:26Told you.
37:30Radio ahead
37:30to Islamabad
37:31for the weather.
37:34Do you know
37:35how to use
37:35the radio?
37:35Yes.
37:40Captain Chowdhury
37:41is a very
37:41experienced pilot.
37:43He should know
37:44that this is not
37:45how he behave
37:46on the flight
37:47deck of an
37:48airliner.
38:02Investigators
38:03wonder why
38:04Captain Chowdhury
38:05would act so
38:06aggressively
38:06towards his
38:07first officer.
38:08He was
38:09recently treated
38:10for diabetes
38:11and hypertension
38:13but deemed
38:14fit to fly.
38:17Anything?
38:18Pilots who
38:19flew with him
38:20said he was
38:20demanding.
38:21Sometimes
38:22difficult.
38:24But nothing
38:25at this level.
38:27Maybe it had
38:28more to do
38:28with him.
38:31Could the
38:32first officer's
38:33background
38:34have affected
38:35his captain's
38:36attitude
38:36towards him?
38:41In Pakistan
38:42there has been
38:43a hidden
38:43rivalry between
38:44Air Force
38:45pilots
38:46and the
38:47people who
38:47are in the
38:48commercial side
38:49already.
38:50They feel
38:51that
38:51Axie Air Force
38:52guys are
38:52taking away
38:53their opportunities.
38:58Investigators
38:59believe that
39:00the captain's
39:00abusive behavior
39:01might explain
39:02one of the
39:03mysteries of
39:04this tragedy.
39:05Why first
39:06officer Ahmed
39:07never took
39:08control of
39:08the plane.
39:12All the
39:12first officer
39:13had to do
39:13was to take
39:14manual control
39:15of the aircraft
39:15and fly it
39:16away from
39:17the mountain.
39:20Investigators
39:21scrutinize
39:22first officer
39:23Ahmed's actions
39:24leading up to
39:24the crash of
39:25flight 202.
39:26his first
39:27officer
39:28told the
39:28captain to
39:29pull up
39:29three times
39:30and to
39:31turn left
39:32twice.
39:34But he
39:34never says
39:35he's taking
39:35control.
39:41If I
39:41were the
39:42first officer
39:42to take
39:43over the
39:44control,
39:44pull back
39:45on the
39:46side stick
39:46to create
39:47the max
39:47performance
39:48maneuver,
39:48apply toga
39:49thrust,
39:49and keep
39:51climbing
39:51until I'm
39:52clear of
39:52the hills.
39:54The team
39:55believes the
39:56captain's
39:56behavior
39:57earlier in
39:58the flight
39:58explains why
40:00the first
40:00officer allowed
40:01him to
40:02mishandle
40:02the approach.
40:03If you
40:04don't know
40:04how to
40:05use the
40:05flight
40:06management
40:06system,
40:07then what
40:08use are
40:08you in
40:09the
40:09cockpit?
40:12We have
40:13the captain's
40:14behavior,
40:14which was
40:15so overbearing,
40:16so autocratic,
40:18so nasty,
40:20that it
40:21served to
40:22completely
40:22shatter the
40:23self-confidence
40:23of the
40:24first officer.
40:26First
40:26officer
40:27Ahmed
40:27allows
40:28procedures
40:28to be
40:29set
40:29aside,
40:31switch
40:31into
40:31lab
40:32mode,
40:33for
40:33managed
40:33approach
40:34to
40:34runway
40:3412.
40:35Okay,
40:37sir.
40:39And then
40:40fails to
40:41take control
40:42when his
40:43captain flies
40:44the plane
40:44directly towards
40:45the mountains.
40:46He was so
40:48worn down
40:48by the
40:48captain's
40:49harsh behavior
40:50that he
40:51just couldn't
40:51stand up
40:51to him.
40:52He became
40:53a bystander.
40:59The
41:00first officer
41:01clearly knows
41:02that what
41:02they're doing
41:02is wrong.
41:03He knows
41:04that his
41:04captain is
41:05disoriented,
41:06that the
41:07aircraft is
41:08on a
41:08collision
41:09course with
41:09a mountain,
41:10and yet
41:11somehow he
41:13doesn't have
41:13it in him
41:14to intervene.
41:16terrain ahead.
41:18Pull up.
41:19Sir, we
41:20are going
41:20down.
41:21Sir, we
41:21are going
41:22down.
41:23Three and
41:23a half
41:24minutes after
41:24the start
41:25of the
41:25approach,
41:28the airbus
41:29slams into
41:30the hills,
41:33killing
41:33everyone
41:34on board.
41:41this is
41:42one of
41:42the most
41:43extraordinary
41:44accidents
41:45I've seen.
41:48There were
41:49no technical
41:50factors in
41:51this accident.
41:53There was
41:54nothing wrong
41:55with the
41:56aircraft,
41:57there was
41:57nothing wrong
41:57with the
41:58engines.
41:59It was
41:59all a
42:01matter of
42:01human
42:02misjudgment
42:02and human
42:03error.
42:10if he
42:11doesn't
42:11try the
42:11approach
42:12in
42:12nav mode,
42:13there's
42:14no accident.
42:16All the
42:17warning signs
42:18were there,
42:19telling them
42:19what to do.
42:22It should
42:22have been
42:23easy to
42:23recover.
42:25Very.
42:27If he
42:27hadn't
42:27taken his
42:28first officer
42:28out of
42:29the picture,
42:31different
42:32outcome.
42:34absolutely
42:35incredible.
42:41it's hard
42:42to believe
42:43that somebody
42:44of his
42:44experience
42:45would make
42:46so many
42:47errors
42:48and
42:49mishandling
42:50of the
42:51aircraft.
42:52It just,
42:54it justifies
42:55logic.
42:58The final
42:59report into
43:00the crash
43:01of Air
43:01Blue
43:01Flight
43:02202
43:03makes
43:03several
43:04recommendations
43:04to
43:05Pakistani
43:05airlines,
43:07including
43:07better
43:08briefings
43:09on the
43:09circling
43:09approach
43:10procedures
43:10and
43:11better
43:12crew
43:12management
43:13training.
43:15This
43:16accident
43:16shows
43:17that
43:17cockpit
43:17management
43:18and
43:19the
43:19atmosphere
43:19in the
43:20cockpit
43:20that's
43:20set
43:21by the
43:21captain
43:21is
43:22just as
43:22important
43:23as an
43:23operating
43:24aircraft
43:24and
43:25operating
43:25engines.
43:26And
43:27in
43:272018,
43:28the
43:29airport
43:29in
43:29Islamabad
43:30is
43:30replaced
43:31with
43:31a
43:31more
43:31modern
43:32airport
43:32with
43:33two
43:33runways
43:33that
43:34are
43:34well
43:34away
43:35from
43:35the
43:35hills
43:35that
43:36claim
43:36the
43:36lives
43:37of
43:37the
43:37152
43:38people
43:39on
43:39board
43:39flight
43:40202.
43:44As
43:45I
43:45learned
43:45more
43:45I
43:47really
43:47felt
43:47extremely
43:48bad.
43:51I
43:52felt
43:52very
43:52sad
43:53about
43:54that
43:54loss.
43:59It
43:59was a
44:00preventable
44:00accident.
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