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00:00¿Qué es la guerra?
00:30¿Qué es la guerra?
01:00¿Qué es la guerra?
01:02¿Qué es la guerra?
01:04¿Qué es la guerra?
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02:28¿Qué es la guerra?
02:30¿Qué es la guerra?
02:32¿Qué es la guerra?
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04:00The submarine menace
04:02had become more serious.
04:04America, at that time still neutral,
04:06saw this as well.
04:08Before December 1941,
04:10the Americans gave Britain considerable help
04:12although not actually being a belligerent
04:14Por ejemplo, en septiembre de 1940, en 1950, más obsolescente, pero no menos precioso,
04:20los americanos fueron entregados a la Royal Navy, y esto haciéndido un no tan insignificante
04:24en bolstrimos de la Royal Navy's convoy defensas.
04:27Además, en 1941, los americanos los británicos los británicos de los británicos de los americanos
04:33en los americanos, y empezaron a enseñar a escuelas para los aeropuertos de los aeropuertos
04:39y los escuelas para los británicos de los británicos en el norte de la norte.
04:46Además, la zona de americanos en el norte de los Estados Unidos y Canadá
04:50se haciéndose a la izquierda de los Estados Unidos.
04:54Esto haciéndose la efecto de los aeropuertos de los aeropuertos de los aeropuertos de los aeropuertos
04:57por el simple motivo de que Hitler fue imposible en 1941, al menos antes de diciembre de 1941,
05:03a dejar de acerir a América y a la prescribir a la guerra.
05:07Astonishingly, this was enough to turn the tide of success.
05:12Despite their tremendous success in World War I,
05:15Hitler had given U-boat construction a low priority.
05:19By the end of 1940, the Germans had lost 31 U-boats and had only 22 left.
05:27All this was to change as the war dragged on.
05:30In May 1941, the German battleship Bismarck was sunk by combined sea and air attack,
05:37leaving the surface fleet with the Tirpitz as their only modern battleship.
05:42She was to be destroyed as she lay at anchor in a Norwegian fjord in November 1944.
05:49This left Germany without a capital surface ship.
05:52Already the plans had been made to replace these losses.
06:03A new directive had been given to the shipyards.
06:06The production of long-range, ocean-going submarines was the new priority.
06:11Once sufficient forces had been built up, they were to operate in the Mid-Atlantic.
06:15Here, serviced by motherships and specially adapted submarines, milk cows,
06:25they were to attack the convoys.
06:29The U-boat fleet was ordered to win the war for Germany
06:33by breaking the sea bridge carrying essential supplies and manpower.
06:37By 1943, the United States of America had entered the war on the British side.
06:53She was supporting the war effort in Europe by supplying materials and men.
06:59All of this had to be transported across the Atlantic Ocean,
07:02where the ships carrying these much-needed supplies
07:05not only faced the worst of weather,
07:08but also a hidden threat of attack by the dreaded U-boat.
07:19New, offensive tactics saw these boats no longer operating as lone raiders.
07:24Spread out along a predetermined line,
07:26they lay in wait for one of their number to make contact with an Allied convoy.
07:31News of this contact was passed to the other submarines by radio.
07:35And the group formed up to attack as a group,
07:39a pack of wolves pursuing relentlessly their defenceless prey.
07:43Often, this wolf pack would bypass the defensive cordon of the surface ships
07:48and get in amongst the merchant ships.
07:51Their feeding frenzy sent ship after ship to the bottom.
07:56This was the greatest threat to an Allied victory
07:59as the war drew towards its close.
08:01Following the end of World War I,
08:18Germany had not originally planned to follow this new tactical direction.
08:22They were stung by their defeat
08:24and were planning how to strike back at their conquerors.
08:29To make good any sort of threat,
08:31Germany originally thought it needed a strong surface fleet.
08:34The Treaty of Versailles that formally ended the First World War
08:38was to lay down strict limits as to the size
08:40and number of ships that Germany was allowed to build.
08:43At that time, the threat was seen as the new Bolshevik state of Russia.
08:49If it chose to expand into the Baltic,
08:52then Germany would be the first to confront it.
08:55The number of ships permitted
08:57were designed to enable Germany to meet such a threat.
09:00The Treaty Limited Navy
09:02was to consist of no more than eight pre-dreadnought battleships
09:06and some smaller vessels.
09:08They were not permitted to build any submarines or modern ships.
09:15This was designed to cause German warship designers
09:18to lose touch with all aspects of modern warship design
09:21when rapid developments were in the offing.
09:25So effectively, during the 1920s
09:27and the first part of the 1930s,
09:29the German Navy did very little building at all.
09:32And that meant that it was a long way behind the British
09:35when the race began in the 1930s
09:38to start building battleships.
09:41Unable to build the Navy,
09:43they fell back on theory.
09:45Consideration was given to the factors
09:47that led to their defeat in the First World War
09:49and how they could be overcome in any future conflict.
09:56One factor remained unalterable,
09:59their disadvantaged geographical position.
10:02The Baltic provided Germany
10:05with some of its only effective naval home bases.
10:08The tactical position for a confrontation at sea
10:11was very poor.
10:13Leaving their home bases,
10:15any German capital ships
10:16had to run the gauntlet of the shield
10:18provided by the home fleets of Britain
10:20and her allies.
10:21Only if these could be met on equal terms
10:26would there be any chance of victory.
10:29It was with this in mind
10:30that a plan of reconstruction,
10:33Plan Z, was conceived.
10:34Plan Z, was drawn up in 1937-1938,
10:42and it was the long-term plan
10:44for the development of the Creek's marine.
10:47They intended to build,
10:49over a period of perhaps eight years or more,
10:53something like ten new battleships,
10:56plus two aircraft carriers,
10:58plus destroyers and cruisers proportionately.
11:03This would take a long time,
11:05and Plan Z was not intended to come into effect
11:08until about the middle of the 1940s.
11:11In the broad planning of the war,
11:14Hitler did not expect to have to fight Britain
11:16until after he had conquered all of mainland Europe.
11:20This would be after 1944.
11:22Plan Z was built on this premise.
11:26His principal aim was to conquer land in the east,
11:30to conquer European Russia.
11:33For this, he would need an army and an air force,
11:36and that's where the resources went in the 1930s.
11:40The Navy would be needed at a considerably later stage
11:44when perhaps he had to fight Britain
11:47or the United States of America.
11:50Maritime trade was the lifeblood
11:53of the dispersed British Empire and its dominions.
11:56Germany saw that this was the strength
11:58and weakness of the British position.
12:02If German naval forces were able to threaten
12:05or sever these long and vulnerable trade routes,
12:08Britain would no longer be able to wage war around the world
12:11using these flexible and economic lines of communication.
12:20Royal naval plans were compromised when France fell in 1940,
12:24and the Germans shifted their main U-Bot bases
12:26to the western coast of France,
12:28giving them direct access to the Atlantic
12:30and to the British lines of communications
12:33in the middle of that ocean.
12:34The Royal Navy now suffered from the fact
12:37that it lacked the necessary warships.
12:39Its existing escorts could only patrol and escort ships
12:43600 miles to the west of Ireland.
12:46As a result of this, shipping losses in 1939,
12:49and in particular in 1940,
12:51when 40 million tonnes,
12:53or a quarter of the British pre-war merchant shipping,
12:56were sunk,
12:57created a major threat to Britain.
13:00A traditionally organized modern navy
13:04was to be a key part of these plans.
13:07Plan Z laid down the orders
13:09for the construction of such a fleet.
13:16Six new battleships were to be built by 1944.
13:20They were to be supported by four new heavy cruisers
13:23to be finished by 1943,
13:25with a further four more ready in 1945.
13:27Four light cruisers were to be operational by 1944,
13:32and a further 13 added to the fleet by 1948.
13:36The two aircraft carriers already under construction
13:39and due for completion by 1944,
13:42were to be increased to four by 1947.
13:46Similarly, new submarines were to be ordered,
13:48128 by 1943,
13:51and a further 95 by 1947.
13:53When these new ships were added
14:00to the two battleships already being built,
14:02and the existing two battle cruisers,
14:04three armored cruisers,
14:05three heavy and five light cruisers,
14:07and the 44 submarines,
14:09Plan Z was to deliver Hitler
14:11a formidable conventional naval fleet.
14:13The authors of Plan Z knew that they could never hope
14:19to surpass the naval strength of Britain.
14:22From their superior starting force
14:24of 15 battleships and battle cruisers,
14:26six aircraft carriers,
14:2853 heavy and light cruisers,
14:30hundreds of destroyers and other light warships,
14:33and 38 submarines,
14:35accelerated building would meet the threat of Plan Z.
14:38Britain would always have more ships.
14:41The planners knew that this was only half the story.
14:46Britain had obligations to maintain a naval presence
14:49in the Far East and the Mediterranean.
14:52This would prevent her concentrating all her ships in home waters,
14:56and in this way, Plan Z would succeed.
14:59If Plan Z had been on schedule,
15:03it is a very large condition indeed,
15:06because you have to presuppose swift victory in Russia
15:09and then a period of time to build the ships.
15:12But making that assumption,
15:15then it does become an interesting,
15:17counterfactual question in history.
15:20I think one would argue
15:22that although the Germans would then be
15:25in a very strong position indeed,
15:27both geographically and in terms of the ships available,
15:31you have to assume that the British
15:32would have responded to that situation as well
15:35by building more big battleships themselves.
15:38And you have to accept too
15:40that America would have come into the war
15:43if not in 1941,
15:44then perhaps in 1942, 1943.
15:53Plan Z was formalised after Hitler
15:55had ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938.
16:02Even before this programmed acceleration of reconstruction
16:05for the German fleet,
16:07plans have been put into practice
16:08to rebuild a strong sea-based force.
16:13The restrictions laid upon Germany
16:14by the Treaty of Versailles
16:15had led German designers
16:17to create a new class of warship.
16:33International treaties defined capital ships,
16:36the largest and most powerful naval vessel afloat
16:39or being built,
16:40in terms of their gross tonnage
16:41and the armament that they carried.
16:44The Treaty of Versailles
16:46that ended the First World War
16:47had laid down strict specifications
16:49for any German replacement capital ships.
16:53At that time,
16:54these were the battleships.
16:57Germany was not permitted
16:58to build any new battleships
17:00that exceeded 10,000 tons
17:01and were to be armed
17:03with guns larger than 11 inches.
17:04The German navy used this replacement battleship tonnage
17:09to build the new pocket battleships.
17:12The weight was the key.
17:18By removing the thick turret and belt armour
17:21and restricting the numbers
17:22and sizes of the guns carried on these vessels,
17:25a new type of warship was built.
17:27This class was outside the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
17:31because it was not a battleship
17:33and therefore not of capital rank.
17:36For example,
17:38if you have a heavy cruiser of around 10,000 tons,
17:41you might put 8-inch guns on it.
17:43The Germans put 11-inch guns on the ships.
17:47They accepted that they could only put two turrets
17:49of 11-inch guns on it
17:51rather than the normal four or so,
17:55but they thought that getting the heavier weight of shell
17:59would more than compensate for this.
18:03Further weight saving was made
18:05by the use of electric arc welding
18:07to construct a lighter hull.
18:09These ships were fitted with diesel engines.
18:11This gave them a large radius of operation
18:14for modest bunkerage.
18:16For the German naval architect,
18:18these ships were a tour de force.
18:23The Finnish ships were of intermediate size and capability
18:26between heavy cruisers and battleships.
18:29They were designed to outfight any ship
18:31they could not outrun
18:32and to outrun any ships they could not outfight.
18:37The Germans called these vessels
18:39panzershift, armoured ships.
18:42They were known by Britain and her allies
18:44as the formidable pocket battleships.
18:54These were destined to fulfil a corsair role.
18:58They were to operate independently far from their home port,
19:01to threaten merchant ships carrying vital supplies,
19:03and raid the lines of communication and trade.
19:16At the same time,
19:18fast coastal raiders were also being designed and built.
19:21These were ideally suited to operations within the Baltic,
19:24where they could strike at an attacker with guns and torpedoes,
19:27using their speed for defence.
19:29Following the fall of France
19:31and the German seizure of their channel ports
19:34as forward bases of operation,
19:36these craft became known as the E-boats
19:38that harried and destroyed vital convoys
19:40as they made their way up the channel.
19:44When these attacks were made in the company of air cover,
19:47they had a devastating effect
19:49on shipping in the coastal areas of German-controlled land.
19:53Attacks were even made directly
19:54against port facilities on the south coast.
19:57Recently, records have been released
20:00that report the effects of a major attack
20:03by these E-boats
20:04on a rehearsal for the D-Day landings in Normandy.
20:07Coming upon this exercise without warning,
20:10they were able to inflict severe damage
20:12on an unprepared enemy operating in Lime Bay.
20:15The extent of the loss of life this attack caused
20:18shows how efficient these craft had become.
20:22Thus, the surface arm was well prepared for the conflict.
20:27The undersea arm of the Navy was not forgotten either.
20:35Here, the Germans had seen their greatest success
20:38in the First World War.
20:39This was not lost on the Allies,
20:42who were at a strict embargo
20:43to prevent the building of any submarines
20:45into the Treaty of Versailles.
20:47This did not prevent German preparations, however.
20:52Prevented from actually building submarines,
20:53theoretical craft were designed
20:56for the time when they could be built.
20:58That time came with the implementation of Plan Z
21:01and was accelerated with actual start
21:03of the Second World War.
21:05In this way,
21:07the undersea arm of the German Navy
21:08was ready to play its decisive part
21:10later in the war.
21:12In light of its experience in the First World War,
21:17when it defeated a substantial German U-boat campaign,
21:21it would be expected that in 1939,
21:23the Royal Navy had in place the doctrine,
21:25ships and tactics for dealing with
21:27a resurgent German U-boat threat.
21:30Indeed, in terms of sheer ship numbers,
21:32the Royal Navy still had a massive amount of force,
21:34in particular for the protection of trade,
21:36over 201 destroyers.
21:39She had a vantage in geographic position.
21:41German U-boats would have to come into the Atlantic
21:43through the Straits of Dover
21:44and through the narrows to the north
21:46between Scotland, Iceland and Greenland.
21:49However, it is shocking to note
21:51that in the interwar years,
21:52the Admiralty had not carried out
21:54any operational analysis
21:56of how it had defeated the U-boat threat
21:58in the First World War.
22:00Furthermore, in 1937,
22:01the Admiralty declared that its ASDIC sonar system
22:04had meant that the U-boat threat
22:06could never be as serious to Britain
22:08as it had in 1917,
22:10when Britain had come within six weeks of defeat.
22:21The fate of the two arms of the Kriegsmarine
22:24and their relative strength
22:25was linked to the two admirals
22:27who led it under Hitler's leadership.
22:31His first appointment was Erik Rader.
22:37He had made his mark as Chief of Staff
22:39to the commander of the High Seas Fleet
22:40Battlecruiser Force in World War I.
22:44His main attributes were caution
22:46and systematic thought.
22:49He favoured the establishment
22:50of a traditionally shaped navy
22:52with the right organisational framework.
22:54If this was to be achieved,
22:59steady progress had to be made
23:00in the design and construction
23:02of the correct blend of warships
23:04optimised for the surface role,
23:06but not ignoring the underwater role.
23:08This underwater role had its champion
23:17in Carl Donitz.
23:19It was the major successes
23:20of this undersea branch that he commanded
23:22that threatened Britain's survival
23:24and that was to lead to his appointment
23:26as Rader's successor.
23:28This happened in January 1943,
23:31but Rader's stock had been falling for some time.
23:34It was the loss of the Bismarck
23:43that led Hitler to order a major change
23:45in German naval policy.
23:47Before that event,
23:49the use of German capital ships
23:50acting as lone raiders
23:51to hound and threaten allied merchantmen
23:53had been partially successful.
23:57Certainly on a number of occasions,
24:00German major surface vessels
24:01such as the Bismarck
24:02did sally forth from their ports
24:05in order to try to interdict
24:06allied or British convoy traffic.
24:09However, these were relatively rare occasions
24:12and although they did cause
24:14quite substantial temporary disruption
24:16to convoy timetables
24:18and indeed sink a few allied ships,
24:21generally speaking,
24:22the effect was negligible
24:23in overall terms.
24:25When the Bismarck was sunk
24:28trying to escape to open sea
24:29to perform this role,
24:31Hitler was so incensed
24:32that he forbade any further warship forays
24:35into the Atlantic.
24:37Rader was quietly furious.
24:40Hitler had never been a believer
24:42in the desirability of a major surface navy
24:44and this decision saw a further weakening
24:47of Rader's position.
24:49While hindsight reveals
24:50that Hitler was right in his decision,
24:52surface ships consumed vast quantities
24:55of valuable fuel
24:56and required skilled manpower.
24:59This was another nail
25:00in the coffin of a fleet
25:01that was producing
25:02a steadily declining return
25:04for the great investment required.
25:13Rader's position
25:14had been greatly undermined.
25:16Matters came to a head
25:22following the failure
25:23of the German 6th Army
25:24to survive in Stalingrad.
25:27Hitler ordered the scrapping
25:28of all Germany's major surface ships
25:30so that their weapons
25:31could be used to bolster
25:32the anti-invasion defences of Norway
25:34and their manpower
25:36sent to perform other much-needed duties.
25:40Plan Z was the long-term plan
25:42for the German fleet.
25:43It presupposed
25:45that Germany would fight
25:47that war of expansion
25:48in Russia
25:49in 1941-42,
25:52win it,
25:53and then have several years of peace
25:55to exploit the resources
25:57of iron and steel
25:58and so forth
25:59which they would then get.
26:01Then, by 1946,
26:03you would be able
26:03to start building the fleet.
26:05Unfortunately for them,
26:06the war in Russia
26:07continued and continued
26:09and continued
26:10so they never had the opportunity
26:12to draw the resources there
26:14which would have built the fleet.
26:15In other words,
26:16it was the continuance
26:17of the war
26:18which made it impossible
26:20to build up Plan Z.
26:22They had to spend
26:24so much of the steel
26:26and resources
26:27that they had available
26:28upon the army
26:29and the air force.
26:31Raider could not accept this
26:33and offered his resignation
26:35which was readily accepted.
26:39Donitz was appointed
26:40as his successor.
26:42His relationship with Hitler
26:43was not to be a distant one
26:44as had been his predecessors.
26:47Donitz was able
26:48to work closely with Hitler.
26:50So successful was he
26:52that Hitler named him
26:53as his successor
26:54in his will.
26:54I think there were two reasons
27:00why Donitz enjoyed
27:01better relations with Hitler
27:02than had Admiral Raider.
27:05The first is that
27:06Donitz was a better Nazi.
27:08He seemed to have embodied
27:09the philosophy of the regime
27:11more effectively
27:12than the earlier admiral.
27:15But the other reason
27:16is that Donitz
27:17was associated with submarines.
27:19He was a submarine commander.
27:21And for a period
27:22in the middle part of the war,
27:24the submarines appeared
27:25to be giving the Germans
27:26a great advantage.
27:28Whereas the surface fleet
27:29associated with Raider,
27:31his predecessor,
27:33had not given
27:33such a good account of itself.
27:36Hitler therefore respected
27:37the man who commanded
27:38the more effective weapon.
27:41Donitz's first success
27:42was in persuading Hitler
27:43to rescind the scrapping order.
27:46Not only did this preserve
27:47the major ships
27:48of the surface force,
27:49but it also maintained them
27:51as a means of strengthening
27:52the defences of Norway
27:53against any Allied landings.
27:59But he had served
28:00in submarines
28:01during the First World War
28:02and maintained his interest
28:04during the years
28:05when all development
28:06had had to be theoretical.
28:08It was with these craft
28:10that he saw a chance
28:12of victory.
28:13Donitz was to put in place
28:15a program of construction
28:16that saw this undersea arm
28:18grow to be the major force
28:19that was to threaten
28:20the Allied effort.
28:22It was a comparatively quick
28:24and cheap method
28:24of developing a real threat
28:26to the maritime lines
28:27of supply and communication.
28:30Earlier in the war,
28:32this role had fallen
28:33to the surface arm.
28:35But the war had started
28:36five years too early
28:37for the German Navy.
28:38By following Plan Z,
28:41they had planned
28:42to build up
28:43a balanced fleet
28:44which by 1944
28:45would have been strong enough
28:47to challenge
28:47the Royal Navy's
28:48command of the sea.
28:50With the misjudgment
28:51of the British
28:51and French attitude
28:53to the invasion of Poland,
28:55Germany was forced
28:55to go to war
28:56with its plans
28:57for the fleet incomplete.
28:58The fleet at the start
29:19of the war
29:19was led by three
29:20of the new pocket battleships
29:21and two battlecruisers.
29:24These were optimized
29:25for raiding
29:26rather than fleet actions.
29:29The rest of the fleet,
29:30two heavy cruisers,
29:32six light cruisers,
29:3334 destroyers
29:34and torpedo boats
29:35and 57 submarines,
29:37was also inadequate
29:38for fleet operations.
29:41So you were left
29:42with a rather oddly
29:43balanced fleet
29:44with two big battleships,
29:47two smaller battleships
29:48and very little
29:50in the way of destroyers
29:51and cruisers
29:51to give them support.
29:53And of course,
29:54no aircraft carrier at all
29:55because the Graf Zeppelin
29:57was never in fact completed.
30:01The outbreak of war
30:02made Plan Z obsolete
30:04and Raider was forced
30:06into a complete rethink
30:07of the strategy
30:08available to him.
30:10In the early months
30:11of the war,
30:12he was forced
30:12to restrict his surface force
30:14to commerce raiding.
30:16The Deutschland,
30:17Scharnhorst,
30:18and Nisenhau
30:19made sorties
30:19into the North Atlantic
30:20but achieved little success.
30:26The Graf's Bay
30:28made a real impact
30:29with the successful cruise
30:30in the Indian
30:30and South Atlantic oceans.
30:33Even this
30:34was to end
30:35in confusion and failure.
30:38Cornered in the mouth
30:39of the river plate
30:39by one New Zealand
30:40and two British cruisers,
30:42she was scuttled
30:43by her captain
30:44rather than let her
30:45fall into the hands
30:46of what he thought
30:47was an overwhelmingly
30:48superior Allied force.
30:52The Germans
30:53possessed only
30:54a small surface fleet
30:55at the outbreak of war.
30:56It could not engage
30:57the Royal Navy
30:58in a Jutland-style
30:59classic naval battle.
31:00It would have been
31:01comprehensively defeated.
31:03The German raiders
31:04themselves
31:04are often exaggerated
31:05in their impact.
31:06Most famous
31:07is the Admiral
31:08Graf Spee pocket battleship.
31:10The Graf Spee,
31:11however,
31:11had only sunk
31:12nine ships
31:13in her cruise,
31:14a total of 50,000 tonnes.
31:16Indeed,
31:17the German Navy's
31:17only reasonable success
31:19was in February 1942
31:20when the two battle cruisers,
31:22the Scharnhorst
31:22and the Nijnau,
31:23broke into the Atlantic
31:24and sunk
31:25a further 110,000.
31:27But when one sets
31:28these figures
31:28against the fact
31:29that overall
31:30the German Air Force
31:31and U-boats
31:32were responsible
31:33for the loss
31:34of something in the region
31:35of 21 million tonnes
31:37of shipping
31:37in World War II,
31:39their contribution
31:39was small.
31:41In overall terms,
31:42the German surface raiders
31:44cannot be accounted
31:45a major success.
31:46Even the conversion
31:47of merchant vessel
31:48into secret raiders
31:49had little effect.
31:51These middle-sized vessels
31:52carried medium-caliber guns
31:54and torpedoes
31:54with which to attack
31:56Allied merchant shipping.
31:58Some of their targets
31:59were captured
31:59and a prized crew
32:01delegated to sail it back
32:02to a German home port.
32:04These raiders,
32:05of which there were only seven,
32:07were to account
32:07for more than twice
32:08the tonnage of ships
32:09sunk than the conventional
32:10warships
32:11which acted
32:12as surface raiders.
32:14However,
32:15it was one of these
32:16conventional warships
32:17that was to achieve
32:19the Kriegsmarine's
32:20greatest early success.
32:21The Bismarck,
32:29in the company
32:29of the heavy cruiser
32:30Prince Eugene,
32:32was making its way
32:32into the North Atlantic
32:33during May 1941.
32:36After leaving
32:37the Baltic Sea,
32:38the two ships
32:39had evaded
32:39the British patrols
32:40by following the coast
32:41of occupied Norway
32:42until they could turn
32:44round the north
32:44of Iceland.
32:46This was to give them
32:47access to the North Atlantic
32:48Ocean via the Denmark
32:50strait between Iceland
32:51and Greenland.
32:54It was here
32:55that the raiders
32:56encountered a strong
32:57British force
32:58led by the pride
32:59of the Royal Navy,
33:01the battlecruiser Hood.
33:03She succumbed
33:04to accurate long-range fire
33:06and the raiders
33:07were free to move away
33:08into the Atlantic.
33:10Here,
33:10they were to be
33:11a potential major threat,
33:13a notable victory
33:14for the surface arm
33:15of the German Navy.
33:16The Royal Navy
33:19saw the danger
33:19that this placed
33:20upon the passage
33:21of the North Atlantic
33:21convoys.
33:23They responded
33:24by detaching
33:25three more capital ships
33:26and an aircraft carrier
33:28from the home fleet
33:28and a further capital ship
33:30and another aircraft carrier
33:32from Gibraltar
33:33to hunt down
33:34the Bismarck.
33:35Once she was sighted
33:37by a British flying boat,
33:38contact was maintained
33:39until a torpedo bomber attack
33:42by swordfish aircraft
33:43launched by Ark Royal
33:44damaged the battleship's rudder.
33:47This allowed
33:48the British heavy ships
33:49to close
33:50and make contact.
33:55In the ensuing battle,
33:56they were to sink the Bismarck
33:58with all but 100
33:59of her 2,300 crew.
34:04From its greatest success
34:05with the sinking of the Hood,
34:07the Bismarck had gone on
34:08to record the greatest failure
34:10of the surface arm
34:11to achieve its proclaimed target
34:13of harassing the merchant ships
34:14with their surface raiders.
34:20It was following this episode
34:22that the emphasis
34:23of the German Navy's construction,
34:25manning,
34:25and operations
34:26were shifted away
34:27from the surface fleet
34:28to the submarine arm.
34:31The successes
34:32that the use of U-boats
34:33had achieved
34:34in the First World War
34:35led to the hope
34:36that here lay the answer
34:37to winning the war at sea.
34:42The first German submarines
34:44to be built for service
34:45in the Second World War
34:46were small
34:46and relatively ineffective boats.
34:49They were little better
34:50than those with which
34:51Germany had finished
34:52the First World War.
34:53They had been built
34:54for coastal operations.
34:57This meant that
34:58the British Navy
34:58was able to formulate
34:59an effective defense strategy.
35:01The limited range
35:04of these coastal submarines
35:06meant that
35:07the anti-submarine defenses
35:08could be concentrated
35:09in the bottleneck regions
35:10of the northwest
35:11and southwest approaches.
35:13In the black hole
35:15of the mid-Atlantic,
35:16beyond the range
35:17of the land-based air support,
35:19there was greater need
35:20for defense
35:20from surface raiders.
35:23British ships
35:24were deployed
35:24to stations
35:25where they were most effective.
35:27To disrupt this deployment,
35:29Germany was desperate
35:30to produce more
35:31ocean-going submarines
35:32to move out
35:33into the black hole.
35:36In the months
35:37immediately before
35:38the outbreak of World War II,
35:40the quality and number
35:41of these boats
35:42was improved.
35:44Despite this,
35:45at the outbreak
35:45of hostilities,
35:46Germany still only had 22
35:48of these necessary
35:49ocean-going submarines.
35:52To understand
35:53the problems
35:54that Dernit's faced,
35:55one has to look at
35:56how the operations unfold
35:57and that they actually
35:58move in a cyclical manner.
36:00That is to say,
36:01at the start of the war,
36:03Dernit's had in place
36:0450% of his U-boats
36:05around the British coast.
36:07These carried out
36:07quite an effective
36:08series of attacks
36:09in September and October.
36:11But by November,
36:12in rough seas,
36:13they needed replenishment,
36:15they needed repair.
36:16They thus returned to port
36:17and Dernit's did not
36:18possess enough submarines
36:19to replace them instantly.
36:21Thus, November,
36:22December, January
36:23of late 1940
36:25and early 1941
36:26were periods of quiet,
36:27calm for the British.
36:28In early 1941,
36:30the German U-boats
36:31were replenished,
36:32set back out
36:32into the Atlantic
36:33and in April inflicted
36:34their highest rate
36:35of loss ever,
36:36640,000 tonnes
36:38in one month.
36:39But, once again,
36:41British countermeasures
36:41and the fact
36:42that the existing U-boats
36:43were again coming
36:44to the end
36:45of their operational cycle
36:46meant that in August,
36:48losses once again declined.
36:50Following the cancellation
36:51of Plan Z,
36:53production rose
36:54from 20 to 30 boats
36:55each month.
36:57The majority of these
36:58was the type V2C class
37:00of ocean-going submarines.
37:02These 770-ton craft
37:04were tightly packed
37:05with machinery
37:06and equipment
37:07inside the small
37:08pressure hull.
37:09This left limited space
37:11for the crew.
37:12On long voyages,
37:13this space became
37:14almost uninhabitable.
37:15Great things were expected
37:21of these boats.
37:23In spite of the increased
37:24production,
37:24they were to remain
37:25in short supply.
37:27The commanders
37:27of this arm of the fleet
37:28were careful
37:29to husband their resources
37:30in the face
37:31of the determined defence
37:32of the Royal Navy.
37:34As the numbers
37:35of submarines
37:36and crews grew,
37:37so did the threat
37:38that they presented.
37:42Despite the development
37:43of new types
37:44of anti-submarine
37:45surface ships,
37:45the German U-boats
37:47were still threatening
37:47the vital supply lines.
37:59Once Germany
38:00had completed
38:01its land campaigns
38:02of April to June 1940,
38:04it now had access
38:05to bases
38:06from the northern tip
38:07of Norway
38:07to the border of France
38:09with Spain.
38:11This gave them
38:12the tactical advantage.
38:14No longer
38:15did the sea-going submarines
38:16have to make the long,
38:18dangerous and uncomfortable
38:19trip through the North Sea
38:20and round the northernmost
38:22point of the British Isles.
38:24Operating out of the French ports
38:25on the western coast,
38:27they had a shortcut
38:28to the mid-Atlantic.
38:29During much of the most important period
38:33from late 1940
38:35through to mid-1943,
38:37Dönitz's headquarters
38:38was actually located
38:39in France,
38:41sometimes in Paris
38:42or around Paris,
38:43and at other points
38:44near Lorient,
38:45which was one of the major
38:46German U-boat bases
38:48in the Brittany Peninsula.
38:49In June 1940,
38:53the submarine sank
38:5458 Allied ships,
38:57totalling 284,000 tons.
39:01By September,
39:02this had risen
39:02to 63 ships
39:04and 350,000 tons.
39:08Dönitz was pleased
39:09with the success.
39:11The Allied tactics
39:13began to be deflected
39:14from their invasion plans
39:15to meet this
39:16underwater menace.
39:17Canada began to provide
39:27a larger number
39:28of effective
39:28anti-submarine patrols
39:30flown by aircraft
39:31operating off
39:32its eastern seaboard.
39:36The United States
39:37took Greenland
39:38under its protection,
39:40garrisoned Iceland,
39:41and made provision
39:42to provide its own
39:43anti-submarine escorts.
39:47Dönitz remained confident.
39:52He estimated
39:53that he needed
39:53some 300 boats
39:54to achieve the objective
39:56of severing
39:57the British lines
39:57of communication.
39:59He was never to have
40:01that number of boats
40:01available.
40:03There were never
40:04enough U-boats.
40:06Germany entered
40:06the war in 1939
40:07with only 57
40:09operational U-boats,
40:10and although the number
40:11later climbed
40:12in 1943 and 1944
40:14to several hundred,
40:16by virtue of the fact
40:17that many of them
40:18had to be fitting out
40:19or were training
40:20their crews
40:20or were moving
40:22back and forth
40:23between their patrol stations
40:25and their ports,
40:26it meant that only
40:27a very small proportion,
40:29very rarely more than 20%,
40:31were ever actually
40:32on patrol
40:33in battle stations,
40:34if you like,
40:35in the central
40:35or indeed the western
40:36and eastern Atlantic.
40:37The wolf pack tactic
40:51was born to make
40:52the most effective use
40:53of what was available.
40:55This operational method
40:57for the submarines
40:58saw them deployed
40:59in packs of between
41:0015 and 20.
41:02Each pack was spaced
41:04to maximize the chances
41:05of a convoy being detected.
41:07Once detected,
41:13radio messages
41:14were used
41:15to guide the pack
41:15to an interception position
41:16from which several
41:18concerted attacks
41:19could be launched.
41:21Their tactics
41:23were to place
41:24a string
41:25or a line
41:26of U-boats
41:27across the northern Atlantic
41:29to observe the passage
41:31of any convoys,
41:33report their positions
41:34and so forth.
41:35But they were able
41:36to do this more effectively
41:38because their code breakers
41:40regularly broke
41:42into the Merchant Navy code,
41:44which then very often
41:46gave the position
41:47of merchant ships
41:48as they moved up
41:49to join the convoy
41:50and the convoy formed up.
41:53The headquarters in France
41:55would send out a signal
41:56giving a location,
41:57the U-boats
41:58would head
41:58for that location
41:59and within a day
42:01or two
42:01they would be able
42:02to have a wolf pack
42:03of submarines,
42:05six, eight,
42:06ten or more
42:06attacking the convoy.
42:13A torrent of torpedoes
42:15rained on the British ships.
42:16The Battle of the Atlantic
42:21was swinging Germany's way.
42:24This was not to last.
42:33Britain accelerated
42:35its escort production.
42:37Longer range aircraft
42:38were introduced
42:39that were able
42:40to roam further
42:41into the central Atlantic
42:42where they could search
42:43for the submarines.
42:45Furthermore,
42:45during 1941,
42:47American help,
42:48intelligence breakthroughs,
42:50gradual improvements
42:51in escort detection
42:53and destruction technologies
42:55all brought together
42:56or began to be brought together
42:58at least
42:58in order to make
42:59the U-boats' chances
43:00of achieving decisive success
43:02less and less
43:03as time passed.
43:05Even so,
43:06by January 1943,
43:09the United Kingdom's
43:10essential supplies
43:11had shrunk to reserves
43:12of only three months.
43:13four months later,
43:16by May,
43:17the tide had turned.
43:20In that month,
43:21the Germans lost
43:2238 submarines.
43:24What eventually defeated
43:26the U-boats
43:27was really a combination
43:29of factors.
43:30In the first place,
43:31the British,
43:32the Americans
43:32and the Canadians
43:33produced a large number
43:35of convoy escorts.
43:37By 1943,
43:38there were many more
43:39escorts available
43:40than had been the case before.
43:41Secondly,
43:43the escorts
43:44now had radar.
43:49U-boats,
43:50by virtue of their
43:51engine design,
43:52could only move
43:52submerged
43:53at very slow speeds,
43:55essentially at about
43:56two or three knots.
43:57They had to move
43:59on the surface
43:59if they wanted
44:00to move faster than that,
44:01where they could use
44:02their diesel engines
44:03and allow the exhaust fumes,
44:04of course,
44:04to get out of the boat
44:05in the process.
44:06U-boats travelling
44:07on the surface
44:07could be picked up
44:08by either airborne
44:09or seaborne radar
44:11or by other means
44:12of location
44:13and ships and aircraft
44:15could then be directed
44:16against them.
44:18In terms of moving
44:19submerged underwater,
44:21German U-boats
44:21could also be picked up
44:23by a range
44:24of anti-submarine
44:25warfare techniques
44:26and could then be targeted
44:27by things like
44:28depth charges
44:29and mortars
44:29and so forth.
44:31So the U-boats,
44:32although lethal
44:33when they could actually
44:34close with the enemy
44:35and engage,
44:36suffered from a number
44:37of debilitating problems
44:39during the Second World War
44:40that certainly compromised
44:41their chances of winning
44:42the Battle of Atlantic.
44:44Donitz hoped
44:45that Germany's position
44:46of superiority
44:47would be restored
44:48by new engineering developers.
44:51The Schnorkel,
44:52or Snorkel Mast,
44:54was designed
44:54to enable a submarine
44:55to run submerged
44:56and make use
44:58of its diesel engines.
44:59This would enable it
45:01to travel faster
45:02than on battery power.
45:07A new propulsion system
45:09based on the decomposition
45:10of hydrogen peroxide
45:11was also tried
45:13to give greater speed.
45:15This was one
45:16of several improvements
45:17that were included
45:18in the Type 21.
45:21Its more streamlined hull
45:22and conning tower
45:23helped this type of craft
45:25to achieve greater speeds
45:26and range.
45:28Despite all these improvements,
45:29Germany was to lose
45:31the Battle of the Atlantic.
45:34Events elsewhere
45:35conspired against them.
45:37The United States
45:38had entered the war
45:39and their resources
45:40were being poured
45:41across the ocean
45:41in an ever-increasing tide.
45:44New escorts
45:45in greater numbers
45:46accompanied these convoys.
45:47Between May
45:51and September 1943,
45:533,546 merchant ships
45:56crossed the Atlantic
45:56in 62 convoys
45:58without suffering
45:59a single loss
46:01to submarine attack.
46:03The American shipyards
46:04were producing merchant ships
46:05at a rate of construction
46:07that exceeded losses
46:08by some 6 million tons
46:10in this period.
46:12Even with these improvements,
46:14the key factor
46:15was the German losses.
46:17Germany lost 204 U-boats
46:24during this time.
46:25The greatest tragedy
46:26was neither the destruction
46:27of the craft
46:28nor the loss of their crew
46:30but the deaths
46:31of large numbers
46:32of experienced commanders
46:33and their subordinates.
46:35With these men
46:36went all the wealth
46:37of operational experience
46:39and the chance
46:40of passing the lessons
46:41of experience
46:42onto trainee crews.
46:43The Battle of the Atlantic
46:46was lost
46:46with the death
46:48of these men.
46:50The Kriegsmarine
46:52also saw defeat elsewhere.
46:54The German Navy's
46:55last major surface battle
46:56took place
46:57in December 1943
46:59of the extreme northern tip
47:01of Norway.
47:01In this battle
47:03of the Barents Sea
47:04the Scharnhorst
47:05was caught
47:06between the British battleship
47:07Duke of York
47:08and two heavy cruisers.
47:10The Scharnhorst
47:11was sunk
47:12with the loss
47:12of all but 36
47:13of her 1900 crew.
47:15This left the Tirpitz
47:21as the only capital ship
47:22still available
47:23to the Germans.
47:25She was sunk
47:26in a bombing raid
47:27in 1944.
47:29All other German
47:30large warships
47:31were used either
47:32as training ships
47:33or as monitors
47:34for army operations.
47:36With the eventual failure
47:38of both the surface
47:39and undersea arms
47:41of the Kriegsmarine
47:42the prophecy made
47:44of the outbreak
47:44of the war
47:45by its commander-in-chief
47:46had finally come true.
47:49He had said
47:50the forces
47:51are so inferior
47:53in numbers
47:53and strength
47:54to those
47:54of the British fleet
47:55that they can do
47:56no more than show
47:57that they know
47:58how to die gallantly.
48:15the forces
48:26with the ship
48:26and will be
48:27for a better
48:28than ever.
48:28Gracias por ver el video
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