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00:00In the modern battle fleet, the aircraft carrier takes pride of place.
00:12It is now unthinkable that a modern superpower could join battle without the aircraft carrier at the heart of its fleet.
00:22Yet despite its crucial role, the aircraft carrier is a comparatively young invention.
00:30Carriers only rose to prominence during the maelstrom of World War II when the cunning of the Japanese Imperial Navy unleashed the full power of the carrier on the unsuspecting world.
01:00In the dim morning light of December 5th, 1941, far out in the North Pacific,
01:28a powerful Japanese fleet was steaming rapidly eastwards with great stealth.
01:32The commander, Admiral Nagumo, deliberately steered a course to minimize the risk of observation by foreign ships or aircraft.
01:39The destination, Pearl Harbor.
01:42The huge Japanese armada under Nagumo's command was radically different from any naval task force ever before assembled.
01:50At its core, rode a group of six large ultra-modern aircraft carriers, which between them could fly off more than 360 warplanes.
01:59The long seagoing reach of the carriers matched with the formidable strike capacity of their air complement gave the combined fleet an offensive capability unprecedented in naval history.
02:09The concept of a mass airstrike mounted exclusively from ships was still novel and Admiral Nagumo was not convinced it would prove effective.
02:20Nevertheless, he prepared his fleet for action following a meticulously prepared timetable.
02:25The attack could only be stopped by express orders from the commander-in-chief in Tokyo, Admiral Isroko Yamamoto.
02:45At one time, Japan and the United States had been moving closer to war.
02:49Japan nurtured ambitions to become the dominant regional power in Asia, and her aggressive expansion on the Chinese mainland roused American anxieties.
03:04So far, American retaliation had been limited to crippling economic sanctions.
03:08High-level negotiations between the two sides were continued in Washington, but by midnight on December 6th, both sides knew they would surely fail.
03:17As the talks continued, the task force swung around on the more southerly course, heading for a bearing 200 miles from the Hawaiian Islands.
03:26Far away in Tokyo, Yamamoto closely monitored his fleet's progress.
03:35The Admiral was Japan's most gifted commander.
03:38It was because of his energy and foresight that the Imperial Navy possessed its magnificent carrier force.
03:44The strategy devised for the forthcoming campaign was also largely Yamamoto's creation.
03:50He knew that the Soviet Union and Britain were desperately embroiled in their mortal struggle against Hitler's Germany.
03:57In the early months of the war, Japan's principal enemy would be the United States.
04:03In the coming war, Yamamoto believed that Japan's best, and perhaps only chance, was to strike first and to strike hard, so that a weakened America might just be persuaded to sue for peace.
04:18With hindsight, it was a long shot.
04:20But in December 1942, the Japanese high command were convinced it would succeed.
04:26A vital centerpiece of the hit first strategy was a surprise attack against the American base at Pearl Harbor, home of the US Pacific Fleet.
04:35The entire air strength of Yamamoto's carrier force was committed to this single operation.
04:40The entire plan had been carefully tested in a series of war games.
04:45Directly after the first raid on Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto intended to launch a rapid series of further attacks against a wide variety of objectives to destroy the US fleet.
04:55There was never a serious intention of an assault on the US mainland.
05:00Yamamoto's only hope was that by the time America had rebuilt her naval strength, Japan would have secured a great empire, protected by a vast ring of island bases around the Pacific, from which she could successfully negotiate a peace settlement.
05:13Success in the initial carrier strike was therefore crucial.
05:18Yamamoto's confidence had been strengthened by the performance of similar British carriers in the European war.
05:24He had made an intensive study on the raid of Taranto Harbor the previous year, when a strong Italian battleship was disabled by a handful of elderly British biplanes.
05:35Yamamoto saw to it that his aircraft carried torpedoes, specifically adapted to drop and run in shallow harbor waters.
05:50As the carrier group approached the attack station, Nagumo's ship enjoyed the cover of cloud and grey skies.
05:57Ahead and below the warships travelled a stealthy advance guard of Japanese submarines.
06:04Yamamoto's major concern was that not all the American fleet would be in the port. Intelligence reports suggested that they were.
06:16This was a significant development, as by then, the Washington negotiations had finally broken down.
06:22Yamamoto knew he must destroy the American carriers to prevent any US counter-strike.
06:27Aboard the Japanese ships, everybody now knew that war was imminent. Expectations rose to fever pitch.
06:34Yamamoto signalled his message to the fleet.
06:37The fate of the Empire hangs on this enterprise. Every man must devote himself unsparingly to the task at hand.
06:55On December 6, Tokyo began an extended transmission to its Washington embassy.
07:00The message ended with a declaration of war to be presented at one o'clock the following day.
07:06Because it took so long to decode, the declaration was actually delivered late.
07:10By then, the Japanese had struck their first unexpected blow.
07:15At six o'clock local time, the carriers turned into the wind and increased their speed to 24 knots.
07:25The decks vibrated to the roar of powerful engines.
07:30On the pilot's headbands were inscribed, the Japanese characters mean certain victory.
07:35By 6.30, the first wave of 100 aircraft was aloft and speeding in the skies towards Pearl Harbor.
07:43Shortly before 8 o'clock, the attackers reached the target zone.
08:00Visibility and weather conditions were ideal, and to their delight, the Japanese found they had caught their enemy hopelessly off guard.
08:11Surprise was complete. American resistance was disorganized and in affection.
08:23On the airfield, both squadrons of American warplanes were destroyed where they stood.
08:29In the great harbor, Japanese bombs and torpedoes transformed the great battleship row below them to a nightmare inferno of explosions, fires and smoke.
08:39And theуєans called the
08:45The Airfield, which was divided on the exit in the opposite side of the ship, a newана of a new one that could be used as a new one that could be used for an incident.
08:51The US Army had a life-m�� in one that could live entirely.
08:54The American warplanes reached a basicwwww and a newана of a new one that could have occupied each other.
08:57The US Army had a recent warplanes and the U.S.
09:02El caos de la segunda vez de los aeropuertos se encontró fácilmente.
09:16Cuando los raíderes finalmente regresaron a su carrera,
09:19se dejaron una escena de devastación de unparalleled.
09:22Hace battleshipes y 10 otros ships habían sido deslizados o deslizados.
09:27Hundreds de aeropuertos se quedaron en action.
09:29Muchos de los aeropuertos se quedaron en ruines.
09:32Los aeropuertos se quedaron en su carrera.
09:45En achieving all this, just 29 Japanese aircraft had been lost.
09:50This was heartening for Yamamoto,
09:52who had been prepared to sacrifice one-third of the task force.
09:57Only one thing spoiled the euphoria of the celebrations.
10:00None of the reported American aircraft carriers was actually in port during the attack,
10:06and all had escaped unscarred.
10:11For Yamamoto, this was a matter of serious concern.
10:14From Tokyo, he urgently signaled Admiral Nagumo,
10:17ordering him to find and sink the American carriers.
10:21Yamamoto also urged further strikes against Pearl Harbor,
10:24designed to destroy the remaining installations there.
10:26Despite the expressed wishes of the commander-in-chief,
10:31the strict code of Japanese military etiquette
10:33yielded the final decision to the commander at the front,
10:36and disregarded the huge naval superiority,
10:39which presented him with a chance which might never come again.
10:42Admiral Nagumo was determined to risk the fleet no more.
10:47Satisfied with the glory of the day,
10:49Nagumo turned his ships around and headed back for safer waters.
10:52In the United States,
11:05the first garbled reports on the raid at Pearl Harbor
11:07were received with incredulity.
11:10However, it quickly became apparent
11:12that the American arms had suffered a humiliating defeat.
11:16President and public responded with outrage and fury.
11:19In Berlin, Hitler received the news of Pearl Harbor with delight
11:25and warmly approved of the Japanese methods.
11:28That's the way to do it, he exclaimed.
11:30Strike hard without warning and ask questions afterwards.
11:35Hitler, who considered the American President Roosevelt
11:38to be incompetent,
11:40took grim pleasure in declaring war in the United States
11:42on December the 11th.
11:44As justification,
11:45he submitted a long list of American violations of neutrality.
11:51America now found herself embroiled in two conflicts,
11:55one in Europe and one in the Pacific.
11:58The powerful isolationist lobby,
12:00which had long preached that America should stay
12:02and not go to war,
12:04soon disintegrated.
12:06The war effort was in full swing.
12:07In Washington,
12:10the first of many inquiries
12:12into the reasons for the Pearl Harbor debacle
12:14was set up.
12:15Not for many years
12:16would the whole truth emerge.
12:18It made sorry reading.
12:21Although both British and American codebreakers
12:23had detailed full knowledge of the raid,
12:25the information was not passed on
12:27either to the President
12:28or to the commander on the spot at Pearl Harbor.
12:30In the interim, however,
12:35there was little America could do
12:37to immediately strike back
12:38until the huge emergency war production
12:40got into its stride.
12:51Every passing week,
12:52it seemingly brought news
12:53of fresh Japanese victories and conquests,
12:56and the American military
12:57were forced to learn some bitter lessons.
12:59It had been widely assumed
13:03that Japanese ships, aircraft, and weaponry
13:05were poor copies of Western models.
13:08Each day brought grim evidence to the contrary.
13:10Much of the Japanese war machines
13:12were far superior to the Western powers.
13:15The Allies also underestimated their adversities
13:18in a number of other respects.
13:20It was assumed, for example,
13:22that the physique of the Japanese
13:23and their curious eyes
13:24rendered it impossible for them
13:26to become accomplished aviators.
13:27In fact, Japan's magnificently trained carrier pilots
13:31were among the best in the world.
13:33One major lesson from Pearl Harbor
13:35was grasped straight away.
13:38The American Navy, like others,
13:39had long since debated
13:40as to whether the battleship
13:42or the aircraft carrier
13:43should be given priority.
13:46Yamamoto's bombs and torpedoes
13:48had settled that question beyond doubt.
13:50For the Pacific War,
13:52America's main naval production priority
13:54were carriers
13:55and the aircraft to fly from them.
13:59Pondering their future strategic options,
14:02American commanders
14:03were far from disheartened.
14:05They knew that in the long term,
14:06the war-making capacity of the United States
14:08far exceeded that of Japan.
14:12Designers, shipyards, and factories
14:14were already working furiously
14:16to provide the carriers and aircraft
14:17that America would need.
14:24Above all,
14:25the existing American carrier forces
14:27were still intact,
14:28and much to the gratification
14:29of the military,
14:30Pearl Harbor submarine base
14:32and merchant ships
14:33were left largely undamaged.
14:34Even more importantly,
14:44so were the vast oil depots.
14:46If Nagumo had struck
14:47at these huge stocks of fuel,
14:49no American naval action
14:50could have been contemplated
14:51until 1943.
14:55In time,
14:57the Japanese would pay dearly
14:58for Nagumo's caution,
15:00but by spring 1942,
15:02the seemingly unstoppable tide of conquest
15:04was still spreading
15:05onwards and upwards.
15:10President Roosevelt
15:11and his advisors
15:12were desperate
15:13for any kind of American success
15:14and were prepared
15:16to sanction
15:16an unusual undertaking.
15:19On April 18th,
15:2116 B-25 bombers
15:22under the command
15:23of Colonel James Doolittle
15:24performed the hazardous feat
15:26of taking off
15:27from a carrier deck.
15:29After a journey
15:30of more than 600 miles,
15:32they unloaded their bombs
15:33over Tokyo
15:34before flying on
15:35in a vain effort
15:36to reach China.
15:39News of the exploit
15:40was received
15:41in the United States
15:42with jubilation
15:43and gave an immense boost
15:44to public morale.
15:47Although Doolittle's bombers
15:48did little damage,
15:49the portals were ominous
15:50and their foray
15:51unsettled the Imperial
15:53High Command.
15:55Fearful revenge reprisals
15:56were made against the civilians
15:57on the Chinese mainland.
16:01One far-reaching consequence
16:03of the Doolittle raid
16:04was to persuade Yamamoto
16:06that the enemy's carrier group
16:07must be forced into battle
16:09while Japan still enjoyed
16:11naval superiority.
16:21Although the American fleet
16:23had been reinforced
16:23lost by two carriers
16:24transferred from the Atlantic,
16:26Japan still enjoyed
16:27a distinct superiority
16:28in carrier strength
16:29and battleships.
16:32Yamamoto's men
16:33also had a better understanding
16:35of the tactics
16:35of carrier warfare.
16:38Whereas America
16:38was setting up
16:39a number of small task forces,
16:41each with a single carrier
16:43as the nucleus,
16:44the Japanese kept
16:45their carriers bunched together
16:46to produce maximum striking power
16:49where it mattered most.
16:54In battle,
16:55this enabled
16:56a sizable contingent
16:57of aircraft
16:58to maintain air cover
16:59over the vital carriers.
17:01The Japanese
17:02had other advantages.
17:04Their carrier aircraft
17:05were significantly better
17:06than those of the opposition.
17:10The fast Zero fighter
17:11was a match
17:12for any aircraft
17:13of any air force
17:14currently in service.
17:17The construction
17:18of the Zero fighter
17:19sacrificed everything
17:21for lightness.
17:22Not even the pilot's seat
17:23enjoyed the protection
17:24of armor.
17:26Consequently,
17:27even a single bullet hit
17:28could easily prove fatal.
17:30Perhaps it was the legacy
17:31of the Samurai Code
17:33which frowned on cowardice
17:34and any sign of weakness,
17:36but placing valuable pilots
17:37in unarmored cockpits
17:38was a false economy
17:40on a grand scale.
17:42Both sides
17:43had devoted intense thought
17:44to the training
17:45of their airmen,
17:46for naval aviation
17:47was a difficult art.
17:52Merely landing at sea
17:53on a relatively small
17:54rectangular deck
17:55which may be pitching
17:56and yawing
17:56in the heavy seas
17:57was a dangerous operation
17:59even for the most skilled.
18:07A rigorous selection process
18:09followed by long training
18:10during three years at sea
18:11ensured that Yamamoto's pilots
18:13were of exceptional quality.
18:17However,
18:17because of an extensive
18:18civil industry,
18:19America had the immediate benefit
18:21of a large pool of trainers
18:22and the first-class training scheme
18:24would in time provide
18:25excellent pilots in abundance.
18:27The Americans also possessed
18:36two further advantages,
18:38the existence of which
18:39was scarcely even guessed at
18:40by the Japanese.
18:43Firstly,
18:44the British had passed on
18:45the full secrets
18:46of their radar technology,
18:47the most advanced in the world
18:48and was still being improved.
18:52Radar was invaluable
18:53not only to locate
18:54the position of the enemy
18:56and warn of his approach
18:57but also in allowing aircraft
18:59to get safely home
19:00to the mothership.
19:02The Japanese pilot,
19:04after flying hundreds of miles,
19:05had to rely on pinpoint accuracy
19:07of navigation
19:08to find his ship again,
19:09usually with no landmarks
19:11to help him.
19:13All too often,
19:14the penalty for pilot error
19:15was a lonely death
19:16in the vastness of the ocean.
19:19The second great advantage
19:21of America
19:21was their code-breaking task force
19:23which supplied a constant,
19:25reliable guide
19:26to Japanese intentions
19:27and movements.
19:29This intelligence
19:29was to be instrumental
19:31in bringing about
19:31a naval engagement
19:32of a kind unknown
19:33in previous history,
19:35a jewel between
19:36two carrier strike forces.
19:38after four months
19:48of extraordinary
19:49unbroken success,
19:50the Japanese military
19:51had become
19:52dangerously overconfident
19:53and resolved
19:54on a further extension
19:55of their defense
19:56of the perimeter.
19:58They envisaged
19:59as a first step
20:00the occupation
20:01of the Pacific island
20:02of Tulagi
20:02in the Solomons
20:03to be followed
20:04by an assault
20:05on Port Moresby
20:06in Papua New Guinea.
20:10The invasion fleet
20:11sailed out
20:12on May 1st, 1942
20:13accompanied by
20:15one small
20:15and two large carriers.
20:18The Americans
20:18knew exactly
20:19where the Japanese
20:20were headed for
20:20and Admiral Fletcher
20:22was dispatched
20:23to intercept them.
20:25Fletcher's task force
20:26comprised the carriers
20:27Lexington and Yorktown
20:28together with
20:29their respective groups
20:30of destroyer
20:31and cruiser escorts.
20:36The first flood
20:37was drawn by aircraft
20:39from the Yorktown
20:39which on May 4th
20:41sank a destroyer
20:42and other vessels
20:43of the invasion
20:43convoy at Tulagi.
20:52Two days later
20:53the Imperial Navy
20:54lost a carrier
20:54for the first time
20:55when the Chahal
20:57fell victim
20:57to a combined
20:58airstrike launched
20:59by Fletcher's ships.
21:00Later the Americans
21:05realised that
21:05the Chahal
21:06was not one
21:07of the major carriers
21:08and the Japanese
21:09must know now
21:10that an enemy task force
21:11was in the vicinity.
21:13There ensued
21:14a period of frantic
21:15moving and
21:15intense aerial activity.
21:17The Japanese
21:17sank a destroyer
21:18but lost heavily
21:19in the air.
21:20After one fierce dogfight
21:22some of the surviving
21:22Japanese aircraft
21:23lost their bearings
21:24and mistook the Yorktown
21:25for their own vessel.
21:30The next day
21:36May the 8th
21:37brought what came
21:38to be known
21:38as the Battle
21:39of the Coral Sea.
21:40It was the first time
21:42that an action
21:42was joined
21:43by two groups of ships
21:44which remained
21:45far out of sight
21:46of each other
21:47throughout.
21:52The fighting
21:53at the Battle
21:54of the Coral Sea
21:54was carried out
21:55by air fleets
21:56from the carriers.
21:58Flights of aircraft
21:59from the two sides
22:00located each other's ships
22:01at almost precisely
22:02the same time.
22:04Within the space
22:04of half an hour
22:05two waves of aircraft
22:07were sent aloft
22:07one Japanese
22:08and one American.
22:11The Americans
22:12reached their quarry first.
22:14After two attacks
22:15the carrier Shikoko
22:16was hit by three bombs
22:17one of which
22:18started a serious fire.
22:26On the US side
22:27the Lexington radar
22:29picked up the approaching
22:30enemy at a range
22:31of 60 miles
22:32and the American
22:33air patrols
22:33took off to intercept it.
22:36Unfortunately
22:37the Americans
22:38were sent
22:38to the wrong altitude
22:39and the Japanese
22:41attackers flew on
22:42undisturbed
22:42above and below
22:43the American fighters.
22:48One Japanese bomb
22:50detonated deep
22:51inside the Yorktown
22:52and a blaze developed.
22:54Two more bombs
22:55hit the Lexington
22:55which also took
22:56a torpedo
22:57on either side.
22:59The Yorktown crew
23:00succeeded
23:00in extinguishing the fire
23:02and the vessel
23:03remained operational.
23:05For a while
23:06it seemed
23:06that the Lexington
23:07would be saved
23:08but following
23:09a large explosion
23:10the vessel
23:10was abandoned
23:11and sunk.
23:13Fortunately
23:13her precious crew
23:14and aircraft
23:15had first been
23:16transferred to the Yorktown.
23:19To set against
23:20the loss of the Lexington
23:21the Americans
23:22had sunk
23:22only one minor
23:23enemy carrier
23:24but they had
23:25damaged the Shikoko
23:26and forced her
23:27to return to Japan
23:28for repairs.
23:30The second Japanese
23:31carrier
23:32the Zuikaka
23:33had also suffered
23:34severe damage.
23:37Both of these
23:38crucial Japanese
23:39warships
23:39would still be
23:40out of action
23:41at a crucial time
23:41in the war
23:42while the Yorktown
23:43could continue on.
23:45So overall
23:46the American commanders
23:47justly regarded
23:48the Battle of the Coral Sea
23:49as both a significant
23:51victory
23:51and a turning point.
23:53The first serious hurt
23:54had been inflicted
23:55on the mighty
23:55Japanese carrier force.
23:59American pilots
24:00had now given proof
24:01that they could match
24:02their opponents
24:02in the air
24:03and the attempted
24:04invasion of Port Moresby
24:06had been rebuffed.
24:08Very soon
24:08the American pilots
24:09would outstrip
24:10the Japanese
24:11not just in terms
24:12of training
24:13but also in numbers.
24:19The Imperial Japanese
24:25forces were
24:26strongly imbued
24:27with the old
24:27martial tradition
24:28of Bushido
24:28whereby it was
24:30considered a high
24:30honor to die
24:31for the Emperor.
24:33This disdain
24:33for personal safety
24:34meant that the
24:35Japanese did not
24:36place such a high
24:36price on the
24:37moral aspects
24:38of saving human
24:39lives.
24:40The Japanese
24:41made few efforts
24:42to recover the
24:43precious airmen
24:43who had come down
24:44in the sea.
24:46Their system
24:46of training
24:47was still slow
24:47and meticulous
24:48which precluded
24:49a rapid replacement
24:50to those who were lost.
24:52The Imperial Navy
24:53had begun to hemorrhage.
24:56The Americans
24:57by contrast
24:58made extraordinary
24:59efforts to rescue
25:00downed pilots.
25:02The Americans
25:03would risk
25:04an expensive submarine
25:05simply to pick up
25:06a crew.
25:07In addition
25:08to humanitarian
25:08concerns
25:09they were moved
25:10by a lively sense
25:11of the value
25:11of a widely trained
25:12experienced operator.
25:17Cumulatively
25:20this difference
25:20in attitudes
25:21worked ever more
25:22to the benefit
25:22of the Americans.
25:28In Tokyo
25:29the strategic situation
25:31was clearly grasped
25:32by Admiral Yamamoto.
25:34He still deferred
25:35unquestioningly
25:36to the Imperial will
25:37but he had always
25:38been strenuously
25:39opposed to the war.
25:43It was he
25:44who had famously
25:44predicted
25:45that the Japanese
25:46forces would be able
25:47to run wild
25:48for six months
25:48but thereafter
25:50the superiority
25:51of the military
25:51industrial might
25:52of the United States
25:53eventually would begin
25:55to assert itself
25:55with irreversible effect.
26:01The six months
26:02were not quite expired
26:03and Yamamoto
26:04had only four major
26:06carriers operational
26:07in the Pacific.
26:09Ominous news
26:10of fresh carriers
26:11under contract
26:12in the US
26:12sounded grim alarms.
26:15Accordingly
26:16Yamamoto drew up
26:17a plan
26:18intending to force
26:19the Americans
26:19into the major
26:20fleet engagement
26:21while he still
26:22had the strength.
26:25In the vast Pacific
26:26the tiny atoll
26:27of Midway
26:28possessed a strategic
26:30importance
26:30far disproportionate
26:32to its size.
26:33Yamamoto knew
26:34that the Americans
26:35could not possibly
26:36countenance
26:36its capture
26:37by the Japanese
26:38as such a move
26:39would menace
26:40the entire basis
26:41of their ocean defense.
26:42If Midway
26:44was attacked
26:44to the American fleet
26:45whatever its condition
26:46must come out
26:47and fight.
26:58In no other arena
27:00of war
27:00was so much
27:01sophisticated
27:02and diverse technology
27:03concentrated in one battle
27:05nor so many desperate
27:06and finely honed
27:08human skills
27:08called upon
27:09as in the battle
27:10of Midway.
27:12Carrier aircraft
27:13required exceptional
27:14engineering and design.
27:16A capability
27:17to deliver bombs
27:18or torpedoes
27:19must be combined
27:19with the agility
27:20indispensable
27:21for aerial combat.
27:28Undercarriages
27:28needed to be
27:29unusually sturdy
27:30to cope with
27:31the inevitable
27:31heavy landings.
27:33Airframes
27:34had to be able
27:34to withstand
27:35being jerked
27:35to a sudden halt
27:36or being hurled
27:37into the air
27:38by a powerful catapult.
27:47The landing officers
27:48who guided down aircraft
27:49were themselves
27:50experienced pilots.
27:52On the accuracy
27:53of their split second judgment
27:55an entire succession
27:56of men's lives
27:57were dependent.
28:05on May 20th
28:10a long transmission
28:11from Yamamoto
28:11to his fleet
28:12was intercepted
28:13by the American
28:14codebreakers.
28:16It was clear
28:16that a major operation
28:18was about to take place
28:19but because Yamamoto
28:20was using new letter codes
28:22for place names
28:23the objective
28:24was unclear.
28:26They suspected
28:26that the Japanese
28:27would go for Midway.
28:29By cunning deception
28:30they obtained confirmation.
28:33Details of the forthcoming attack
28:35was passed on
28:36to Chester Nimitz
28:37commander
28:38of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
28:40Nimitz took care
28:41to position his carriers
28:42where the enemy
28:42would least expect them.
28:45After three days
28:46of extraordinary efforts
28:47the Yorktown
28:47damaged in the Coral Sea battle
28:49was repaired sufficiently
28:50to go once more to war.
28:57As the most senior
28:58Japanese commander
28:59it was again
29:01Admiral Nagumo
29:02who led the strike force
29:03sailing for Midway.
29:04His four large carriers
29:06Agaki
29:07Kaga
29:08Soryu
29:09and Hiryu
29:10were all veterans
29:11of Pearl Harbor.
29:15Because of the larger size
29:16of Nagumo's ships
29:17the Japanese
29:17had a strong advantage
29:19in the strength
29:19of carrier aircraft
29:20270
29:22against the Americans
29:24180.
29:26The ratio
29:27was only slightly improved
29:28by a number
29:29of elderly aircraft
29:30which the Americans
29:31flew from the Midway
29:32Island itself.
29:36The Japanese carrier groups
29:38were well supported
29:39by battleships
29:40cruisers
29:40and destroyers.
29:43The Americans
29:44had three carriers
29:45at sea
29:45Enterprise,
29:46Hornet
29:47and Yorktown
29:47again accompanied
29:49by numerous cruisers
29:50and destroyers.
29:51However
29:52the Americans
29:53knew the disposition
29:54of the enemy ships
29:55and where each
29:55was steaming.
29:57The Japanese
29:57however
29:58did not know
29:58what opposition
29:59they might encounter.
30:02On June 3rd
30:04Nagumo's forces
30:04were discovered
30:05by an American aircraft
30:06and by June 4th
30:08the distance
30:08between the two
30:09hostile battle groups
30:10had closed
30:11to 250 miles.
30:14Whether for bad
30:16or for ill
30:16the decisive engagement
30:18so long sought
30:18by Yamamoto
30:19was to hand.
30:21On this same day's events
30:22would rest
30:23the mastery
30:23of the Pacific.
30:26Nagumo believed
30:26that he still
30:27commanded
30:27the element
30:28of surprise
30:29but he was soon
30:30disabused
30:31of that notion
30:31as a flight
30:32of American bombers
30:33arrived from Midway.
30:35However
30:35the slow
30:36unwielding machines
30:37were far outclassed
30:38by the Japanese
30:38Zeros
30:39and succeeded
30:40only in hitting
30:40a small supply vessel.
30:46Partly because
30:47of this attack
30:48Nagumo decided
30:49to reduce
30:50the defences
30:50at Midway
30:51before proceeding
30:51with the invasion.
30:52and a strike
30:53was launched.
30:56Alerted
30:56by their radar
30:57Midway defenders
30:58flew up
30:59to meet
30:59the oncoming flow
31:00and sustained
31:01heavy losses.
31:03The Japanese bombs
31:04got through
31:04inflicting heavy damage
31:06on island installations.
31:08However
31:08they failed
31:09in their primary
31:10objective
31:10of bombing
31:11the enemy planes
31:12on the ground.
31:15The Americans
31:16had put all
31:16their aircraft
31:17aloft
31:17and as the Japanese
31:19raiders left
31:19unscarred
31:20their commander
31:21radioed
31:21that a second raid
31:22would be needed.
31:25Nagumo resolved
31:26on the second foray
31:27on the island
31:28and was confirmed
31:29in his decisions
31:30by another fight
31:30of bombers
31:31from Midway.
31:32These were again
31:33easily rebuffed
31:34by the fighting
31:34of the fleet.
31:37The Japanese admiral
31:38still had no information
31:39about the American carriers
31:41which in the meantime
31:42had moved into position
31:43and set off
31:44their own air strikes.
31:47Nagumo's bombers
31:47returned a second time
31:49from Midway
31:49and were re-arming
31:50just as the first wave
31:51of hostile torpedo bombers
31:53came into the attack.
31:55In this potentially grave situation
31:57the Zeros
31:58which were still airborne
31:59proved their worth.
32:01More than 100 enemy aircraft
32:02were shot down
32:03driven off
32:04or forced to ditch
32:05without scoring
32:06a single hit.
32:07Despite all the benefits
32:09of their radar
32:09and code breaking
32:10the Americans
32:11had suffered
32:12horrendous losses
32:13with nothing
32:13to show in return.
32:14Then
32:19there occurred
32:19an astonishing reversal
32:21of fortune.
32:22A group of 50 dive bombers
32:24from the Enterprise
32:24had strayed off course
32:25and flown far beyond
32:26their target zone.
32:28Returning to the fleet
32:29their commander
32:30was alerted
32:31by the position
32:31of a Japanese destroyer.
32:33He guessed correctly
32:34that she was steaming
32:35directly for the main
32:36carrier force
32:36and was quickly able
32:38to find the scene of battle.
32:40The Japanese Zeros
32:41were all at low altitude
32:42dealing with the remainder
32:44of torpedo bombers
32:45while the incoming bombers
32:46were all at high altitude.
32:51Because the carriers
32:52had been servicing
32:53relays of fighters
32:54their decks were crisscrossed
32:56with fuel hoses
32:56and cluttered with bombs.
32:59It was precisely
33:0010.25 in the morning
33:02when the first
33:03American dive bombers
33:04swooped down
33:04into the attack.
33:06Within the space
33:06of only five minutes
33:07the balance of power
33:08in the Pacific
33:09had utterly transformed.
33:14No less than three
33:21of the four Japanese
33:23carriers sustained
33:24direct hits.
33:25The bombs set off
33:26sequences of further
33:27explosions
33:28and furious fires
33:29broke out.
33:31A raging conflagration
33:32swept through the flagship
33:33Akagi.
33:34The firefighters
33:35won a sufficient respite
33:36for many of the
33:37surviving crew
33:37to be saved
33:38and Admiral Nagumo
33:39himself moved his flag
33:41to the cruiser Nagara.
33:44On the Kargarh
33:45a furious inferno
33:46trapped hundreds
33:47below deck
33:48with no hope.
33:49Numerous others
33:50perished in the water
33:51lapped around
33:52by burning oil.
34:04The Soryu
34:05was left dead
34:06in the water
34:06and was blazing
34:07along her entire length.
34:09She was abandoned
34:09and later sank.
34:11It had taken
34:12a total of nine
34:13accurately delivered bombs
34:15to eliminate half
34:16of Japan's
34:17first-line carrier fleet.
34:32The Hiryu
34:33had escaped
34:34the umslaught
34:35her parcel force
34:36of fighters
34:37and bombers
34:37still largely intact.
34:38Directly the planes
34:43of Hiryu
34:43had been serviced
34:44and repaired.
34:46He ordered a counter-strike
34:47which found the Yorktown.
34:54Forewarned by radar
34:55the Yorktown
34:57discontinued
34:58her refuelling operations.
35:03Her defence patrols
35:04went up to intercept
35:05the Japanese
35:06and a fierce aerial combat ensued.
35:16Breaking through the melee
35:17a group of dive bombers
35:19plunged down on the Yorktown
35:20and succeeded
35:21in scoring three hits.
35:23As the Japanese
35:24turned away
35:25they had the satisfaction
35:26of seeing the Yorktown
35:28covered in smoke
35:28and bright flames.
35:29After their own
35:31terrible experience
35:32that morning
35:33they were sure
35:34that the ship
35:35was finished.
35:37Yet she was not.
35:39The crew responded
35:40to the crisis
35:40with courage.
35:43The fires
35:44were extinguished
35:44power and steering
35:46was regained
35:46and the Yorktown
35:47could still fly off
35:48some aircraft.
35:50These were needed
35:51for the Hiryu
35:52had sent off
35:53a second strike
35:54which arrived
35:55mid-afternoon.
35:55Penetrating
35:58the weaker
35:59air defences
36:00the Japanese bombers
36:01roared in low
36:02and launched
36:03their torpedoes
36:04two of which
36:05hit their target.
36:06Disabled
36:07and burning
36:07the Yorktown
36:09was soon abandoned.
36:15Meantime
36:16the Enterprise
36:16and Hornet
36:17were assembling
36:18their air strength
36:19for a last desperate
36:20strike against the Hiryu.
36:22For the second time
36:23that day
36:23fortune favoured
36:24the Americans.
36:25The dive bombers
36:26streaked down
36:27out of the sun
36:27catching the exhausted
36:29Japanese totally unaware.
36:31Four bombs
36:32ripped into it
36:32fuel tanks ignited
36:34and fire travelled
36:35speedily through the decks.
36:36There was no chance
36:37of saving the great vessel.
36:51It was 5.10
36:52in the afternoon
36:53and the Battle of Midway
36:54was over.
36:55The smaller force
36:57had defeated
36:57the larger.
36:58The Imperial Navy's
36:59magnificent carrier strike force
37:01which that morning
37:02had sailed to battle
37:02with such proud hopes
37:04had passed into oblivion.
37:06On the morning of June 5th
37:17Yamamoto was deeply disconsolate
37:19and shocked
37:20by the loss
37:20of his carriers.
37:22He called off
37:23the invasion.
37:25The Japanese ships
37:26turned away
37:26from Midway.
37:27It was the first
37:28conclusive naval defeat
37:29in the history
37:30of the rising sun.
37:31Although Midway had brought
37:38about a decisive
37:39and irreversible shift
37:41in the balance of power
37:42a huge and gruelling struggle
37:44had yet to be endured
37:45before the Americans
37:45and their allies
37:46achieved final victory.
37:47Within two years
37:56another 14 fleet carriers
37:57and over 70 light
37:59escort carriers
38:00would come down
38:01American slipways.
38:03Arriving in the Pacific
38:04they would fly off
38:05from their decks
38:05an invincible new generation
38:07of faster
38:08better aircraft.
38:09Yamamoto told his men
38:19that the real fight
38:19was now one
38:20between Japanese discipline
38:21and American industrial
38:23might and technology
38:24but he would not live
38:25to see the conclusion.
38:28In April 1943
38:29American codebreakers
38:31discovered that Yamamoto
38:32was to make an inspection
38:33of frontline air bases.
38:35His aircraft was intercepted
38:37and shot down.
38:38Yamamoto died.
38:46Slowly
38:46after a torturous series
38:48of campaigns
38:48the American forces
38:49clawed their way back
38:50bit by bit
38:51into island after island.
38:56As the Japanese empire shrank
38:58and the character
38:59of the sea war
39:00in the Pacific changed
39:01so did the role
39:02of the aircraft carrier.
39:03increasingly the carrier
39:08was used to provide
39:09air support
39:10for amphibious assaults
39:11or ground operations.
39:14Carriers also proved
39:15their value
39:15as an attack force
39:16against distant objectives.
39:19In November 1943
39:21a surprise carrier strike
39:23devastated
39:23a large Japanese
39:24invasion fleet.
39:25The following February
39:35another carrier based
39:37assault hit the Japanese
39:38base at Turk Island
39:39dropping 30 times
39:40the weight of bombs
39:41dropped at Pearl Harbor.
39:43The Americans did not need
39:45to capture the island
39:45instead its garrison
39:47was simply sidestepped
39:48and left to wither
39:49on the vine.
39:49By this means
39:53much time
39:53and many lives
39:54were saved.
40:01The effectiveness
40:02of Japan's carrier force
40:03had sharply deteriorated.
40:05There was a crucial
40:06shortage of trained pilots
40:07and the summer of 1944
40:09saw the last naval engagement
40:11to be fought principally
40:12by contending carrier groups.
40:17Dozens of warships
40:18and hundreds of Japanese
40:19land-based aircraft
40:21also participated.
40:25The Battle of the Philippine Sea
40:27commenced on the morning
40:28of June 19th
40:29when the Japanese carriers
40:31launched their first airstrike.
40:37Throughout the day
40:38the skies echoed
40:39with the sound of cannons
40:40and machine gun fire
40:41from innumerable dogfights.
40:43The outcome was a massacre
40:45in which returning
40:46American pilots
40:47shot down over 400
40:48enemy aircraft
40:49for the loss
40:50of 30 of their own.
41:01Meanwhile,
41:02American submarines
41:03had intervened
41:03to deadly effect
41:04with enormous loss of life.
41:06in which the American carriers
41:07were increasingly deployed
41:08not as independent strike forces,
41:08but rather as integrated
41:09strike forces.
41:10¡Gracias!
41:40...were gathering might against the Japanese mainland.
41:46Despite the dwindling resistance, at no stage of the Pacific War could any ship feel completely safe.
41:52It was always the carriers whose destruction was most eagerly sought by the Japanese.
41:58Accordingly, it was the men on the carriers who first experienced the terror of a fearsome new Japanese tactic which appeared in late 1944.
42:10The kamikaze was the first effective guided missile. The projectile was a fast aircraft, its warhead a cargo of high explosives.
42:30The highly accurate guidance system was a human pilot devoted to certain death for the greater glory of the Sun Emperor.
42:40The kamikaze was seen by the Japanese commanders as offering the capability to create maximum destruction on the enemy with a minimal outlay.
42:51In 1945, the kamikaze pilots appeared in greater numbers, claiming a number of victims.
42:56Although the majority of kamikazes were shot down or missed their target, the few that did get through caused appalling damage and casualties.
43:06Their effect in material tons was limited, but as a weapon of terror, they caused panic disproportionate to their numbers.
43:13Air patrols were increased, vigilance was sharpened, and the kamikazes were usually destroyed on the way in, but the suicide pilots posed a seemingly unsolvable riddle.
43:31Air patrols were increased, vigilance was sharpened, and the kamikazes were usually destroyed on the way in, but the suicide pilots posed a seemingly unsolvable riddle.
43:41Air patrols were seen by the
44:07El ataque de los kamikazes fue un gran factor de la decisión de usar armas en Japón en agosto de 1945.
44:22The crowds awaiting returning American servicemen were as glad and as jubilant
44:41as were those rejoicing the end of the Great War in 1918, but in one respect this homecoming
44:47was different, for as the ship steamed slowly in it was the aircraft carrier, not the battleship,
44:53that held pride of place. The day of the carrier had dawned.
45:17So I decided that I was the idea of the ship's new car now, but in the air, it was the
45:36Gracias por ver el video.
46:06Gracias por ver el video.
46:36Gracias por ver el video.
47:06Gracias por ver el video.
48:36Gracias por ver el video.
49:06The invaders were driven out of the south and eventually the war ended in uneasy terms.
49:18For the West, Korea had proved the continued need for strong conventional forces and once
49:37again had underlined the immense value of the carrier aircraft.
49:41The carrier's unique combination of striking power and flexible deployment created the
49:47essential component in a modern worldwide peacekeeping force.
50:17The North, the collegiate meteordag.
50:22No, no, no.
50:52No, no, no.
51:22No, no.
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