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00:00The outbreak of World War II took many people by surprise,
00:05none more so than the men of the Kriegsmarine, the German Navy.
00:10They had been promised that no war would come before 1942,
00:14and the sudden onset of hostilities found the German surface fleet woefully unprepared.
00:20Only the U-boat fleet was on anything like a wartime footing.
00:30The commander of the German U-boat fleet was Karl Donitz,
00:34who had himself commanded a U-boat during World War I.
00:39Donitz appreciated the possibilities which were inherent in U-boat warfare,
00:43and was in a perfect position when it came to developing the new tactics
00:47which would shape the face of the battle for the Atlantic in World War II.
01:00The U-boat fleet was the greatest threat from the Mansion of the War II.
01:05The U-boat fleet was the most important part of the
01:20The U-boat fleet was the most important part of the Navy.
01:22The U-boat fleet was the most important part of the railroad fleet,
01:27¡Gracias!
01:57...claimed would make the First World War U-boat campaign look like a sideshow.
02:03During the dark days of World War II, the men of Germany's U-boat fleet were the national heroes of their day, fated and adored by a grateful public.
02:14But their fame and adoration was hard won.
02:18Out of every four men who went to sea in the U-boats, three died in action, doomed to rest forever in an iron coffin.
02:25Of a total of 40,000 men who sailed in the U-boats, 5,000 were captured and 30,000 were killed in action, leaving only 5,000 to sail the boats home.
02:39Hitler wanted to make peace because he felt that peace was inevitable.
02:43In simple terms, he felt that by June 1940, Germany quite clearly had won the Second World War, at least the war in Europe, up to that point.
02:51And that for Britain to continue fighting was nonsensical, as Britain quite clearly had no chance of winning.
02:59Unfortunately for Hitler, Britain did not quite agree with his analysis of the situation.
03:04The sudden onset of war had left the giant merchant ships of the British Navy scattered across the oceans of the world.
03:11As the unescorted and defenceless ships dashed frantically for safe havens, they fell easy prey to U-boats and the auxiliary cruisers.
03:22Throughout the winter months, there was massive destruction of British shipping.
03:28In those first months of the war, to travel alone courted oblivion from beneath the waves.
03:33Despite the lessons from the First World War, the Navy was caught ill-prepared for the new submarine menace.
03:49The scattered seaways provided admirable scope for a U-boat.
03:54The British warships themselves were not immune from danger.
03:58In terms of sheer numbers, the Royal Navy had a massive amount of force available for the protection of British trade.
04:07Over 200 destroyers were at sea.
04:10Despite this, it is shocking to note that in the interwar years,
04:13the Admiralty had not carried out any operational analysis of how it had defeated the U-boat threat in the First World War.
04:20In fact, in 1937, the Admiralty declared that the development of its ASDIC sonar system had defeated any future U-boat threat.
04:31These boasts were to prove hopelessly incorrect.
04:35In light of its experience in the First World War, when it defeated a substantial German U-boat campaign,
04:42it would be expected that in 1939, the Royal Navy had in place the doctrine, ships and tactics for dealing with a resurgent German U-boat threat.
04:51However, the Navy paid no attention to convoy drills or rehearsing convoy procedures.
04:57The number of destroyers available for convoys was in fact quite small.
05:01They were allocated to the support of the battle fleets.
05:03The escorts that did exist had a very short range.
05:07This was fine whilst the battle remained in the North Sea.
05:10But when the Germans captured France in May, June 1940 and transferred their main U-boat bases to the French Atlantic coast,
05:18the Royal Navy faced the problem it would have to fight its opponents in the middle of the Atlantic.
05:23These created a major threat to Britain.
05:26On September 17th, the aircraft carrier Courageous was sunk with the loss of over 500 men.
05:33It was a major loss to the Royal Navy.
05:37At this stage of the war, the U-boats would sink the unarmed ships by fire from their deck guns.
05:44Although this was a slow and dangerous maneuver, there was often no choice.
05:48German torpedoes were plagued by development problems, which caused many to fail to explode.
05:55In the First World War, torpedoes were detonated by percussion.
05:59They hit the target, a percussion cell was ignited, and the explosive detonated.
06:05This was all well and good, but sometimes the torpedo would run underneath the target, and would therefore completely miss.
06:14Sometimes, if the torpedo struck the target at a glancing angle, there was not enough pressure on the percussion cap,
06:22and the thing didn't detonate, so the Germans looked for a better kind of detonation device.
06:28And they came up with a magnetic detonator, in which the iron of the ship disturbed the magnetic field, or amagnetic field, created by the torpedo.
06:39The beauty of this was, you didn't actually have to hit the ship.
06:42If you were close enough, the proximity of the iron would disturb the magnetic field, and the torpedo would go off.
06:49And if it was underneath the ship, this was even better, because the explosion would break the back of the ship, and it would most certainly sink.
06:57The problem that developed, however, was that the magnetic device being used was simply too delicate.
07:03And sometimes the Earth's magnetic field took it off, other reasons detonated it, and the result was pure mayhem.
07:12Most of the fighting in the U-boats was done by Germany's legendary Type 7-class submarines.
07:17They proved ideal for the task.
07:21With a low conning tower, only 5.2 meters above the waterline, they were hard to see from over a mile, even in daylight.
07:29At night, and head on, they were practically invisible.
07:34They could dive in under half a minute.
07:36They could reach a depth of 100 meters without strain, and 200 meters if pressed.
07:41To combat the U-boat threat, hurried arrangements were made for British ships to travel in tight escorted convoys,
07:52which allowed the unarmed ships to be guarded by destroyers and cruisers.
07:56In those early days, the system was makeshift and rather clumsy.
08:02No attempt was made to sort ships by their speed of travel, and the speed of the convoy was limited to that of the slowest ship.
08:10But it significantly increased the chances of survival.
08:14For the Kriegsmarine, the main burden of the fight at sea was carried by the smaller craft, destroyers, torpedo boats, and mine layers.
08:25In the early months of the war, the most successful weapon employed by the surface fleet was the mine.
08:31This early German newsreel shows the mines being manufactured in the factories, then shipped to the channel, where they were laid in the sea lanes.
08:45Unnoticed by British observers, German destroyers clandestinely completed 11 mine-laying missions off the English coast,
08:53even venturing into the Thames estuary itself.
08:56Britain's North Sea coastline is very long, and in darkness, it's virtually impossible to prevent submarines and aircraft
09:08making fast incursions and laying mines and getting away.
09:13Indeed, fast surface craft would be very difficult to prevent.
09:17So it was not too difficult for the Germans to lay mines along the British coastline.
09:22The mines reaped havoc amongst the channel traffic.
09:2867 ships, including two destroyers, were lost.
09:32These losses added to the steadily rising toll by the U-boats themselves, and clearly showed the way ahead.
09:40The U-boats had won the political war, but could they also be relied upon to win the real war?
09:46It seemed Hitler needed one more lesson to convince him.
09:49In the First World War, Britain had been saved from starvation by the development of the convoy system.
09:57Donitz believed that this time he could overcome the British convoys by a combination of a bigger, faster, and more powerful submarine,
10:05allied to a new system of tactics which would become known as the wolf packs.
10:10From his headquarters at the French port of Lorient, Donitz was able to control wolf pack operations personally.
10:19Donitz would arrive in his headquarters at around 9 o'clock in the morning.
10:23There, his chief of staff, Captain Goethe, would inform him of the latest positions,
10:28and up on the wall was an enormous map of the Atlantic.
10:31Here were the latest positions of German U-boats, indicated in blue,
10:36and allied merchant convoys and ships, indicated in red.
10:40What then happened was that Donitz received a series of detailed staff briefings,
10:44from his intelligence officer in particular.
10:47At this point, the Germans were reading the British intelligence codes,
10:50and thus Donitz was able to form a clear picture of British movements and activities,
10:54and thus direct his wolf packs effectively against the British convoys.
10:58The German wolf pack consisted of 15 to 20 U-boats.
11:04The tactics of the wolf pack dictated that initially,
11:07all of the submarines in a pack were to be spread out in a wide fan,
11:12covering the likely sea lanes leading to the British Isles.
11:16Operating alone, they would remain constantly vigilant
11:20as they waited for British convoys to pass by.
11:23If a single ship was spotted,
11:25it was permissible for the U-boat to launch an attack,
11:29and many lone merchantmen were sent to the bottom
11:32in the first few months of the war.
11:35But the main target of the wolf packs
11:37were always the Atlantic convoys.
11:41So the crews of the British ships
11:43had to remain constantly on their guard.
11:45Once a convoy was sighted by a U-boat,
11:49it was an important part of the tactical doctrine
11:52that the submarine which spotted the convoy
11:55did not attack right away.
11:58Instead, it reported by coded radio signal
12:01using a highly sophisticated code
12:03which was encrypted on a specialized device
12:06known as the Enigma machine.
12:08These signals were sent directly to U-boat headquarters,
12:13giving the location, size, direction, and speed of the convoy.
12:19The lone submarine then shadowed the convoy,
12:22avoiding contact with the cruiser or destroyer escorts,
12:26but always keeping its prey in sight.
12:30Back at his headquarters,
12:32Donets radioed his orders to the other members of the wolf pack,
12:35who would then be instructed to close in for the attack.
12:39When enough submarines had been assembled near the convoy,
12:43usually on the first night after it was sighted,
12:46the signal was given for the attack to begin.
12:54Becker!
12:55Los!
12:56Ab!
13:01So, and when then the torpedo leaf,
13:03was set up, the stopwatch was set up,
13:06but with the distance,
13:08and if there was no detonation,
13:11oh God, then it was over.
13:13Yeah?
13:14And if it hit or something,
13:18so, then the success was there.
13:22I can also say,
13:23I can't say that it was not a hurrah,
13:25but it was more than a hurrah,
13:27but it was said, oh God,
13:28the poor people are now.
13:29As soon as the U-boats had loosed their torpedoes,
13:34they dived further beneath the surface
13:36to escape the powerful explosive depth charges
13:39fired by the warships which escorted the convoy.
13:43The British destroyers posed a powerful threat to the U-boats.
13:48With their superior speed and agility,
13:51they could easily destroy any U-boat on the surface,
13:54and they proved to be tenacious in the chase for submerged U-boats,
13:57which could only travel very slowly underwater.
14:02If a convoy was well protected, the first attack would raise the alarm.
14:07In a moment, the hunter became the hunted,
14:10and the real trial for a submarine crew began.
14:14It was a battle for survival,
14:16to outwit the enemy above in a tense and deadly game of hide-and-seek.
14:21A pattern of depth charges laid in a spread
14:25could either destroy the U-boat
14:27or cause damage enough to force it to the surface
14:30to the waiting guns of the hunters.
14:33Ja, die Wasserbombenverfolgung als solche ging natürlich nicht nur an die Nerven,
14:42sondern ans Gemüt.
14:44Und das war schon schrecklich.
14:47Ja, und wer behauptet, er hätte keine Angst gehabt, der lügt.
14:53Ja, Wasserbomben waren wirklich nervig.
14:58Also, wenn sie es nahe kamen, das können sie sich gar nicht vorstellen.
15:03Unter Wasserschall, das ist ein so wahnsinniger Knall,
15:07den bringt eine Bombe an Land gar nicht mal.
15:11Und wenn dann also Beschädigungen waren,
15:13blub, sprangen dann irgendwelche Ventile raus.
15:17Ja, oder in der E-Maschine flogen die Schalter raus.
15:22Das Boot schüttelte sich.
15:25Dann war das also schon kritischer.
15:26Ja, das war's.
15:56Das Boot schüttelte sich.
16:03which tested their stoic resolve.
16:06The psychological strain was immense,
16:08as they waited for the shock waves of an exploding charge,
16:11not knowing if it would be a fatal blow.
16:15Despite the dangers, some of the bolder U-boat captains
16:18actually sought to draw off the escort ships,
16:21as this allowed the other members of the Wolf Pack
16:23to close in for the kill unmolested.
16:26Night after night, the U-boats repeated this pattern of attack,
16:30running away to avoid the destroyers
16:32y luego regresando de nuevo para encontrar a target.
16:36Hay varias razones para preferir a night attack.
16:40Submerged, la U-boat traveled slowly.
16:438 knots was the maximum practical speed
16:45y la duración de la nave era limitada.
16:49En la superficie, la U-boat podía mantener 16 knots,
16:52giving el aeropuerto a huge, increased range.
16:56En ese momento, la convoy still relied mainly
16:58en visual observación para detectar submarinos.
17:01In the dark, the low profile of the U-boat was easily missed.
17:06The U-boat's much larger target
17:08was clearly silhouetted against any available light,
17:11particularly if another vessel had been set on fire.
17:15As they gained experience in their deadly trade,
17:19the wolf packs became bolder,
17:21and some adventurous captains even took to striking
17:23within the convoy itself,
17:25where the escorts dared not use their guns
17:27for fear of hitting their own ships.
17:31For the merchant seamen on the convoys,
17:33their working world had become a nightmare.
17:37Anybody who was sailing on a vessel,
17:39working in the merchant navy,
17:41and who was therefore a participant
17:42in this Battle of the Atlantic,
17:45for want of a better name,
17:47never knew when something was going to happen.
17:49The sea looks great, clear,
17:53but you just did not know
17:55if there was a U-boat out there
17:58with a torpedo ready to fire,
18:01and therefore, if you wanted to,
18:03you could be living on tent hooks,
18:04although you might say you were living dangerously,
18:07it didn't do any good to think about it,
18:09but it could happen,
18:10and suddenly, bingo,
18:12there's one ship less to worry about,
18:15as far as anybody was concerned,
18:17because the Atlantic Ocean is a very deep place,
18:20and you had to live with that.
18:23Britain now scrambled to find every available destroyer,
18:27as well as a number of armed merchant cruisers
18:30in order to provide protection for the convoys.
18:33But there were simply not enough warships available
18:35to provide the level of protection which was required.
18:40During the first year of the war,
18:42British warships sank an average of four U-boats per month,
18:46but the German shipyards were already turning out new U-boats
18:49faster than the old ones could be destroyed.
18:52For their part,
18:54the U-boats were sinking an average
18:55of three or four British merchant ships every single day.
19:00At that time,
19:01this was more than six times the level of construction
19:04of the new shipping in the British Isles.
19:07In the year between the 19th of June 1940
19:09and the 19th of June 1941,
19:12the Germans sank more than 1,300 British merchant ships.
19:16In all,
19:17they had destroyed 5,700,000 tons of British shipping.
19:22In that same year,
19:23British shipyards were able to build
19:25only 800,000 tons of new ships.
19:29Due to the restrictions of the electric motors,
19:32which needed frequent recharging,
19:35the U-boats spent almost all of their time on the surface.
19:38The submarines of World War II were, in truth,
19:42no more than submersible torpedo boats
19:44with a very limited submerged endurance.
19:46They had to surface at regular intervals for air
19:50and to recharge the batteries.
19:53This was often to prove their undoing.
19:56Destroyers, or prowling aircraft,
19:59often caught U-boats on the surface
20:00as they attempted to refuel or recharge the batteries.
20:05Sixty years on from the events he describes,
20:08Werner Zeimer can still remember vividly
20:10the effects of an air attack.
20:13We were in the battery supply of water
20:16and during this loading period
20:20we got the aircrafts.
20:23Before, I have to say,
20:24we had another attack of Sundaland.
20:27That were these flying boats.
20:30And as they hit us,
20:32we only saw a fire column
20:36from right to left,
20:37from right to right to right to right to right to right.
20:39And then we also shot with two centimeters.
20:43And then we saw how the ammunition
20:45from the council of the aircraft
20:48was out of the aircraft.
20:50The air air ammunition.
20:53We didn't get through.
20:54It was out.
20:55In the early years of the war,
20:57the British had two devices
20:59for detecting submarines.
21:01The first was the hydrophone,
21:03a simple listening device
21:05which could detect propeller noise.
21:07It could be defeated
21:08by the submarine shutting down its engine
21:10and it could only be used
21:12if the ship stopped its own propellers.
21:15Much more was expected of the ASDIC,
21:18a device which emitted high-frequency sound
21:20and detected the reflections from the submarine.
21:24A searching vessel could continue at full speed
21:27and could determine the submarine's position
21:29and course.
21:31ASDIC operators became the eyes
21:33of the hunting battleship.
21:36We would pick them up ASDIC
21:38and you would fix on to a submarine
21:42and you'd get the bleep, bleep, bleep coming back
21:45and then you'd probably be on them.
21:48I know at one time
21:49in the Battle of the Atlantic
21:51we sunk three U-boats in nine hours.
21:56Infuriatingly,
21:56the early ASDIC sets
21:58lost the signal
21:59when they were immediately over the submarine
22:01making the accurate placing
22:03of depth charges difficult.
22:06Additionally,
22:07the U-boat crew
22:07alerted by the distinctive pings
22:09of the ASDIC
22:10would often alter course
22:12and slip away.
22:15During the early phase of the war
22:16this period of havoc
22:17visited on Allied shipping
22:19became known to the U-boat crew
22:20as the happy time.
22:24Initially,
22:24the British had realised
22:25on their ASDIC sonar system
22:27but there were incredible flaws in this.
22:29It was effective
22:30to up to three quarters of a mile
22:31and as German U-boat commanders
22:33believed in engaging
22:34at around 2,000 to 3,000 yards
22:36the escorts could rarely detect
22:38the approaching attack.
22:40ASDIC was modified
22:41as the war went on
22:42and improved in quality
22:43but it still remained
22:44a problematical machine to use.
22:46ASDIC's other failure,
22:47of course,
22:48was it worked only on
22:49submerged submarines
22:49and the German U-boat tactics
22:51were to attack at night
22:52on the surface
22:53and thus avoid detection.
22:56The chances of Britain's survival
22:58during the period
22:59of 1941 to 1942
23:01was by no means guaranteed.
23:04However,
23:05the evidence suggests
23:06that the chances of Britain
23:07ever losing the convoy battle
23:09in the Atlantic
23:09during this period
23:11were in fact very slim.
23:14British merchant marine
23:15at the outbreak
23:15of the Second World War
23:16was absolutely huge.
23:18well over 20 million tonnes
23:20of shipping
23:21and in simple,
23:22rather brutal terms,
23:24Britain could afford
23:25to lose huge quantities
23:26of shipping
23:27before real crisis
23:28began to loom.
23:30It was estimated
23:31by the Germans
23:32that they had to sink
23:34750,000 tonnes
23:36of merchant shipping
23:36every month
23:37consistently
23:38for 12 months
23:40to defeat Britain.
23:42British losses
23:43had climbed
23:44to that level.
23:44during 1941
23:47a new danger emerged
23:48to join the U-boats.
23:51The long-range
23:52Focke-Wulf
23:52Condor bombers
23:53now joined the attacks
23:55against British shipping.
23:56At this point of the war
23:58there was little
23:58the British could do
23:59in reply.
24:01British fighter planes
24:02simply did not have
24:03the range
24:03to interfere
24:04with the Condors
24:05and the aircraft carriers
24:06which could have made
24:07a fighter cover available
24:08were urgently required
24:10elsewhere.
24:11Winston Churchill
24:14recognised the threat
24:15when he issued
24:16his 1941 orders
24:17to the fighting forces
24:18in the battle
24:19for the Atlantic.
24:22We must take
24:23the offensive
24:23against the U-boats
24:24whenever and
24:25wherever we can.
24:27The U-boats at sea
24:28must be hunted.
24:29The U-boats
24:29in the building yard
24:30or in dock
24:31must be bombed.
24:32The Focke-Wulf bombers
24:33employed against our shipping
24:35must be attacked
24:35in the air
24:36and in their nests.
24:38As far as aerial
24:41attackers are concerned
24:42the better option
24:43really was to equip
24:44merchant ships
24:46not just escorts
24:46but merchant ships
24:47with anti-aircraft weapons.
24:50.3
24:50.303 machine guns
24:52and then half-inch
24:53machine guns
24:54preferably 20mm
24:55or 40mm
24:57anti-aircraft guns.
24:58These of course
24:59were not readily available
25:00in the dark days
25:01of 1940 and 1941.
25:04But if you could equip
25:05most of the ships
25:07in the convoy
25:08with anti-aircraft weapons
25:10then the volume
25:11of fire put up
25:12not terribly accurate
25:14but a huge volume
25:15was quite enough
25:16to deter
25:16the Condors
25:17from attacking
25:18because they tended
25:19to attack
25:20from quite low altitudes
25:22in order to be sure
25:23of putting the bombs
25:24on the ships.
25:26Winston Churchill
25:27was also to play
25:28a leading part
25:29in the next phase
25:30in the battle
25:30for the Atlantic.
25:31In a momentous conference
25:33between the British
25:34Prime Minister
25:35and American
25:35President Roosevelt
25:36held in Newfoundland
25:38early in 1941
25:39Churchill managed
25:40to elicit American help
25:42in protecting
25:42convoys sailing to Britain.
25:45Although the United States
25:47was not yet at war
25:48with Germany
25:48Roosevelt recognised
25:50the danger
25:50to Western civilisation
25:52if Hitler succeeded
25:53in starving Britain
25:54into surrender
25:55and he agreed
25:56that the American Navy
25:58would not permit
25:59the German submarines
26:00to attack British shipping
26:01in any part
26:03of the Atlantic Ocean
26:04west of Iceland.
26:07Roosevelt realised
26:08that if Britain
26:09went under
26:09the consequences
26:11for America
26:11would be extremely severe.
26:14As a result
26:15he introduced legislation
26:16to provide the British
26:17with 50 worn out destroyers
26:19from World War I
26:20from the American
26:21Fleet Reserve.
26:22In April 1941
26:25Roosevelt extended
26:27the Pan-American
26:28neutrality zone
26:29in which the Germans
26:31were forbidden
26:32and warned not
26:33to attack shipping.
26:35This had been quite convenient
26:37for the British
26:37in that it allowed
26:39their convoys
26:39on the eastern coast
26:40of America and Canada
26:42a relative degree
26:43of security.
26:45Roosevelt extended
26:46this up to 1,000 miles
26:48into the Atlantic
26:48which meant
26:50the German U-boat
26:50activity was restricted
26:52to the western side
26:53of the Atlantic
26:53where the British
26:55escorts and convoys
26:56were more numerous.
26:58There was also
26:59a renewed glimmer
27:00of hope
27:01for the British
27:02surface fleet.
27:03Following a successful
27:04battle against
27:05a British convoy
27:06in May 1941
27:07the Bismarck
27:09a new battleship
27:10and the pride
27:11of the German
27:11surface fleet
27:12accompanied by
27:13the heavy cruiser
27:14Prince Eugene
27:15was engaged
27:16by a British
27:17naval force
27:18southwest of Iceland.
27:20The Germans
27:20fought back fiercely
27:22destroying the British
27:23battlecruiser Hood
27:24and crippling
27:25the battleship
27:26Prince of Wales.
27:28But the Bismarck
27:29herself had been hit
27:30and in the continued
27:31fighting suffered
27:32further damage
27:33from an airstrike
27:34launched from
27:35the Ark Royal.
27:37There was no escaping
27:38the guns and torpedoes
27:39of the converging
27:40home fleet.
27:42Hitler's most powerful
27:43battleship
27:44finally sank
27:45on the morning
27:46of May the 27th.
27:48In 1941
27:51the lifting
27:52of the German
27:52invasion threat
27:53to Britain
27:53allowed extra
27:55British destroyers
27:56to be released
27:56for convoy duty.
27:58As the numbers
27:59grew
27:59the escorts
28:00developed better
28:01tactical methods
28:02to combat
28:03the U-boats.
28:04They were aided
28:05by rapid improvements
28:07in wireless
28:07communications.
28:09Ironically
28:10the cohesiveness
28:11which made
28:11the Wolfpack
28:12so successful
28:13was also
28:14the Achilles heel
28:15which made them
28:16invulnerable.
28:18When it became
28:19necessary for
28:20dispersed U-boats
28:21to gather together
28:22to form a Wolfpack
28:23regular wireless
28:25contact with base
28:26was inevitable.
28:28A new British
28:29apparatus
28:29the High Frequency
28:30Direction Finder
28:32or Huffduff
28:33allowed escort ships
28:34accurately to locate
28:35a U-boat
28:36from its radio signals.
28:38Huffduff was a success.
28:40In commanding his U-boats
28:42and in organising them
28:43in Wolfpacks
28:44Durnich used radio signals.
28:46Now he accepted
28:47that the Allies
28:47could use land stations
28:49to detect these
28:50and pinpoint
28:51the positions of U-boats
28:52but as the U-boats
28:53would only be signalling
28:55normally at the moment
28:56of attack
28:56it was regarded
28:57that the threat to them
28:58would be minimal.
28:59It would be too late
29:00for the Allies to act.
29:01The Allies however
29:02developed
29:03Huffduff
29:04or High Frequency
29:05Direction Finding
29:07radar
29:07which was mounted
29:08unbeknownst to Durnich
29:09on escorts
29:10in 1943 onwards.
29:12The result was
29:13that they could
29:13actually themselves
29:14detect German U-boats
29:16sending radio signals
29:17nearby
29:18locate them
29:19and engage them.
29:22Also introduced
29:22in 1941
29:23was another device
29:25that changed
29:25the whole pattern
29:26of war at sea.
29:28During the course
29:29of 1941
29:30radar scanners
29:32began to sprout
29:33from the mastheads
29:34of British destroyers.
29:35The newly perfected radar
29:38would prove decisive
29:39in the long-fought battle
29:41of the Atlantic.
29:42The Germans too
29:44had radar technology
29:45but under the Nazi regime
29:47its potential
29:48had not been realised.
29:50Research was erratic.
29:52Their first countermeasure
29:54to the new detection system
29:55was to deploy radio silence.
29:59Radar allowed
29:59the fast destroyers
30:00to provide protective cover
30:02to a convoy
30:02even when out of sight.
30:05The range
30:06over which
30:07they could seek out
30:07the enemy
30:08was also extended.
30:10The happy time
30:11was not yet over
30:12but Britain
30:13was on the point
30:14of fighting back.
30:17The much-needed
30:18infusion of support
30:19which came
30:20from the American intervention
30:21did a great deal
30:22to free British warships
30:24to concentrate
30:24on escort duty
30:25in the eastern part
30:27of the ocean
30:27where German attacks
30:29were growing ever more destructive.
30:32It was just as well
30:33because the British navy
30:35was about to embark
30:36on one of the greatest tests
30:37of World War II
30:38the Russian convoys.
30:41In June 1941
30:43Hitler sent his armies
30:45into Soviet Russia
30:46and the Germans
30:47won spectacular victories
30:48as they drove closer
30:49and closer
30:50to the beleaguered
30:51Soviet capital of Moscow.
30:53Stalin had appealed
30:55to Britain for help
30:56and in the late autumn
30:57of 1941
30:58the first convoy
31:00sailed through
31:01the treacherous
31:01Arctic waters
31:02laden with aid
31:04for Russia.
31:06Great Britain
31:07and the United States
31:07sent the Soviet Union
31:08during the war
31:09about 22,000 aircraft
31:10and about 12,000 tanks.
31:13But when you consider
31:13the fact that the Russians
31:14produced 106,000 tanks
31:18during the war
31:18then therefore
31:19our tank supplies
31:20were roughly about
31:21somewhere about 10%.
31:23And there were other supplies
31:24which are extremely important.
31:26I mean the food supplies
31:27were important.
31:28I mean talk to Russians now
31:29and they'll tell you
31:30about the bags of flour
31:32with the stars and stripes
31:33and they'll tell you
31:33about the butter
31:34in the hospitals
31:34and all of these things
31:35though appearing to be
31:37on the surface
31:38rather minuscule
31:39had very important consequences.
31:42In order to reach Russia
31:44the Arctic convoys
31:45had to sail through
31:46some of the most
31:46inhospitable oceans
31:47in the world.
31:48During the summer months
31:50darkness never really comes
31:52in the Arctic circle
31:53and the 24 hours of daylight
31:55provided a superb opportunity
31:57for the German long-range bombers
31:59and surface ships
32:00which were stationed
32:01on the coast of Norway
32:02to launch punishing attacks
32:04against the Arctic convoys.
32:07When winter came
32:08the violent storms
32:10almost constant darkness
32:11and ever-present dangers
32:13of the ice
32:14added to the misery
32:15of the crews
32:16manning the ships
32:17in the Arctic.
32:18The guys who were on
32:20the Mermansk run
32:22when convoys would leave
32:24the north-west coast
32:26north-east coast of England
32:27and head up around
32:28that North Cape
32:30that was bloody murder.
32:33The icy conditions
32:34of January and February
32:36let alone the other winter parts
32:38if you got torpedoed up
32:40in the real North Atlantic
32:42around the North Cape
32:44Spitsbergen
32:46and there
32:47if you went in the sea
32:48you would last for 20 minutes
32:50and that would be it
32:52you would just freeze to death.
32:54So the guys who went up
32:55on that Mermansk run
32:56were real heroes.
32:58They just had a lot
33:01to put up with
33:01and a lot of course
33:02didn't come back.
33:03In June 1941
33:06the first U-boats
33:07appeared in Arctic waters
33:08the most dangerous
33:10and inhospitable seas
33:12in the world.
33:14For the sailors
33:15of both sides
33:16conditions in the Arctic
33:17were appalling
33:17a numbing
33:19unending nightmare
33:20of fog
33:21ice
33:21and blizzards.
33:23Although the threat
33:24of enemy action
33:25was the fear
33:25always uppermost
33:27in the seamen's minds
33:28they could equally succumb
33:29to exposure
33:30frostbite
33:31or drowning
33:32in ferocious storms.
33:34Of the 81 vessels
33:35sunk in these waters
33:36the U-boat fleet
33:38accounted for all
33:39but three.
33:40In return
33:4138 U-boats
33:42were lost
33:43with all hands
33:43in the same
33:44unforgiving waters.
33:48Conditions on the
33:49Arctic convoy routes
33:50really almost
33:52stretched the bounds
33:53of human imagination.
33:55This was an area
33:56of water
33:56between Iceland
33:57and the Russian ports
33:58of Mermansk
33:59and Archangel
34:00that was traversed
34:02during the Second World War
34:03by around 40 convoys
34:05of about 800 ships
34:07in total
34:07about 100 of which
34:08were lost
34:09during the Arctic convoy
34:10battles.
34:12The seas in this area
34:13are mountainous
34:15the areas subject
34:16to vicious
34:17northeasterly gales
34:18with sleet
34:20and snow
34:21and hail.
34:22Sea temperatures
34:23are rarely above
34:24more than a few
34:25degrees centigrade
34:26which means that
34:27anybody unlucky
34:28enough to find
34:28themselves in the water
34:29has a life expectancy
34:30of mere minutes
34:31so all in all
34:32it was pretty awful.
34:34These harsh conditions
34:36did not prevent
34:36the U-boats in the
34:37wolfpacks from
34:38stalking the convoys
34:39and although losses
34:41began to mount
34:42it was obvious to
34:43Britain that Russia's
34:44need was so great
34:45they had to continue
34:46to send supplies
34:47regardless of the
34:48costs
34:49and those costs
34:51could be enormous.
34:53By early 1942
34:55the Germans had managed
34:57to concentrate
34:57powerful air, surface
34:59and submarine forces
35:00in Norway
35:01with the aim of causing
35:02as much damage as
35:03possible to the convoys.
35:06The Admiralty in Britain
35:07was particularly concerned
35:09to discover that the
35:10giant German battleship
35:11Tirpitz
35:12had arrived in Trondheim.
35:13Even more ominously
35:16she was joined
35:17in the Norwegian waters
35:18by the pocket battleships
35:19Scheer and Lutzau
35:21and the heavy cruisers
35:22Hipper and Prince Eugen.
35:25The German surface fleet
35:27entered the war
35:28in 1939
35:29as a relatively balanced
35:31but rather small
35:32surface fleet.
35:33Certainly it was
35:34incapable of engaging
35:35the Royal Navy
35:36on any serious battle
35:38so as to try
35:38and gain command
35:39of the sea.
35:41The one area
35:42of operations
35:43in which the German
35:44surface raiders
35:45managed to achieve
35:46some degree of effect
35:47was in the Arctic Ocean.
35:50Their bases in Norway
35:51put them astride
35:53the main communication
35:54lines of the convoys
35:55from Britain to Mamansk
35:57and sorties on several
35:59occasions did create
36:00panic amongst the Allies.
36:03The U-boats
36:04continued to hit home
36:06and on the Arctic convoys
36:08losses now grew
36:09to a point
36:09that they were even heavier
36:10than the massive losses
36:12which were still
36:12still being sustained
36:13on the North Atlantic
36:15sea lanes.
36:16Between March and June
36:17of 1942
36:18five British convoy
36:20sailed for Russia
36:21and all five
36:23suffered heavy losses
36:24which included
36:25several British cruisers
36:26and destroyers.
36:29Despite these losses
36:30the situation in Russia
36:32appeared so desperate
36:33that authorisation
36:34was given
36:35for convoy PQ-17
36:37to sail for Mamansk.
36:39Allied covering forces
36:41of two battleships
36:42one aircraft carrier
36:43three cruisers
36:45and eight destroyers
36:46were sent to the North Sea
36:47ready to strike
36:48if the German battleships
36:50appeared.
36:52By the 4th of July
36:53swarms of German aircraft
36:55began a series of attacks
36:57against the convoy.
36:59They succeeded in striking
37:01three merchant ships
37:02but there was worse
37:03to follow.
37:05That same day
37:06the Admiralty learnt
37:07that a German squadron
37:09consisting of the Tirpitz,
37:10Prince Yujian,
37:12Lutzau,
37:12the Hipper
37:13and several German destroyers
37:14had gone to sea.
37:16The report suggested
37:18that the Germans
37:19would be able
37:20to reach the British convoy
37:21long before
37:22the covering naval force
37:24could catch up with them.
37:26It was feared
37:27that the German ships
37:28would overwhelm
37:29the escort vessels
37:30and then sink
37:31all of the merchant ships.
37:34In fact,
37:35the German surface ships
37:36were not as close
37:37to the convoy
37:38as the Admiralty had feared
37:39but the escort vessels
37:41with the convoy
37:42were ordered to draw off
37:44in an attempt
37:45to decoy
37:45German task forces
37:47away from the convoy.
37:49It was to prove
37:50to be a disastrous decision.
37:53With the escort
37:54safely out of the way
37:55the wolf packs
37:56and bomber forces
37:57moved in
37:57on the unprotected merchantmen
37:59and had a field day.
38:01They sank 20 more
38:03British merchant ships
38:04which meant that
38:05out of a total
38:05of 34 ships
38:06that had started
38:07in the convoy
38:08only 11
38:09finally struggled
38:11into Mamansk.
38:12With hindsight
38:13it's easy to say
38:14that convoy PQ-17
38:16was a disaster
38:17waiting to happen.
38:19The core of the problem
38:20was the presence
38:21of the Tirpitz.
38:23This battleship
38:24if it emerged
38:25and engaged the convoy
38:27could sink
38:28could sink
38:28the convoy
38:30and the escorts
38:31in reasonably short time.
38:33The only defence
38:34against the Tirpitz
38:35was for the convoy
38:36to scatter
38:37and so they are easy
38:39and single victims
38:40for the aircraft
38:42and the U-boats
38:44and they simply
38:46massacre them.
38:48To add insult
38:49to injury
38:50the Russians
38:51refused to believe
38:52that the missing 23 ships
38:54of convoy PQ-17
38:56had actually been sunk.
38:58They accused the allies
38:59of inventing the story
39:01of great losses
39:01and of pretending
39:03to give more help
39:04than they were
39:04really providing.
39:06The suspicious Russians
39:08never fully understood
39:09the terrible conditions
39:11which the convoy
39:12encountered sailing
39:12to Mamansk
39:13and the value
39:14of the aid
39:15they received
39:16by these great sacrifices
39:17was never fully appreciated.
39:23Despite the value
39:24of the supplies
39:25after the disaster
39:26of PQ-17
39:28the allies
39:29were temporarily
39:29forced to discontinue
39:31the convoys
39:32to Russia.
39:33The halting
39:34of the convoys
39:35until September
39:36that year
39:37went down
39:38extremely badly
39:39in Moscow.
39:40The Soviets
39:41were engaged
39:42in the very costly
39:43battle of Stalingrad
39:44and were desperate
39:45for war supplies
39:46which the convoys
39:47provided.
39:48And there were
39:49some sharp words
39:50sent to both
39:50Washington and London
39:51from the Soviets
39:52about halting
39:53these convoys.
39:55The battle
39:56for the Atlantic
39:56had reached its peak
39:58and there were simply
39:59not enough warships
39:59to protect convoys
40:00on both the North Atlantic
40:02and the Arctic Oceans.
40:04By the time
40:05they were restructured
40:06the Admiralty
40:07had realized
40:08that the convoy
40:08losses on the Mamansk run
40:10were less
40:11during the dark
40:12and stormy winter months
40:13than they had been
40:14during the summer
40:15with its 24 hours
40:16of daylight.
40:18Although the terrible
40:19conditions of ice
40:20and snow
40:21meant misery
40:21for the crews
40:22ironically it produced
40:24an increased chance
40:25of survival.
40:27The sacrifice
40:27of the merchantmen
40:28made a real difference
40:30to the Russian war effort.
40:32By 1942
40:34British losses
40:35in the Atlantic
40:36had reached
40:37epidemic proportions
40:38and the German propaganda
40:40machine was quick
40:41to seize on the opportunity
40:42to trumpet the impending
40:44victory in the Atlantic.
40:46British losses
40:47were approaching
40:48the level
40:48which the German
40:49propaganda machine
40:50called
40:51the Death Line.
40:54Just as victory
40:55appeared to be
40:56within the grasp
40:57of the Wolf Packs
40:58the scales
40:59suddenly shifted
41:00in favor
41:01of the Allies.
41:03Perhaps the most
41:04significant breakthrough
41:05in the U-Boat War
41:06came with the breakthrough
41:08by the British
41:08intelligence services
41:10operating from
41:10Bletchley Park.
41:12Thanks to the
41:13extremely fortunate
41:14capture of an Enigma
41:15encoding book
41:16British scientists
41:18were able to begin
41:19cracking the coded signals
41:20which told the U-boats
41:22where to gather
41:23for the attack.
41:25Armed with this information
41:26they could intercept
41:27at sea
41:27and the level
41:28of the U-boat sinkings
41:29rose dramatically
41:30from 1943 onwards.
41:33The intelligence war
41:35in the Second World War
41:37was as we now know
41:38of absolutely crucial
41:39importance
41:39to the winning
41:40of that war
41:40and so too
41:41was the intelligence war
41:42in the context
41:43of the battle
41:43for the Atlantic.
41:45In particular
41:45British ability
41:47to read
41:48German signals traffic
41:49in particular
41:50traffic between
41:51the U-boats
41:52and their higher commands
41:53from December 1942 onwards
41:55was very important
41:56because it allowed
41:58convoys to be
41:58rerouted
41:59to avoid
42:00the German U-boats
42:01on many occasions.
42:03This certainly
42:03saved the Allies
42:04literally millions
42:06of tons of shipping
42:07as a result
42:08of this.
42:09Of course
42:09it should be said
42:10that the Germans
42:10had actually broken
42:11British naval codes
42:13even before
42:13the Second World War.
42:15However,
42:15from 1943 onwards
42:17when the British
42:17changed their codes
42:18effectively the Germans
42:20were fighting
42:21almost blind
42:22in terms of
42:22their intelligence
42:23sources
42:23whilst the Allies
42:24were going
42:25from strength
42:25to strength.
42:28One of the other
42:29significant developments
42:31in 1943
42:31was the closing
42:33of the air gap
42:34over the Atlantic
42:34convoys
42:35with the appearance
42:36of long-distance
42:37American bombers
42:38and with the increased
42:40availability
42:40of new aircraft
42:41such as the
42:42Short Sunderland
42:43there was now
42:44no place
42:45for the U-boats
42:45to hide
42:46over the entire
42:47expanse
42:48of the Atlantic Ocean.
42:50In the early years
42:52of the war
42:52when the U-boats
42:53submerged
42:54it had been
42:55almost impossible
42:56to pinpoint
42:57their position.
42:58However,
42:59by 1943
43:00increasingly
43:01sophisticated
43:02detection methods
43:03were beginning
43:04to eliminate
43:05the ability
43:05of the U-boats
43:06to hide
43:07from detection
43:07by surface
43:08vessels
43:09or aircraft.
43:12In 1943
43:13the technical
43:15side of Allied
43:16innovations
43:16in sonar
43:17radar detection
43:18and in weapons
43:19development
43:20along with
43:21improvements
43:21in tactics
43:22and training
43:22came together
43:23in a series
43:24of devastating
43:25battles
43:26which saw
43:26the U-boats
43:27suffer horrendous
43:28losses.
43:30When the U-boats
43:30attacked a convoy
43:32the support groups
43:33would be freely
43:33able to move up
43:34and bring overwhelming
43:36force to bear
43:36with the new
43:37technology
43:38and destroy them.
43:40It was devastating.
43:41these advances
43:47together
43:48produced a huge
43:49shift in the U-boat
43:50war.
43:511942
43:52had been known
43:53by the U-boat
43:53crews as
43:54the happy time.
43:56In that year
43:56alone
43:56the Allies
43:57had lost
43:57over 1,700
43:58ships
43:59which accounted
44:00for a massive
44:008 million tons
44:01of shipping.
44:03In the same year
44:03they had been able
44:04to build
44:05only 7 million tons
44:06of shipping.
44:07There was to be
44:08no such triumph
44:09in 1943
44:10although ironically
44:12the last
44:13of the U-boat
44:13victories
44:14took place
44:14in February
44:15and March
44:16of that year.
44:17In a fierce battle
44:18against a large
44:19Allied convoy
44:20bound for Liverpool
44:21the Wolfpack
44:22sank 21 ships
44:24for the loss
44:25of only one submarine.
44:27It looked
44:28as if the pattern
44:29would be repeated
44:29when in early May
44:31a pack
44:31of 12 submarines
44:33found a convoy
44:34that had been
44:34scattered in a storm.
44:37In just 2 days
44:38the U-boat
44:38sank 9 ships
44:39but this time
44:41the escort
44:42struck back.
44:44In the next few days
44:45they sank 11
44:46of the attackers
44:46without losing
44:47a single ship.
44:49It was this action
44:50which clearly
44:51demonstrated
44:52that the tide
44:53had now turned.
44:57By 1943
44:58Allied losses
44:59were less than
45:003.5 million tonnes
45:01during which time
45:03they built
45:0314.5 million tonnes
45:05of new shipping.
45:07In a war
45:08of attrition
45:09in which the tonnage
45:10of shipping sunk
45:11was the key indicator
45:12to both sides
45:13of how effective
45:14the war was being fought
45:16the shipyards
45:17were vital.
45:20British shipyards
45:20averaged around
45:212 million tonnes
45:22of merchant shipping
45:23a year
45:24throughout the war.
45:25This helped
45:26to sustain
45:27and replace
45:28the massive losses
45:2922 million
45:31in all
45:32to the Allies.
45:33But of course
45:34the key
45:34to the Allied victory
45:35was the American
45:36shipyards.
45:38In the first
45:39three months
45:39of 1942
45:40they produced
45:411.5 million tonnes
45:43of shipping
45:43and for every quarter
45:44of the war afterwards
45:45they never fell
45:47below 2 million tonnes.
45:50Inexorably
45:50the balance
45:51was tipping
45:52against the Kriegs marine
45:53in the Atlantic.
45:55The rate of Allied shipbuilding
45:56was climbing
45:56far above losses.
45:59In the first
45:59three months
46:00of 1940
46:00when on average
46:0214 U-boats
46:03were on patrol
46:03over 800,000 tonnes
46:05of Allied shipping
46:06had been sunk.
46:08In a similar period
46:09in 1943
46:10with 115 U-boats
46:12operating
46:13the tally
46:14was nearly
46:14550,000 tonnes.
46:17100 more U-boats
46:18were actually sinking
46:20less tonnage.
46:21There were never
46:23enough U-boats.
46:25Germany entered
46:25the war in 1939
46:26with only 57
46:27operational U-boats
46:29and although
46:29the number
46:30later climbed
46:31in 1943
46:32and 1944
46:32to several hundred
46:34by virtue
46:35of the fact
46:36that many of them
46:37had to be fitting out
46:38or were training
46:38their crews
46:39or were moving
46:40back and forth
46:41between their patrol
46:43stations
46:43and their ports
46:44it meant
46:45that only a
46:46very small proportion
46:47very rarely
46:48more than 20%
46:49were ever actually
46:50on patrol
46:52in battle stations
46:53if you like
46:54in the central
46:54or indeed
46:55the western
46:55and eastern Atlantic.
46:57More significantly
46:59U-boat losses
47:00were growing
47:01at an alarming rate.
47:03The conventional
47:03submarines
47:04which had fared
47:05so well
47:06in the first winter
47:06of the war
47:07were now highly
47:08vulnerable
47:08to the Allied
47:09hunter-killer groups.
47:11It became rare
47:12for a U-boat
47:13to survive
47:13more than two sorties.
47:15It was not just
47:17the undersea fleet
47:18that was now
47:18on the run
47:19the German surface
47:20fleet had suffered
47:21a number of serious
47:22losses in late 1942
47:24and in consequence
47:25the German capital
47:27ships spent most
47:28of 1943
47:29standing idle
47:30in port
47:30where they had
47:31endured the disfavor
47:32of Hitler
47:33and Donitz.
47:35In December
47:36of that year
47:36the Scharnhorst
47:37was sunk
47:38by the guns
47:38from the battleship
47:39Duke of York
47:40and sent to the bottom.
47:42In 1944
47:43the mighty
47:44Tirpitz
47:45was also sunk
47:45this time
47:46by the RAF
47:47who were able
47:48to sink
47:49the battleship
47:49with six ton bombs
47:50which were designed
47:51especially for the task.
47:54There were a few
47:55German attempts
47:56to reestablish
47:56a technological lead
47:58in the battle
47:58for the Atlantic
47:59during 1944
48:00and 1945.
48:03Most notable
48:03was the adoption
48:04of the Biscay
48:05cross radar system
48:06which allowed radar
48:08to be carried
48:08on U-boats.
48:10This gave the commanders
48:11at least some warning
48:12of an impending
48:13air attack.
48:13Of even more value
48:15was the adoption
48:16of their snorkel system
48:17which allowed U-boats
48:19to run underneath
48:19the surface
48:20and still draw the air
48:21for the diesel engines
48:22through a thin tube
48:24which extended
48:25a few feet
48:25above the water.
48:27This made U-boats
48:28almost impossible
48:29to detect
48:30from the surface
48:31but it was a case
48:32of far too little
48:33too late.
48:38On May the 4th
48:39Grand Admiral Donitz
48:41now head of state
48:42issued the order
48:44for the U-boats
48:44to cease hostilities.
48:49The battle
48:50for the Atlantic
48:50had been won
48:51by the bravery
48:52and skill
48:53of the men and women
48:54who worked together
48:55in the intelligence
48:56gathering network
48:57in the British
48:58Merchant Navy
48:59the convoy escort
49:01aircraft of the RAF
49:02and in the ships
49:03of the Royal Navy.
49:05We'll see you next time.
49:07Gracias por ver el video.
49:37Gracias por ver el video.
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