* Tucker Carlson 5-Part Series Exposing The Lies Of The Official 9/11 Report *
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Tucker Carlson
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#News #Politics #Trump 47 #Juan O Savin #Nino #Jennifer Mac #Michael Jaco #Education #Republican #USAID #Documentary
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00:00The Bush administration did everything it possibly could to undermine an actual investigation into what happened on September 11th.
00:08But why? What were they trying to hide?
00:10There's an old saying in Tennessee, I know it's in Texas, probably in Tennessee, that says,
00:15Fool me once, shame on, shame on you.
00:24If fool me, we can't get fooled again.
00:26Well, for one thing, the United States had incredible intelligence on bin Laden and his plans.
00:31Precise intelligence. Actionable intelligence.
00:33On August 6th, 2001, President Bush received a presidential daily briefing.
00:38Its title, literally, Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.
00:43It continued, Al-Qaeda members, including some who are U.S. citizens, have resided in or traveled to the U.S. for years.
00:50And the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks.
00:54And then it added this.
00:56FBI information indicates patterns of suspicious activity consistent with preparations for hijacking.
01:03Bin Laden was mentioned no fewer than 40 times in the president's daily intelligence briefing.
01:08CIA Director George Tenet said that in the summer of 2001, quote, the system was blinking red.
01:15So how far-fetched was it that Al-Qaeda might hijack airplanes and fly them into buildings?
01:20Not very far-fetched, it turns out.
01:22In May 2001, an intelligence report concluded this.
01:26Operatives may hijack airplanes, end quote.
01:29The FAA issued a circular to airlines warning of heightened increase in hijackings.
01:35And then in July of 2001, the FAA issued another circular, this one noting that, quote,
01:40currently active terror groups were known to plan and train for hijackings and were able to build and conceal explosives and luggage.
01:50Between 1999 and 2001, NORAD, which defends North American airspace, simulated a foreign hijacked airliner crashing into a building in the United States as part of a training exercise.
02:01And they were not alone.
02:02The National Reconnaissance Office, a little-known intelligence agency that runs our spy satellites and remote-controlled surveillance planes,
02:09was planning an exercise in which an errant aircraft would crash into one of its buildings.
02:15That exercise was on September 11, 2001, and planned to take place just a couple of miles from Dulles Airport.
02:22That's where the American Airlines flight number 77 had taken off before it crashed into the Pentagon.
02:28In other words, the idea of al-Qaeda hijacking an airplane and flying into a building was entirely plausible before 9-11.
02:37Officials knew it could happen.
02:39And there were other signs as well.
02:40During the presidential transition in 2000 and 2001, nine months before 9-11,
02:45Bill Clinton told President Bush,
02:48I think by far your greatest threat is bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
02:52In January of 2001, Philip Zellicoe, the future executive director of the 9-11 Commission,
02:59attended a briefing in which Condoleezza Rice, the future national security advisor,
03:03was warned by Sandy Berger, that'd be Bill Clinton's outgoing national security advisor,
03:08that, quote,
03:09The biggest national security threat facing this country is al-Qaeda.
03:13On July 10, 2001, the CIA director, George Tenet, and his counterterrorism deputy,
03:18Jay Kofor Black, were so alarmed by intelligence pointing to an impending attack by al-Qaeda
03:23that they demanded an emergency meeting at the White House with Condoleezza Rice and her Security Council staff.
03:29In fact, on the morning of the attacks,
03:32director of central intelligence, Tenet, told a U.S. senator,
03:35quote,
03:35I wonder if it has anything to do with this guy taking pilot training.
03:39And of course it did.
03:40By any measure, including according to the heavily biased commission report,
03:45George W. Bush, and particularly Condoleezza Rice,
03:49had ample warning that al-Qaeda was plotting an attack.
03:52And by all accounts, the U.S. intel agencies were fully aware the hijackers were in the United States.
03:57And in fact, it helped at least two of them get to the United States.
04:01U.S. intelligence was so strong at the time, on the morning of the attacks,
04:05the majority of the hijackers were flagged at the airport for additional screening.
04:10The question is, how did they wind up on the watch list in the first place?
04:14The report never tells us.
04:15Well, my name is Mike Shoyer.
04:18I worked at the CIA for 22 years.
04:22And from 1995 until 1999, I was chief of the Osama bin Laden unit.
04:28I would say it was 1983 to 1992.
04:33I worked on Afghanistan.
04:36I worked on the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
04:41Bin Laden was a popular name during the war against the Soviets.
04:44We knew he was fighting in Afghanistan with the Mujahideen.
04:49He was the poster boy for jihad in Saudi Arabia.
04:53So he was well-known throughout the Arab world.
04:55Osama bin Laden was born in 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, into a well-connected and wealthy family.
05:01He was one of 50 siblings.
05:03His father built a multi-billion dollar construction business,
05:06reconstructing, among other things, the cities of Mecca and Medina.
05:09In 1979, Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet invasion there.
05:14After the war, he returned to Saudi Arabia, but he was eventually exiled to Sudan
05:18because he was openly critical of the Saudi government's close ties to the United States.
05:23In 1996, he returned to Afghanistan and declared war on the U.S.
05:27In 1996, bin Laden announced what he said was his declaration of war against the United States.
05:35And it's a very compelling document to this day
05:38because it doesn't have anything to do with what the American people were told
05:43about either Islam or al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden.
05:48America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.
05:54The basis of the declaration of war from him was, get out of our land.
05:59That was a compelling message within a Middle Eastern framework
06:03that had been dominated by the United States government and the Israelis since the end of World War II.
06:10Since then, the United States has been repeatedly attacked in the region.
06:13Now the fanatics behind this bomb have given the French soldiers and their American counterparts
06:1810 days to leave Lebanon or die.
06:20In 1983, a group called Islamic Jihad murdered more than 300 U.S. Marines at a military barracks in Beirut.
06:28At the time, it was the largest non-nuclear explosion since Nagasaki.
06:32The four-story concrete building collapsed in a pile of rubble.
06:35More than 200 of the sleeping men were killed in that one hideous, insane attack.
06:39In 1993, a Pakistani national called Ramzi Youssef bombed the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan.
06:45The key question now, was this a one-off attack or the start of a campaign of bombing?
06:51By 1996, al-Qaeda had emerged as the single clearest threat to the United States.
06:56In response to that threat, the CIA created something called ALEC Station,
07:00otherwise known as the bin Laden unit, which Mike Schoyer ran.
07:04But as it turned out, not everyone at the CIA wanted to help fight al-Qaeda.
07:08We wanted some basic information about Osama bin Laden, his bank accounts, his health information, his educational information, very basic things.
07:19We kept sending a message because it was important.
07:23We were building a base of data.
07:25And so the COS in Saudi Arabia at the time, John Brennan, we didn't know if he was dealing with them on the issue or not.
07:36And so we finally sent a message that said, didn't say pretty please, but said, please do this as quickly as possible.
07:45He called Tenant.
07:48And that was the end of that.
07:52Don't send Brennan any more of these notes.
07:55So whatever the reason was, I don't know.
07:59But, you know, if you identify a liaison service who you know has information you need,
08:07it's not impossible to persuade them to do it since we defend Saudi Arabia, especially in that case.
08:14We were told not to send any more cables on that issue to Riyadh.
08:18Just because I was the chief of operations on Osama bin Laden didn't mean there wasn't somebody else working on the same issue in an opposite direction.
08:27And as it turned out, the opposite direction carried the day with the approval of presidents.
08:34As Brennan was withholding critical information on bin Laden, the CIA's counterterrorism center started developing a plan to capture bin Laden at a terrorist training facility known as Tarnak Farms.
08:45Tarnak Farms is where he lived.
08:48We knew Osama bin Laden, his family, Zawahiri's family, and a couple of other, the most senior al-Qaeda people were going to be there.
08:58And initially, the administration went along with it.
09:03The plan was finalized with the help of friendly Afghan tribal leaders.
09:07It was even rehearsed twice in the United States in late 1997.
09:11All it needed was approval from the White House.
09:13On March 7, 1998, Richard Clark, who headed the Interagency Counterterrorism Security Group,
09:19described the plan as embryonic to then-National Security Advisor Sandy Berger,
09:23even as the CIA was conducting its third rehearsal of the action.
09:29Military officers in the Pentagon reviewed the plan,
09:32and despite some mild misgivings that could have been attributed to interdepartmental rivalries,
09:37they generally expressed their satisfaction.
09:39They supported it.
09:40Legal justifications were prepared in advance from the CIA to the NSC for approval.
09:45The Attorney General of the United States, the FBI Director,
09:48and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
09:51where bin Laden was to be tried if he was captured alive,
09:54were all briefed on the plan.
09:55The CIA ran a fourth rehearsal between May 20th and May 24th,
09:59with the expectation that the plan would be executed in late June of that year,
10:04and no later than late July.
10:05And yet, less than a week later,
10:08the CIA's assets in the field were informed that the operation
10:11had been suspended by the Clinton administration.
10:14When we wrote the operational plan,
10:18you have to keep in mind,
10:20speaking to the policymaker,
10:22you have to keep in mind
10:23that they have their families there.
10:28And if there is violence,
10:30if they don't surrender,
10:31they're liable to be people killed.
10:35Noncombatants.
10:36They said, okay, we'll go ahead with it.
10:37So, that one went almost to the starting gate,
10:43and one of the last dumps of overhead imagery we got
10:48happened to show a child swing set,
10:54and they suddenly said,
10:55oh, we can't do that.
10:56What if that picture gets out,
10:57and we'll be responsible?
10:59A clear pattern emerged throughout Scheuer's tenure at Alec Station.
11:03Whenever there was a chance to kill or capture Osama bin Laden,
11:06the Clinton administration chose not to do it.
11:09We had an operation that was planned to kidnap bin Laden within Afghanistan.
11:15The plan was supposed to unfold just days
11:18before al-Qaeda bombed the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
11:22It was a plan that required getting him out of the country
11:27and then taking him to another country.
11:30And it was approved.
11:32And then it was, at the last minute, it was unapproved.
11:35And then a week later, the embassies went up.
11:38The greatest fear tonight is that what has happened here
11:40will herald some alarming new phase in international terrorism.
11:45About four o'clock in the morning,
11:47George Tenet, who was the DCI at the time,
11:50calls my office number, and I pick it up and said,
11:52yep, Scheuer.
11:54I said, yeah.
11:55And somebody else put him on.
11:59And he said, can we revive that program?
12:02The president wants to know if we can revive the program
12:05on the capture operation.
12:07By Tenet's words, realized they missed an opportunity,
12:10perhaps, to stop the operation.
12:11But that got to be a habit throughout the rest of my career there.
12:17Less than two weeks after the attacks,
12:19Clinton launched cruise missiles at targets
12:21he said were associated with bin Laden.
12:23Today, I ordered our armed forces to strike
12:25at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan.
12:29Our mission was clear.
12:31To strike at the network of radical groups
12:34affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden.
12:38But the strike was worthless.
12:40In fact, it was embarrassing.
12:41The Pentagon targeted suspected terrorist training facilities
12:44in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan,
12:48which U.S. intelligence falsely claimed
12:50was making chemical weapons.
12:51The pattern became clearer over time.
12:54The CIA would offer a way to capture or kill bin Laden,
12:57and then somebody would call off the strike at the last moment.
12:59To me, it's a mystery.
13:01To me, going after Osama bin Laden was hard work,
13:06but it could have been accomplished by 97.
13:08And then from 97 till I left in 99,
13:11there were 10 more opportunities.
13:13And none of them were taken advantage.
13:15Kill, capture, whatever the government wanted to do.
13:18And the chances kept coming.
13:20In May of 1999, U.S. intelligence services
13:22had a credible lead that bin Laden was at his compound
13:25near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
13:26Officials in both the U.S. military and the CIA agreed
13:30this was the best opportunity they could hope for
13:32to kill bin Laden.
13:33They had at least three opportunities to strike,
13:36but they never did.
13:37Somebody got wet feet?
13:39Schoyer was removed from his role running Alex Station in 1999.
13:43He was replaced with a figure called Richard Blee,
13:46who barely comes up in the 9-11 commission report.
13:49On October 12, 2000, the failure to act in bin Laden
13:52caught up to the agency and with our country,
13:55when the USS Cole, a destroyer anchored in Aden, Yemen,
13:59was attacked by a suicide bomber.
14:00Killed 17 soldiers on the USS Cole.
14:0317 American servicemen died, but this time the government
14:07didn't strike anyone or anything in retaliation.
14:11The official reason given by the report for the lack of action
14:14was that the administration lacked definitive proof
14:16that al-Qaeda was responsible for the terror attack.
14:19We knew right away it was Osama bin Laden.
14:21And then I hear Clinton on the radio or on the television saying,
14:28well, my experts, my team, my intelligence community says,
14:34we can't be sure if it's Osama bin Laden or not,
14:38or al-Qaeda or not.
14:41And we just stood there and said, no, what do we see?
14:43What are you talking about?
14:44In this case, the 9-11 commission offers excuses for Clinton,
14:47citing an absurd blame game with Clinton administration officials
14:51who claimed they were waiting for the legal go-ahead
14:53from the CIA and the FBI.
14:55But at the same time, then-CIA director George Tenet
14:58is reported to have said that he was surprised to hear
15:01the White House was awaiting a conclusion from him
15:03on responsibility for the coal attack.
15:05Everyone already knew who did it.
15:07My impression over the course of my career after...
15:10over 22 years is that the first thing the 7th floor ever considered
15:15when you brought them in operation to approve
15:18was what if we fail and how will we get roasted by the media?
15:23It took Bill Clinton just 13 days to respond to the embassy bombings.
15:27But for some reason, a reason that has never been explained,
15:30he had no response at all to the attack on the USS Cole.
15:34Even more bizarre and telling is the Bush administration's explanation
15:37for why it didn't respond.
15:39It was most clearly articulated by the neocon number two
15:42at the Pentagon, Paul Wolfowitz.
15:44He described the coal bombing as stale by the time Bush took office.
15:48It was just five months after the terror attacks.
15:51Wolfowitz wanted something bigger to respond to.
15:54And soon, he got it.
15:55It was remarkable to watch this, especially after the man had declared war on us,
16:01reiterated it, said, your time is coming.
16:03We hadn't had a friend like that in terms of divulging what their true mission was since General Giap.
16:11And we didn't listen to him and look where it got us.
16:14And look where we are now.
16:16Not only 9-11, but the whole...
16:19We lost another war to the Afghans.
16:22If you want to understand why and how 9-11 happened, the years to look at most closely are 1999 to 2001.
16:31Those years coincided with George Tenet's implementation of what became known simply as the plan.
16:37To formulate this effort, CIA Director Tenet elevated a man called Kofor Black,
16:41a former spy who'd risen to head CIA stations in the Sudan and elsewhere,
16:45to director of the Counterterrorism Center.
16:48To give you an idea of Kofor Black's character, in 2017,
16:51he joined Hunter Biden on the board of directors of Burisma, the Ukrainian gas company.
16:56But at that time, in late 1999, the core of the future 9-11 hijackers were gathering in Afghanistan.
17:03These 22 individuals do not account for all the terrorist activity in the world.
17:07But they're among the most dangerous.
17:09The leaders and key supporters, the planners and strategists.
17:16They must be found.
17:18Here's a summary of some of the warnings they had.
17:21In December 1999, a 23-year-old Algerian man called Ahmed Rassam
17:25attempted to cross with a rental car on the ferry from Victoria, British Columbia,
17:29to Port Angeles, Washington state.
17:32Thanks to alert border security in Port Angeles,
17:35Rassam was apprehended with hundreds of pounds of explosives in his car.
17:39His plan had been to set off a car bomb at LAX on January 1st, 2000.
17:45But the biggest warning signs of an appending attack in the United States
17:49came in the summer of 2001, just months or weeks before.
17:53On April 20th, 2001, a briefing to top Bush administration officials noted that Bin Laden planned multiple operations.
18:01In May 2001, a report was distributed to Bush administration officials
18:06noting that Bin Laden public profile may presage attack.
18:09On May 16th, 2001, an intel report mentioned a phone call to an embassy that Bin Laden's supporters
18:15were planning an attack inside the United States.
18:18On June 12th, a CIA report indicated that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was recruiting people
18:23to travel to the U.S., possibly to aid in terror attacks.
18:28On June 22nd of that year, the CIA notified station chiefs about intelligence suggesting an Al-Qaeda suicide bombing
18:36in the United States could be on the way.
18:39At about the same time, U.S. intelligence issued a terror advisory threat
18:43indicating a high probability of near-term spectacular terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties.
18:50On June 25th, George W. Bush's counterterrorisms are Richard Clark told Condoleezza Rice that six intelligence reports
18:58showed Al-Qaeda personnel warning of an impending terror attack.
19:02Three days later, he told Rice that something very, very, very, very big was about to happen.
19:09On June 30th, top U.S. intel officials were warned Bin Laden planning high-profile attacks of catastrophic proportion.
19:18In July, intelligence reports of an impending attack reached a fever pitch
19:22that led to the closure of U.S. embassies in the Middle East.
19:26None of this apparently got the attention of the White House.
19:30Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the man who thought the coal bombing was, quote, stale,
19:35questioned the reporting in a conversation with Bush's deputy national security advisor.
19:40On July 12th, 2001, acting FBI director Thomas Picard
19:44opened Attorney General John Ashcroft's intelligence briefing
19:48with the latest on the CIA warnings about an Al-Qaeda attack.
19:53Ashcroft responded by saying,
19:55I don't want you to ever talk to me about Al-Qaeda, about these threats.
19:59I don't want to hear about Al-Qaeda anymore.
20:02Picard appealed for more counterterrorism enhancements, meaning funding,
20:06an appeal the Attorney General denied on September 10th.
20:11The United States was attacked the very next day.
20:13By lying to the American public serially and aggressively,
20:24the CIA, the Bush administration, and the 9-11 Commission
20:27created the perfect condition for conspiracy theories to thrive.
20:31Consider, for example, the established fact that in the days before the attack,
20:35there was a huge surge in put options against airline stocks.
20:39Who beside Al-Qaeda knew the attacks were coming?
20:42And who specifically profited from these trades?
20:45It seems possible, probably likely, that foreign governments,
20:49including supposed allies, knew the plot was coming.
20:52Why didn't they warn the United States?
20:54And why did U.S. authorities rush to ship all the debris from the attacks abroad,
20:59almost immediately,
21:01making it impossible for engineers to study the crime scene?
21:04Those are just some of the questions we will address in the next installment of our series.
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