* Tucker Carlson 5-Part Series Exposing The Lies Of The Official 9/11 Report *
Tucker Carlson
.
#News #Politics #Trump 47 #Juan O Savin #Nino #Jennifer Mac #Michael Jaco #Education #Republican #USAID #Documentary
Tucker Carlson
.
#News #Politics #Trump 47 #Juan O Savin #Nino #Jennifer Mac #Michael Jaco #Education #Republican #USAID #Documentary
Category
๐
NewsTranscript
00:00For 24 years now, politicians, the media, intel agencies in this country and abroad
00:06have all demanded that you believe the official story about 9-11, and here's what it is.
00:12They tell you a group of al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, many of whom were known to U.S.
00:17intel services, somehow managed to evade capture for years as they planned the most significant
00:23and elaborate terror attack in human history.
00:26We're told that despite repeated encounters with the FBI, the CIA, local law enforcement,
00:32airport security, foreign intel organizations, the right information somehow never made it
00:40to the right people.
00:41The government failed because it just didn't have the intelligence it needed.
00:44That's the story.
00:46That story is a lie.
00:48Nearly 25 years later, the families of 3,000 civilians are still mourning the murder of
00:53their loved ones.
00:54Anyone who doubts the official narrative is cast as a kook, a criminal, a fringe conspiracy
01:00theorist, and punished.
01:02They've been blacklisted and censored and banned, even as the leaders who failed to protect
01:08our country on 9-11 use these attacks as a pretense to expand their own powers and permanently
01:14transform the United States.
01:17None of this is speculation.
01:18All of it is true.
01:19Over the course of this series, you will hear accounts from people who lived it, CIA officers
01:24and analysts who were theirs, FBI agents from the bin Laden unit, family members of the victims.
01:30None of these people are kooks.
01:32All of them have firsthand information.
01:35What they'll tell you is that what you have been told about September 11th is not true.
01:40Why are we doing this?
01:43Our purpose is, in part, to make the strongest possible case for a real investigation into 9-11,
01:4925 years later, a new 9-11 commission, one that is honest, one that is not guided by partisan
01:56political interests, one that is not serving foreign powers.
01:59To do this investigation, we spent many months looking into what actually happened and speaking
02:05to people who saw it.
02:06We poured over thousands of pages of documents, mostly primary sources, but also contemporaneous
02:12news reports and declassified government documents.
02:15Over the course of this investigation, we made numerous findings that shocked us, not least
02:20of which the apparent role that former CIA director John Brennan played in helping bring
02:26the 9-11 hijackers to the United States, and the remarkable lengths the CIA went to to protect
02:32the 9-11 hijackers from the FBI and from domestic law enforcement.
02:38Telling the full story requires starting before the attacks, going back to something called
02:44ALEC Station, that was the CIA's bin Laden unit, in 1999.
02:47My name is Mark Rossini, I'm a former FBI agent.
02:52So from January 1999 to May of 2003, I was the FBI New York Joint Terrorism Task Force representative
03:00to ALEC Station at CIA headquarters.
03:05Before 9-11, there were no sources in Al-Qaeda.
03:09None.
03:10There was a group of Pashtun caretakers, okay, they called them the Trodpines.
03:19Trodpines were these Pashtun people that were Bin Laden's t-boys and t-gals, right?
03:25And they were the great source of the Pakistani intel service that was feeding information from
03:33the Trodpines to the ISI to the CIA about what was going on in Al-Qaeda.
03:38They had all the electronic communications, satellite shit in the world, imagery.
03:43I remember looking at images of Bin Laden, you know, in his courtyard, all that.
03:47Fine.
03:48But what's in his head?
03:49What's he saying?
03:50What's he doing?
03:51These people are 10,000 miles away.
03:53They don't give a shit about American law.
03:54They don't care about going to jail.
03:55They want to die.
03:57How are you going to get a source inside there?
03:59Before September 11th, U.S. intel services got most of their intelligence on Bin Laden from
04:04what was called the Hada Home switchboard in Sanae, Yemen.
04:07That was a communications hub that Bin Laden and his associates used to communicate with
04:12each other.
04:13They were, at the time, living in Yemen.
04:16The FBI gained access to this after the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa.
04:21How did we officially get the Hada Home in Sanae, Yemen, on the books, on the radar, if you
04:29will?
04:30Okay.
04:32Nairobi, 1998.
04:35August 7th.
04:36John Anticef, Special Agent John Anticef, greatest FBI agent ever in the FBI.
04:40Even better than me.
04:41John flies over to Nairobi.
04:43And one of the survivors, one of the perpetrators who chickened out and ran and lived, Daoud Rashid
04:50al-Awali, Saudi, he gets captured by the Kenyan police.
04:56John flies over from New York, and already there have been two FBI agents interviewing
05:00Daoud.
05:02They were getting someplace, but they really weren't getting that far.
05:06John walks in, and the first thing he does, he says, you need some water?
05:14You want a drink?
05:15Did you eat today?
05:16Did you pray?
05:17Are you okay?
05:18Yeah, I'm fine.
05:19I'm fine.
05:19I'm fine.
05:19He's like, just relax.
05:22Just have a chat.
05:26He didn't beat him with a phone book.
05:27He didn't fucking waterboard him.
05:29He didn't pull his fingernails out.
05:31He wasn't Mr. Tough Guy, like all these fucking assholes like Dick Cheney want to believe.
05:36Right?
05:36All pieces of shit.
05:37He talked to him like a human being.
05:41Take me through the day.
05:43Talk to me.
05:44Well, I went to the hotel, and I got my stuff ready.
05:46And?
05:47Did you call anybody?
05:49Yeah, yeah, yeah.
05:50I called this number.
05:52And he wrote it down.
05:54And he gave John the number of the Hadahoum in Sana'em, which was the Al-Qaeda switchboard
06:01that we in the FBI had no fucking clue existed up until that point.
06:08CIA and NSA did, because remember, they had been listening to the Nairobi cell and their
06:13activity since 1996.
06:17We in the FBI didn't know about that number.
06:19The Hadahoum wasn't just a communications hub for Al-Qaeda.
06:22It was the physical home of the father-in-law of Khalid Al-Medhar, one of the future 9-11
06:28hijackers.
06:29At the end of 1999, listening to that phone is when the CIA learns and the NSA learns that
06:38Khalid Al-Medhar is going to be traveling from there to Dubai, and then from Dubai onward
06:47to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to meet the summit.
06:51The summit was a meeting of an operational cadre of Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists from
06:57around the world.
06:58He was scheduled to travel on or about January 5th, 2000.
07:01The NSA has the ability, did and probably still has, to get any plane, airplane reservation
07:09at once in the world and know about it, right?
07:11We knew his passport number, we had the phone, we have everything.
07:13So we knew his travel information.
07:14We knew what flights he was taking, who was seat he was going to sit in.
07:17The CIA arranges for when he gets to Dubai to be secondary, okay?
07:25Not fully questioned, but, you know, talk to him a little bit.
07:30And then he goes to his hotel room, and they arrange to search his room and go in.
07:36And when they go in, his passport is there, and they take pictures of it, a photocopy it.
07:40And they send back the imagery.
07:43And lo and behold, in his passport is a visa to go to the United States of America, issued
07:50out of the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
07:53According to one recently released court filings, quote, the visas were issued to facilitate
07:58an operation run by the Saudis and the CIA spying operation.
08:02The station chief in Riyadh at the time was future CIA director John Brennan.
08:08The CIA continued tracking Al-Mudhar to Kuala Lumpur, where he met up with other al-Qaeda
08:14associates, including Nawaf al-Hazmi, a second future 9-11 hijacker.
08:19He lands in Kuala Lumpur.
08:21They entrust the Malaysia Special Branch, police, to surveil this terror summit in this park
08:29in Kuala Lumpur, and so much so to tail them and to surveil them, et cetera.
08:37And that information ends up in a communication from Kuala Lumpur Station CIA to CIA headquarters,
08:47through Alex Station, to the computer screen of me and Special Agent Doug Miller of Washington
08:55Field Office FBI.
08:56You have this cable that lays out the meeting Kuala Lumpur, the photocopying of his passport
09:04in Dubai, and the learning of the visa to go to the United States of America.
09:10Doug Miller gets up from his cubicle of power, comes over to my cubicle of power, and says,
09:15hey, we got to tell the FBI about this.
09:17I said, Doug, you're damn right.
09:18He goes, I'll write up the CIR.
09:20What is a CIR?
09:21A CIR is what is a central intelligence report.
09:26Doug writes it.
09:27He sends it to me.
09:28I approve it.
09:29And it goes to the desk of Michael Ann Casey, the CIA officer, analyst.
09:36And it sits in her queue, her electronic queue, and it doesn't move for like a day or two.
09:43It should move in a fucking few hours.
09:44I'll never forget, like it was yesterday, I'll never forget, I'm standing over her.
09:50I said, hey, Doug's CIR.
09:53She's got to go to the FBI.
09:55He said, no, it's not.
09:56I said, well, why not?
09:57She said, because it's not FBI, not an FBI matter.
10:03What do you mean it's not FBI matter?
10:05She said, it's a CIA matter.
10:06And when and if we want the FBI to know, we will tell them.
10:11And you are not to say anything.
10:15I said, but yeah, but they got a visa to come to the U.S.
10:18Like, she said, no, we're handling it.
10:21And when we want to tell the FBI, we will.
10:24And I looked at her.
10:26And remember, she got up.
10:27She put her hands on her hip, pointing her finger at me.
10:29Now, in my naivete, I believed her.
10:37And I have to live with that every day of my life that I believed her.
10:43So here's a company we're always excited to advertise because we actually use their products every day.
10:49It's Merriweather Farms.
10:50Remember when everybody knew their neighborhood butcher?
10:52You look back and you feel like, oh, there was something really important about that,
10:56knowing the person who cut your meat.
10:59And at some point, your grandparents knew the people who raised their meat so they could trust what they ate.
11:05But that time is long gone.
11:06It's been replaced by an era of grocery store mystery meat boxed by distant beef corporations.
11:12None of which raised a single cow.
11:15Unlike your childhood, they don't know you.
11:18They're not interested in you.
11:19The whole thing is creepy.
11:20The only thing that matters to them is money.
11:22And God knows what you're eating.
11:24Merriweather Farms is the answer to that.
11:25They raise their cattle in the U.S.
11:27In Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado.
11:29And they prepare their meat themselves in their facilities in this country.
11:34No middlemen, no outsourcing, no foreign beef sneaking through a back door.
11:38Nobody wants foreign meat.
11:40Sorry, we have a great meat, the best meat here in the United States.
11:43And we buy ours at Merriweather Farms.
11:45Their cuts are pasture-raised, hormone-free, antibiotic-free, and absolutely delicious.
11:50I gorged on one last night.
11:52You got to try this.
11:53For real.
11:54Every day we eat it.
11:55Go to merriweatherfarms.com slash Tucker.
11:58Use the code Tucker76 for 15% off your first order.
12:01That's merriweatherfarms.com slash Tucker.
12:04As the CIA was blocking the FBI detail from informing the Bureau, the hijackers were moving.
12:11On January 8, 2000, CIA surveillance teams reported that Al-Midhar had boarded a flight
12:17to Bangkok, Thailand.
12:19He was accompanied by a man they identified as Al-Hazmi.
12:23According to the official account, this is where the trail went cold.
12:26The CIA placed their names on a watch list and asked that Thai authorities track their movements.
12:32Three months later, the Thai government reported back.
12:35Al-Hazmi had boarded a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles.
12:40Al-Midhar was with him.
12:41The two hijackers had arrived in the United States.
12:44But here's my problem with this whole fucking thing and the whole subsequent investigation of 9-11.
12:53You have the CIA then following one man and then two men all over the planet.
13:00And then eventually, even to America, right?
13:03Landing in Los Angeles, California.
13:05And you don't tell the FBI.
13:08But why would the CIA want to hide the highly relevant and potentially dangerous fact
13:13that two known Al-Qaeda terrorists had just landed in California?
13:18According to a recently released court filing,
13:21former White House counterterrorism's R. Richard Clark told government investigators
13:25that the, quote, CIA was running a false flag operation to recruit the hijackers.
13:31When Kofor Black became the head of the counterterrorism center at CIA,
13:35he was aghast that they had no sources in Al-Qaeda.
13:40So he told me, I'm going to try to get sources in Al-Qaeda.
13:43I can understand them possibly saying, we need to develop sources inside Al-Qaeda.
13:54When we do that, we can't tell anybody about it.
13:57After Clark made that claim publicly,
13:59he received an angry call from former director of the CIA, George Tenet,
14:04who did not deny the allegations made by Mr. Clark, end quote.
14:07But when we reached out to Tenet, his spokesperson denied that the CIA was recruiting hijackers,
14:13calling it false rumors and saying, quote, that's categorically not true.
14:18He also recalled that the executive director of the 9-11 commission, Philip Zelikow,
14:23blocked the commission's investigation into the matter at the behest of Condoleezza Rice.
14:28CIA had this delusional grand plan.
14:31So the CIA, with their information that they had from the Hada House
14:35and their own psychological analysis of everybody in that team,
14:40they figured the best way is maybe to recruit somebody who came over from Malaysia.
14:50Khalil Amidhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
14:54We kept the FBI at bay because we told Mark Rossini and Doug Miller to shut the fuck up.
14:58So let's just try to get inside there.
15:02And that's what went wrong.
15:07That was the grand lie, the grand risk, the grand delusion.
15:14You had a duty to protect Americans and you failed because of your fucking fantastical delusion
15:20that you could recruit somebody inside the cell.
15:22The official 9-11 report does not address the CIA's plan to recruit the hijackers.
15:28It's not even mentioned.
15:29It's possible this is because the CIA blocked 9-11 commission investigators
15:34from talking to the agents who participated in the plot.
15:38Amazingly, the CIA's director of operations kept the CIA operative attempting to recruit the hijackers,
15:44referred to as VVV in the documents,
15:48away from the commission's investigators.
15:50The consequence of this?
15:51The commission's explanation for this story is that the CIA made an honest mistake.
15:57The actual language in the report says the CIA played, quote,
16:01zone defense and the FBI had a man-to-man approach to counterterrorism.
16:07The difference in strategies is why the CIA didn't tell the FBI that terrorists had arrived on American soil.
16:14Well, incredibly, the commission investigators didn't ask the CIA director at the time, George Tennant,
16:21about the summit in Kuala Lumpur or why the CIA had blocked the FBI from being warned.
16:28It wasn't the story they wanted.
16:30And that is the crux of the matter.
16:32And that is the truth.
16:33And no one has ever answered those questions.
16:35No one has the balls to because they're afraid because the house will come tumbling down.
16:40So how exactly did the CIA try to recruit the 9-11 hijackers?
16:46Well, one amazing thing about their arrival is that they didn't try to hide.
16:50The hijackers used their real names while in the United States.
16:53They operated in plain daylight.
16:55Al-Hazmi and Al-Midhar lived in San Diego for more than a year before the attacks.
17:01They lived openly.
17:02In fact, they were so open that Hazmi's name, address, and a home phone number were listed in the San Diego phone book.
17:11When they arrived, the hijackers encountered a Saudi intel operative called Omar al-Bayoumi.
17:17They met at a restaurant outside of Los Angeles.
17:20The CIA utilized the Saudis in the form of Omar al-Bayoumi to spy for them and to gather intelligence.
17:30Before 9-11, the CIA was forbidden from engaging in domestic spying.
17:36They used the Saudi intelligence as a workaround.
17:39We'll rely upon the Saudi GID, General Intelligence Directorate, their version of the CIA,
17:45via Prince Bandar, via their man, Omar al-Bayoumi,
17:50to keep us informed as to the activity of these terrorists.
17:55Bayoumi's notebook, which was uncovered when British law enforcement raided his home in the U.K.,
18:00contained a drawing of an airplane and mathematical calculations related to flying it.
18:06The 9-11 Commission investigators never saw this.
18:09At the time, al-Bayoumi had a no-show job at a Saudi aviation contractor called Avco.
18:15The company's employees say he was one of roughly 50 ghost employees working there at the time,
18:20taking the paycheck but never coming to work.
18:22According to declassified government documents, an investigator from the 9-11 Commission said al-Bayoumi
18:28was receiving substantial sums of money from the Saudi embassy in Washington prior to the 9-11 attacks,
18:34that the money was being funneled from accounts at Riggs Bank in Georgetown,
18:39belonging to Haifa bin Faisal, the wife of the Saudi ambassador to the United States.
18:43By using the Saudis as a proxy to recruit the 9-11 hijackers, the CIA gave itself cover.
18:50If things went wrong, they could push a narrative that blamed the Saudi government for the attacks,
18:55which is what they did.
18:56For all intents and purposes, Omar al-Bayoumi was an employee of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Washington, D.C.,
19:02in their consulate in Los Angeles, California.
19:06Al-Bayoumi convinced the hijackers to move to San Diego.
19:09He helped them find an apartment.
19:10He served as a co-signer on the lease to that apartment.
19:14He paid their first month's rent and deposit.
19:16He got them bank accounts.
19:17He got them driver's license.
19:19He introduced them to many other radical Muslims in the area,
19:22including the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.
19:25Eventually, al-Midhar went home to Yemen.
19:28Khalil al-Midhar leaves America for his daughter's birth, right?
19:32And in that time, he loses his passport.
19:36He claims he went to Afghanistan.
19:41He goes back to Jeddah and gets another passport.
19:48And by this time, even prior, as I understand it now,
19:51the Saudis had identified the terrorists, the hijackers,
19:57as potential threats to the kingdom
19:58and had put chips in their passports,
20:03identifying them as a threat.
20:07Al-Midhar comes back to the United States,
20:10I believe it was on July 4th, 2001.
20:15He's allowed back in, not stopped, not questioned.
20:16So here's a guy that the CIA knew came to America,
20:23had been at this terror summit meeting in Malaysia in January 2000.
20:28He's allowed to leave and come back.
20:32Midhar was able to exit and enter the country at will
20:35because he was issued a multi-visit U.S. visa.
20:38According to a summary of an interview with an FBI agent from Alex Station,
20:42Al-Hamsi and Al-Midhar obtained their visas to enter the United States
20:45at the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
20:49All told, the vast majority of the 19 9-11 hijackers
20:53had their visas issued at that consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
20:58At the time, John Brennan was running the CIA station there.
21:03Just a few days before Al-Midhar re-entered the country at JFK Airport in New York,
21:07the FBI and the CIA held a joint meeting in New York City
21:11to discuss the bombing of the USS Cole, which Al-Midhar was involved in.
21:15And killed 17 soldiers on the USS Cole.
21:18An FBI agent was shown a photograph of Al-Midhar
21:21taken at the summit in Kuala Lumpur.
21:24The agent asked the CIA who this man was,
21:27but the CIA once again refused to tell them.
21:31It wasn't until August of 2001 that the CIA finally alerted the FBI.
21:36And of course, by then, it was too late.
21:39It's not just Mark Rossini who testifies to this.
21:42Another anonymous FBI agent told investigators that, quote,
21:46he, she believed the CIA's operation may have spun out of control.
21:52And that they, the CIA, came to the FBI with limited information
21:56in an attempt to locate the hijackers without revealing
21:59the true nature or extent of their operation against Al-Qaeda, end quote.
22:03This is the failure of the 9-11 Commission
22:07and every other fucking commission that ever existed after that.
22:11But if the CIA was grooming the hijackers as sources,
22:15the FBI failed too.
22:17When Al-Hazmi and Al-Midhar were in California,
22:20they lived for a period in the home of an FBI informant
22:23called Abdu Sattar.
22:25And yet, somehow, the FBI never learned about this.
22:30Then, less than a month before the terror attacks,
22:33the FBI began an investigation into a French-Moroccan national
22:37called Zacharias Massawi.
22:39He had just moved to Minneapolis from Oklahoma,
22:41where he resumed aviation training.
22:45After raising suspicions during training,
22:47he was arrested on August 16th
22:49and charged with immigration violations.
22:51But agents were denied permission to search his laptop
22:54and the room where he was staying.
22:57His exact connection to the hijacking remains unclear even now.
23:01But he did receive wire transfers from Ramzi bin al-Shib,
23:05who was also sending money to the hijackers.
23:08In July 2001, an FBI agent stationed in the Phoenix field office
23:11sent a memo to headquarters theorizing
23:14that there could be, quote,
23:15a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden
23:17to send individuals to the United States
23:20to receive aviation training.
23:22For some reason,
23:23this memo was never received by headquarters,
23:26not until after 9-11.
23:29Why?
23:30Possibly because, as late as 2003,
23:33the FBI didn't have a functioning internal email system.
23:37Most case files were not digitized,
23:39they weren't searchable,
23:40and employees did not have access to the internet.
23:42That's true.
23:43By September 2001,
23:45the Bureau's computers were so out of date,
23:48it took 12 commands simply to save a document.
23:52And in the aftermath of the attack,
23:54the FBI distributed photographs
23:55of the suspected hijackers via express mail.
23:58They didn't have scanners.
24:00The Bush administration worked hard
24:02for us not to know any of this.
24:04They hid it.
24:05Many of these details were discovered
24:07during the congressional joint inquiry into 9-11.
24:10But when Congress released its report,
24:12the 28 pages dealing with the hijackers' time
24:15in Southern California were hidden.
24:17They were redacted.
24:19When a man called Philip Zellicoe
24:21took over as the commission's executive director,
24:24he reached a secret agreement with the White House
24:26to block his investigators
24:28from accessing records related to the hijackers
24:30until the White House had already screened them.
24:34Government documents show
24:35that the commission investigator
24:37assigned to this topic complained that,
24:39Quote, Zellicoe limited the number of witnesses
24:41that commission investigators could interview.
24:44And just days before the report was released,
24:47Dieter Snell, senior counsel to the commission,
24:49attempted to remove most of the details
24:51of the Saudi collaboration with the hijackers.
24:54Some of the findings were included in the end,
24:56but they were buried in the footnotes.
24:58The truth is,
25:00the official 9-11 commission report
25:02sold to the American public
25:03and the world for decades
25:05as the definitive account of what happened that day
25:08is a lie.
25:109-11 commission
25:11is a cover-up.
25:15But how did the Bush administration
25:17manage to hijack what was sold
25:19as an independent commission?
25:21And what exactly were they trying to hide?
25:24We'll reveal what we found
25:26in the next episode.
Recommended
19:00
0:20
0:24
6:21
1:17:50
1:19:00
Be the first to comment