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00:00Satsang with Mooji
00:30In 1950, General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower bought this farm here in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,
00:38next to the famous battlefield.
00:40The idea was to retire here after a stint as president of Columbia University
00:44to sit on this porch, read books, talk to friends, play cards, paint.
00:49This was the first house that he and Mamie had ever owned,
00:53but the Cold War had different plans for them.
00:55Fearing that our Cold War with the Soviet Union could ultimately lead to a nuclear conflict,
01:01Eisenhower was persuaded that he should not retire from the world stage,
01:05but instead play an even greater role in the badly divided post-war world.
01:10He entered politics in 1952 and won two terms as president,
01:15becoming the leader of the free world.
01:17Believing that the future of civilization was at stake, he made peace as mission.
01:21But in a memorable farewell address to the nation,
01:24he candidly admitted that he had failed to achieve this peace,
01:27a peace that had not been achieved by our total victory in World War II.
01:34Disarmament with mutual honor and confidence is a continuing imperative.
01:40Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms,
01:44but with intellect and decent purpose.
01:48Because this need is so sharp and apparent,
01:52I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field
01:56with a definite sense of disappointment.
02:00As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war,
02:05as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization,
02:09which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years,
02:14I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.
02:21Happily, I can say that war has been avoided.
02:25Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made,
02:28but so much remains to be done.
02:31It was mainly on the bloody beaches of Normandy
02:35and in the killing fields of Europe in World War II
02:37that Ike had confronted the human costs of wars
02:40fought with the technological innovations of the mid-20th century.
02:44By the end of the war, the existence of long-range rockets,
02:48jet aircraft, and nuclear weapons
02:50that made no distinction between soldier and civilian
02:53demonstrated for him that the implications of modern warfare were unthinkable.
02:57The road to the White House for General Dwight Eisenhower,
03:04supreme commander of Allied forces in World War II Europe,
03:08began on June 5, 1944, D-Day Eve,
03:12when he said, OK, let's go.
03:15His order meant that the massive military force under his command
03:18would invade Nazi-occupied Europe the next day.
03:22The visit of Eisenhower is very much of a surprise to our group.
03:27And we heard about it.
03:29Someone came running up and saying,
03:30Eisenhower's here, Eisenhower's here.
03:33And at that point, it was about 8.30 in the evening,
03:36we were all ready to go,
03:38ready to go to the planes, as a matter of fact.
03:41And the attitude of almost everybody was,
03:45so Eisenhower's here, you know.
03:47We love him, but we have other things to think about right now.
03:51I was standing out in front of our tent,
03:55and suddenly up the street came this gangly,
03:57as you call them, senior officers, staff, and Eisenhower.
04:02And he said, what's your name, Lieutenant?
04:06I told him.
04:08He said, where are you from?
04:10And I said, Michigan.
04:11And he said, Michigan.
04:13Great fishing in Michigan.
04:14I've fished there many times.
04:17And he said, are you well prepared?
04:19Are your men ready to go on this?
04:20He said, yes, sir.
04:21Have you received all of the planes properly?
04:24And you're well equipped?
04:26He said, yes, sir, we're all set to go.
04:28And a couple of the men yelled in the background at that time.
04:31Don't worry, General, we'll take care of it.
04:39The largest invasion ever mounted in the history of warfare.
04:43Some 150,000 soldiers, including 13,000 paratroopers,
04:48and more than 2,000 ships and 11,000 aircraft,
04:53began the assault on Normandy's heavily defended beaches
04:56in the pre-dawn hours of June 6.
04:59I think it was like 3 o'clock in the morning
05:02or 2 o'clock in the morning that they got us up,
05:05and we went on to our LCA's.
05:08That was a boat that carried about our one platoon,
05:12about 30 men.
05:13And we departed off the ship going down our rope ladders,
05:19got on there.
05:21It had been delayed because of the bad seas.
05:24Well, it was not a calm sea that day either.
05:27That boat was just rocking every which way,
05:29so you had to be careful that you landed in the boat
05:33and not in the water.
05:34We circled around the ocean a long time
05:37before we ever headed towards France.
05:40As we approached, the fact that really affected us
05:44was that machine gun fire that was coming from the east.
05:48And the sad part of it for the 29th Division
05:52is they were closer to most of those machine guns
05:55than we were.
05:56They were east of us,
05:57and as we were coming along,
05:59you could see the slaughter that was going on over there.
06:08A few years earlier,
06:10General Eisenhower was a relatively unknown officer
06:12in the U.S. Army,
06:14a force ill-prepared for war of any kind.
06:17But on December 7, 1941,
06:20Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
06:23and America was at war.
06:26Eisenhower reported to duty Sunday morning,
06:28the 14th of December,
06:30about 9 o'clock.
06:31I took him down to General Giroux's office,
06:33and then Marshal sent for both of them at 11 o'clock.
06:37And for 20 minutes,
06:38General Marshal described the situation in the world,
06:41primarily what was going on in the Philippines,
06:43and then turned to Eisenhower and said,
06:45what course of action do you think we ought to take?
06:49He told the General that he thought,
06:51in view of the size of the Japanese Army
06:53and the various islands they'd taken
06:56and the fact that they were obviously going to take the Philippines,
06:59that it would be impossible
07:01to foresee the recapture of the Philippines anytime soon,
07:05but that the real crisis was in Europe.
07:08Eisenhower proved to be the perfect man for the job
07:11as head of the War Plans Division.
07:13General Eisenhower demonstrated in the six and a half months
07:16that he worked with General Marshal
07:17that he had the same strategic concept that General Marshal had,
07:21so that was a leg up.
07:22He was very articulate
07:25and caught on very soon
07:27to General Marshal's desire for brevity.
07:29I think the staff papers that he brought up,
07:32everything he did impressed Marshal with his efficiency,
07:36with his directness,
07:37and with the soundness of his doctrine
07:39of what ought to be done,
07:41added to that his very attractive personality.
07:44The battle plan devised by Eisenhower
07:46to fight a global war,
07:48identified Nazi Germany as the early primary target,
07:52and Eisenhower took a plan
07:53for a quick invasion of Europe
07:55with him to London in mid-1942.
07:58But America's alliance with England
08:00led to changes in that plan.
08:02Prime Minister Churchill,
08:03fearing another disaster in Europe,
08:05convinced President Roosevelt
08:07that the Allies should carefully build up their forces
08:10for an eventual invasion of Europe.
08:12North Africa and a confrontation
08:14with General Rommel and his Africa Corps
08:16would be first.
08:18Well, the British at that time
08:19had been in the war a long while,
08:21and they looked upon themselves as pros,
08:22and they were.
08:23They knew their business.
08:24When the American forces
08:26took the beating at Kessarine,
08:30it left a permanent impression with the British
08:34that they never really lost.
08:35They concluded that we really didn't know
08:38what we were doing,
08:38that we were amateurs in this trade.
08:40And I'm afraid that lingering impression
08:43just lingered on and on and on into Europe.
08:46I'm sure it affected Monty's view of the American army.
08:51I guess he saw us as a bunch of colonials
08:52who had a lot to learn from the Brits
08:54on how to fight a war.
08:56The performance of U.S. troops was one problem.
08:59Ike's handling of a major political crisis was another.
09:03His appointment of French Admiral Darlan
09:06as head of the North African state
09:07made it appear that the Allies were cooperating
09:10with Nazi collaborators.
09:12General Marshall understood exactly
09:14what Eisenhower was doing.
09:15When he arrived there,
09:17he found Darlan, a former Vichy collaborator
09:19who apparently had the greatest influence there,
09:22and by doing business with him,
09:24he saved a lot of time, a lot of money,
09:26and a lot of lives.
09:29And that was clearly understood in the staff.
09:32It was not understood at the press for a long time,
09:34and the Darlan incident was played up
09:36in the newspapers for a long time.
09:38But I think everybody in the general staff
09:40who knew the facts understood
09:41that he did the smart thing,
09:43and Marshall has said many times
09:45in his taped interviews after the war
09:48that he supported fully what Eisenhower did
09:51and the way he commanded the troops in North Africa.
09:54The British forces in North Africa
09:56were led by General Bernard Law Montgomery,
10:00soon to become Ike's betenoir
10:01once the Allies had defeated Rommel.
10:03I can only say what Monty's view of Ike was,
10:07that he was not a military commander in the field,
10:11that he was beyond that.
10:13He was a strategic commander,
10:16and Monty tried to tell him what to do in the field.
10:21Thanks to Ike, he kept it on a pretty even keel.
10:24Monty had to climb down once or twice, mind you,
10:27when he saw that he'd gone too far.
10:28With North Africa secured and the Mediterranean open
10:32to Allied shipping, Marshall and Eisenhower
10:34sought to make France the next target.
10:37But Churchill and his generals again insisted on delaying
10:40the ultimate battle versus the Nazi war machine in Europe.
10:44And Churchill once again won Roosevelt's endorsement.
10:47The next stop was Sicily, where victory came easily,
10:51but Allied mistakes let the main German army escape.
10:55Then it was on to Italy,
10:56where German troops put up a fierce defense.
10:59I think they would have liked to have stopped in North Africa
11:01and gone back and planned the Overlord invasion across France.
11:05I think it was a blessing in disguise
11:07because the Kasserine Pass showed that our troops
11:10were not as good as we thought they were,
11:11and we had not had the practice with the landing craft
11:15that we got in Sicily and in Italy.
11:17Finally, in late 1943,
11:19with Stalin insisting on a second front in Northwest Europe,
11:23the American plan to invade France was put into effect.
11:27FDR decided on Ike to direct the invasion
11:30of the Nazis' fortress Europe.
11:32And Marshall said,
11:33I will do whatever you decide.
11:35Whatever you decide will be all right with me.
11:38And the president changed the subject.
11:40He came back two days later to see the president,
11:44and the president said,
11:45I want you to help me draft a message to Premier Stalin.
11:49And Marshall took his paper and pencil,
11:52and the president started dictating to Stalin.
11:55The decision has been made for General Heisenau
11:58to take immediate command of the forces in England
12:01and to head the invasion or something to that effect.
12:04And that's the first Marshall knew
12:06that the president had made the decision.
12:07The preparations in England for the D-Day landings
12:11began long before Eisenhower
12:13and the Allied battlefield generals
12:14arrived in London in early 1944.
12:18By then, more than two million military personnel
12:20had flooded into England from the United States,
12:23the nations of the British Empire,
12:25and even from many Nazi-occupied countries.
12:28Intensive training was ongoing throughout the island.
12:31The truth is that the whole coastline
12:34and in-depth of southern England
12:38became a great armed camp.
12:40Everything from jeeps to tanks,
12:42you know, armoured vehicles, ambulances,
12:44whatever you can think of,
12:46three-ton trucks and all the rest of it,
12:48hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of them
12:50on the road verges everywhere.
12:51And concealed wherever there was foliage,
12:54I mean, woods and coppices,
12:56in churchyards, in schoolyards,
12:59in private people's gardens.
13:01Everywhere you looked,
13:03the whole place was a great armed centre,
13:07ready for the moment
13:08when the whole lot would pounce across the channel.
13:10Although Ike was the supreme commander
13:12of the Allied Expeditionary Force,
13:14it was Monty, the hero of North Africa,
13:17who was the battlefield commander
13:19and in charge of devising an invasion plan.
13:22He was the great hero to the whole of Britain.
13:25We at last had got a general who won battles.
13:29We'd had heaps of generals who'd lost them
13:30year after year in North Africa.
13:33Now we've got a general who won his battles, you see.
13:36And so he became a great hero.
13:38And when, in fact, at long last,
13:39he came back to Britain for a brief spell of leave,
13:41I mean, he got a hero's welcome
13:43wherever he went.
13:45But Ike was the one in charge
13:46of everything related to D-Day,
13:49including the armies, air forces, navies,
13:52along with equipment and supplies
13:54needed to keep a massive force going
13:56until it connected with the Soviet armies
13:58moving on Germany from the east.
14:01I think there was some feeling in the staff
14:03he ought to be tougher,
14:04but Marshall never thought so.
14:05He said, Eisenhower has a very difficult situation to handle.
14:09He's under almost daily pressure from Mr. Churchill.
14:12Mr. Roosevelt doesn't bother with me.
14:13I don't see him from one month to the next.
14:15But Ike's got Winston Churchill on his back
14:17all the time and Montgomery.
14:19And he said, if I were in Ike's place,
14:21I wouldn't have lasted a day.
14:23He said, I would have told Montgomery where to go.
14:26Those who worked close to Ike at Supreme headquarters
14:30were impressed with his management
14:32of the huge operation.
14:33He was a man of presence.
14:36He's a man of sincerity.
14:39He had a great God-given quality
14:41of being fine with a crowd,
14:44but very sincere and interested
14:46in his exchanges with individuals.
14:48And I can assure you that it meant a lot
14:50to them and to their mothers
14:52who knew about it.
14:55Eisenhower was an anticipator.
14:58He was a great administrator,
15:00not necessarily doing all of that work himself,
15:03but he always made sure that the mechanisms
15:06and responsibilities were enforced
15:08to achieve the purpose
15:11for which it was all designed.
15:13He could be tough.
15:15He could be rough.
15:16But he was under control.
15:19He never, ever looked down trodden
15:22or below the line.
15:23It was just something magnificent
15:25about the way he looked and exuded
15:27when he got around people.
15:29You couldn't think about defeat
15:31or marching back home.
15:33You knew there was hope in the corpus.
15:35He kept my hope alive all the time,
15:37I can tell you that.
15:38The Supreme Commander also committed himself
15:41outside headquarters
15:42to regular visits with the troops,
15:44watching their training
15:46and otherwise staying closely connected
15:48to those who would soon do the fighting
15:50and the dying.
15:52General Eisenhower had a great ability
15:55to communicate with the average soldier.
15:59He was in their presence anything
16:02but an aloof personality,
16:03out of reach and out of touch.
16:05He got a great deal from them
16:08to pick up his own spirits
16:09because of the enormous size of decisions
16:11he had to make.
16:13And he saw in their eyes
16:15the hope that his custody of their future
16:18was being well attended to.
16:20And finally, the day arrived.
16:23I remember I was standing down
16:25near the Bristol Channel
16:26when this big fleet of ships
16:28started moving out.
16:29And we heard the announcement
16:31on the loudspeakers,
16:32General Eisenhower's voice,
16:34telling us that the big day had come
16:35and we were moving toward
16:37the liberation of Europe.
16:38You are about to embark upon
16:40the great crusade
16:41toward which we have striven
16:43these many months.
16:44The eyes of the world are upon you.
16:47The hopes and prayers
16:48of liberty-loving people everywhere
16:50march with you.
16:52More than 50 years later,
16:53I'm deeply moved by it
16:54because his voice conveyed this feeling
16:57that we were engaged in something
16:59very noble,
17:00something very worthwhile.
17:02We weren't just going over there
17:03to kill people.
17:04We were going to liberate
17:05the whole continent of Europe.
17:07Once the Allied forces
17:09had secured the invasion beaches,
17:11there was the expectation
17:13that a breakout would quickly happen.
17:15But it did not,
17:17and the Americans blamed
17:18Monty's cautious leadership.
17:20The breakout finally did happen
17:22in mid-summer,
17:23and in early August,
17:25Paris was liberated.
17:27The advance continued rapidly
17:28toward Germany.
17:30There was talk of the war
17:31ending by Christmas,
17:32but in mid-December,
17:34the German army made one last gasp effort
17:36to turn the tide of battle.
17:38A surprise offensive at first
17:40overwhelmed the Allies,
17:42but it could not be sustained.
17:44The Battle of the Bulge
17:45ended any hope
17:47of the German military
17:48stopping the Allies' advance.
17:51At the same time,
17:52Eisenhower was in a continuing struggle
17:54inside the Allied command
17:56with Monty,
17:58who urged a single thrust to Berlin
18:00so the Allies could claim
18:02the German capital
18:03before the Soviets got there.
18:05Eisenhower's view
18:06was to confront
18:07the remaining German forces
18:09on a broad front
18:10and completely destroy them.
18:12After the breakout in Normandy
18:14and then following the battle
18:16at Ardennes,
18:17when the Germans' final effort
18:18was repressed west of the Rhine,
18:21I think there was a great deal
18:22of feeling among people
18:23that the war might end very quickly.
18:25Field Marshal Montgomery
18:26fed that feeling
18:27with his vociferous support
18:29of a single thrust
18:30across the Rhine
18:31that he would lead
18:32going right into
18:33the heart of Berlin.
18:35General Eisenhower
18:35had a different strategy.
18:36He wanted to close on the Rhine
18:38as he expressed it
18:39in a much broader basis.
18:40Monty was persistent.
18:42He would never give up
18:44nagging Icke
18:44about this proposal of his
18:46that American forces
18:47should be put under his command
18:49and that there should be
18:50a single powerful thrust
18:52right into the heart
18:53of Germany to Berlin.
18:54He would not accept
18:55the political situation
18:57which made that
18:57utterly impossible
18:58that there should be
18:59a British general
19:01commanding the great
19:02American armies
19:03in the final move
19:05of the war.
19:05It just wasn't on
19:06but Monty couldn't see that
19:08and he kept on
19:09nagging Icke
19:10and nagging Icke
19:10and finally Icke exploded.
19:15Icke finally decided
19:16that the time had come
19:17when either he
19:18or Monty must go.
19:20Ultimately,
19:21Monty capitulated
19:22and Eisenhower's plan
19:24was implemented.
19:25In early May,
19:2611 months after
19:28the D-Day invasion,
19:29Allied troops
19:30met up with Soviet troops
19:31on the Elbe River
19:32well outside Berlin.
19:35The Soviet army
19:36led by General Zhukov
19:38captured Berlin
19:39deep inside German territory
19:41already promised
19:42to Stalin.
19:43For a while there,
19:46I'm sure that my dad felt
19:48that if all the Russians
19:52could be made
19:52and to be like Zhukov,
19:53we could get along fine
19:55in the post-war world.
19:57He hoped that
19:58and I think
19:59he had an inkling
20:00of expectation.
20:04That good feeling
20:06went on,
20:08at least at his level,
20:10through August.
20:11and on August 12th,
20:16he went to Moscow
20:17as the guest
20:18of Marshal Zhukov
20:19for just a PR visit.
20:22The big impression
20:23that we got from that,
20:24of course,
20:24was the immensity
20:25of the parade
20:26they put on,
20:26the physical culture parade
20:27on the 12th of August,
20:29but was the exceeding goodwill.
20:33General Eisner
20:33was invited up
20:34on top of Lenin's tomb
20:35to watch the parade
20:37by Stalin,
20:40the first American
20:41that had ever been up there.
20:43In the aftermath of war,
20:44the United States
20:45quickly realized
20:46that things
20:47would be different.
20:48In June 1950,
21:06communist North Korea
21:07launched a surprise attack
21:09that quickly overran
21:10South Korea's defenses
21:11along the 38th parallel.
21:14The demarcation line
21:15established by the United Nations
21:17after the defeat of Japan.
21:20The communist invaders
21:21soon captured
21:22the South Korean capital
21:23of Seoul.
21:25The route
21:25of South Korea's army
21:27and its American ally
21:28seemed complete.
21:30The only reinforcements
21:31readily available
21:32to the American military
21:34were the occupation forces
21:36of Japan,
21:37who were completely
21:38unprepared for war.
21:41President Truman
21:42and Secretary of State
21:43Acheson
21:43promptly decided
21:44to defend South Korea
21:46from a communist
21:47takeover,
21:48and the United States
21:49won official support
21:50for a police action
21:52from the United Nations.
21:54The Soviet Union
21:55was boycotting
21:56the Security Council
21:57at the time
21:58and could not influence
21:59the decision.
22:01By Thanksgiving,
22:03American soldiers
22:04had reached
22:04the Yellow River,
22:06the border
22:06with communist China.
22:08While the G.I.s
22:09enjoyed Thanksgiving Turkey,
22:12Chinese troops
22:13prepared to enter
22:14the war in force.
22:16The fresh communist forces
22:17overwhelmed American positions
22:20along the Yalu.
22:21A devastating retreat
22:23in the snow
22:24and bitter cold
22:25followed for American
22:26and other United Nations forces.
22:29Their escape
22:29was only possible
22:31because the U.S. Navy
22:32had total command
22:33of the sea.
22:35To reassure our allies
22:37and the American public
22:38that the U.S.
22:39would not desert
22:40Western Europe
22:41if the USSR attacked,
22:43Truman named
22:44the hero of D-Day
22:45to command
22:46the newly formed
22:47NATO military force.
22:48At the Pentagon building,
22:50he enters into a series
22:51of high-level discussions
22:52over strategy
22:53for the defense
22:54of Western Europe.
22:55General Icke
22:56is on the job.
22:59I know only two things
23:01for certain.
23:03The first,
23:04that this
23:05is a venture,
23:07an organizational effort
23:08to preserve the peace
23:09and to give to all
23:11of our people
23:11the feeling of tranquility
23:13and confidence
23:14that they deserve
23:15in a free country.
23:16And secondly,
23:18it can be successful
23:19only if the people
23:21of all countries
23:23are own
23:24and the populations
23:26of every single country
23:27making up
23:28the Atlantic Union
23:29join in the effort
23:31wholeheartedly
23:31without stint
23:33and with readiness
23:34to sacrifice
23:35for success.
23:36He was getting settled
23:38down in Columbia University.
23:39He'd started his due life.
23:41He really didn't
23:43want to go to Europe.
23:45But I think
23:47the arguments
23:47on his going
23:51were absolutely overwhelming.
23:53For one thing,
23:54he was a lifetime
23:55five-star general.
23:57And so,
23:58he was always
23:59at the beck and call,
24:01the disposal
24:01of the president
24:02to call him
24:03to any job
24:03that he was to be called to.
24:07Also,
24:08and I don't think
24:09I'm being unduly
24:10and modest in this,
24:12there was nobody else
24:13that had the stature
24:14that he did
24:14to do that job,
24:16which he think
24:16needed doing.
24:17Despite his return
24:25to active military service,
24:28Eisenhower remained
24:29a favorite
24:29with key leaders
24:30in both political parties
24:32to run for president
24:33in 1952.
24:35Within the GOP,
24:37Ike was the favorite
24:37of the internationalist wing,
24:39including Governor Tom Dewey
24:41of New York,
24:42the Republican Party's
24:43candidate for president
24:44in 1944 and 1948.
24:47We arranged a date
24:49to see Eisenhower
24:51just as he was going over
24:52to be commander of NATO
24:54by appointment
24:56from President Truman
24:57and told him that.
24:59We told him that we,
25:00of course,
25:02it had some experience
25:03in the Republican Party
25:07because of the two
25:08presidential campaigns
25:09in which Governor Dewey
25:10was the nominee.
25:12We told him that we wanted
25:13him for president
25:15and told him that he was
25:17the logical man
25:19for the nomination
25:20because of his
25:22internationalist approach
25:24to world affairs
25:27and that the Republican Party
25:29needed that type
25:30of leadership.
25:32He, of course,
25:34was completely noncommittal.
25:36General,
25:37if one of the nominating
25:38conventions
25:38should put your name
25:39up for the presidency,
25:40would you accept?
25:43Last January,
25:44I wrote a letter,
25:45which I assume
25:46most of you here
25:47have read.
25:48In it,
25:49I expressed myself
25:50completely and positively
25:52on this subject.
25:54Nothing since the writing
25:55of that letter
25:55has occurred
25:56to change my mind
25:58with respect
25:59to that subject.
26:00Outside the Republican Party,
26:02Ike's possible candidacy
26:04also attracted
26:05the interest
26:06of many Democrats
26:07and independents.
26:08Eisenhower was in Paris.
26:10He was head of NATO.
26:12He was in uniform.
26:14He was not
26:15a declared candidate.
26:17He was immensely popular,
26:19but he was not a candidate.
26:22Here,
26:23Senator Taft
26:24was Mr. Republican,
26:26and it appeared
26:29that he had
26:29the nomination locked up.
26:33But out there
26:34were
26:35whole flocks
26:38of people
26:38who were
26:39thinking about
26:40Eisenhower,
26:41who were talking
26:42about Eisenhower,
26:43who were hoping
26:44that he would run.
26:44At the stage
26:46of the inauguration
26:49of Citizens
26:51for Eisenhower
26:52in 1951,
26:53the purpose
26:54was to show
26:55General Eisenhower
26:57that he was wanted
26:59by the people
27:00of the United States
27:02to run
27:03for president.
27:05And because
27:05at the time
27:07it was a Democratic
27:09administration,
27:10we wanted him
27:11to declare himself
27:13a Republican.
27:15He could do anything.
27:18That, I think,
27:19was the feeling
27:20at that time,
27:22that he was
27:23a proven winner,
27:26and he certainly
27:28knew what made wars
27:29and what won wars,
27:30and he certainly
27:31knew that the world
27:33was in a mess,
27:34and he,
27:35rather than anyone else,
27:37could fix it.
27:38Although not
27:39a declared candidate,
27:40Ike made it clear
27:41where he stood
27:42on the key issue
27:43for most Americans
27:44who had endured
27:45the pain and suffering
27:46of World War II
27:47only a few years earlier.
27:49I believe today,
27:51just as I did
27:51a year ago,
27:52that no great nation
27:54would deliberately
27:56provoke global war
27:58at this time.
27:59That does not mean
28:01that war cannot start.
28:04Wars are stupid,
28:05and they can start stupidly.
28:06He knew that after World War I,
28:09the United States disarmed
28:10and became isolationist,
28:13and that contributed
28:14to the fact that we went
28:15into World War II
28:16unprepared.
28:17Isolationism was growing
28:19again in the United States.
28:21He knew that for peace
28:23to survive,
28:24it was necessary
28:25for the United States
28:26to play the leading role
28:28in the free world,
28:30and to play that role,
28:32we had to have the means,
28:33military and economic,
28:35we had to have the will,
28:36and we also had to have
28:38the mission,
28:40the wisdom,
28:41to lead effectively.
28:42The pressure
28:43on General Eisenhower
28:44to enter the presidential race
28:46as a Republican
28:47began to yield results
28:49in early 1952.
28:51And the Republican Party
28:52had Robert Taft,
28:54Senator Robert Taft
28:55of Ohio,
28:57beloved of the conservatives,
29:00beloved of many Republicans,
29:03even if they weren't
29:05ideologically akin particularly,
29:07but he'd been a favorite
29:10leader in the Senate,
29:12a man of great dignity,
29:15and it was expected
29:17that he would be the nominee.
29:20He was dead set
29:21on holding down
29:24the number of divisions
29:25that would be sent to Europe
29:26to put teeth
29:28into the NATO treaty.
29:31And I think that did not like
29:32the principle
29:34of the Congress
29:35tying the president's hands.
29:37So he actually
29:38had a secret meeting
29:39with Senator Taft
29:41and said,
29:42I was going to make
29:44a Sherman-esque declaration
29:45that I will never run
29:46for president,
29:47but now I'm not going to make it.
29:50And let Taft worry
29:52about it a little bit.
29:53There are two bad things
29:54that happens
29:55if Eisenhower doesn't run.
29:56One, Taft could win,
29:58and two, Taft could lose.
30:00If Taft won,
30:01the country would turn
30:02toward isolationism
30:04and would abandon
30:05Western Europe
30:05and would, you know,
30:06cast NATO adrift.
30:08If Taft lost,
30:11the Democrats
30:11would be back in power.
30:13They would continue
30:13their programs
30:14of deficit spending,
30:15and they would continue
30:16to erode what he felt
30:17was the moral fiber
30:19of America.
30:20Trying to understand
30:21why Dwight Eisenhower
30:22will make a commitment
30:23to seek the Republican
30:24nomination for president
30:26in 1952
30:27is a little bit
30:28like trying to understand
30:30what made the Kremlin act
30:31as it did
30:32at the same time.
30:33Eisenhower kept
30:34his own counsel,
30:35and only Eisenhower
30:36knew what he was thinking.
30:37What we know
30:38is that Eisenhower
30:39was listening very carefully
30:41to people who thought
30:42he was the only way
30:43the Republican Party
30:44could regain power
30:46and the only way
30:47that creeping socialism
30:48could be at least
30:49halted for the time being.
30:51By the spring of 1952,
30:53the European Defense Force,
30:55which he's negotiated
30:56and thought he had brought
30:58into being,
30:59is now in doubt
31:00because the French General Assembly
31:01has voted against it.
31:02The French are also concerned
31:04about the German troops.
31:05They're not sure
31:05they want to have
31:06their former enemy
31:07on their border armed.
31:09The Liberal Party in Germany
31:11isn't sure
31:11they want to rearm.
31:12And so Eisenhower
31:13is faced with all these things,
31:14plus the fact that Congress
31:15doesn't seem to be
31:17particularly interested
31:17and funding to the full level,
31:19providing funding for NATO
31:20to the full level.
31:22So if he runs for president,
31:24comes back,
31:25runs for president,
31:26and becomes president,
31:27he can solve
31:28all these problems.
31:36In the early part of 1952,
31:39he wrote me a letter
31:40from his position
31:43there in Paris.
31:44And in Paris,
31:45the commander of NATO
31:46said he would like
31:48to have me come over
31:48and see him
31:49and talk about
31:50the problem of his,
31:53would be involved
31:54in his answering
31:55all the pleas
31:56that were being made to him
31:57to run for president.
31:59Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,
32:01head of the movement
32:02to draft Eisenhower,
32:04defines the general's
32:05political status.
32:07General Eisenhower
32:08has personally assured me
32:10that he is a Republican.
32:14His name, therefore,
32:15cannot be entered
32:16as a Democratic candidate
32:18in the New Hampshire primary
32:20or elsewhere.
32:21I have not submitted
32:22my resignation
32:23from the American Army.
32:25I have forwarded
32:27a request
32:28that I be relieved
32:29from my current military assignment
32:31and placed
32:32on inactive status.
32:35If, however,
32:37I should,
32:38because of the current effort,
32:40be nominated
32:42this July
32:42to political office,
32:44I shall promptly
32:45submit to the president
32:46my resignation
32:48as an officer
32:49of the Army.
32:50At the time
32:51of Ike's announcement
32:52from NATO headquarters
32:53that he was in the running
32:55for the GOP nomination,
32:57an army of political volunteers
32:59in the U.S.
33:00awaited its marching orders.
33:01By the time
33:03Cabot Lodge
33:05announced
33:07that he was
33:08the campaign chairman,
33:09we had 38 state chairmen,
33:13and I have no idea
33:15how many clubs
33:17and individuals
33:19they had connected
33:20in each state,
33:23but we knew
33:25that it was
33:25a considerable number,
33:26and Charlie
33:28and myself
33:29had each
33:30been carrying
33:31the overhead
33:32of the rental
33:34and the mail
33:38and the phones
33:39and everything.
33:40We'd each put in
33:41about $5,000
33:42in 1951 terms,
33:47and it was growing
33:51to be too much
33:53of a burden for us,
33:54so when Cabot Lodge
33:57became the chairman,
33:59we reported to him
34:00and said,
34:01this is what we've done,
34:02and he immediately said,
34:05well, let me give you help
34:07because we like
34:09what you've done
34:09and we want
34:11to continue it,
34:12and he then gave us
34:14considerable help.
34:16To keep the pressure
34:17on Ike to come home,
34:18a major Eisenhower rally
34:20in the heart of Manhattan
34:21was planned by the group
34:22in advance
34:23of the nation's
34:24first primary.
34:25We couldn't enter
34:26the garden
34:27until 11 o'clock
34:28on a Friday night,
34:30so in spite
34:32of all of that,
34:33we got our group organized.
34:35Tex McCrary,
34:36in the meantime,
34:37was able to announce
34:39on his radio show
34:41that he was getting
34:42Clark Gable
34:43and Jimmy Stewart
34:44and Ethel Merman,
34:45et cetera, et cetera, et cetera,
34:46a lot of big stars.
34:4720,000 people inside the garden
34:54and 10,000 people
34:56waiting outside to get in,
34:58so they put up loudspeakers
35:00for the crowd outside,
35:02and so we had
35:03all these celebrities
35:04and everybody in the audience
35:06yelling,
35:07we like Ike!
35:09We like Ike!
35:11We like Ike!
35:14The rally was organized
35:16and energized
35:17by Tex McCrary
35:18and Jinx Falkenberg,
35:20New York City
35:21media celebrities
35:22with a large following
35:23on both radio and TV.
35:27The professional politicians
35:29told us that
35:30there's no use doing that.
35:31That's going to flop
35:33and it's going to hurt Ike.
35:34Well, it turned out
35:36to be an absolute
35:38terrific rouser
35:40with the bands
35:43and huge win-with-Ike banners
35:46and crowds yelling for Ike
35:50until 3 in the morning.
35:52Well, the next day,
35:54Jacqueline Cochran,
35:56the famous flyer,
35:58flew to Paris
35:59with a two-hour film
36:01of this event.
36:03That is correct,
36:03and I just wish you had
36:04just some of it in color.
36:06It's the most wonderful thing
36:07I've ever seen.
36:07When do you expect
36:08to take off?
36:08I'll take off tomorrow afternoon
36:10just as soon as I get
36:11the film developed.
36:11And when will you be in Paris?
36:12I'll be in Paris
36:13Sunday at 11.30.
36:14And when will Ike
36:15look at the films?
36:16Well, I don't know.
36:16I can't guarantee that,
36:17but I think pretty soon thereafter.
36:19I hope so anyway.
36:20Jackie Cochran,
36:20ladies and gentlemen.
36:21Jackie Cochran.
36:22Later on,
36:23Eisenhower said
36:24in his memoirs
36:26that that did more
36:28to convince him
36:29than any other
36:30single thing
36:32that the people
36:34were behind him
36:35and that he had a mandate.
36:36In New Hampshire
36:37on March 11th,
36:38a record turnout
36:39of voters
36:40gave the absent Eisenhower
36:41all of the state's delegates
36:43to the GOP National Convention.
36:46Taft,
36:46throughout the year 1952,
36:49held a lead over Eisenhower
36:50in the delegate count.
36:51Nobody really knew
36:52how many firm delegates
36:53Taft had,
36:54but he seemed to be closing in
36:56on the 604 he needed
36:57for nomination.
36:58The Eisenhower people
36:59had going for them
37:00Ike's magnetic personality
37:02and the fact that
37:02Americans liked Ike.
37:04Ike had shown up
37:04well in primaries.
37:06He hadn't won them all.
37:07Taft had won some primaries.
37:08But Eisenhower,
37:09clearly in the polls,
37:11was running stronger
37:11than Taft was
37:12against any potential
37:13Democratic nominee.
37:15The trick was
37:16was to get
37:16the independent voter,
37:18to get the Republican
37:19convention delegate
37:21interested in Ike,
37:23willing to go for Ike.
37:24And that was going
37:25to take a lot of work.
37:26On June 2nd,
37:28General Eisenhower
37:29retired from the U.S. Army
37:30so he could become
37:31an active candidate
37:32for president.
37:34The GOP nominating convention
37:35would convene
37:37in just one month.
37:41As the convention
37:42got underway in Chicago,
37:44Eisenhower and Taft
37:45were virtually deadlocked
37:47in the nomination battle.
37:49A day and night fight
37:50for delegates
37:51highlighted the convention's
37:52early days.
37:53On the streets
37:55of downtown Chicago,
37:57the demonstrations
37:57grew larger and noisier.
38:00Leaders of the
38:01bandwagon division
38:02of Citizens for Eisenhower
38:04found a way
38:05to take its supporters
38:06off the street
38:07and inside the hall.
38:09The Taft people
38:10completely controlled
38:12the convention.
38:13The sergeant-at-arms
38:14gave out very few tickets
38:16to the Eisenhower people.
38:19And they didn't want
38:21to have what happened
38:22in 1940 where the balcony
38:24started yelling,
38:24we want Wilkie,
38:25we want Wilkie,
38:26and get it out of control.
38:28So they were determined
38:29that that wouldn't happen.
38:31My roommate
38:31at the Blackstone Hotel
38:34was Arthur Gray.
38:36And Arthur Gray
38:37was working on
38:39demonstrations
38:41for Citizens for Eisenhower.
38:43and he became friendly
38:49with a gentleman
38:51named Frayne,
38:53Andy Frayne,
38:55who was the head usher
38:57at the convention.
39:01And Frayne was
39:03for Eisenhower.
39:04So despite the fact
39:06that we were in Taft territory,
39:07Frayne would open the doors
39:13and let in
39:13the Eisenhower demonstrators.
39:16The demonstrators
39:17did not have votes for Ike,
39:19but they helped
39:19to change the atmosphere
39:21inside a convention hall
39:22controlled by Mr. Republican's
39:25stalwarts.
39:26To win the Republican nomination
39:27for Eisenhower,
39:28Eisenhower's managers
39:29had to get votes
39:31from the South.
39:32They had to find a way
39:33to unlock the lock
39:34that Taft had
39:35on the Southern delegations.
39:37And they found a way.
39:38The Taft delegates
39:39had been essentially elected
39:40under a very rotten system
39:42whereby a few guys
39:43knew a few guys
39:44who met in a small group
39:45and decided that Taft
39:47would get the votes.
39:48In the light of controversy
39:49arising over the seating
39:50of rival delegations
39:52from Texas
39:52to the Republican
39:53National Convention,
39:55Senator James Duff
39:56of Pennsylvania,
39:57an Eisenhower supporter,
39:58issues a strong plea
39:59for an honest convention.
40:00On behalf of
40:03the American people,
40:05I want to say
40:06to these architects
40:07of disaster
40:08who are attempting
40:10to rig this convention
40:11that the American people
40:13want a fair convention
40:15according to good
40:17sportsmanship
40:18and fair play.
40:20The Eisenhower forces
40:21use the issue effectively
40:23by making it
40:23not just a political matter
40:25but a moral matter.
40:26They begin to attack
40:27Taft and his supporters
40:29for stealing.
40:30They argue,
40:30thou shalt not steal
40:31is emblazoned
40:32in Republican commercials
40:34and Eisenhower ads
40:35and newspapers
40:36and of course
40:37throughout the media.
40:38This puts the Taft people
40:39on a defensive posture
40:41that they never recover from.
40:42Taft really didn't know
40:43what had hit him.
40:44The hearing before
40:46the credentials committee
40:47was televised
40:49and my opinion
40:50that it was that hearing
40:52and the showing we made
40:54which was so overwhelming
40:55and generally recognized
40:57by objective reporters
41:01but what was really important
41:03was that television
41:04of our contest
41:05and the total votes
41:07of Georgia, Texas
41:09and Louisiana
41:10amounted to 106.
41:12That was the difference
41:13between Eisenhower
41:14being nominated
41:15and Taft being nominated.
41:17By winning the fight
41:19to seat his contested delegates
41:20from three states
41:21Eisenhower captured
41:23the nomination
41:24on the first ballot.
41:25There were many, many, many
41:35embittered conservative Republicans
41:38when Eisenhower won that nomination.
41:42They accused him
41:42not even of being a Republican,
41:44not having decided
41:45to be a Republican
41:46until the presidency
41:47was offered him,
41:49that he was ideologically removed
41:51from the mainstream
41:52of the party
41:53which they considered
41:54to be the conservative
41:55wing of the party.
41:57He was the darling
41:58of what the conservatives
41:59thought of
42:00as the liberal
42:01eastern establishment.
42:03The key figure
42:04in putting things together
42:06is Dwight D. Eisenhower.
42:07The first thing
42:08Eisenhower does
42:09in the wake of his nomination
42:10is to go through a crowd
42:12and seek out Robert Taft
42:13and shake his hand
42:14and express his respect
42:16for Robert Taft.
42:17That was an important opening.
42:19The second thing Ike does
42:20is to agree to meet with Taft
42:21at Morningside Heights
42:22in New York
42:23and to talk about
42:24the Republican campaign
42:25in a sense
42:26to listen to Taft's views
42:27on the issues
42:28and on the way
42:29that the campaign
42:30is going to be run.
42:31He's not going to
42:31essentially sign off
42:32and say I'm going to do it
42:33Bob Taft's way
42:34but he's going to say
42:35that Bob Taft's a member
42:36of my team.
42:37That sends an incredibly
42:38important signal
42:39to the Main Street Republicans
42:41who've idolized Bob Taft
42:43for a generation.
42:44Governor Tom Dewey
42:45of New York,
42:46the GOP's presidential loser
42:48in 1944 and 1948
42:50and a leader
42:51of the party's liberal wing
42:53was Eisenhower's
42:54most important supporter.
42:57A conservative running mate
42:58for Ike
42:58was now needed
42:59to balance the ticket.
43:01It was a logical choice
43:02because Eisenhower
43:04was fairly old at that time.
43:07Nixon was young
43:08and vigorous.
43:09Eisenhower was really
43:10an Easterner
43:11at that point in his life
43:12and Nixon came
43:14from the West Coast.
43:17Nixon was a senator
43:18and had had
43:19legislative experience
43:21in both the House
43:22of Representatives
43:23and the Senate
43:24and Nixon had gained
43:27national reputation
43:28because of his
43:29the controversy
43:31over Alger Hiss
43:32and that was one
43:34of the obviously
43:35important campaign issues
43:37was the Cold War,
43:39anti-communism
43:40and the elimination
43:42from government roles
43:44of suspected communism.
43:52In a series of dawn raids,
43:55FBI agents
43:55swooped down on communists
43:57indicted on charges
43:58of advocating
43:59the violent overthrow
44:00of the government.
44:04To many observers,
44:06it seemed like
44:07a perfect ticket.
44:08Age and experience
44:09joined with youth
44:10to make a team
44:10that sends Republican hope
44:12soaring in the campaign
44:13of 1952.
44:15Well, I had an opportunity
44:16when I was in Washington
44:17during the past two weeks
44:18to talk to a number
44:19of congressmen and senators
44:20and also I had a chance
44:22to look over the mail
44:23and I have been
44:25tremendously gratified
44:26by the spirit of unity
44:28that has developed
44:28in the Republican Party.
44:30We're going to have
44:30a united front this November
44:32that's going to assure
44:33the victory
44:33for General Eisenhower
44:35that the country needs.
44:36By the time
44:37the Democrat convention
44:37met in Chicago
44:39in mid-July 1952,
44:42the Republicans
44:43had nominated Eisenhower.
44:45Stevenson had never wanted
44:47to run against Eisenhower.
44:49He had hoped
44:50that he could stop
44:51any draft movement
44:53if the Republicans
44:55had nominated Eisenhower.
44:57And I think he sincerely
44:59tried to stop the draft.
45:02At the start
45:03of the Democratic convention,
45:05Governor Stevenson's
45:06inspiring speech of welcome
45:07won over many
45:08uncommitted delegates.
45:10The response
45:11to his speech
45:11is so enthusiastic
45:13that the movement
45:14to draft him
45:14as a candidate
45:15gains momentum.
45:16On the third ballot,
45:18Stevenson became
45:19the Democratic Party's nominee
45:20to oppose Eisenhower.
45:22After Eisenhower
45:23was nominated
45:24after the Chicago convention,
45:26I then went back
45:27to my law practice
45:28and told him
45:29that I was sure
45:30that he would win
45:31overwhelmingly in November.
45:33But along in September,
45:35he called me
45:35on the telephone
45:36and asked me
45:36to meet him
45:37on his campaign train
45:39after midnight
45:40the following night
45:42because the so-called
45:44Nixon episode
45:45had arisen
45:46and Nixon was about
45:48to make his checker speech.
45:51And he was charged
45:52with having kept
45:52a secret fund.
45:54It was about $18,000
45:56without accounting for it
45:59publicly.
46:01And there were demands
46:03from Republicans
46:04and Democrats alike
46:05that Nixon be removed
46:07from the ticket.
46:08Without consulting Ike,
46:10Nixon took the extraordinary
46:11step of booking
46:12national television time
46:14to tell his side
46:15of the story.
46:17Why do I feel so deeply?
46:19Why do I feel
46:20that in spite of the smears,
46:22the misunderstanding,
46:23the necessity for a man
46:24to come up here
46:25and bear his soul
46:26as I have,
46:27why is it necessary
46:28for me to continue
46:29this fight?
46:31And I want to tell you
46:32why.
46:33Because you see,
46:34I love my country.
46:37And I think my country
46:39is in danger.
46:40And I think the only man
46:42that can save America
46:43at this time
46:44is the man that's running
46:46for president
46:47on my ticket.
46:49Nixon's performance
46:50on national television
46:51would save his place
46:53on Ike's ticket.
46:54And it saved Checkers,
46:56the family dog
46:57that one of his secret donors
46:59had given to the Nixon daughters.
47:03The meeting takes place
47:05after a wholehearted endorsement
47:06by the Republican National Committee
47:08of the Senator's conduct.
47:10Once again,
47:10the GOP closes ranks
47:12during one of the most crucial elections
47:13in the nation's history.
47:15With the Nixon crisis resolved,
47:18Ike quickly stumbled into another,
47:20this time involving
47:22the party's most powerful
47:23and popular politician,
47:25Senator Joe McCarthy
47:26of Wisconsin.
47:28And to make matters worse,
47:30the crisis also involved
47:31Ike's World War II boss
47:33and mentor,
47:34General George C. Marshall,
47:36who was called a traitor
47:37by McCarthy
47:38for his actions
47:39as Truman's secretary of state.
47:41The genesis of the incident
47:43really was that
47:45Marshall was being vilified
47:47by the Republican Party.
47:49McCarthy had picked up on this,
47:52but many Republicans
47:53were trying to blame Marshall
47:54for the loss of China
47:56to the communists.
47:58So it was a big issue
47:59within the Republican Party.
48:01As McCarthy had trained
48:03his guns on Marshall,
48:05Eisenhower had two or three times
48:07defended Marshall
48:08at press conferences.
48:09It wasn't the first time
48:11the issue had come up.
48:12In a run-up to the campaign swing
48:13in Wisconsin,
48:14the Eisenhower people
48:16faced a real problem.
48:18Eisenhower wanted to defend
48:19General Marshall
48:20from attacks
48:21by right-wing Republicans,
48:23including the most important
48:24right-wing Republican
48:25of them all,
48:25Senator Joseph McCarthy
48:27of Wisconsin.
48:28And in an early speech draft,
48:30Eisenhower had inserted
48:31a paragraph
48:31in which he defended Marshall
48:33against any attacks
48:34on Marshall's character.
48:36The problem was
48:37an early draft
48:38was circulated
48:38to the governor of Wisconsin,
48:40Walter Kohler.
48:41And when Kohler read this draft,
48:43he said,
48:43this is going to split
48:44the Republican Party
48:45right in two.
48:46Kohler gets to make his say.
48:48Eisenhower looks at Adams
48:49and says,
48:50so?
48:51Adams says,
48:52take it out.
48:55Eisenhower takes it out
48:57and lives through it.
49:00Gabriel Hauge told me
49:02when he came back
49:02from the rear car
49:04where this was going on,
49:05said that Ike had sweated blood
49:07all day over this issue.
49:09he wanted to affirm
49:13once again
49:14his belief in Marshall,
49:15but he also,
49:16he wanted to be
49:18a good political team player
49:20if the locals were saying
49:22this would lose the state
49:24and if it didn't
49:25make any difference otherwise.
49:27He felt that he'd already
49:28affirmed his belief in Marshall.
49:30With the McCarthy issue
49:32behind him,
49:33Ike could focus
49:34on his main reason
49:35for running,
49:35his commitment
49:37to keeping the peace.
49:39If we believe
49:40in our own system,
49:42if we allow
49:43no taint
49:43of false doctrine
49:45to confuse it,
49:46if we practice
49:47what we preach,
49:49if we provide
49:50upright leadership,
49:52we can help
49:53to show the world
49:53the folly
49:54of war.
49:56With all the strength
49:57I can command
49:58and the devotion
49:59I hold for my country,
50:01I pledge myself
50:02to this objective.
50:11Eisenhower was
50:12a remarkable campaigner,
50:13especially for one
50:14who had not grown up
50:16in politics,
50:17who spent his whole career
50:19in the military.
50:20He took to it
50:21and actually
50:25the press people
50:27like Ray Shearer
50:29and Bob Donovan
50:30and those who saw him
50:32in action
50:32were surprised
50:35that he was so good.
50:37He had an absolutely
50:38electric television personality.
50:41He had that marvelous
50:43beaming smile
50:44and put his hands up
50:45and it really got
50:47across to people.
50:48Eisenhower had
50:49the perfect personality
50:51for the visual medium
50:53of television.
50:54Grew up in Abilene,
50:56humble childhood,
50:58growing up
50:58in Middle America,
51:00the attributes
51:01of family
51:02and cause
51:03and country,
51:04all of those things
51:06were destined
51:07to make him great
51:08in television.
51:10What he did
51:11to become a personality
51:14was to flaunt
51:16those characteristics.
51:18he came off
51:19as a real person.
51:24The whistle-stop
51:25politicking
51:26from the back
51:27of a train
51:27was the campaign's
51:28link to the past.
51:30But Citizens for Eisenhower
51:31was also inventing
51:33the future
51:33of political campaign.
51:37They'd go into a town
51:39and they'd
51:39have balloons,
51:42barrage balloons,
51:43up in the air
51:44and the band would play.
51:45It was like
51:46a traveling circus.
51:47It was a great
51:47American pageant.
51:49Nothing like it had ever
51:49been done quite before
51:50or since.
52:06Citizens for Eisenhower
52:07also created
52:08a new role
52:09for the former general.
52:11Television personality.
52:12You like Ike,
52:13I like Ike,
52:14everybody likes Ike,
52:16for president.
52:16Hang out the banner,
52:17beat the drum,
52:18we'll take Ike to Washington,
52:20we'll take Ike to Washington.
52:25Ike's advisors
52:26also used
52:27that famous face
52:28and voice
52:28to attack
52:29Truman's policies.
52:31General,
52:31the Democrats
52:32are telling me
52:33I never had it so good.
52:34Can that be true
52:35when America's billions
52:37in debt,
52:38when prices have doubled,
52:39when taxes break our backs
52:40and we are still fighting
52:42in Korea
52:42is tragic
52:44and it's time
52:45for a change.
52:46The money was raised
52:48by citizens
52:49for Eisenhower.
52:51I can't remember
52:52the exact details
52:53but I think
52:54it was somewhere
52:55around $8 million.
52:57We had the most
52:59remarkable
53:00finance committee
53:03composed of
53:05big hitters
53:06who knew
53:07how to get money.
53:08With the election looming,
53:09the polls pointed
53:10to a tight race
53:11and with the country
53:13facing a hopeless
53:14stalemate in Korea,
53:15the Eisenhower campaign
53:16decided to take advantage
53:18of Ike's military reputation.
53:20Stevenson was getting
53:21more play in the press
53:23than Eisenhower was
53:24so my first job
53:26was to try
53:27and turn that around
53:28and get Eisenhower
53:30on the offensive again
53:31so I consulted
53:32with one of the campaign
53:34speechwriters,
53:35a fellow by the name
53:36of Emmett Hughes
53:37and I said,
53:39well,
53:39my analysis is
53:41that the people
53:41are getting very tired
53:42of the Korean War.
53:44There are heavy casualties
53:45among the American forces
53:46there in Korea
53:48and they're turning
53:49against the idea
53:51of carrying on
53:52the fighting.
53:53We then decided
53:54that that was
53:55the number one issue
53:56in the campaign
53:58and Hughes wrote out
54:00a speech,
54:02several drafts
54:02of the speech
54:03and he finally
54:04turned out the phrase,
54:06Eisenhower speaking,
54:08I shall go to Korea.
54:10To appraise on the spot
54:12methods for solving
54:14that particular problem,
54:16with speed and honor,
54:17I shall go to Korea.
54:22Ike made his pledge
54:24to go to Korea
54:25just 10 days
54:26before the nation voted.
54:28Eisenhower's pledge
54:29to go to Korea
54:29hurt Stevenson.
54:32Stevenson couldn't compete
54:34with Eisenhower's
54:35military record.
54:36Ironically,
54:37earlier in the campaign,
54:38Stevenson and his advisors
54:40had considered
54:41having Stevenson announce
54:44that if he were elected
54:44president,
54:45he would go to Korea.
54:46But they dismissed that
54:48as really a kind
54:49of a political stunt
54:50because they had no idea
54:52what Stevenson would do
54:53once he got to Korea.
54:56The returns come in
54:57slowly at first,
54:58but then rising
54:59into a flood of votes,
55:00soon pointing
55:01toward a Republican victory.
55:03The big tally board
55:03at Eisenhower headquarters
55:05in New York
55:05brings a swelling chorus
55:06of cheers
55:07from party workers.
55:09It would be close,
55:09the polls indicated,
55:11but now state after state
55:12falls into the GOP column.
55:14It's Eisenhower
55:15by a landslide,
55:16the greatest plurality
55:17of any Republican
55:18standard bearer,
55:19with 30 million votes,
55:21well over 400 electoral votes.
55:22And I recognize clearly
55:25the weight of the responsibilities
55:27you have placed upon me,
55:30and I assure you
55:31that I shall never,
55:33in my service in Washington,
55:35give short weight
55:36to those responsibilities.
55:38Here on the porch
55:48at the Eisenhower farm,
55:50Eisenhower relaxed
55:51by playing bridge
55:52with his friends.
55:53But as a West Point cadet
55:55and as a young army officer,
55:57Ike was a great poker player.
55:59In fact, he was so good
56:00he had to give up.
56:01He took so much money
56:02from his fellow officers
56:03that it was bad
56:04for his career.
56:05But Ike never forgot
56:06how to bluff.
56:08And he used this skill
56:09brilliantly
56:10throughout his presidency,
56:12first in Korea.
56:13At the end of the 1952 campaign,
56:16when Ike said,
56:16I will go to Korea,
56:18no one, including Ike,
56:19was quite sure
56:20what he was going to do
56:21when he got there.
56:21But Ike was already
56:23thinking of a strategy,
56:24a way to get out of Korea,
56:26but also to contain
56:27the Cold War
56:28and to contain
56:29the Soviet Union.
56:51The Cold War
57:21the Cold War
Recommended
56:36
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