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00:00This is Trent Park in North London, today part of Middlesex University.
00:18In the Battle of Britain, every single German pilot shot down over this country was brought here.
00:30They were allowed to live here in some comfort, completely unaware that every word they said was secretly bugged by British intelligence.
00:44Throughout the battle, these overheard conversations were a direct line into what the Germans were thinking.
00:52The transcript survived.
00:54And what these men said has completely changed my mind about what really happened in the Battle of Britain.
01:08The English certainly have many more aircraft than is assumed by us.
01:11If we are not in a position to force England to make peace, it might develop into a kind of 30 years' war. That is what I am afraid of.
01:26Reading through these transcripts, you realise that there were two sides to the story, and one that has never been properly investigated.
01:32Could it be that after all these years, there are still new things to be said about the Battle of Britain?
02:03The story is a famous one.
02:08Just a handful of pilots, all that lay between Britain and annihilation.
02:12It's part of our national legend.
02:26I want to show that it's more complex, that the real story is richer and even more extraordinary.
02:32I absolutely love places like this, cram full of jackets and guns and bits of old aircraft, and of course the machines themselves.
02:43Even now, standing next to this real Spitfire still gives me quite a thrill.
02:47And I think it's that image of Spitfires and Hurricanes, of the few and of those huge battles over southern England in 1940,
02:54that encapsulates the Battle of Britain that I grew up with.
02:57But it's only one part of the story.
02:59This is the familiar story.
03:07Nazi Germany, a military colossus crushing all before it.
03:12Amateurish Britain, on her knees, her army defeated.
03:20Hitler's forces, superbly trained, highly efficient.
03:23I don't want to debunk the Battle of Britain, or dismiss the rousing words of Churchill.
03:31Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty, and so bear ourselves that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, this was their finest hour.
03:51It may have been our finest hour.
03:52It may have been our finest hour, but it extends beyond the few.
04:00The problem is that the myth misses so much of the detail, detail that reveals a quite different story.
04:10The familiar picture is that by June 1940, Britain was isolated, with Nazi and fascist powers in control from the Arctic all the way to West Africa.
04:21But was Britain really alone?
04:29Even from the White Cliffs above Dover, the channel was a formidable obstacle.
04:33If you're a German and you're standing on the clifftops over there looking at the United Kingdom, then you forget that it's not just Britain that you're up against.
04:42It's the British Empire and all their friends, and you haven't got all the time in the world.
04:47You certainly don't have all the resources in the world to continue this fight.
04:52Peter Caddick-Adams is a historian from the Defence Academy at Shrivenham.
04:55He's always believed that Britain's position in 1940 was not nearly so hopeless as is generally thought.
05:03One of the criticisms we can make of Hitler is that in the First World War he served as a corporal, and he's a land man.
05:10He only thinks in terms of a land campaign, and even then only at the tactical level.
05:16So his view of fighting a world war is purely in his own mind in terms of the land battle at the tactical level.
05:24He knows and understands nothing about maritime warfare, and he understands very little about aerial warfare.
05:30He has advisers who will tell him, Goering, Raider, whoever the top generals are, they will tell him what he should be doing.
05:39And so when you come up against a campaign, the invasion of England, that requires a large maritime element, that requires an aerial battle,
05:47he's way out of his comfort zone, and often people who are uncomfortable with a decision that they have to make,
05:54that they have no personal expertise or experience of, they delay.
05:58They fritter while they sum up the options.
06:02And that's exactly what's happening in the summer of 1930.
06:05Saturday, July the 6th.
06:16After completing his stunning victory over France, Hitler paraded in triumph through Berlin.
06:21The soldiers were marching through the Brandenburg Gate, and everyone was cheering.
06:35That was really something.
06:40There was this victorious mood, and everybody got swept up in it.
06:47And when we turned on England, well, we thought, we can do this.
06:55Hitler had most of Europe at his feet. His power had never been greater.
07:06Surely, he told himself, Britain would now do the sensible thing, and sue for peace.
07:13They came home victorious, and we young girls could finally go dancing again.
07:20When the war started, dancing was prohibited, and I live for dancing.
07:31And while Britain anxiously feared an invasion, Germany had relaxed.
07:37Amidst jubilant scenes, total victory seemed just a formality.
07:42If anything, it's the German nation that needs to be keeping an eye on the clock,
07:47because sooner or later they will run out of time with all the other grand ideas they've got.
07:52And they're in danger of a fleeting opportunity to cross the channel and go and defeat England.
07:59And then it will be gone.
08:01This wasn't the Germany famed for its efficiency.
08:04In fact, uncertainty was already compromising its effectiveness.
08:08Over here, the army may have been defeated, Europe may have fallen,
08:12but Britain still had crucial strengths.
08:18The Royal Navy was the biggest in the world,
08:20far eclipsing the size of the Kriegsmarine.
08:25Britain also controlled a third of the world's merchant shipping.
08:28And the contribution of the little ships did not stop at Dunkirk.
08:32In the summer of 1940, far from being weak and isolated, Britain was a marine superpower.
08:45For me, the Battle of Britain has always been about so much more than just RAF Fighter Command against the Luftwaffe.
08:51It's a giant clash of Great Britain against Germany, which involves a war on land, in the air and on sea.
08:58That's why I've come here to Portsmouth, to see Steve Prince, head of the Royal Navy's historical branch.
09:07You've got great national determination, particularly after Dunkirk,
09:11but that's also buttressed by the wider maritime-connected world
09:15that the Germans, as a land power, have great difficulty in understanding.
09:18So you have all the Commonwealth forces who are here, both in the RAF, obviously in the Battle of Britain,
09:23budding Canadian, Australian, New Zealand forces who are available for anti-invasion work.
09:28We think of the small ships as being involved at Dunkirk, but many of the ships,
09:32often many of the same vessels, are involved in this auxiliary patrol service,
09:36which is along the coast of the UK.
09:38And while Fighter Command are operating very largely by day,
09:41this patrol service are operating very largely by night.
09:44Yeah, and I love the idea of these fishing crews in converted trawlers turned into minesweepers,
09:50given a very small gun and a couple of machine guns, and off you go.
09:54It's amazing kind of ingenuity, isn't it?
09:56Just making it up on the spot a bit.
09:58Yes, it's an improvisation that relies on Britain's very large, at the time, seafaring community
10:03that's available and their willingness to serve.
10:05And there was more to the RAF than fighters.
10:15There were coastal and bomber commands.
10:19The traditional view is that the early efforts of bomber command were ineffective.
10:24The truth is that from as early as mid-May,
10:26they were already making daily strikes against Germany,
10:30hitting its navy, industry and airfields.
10:34My hometown, Kiel, was bombed in June 1940,
10:44and there were 40 or 60 people death as civilians.
10:52So we were prepared to do the same.
10:56The material impact of bomber command's efforts may have been slight,
11:00but the psychological impact,
11:02particularly on those in the Nazi high command, was considerable.
11:08Despite this, Hitler resisted calls to strike back at Britain's cities.
11:15For the time being, his principal aim was to cut off Britain's lifelines
11:19and starve her into submission.
11:21This was a period known as Canal Kampf, the fighting over the channel.
11:28By the middle of July, Luftwaffe attacks on British shipping were having an alarming effect.
11:34500,000 tons of vital supplies had been sunk.
11:38Hitler needed Britain out of the war, one way or the other.
11:42If his victories in Europe weren't enough to persuade Britain to the peace table,
11:47maybe the threat of starvation would.
11:59Hitler had retreated to the Berkhof, his house in Bavaria.
12:03He was already eyeing the invasion of Russia, but needed Britain out of the way first.
12:09And here he was receiving conflicting advice.
12:12Hermann Goering, the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, was optimistic.
12:18He promised Hitler that RAF could be destroyed in just four clear days, paving the way to invasion.
12:24But the Kriegsmarine, the German navy, was not so sure.
12:30It maintained the best way to win the war was by choking off the supply lines.
12:35And for this, the U-boat was ideally suited.
12:39Before the war, Germany had planned to build a vast navy,
12:42to include over 230 U-boats, but this had been fantasy.
12:46In the summer of 1940, no more than 14 were ever operational.
12:54These alone were destroying vast amounts of shipping.
12:58Had they had 100, or even 50, Hitler might well have prevailed.
13:04There was a gulf between German plans and what could be realistically achieved.
13:17In Germany, production was stalling.
13:24Hermann Goering was in charge of both the Luftwaffe and the German economy.
13:29Just as Churchill had put Beaverbrook in charge of airplane production,
13:33so Goering turned to his friend, the former ace and famous stunt pilot, Ernst Udet.
13:40Udet poured all his resources into the development of new dive bombers,
13:44which had already revealed fatal shortcomings over Dunkirk.
13:47Meanwhile, other areas of aircraft production were neglected.
13:56July 1940 was the most productive month all year for single-seater fighters.
14:02Just 237 were built.
14:05The German effort contrasted with the 496 British fighters produced in the same period,
14:10more than double.
14:11It was a ratio that would not improve for the Luftwaffe.
14:21This failure to deploy their technological genius in a coherent plan
14:25would have even more dramatic results in a crucial scientific development.
14:30Radar.
14:36Today, not much remains of the coast-long radar chain that once protected Britain.
14:41Just two out of six towers here at Dover.
14:48Despite the legend, it's not true that radar was a British invention.
14:52German radar technology was years ahead.
14:58When the Germans examined a captured mobile British set,
15:03they laughed at its primitive simplicity.
15:06Yet radar was vital to Britain's defence.
15:09Astonishingly, there was no radar whatsoever
15:14helping the Luftwaffe as they prepared to attack.
15:17When the Germans compared these huge static towers
15:21with their own smaller 360-degree rotating radars,
15:25they felt convinced they could only be of limited effectiveness.
15:28What the Germans completely failed to understand
15:31was that not only were these towers Britain's eyes out across the Channel,
15:35they were also just one part of Dowding's air defence system.
15:40Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding,
15:42Commander-in-Chief of RAF Fighter Command,
15:43had worked tirelessly,
15:46not only to build up his early warning and deployment system,
15:49but had also fought hard to preserve and strengthen his fighter forces.
15:56British technology may not have been the best in the world,
15:59but unlike the Germans,
16:01Dowding managed to harness the best of the resources available to him.
16:03Hostile raids, sir.
16:13The net result was that his fighter force was able to intercept enemy aircraft
16:18with unprecedented speed and accuracy.
16:20and the first approach was not at the point where they were targeting,
16:22because the batteries were built in the U.S.
16:23recycled power forces in the U.S.
16:24the�ических cycle.
16:33The W.S. pulled at the remaining units were built by the following and the two buildings were built by the blocking area of the U.S.
16:36operations room at RAF Axbridge in 1940 the headquarters of Fighter Command's 11 group
16:56the system had a number of different cogs the radar chain the 30,000 strong observer core the
17:02GPOs telephone and teleprinter service and of course the pilots themselves it's genius laying
17:07its ability to quickly bring all this information together at Fighter Command headquarters then
17:12equally rapidly feed it back out again to the various operations rooms which like this one
17:16at Uxbridge were almost exactly the same at every level of the chain throughout July as German raids
17:25built up across the channel Dowding was able to iron out glitches in the system the size and
17:32direction of Luftwaffe formations were carefully monitored with detail being added as more
17:36information poured in what we have here is a graphic representation of a rapidly unfolding situation
17:43which enabled any of the controllers to see with a single sweep of the eye exactly what was going on
17:49in other words coordination and standardization were the key what Dowding had created was the world's
17:55first ever fully coordinated air defense system and the Germans had nothing like it nothing like it at all
18:05the channel mid-july despite continued attacks on shipping and coastal targets the air fighting had been
18:13comparatively light
18:17in the whole month both sides would lose fewer aircraft than they had over dunkirk
18:21the real battle was yet to begin
18:32on the 16th of july from the burkoff hitler issued fure directive number 16 preparations for a landing against england
18:42code name sea lion
18:44three days later he made a final peace offer which he hoped britain could not refuse
18:53churchill refused
18:57the stage was set for the biggest air battle in history
19:03it would be a battle of modern combat aircraft and the young men who flew them
19:07in germany and britain these men and machines were the source of intense pride
19:18on both sides the airmen were seen as young handsome and brave a romantic expression of the national ideal
19:27for some of those still alive the memories remain vividly clear
19:31hands eckhart bob is one of the last survivors
19:38in 1940 he was a pilot with the fighter group jg 54 based at geene near calais
19:51today he is 93 and incredibly still flying
19:55the plane he's strapping himself into is a messersmith 108 a contemporary of the one he flew in the battle of britain
20:13last time he was flying over this airfield at north weald was at the battle's height
20:25in the battle of the island
20:40my mother told me once that when i was five i said
20:43i want to be a pilot with my right hand
20:46i will fly the plane and with my left hand i will catch eagles
20:50In 1940, the situation was still very positive for the Germans.
21:02We were certain of victory.
21:04Spirits were high.
21:11It's clear that because we already had experience from previous missions,
21:16we probably had an advantage over the British at the time,
21:19because we already had Poland and France under our belts.
21:24The British, rather, were just getting started.
21:27That's the way it was.
21:41Now I want to see a British ace, one of the few.
21:49Well, this is where Billy Drake lives.
21:55Group Captain Drake, as I should call him,
21:57is one of the toughest fighter leaders we ever produced.
22:02He had an extraordinary career,
22:04one that began with cloth-covered biplanes before the war
22:07and ended on fast jets.
22:08Imagine having a career like that.
22:16Billy remembers when the RAF were still flying the feebly-armed Hawker Fury biplanes
22:20and attending a top-secret briefing about the latest German fighter,
22:25the Messerschmitt 109.
22:26It was a very frightening lecture because we were told all about the 109s.
22:33And there we were with the Furies.
22:36And we said, well, if we can't shoot them down, what do we do?
22:39He said, you'll have to ram them, old boy.
22:42And that was his statement.
22:45Luckily, we got the Hurricanes in time.
22:47By the beginning of August, Britain had had two months
22:50in which to recover from the humiliation at Dunkirk.
22:53Over there, across the water,
22:55the French coast was now full of newly completed airfields,
22:58all crammed with aircraft.
22:59The mood amongst the Luftwaffe was buoyant.
23:02Confidence was high.
23:03While Britain waited for the inevitable onslaught,
23:06all Göring believed he needed
23:07was just four good days of clear weather.
23:10According to the weather forecasts,
23:23a ridge of high pressure was moving in from the 12th of August.
23:26Preliminary raids were sent over to destroy the British radar chain
23:41and attack ports along the south coast.
23:4310 o'clock, we heard this noise.
23:57And my brother said, what is that?
23:59So we went out, and it was covered with planes upstairs in the sky, black.
24:06And I thought, oh dear, something wrong here.
24:09So we went into the shelter.
24:11We heard all the bombing and all the machine guns.
24:25I saw the parachutists coming down in flames
24:29because they were hit.
24:31And then it eased off.
24:33So when we came out of the house to see what had happened midday,
24:38all along Multimer Road, where we lived,
24:41was bullets and the cartridge cases and the shrapnel.
24:46So we run down the road, and they came back.
24:50So, of course, we ran like mad back to the shelter, terrified.
24:54I thought it was our last day on Earth.
24:56The all-out attack on Britain had begun.
25:07Tom Neill had just celebrated his 20th birthday
25:10and was a fighter pilot throughout the battle.
25:12From control, you will learn there are 30 enemy forming up over France,
25:1960, 90, 100, 150, 250, 400, oh, my God, 400,
25:26and there's only 12 of us, you know, that sort of attitude.
25:29That was the time when you really felt apprehensive.
25:32But once you're airborne, no problem.
25:34The operation against the RAF was codenamed Adler-Angrif,
25:43the attack of the Eagles.
25:47In the five days following its launch,
25:50Fighter Command lost 118 aircraft.
25:55But the Luftwaffe lost more.
26:00251.
26:04Sunday, the 18th of August, became known as the hardest day
26:12as both sides threw all they had
26:14into an increasingly ferocious air battle.
26:18According to Goering's pre-battle plan,
26:20he should have already cleared the skies of British planes,
26:23and yet the RAF was still meeting every single raid
26:26the Luftwaffe sent over.
26:28Both nations have placed great faith in their fighter aircraft,
26:32but which was the best?
26:34The German pilots who survived being shot down
26:39were hastily taken into custody.
26:44Before being taken to prison camp,
26:46they were sent to Trent Park in North London,
26:49where their conversations were secretly bugged
26:51by Dennis Felkin and his team in air intelligence.
26:56It was immediately apparent
26:58that the German airmen felt their aircraft
27:00gave them the upper hand.
27:02The 109 is superior to the Spitfire
27:05if it has a pilot who knows how to fly it well.
27:10It is incomprehensible how frightened many airmen are
27:13of the Spitfire.
27:17I'd always prefer a 109 to the Spitfire.
27:21You have to fly long, wide curves,
27:22and the Spitfire can't keep up.
27:24Not a surprising judgment from the German pilots,
27:33but there were English airmen who agreed about the 109.
27:38It was a small aeroplane with a very weighty engine,
27:41and it could dive very quickly,
27:44and it would escape very quickly.
27:47So the tactics were largely determined by them.
27:52And time and time again,
27:53we used to watch them coming,
27:54but there was nothing we could do about it.
27:56And they would dive away quite freely
27:59without us being able to catch them.
28:01In the Spitfire,
28:03I always felt that given 10 seconds
28:05to work up a bit of speed,
28:07you could cope with them.
28:08But initially,
28:10the 109 was a more effective fighter.
28:15The Messerschmitt 109
28:16was acknowledged to be a trickier machine to handle,
28:19but once mastered,
28:21it had a number of key advantages.
28:23Hans-Eckhardt Bobb had been flying the 109 since 1938.
28:35Personally,
28:36I was always able to outmaneuver the Spitfire.
28:39That means in dogfights,
28:41I was able to get behind the Spitfire
28:43and get into the firing position.
28:45We were, of course, convinced
28:53that the Me 109E
28:55was the best plane
28:56to be used in missions at the time.
29:03The argument over who had the best aircraft
29:05has been raging ever since the battle.
29:11I want to resolve this once and for all.
29:13Now, this is the real thing,
29:16a Messerschmitt 109E
29:18as flown in the Battle of Britain.
29:20There's only two Messerschmitt,
29:21proper Messerschmitts,
29:22flying in the world today,
29:23and this, when it's finished,
29:24will be the third.
29:25All the others, you can see,
29:27are post-war 1950s Spanish-built Bouchons.
29:31Not the same thing at all,
29:32but this is the real McCoy.
29:37One key difference lay in the engines.
29:43Our engines had carburettors,
29:47whereas the Germans always had direct injection,
29:50which we have in our cars nowadays.
29:52In a carburettor,
29:53it all depends on a little chamber in the carburettor
29:55and a float that goes up and down.
29:58And when the demands of the engine are such,
30:00the float goes up
30:01and more fuel is allowed in the engine.
30:04In an aircraft,
30:05when you push the nose down,
30:07the float flies to the top of the cylinder.
30:09You get the fuel whether you like it or not,
30:11and the engine stops.
30:13Now, masses of black smoke
30:15used to come out of the exhaust,
30:17and the engine would stop
30:19for as long as you kept on negative G,
30:21which could be up to two, three, four, five seconds,
30:24by which time, of course,
30:25your enemy had escaped.
30:27He was halfway home to France.
30:29And in a dogfight,
30:36there was another equally vital factor.
30:40The enormous advantage of the 109
30:42for low-flying attacks
30:43is the terrific power of its armament.
30:45You make one attack,
30:46and it does an enormous amount of damage.
30:51The British pilots
30:52couldn't feel so confident in their firepower.
30:55In a Spitfire Hurricane,
30:59you had 14.7 seconds of fire,
31:03of really pea-shooter ammunition.
31:08And the 109 had 55 seconds of machine-gun fire,
31:12nearly four times as long.
31:17You can argue all you like
31:18about manoeuvrability and performance,
31:20but I think it really boils down to this, firepower.
31:23Now, Spitfires and Hurricanes
31:25were armed with 0.303 Browning machine guns,
31:27which fired these.
31:28This is the bit that actually hits the enemy plane.
31:30As you can see, it's pretty small.
31:32Now, here we've got a bit of German fuselage
31:34from a 109 that was hit during the Battle of Britain
31:35and repaired.
31:37And as you can see, here's the hole.
31:38Pretty neat and not an awful lot of damage.
31:41So we've got that.
31:42Germans also have machine guns,
31:45but in addition,
31:46they've got 20-millimeter cannon shells.
31:48Now, this is a high-explosive cannon shell,
31:50so it hits the aircraft and then explodes.
31:53They also had armor-piercing shells.
31:56Now, if you put this together with a .303,
32:00there's absolutely no comparison at all.
32:03And if I was flying in the Battle of Britain,
32:04I know which I'd rather have, cannons.
32:10For me, there is no doubt
32:11that the Messerschmitt 109
32:13was the better plane in 1940.
32:1655 seconds of firepower
32:18was a colossal edge.
32:20And that was on top of its other advantages.
32:25Tom Neill faced the 109 in combat.
32:28The 109s had the supreme ability
32:32to catch us whenever they wanted,
32:34to get away whenever they wanted,
32:36and to knock us down whenever they want,
32:38because they had big 20-millimeter cannons.
32:41We had pea shooters by comparison,
32:43and they could knock us down with three shots.
32:45The ME109E might have been the better aircraft,
33:02but it was being forced to operate
33:04at a number of disadvantages.
33:06The first was fuel.
33:07Flying over from France,
33:09they had only around 10 minutes in the combat zone
33:11before they had to head for home.
33:13If they didn't, they risked ending up in the channel.
33:16And whilst it might only look
33:17like a narrow river from the air,
33:19the reality of being a lone airman
33:21lost adrift in that vast expanse at sea level
33:24held true terrors for the German pilots.
33:27The second disadvantage was tactical.
33:30Preventing its pilots
33:31from fulfilling its basic design function
33:33was unthinkably, unimaginably stupid.
33:39Despite earlier insisting
33:41the 109s operate freely,
33:43to make the most of their advantages,
33:45Goering then reversed the order,
33:47demanding his fighters escort
33:49the dive bombers at all times.
33:59The 109 was designed to fly at speed,
34:02not so slowly.
34:04Its pilots were struggling
34:06going to keep it airborne.
34:11When that order came from Goering,
34:14it caused a huge stir.
34:17We fighter pilots were furious.
34:18We were shocked that a commander-in-chief
34:23could issue such a ridiculous order as that.
34:26We fighters hated flying in direct escort.
34:35No one wanted to do it
34:37because you were helpless.
34:39You flew next to the bombers
34:40in normal formation.
34:43You couldn't defend yourself
34:45or attack or anything.
34:46You could do nothing.
34:47You just stayed still
34:52until you were shot down.
34:54That was what it amounted to.
34:56Because the 109s couldn't operate
35:11so effectively at such low speeds,
35:14they were less able to protect the Stukas,
35:16which were now decimated.
35:18On the 25th of August,
35:26the Stukas were withdrawn
35:28from the battle for good.
35:32The most lauded part
35:34of the German bomber force was gone
35:36and the channel wasn't getting any smaller.
35:45The war took a sinister turn
35:48on the night of Sunday,
35:49the 25th of August,
35:50when, on Churchill's insistence,
35:52around 50 RAF bombers
35:54set off to attack Berlin.
35:57The night before,
35:58German bombers had mistakenly
36:00dropped bombs on London,
36:01something Hitler had forbidden.
36:12There was a building
36:13next to the commuter line
36:14in Charlottenburg
36:15and it was destroyed
36:16and everybody came
36:17and stared at it
36:18like some sort of miracle.
36:21Everybody went there
36:22and looked at it
36:23to see what a destroyed building
36:24looks like.
36:26Herman Goering said,
36:27you can call me Meyer
36:28if a plane ever drops bombs on Germany.
36:31Well, his name was Meyer
36:34real quick, wasn't it?
36:35The British Bomber Command
36:41had already begun
36:43to bomb Germany
36:45six times
36:46in August, 1940.
36:49There was no real cause
36:51to do that,
36:53to go to Berlin.
36:55We were
36:57very enraged
36:59to do the same
37:01to London.
37:02incensed,
37:08Hitler ordered
37:08retaliatory attacks
37:09on London
37:10as the British government
37:11knew he must.
37:17For some,
37:18this change of tactics
37:19from attacking airfields
37:21to British cities
37:21was the decisive moment
37:23in the battle.
37:24The best general
37:26we ever had
37:27was Hitler himself.
37:28He suddenly stopped
37:29the destruction
37:31of our airfields.
37:37He lost his temper
37:39and said
37:39to Goering,
37:41send all the bombers
37:43to London
37:43and teach them a lesson.
37:46That probably
37:47made the Battle of Britain
37:49a success
37:50on our part.
37:54If the Luftwaffe's
37:55core aim
37:56was to destroy
37:56the RAF
37:57in advance
37:58of an invasion,
37:59it's hard to see
38:00how they would achieve
38:00it by bombing London.
38:03But I'm not convinced
38:05the bombing of airfields
38:06had been that successful
38:07anyway.
38:10This is Manston
38:11in Kent,
38:11one of Fighter Command's
38:12front-line airfields
38:13in 1940.
38:15During the Battle of Britain,
38:16it was attacked
38:17numerous times,
38:18as were other airfields
38:19in southern England.
38:20We've always been told
38:21that by the beginning
38:22of September,
38:23Fighter Command
38:24was on its knees.
38:25It isn't true.
38:26Of all the RAF's airfields,
38:28this was the only one
38:29to be knocked out
38:30for more than one day.
38:31And this is the point.
38:32To destroy
38:33a large grass airfield
38:34took an awful lot
38:35more bombs
38:36than the Luftwaffe
38:36were dropping on them.
38:38The truth is
38:39that although the skies
38:40were thick
38:40with enemy aircraft,
38:42and although the rising
38:43number of pilot casualties
38:44was causing concern
38:45for Dowdingham Park,
38:47when the Luftwaffe
38:48turned on London,
38:49the RAF
38:49was still a long way
38:51from defeat.
38:58Air minister,
38:59communicate.
39:00The biggest bag yet.
39:03End of message.
39:04Both sides greatly
39:05exaggerated claims
39:06of aircraft shot down.
39:08Neither side, however,
39:09had a clear idea
39:10of exactly what was happening.
39:15One person uniquely qualified
39:17to examine the intelligence
39:18failings on both sides
39:20is Sebastian Cox,
39:21the RAF's official historian.
39:24The RAF
39:25grossly overestimates
39:27the strength
39:28of the Luftwaffe,
39:29but the Luftwaffe,
39:30not only do they
39:31overestimate
39:32the number of planes
39:33they shoot down,
39:34but they seriously
39:36underestimate
39:37the capacity of the RAF
39:39to replace planes
39:40that they have lost.
39:42And that has a serious effect
39:43on the way
39:44the Germans fight the battle.
39:46both sides
39:49had a problem
39:49because they assumed
39:51the basic military unit
39:52of planes
39:53was the same
39:54in each air force.
39:56But in the RAF,
39:57a fighter squadron
39:58was about 20 planes.
40:01In the Luftwaffe,
40:02the Staffel
40:03was only roughly
40:0412 planes.
40:05The RAF
40:08don't correctly
40:09understand
40:11the structure
40:12of the German units
40:13and they think
40:14that there are
40:15more German aeroplanes
40:17in each of these units
40:18than is actually the case.
40:21And so the simple arithmetic
40:22of multiplying
40:23the number of units
40:24by the wrong number
40:25of aeroplanes
40:26gives them
40:27an excessive strength
40:29for the Luftwaffe.
40:29Because of this
40:32simple mistake alone,
40:34the RAF
40:34thought the Luftwaffe
40:35was 50% bigger
40:36than it actually was.
40:41At the same time,
40:42the Luftwaffe
40:43thought the RAF
40:44was smaller
40:45than it really was.
40:48Presumably,
40:49overestimating
40:50the strength
40:50of your enemy
40:50is probably
40:51no bad thing,
40:52but it's a serious problem
40:54if you underestimate it,
40:55isn't it?
40:55If you are
40:56on the defensive
40:56and you overestimate
40:59the strength
40:59of the enemy
41:00who's going
41:00to attack you,
41:01that's not necessarily
41:03going to be disastrous.
41:05Whereas if you're
41:06on the offensive
41:07and you underestimate
41:09the defensive strength
41:10of the enemy,
41:11that can lead you
41:12into serious difficulties,
41:14which is exactly
41:14what happens
41:15with the Luftwaffe.
41:21By the beginning
41:22of September,
41:23Luftwaffe pilots
41:24were showing signs
41:25of strain.
41:26They're always higher
41:29than him.
41:36Judging from
41:36what Beck is saying
41:37in this diary,
41:38the Luftwaffe
41:39thinks are pretty bad.
41:40For example,
41:41he talks on the 2nd
41:42of September,
41:43he says,
41:44we can almost
41:44never surprise them,
41:45and this is why
41:46he feels he's never,
41:47fighting from Normandy,
41:49he's never going
41:49to get the kind of scores
41:50that some of these
41:51other pilots
41:51are now amassing
41:52on the Luftwaffe.
41:53He says,
41:54because he can never
41:54surprise them,
41:55they're always higher
41:56than him.
41:58I mean,
41:59we're always taught
41:59that beware of the Hun
42:01in the sun,
42:01but from Becca's diary,
42:03it's clear that you
42:03have to beware
42:04the Spitfire in the sun.
42:05If we began
42:14in July,
42:16we had losses
42:16from 50% or so,
42:19and this was,
42:21of course,
42:22a very,
42:23very hard job,
42:25and we were not
42:26very enthusiastic
42:29about it.
42:30I'm afraid that our
42:39fighter escorts
42:40are considerably weakened.
42:41You notice that now?
42:46I know a staffel
42:47which has only
42:48two aircraft left.
42:54Once,
42:55for a whole week,
42:56we're always reported
42:57number of aircraft
42:58fit for service,
42:59nil.
43:03By the 7th of September,
43:06the Luftwaffe had lost
43:07721 aircraft
43:08since the attack
43:09had been launched,
43:10fighter command,
43:11405.
43:14But the real difference
43:16was that the RAF
43:17was replacing its losses.
43:18One of the important points
43:22which is very seldom mentioned
43:24is the efficiency
43:26of our organization
43:27which provided aircraft
43:30when we lost them.
43:33And time and time again,
43:34if we flew for three,
43:35four times a day,
43:36we'd be down to five aircraft
43:39out of 18.
43:41And suddenly,
43:42miraculously,
43:42by lunchtime,
43:43the following day,
43:44we were at full strength again.
43:46Where they came from,
43:47nobody knows.
43:48They just appeared.
43:49Billy Drake
43:51had been shot down
43:52back in May
43:52and after a spell
43:54as an instructor
43:55training new pilots,
43:56he returned
43:56to the front line.
43:58And when you became
43:59operational again,
44:00can you recall
44:01there ever being
44:01a shortage of aircraft?
44:04No.
44:07No.
44:11It was replacing pilots
44:12that was more of a worry,
44:14but Keefe Park
44:14now came up
44:15with a brilliant solution.
44:16Exhausted squadrons
44:21were rotated
44:22to regain strength,
44:24while new pilots
44:25were allowed
44:25to gain flying experience
44:27away from the front line.
44:29Because of the flexibility
44:30of Dowding's system,
44:32this could be implemented
44:33immediately.
44:34It was simple,
44:35effective,
44:36saved lives
44:37and gave Britain
44:38an invaluable advantage.
44:39Billy Drake
44:41appreciated the effectiveness
44:43of Park's ideas.
44:45Those responsible
44:47for assessing
44:48the operation
44:49capability
44:49said,
44:50these squadrons
44:51are not capable
44:52of being accepted
44:56as operational
44:57and therefore
44:58will send them
44:59up north,
45:00away from
45:01the main theater
45:02above to recoup.
45:06Once again,
45:07the Germans
45:07had no comparable system.
45:10Experienced pilots
45:11flew on and on.
45:13New ones
45:13were flung
45:14straight into the battle.
45:17By mid-September,
45:19Dowding's defenses
45:20were holding firm.
45:22Around Britain's coast,
45:24more than 1,000 ships
45:25patrolled her waters
45:26and convoys
45:28were getting through.
45:30Britain was
45:31as strong as ever.
45:35The operations room
45:36here at Uxbridge
45:37has been set up
45:37to represent
45:38the situation
45:39as it was
45:39on 15th September 1940
45:41and it's absolutely
45:42full of information
45:43about the state
45:44of the squadrons.
45:46Over here,
45:47we have the Biggin Hill sector
45:49and there were
45:49three single-engine
45:50fighter squadrons,
45:5192,
45:5272 and 66.
45:54Now,
45:55what Park and Dowding
45:55were looking for
45:56was to have
45:5712 operational aircraft
45:58on any one given day
45:59and then roughly
46:00double the amount
46:01of pilots
46:02as a cushion.
46:03So,
46:03what we've got here
46:04is P for pilots
46:05and 92 squadron
46:06and A for aircraft,
46:0719 and 12.
46:09And then,
46:09in 72 squadron,
46:10we've got 20 pilots
46:12and 11 aircraft,
46:1366 squadron,
46:1519 pilots
46:16and 10 aircraft.
46:17They've got plenty
46:18of pilots
46:19and only 66 squadron
46:21is really seriously
46:22understrength
46:22in any way.
46:24In other words,
46:24the situation
46:25is pretty healthy.
46:26The contrast
46:27with across the channel
46:28with the Luftwaffe's
46:29fighter situation
46:30could not have been greater.
46:33Not that Goering
46:34understood this.
46:35Armed with increasingly
46:36fantastical intelligence reports,
46:38he believed the RAF
46:39was now all but destroyed.
46:42All that was needed,
46:43he reassured Hitler,
46:44was one final push.
46:45On Sunday,
46:52the 15th of September,
46:53a huge air battle
46:54took place.
47:08Although much smaller
47:09than originally claimed,
47:10the toll was still high.
47:12The Germans lost 61 aircraft
47:14and 93 men.
47:17For the British,
47:19it was 31 and 16.
47:22But far more important
47:23than the figures
47:24was the fact
47:25that Luftwaffe
47:25was as far away
47:26from beating the RAF
47:28as ever.
47:32Yet some German pilots
47:34still thought
47:34the invasion was imminent.
47:36It's quite interesting,
47:37but Seafried Betka
47:38doesn't make an entry
47:39on the 15th of September,
47:411940,
47:41the day we've come to know
47:42as the Battle of Britain day.
47:44But he does put an entry
47:45in on the 60th,
47:46the next day.
47:48And in which,
47:48funny enough,
47:49he still thinks
47:50the invasion's a goer.
47:51So he talks about
47:52when it might happen
47:53and he reckons
47:54it's going to happen
47:54in the next few weeks
47:55and certainly
47:56within the next month.
47:57And the reason he thinks
47:58that is because
47:59his squadron has just,
48:01his staff has just been
48:02recently placed up
48:03in the Padakale
48:04and he's flown over
48:05and seen all
48:06the invasion barges.
48:09It's true that
48:10by mid-September
48:12the barges were ready.
48:15Hitler's invasion plans
48:16were complete.
48:19The army was ready,
48:21so too the navy.
48:23But the Germans
48:24still hadn't beaten
48:25the RAF.
48:28From the start,
48:30they knew that
48:31without air superiority,
48:32the plan would be doomed.
48:36Today,
48:36we can piece together
48:37the events
48:38of that world-changing summer
48:39in a way that
48:40those who lived through it
48:41never could.
48:42We now know
48:43that the battle
48:43was fought
48:44on a much broader front,
48:45that beyond the few
48:46were the men
48:47of Bomber Command
48:47and the rest of the RAF
48:49and the full weight
48:50of a great maritime nation.
48:52This, combined with
48:53Dowding's ingenious
48:54defence system
48:55and plentiful aircraft,
48:56ensured that Britain
48:57was a far stronger enemy
48:59than Germany
48:59had ever expected.
49:01And it was, of course,
49:02also a battle
49:03of two sides,
49:03not one.
49:05The result was
49:05as much to do
49:06with German failings
49:07as it was
49:08Britain's achievements.
49:11If anyone
49:12had been amateurish,
49:13it was the Germans.
49:19Hitler knew
49:20that time
49:20was now running out.
49:22The Luftwaffe
49:23had failed.
49:25The captured pilots
49:26at Trent Park
49:27were coming
49:28to the same conclusion.
49:30If they don't come
49:31in three weeks,
49:32then they'll not be
49:33coming across this year.
49:36Either the landing
49:37will come very soon
49:38in this good weather,
49:39or will probably
49:40not come at all.
49:43They simply must
49:44start the attack
49:45this winter,
49:46or we'll have
49:46no fighters left.
49:47We have missed
49:50the best moment
49:51for the invasion.
49:55September moved
49:56into October,
49:57and summer
49:58turned to autumn.
50:01Just a few months
50:02earlier,
50:03victory had seemed
50:04inevitable,
50:05and Hitler
50:05had had the world
50:06in his grasp.
50:08Now it was
50:08slipping away.
50:10On the 12th of October,
50:12he postponed
50:12the invasion indefinitely,
50:14effectively ending
50:15the battle.
50:17Britain had won.
50:22When you really
50:23look at the complexity
50:24and detail
50:24of the real story,
50:26it becomes even
50:27more dramatic
50:27and exciting
50:28than the one
50:28we've all grown up with.
50:31Hitler's plans
50:32now lay in tatters.
50:34Britain's victory
50:35ensured the war
50:36would continue.
50:38While there was relief
50:40that her sovereignty
50:40had been saved,
50:42the celebrations
50:42would have to wait.
50:43but the genesis
50:46of victory
50:46that came
50:47five long years later
50:48can be found
50:49in the summer
50:50of 1940
50:50in the Battle
50:52of Britain.
50:53alias
51:04the
51:06the
51:06the
51:07the
51:17the
51:18the
51:19You
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