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00:00This is Trent Park in North London, today part of Middlesex University.
00:18In the Battle of Britain, every single German pilot shot down over this country was brought here.
00:30They were allowed to live here in some comfort, completely unaware that every word they said was secretly bugged by British intelligence.
00:44Throughout the battle, these overheard conversations were a direct line into what the Germans were thinking.
00:51The transcript survived.
00:54And what these men said has completely changed my mind about what really happened in the Battle of Britain.
01:08The English certainly have many more aircraft than is assumed by us.
01:11If we are not in a position to force England to make peace, it might develop into a kind of 30 years' war.
01:20That is what I am afraid of.
01:26Reading through these transcripts, you realise that there were two sides to the story,
01:31and one that has never been properly investigated.
01:34Could it be that after all these years, there are still new things to be said about the Battle of Britain?
01:40The story is a famous one.
01:41Just a handful of pilots, all that lay between Britain and Britain.
01:43Of the world.
01:44It's been a testament to the Battle of Britain.
01:47With an entry to the Battle of Britain, the Battle of Britain and the Battle of Britain and the Battle of Britain have been awarded a defence of the battle of Beijing.
02:04The story is a famous one.
02:05famous one. Just a handful of pilots, all that lay between Britain and annihilation.
02:17It's part of our national legend. I want to show that it's more complex, that the real
02:29story is richer and even more extraordinary. I absolutely love places like this, cram full
02:37of jackets and guns and bits of old aircraft and, of course, the machines themselves. Even
02:43now, standing next to this real Spitfire still gives me quite a thrill. And I think it's
02:48that image of Spitfires and Hurricanes, of the few and of those huge battles over southern
02:52England in 1940, that encapsulates the Battle of Britain that I grew up with. But it's only
02:57one part of the story.
03:05This is the familiar story. Nazi Germany, a military colossus crushing all before it. Amateurish
03:13Britain on her knees, her army defeated. Hitler's forces, superbly trained, highly efficient.
03:27I don't want to debunk the Battle of Britain or dismiss the rousing words of Churchill.
03:31Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty. And so bear ourselves that if the British Empire
03:41and its Commonwealth lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, this was their finest hour.
03:55It may have been our finest hour, but it extends beyond the few.
04:03The problem is that the myth misses so much of the detail, detail that reveals a quite different story.
04:08The familiar picture is that by June 1940, Britain was isolated, with Nazi and fascist powers in control from the Arctic all the way to West Africa.
04:22But was Britain really alone?
04:28Even from the White Cliffs above Dover, the channel was a formidable obstacle.
04:32If you're a German and you're standing on the clifftops over there looking at the United Kingdom, then you forget that it's not just Britain that you're up against.
04:41It's the British Empire and all their friends, and you haven't got all the time in the world, you certainly don't have all the resources in the world to continue this fight.
04:50Peter Caddick-Adams is a historian from the Defence Academy at Shrivenham. He's always believed that Britain's position in 1940 was not nearly so hopeless as is generally thought.
05:03One of the criticisms we can make of Hitler is that in the First World War he served as a corporal, and he's a land man.
05:10He only thinks in terms of a land campaign, and even then only at the tactical level.
05:15So his view of fighting a world war is purely in his own mind in terms of the land battle at the tactical level.
05:24He knows and understands nothing about maritime warfare, and he understands very little about aerial warfare.
05:30He has advisers who will tell him, Goering, Raider, whoever the top generals are, they will tell him what he should be doing.
05:39And so when you come up against a campaign, the invasion of England, that requires a large maritime element, that requires an aerial battle, he's way out of his comfort zone.
05:49And often people who are uncomfortable with a decision that they have to make, that they have no personal expertise or experience of, they delay.
05:58They fritter while they sum up the options. And that's exactly what's happening in the summer of 1930.
06:05Saturday, July the 6th.
06:15After completing his stunning victory over France, Hitler paraded in triumph through Berlin.
06:21The soldiers were marching through the Brandenburg Gate and everyone was cheering. That was really something.
06:40There was this victorious mood and everybody got swept up in it.
06:43And when we turned on England, well, we thought, we can do this.
06:53Hitler had most of Europe at his feet. His power had never been greater.
07:03Surely, he told himself, Britain would now do the sensible thing and sue for peace.
07:11They came home victorious and we young girls could finally go dancing again.
07:18When the war started, dancing was prohibited. And I live for dancing.
07:23And while Britain anxiously feared an invasion, Germany had relaxed.
07:30Amidst jubilant scenes, total victory seemed just a formality.
07:42If anything, it's the German nation that needs to be keeping an eye on the clock because sooner or later they will run out of time with all the other grand ideas they've got.
07:52And they're in danger of a fleeting opportunity to cross the channel and go and defeat England. And then it will be gone.
07:59This wasn't the Germany famed for its efficiency. In fact, uncertainty was already compromising its effectiveness.
08:07Over here, the army may have been defeated, Europe may have fallen, but Britain still had crucial strengths.
08:17The Royal Navy was the biggest in the world, far eclipsing the size of the Kriegsmarine.
08:24Britain also controlled a third of the world's merchant shipping.
08:28And the contribution of the little ships did not stop at Dunkirk.
08:33In the summer of 1940, far from being weak and isolated, Britain was a marine superpower.
08:44For me, the Battle of Britain has always been about so much more than just RAF fighter command against the Luftwaffe.
08:50It's a giant clash of Great Britain against Germany, which involves a war on land, in the air and on sea.
08:57That's why I've come here to Portsmouth, to see Steve Prince, head of the Royal Navy's historical branch.
09:06You've got great national determination, particularly after Dunkirk, but that's also buttressed by the wider maritime-connected world
09:14that the Germans, as a land power, have great difficulty in understanding.
09:17So you have all the Commonwealth forces who are here, both in the RAF, obviously in the Battle of Britain,
09:22but in Canadian, Australian, New Zealand forces who are available for anti-invasion work.
09:27We think of the small ships as being involved at Dunkirk, but many of the ships, often many of the same vessels,
09:32are involved in this auxiliary patrol service, which is along the coast of the UK.
09:37And while fighter command are operating very largely by day, this patrol service are operating very largely by night.
09:43Yeah, and I love the idea of these fishing crews in converted trawlers turned into minesweepers,
09:49given a kind of a very small gun and a couple of machine guns, and off you go.
09:53It's amazing kind of ingenuity, isn't it? Just making it up on the spot a bit.
09:57Yes, it's an improvisation that relies on Britain's very large, at the time, seafaring community
10:03that's available and their willingness to serve.
10:12And there was more to the RAF than fighters.
10:15There were coastal and bomber commands.
10:18The traditional view is that the early efforts of bomber command were ineffective.
10:23The truth is that from as early as mid-May, they were already making daily strikes against Germany,
10:29hitting its navy, industry and airfields.
10:38My hometown, Kiel, was bombed in June 1940,
10:43and there were 40 or 60 people death as civilians.
10:51So we were prepared to do the same.
10:56The material impact of bomber command's efforts may have been slight,
11:00but the psychological impact, particularly on those in the Nazi high command, was considerable.
11:07Despite this, Hitler resisted calls to strike back at Britain's cities.
11:11For the time being, his principal aim was to cut off Britain's lifelines and starve her into submission.
11:21This was a period known as Canal Kampf, the fighting over the channel.
11:28By the middle of July, Luftwaffe attacks on British shipping were having an alarming effect.
11:33500,000 tonnes of vital supplies had been sunk.
11:38Hitler needed Britain out of the war, one way or the other.
11:42If his victories in Europe weren't enough to persuade Britain to the peace table,
11:46maybe the threat of starvation would.
11:48Hitler had retreated to the Berkhof, his house in Bavaria.
12:04He was already eyeing the invasion of Russia, but needed Britain out of the way first.
12:08And here he was receiving conflicting advice.
12:13Hermann Göring, the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, was optimistic.
12:18He promised Hitler that RAF could be destroyed in just four clear days, paving the way to invasion.
12:26But the Kriegsmarine, the German navy, was not so sure.
12:30It maintained the best way to win the war was by choking off the supply lines.
12:33And for this, the U-boat was ideally suited.
12:38Before the war, Germany had planned to build a vast navy to include over 230 U-boats.
12:44But this had been fantasy.
12:46In the summer of 1940, no more than 14 were ever operational.
12:54These alone were destroying vast amounts of shipping.
12:58Had they had 100, or even 50, Hitler might well have prevailed.
13:03There was a gulf between German plans and what could be realistically achieved.
13:17In Germany, production was stalling.
13:24Hermann Göring was in charge of both the Luftwaffe and the German economy.
13:27Just as Churchill had put Beaverbrook in charge of airplane production, so Göring turned to his friend, the former ace and famous stunt pilot, Ernst Udet.
13:38Udet poured all his resources into the development of new dive bombers, which had already revealed fatal shortcomings over Dunkirk.
13:46Meanwhile, other areas of aircraft production were neglected.
13:56July 1940 was the most productive month all year for single-seater fighters.
14:01Just 237 were built.
14:03The German effort contrasted with the 496 British fighters produced in the same period, more than double.
14:12It was a ratio that would not improve for the Luftwaffe.
14:15This failure to deploy their technological genius in a coherent plan would have even more dramatic results in a crucial scientific development.
14:32Radar.
14:33Today, not much remains of the coast-long radar chain that once protected Britain.
14:41Just two out of six towers here at Dover.
14:47Despite the legend, it's not true that radar was a British invention.
14:54German radar technology was years ahead.
14:57When the Germans examined a captured mobile British set, they laughed at its primitive simplicity.
15:05Yet radar was vital to Britain's defence.
15:10Astonishingly, there was no radar whatsoever helping the Luftwaffe as they prepared to attack.
15:18When the Germans compared these huge static towers with their own smaller 360-degree rotating radars,
15:24they felt convinced they could only be of limited effectiveness.
15:28What the Germans completely failed to understand was that not only were these towers Britain's eyes out across the channel,
15:34they were also just one part of Dowding's air defence system.
15:39Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, Commander-in-Chief of RAF Fighter Command,
15:44had worked tirelessly not only to build up his early warning and deployment system,
15:49but had also fought hard to preserve and strengthen his fighter forces.
15:55British technology may not have been the best in the world,
15:59but unlike the Germans, Dowding managed to harness the best of the resources available to him.
16:10Hostile raid, sir.
16:13The net result was that his fighter force was able to intercept enemy aircraft with unprecedented speed and accuracy.
16:19Douding's system can still be best understood by looking at the surviving operations room at RAF Axbridge.
16:38In 1940, the headquarters of Fighter Command's 11 group.
16:42The system had a number of different cogs. The radar chain, the 30,000-strong observer core, the GPO's telephone and teleprinter service, and of course the pilots themselves.
17:04Its genius lay in its ability to quickly bring all this information together at Fighter Command headquarters, then equally rapidly feed it back out again to the various operations rooms,
17:15which, like this one at Uxbridge, were almost exactly the same at every level of the chain.
17:20Throughout July, as German raids built up across the channel, Dowding was able to iron out glitches in the system.
17:30The size and direction of Luftwaffe formations were carefully monitored with detail being added as more information poured in.
17:37What we have here is a graphic representation of a rapidly unfolding situation, which enabled any of the controllers to see with a single sweep of the eye exactly what was going on.
17:48In other words, coordination and standardisation were the key.
17:53What Dowding had created was the world's first ever fully coordinated air defence system, and the Germans had nothing like it. Nothing like it at all.
18:01The Channel, mid-July. Despite continued attacks on shipping and coastal targets, the air fighting had been comparatively light.
18:16In the whole month, both sides would lose fewer aircraft than they had over Dunkirk.
18:24The real battle was yet to begin.
18:31On the 16th of July from the Berghof, Hitler issued Führer Directive Number 16, preparations for a landing against England.
18:41Codename, Sea Lion.
18:46Three days later, he made a final peace offer which he hoped Britain could not refuse.
18:53Churchill refused.
18:56The stage was set for the biggest air battle in history.
18:59It would be a battle of modern combat aircraft and the young men who flew them.
19:10In Germany and Britain, these men and machines were the source of intense pride.
19:14On both sides, the airmen were seen as young, handsome and brave, a romantic expression of the national ideal.
19:27For some of those still alive, the memories remain vividly clear.
19:30Hans Eckhart Bobb is one of the last survivors.
19:37In 1940, he was a pilot with the fighter group JG 54, based at Gein, near Calais.
19:43Today, he is 93, and incredibly still flying.
19:59The plane he's strapping himself into is a Messerschmitt 108, a contemporary of the one he flew in the Battle of Britain.
20:05Last time he was flying over this airfield at North Weald was at the battle's height.
20:18Last time he was on the first flight.
20:36My mother told me once, that when I was five I said,
20:38My mother told me once that when I was five, I said,
20:43I want to be a pilot.
20:45With my right hand, I will fly the plane,
20:48and with my left hand, I will catch eagles.
20:57In 1940, the situation was still very positive for the Germans.
21:02We were certain of victory.
21:04Spirits were high.
21:08It's clear that because we already had experience from previous missions,
21:16we probably had an advantage over the British at the time,
21:19because we already had Poland and France under our belts.
21:24The British, rather, were just getting started.
21:27That's the way it was.
21:38Now I want to see a British ace, one of the few.
21:52Well, this is where Billy Drake lives.
21:55Group Captain Drake, as I should call him,
21:57is one of the toughest fighter leaders we ever produced.
22:00He had an extraordinary career,
22:04one that began with clock-covered biplanes before the war
22:07and ended on fast jets.
22:09Imagine having a career like that.
22:16Billy remembers when the RAF were still flying
22:18the feebly armed Hawker Fury biplanes
22:20and attending a top-secret briefing about the latest German fighter,
22:25the Messerschmitt 109.
22:27It was a very frightening lecture
22:29because we were told all about the 109s
22:33and there we were with the Furies.
22:36And we said,
22:37well, if we can't shoot them down, what do we do?
22:39He said,
22:40you'll have to ram them, old boy.
22:42And that was his statement.
22:45Luckily, we got the Hurricanes in time.
22:47By the beginning of August,
22:49Britain had had two months
22:50in which to recover from the humiliation at Dunkirk.
22:53Over there, across the water,
22:54the French coast was now full of newly completed airfields,
22:57all crammed with aircraft.
22:59The mood amongst the Luftwaffe was buoyant.
23:02Confidence was high.
23:03While Britain waited for the inevitable onslaught,
23:06all Göring believed he needed
23:07was just four good days of clear weather.
23:17According to the weather forecasts,
23:23a ridge of high pressure was moving in
23:25from the 12th of August.
23:38Preliminary raids were sent over
23:40to destroy the British radar chain
23:41and attack ports along the south coast.
23:4310 o'clock, we heard this noise
23:56and my brother said,
23:58what is that?
23:59So we went out
24:00and it was covered with planes upstairs
24:04in the sky, black.
24:06And I thought, oh dear,
24:08something wrong here.
24:09So we went into the shelter,
24:11we heard all the bombing
24:12and all the machine guns.
24:25I saw the parachutists coming down in flames
24:29because they were hit
24:31and then it eased off.
24:33So when we came out of the house
24:35to see what had happened midday,
24:38all along Mortimer Road where we lived
24:41was bullets
24:42and the cartridge cases
24:44and the shrapnel.
24:46So we run down the road
24:48and they came back.
24:50So of course we ran like mad
24:52back to the shelter,
24:53terrified.
24:54I thought it was our last day on Earth.
24:56The all-out attack on Britain
25:02had begun.
25:07Tom Neill had just celebrated
25:08his 20th birthday
25:10and was a fighter pilot
25:11throughout the battle.
25:13From control,
25:14you will learn
25:15there are 30 enemy
25:17forming up over France,
25:1960, 90, 100,
25:21150, 250,
25:23400,
25:24oh my God,
25:25400,
25:26and there's only 12 of us.
25:27That sort of attitude.
25:29That was the time
25:30when you really felt apprehensive.
25:32But once you're airborne,
25:33no problem.
25:39The operation against the RAF
25:41was codenamed
25:42Adler-Angrif,
25:43the attack of the Eagles.
25:47In the five days following its launch,
25:50Fighter Command lost 118 aircraft.
25:54But the Luftwaffe lost more.
26:00251.
26:09Sunday the 18th of August
26:10became known as the hardest day
26:12as both sides threw all they had
26:14into an increasingly ferocious air battle.
26:18According to Goering's pre-battle plan,
26:20he should have already cleared
26:21the skies of British planes,
26:23and yet the RAF
26:24was still meeting
26:25every single raid
26:26the Luftwaffe sent over.
26:28Both nations
26:29had placed great faith
26:30in their fighter aircraft.
26:31But which was the best?
26:33The German pilots
26:37who survived being shot down
26:39were hastily taken into custody.
26:44Before being taken to prison camp,
26:46they were sent to Trent Park
26:48in North London,
26:48where their conversations
26:50were secretly bugged
26:51by Dennis Felkin
26:52and his team
26:53in air intelligence.
26:56It was immediately apparent
26:58that the German airmen
26:59felt their aircraft
27:00gave them the upper hand.
27:03The 109 is superior
27:04to the Spitfire
27:05if it has a pilot
27:06who knows how to fly it well.
27:08It is incomprehensible
27:12how frightened
27:12many airmen are
27:13of the Spitfire.
27:17I'd always prefer
27:19a 109 to the Spitfire.
27:20You have to fly
27:21long wide curves
27:22and the Spitfire
27:23can't keep up.
27:30Not a surprising judgment
27:31from the German pilots,
27:33but there were English airmen
27:36who agreed about the 109.
27:38It was a small airplane
27:40with a very weighty engine
27:41and it could dive very quickly
27:44and it would escape very quickly.
27:47So the tactics
27:48were largely determined by them
27:51and time and time again
27:53we used to watch them coming
27:54but there was nothing
27:55we could do about it
27:56and they would dive away
27:57quite freely
27:59without us being able
28:00to catch them.
28:01In the Spitfire,
28:02I always felt that
28:04given 10 seconds
28:05to work up a bit of speed,
28:07you could cope with them
28:08but initially
28:09the 109 was a more
28:11effective fighter.
28:15The Messerschmitt 109
28:16was acknowledged
28:17to be a trickier machine
28:18to handle
28:19but once mastered
28:20it had a number
28:22of key advantages.
28:23Hans-Eckhardt-Bopp
28:26had been flying
28:27the 109
28:27since 1938.
28:35Personally,
28:36I was always able
28:37to outmaneuver
28:37the Spitfire.
28:39That means in dogfights
28:41I was able
28:41to get behind
28:42the Spitfire
28:43and get into
28:44the firing position.
28:45We were of course
28:53convinced that
28:54the Me 109E
28:55was the best plane
28:56to be used
28:57in missions
28:57at the time.
29:03The argument
29:04over who had
29:05the best aircraft
29:05has been raging
29:06ever since the battle.
29:11I want to resolve
29:12this once and for all.
29:13Now this is the real thing.
29:16A Messerschmitt 109E
29:18as flown
29:18in the Battle of Britain.
29:20There's only two
29:21proper Messerschmitts
29:22flying in the world today
29:23and this when it's finished
29:24will be the third.
29:25All the others
29:26you can see
29:26are post-war
29:281950s
29:29Spanish-built Bouchons.
29:30Not the same thing at all
29:32but this
29:33is the real McCoy.
29:37One key difference
29:38lay in the engines.
29:43Our engines
29:44had carburettors
29:46whereas the Germans
29:47always had
29:48direct injection
29:50which we have
29:50in our cars nowadays.
29:52In a carburettor
29:53it all depends
29:54on a little chamber
29:54in the carburettor
29:55and a float
29:56that goes up and down
29:57and when the demands
29:59of the engine
29:59are such
30:00the float goes up
30:01and more fuel
30:02is allowed
30:03in the engine.
30:04In an aircraft
30:04when you push
30:06the nose down
30:07the float flies
30:07to the top
30:08of the cylinder
30:09you get the fuel
30:10whether you like it
30:11or not
30:11and the engine stops.
30:13Now
30:13masses of black smoke
30:15used to come out
30:16of the exhaust
30:17and the engine
30:18would stop
30:18for as long
30:19as you kept
30:20on negative G
30:21which could be
30:22up to two, three,
30:23four, five seconds
30:24by which time
30:25of course
30:25your enemy
30:26has escaped.
30:27He was halfway
30:28home to France.
30:29And in a dogfight
30:36there was another
30:37equally vital factor.
30:40The enormous advantage
30:41of the 109
30:42for low-flying attacks
30:43is the terrific power
30:44of its armament.
30:45You make one attack
30:46and it does
30:47an enormous amount
30:48of damage.
30:51The British pilots
30:52couldn't feel so confident
30:53in their firepower.
30:56In a Spitfire Hurricane
30:58you had
30:5914.7 seconds
31:02of fire
31:03of really
31:04pea shooter
31:05ammunition.
31:08And the 109
31:09had 55 seconds
31:11of machine gun fire
31:12nearly four times
31:13as long.
31:17You can argue
31:18all you like
31:18about manoeuvrability
31:19and performance
31:20but I think
31:20it really boils down
31:22to this
31:22firepower.
31:24Now Spitfires
31:24and Hurricanes
31:25were armed
31:26with .303 Browning
31:27machine guns
31:27which fired these.
31:28This is the bit
31:29that actually hits
31:30the enemy plane.
31:30As you can see
31:31it's pretty small.
31:32And here we've got
31:32a bit of German fuselage
31:34from a 109
31:34that was hit
31:35during the Battle of Britain
31:35and repaired.
31:37And as you can see
31:37here's the hole.
31:38Pretty neat
31:39and not an awful lot
31:40of damage.
31:41So we've got that.
31:42Germans also have
31:43machine guns
31:44but in addition
31:45they've got
31:4620mm cannon shells.
31:48Now this is
31:48a high explosive
31:49cannon shell
31:50so it hits the aircraft
31:51and then explodes.
31:53They also had
31:54armor piercing shells.
31:56Now if you put
31:57this together
31:58with a .303
31:59there's absolutely
32:01no comparison
32:02at all.
32:03And if I was flying
32:04in the Battle of Britain
32:04I know which I'd
32:05rather have
32:06cannons.
32:10For me
32:10there is no doubt
32:11that the Messerschmitt
32:12109
32:13was the better
32:13plane
32:14in 1940.
32:1655 seconds
32:17of firepower
32:18was a colossal edge
32:19and that was
32:20on top
32:21of its other
32:21advantages.
32:25Tom Neill
32:26faced the 109
32:27in combat.
32:29The 109
32:30had the supreme
32:31ability
32:32to catch us
32:33whenever they wanted
32:34to get away
32:35whenever they wanted
32:36and to knock us
32:37down whenever they
32:38want
32:38because they had
32:39big 20mm cannons
32:40we had
32:41P-shooters
32:42by comparison
32:42and they could
32:43knock us down
32:44with three shots.
32:49The Me 109E
33:01might have been
33:01the better aircraft
33:02but it was being
33:03forced to operate
33:04at a number
33:04of disadvantages.
33:06The first
33:06was fuel.
33:07Flying over
33:08from France
33:09they had only
33:09around 10 minutes
33:10in the combat zone
33:11before they had
33:12to head for home.
33:13If they didn't
33:14they risked
33:14ending up
33:15in the channel
33:15and whilst it
33:16might only look
33:17like a narrow river
33:18from the air
33:19the reality
33:20of being a lone
33:21airman lost
33:21adrift in that
33:22vast expanse
33:23at sea level
33:24held true
33:25terrors for the
33:25German pilots.
33:27The second
33:27disadvantage
33:28was tactical.
33:29Preventing its
33:30pilots from
33:31fulfilling its
33:31basic design
33:32function was
33:33unthinkably
33:34unimaginably
33:35stupid.
33:39Despite earlier
33:40insisting the
33:41109s operate
33:42freely to make
33:43the most of
33:43their advantages
33:44Goering then
33:46reversed the
33:47order demanding
33:48his fighters
33:48escort the
33:49dive bombers
33:50at all times.
33:59The 109
34:00was designed
34:00to fly at speed
34:01not so slowly.
34:04Its pilots
34:05were struggling
34:06to keep it
34:06airborne.
34:10When that order
34:13came from Goering
34:14it caused a huge
34:15stir, we fighter
34:17pilots were furious.
34:21We were shocked
34:22that a commander
34:23in chief could
34:24issue such a
34:24ridiculous order
34:25as that.
34:33We fighters
34:33hated flying in
34:34direct escort.
34:36No one wanted to
34:37do it because you
34:37were helpless.
34:38you flew next to
34:40the bombers in
34:40normal formation.
34:44You couldn't
34:44defend yourself
34:45or attack or
34:46anything.
34:46You could do
34:47nothing.
34:51You just stayed
34:52still until you
34:53were shot down.
34:54That was what it
34:55amounted to.
34:55until you were shot
34:57until you were shot
34:57in etwa.
35:09Because the 109s
35:11couldn't operate so
35:11effectively at such
35:12low speeds, they were
35:14less able to protect
35:15the Stukas, which were
35:16now decimated.
35:17on the 25th of August,
35:26the Stukas were
35:27withdrawn from the
35:28battle for good.
35:32The most lauded part
35:34of the German bomber
35:35force was gone.
35:38And the channel
35:39wasn't getting any
35:39smaller.
35:40The war took a
35:47sinister turn on the
35:48night of Sunday,
35:49the 25th of August,
35:50when, on Churchill's
35:51insistence, around 50
35:53RAF bombers set off
35:54to attack Berlin.
35:56The night before,
35:58German bombers had
35:59mistakenly dropped
36:00bombs on London,
36:01something Hitler had
36:02forbidden.
36:03There was a building
36:13next to the commuter
36:14line in Charlottenburg
36:15and it was destroyed
36:16and everybody came
36:17and stared at it,
36:18like some sort of
36:19miracle.
36:21Everybody went there
36:22and looked at it to
36:23see what a destroyed
36:24building looks like.
36:26Hermann Göring said,
36:27you can call me
36:28Meyer if a plane ever
36:29drops bombs on Germany.
36:30Well, his name was
36:33Meyer real quick,
36:35wasn't it?
36:39The British
36:40Omerkoman had already
36:43begun to bomb Germany
36:45six times in
36:46August 1940.
36:49There was no real
36:51cause to do that,
36:53to go to Berlin.
36:56We were very
36:59enraged to do that.
37:00to do the same
37:01to London.
37:07Incensed,
37:08Hitler ordered
37:08retaliatory attacks
37:09on London,
37:10as the British
37:11government knew
37:12he must.
37:17For some,
37:18this change of
37:19tactics,
37:19from attacking
37:20airfields to
37:21British cities,
37:22was the decisive
37:23moment in the battle.
37:25The best general
37:26we ever had
37:27was Hitler himself.
37:28He suddenly stopped
37:29the destruction
37:31of our airfields.
37:37He lost his temper
37:39and said to Göring,
37:41send all the bombers
37:43to London
37:43and teach them a lesson.
37:46That probably
37:47made the Battle of Britain
37:49a success on our part.
37:51If the Luftwaffe's
37:55core aim
37:56was to destroy
37:56the RAF
37:57in advance
37:57of an invasion,
37:59it's hard to see
38:00how they would
38:00achieve it
38:01by bombing London.
38:03But I'm not convinced
38:05the bombing of airfields
38:06had been that successful
38:07anyway.
38:10This is Manston
38:11in Kent,
38:11one of Fighter Command's
38:12front-line airfields
38:13in 1940.
38:15During the Battle of Britain,
38:16it was attacked
38:17numerous times,
38:18as were other airfields
38:19in southern England.
38:20We've always been told
38:21that by the beginning
38:22of September,
38:23Fighter Command
38:23was on its knees.
38:25It isn't true.
38:26Of all the RAF's airfields,
38:28this was the only one
38:29to be knocked out
38:30for more than one day.
38:31And this is the point.
38:32To destroy
38:33a large grass airfield
38:34took an awful lot
38:35more bombs
38:36than the Luftwaffe
38:36were dropping on them.
38:38The truth is
38:39that although the skies
38:40were thick
38:40with enemy aircraft
38:41and although the rising
38:43number of pilot casualties
38:44was causing concern
38:45for Dowdingham Park,
38:47when the Luftwaffe
38:47turned on London,
38:49the RAF was still
38:50a long way
38:50from defeat.
38:58Air Minister,
38:59communicate.
39:00The biggest bag yet.
39:03End of message.
39:04Both sides
39:04greatly exaggerated claims
39:06of aircraft shot down.
39:08Neither side, however,
39:09had a clear idea
39:10of exactly what was happening.
39:15One person uniquely qualified
39:17to examine
39:18the intelligence failings
39:19on both sides
39:20is Sebastian Cox,
39:21the RAF's official historian.
39:24The RAF
39:25grossly overestimates
39:27the strength
39:28of the Luftwaffe,
39:29but the Luftwaffe,
39:30not only do they
39:31overestimate
39:32the number of planes
39:33they shoot down,
39:34but they seriously
39:36underestimate
39:37the capacity
39:38of the RAF
39:39to replace planes
39:40that they have lost.
39:42And that has
39:42a serious effect
39:43on the way
39:44the Germans
39:45fight the battle.
39:48Both sides
39:49had a problem
39:49because they assumed
39:51the basic military unit
39:52of planes
39:53was the same
39:54in each air force.
39:56But in the RAF,
39:57the fighter squadron
39:58was about 20 planes.
39:59In the Luftwaffe,
40:02the Stapfel
40:03was only roughly
40:0412 planes.
40:06The RAF
40:08don't correctly
40:09understand
40:11the structure
40:12of the German units,
40:13and they think
40:14that there are
40:15more German aeroplanes
40:17in each of these units
40:18than is actually the case.
40:21And so the simple arithmetic
40:22of multiplying
40:23the number of units
40:24by the wrong number
40:25of aeroplanes
40:26gives them
40:27an excessive strength
40:29for the Luftwaffe.
40:31Because of this
40:32simple mistake alone,
40:33the RAF
40:34thought the Luftwaffe
40:35was 50% bigger
40:36than it actually was.
40:41At the same time,
40:42the Luftwaffe
40:43thought the RAF
40:44was smaller
40:45than it really was.
40:48Presumably,
40:49overestimating
40:49the strength
40:50of your enemy
40:50is probably
40:51no bad thing,
40:52but it's a serious problem
40:54if you underestimate it,
40:54isn't it?
40:55If you are
40:56on the defensive
40:56and you
40:58overestimate
40:59the strength
40:59of the enemy
41:00who's going
41:00to attack you,
41:01that's not necessarily
41:03going to be disastrous.
41:05Whereas if you're
41:06on the offensive
41:07and you underestimate
41:09the defensive strength
41:10of the enemy,
41:11that can lead you
41:12into serious difficulties,
41:14which is exactly
41:14what happens
41:15with the Luftwaffe.
41:21By the beginning
41:22of September,
41:23Luftwaffe pilots
41:24were showing signs
41:25of strain.
41:36Judging from
41:36what Beck
41:37is saying
41:37in this diary,
41:38the Luftwaffe
41:39thinks are pretty bad.
41:40For example,
41:41he talks on the 2nd
41:42of September,
41:43he says,
41:44we can almost
41:44never surprise them
41:45and this is why
41:46he feels he's never,
41:47fighting from Normandy,
41:49he's never going
41:49to get the kind
41:50of scores
41:50that some
41:51of these other pilots
41:51are now amassing
41:52on the Luftwaffe.
41:53He says,
41:54because he can never
41:54surprise them,
41:55they're always higher
41:56than him.
41:58I mean,
41:58we're always taught
41:59that beware of the Hun
42:00in the sun,
42:01but from Beck's diary,
42:03it's clear that you have
42:04to beware the Spitfire
42:04in the sun.
42:12If we began in July,
42:15we had losses
42:16from 50% or so
42:18and this was,
42:21of course,
42:22a very, very hard job
42:24and we were not
42:26very enthusiastic
42:29about it.
42:38I'm afraid
42:39that our fighter escorts
42:39are considerably weakened.
42:41You notice that now.
42:42I know a staffel
42:47which has only
42:48two aircraft left.
42:54Once,
42:55for a whole week,
42:56we always reported
42:57number of aircraft
42:58fit for service,
42:59nil.
43:04By the 7th of September,
43:05the Luftwaffe
43:06had lost 721 aircraft
43:08since the attack
43:09had been launched.
43:10Fighter command,
43:11405.
43:15But the real difference
43:16was that the RAF
43:17was replacing its losses.
43:20One of the important points
43:22which is very seldom mentioned
43:24is the efficiency
43:26of our organisation
43:27which provided aircraft
43:30when we lost them
43:32and time and time again
43:34if we flew for three,
43:35four times a day,
43:36we'd be down to
43:37five aircraft
43:39out of 18
43:40and suddenly,
43:42miraculously,
43:42by lunchtime
43:43the following day,
43:44we were at full strength again.
43:46Where they came from,
43:47nobody knows.
43:48They just appeared.
43:50Billy Drake
43:51had been shot down
43:52back in May
43:52and after a spell
43:54as an instructor
43:54training new pilots,
43:56he returned
43:56to the front line.
43:58When you became
43:59operational again,
44:00can you recall
44:00there ever being
44:01a shortage of aircraft?
44:02aircraft?
44:04No.
44:06No.
44:10It was replacing pilots
44:12that was more of a worry,
44:13but Keefe Park
44:14now came up
44:15with a brilliant solution.
44:20Exhausted squadrons
44:21were rotated
44:22to regain strength
44:23while new pilots
44:25were allowed
44:25to gain flying experience
44:27away from the front line.
44:28Because of the flexibility
44:30of Dowding's system,
44:32this could be
44:32implemented immediately.
44:34It was simple,
44:35effective,
44:36saved lives
44:37and gave Britain
44:38an invaluable advantage.
44:41Billy Drake
44:41appreciated the effectiveness
44:43of Park's ideas.
44:44Those responsible
44:47for assessing
44:48the operation capability
44:49said,
44:50these squadrons
44:51are not capable
44:52of being accepted
44:56as operational
44:57and therefore
44:58will send them up north
44:59away from the main theatre
45:02above to recoup.
45:06Once again,
45:07the Germans
45:07had no comparable system.
45:10Experienced pilots
45:11flew on and on.
45:13New ones
45:13were flung straight
45:14into the battle.
45:17By mid-September,
45:19Dowding's defences
45:20were holding firm.
45:22Around Britain's coast,
45:24more than 1,000 ships
45:25patrolled her waters
45:26and convoys
45:28were getting through.
45:30Britain was
45:31as strong as ever.
45:35The operations room
45:36here at Uxbridge
45:37has been set up
45:37to represent
45:38the situation
45:39as it was
45:39on 15th September 1940
45:41and it's absolutely
45:42full of information
45:43about the state
45:44of the squadrons.
45:46Now, over here,
45:47we have the big
45:48in-hill sector
45:48and there were
45:49three single-engine
45:50fighter squadrons,
45:5192, 72 and 66.
45:54Now, what Park and Dowding
45:55were looking for
45:56was to have 12
45:57operational aircraft
45:58on any one given day
45:59and then roughly
46:00double the amount
46:01of pilots
46:01as a cushion.
46:02So, what we've got here
46:04is P for pilots
46:05and 92 squadron
46:06and A for aircraft,
46:0719 and 12.
46:09And then in 72 squadron,
46:10we've got 20 pilots
46:12and 11 aircraft,
46:1366 squadron,
46:1519 pilots
46:16and 10 aircraft.
46:17They've got plenty
46:18of pilots
46:19and only 66 squadron
46:21is really seriously
46:22understrength
46:22in any way.
46:24In other words,
46:24the situation
46:25is pretty healthy.
46:26The contrast
46:27with across the channel
46:28with the Luftwaffe's
46:29fighter situation
46:30could not have been greater.
46:32Not that Goering
46:34understood this.
46:35Armed with increasingly
46:36fantastical intelligence reports,
46:38he believed the RAF
46:39was now all but destroyed.
46:42All that was needed,
46:43he reassured Hitler,
46:44was one final push.
46:50On Sunday,
46:52the 15th of September,
46:53a huge air battle
46:54took place.
47:02Although much smaller
47:09than originally claimed,
47:10the toll was still high.
47:12The Germans lost 61 aircraft
47:14and 93 men.
47:17For the British,
47:18it was 31 and 16.
47:22But far more important
47:23than the figures
47:24was the fact
47:25that Luftwaffe
47:25was as far away
47:26from beating the RAF
47:28as ever.
47:32Yet some German pilots
47:34still thought
47:34the invasion was imminent.
47:36It's quite interesting,
47:37but Siegfried Becker
47:38doesn't make an entry
47:39on the 15th of September,
47:411940,
47:41the day we've come to know
47:42as the Battle of Britain day.
47:44But he does put an entry
47:45in on the 16th,
47:46the next day.
47:48And in which,
47:48funny enough,
47:49he still thinks
47:50the invasion's a goer.
47:51So he talks about
47:52when it might happen
47:53and he reckons
47:54it's going to happen
47:54in the next few weeks
47:55and certainly
47:56within the next month.
47:57And the reason
47:57he thinks that
47:58is because his squadron
48:00has just,
48:01his staffel
48:01has just been recently
48:02placed up in the
48:03Padakale
48:04and he's flown over
48:05and seen all
48:06the invasion barges.
48:09It's true
48:10that by mid-September
48:11the barges were ready.
48:15Hitler's invasion plans
48:16were complete.
48:19The army was ready,
48:21so too the Navy.
48:23But the Germans
48:24still hadn't beaten
48:25the RAF.
48:29From the start,
48:30they knew that
48:30without air superiority,
48:32the plan would be doomed.
48:35Today,
48:36we can piece together
48:37the events of that
48:38world-changing summer
48:39in a way that those
48:40who lived through it
48:41never could.
48:42We now know
48:43that the battle
48:43was fought
48:43on a much broader front,
48:45that beyond the few
48:46were the men
48:47of Bomber Command
48:47and the rest of the RAF
48:49and the full weight
48:50of a great maritime nation.
48:52This, combined with
48:53Dowding's ingenious
48:54defence system
48:55and plentiful aircraft,
48:56ensured that Britain
48:57was a far stronger enemy
48:59than Germany
48:59had ever expected.
49:01And it was, of course,
49:02also a battle
49:03of two sides,
49:03not one.
49:05The result was
49:05as much to do
49:06with German failings
49:07as it was
49:08Britain's achievements.
49:11If anyone
49:12had been amateurish,
49:13it was the Germans.
49:14Hitler knew
49:20that time
49:20was now running out.
49:22The Luftwaffe
49:23had failed.
49:25The captured pilots
49:26at Trent Park
49:27were coming
49:28to the same conclusion.
49:30If they don't come
49:31in three weeks,
49:32then they'll not be
49:33coming across this year.
49:36Either the landing
49:37will come very soon
49:38in this good weather
49:39or will probably
49:40not come at all.
49:41They simply must
49:44start the attack
49:45this winter
49:45or we'll have
49:46no fighters left.
49:48We have missed
49:50the best moment
49:50for the invasion.
49:55September moved
49:56into October
49:56and summer
49:57turned to autumn.
50:01Just a few months
50:02earlier,
50:03victory had seemed
50:04inevitable
50:04and Hitler
50:05had had the world
50:06in his grasp.
50:08Now it was
50:08slipping away.
50:09On the 12th of October,
50:12he postponed
50:12the invasion indefinitely,
50:14effectively ending
50:15the battle.
50:17Britain had won.
50:22When you really look
50:23at the complexity
50:24and detail
50:24of the real story,
50:26it becomes even more
50:27dramatic and exciting
50:28than the one
50:28we've all grown up with.
50:31Hitler's plans
50:32now lay in tatters.
50:34Britain's victory
50:35ensured the war
50:36would continue.
50:36While there was relief
50:40that her sovereignty
50:40had been saved,
50:42the celebrations
50:42would have to wait.
50:45But the genesis
50:45of victory
50:46that came five
50:47long years later
50:48can be found
50:49in the summer
50:50of 1940
50:50in the Battle
50:52of Britain.
50:52Paris
50:54in the Battle
50:55of Northern
51:20You
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