- 5个月前
9·11真相背后：一场持续24年的追问
你还记得2001年9月11日那一天吗？那一刻，世界仿佛停滞了。恐怖袭击让无数家庭失去了亲人，也让美国社会陷入了漫长的创伤与反思。可你有没有想过，官方公布的9·11故事，真的就是全部真相吗？为什么那么多年过去，仍有无数疑问在民间流传？今天，我们就来聊聊那些被官方掩盖的谜团，以及背后错综复杂的权力博弈。
官方故事：谁在掌控叙事？
自9·11事件发生以来，政治人物、情报机构、媒体不断向公众灌输一个“标准答案”：一群与基地组织有关的恐怖分子策划并实施了袭击。然而，任何质疑这一说法的人都会被贴上“阴谋论者”的标签，甚至被边缘化。可在这24年里，越来越多的调查、证词和解密文件逐渐揭示出，事件背后的故事远比我们想象的复杂。
情报机构的“信息黑洞”：CIA与FBI的较量
你知道吗？就在袭击前，CIA其实早已掌握了部分恐怖分子的行踪，却迟迟没有告知FBI。比如，策划者之一Al-Hazmi和Al-Midhar，公开用真名在美国生活了一年多，甚至住在FBI线人的家里，但FBI却始终未能掌握他们的真实身份。更令人震惊的是，CIA曾试图通过“招募”恐怖分子为线人，甚至利用沙特情报人员作为“代理”，以规避国内法律限制。
这就像两支球队在打球——FBI打的是“人盯人”，而CIA却在玩“区域防守”，结果导致信息断层，最终酿成悲剧。
沙特情报的“影子角色”：谁在幕后操控？
Al-Hazmi和Al-Midhar刚到美国时，遇到了沙特情报人员Omar al-Bayoumi。他不仅帮他们找房子、办银行卡，还介绍给当地激进分子。更诡异的是，英国警方后来在al-Bayoumi家中发现了飞机图纸和飞行计算公式，但这些线索从未被9·11调查委员会正式采纳。沙特政府通过秘密资金支持这些人的生活，而这些钱的来源，竟然与沙特驻美大使夫人有关。
如果把整个情报体系比作一张蜘蛛网，沙特情报就是那只隐藏在暗处的蜘蛛，悄悄牵动着每一根丝线。
信息时代的“落后”：技术滞后导致真相延误
你或许会觉得不可思议，2001年时FBI内部没有完善的电子邮件系统，绝大多数案件文件都未电子化，甚至没有扫描仪。调查人员只能靠快递寄照片，信息传递效率极低。正是这些技术短板，让关键线索在袭击前未能及时汇总，错失了阻止悲剧的最后机会。
这就像一场赛车，别人都开上了高速公路，而FBI还在用马车赶路。
真相被遮蔽：官方报告的“掩盖与删减”
9·11事件后，国会成立了调查委员会，但关键的28页内容——涉及恐怖分子在南加州的活动和沙特政府的关联——被全部涂黑。委员会负责人甚至与白宫达成协议，限制调查人员获取真实档案。最终，许多重要发现被埋在脚注里，官方报告变成了一个“精心包装的故事”，而不是揭示真相的工具。
这不禁让人联想到童话故事里的“魔镜”，只反映出权力想让你看到的那一面。
总结与思考：我们该相信谁？
9·11的官方叙述，真的就是全部吗？情报机构的内斗、沙特的暗中支持、技术的滞后、政府的刻意遮掩……每一个细节都像拼图的一角，等待我们去还原完整的画面。或许，真正的真相远比阴谋论更加离奇，也更加令人唏嘘。
你怎么看待9·11背后的这些秘密？你相信政府的说法，还是愿意聆听更多不同的声音？欢迎在评论区留下你的观点，和大家一起探讨。
來源: https://rumble.com/c/TuckerCarlson?e9s=src_v1_cbl
你还记得2001年9月11日那一天吗？那一刻，世界仿佛停滞了。恐怖袭击让无数家庭失去了亲人，也让美国社会陷入了漫长的创伤与反思。可你有没有想过，官方公布的9·11故事，真的就是全部真相吗？为什么那么多年过去，仍有无数疑问在民间流传？今天，我们就来聊聊那些被官方掩盖的谜团，以及背后错综复杂的权力博弈。
官方故事：谁在掌控叙事？
自9·11事件发生以来，政治人物、情报机构、媒体不断向公众灌输一个“标准答案”：一群与基地组织有关的恐怖分子策划并实施了袭击。然而，任何质疑这一说法的人都会被贴上“阴谋论者”的标签，甚至被边缘化。可在这24年里，越来越多的调查、证词和解密文件逐渐揭示出，事件背后的故事远比我们想象的复杂。
情报机构的“信息黑洞”：CIA与FBI的较量
你知道吗？就在袭击前，CIA其实早已掌握了部分恐怖分子的行踪，却迟迟没有告知FBI。比如，策划者之一Al-Hazmi和Al-Midhar，公开用真名在美国生活了一年多，甚至住在FBI线人的家里，但FBI却始终未能掌握他们的真实身份。更令人震惊的是，CIA曾试图通过“招募”恐怖分子为线人，甚至利用沙特情报人员作为“代理”，以规避国内法律限制。
这就像两支球队在打球——FBI打的是“人盯人”，而CIA却在玩“区域防守”，结果导致信息断层，最终酿成悲剧。
沙特情报的“影子角色”：谁在幕后操控？
Al-Hazmi和Al-Midhar刚到美国时，遇到了沙特情报人员Omar al-Bayoumi。他不仅帮他们找房子、办银行卡，还介绍给当地激进分子。更诡异的是，英国警方后来在al-Bayoumi家中发现了飞机图纸和飞行计算公式，但这些线索从未被9·11调查委员会正式采纳。沙特政府通过秘密资金支持这些人的生活，而这些钱的来源，竟然与沙特驻美大使夫人有关。
如果把整个情报体系比作一张蜘蛛网，沙特情报就是那只隐藏在暗处的蜘蛛，悄悄牵动着每一根丝线。
信息时代的“落后”：技术滞后导致真相延误
你或许会觉得不可思议，2001年时FBI内部没有完善的电子邮件系统，绝大多数案件文件都未电子化，甚至没有扫描仪。调查人员只能靠快递寄照片，信息传递效率极低。正是这些技术短板，让关键线索在袭击前未能及时汇总，错失了阻止悲剧的最后机会。
这就像一场赛车，别人都开上了高速公路，而FBI还在用马车赶路。
真相被遮蔽：官方报告的“掩盖与删减”
9·11事件后，国会成立了调查委员会，但关键的28页内容——涉及恐怖分子在南加州的活动和沙特政府的关联——被全部涂黑。委员会负责人甚至与白宫达成协议，限制调查人员获取真实档案。最终，许多重要发现被埋在脚注里，官方报告变成了一个“精心包装的故事”，而不是揭示真相的工具。
这不禁让人联想到童话故事里的“魔镜”，只反映出权力想让你看到的那一面。
总结与思考：我们该相信谁？
9·11的官方叙述，真的就是全部吗？情报机构的内斗、沙特的暗中支持、技术的滞后、政府的刻意遮掩……每一个细节都像拼图的一角，等待我们去还原完整的画面。或许，真正的真相远比阴谋论更加离奇，也更加令人唏嘘。
你怎么看待9·11背后的这些秘密？你相信政府的说法，还是愿意聆听更多不同的声音？欢迎在评论区留下你的观点，和大家一起探讨。
來源: https://rumble.com/c/TuckerCarlson?e9s=src_v1_cbl
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00:00感谢观看
00:30感谢观看
01:00For 24 years now, politicians, the media, intel agencies in this country and abroad
01:06have all demanded that you believe the official story about 9-11, and here's what it is.
01:12They tell you a group of al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, many of whom were known to U.S.
01:16intel services, somehow managed to evade capture for years as they planned the most significant
01:23and elaborate terror attack in human history. We're told that despite repeated encounters
01:29with the FBI, the CIA, local law enforcement, airport security, foreign intel organizations,
01:36the right information somehow never made it to the right people. The government failed because
01:42it just didn't have the intelligence it needed. That's the story. That story is a lie. Nearly 25
01:48years later, the families of 3,000 civilians are still mourning the murder of their loved
01:53ones. Anyone who doubts the official narrative is cast as a kook, a criminal, a fringe conspiracy
02:00theorist, and punished. They've been blacklisted and censored and banned, even as the leaders who
02:06failed to protect our country on 9-11 used these attacks as a pretense to expand their own powers
02:13and permanently transform the United States. None of this is speculation. All of it is true.
02:20Over the course of this series, you will hear accounts from people who lived it,
02:23CIA officers and analysts who were theirs, FBI agents from the bin Laden unit, family members
02:28of the victims. None of these people are kooks. All of them have firsthand information.
02:35What they'll tell you is that what you have been told about September 11th is not true.
02:40Why are we doing this? Our purpose is in part to make the strongest possible case for a real
02:46investigation into 9-11 25 years later, a new 9-11 commission, one that is honest,
02:54one that is not guided by partisan political interests, one that is not serving foreign powers.
02:58To do this investigation, we spent many months looking into what actually happened and speaking
03:05to people who saw it. We poured over thousands of pages of documents, mostly primary sources,
03:10but also contemporaneous news reports and declassified government documents.
03:14Over the course of this investigation, we made numerous findings that shocked us,
03:20not least of which the apparent role that former CIA director John Brennan played
03:24in helping bring the 9-11 hijackers to the United States and the remarkable lengths the CIA went to
03:32to protect the 9-11 hijackers from the FBI and from domestic law enforcement.
03:38Telling the full story requires starting before the attacks, going back to something called
03:44ALEC Station, that was the CIA's bin Laden unit in 1999.
03:47My name is Mark Rossini. I'm a former FBI agent. So from January 1999 to May of 2003, I was the FBI,
03:57New York Joint Terrorism Task Force representative to ALEC Station at CIA headquarters.
04:05Before 9-11, there were no sources in Al-Qaeda. None.
04:09There was a group of Pashtun caretakers, okay? They called them the Trodpines.
04:19Trodpines were these Pashtun people that were bin Laden's t-boys and t-gals, right?
04:25And they were the great source of the Pakistani intel service that was feeding information from
04:33the Trodpines to the ISI to the CIA about what was going on in Al-Qaeda.
04:38They had all the electronic communication satellite shit in the world, imagery. I remember looking at
04:44images of bin Laden, you know, in his courtyard. Fine. But what's in his head? What's he saying?
04:50What's he doing? These people are 10,000 miles away. They don't give a shit about American law.
04:54They don't care about going to jail. They want to die. How are you going to get a source inside there?
04:59Before September 11th, U.S. intel services got most of their intelligence on bin Laden
05:04from what was called the Hada Home switchboard in Sanae, Yemen.
05:07That was a communications hub that bin Laden and his associates used to communicate with
05:12each other. They were, at the time, living in Yemen. The FBI gained access to this after
05:18the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa.
05:21How did we officially get the Hada Home in Sanae, Yemen on the books, on the radar, if you will?
05:32Nairobi, 1998, August 7th. John Antiseff, Special Agent John Antiseff, greatest FBI agent ever in the
05:39FBI, even better than me. John flies over to Nairobi. And one of the survivors, one of the perpetrators who
05:46chickened out and ran and lived, Dawoud Rashid Alawali, Saudi, he gets captured by the Kenyan police.
05:55John flies over from New York, and already there have been two FBI agents interviewing Dawoud.
06:01They were getting someplace, but they really weren't getting that far, right? John walks in.
06:07And first thing he does, he says, you need some water? You want a drink? Did you eat today? Did you pray? Are you okay?
06:18Yeah, I'm fine. I'm fine. I'm fine. I'm fine. He said, just relax. Just have a chat.
06:24He didn't beat him with a phone book. He didn't fucking water bottle him. He didn't pull his fingernails out.
06:30He wasn't Mr. Tough Guy, like all these fucking assholes, like Dick Cheney want to believe, right? All pieces of shit.
06:37He talked to him like a human being. Take me through the day. Talk to me.
06:43So I went to the hotel, and I got my stuff ready. And did you call anybody? Yeah, yeah, yeah, I called this number.
06:51And he wrote it down. And he gave John the number of the Hadahoum in Sana'a Yemen, which was the Al-Qaeda switchboard that we in the FBI had no fucking clue existed up until that point.
07:08CIA and NSA did, because remember, they had been listening to the Nairobi cell and their activity since 1996.
07:17We in the FBI didn't know about that number.
07:19The Hadahoum wasn't just a communications hub for Al-Qaeda.
07:23It was the physical home of the father-in-law of Khalid al-Medhar, one of the future 9-11 hijackers.
07:29At the end of 1999, listening to that phone is when the CIA learns and the NSA learns that Khalid al-Medhar is going to be traveling from there to Dubai and then from Dubai onward to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to meet the summit.
07:51The summit was a meeting of an operational cadre of Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists from around the world.
07:57He was scheduled to travel on or about January 5th, 2000.
08:01The NSA has the ability, did and probably still has, to get any plane, airplane reservation at once in the world and know about it, right?
08:11We knew his passport number, we had the phone, we had everything.
08:12So we knew his travel information, we knew what flights he was taking, we knew what seat he was going to sit in.
08:17The CIA arranges for when he gets to Dubai to be secondary, okay?
08:25Not fully questioned, but, you know, talk to him a little bit.
08:29And then he goes to his hotel room and they arrange to search his room and go in.
08:36And when they go in, his passport is there and they take pictures of it and photocopy it.
08:40And they send back the imagery and lo and behold, in his passport is a visa to go to the United States of America.
08:49Issued out of the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
08:53According to one recently released court filings, quote,
08:56the visas were issued to facilitate an operation run by the Saudis and the CIA spying operation.
09:03The station chief in Riyadh at the time was future CIA director John Brennan.
09:08The CIA continued tracking Al-Mudhar to Kuala Lumpur, where he met up with other al-Qaeda associates,
09:15including Nawaf al-Hazmi, a second future 9-11 hijacker.
09:19He lands in Kuala Lumpur.
09:21They entrust the Malaysia Special Branch, police, to surveil this terror summit in this park in Kuala Lumpur.
09:33And so much so to tail them and to surveil them, etc.
09:36And that information ends up in a communication from Kuala Lumpur Station, CIA, to CIA headquarters,
09:47to Alex Station, to the computer screen of me and Special Agent Doug Miller of Washington Field Office, FBI.
09:56You have this cable that lays out the meeting Kuala Lumpur, the photocopying of his passport in Dubai,
10:05and the learning of the visa to go to the United States of America.
10:10Doug Miller gets up from his cubicle of power, comes over to my cubicle of power, and says,
10:15hey, we've got to tell the FBI about this.
10:17I said, Doug, you're damn right.
10:18He goes, I'll write up the CIR.
10:19What is a CIR?
10:22A CIR is what is a central intelligence report.
10:26Doug writes it.
10:27He sends it to me.
10:28I approve it.
10:29And it goes to the desk of Michael Ann Casey, the CIA officer, analyst.
10:34And it sits in her queue, her electronic queue, and it doesn't move for like a day or two.
10:42It should move in a fucking few hours.
10:44I'll never forget, like it was yesterday.
10:46I'll never forget.
10:47I'm standing over her.
10:50I said, hey, Doug's CIR.
10:53She's got to go to the FBI.
10:55He said, no, it's not.
10:56I said, well, why not?
10:57She said, because it's not FBI, not an FBI matter.
11:03What do you mean it's not FBI matter?
11:04She said, it's a CIA matter.
11:06And when and if we want the FBI to know, we will tell them.
11:11And you are not to say anything.
11:15I said, yeah, but they got a visa to come to the U.S.
11:18She said, no, we're handling it.
11:20And when we want to tell the FBI, we will.
11:24And I looked at her.
11:25And remember, she got up.
11:26She put her hands on her hips, pointing her finger at me.
11:29Now, in my naivete, I believed her.
11:37And I have to live with that every day of my life that I believed her.
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13:05As the CIA was blocking the FBI detail from informing the Bureau, the hijackers were moving.
13:11On January 8, 2000, CIA surveillance teams reported that Al-Midhar had boarded a flight to Bangkok, Thailand.
13:19He was accompanied by a man they identified as Al-Hazmi.
13:22According to the official account, this is where the trail went cold.
13:26The CIA placed their names on a watch list and asked that Thai authorities track their movements.
13:32Three months later, the Thai government reported back.
13:35Al-Hazmi had boarded a United Airlines flight to Los Angeles.
13:39Al-Midhar was with him.
13:41The two hijackers had arrived in the United States.
13:44But here's my problem with this whole fucking thing and the whole subsequent investigation of 9-11.
13:52You have the CIA then following one man and then two men all over the planet and then eventually even to America, right?
14:03Landing in Los Angeles, California.
14:05And you don't tell the FBI.
14:06But why would the CIA want to hide the highly relevant and potentially dangerous fact that two known Al-Qaeda terrorists had just landed in California?
14:18According to a recently released court filing, former White House counterterrorism's R Richard Clark told government investigators that the, quote,
14:26CIA was running a false flag operation to recruit the hijackers.
14:30When Kofra Black became the head of the counterterrorism center at CIA, he was aghast that they had no sources in Al-Qaeda.
14:40So he told me, I'm going to try to get sources in Al-Qaeda.
14:45I can understand them possibly saying we need to develop sources inside Al-Qaeda.
14:53When we do that, we can't tell anybody about it.
14:56After Clark made that claim publicly, he received an angry call from former director of the CIA, George Tenet, who did not deny the allegations made by Mr. Clark, end quote.
15:07But when we reached out to Tenet, his spokesperson denied that the CIA was recruiting hijackers, calling it false rumors and saying, quote, that's categorically not true.
15:18He also recalled that the executive director of the 9-11 commission, Philip Zelikow, blocked the commission's investigation into the matter at the behest of Condoleezza Rice.
15:28CIA had this delusional grand plan.
15:31So the CIA, with their information that they had from Mr. Dehada House and their own psychological analysis of everybody in that team,
15:39they figured the best way is maybe to recruit somebody who came over from Malaysia.
15:50Talila Mirhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.
15:53We kept the FBI at bay because we told Mark Rossini and Doug Miller to shut the fuck up.
15:58So let's just try to get inside there.
16:01The official 9-11 report does not address the CIA's plan to recruit the hijackers.
16:27It's possible this is because the CIA blocked 9-11 commission investigators from talking to the agents who participated in the plot.
16:38Amazingly, the CIA's director of operations kept the CIA operative attempting to recruit the hijackers, referred to as VVV in the documents,
16:47away from the commission's investigators.
16:50The consequence of this?
16:52The commission's explanation for this story is that the CIA made an honest mistake.
16:56The actual language in the report says the CIA played, quote, zone defense,
17:02and the FBI had a man-to-man approach to counterterrorism.
17:06The difference in strategies is why the CIA didn't tell the FBI that terrorists had arrived on American soil.
17:15Incredibly, the commission investigators didn't ask the CIA director at the time, George Tenant,
17:20about the summit in Kuala Lumpur, or why the CIA had blocked the FBI from being warned.
17:28It wasn't the story they wanted.
17:30And that is the crutch of the matter.
17:32And that is the truth.
17:33And no one has ever answered those questions.
17:35No one has the balls to because they're afraid.
17:37Because the house would come tumbling down.
17:39So how exactly did the CIA try to recruit the 9-11 hijackers?
17:46Well, one amazing thing about their arrival is that they didn't try to hide.
17:50The hijackers used their real names while in the United States.
17:53They operated in plain daylight.
17:55Al-Hazmi and Al-Midhar lived in San Diego for more than a year before the attacks.
18:01They lived openly.
18:02In fact, they were so open that Al-Hazmi's name, address, and a home phone number were listed in the San Diego phone book.
18:11When they arrived, the hijackers encountered a Saudi intel operative called Omar al-Bayoumi.
18:17They met at a restaurant outside of Los Angeles.
18:20The CIA utilized the Saudis in the form of Omar al-Bayoumi to spy for them and to gather intelligence.
18:30Before 9-11, the CIA was forbidden from engaging in domestic spying.
18:36They used the Saudi intelligence as a workaround.
18:39We'll rely upon the Saudi G.I.D., General Intelligence Directorate, their version of the CIA, via Prince Bandar, via their man, Omar al-Bayoumi, to keep us informed as to the activity of these terrorists.
18:55Bayoumi's notebook, which was uncovered when British law enforcement raided his home in the U.K.,
19:00contained a drawing of an airplane and mathematical calculations related to flying it.
19:06The 9-11 Commission investigators never saw this.
19:09At the time, al-Bayoumi had a no-show job at a Saudi aviation contractor called Avco.
19:15The company's employees say he was one of roughly 50 ghost employees working there at the time,
19:20taking the paycheck but never coming to work.
19:22According to declassified government documents, an investigator from the 9-11 Commission said al-Bayoumi was receiving substantial sums of money from the Saudi embassy in Washington prior to the 9-11 attacks,
19:34that the money was being funneled from accounts at Riggs Bank in Georgetown, belonging to Haifa bin Faisal, the wife of the Saudi ambassador to the United States.
19:43By using the Saudis as a proxy to recruit the 9-11 hijackers, the CIA gave itself cover.
19:50If things went wrong, they could push a narrative that blamed the Saudi government for the attacks, which is what they did.
19:56For all intents and purposes, Omar al-Bayoumi was an employee of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Washington, D.C., in their consulate in Los Angeles, California.
20:05Al-Bayoumi convinced the hijackers to move to San Diego.
20:09He helped them find an apartment.
20:10He served as a co-signer on the lease to that apartment.
20:13He paid their first month's rent and deposit.
20:16He got them bank accounts.
20:17He got them driver's license.
20:19He introduced them to many other radical Muslims in the area, including the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.
20:25Eventually, al-Midhar went home to Yemen.
20:28Khalil al-Midhar leaves America for his daughter's birth, right?
20:32And in that time, he loses his passport.
20:38He claims he went to Afghanistan.
20:41He goes back to Jeddah and gets another passport.
20:47And by this time, even prior as I understand it now,
20:52the Saudis had identified the terrorists, the hijackers, as potential threats to the kingdom
20:58and had put chips in their passports, identifying them as a threat.
21:07Al-Midhar comes back to the United States, I believe it was on July 4th, 2001.
21:14He's allowed back in, not stopped, not questioned.
21:16So here's a guy that the CIA knew came to America, had been at this terror summit meeting in Malaysia in January 2000.
21:28He's allowed to leave and come back.
21:32Midhar was able to exit and enter the country at will because he was issued a multi-visit U.S. visa.
21:38According to a summary of an interview with an FBI agent from Alex Station,
21:42quote, Al-Hamsi and Al-Midhar obtained their visas to enter the United States
21:45at the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
21:49All told, the vast majority of the 19 9-11 hijackers
21:53had their visas issued at that consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
21:57At the time, John Brennan was running the CIA station there.
22:01Just a few days before Al-Midhar re-entered the country at JFK Airport in New York,
22:08the FBI and the CIA held a joint meeting in New York City
22:11to discuss the bombing of the USS Cole, which Al-Midhar was involved in.
22:15Killed 17 soldiers on the USS Cole.
22:18An FBI agent was shown a photograph of Al-Midhar taken at the summit in Kuala Lumpur.
22:23The agent asked the CIA who this man was, but the CIA once again refused to tell them.
22:30It wasn't until August of 2001 that the CIA finally alerted the FBI.
22:36And of course, by then, it was too late.
22:39It's not just Mark Rossini who testifies to this.
22:42Another anonymous FBI agent told investigators that, quote,
22:46he, she believed the CIA's operation may have spun out of control.
22:51and that they, the CIA, came to the FBI with limited information in an attempt to locate the hijackers
22:57without revealing the true nature or extent of their operation against Al-Qaeda, end quote.
23:03This is the failure of the 9-11 Commission and every other fucking commission that ever existed after that.
23:10But if the CIA was grooming the hijackers as sources, the FBI failed too.
23:16When Al-Hazmi and Al-Midhar were in California, they lived for a period in the home of an FBI informant called Abdu Sattar.
23:26And yet somehow, the FBI never learned about this.
23:30Then, less than a month before the terror attacks,
23:33the FBI began an investigation into a French-Moroccan national called Zacharias Moussaoui.
23:39He had just moved to Minneapolis from Oklahoma, where he resumed aviation training.
23:45After raising suspicions during training, he was arrested on August 16th and charged with immigration violations.
23:51But agents were denied permission to search his laptop and the room where he was staying.
23:57His exact connection to the hijacking remains unclear even now.
24:01But he did receive wire transfers from Ramzi Ben-Al-Sheib, who was also sending money to the hijackers.
24:07In July 2001, an FBI agent stationed in the Phoenix field office sent a memo to headquarters theorizing
24:14that there could be, quote, a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden
24:17to send individuals to the United States to receive aviation training.
24:22For some reason, this memo was never received by headquarters, not until after 9-11.
24:28Why?
24:30Possibly because, as late as 2003, the FBI didn't have a functioning internal email system.
24:37Most case files were not digitized, they weren't searchable, and employees did not have access to the Internet.
24:42That's true.
24:44By September 2001, the Bureau's computers were so out of date, it took 12 commands simply to save a document.
24:52And in the aftermath of the attack, the FBI distributed photographs of the suspected hijackers via express mail.
24:58They didn't have scanners.
24:59The Bush administration worked hard for us not to know any of this.
25:04They hid it.
25:05Many of these details were discovered during the congressional joint inquiry into 9-11.
25:09But when Congress released its report, the 28 pages dealing with the hijackers' time in Southern California were hidden.
25:17They were redacted.
25:18When a man called Philip Zellicoe took over as the commission's executive director,
25:23he reached a secret agreement with the White House to block his investigators from accessing records related to the hijackers until the White House had already screened them.
25:34Government documents show that the commission investigator assigned to this topic complained that, quote,
25:39Zellicoe limited the number of witnesses that commission investigators could interview.
25:44And just days before the report was released, Dieter Snell, senior counsel to the commission,
25:49attempted to remove most of the details of the Saudi collaboration with the hijackers.
25:54Some of the findings were included in the end, but they were buried in the footnotes.
25:58The truth is, the official 9-11 commission report, sold to the American public and the world for decades as the definitive account of what happened that day, is a lie.
26:099-11 commission is a cover-up.
26:15But how did the Bush administration manage to hijack what was sold as an independent commission?
26:21And what exactly were they trying to hide?
26:24We'll reveal what we found in the next episode.
26:28Thank you for watching the 9-11 files.
26:33The next episode drops next week, or you can unlock the entire five-part series right now, ad-free, by becoming a TCN member.
26:41Members also get access to the Watch Companion, a guide to the timeline, the key figures, the primary sources that we went to to bring you this documentary.
26:49You can read along as you watch.
26:51Join us today at tuckercarlson.com for the whole series all at once to support our investigative work.
26:57We couldn't do any of this without our members.
26:58We're grateful for you.
26:59So thanks.
27:00Thanks.
27:01No way so much.
27:01Thank you.
27:01Thank you.
27:17感谢观看
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