- 7 months ago
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00:01A botched take-off in Buenos Aires.
00:06Stuns investigators.
00:08To me, that was unprecedented.
00:10Get out of it! Get out of it!
00:12A shocking error.
00:14We're stuck in it!
00:16Lies behind the deadly free-fall of American Airlines Flight 587.
00:23And when Continental Connection 3407 stalls,
00:27the flight crew's reaction is baffling.
00:30Not only did they not respond correctly,
00:34they responded in the exactly opposite way.
00:37Commercial pilots undergo hundreds of hours of training and testing.
00:42Still, experienced pilots make rookie mistakes.
00:47Rookie errors don't necessarily occur to just rookie pilots.
00:51It can happen to the most experienced pilots.
00:53It's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
00:54it's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
00:58in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
00:59It's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
01:01in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
01:02Win 0-2-0 at 5, altimeter 3-0, decimal 1-0.
01:03It's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
01:05in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
01:07Win 0-2-0 at 5, altimeter 3-0, decimal 1-0.
01:08It's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
01:10in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
01:12Win 0-2-0 at 5, altimeter 3-0, decimal 1-0.
01:15It's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
01:19in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
01:20It's 8.30pm at Jorge Newbury Airfield,
01:22in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
01:24Win 0-2-0 at 5, altimeter 3-0, decimal 1-0.
01:29A Boeing 737 flight crew prepares for takeoff.
01:35Their plane is operated by the Argentinian airline, Lapa.
01:41Jamaican?
01:43No.
01:44Hey, captain.
01:46Hey.
01:47The captain of Lapa flight 3142 is Gustavo Weigel.
01:52He's an experienced pilot who's been flying for more than 20 years.
01:56Everything okay?
01:58Fine. Everything's fine.
02:01We're just waiting on our fuel.
02:04First officer Luis Echeverry has logged more than 500 hours in the 737.
02:10Total fuel required, 8,500 kilograms to be transferred to the wings.
02:16Tonight's flight is a little over an hour.
02:19Its destination, the city of Cordoba, 400 miles west of Buenos Aires.
02:25Along with the pilots, three flight attendants and 95 passengers are on board.
02:38Before start checklist.
02:39Before start checklist.
02:40Before start checklist.
02:41The crew is making last minute preparations for takeoff.
02:44Cockpit preparations?
02:47Completed.
02:50The relationship between the crew seemed to be very close.
02:54It appeared that they were friends.
02:58You guys should come for dinner in Cordoba.
03:01That sounds good. What should we bring?
03:03You can bring the ice cream.
03:04You know, we're seconds away.
03:05You should probably get back there and strap in.
03:07Alright guys.
03:08It's been a pleasure.
03:09See you soon.
03:14Clear for takeoff.
03:15Lapa 3142.
03:18Taking off.
03:20Flight 3142 speeds down the runway.
03:23As the aircraft lifts off, it's immediately apparent that something is wrong.
03:36The plane begins to take off, but instantly it starts shaking like it was going to fall apart.
03:44We all knew something was going wrong.
03:48The hell?
03:49Hurtling forward at 160 knots.
03:58The 737 slams violently back to the ground.
04:04They're now headed straight for a busy highway and an industrial gas plant.
04:12Stop, stop, stop, stop.
04:14It was very quick.
04:16It was very quick.
04:17I just looked at my friends and I braced my head.
04:20No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
04:23The airplane crossed a busy highway without warning.
04:28Killed people who were commuting at that time in their cars.
04:31Stop, stop, stop.
04:32Flight 3142 slams into the gas plant.
04:34Yeah.
04:35I could feel extreme heat all around me.
04:37I was suffocating.
04:38And I needed to get out, but I couldn't release my seat belt.
04:40Rescuers race to the site of the crash.
04:41But survivors on board don't have much time.
04:54And I needed to get out, but I couldn't release my seatbelt.
05:01Rescuers race to the site of the crash.
05:04But survivors on board don't have much time.
05:08Fire threatens to consume the entire plane.
05:15I felt like I was dying.
05:18And someone said to me, get out.
05:21Though badly injured, Marisa Beiro is lucky to survive.
05:26The crash has killed 60 passengers,
05:29three crew members including both pilots, and two motorists.
05:34It's a disaster unlike anything Buenos Aires has ever seen before.
05:39It was a major calamity.
05:42It involved automobiles, it involved a natural gas regulating plant.
05:45It's a lot of smoke, hard to see anything.
05:52Horacio La Rosa is a senior investigator for Argentina's Accident Investigation Unit.
06:02He tried to focus on the job and look for details that later on could be harder to find,
06:08once the rescue teams have finished their work.
06:11Neither pilot survived.
06:15Okay.
06:18Any hope of finding out what went wrong lies in the wreckage.
06:26Because the 737 is American-made,
06:29the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board joins the investigation.
06:33Whatever you need, we're here to help.
06:35There was just a tremendous amount of public concern
06:39and a great deal of encouragement
06:41to try to solve this definitively and quickly.
06:45One of the big questions was,
06:47how did this aircraft go off the end of the runway,
06:50especially on takeoff?
06:56Look here.
06:57The wings of the downed plane reveal the first clue for investigators.
07:06I was able to observe with some of my colleagues
07:09that the aircraft's flaps were apparently not extended.
07:16Let's get this wing piece out of here.
07:18For takeoff, 737 pilots must always extend the plane's wing flaps.
07:24The flaps increase the area of the wing and give it extra lift.
07:29Without them, a fully loaded 737 cannot get off the ground.
07:35Did the flaps retract during the crash?
07:38Or were they never deployed in the first place?
07:40When you see something that's out of place,
07:44you begin to wonder, what has happened?
07:47Has someone raised the flaps?
07:49Or has some electronic or hydraulic intervention
07:52made the flaps come up?
07:55We need to study the entire system.
07:59In the meantime...
08:01Oh, oh.
08:02Yep.
08:03...the team on site retrieves the plane's black boxes.
08:06The importance of flight recorders and accident investigation
08:11cannot be overemphasized.
08:13But they're badly damaged
08:14and immediately sent to Washington for repair.
08:18There was a good deal of pressure
08:20to get back the cockpit voice recorder
08:22and the flight recorder information in a timely way.
08:28In a nearby hangar,
08:30investigators carefully examine
08:32every wire, gear, and screw of the wing flaps.
08:37Activators seem fine.
08:39They focus on a part
08:40that controls the flaps' movement.
08:43The jack screw,
08:45which acts much like a jack used to lift a car.
08:49As it turns,
08:50it moves a nut
08:51that extends or retracts the flaps.
08:53That nut travels along the shaft.
08:59It stops at various places
09:01to indicate various degrees of flap extension.
09:07We had discovered
09:08the nuts on the screw
09:10were in the retracted position.
09:12The flap lever from the cockpit
09:15confirms the finding.
09:17The lever's pretty banged up,
09:18but it sure looks like it's in the flaps' up position.
09:20It had left a mark
09:27with the flap lever in the up position,
09:29so there was no chance
09:31that it had moved during the accident.
09:36The astonishing discovery
09:38reveals the flaps were never extended.
09:42Flight 3142's configuration
09:44for take-off was all wrong.
09:46Baffled investigators wrestle
09:50with a difficult question.
09:53How could an attempted take-off be made
09:55with the flaps in this position?
10:05Investigators want to know
10:06how the experienced crew
10:08on board Flight 3142
10:10took off without their flaps extended.
10:12You find yourself wondering
10:19why did this action
10:21not take place
10:22when it is indispensable for flight?
10:31Can we get the FDR data on the screen?
10:33The crucial black box data
10:35finally arrives from Washington.
10:39Investigators hope
10:40this will help explain what happened.
10:44Great.
10:45Let's go to the flap positions
10:46and engine performance.
10:48The flight data recorder
10:50confirms suspicions.
10:52No flaps.
10:54They stall.
10:55They get the plane back down here.
10:5850 meters from the end of the runway.
10:59There's no way they could stop in time.
11:02It verifies the flaps
11:03were not extended.
11:05But not why.
11:08Investigators turn
11:09to the cockpit voice recorder
11:10for clues.
11:13The only possibility
11:15was in the voice recorder.
11:17Everything okay?
11:19Fine.
11:19Everything's fine.
11:21Investigators begin
11:23by listening to what was happening
11:24just before take-off.
11:26Waiting on our fuel.
11:28So besides him,
11:29any other guys you're interested in?
11:31Yes.
11:32But you don't know him.
11:33I haven't seen him in a while.
11:34What they hear from the crew
11:36is astounding.
11:38The whole thing's getting complicated.
11:41You're breaking my heart.
11:42Not only unexpected,
11:44but entirely unprofessional.
11:47They should be running checklists.
11:48What's going on?
11:50They're required to have
11:51a sterile cockpit.
11:53Once you start the engines
11:54up to 10,000 feet,
11:57you talk only about
11:58operational procedures.
12:00And this is to prevent
12:01distraction.
12:02You guys should come
12:03for dinner in Cordoba.
12:05That sounds good.
12:06What should we bring?
12:07You can bring me ice cream.
12:10Okay.
12:12Before start checklist.
12:14Before start checklist.
12:16They're talking about
12:17planning a meal together.
12:18They're talking about
12:19the romantic lives.
12:21And this is interspersed
12:22with the checklist.
12:23Hey, you know I'm with you
12:24in the good times
12:25and the bad moron.
12:26It's a good thing
12:27I'm nothing like you.
12:27You're full of it.
12:30You're only with me
12:31for the good times.
12:34Cockpit preparations.
12:36Completed.
12:37The checklists were interrupted
12:38and were performed incorrectly.
12:40Flaps are part of the
12:41before takeoff checklist.
12:42Do they even do that?
12:44Anti-ice.
12:46Off.
12:47Start levers.
12:49That'll stop.
12:51Ready to taxi.
12:523-1-4-2.
12:543-1-4-2.
12:55Ready to taxi.
12:56Charlie 5 to runway 1-3.
12:59Charlie 5 to 1-3.
13:01Don't smoke all of it.
13:02Give me a puff at least.
13:05Think of a puff
13:06can make you all look great.
13:12Thanks.
13:13They're actually smoking
13:15in the cockpit.
13:16Three of them are passing
13:17a cigarette which is
13:18prohibited by the company.
13:19They're not supposed to be
13:19smoking in the cockpit at all.
13:20No mention of flaps.
13:23They're starting to taxi.
13:26We should probably
13:26head back there
13:27and strap in.
13:28I guess.
13:29The reason the crew
13:30failed to extend
13:31the flaps is now clear.
13:33Hurry, hurry.
13:35They were simply
13:36too distracted
13:36by their own
13:37careless behavior.
13:39Clear for takeoff.
13:40Lap of 3-1-4-2.
13:41But what investigators
13:42hear next
13:43is even more shocking.
13:45There it is.
13:49It's an alarm
13:50warning the crew
13:51of their mistake.
13:55The sound of the alarm
13:56was loud.
13:57It could be heard
13:58perfectly in the voice
13:59recorder many times.
14:04I don't know
14:05if the alarm
14:05is going to turn.
14:06It seems fine.
14:08Hey, pause.
14:10How can they ignore that?
14:12How could a crew
14:13forget to perform
14:15one of the most
14:15basic takeoff procedures
14:17and then go on
14:19to ignore
14:19the loud, persistent
14:20warning designed
14:22to alert them
14:23to their serious mistake?
14:28I believe
14:29they didn't understand
14:30the importance
14:31of this alarm,
14:32which was absolutely
14:33critical for takeoff.
14:3665 people
14:38lost their lives
14:39because the crew
14:40wasn't paying attention
14:41to what they were doing.
14:45If the alarm went off
14:49and it warned
14:50that the flaps
14:51weren't configured,
14:52why didn't they
14:53do something?
14:56In their final report,
14:58investigators stress
14:59the need for pilots
15:00to always comply
15:02with the sterile cockpit rule.
15:04It restricts
15:05crew conversation
15:06and helps minimize
15:08distractions
15:08during key parts
15:10of the flight.
15:10By not maintaining
15:11sterile cockpit
15:12and following
15:13every checklist
15:14and doing exactly
15:15what you're supposed
15:16to do,
15:17people died.
15:21But sometimes,
15:23following strict
15:24operational discipline
15:25can still lead
15:26to catastrophe.
15:28Even when pilots
15:29are following
15:29the procedures
15:30correctly,
15:31you can still
15:32have a rookie error.
15:33Just nine weeks
15:44after the 9-11
15:45attacks,
15:46New York's
15:46John F. Kennedy
15:47Airport
15:48is busy again.
15:51American Airlines
15:52Flight 587
15:53is carrying
15:54251 passengers
15:56en route
15:56to the Caribbean.
16:00Your leg,
16:01you check the rudders.
16:02The crew
16:03is preparing
16:04the plane
16:04for take-off.
16:05Rudders,
16:06check.
16:07Taxi checklist
16:08is complete.
16:09OK.
16:12Captain Ed States
16:13is a former
16:14military pilot
16:15who joined
16:15American Airlines
16:1616 years ago.
16:20First officer
16:21Sten Moline
16:22has racked up
16:23more than
16:234,000 hours
16:24of flying time
16:25and is the pilot
16:26flying today.
16:28Winds,
16:28checked.
16:32American 587,
16:37follow Japan Air,
16:38Boeing 747 ahead.
16:39Follow Japan Air,
16:41American 587.
16:42Flight 587's
16:44flight plan
16:45takes it out
16:45over New York's
16:46Jamaica Bay
16:47before heading
16:49south to
16:49the Dominican Republic.
16:51You have the
16:52airplane.
16:54The captain
16:55indicated
16:56the first officer
16:57would be the
16:57flying pilot
16:58on this leg.
16:59The captain
17:00designated him
17:00to fly the flight.
17:02That's routine.
17:03It's the captain's
17:04choice.
17:05American 587,
17:07Kennedy Tower.
17:08Caution.
17:08Wake turbulence
17:09runway 3,
17:101 left.
17:11Taxi into position
17:12and hold.
17:14You happy
17:15with that distance?
17:16We'll be all right
17:17once we get rolling.
17:18It's supposed
17:19to be five miles
17:20by the time
17:20we're airborne.
17:21That's the idea.
17:22So you're happy.
17:25I'm on the roll.
17:28Thank you, sir.
17:29Flight 587 lifts off
17:37at 9.14 a.m.
17:43American 587, heavy.
17:46Clod and maintain.
17:47One 3,000.
17:51Residents of Queens,
17:53New York, hear the
17:54familiar sound of jets
17:55overhead.
17:56Planes, you know,
17:59take off and land.
18:00They fly right
18:01over the peninsula
18:01every 45 seconds.
18:04It was just
18:05a normal thing.
18:07High above,
18:08a patch of turbulence,
18:09rocks,
18:10flight 587.
18:11Where are we?
18:14Max power.
18:17You all right?
18:18Yeah, I'm fine.
18:20Hang on to it.
18:20Hang on to it.
18:21Let's go for power, please.
18:272,300 feet above
18:28the ground,
18:29disaster strikes.
18:32Holy crap.
18:35The plane is losing
18:36altitude and falling
18:38out of the sky.
18:40What the hell are we into?
18:43There are more than
18:4468,000 pounds of
18:46flammable jet fuel
18:47on board.
18:48Flight 587 plummets
18:55towards Queens,
18:56New York.
18:57We're stuck in it.
18:59Get out of it.
19:00Get out of it.
19:01Get out of it.
19:03The house started
19:04vibrating very heavily.
19:06You know,
19:06this all happened
19:06really quick.
19:07At impact,
19:19the fuel ignites
19:20a massive fireball
19:21engulfing several homes.
19:24The plane crashed
19:25pretty much
19:25like in the backyard
19:26in the street,
19:27exploded.
19:30It's like a plane.
19:32It looks like a war zone.
19:34All 260 people
19:38on board are dead,
19:40as well as
19:41five people
19:41on the ground.
19:43Many wonder,
19:44was this an accident?
19:48We were still
19:49heavily involved
19:50in the investigation
19:51of 9-11.
19:53I immediately
19:54got concerned
19:55as to,
19:56was this another
19:57terrorist attack?
19:58That means
20:00the FBI
20:01and the NTSB
20:03will be investigating
20:04this air crash
20:05together.
20:06This accident
20:07occurred so close
20:08to the tragedy
20:10of 9-11
20:10that we naturally
20:12jumped to conclusions.
20:14Then we had
20:14to force ourselves
20:15to back up
20:16and carefully
20:18study the evidence.
20:19It came in
20:19fast and steep.
20:21Let's hope
20:22it's not what we think.
20:23Their mission
20:24is to answer
20:25a vital question.
20:26Was this
20:29terrorism
20:30or an accident?
20:33Any evidence
20:34of a bomb
20:35would be
20:36in the debris.
20:36Everything else
20:37stays here for now.
20:39Experts
20:40would be
20:41physically
20:41examining
20:42all of the
20:43parts of the plane
20:44to see
20:45if there was
20:45any indentations
20:48indicating
20:48that the explosion
20:50was inside
20:51and pushed
20:51everything out.
20:52But the crash site
20:57and tests
20:58for explosive residue
20:59reveal no evidence
21:01that a bomb
21:02took down the plane.
21:04We learned
21:05very quickly
21:06that in fact
21:07it was not
21:08a terrorist event.
21:11Then a discovery
21:12three quarters
21:13of a mile
21:14from the crash
21:15provides investigators
21:16with a massive clue.
21:18we found
21:19a vertical stabilizer
21:20miles and miles away.
21:23The vertical stabilizer
21:24is found
21:25in Jamaica Bay
21:26between the airport
21:27and the crash site.
21:30The location
21:31tells investigators
21:32it broke off
21:33while the plane
21:34was still in the air.
21:35It was a good
21:39first step
21:40for us.
21:41The vertical stabilizer
21:42is part of the tail.
21:44Along with
21:45the horizontal stabilizer
21:46it's critical
21:47for stable flight.
21:50You can't fly
21:51without a tail.
21:52I mean
21:52you can't.
21:53The airplane
21:54is going to go down
21:54there's nothing
21:55you can do about it.
21:57NTSB investigators
21:59are under pressure
22:00to find out
22:00what happened
22:01to the A300
22:02one of the world's
22:04most popular aircraft.
22:08How does a vertical stabilizer
22:10just fall off?
22:12I've been
22:12investigator in charge
22:13of the NTSB
22:14for at that time
22:15oh gosh
22:1620 years or so
22:17and I had never
22:20seen anything
22:21quite like this.
22:23Investigators
22:24turned to the plane's
22:25cockpit voice recorder
22:26hoping to discover
22:27what went wrong
22:28with the stabilizer.
22:29American 587
22:35Kennedy Tower
22:35caution
22:36wake turbulence
22:37runway 3-1 left
22:39taxi into position
22:40and hold.
22:41After the controller
22:42issues a warning
22:43about wake turbulence
22:44the first officer
22:46sounds concerned.
22:48You happy
22:48with that distance?
22:51We'll be okay
22:52once we get rolling.
22:53He's supposed to be
22:53five miles
22:54by the time
22:54we're airborne.
22:56Wake turbulence
22:57is caused by
22:58the movement of air
22:59over and under
23:01the wing.
23:02When the two streams
23:03of air meet
23:04at the wingtips
23:05they combine
23:06to create
23:06a powerful vortex
23:07that trails
23:08behind the plane.
23:13Max power.
23:14Did the pilots
23:20get too close
23:21to the plane
23:22in front of them?
23:24Investigators
23:25listen as
23:26First Officer
23:26Molin wants
23:27more speed
23:28to help them
23:28fly through
23:29the turbulence.
23:33Moments later
23:34catastrophe strikes.
23:381558
23:38that's the tail
23:39coming off.
23:41Was the aircraft
23:42upset by the wake
23:43of a plane
23:44taking off
23:45ahead of it?
23:46We knew
23:46of course
23:47from listening
23:48to the air
23:50traffic control
23:50tapes
23:51that the accident
23:52aircraft took
23:53off a minute
23:54and a half
23:54or two minutes
23:55after a JAL
23:57Japanese airline
23:58Boeing 747.
24:01Radar data
24:02shows that
24:03Flight 587
24:04was flying
24:05at a safe distance.
24:07The wake
24:08was too weak
24:08to be dangerous.
24:10Not even close
24:11to what it would
24:11take to rip
24:11the tail
24:12off an Airbus.
24:16But another
24:17piece of data
24:18provides a vital
24:19clue.
24:21Frantic rudder
24:22movements.
24:2711 degrees
24:28left.
24:3011 degrees
24:31right.
24:32We saw
24:33the rudder
24:33go back
24:34and forth
24:34to its
24:35maximum
24:35deflection
24:37several times
24:38very,
24:39very rapidly.
24:43Could he
24:44have ripped
24:45the tail
24:45off his
24:45own plane?
24:46NTSB
24:55investigators
24:56wonder
24:56if
24:57extreme
24:57rudder
24:58movements
24:58on Flight 587
24:59created an
25:00aerodynamic
25:01force strong
25:02enough to
25:02rip the
25:03vertical
25:03stabilizer
25:04off.
25:06We need
25:07to determine
25:07whether
25:08that
25:08particular
25:09motion
25:10would be
25:12violent
25:12enough
25:13to
25:13snap
25:14the
25:14vertical
25:14stabilizer
25:15off.
25:17Normally,
25:18pilots only
25:18move the
25:19rudder a
25:19couple of
25:20degrees in
25:20either direction
25:21to steer
25:22the plane.
25:24But First
25:25Officer
25:25Sten Molen
25:26was moving
25:27his plane's
25:27rudder much
25:28more than
25:29that.
25:31You ready?
25:34To learn
25:35more,
25:35they create
25:36a computer
25:36simulation
25:37of an
25:37A300
25:38and fly
25:39it the same
25:40way as
25:40First
25:40Officer
25:41Molen,
25:42moving the
25:42rudder 11
25:43degrees back
25:44and forth
25:45three times.
25:47With each
25:49rudder deflection,
25:51the aerodynamic
25:51loads on the
25:52tail increase.
25:58There.
26:00That would have
26:01done it.
26:02And it was
26:03those increasing
26:04loads that
26:05caused this.
26:06to do it.
26:07It's doing it
26:14to himself.
26:16The discovery
26:17finally explains
26:19what happened
26:20to American
26:20Airlines Flight
26:21587.
26:23But it doesn't
26:24explain why.
26:26So now,
26:26we've eliminated
26:27several items
26:28and we're starting
26:29to look at the
26:30actions of the
26:31flight crew
26:31very carefully.
26:32Why would
26:34an experienced
26:35pilot move
26:36his rudder
26:36so violently
26:37to fly out
26:38of the
26:39waiting?
26:41When they
26:42talk to
26:42pilots who
26:43flew with
26:43Molen,
26:44investigators
26:44make a
26:45surprising
26:46discovery.
26:46take a seat.
26:50We began to
26:51suspect that
26:52the first
26:53officer
26:53overreacted.
26:55Tell me what
26:55happened.
26:56He had a
26:56history of
26:57responding
26:57very aggressively
26:59to wake
27:00turbulence.
27:03He did the
27:04same thing
27:04seven years
27:04ago.
27:05He moved
27:06the rudder
27:07pedal quickly
27:08back and
27:08forth.
27:10The captain
27:10said that he
27:11was shocked
27:11by this.
27:12He was
27:12overworking
27:13the rudders.
27:13He said,
27:14why did you
27:14do that?
27:15Why did you
27:15respond like
27:16that?
27:16And according
27:17to the
27:17statement,
27:18the first
27:18officer said
27:19they taught
27:19us to
27:20respond like
27:21that in
27:21the training.
27:23When
27:24investigators
27:24turn their
27:25attention to
27:26American
27:26Airlines
27:27training,
27:27they're
27:28shocked by
27:28what they
27:29learn.
27:30Pilots are
27:31taught that
27:32minor wake
27:32turbulence can
27:33induce a
27:34sudden,
27:35steep roll.
27:36We determined
27:37that they were
27:38actually providing,
27:39inadvertently,
27:40providing some
27:41negative training
27:41to their
27:42pilots.
27:42That led
27:43us to the
27:43conclusion
27:44that he
27:46overreacted.
27:47First
27:48officer
27:48Molin was
27:49trained to
27:49believe that
27:50severe wake
27:51turbulence could
27:51cause a
27:52catastrophic
27:53upset.
27:55Max power.
27:57You all
27:58right?
27:59The captain
28:00asks him,
28:01are you all
28:02right?
28:02And it's
28:03noteworthy
28:03that the
28:04captain does
28:04not add
28:05max power.
28:06In the
28:06captain's
28:07opinion,
28:07max power
28:08is not
28:08appropriate in
28:09this situation.
28:09the first
28:12officer began
28:12responding with
28:14a wheel back
28:15and forth and
28:17accompanied by
28:17a back and
28:18forth.
28:18Rudder.
28:20Hang on to it.
28:21Hang on to it.
28:25The first
28:25officer overreacted
28:26on the rudders.
28:27He didn't let the
28:28aircraft stabilize
28:29in one position
28:30or the other,
28:31so it hits a
28:33stop and then
28:33whips itself
28:34back.
28:37Back and forth,
28:38back and forth,
28:38and this creates
28:39huge loads on
28:40the vertical part
28:41of the fin.
28:43The first
28:44officer's actions
28:45stress the
28:46vertical stabilizer
28:47until it breaks
28:48under the strain.
28:52What the hell
28:53are we into?
28:56Get out of me!
28:57Get out of me!
28:58Get out of me!
28:59Get out of me!
29:00Ah!
29:05Hello,
29:06hello.
29:08After the accident,
29:18American Airlines
29:19changes its training
29:20procedures for wake
29:21turbulence.
29:23Once it became
29:25clear that some
29:27negative training
29:28was going on,
29:29American Airlines,
29:29to their credit,
29:30revamped the
29:32program to prevent
29:33this type of
29:35activity.
29:35American Airlines
29:38modifies their
29:39training simulator
29:40to be more
29:41realistic.
29:43Pilots are now
29:43taught not to use
29:44the rudder at
29:45high speed.
29:47A new warning
29:48light is also
29:48installed in the
29:49cockpit to help
29:50prevent pilots
29:51from deflecting the
29:52rudder too far.
29:53I think 587 brought
29:59an awareness to the
30:00aviation industry.
30:02Pilots, they pushed
30:03that rudder in full
30:04deflection.
30:05It could have
30:06disastrous effects.
30:11But despite the
30:12lessons learned from
30:13the crash of American
30:14Airlines 587, a rookie
30:17mistake causes disaster
30:19seven years later.
30:21Gear down.
30:23Folks alive.
30:24Gears down.
30:37It was one of the
30:38grisliest, nastiest
30:39scenes that I think
30:39I've seen.
30:42Continental Connection
30:44Flight 3407,
30:46operated by Colgan Air,
30:47is en route from
30:49Newark, New Jersey
30:50to Buffalo, New York.
30:54It's been a busy
30:55flight for Captain
30:56Marvin Renslow.
30:58He's providing
30:58guidance to a new
31:00first officer.
31:0424-year-old Rebecca
31:05Shaw has been with
31:07the airline for just
31:08over a year.
31:09She must decide now
31:10if she wants to
31:11become a captain.
31:13I don't know what
31:14I want to do with
31:14the upgrade.
31:16If you stayed on
31:17the queue,
31:17obviously you're not
31:18making the captain
31:19rate.
31:20Right.
31:20But you may have
31:21a better quality of
31:21life with regards
31:22to buying a house,
31:23having a schedule.
31:25Shaw trained on the
31:26plane they're flying
31:27now, a Canadian-made
31:29Bombardier Q400.
31:34There are 45
31:35passengers on board.
31:38Flight 3407 is
31:40heading northwest
31:41over upstate New York.
31:43The trip is only
31:4453 minutes.
31:50Visibility is poor
31:51and there's a forecast
31:53of snow and moderate
31:54winds in Buffalo.
31:57Folks from the flight
31:58deck, your first
31:59officer speaking.
32:00At this time, we're
32:01about 15 minutes
32:02outside of Buffalo.
32:03Weather in Buffalo
32:04is pretty foggy.
32:05Snowing a little bit
32:06there.
32:06I'd like to make sure
32:07everyone remains in
32:08their seats so the
32:08flight attendants can
32:09prepare the cabin for
32:10arrival.
32:10As the flight makes
32:12its approach, the
32:13pilots prepare the
32:15aircraft for landing.
32:16Gear down.
32:19Loke's alive.
32:20Gear's down.
32:22All right.
32:22Flaps 15.
32:24Extending the flaps
32:25provides more lift,
32:27allowing the plane to
32:28slow to its final
32:29approach speed.
32:30suddenly, the Q400
32:39slips out of control.
32:42Captain Renslow struggles
32:43to contain his aircraft.
32:54But it seems to have a
32:55mind of its own.
32:56It's too late.
33:11The plane is now in a
33:12stall, and Renslow can't
33:14recover.
33:15Oh, we're down.
33:17The plane crashes into a
33:34suburban home in Clarence
33:35Center, a town five miles
33:37short of Buffalo Airport.
33:40All 49 passengers and crew
33:43are killed on impact.
33:44One person on the ground
33:47also dies.
33:50The devastated house and
33:52downed plane are a blazing
33:54inferno.
33:56The height of it was just
33:57unbelievable.
34:00Obviously, because of the
34:01fuel that was probably added
34:02to it, and the debris area
34:05was very large.
34:07It was a horrific sight.
34:12Firefighters work tirelessly
34:13through the night.
34:18The scene in the morning is
34:20one of utter devastation.
34:23Clint Crookshanks from the
34:24NTSB, and I start poking
34:26around.
34:27Clint Crookshanks is one of
34:29the first investigators on the
34:30case.
34:31When we arrived on scene,
34:33there was a fire still
34:33burning.
34:34It turns out it was from a
34:35gas line that had been broken
34:37in the house.
34:38The fireman would put the fire
34:40out, and it would reignite
34:41every couple of minutes.
34:44Investigators hope the
34:45flight's black boxes will
34:46provide answers.
34:49We were able to cut a hole in
34:50the side of the fuselage.
34:54Once we took the recorders out
34:56of the airplane, we put them
34:57on the jet, and they were
34:58flown back to Washington, D.C.
34:59to our headquarters.
35:02At the NTSB labs in Washington,
35:04systems investigator Scott
35:06Warren analyzes the aircraft's
35:09cockpit voice recorder, or CVR,
35:11to determine if there are any
35:13indications of a problem in the
35:14cockpit.
35:17Is that ice on the windshield?
35:19He discovers that six minutes
35:21before the crash, the crew of
35:24flight 3407 notices a buildup of
35:26ice on the aircraft.
35:29Got it on my side.
35:31You don't have yours?
35:33Oh, yeah.
35:35Oh, it's lots of ice.
35:37Ice can be a deadly threat to
35:40any airplane.
35:41If an aircraft has ice on it,
35:43it will have more drag on it,
35:44so it will require more power to
35:46maintain a given airspeed.
35:48When ice accretes on a wing,
35:50it adds weight to the airplane,
35:52but most importantly, it changes
35:54the shape of the wing.
35:55And of course, it's the curved
35:56shape of the wing that actually
35:58creates the lift.
35:59So by changing the lift
36:01characteristics of the airplane,
36:03it makes it less able to fly.
36:05Laps 15 before...
36:06The CVR reveals that only
36:08minutes after the crew detects
36:10ice, a device called the stick
36:12shaker goes off.
36:16It's a warning to pilots that
36:18the plane is losing airspeed.
36:20If they don't go faster, the plane
36:22will stall and fall out of the sky.
36:28Scott Warren knows the Q400 has a
36:31sophisticated de-icing system.
36:34To prevent ice accumulating, the plane
36:36has rubber bladders along the front
36:38of the wings called de-icing boots.
36:42A series of valves uses air from the
36:44engines to inflate the boots and
36:46crack the ice off the wing.
36:50Studying the flight data recorder,
36:52or FDR, will reveal whether the de-icing
36:55system was switched on.
36:58We know from the FDR data that the
37:00de-icing system had been selected on
37:01by the crew, and it was on during
37:05the majority of the flight.
37:07The pilots had switched the de-icing
37:10mechanisms on.
37:12But were they working properly?
37:14To answer that question, investigators
37:16sift through piles of charred wreckage
37:19until they find the de-icing valves.
37:23We took those valves, and as far as we
37:25could tell, all those valves were
37:26working properly.
37:27If ice didn't bring down flight
37:333407, what else caused the plane to
37:36stall, crash, and kill 50 people?
37:42Investigators know icing conditions
37:44were not bad enough to take down
37:46continental connection flight 3407.
37:50Something else must have caused it to
37:53suddenly lose airspeed.
37:57NTSB investigator Scott Warren knows
38:03the plane was flying at 131 knots
38:05when the stick shaker went off.
38:08More than enough speed to stay
38:10airborne.
38:11All right, flaps 15.
38:16When the stick shaker went off,
38:18they were not necessarily at the edge
38:25of a stall.
38:26They were still 20 knots or so
38:29away from the stall.
38:30This new revelation deepens the mystery
38:33of flight 3407.
38:36The stall warning was triggered when the
38:38plane was in no danger of slowing
38:40to a stall speed.
38:43Investigators work with the plane's
38:45manufacturer to learn more about the
38:47aircraft.
38:47They discover the Bombardier Q400 has a
38:53unique safety feature known as a
38:55reference speed switch.
38:59The switch changes the airspeed at which
39:01the plane's stall warning is activated.
39:05Some kind of variable ref speed?
39:08Captain Renslow should have activated the
39:11switch before flying through the icy weather.
39:13When you are in icing conditions and ice
39:18does accrue on the wing, it can cause the
39:21stall speed to go up.
39:23And so this ref speed switch correspondingly
39:26causes the warning to come on sooner or at a
39:29higher speed.
39:30What that switch does is it basically changes
39:34the trigger settings for the stick shaker.
39:36If ice was slowing the plane, Captain
39:40Renslow would be alerted sooner than usual
39:42to pick up speed and avoid a stall
39:45situation.
39:51Investigators eventually find the reference
39:53speed switch panel buried in layers of
39:56crash debris.
39:58Bingo.
39:59And it's in the activated position.
40:01We'll probably be picking up some ice.
40:08If Renslow and Shaw remembered to configure
40:11the plane properly by turning on the
40:13reference speed switch, why didn't they
40:16notice their airspeed was too slow for the
40:19icy conditions?
40:21Obviously you're not making the captain,
40:23right?
40:24Right.
40:24The CVR reveals a chilling answer.
40:27The flight crew had been talking throughout
40:31the flight, continuing into the landing
40:34approach, a violation of the sterile cockpit
40:37rule.
40:38Yeah, that's another thing.
40:39And he said, yeah, you're going to be upgraded
40:41in six months.
40:43Blah, blah, blah.
40:45When the stick shaker goes off, the distracted
40:48crew is caught off guard.
40:52Once the stick shaker have activated, they
40:54could have turned the switch off.
40:57Or they could have put the nose down and
40:59increased their airspeed.
41:01Using data from the flight recorders,
41:03investigators create a computer simulation to
41:06give them a better understanding of the crash.
41:10Watch what happens just after the stick shaker
41:12goes off.
41:14It illustrates that just after the stick shaker
41:16was triggered, the plane suddenly pulled up.
41:20This action dramatically slowed the aircraft.
41:23And at this point, it did stall.
41:25Essentially, the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall
41:28from which it did not recover.
41:30It pitched over and hit the ground.
41:32Investigators are dumbfounded.
41:35Both pilots should have known how to respond to one of
41:38flight's most basic tasks.
41:40The crew's every action during the critical seconds after the stall
41:46warning sounded now demand careful scrutiny.
41:50We wanted to see if the way they flew the airplane was the way they
41:54were trained.
41:57Investigators dig deeper into the FDR data to examine how the pilot
42:02maneuvered the plane after the stick shaker was triggered.
42:05They focus in on the control column.
42:09What Scott Warren finds is stunning.
42:13In response to the stick shaker, Captain Renslow should have pushed the
42:17column forward to bring the nose down and gain speed.
42:21But the distracted captain did the exact opposite.
42:27We found that the crew, instead of pushing forward, which is the normal response to a
42:31stick shaker triggering, the crew was actually pulling back on the control.
42:36This had the effect of pulling the nose up, causing the airspeed to drop and
42:42tipping the aircraft into an actual storm.
42:47Captain Renslow apparently mishandled one of the most elemental
42:51piloting maneuvers, how to recover from a storm.
42:57Had the first officer simply called out, you're stalled, advanced the power,
43:01pushed the nose over, the airplane would have been able to recover.
43:05From a human point of view, it's sad to recognize that those sorts of things
43:09happened and the tragedy that came from that.
43:14It's concluded that Captain Renslow's failure to properly respond to the stall warning
43:19is the primary cause of the crash of Flight 3407.
43:24He reacted in the worst possible way and sealed the fate of the plane.
43:29You get a stall warning and you have to take corrective action and you know the
43:33altitude is very low.
43:35You don't have a lot of options.
43:37You just have to be able to react.
43:40No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
43:42At the heart of some of the worst airline accidents lie mistakes of staggering simplicity.
43:48What the hell are we into?
43:52Rookie errors don't necessarily occur to just rookie pilots.
43:56It can happen to the most experienced pilot.
43:58I'm so happy to see the risk of having the crash of the flight, which is very high- entraîned.
44:02Hold on.
44:03It can happen.
44:04We'll see you later.
44:04See you later.
44:05Finally, let's go on.
44:06See you later.
44:06See you later.
44:07Hi.
44:07Have a good day.
44:07See you later.
44:08See you later.
44:08Bye.
44:09Bye.
44:09See you later.
44:10Bye.
44:10Bye.
44:11Bye.
44:11Bye.
44:12Bye.
44:12Bye.
44:14Bye.
44:15Bye.
44:15Bye.
44:16Bye.
44:17Bye.
44:18Bye.
44:19Bye.
44:20Bye.
44:22Bye.
44:22Bye.
44:23Bye.
44:23Bye.
44:24Bye.
44:25Bye.
44:25Bye.
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