Dr. Mark N. Katz, senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government on his interview at Ukrlife with Liudmyla Nemyria presented his forecast for 2024 for Ukraine and the world.
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00:00Hello, this is UKLIFE TV with Lyudmila Nimeria and we continue our broadcasting from Kiev and today we have a special guest. Our guest today is Mark Katz. He is a professor of government and politics in the George Mason University Church School of Policy and Government and non-residential senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Professor, hello and thank you so much to be with us today.
00:26Hello and thank you for having me on your program.
00:28Thank you. Professor, you know, we have a tradition, many year tradition to speak in December about scenarios, trends, you know, main events which can determine the next year. And what do you think, how new 2024 could look like?
00:57Well, it seems like there are several scenarios that are possible. Obviously, we today have President Zelensky here in Washington and it's a very different situation than when he was here before.
01:15Obviously, it's not clear that the Republicans want to provide additional support to Ukraine.
01:23Ukraine. I actually think that they will, that we here in the US, we often see these, you know, these, these showdowns, as we call them, over budget issues. And it appears that, you know, nothing, there's going to be no agreement, no agreement, no agreement.
01:40And then suddenly at the last moment, there's an agreement. And, and so what I'm hoping is that this is what we're going to see this time. Because in fact, I think that, you know, most of the mainstream Republican politicians really do want to support Ukraine.
02:03But they want to support Ukraine, but they want to support Ukraine, but they want to support Ukraine, but they want to get something, you know, concessions from President Biden on the border issue.
02:12And I think that, you know, President Biden, probably, I think actually, there's a lot of Democrats that would like him to do more about the border as well. So I am hopeful that we're going to see USA to Ukraine continue.
02:34And also, I think what's interesting is just looking at the European press is that a lot of Europeans are talking about how, well, you know, if, if we can't rely on the US, then we have to do more for Ukraine. That's, you know, very interesting, I think, development that we have seen.
02:56So, you know, I think that 2024, you know, maybe a difficult year. But I think that, hopefully, US support is going to be continuing. And I think that, you know, people talk about, you know, the difficulties on the Western side, but I think the Russian side also has difficulties.
03:23And, you know, we see more and more accounts that the real problem is that, you know, they just are letting so many of their own, you know, young men, not even so young, you know, die at the front and not even giving them much by way of arms or just pushing these people out.
03:43And I think at a certain point, you know, to undermine the Russian forces that they're not going to be able to do this indefinitely. They're going to run out of people. And at a certain point, the people who are enforcing this are going to have to be shoved to the front themselves.
04:02They're not going to like this. And I have a feeling that they're going to want to protect themselves. So this struggle, I think, will continue, you know, so I've talked too much there.
04:20No, it's fine. Professor, do you think that the support of Ukraine from the side of United States of America is about a situation on the battlefield in Ukraine, or it is about the whole strategy of USA?
04:35Because I think it is quite important to understand here in Ukraine as well and in Europe as well and USA as well.
04:42You know, I think it's more about American domestic politics. You know, I think that for I think a lot of Republicans, the real problem is that Biden's support for Ukraine has been successful, that they don't like this because that's not the narrative that they they want to, you know, they like the narrative that that Biden is weak.
05:06You know, oh, you know, we lost Afghanistan. And so the fact that American support for Ukraine has been successful, really angers them. And so they, you know, somehow, they want to be able to be the ones who somehow show that the Democrats didn't do a good job, but you know, they'll come in at the last minute, if they can, to do something. So that's that's part of it.
05:32I think another part is simply that, you know, there has been a failure, I think, in the United States, certainly, you know, just all along, we don't teach people about international relations.
05:47You know, there's no, there's very little, you know, memory of the events that led to World War Two. And certainly on the American side, there's not, you know, much knowledge of what happened before the US entered the war.
06:04And I think that even knowledge of the Cold War is receding. So, you know, I think that there are those people out there who feel, you know, you know, why should we spend money on Ukraine when we have problems of our own?
06:24And there's no real appreciation that in fact, most of the money that the US devotes to Ukraine is spent in the United States, on American munitions, you know, hiring American workers. It's really very sad that they don't understand this. But I think it's, it's, it's really more about domestic politics than anything else.
06:46Professor, I know that there are many discussions in the United States of America, as well in US, EU country, that the war in Ukraine has reached a settlement. Do you think that it is true? And if it is true, what, what scenario are possible right now?
07:12Well, you know, maybe it has. I'm not a military expert. But, you know, it sounds like if, you know, that, you know, positions are static. But the thing is, is that this is, I think it's going to be a long war, that this is a situation we may see, you know, continue something like this.
07:33But, you know, the response is that, oh, well, you know, if it's, if it's not going to change, then we shouldn't support Ukraine. The thing is, is that, you know, Ukraine is doing everything it can just to maintain that stalemate. It's, it's, if without that support, the Russians aren't going to simply stop.
07:55That's the problem, is that, you know, someone like Putin, he's, he's prepared to sacrifice as many of his own people, and hope that people will, you know, get tired of it, and he can achieve what he wants.
08:10So, now, I think that there are those who are, who want to say, well, you know, if the, if the, if the front is not going to change, maybe what we need to have is a ceasefire in place.
08:27That's, that's, that would be the reasonable thing to do. And, you know, okay, let's, let's, let's, let's, let's, let's even think about that. You know, it's, it's, you know, how long would it last? In other words, I think that, you know, the problem is that so long as the Ukrainians themselves want to continue fighting, I think the West would be well advised to support them.
08:50Because even if there's a ceasefire, there will be a tendency in the West to think, oh, well, the war is now over. But Vladimir Putin is not going to think that, that he's simply going to use any ceasefire as a chance to, you know, to beef up his forces and to take advantage of the situation.
09:12So, you know, if there is to be, you know, a ceasefire, it has to come with something else. And I think that, you know, there's some people who say, well, the choice that people should offer is that, you know, if there's to be a ceasefire in place, then, you know, Ukraine joins NATO.
09:29In other words, that there has to be, you know, there has to be some major concession on Russia's part. And I think that, you know, someone like Putin, who I think exists very much in a bubble, you know, he's only told what he himself wants to hear. He's just not going to appreciate that.
09:54I think, you know, someone made a suggestion and the Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman, what's her name, Zakharova or whatever, you know, she is, this is something that, you know, for her was just, you know, impossible.
10:10But I think that's, that's the kind of offer that, that, that would only make sense.
10:18Sorry, my throat's a little dry.
10:22So, you know, I think, again, you know, it's like, it's, it's only if Ukraine itself wants to do anything like this.
10:31And I don't think that Ukraine will want to.
10:36Also, I think that if, if, in other words, that the sanctions on Russia cannot be lifted until Russia, you know, withdraws from Ukrainian territory.
10:48In other words, if there's to be a ceasefire, then the sanctions have to remain.
10:52In other words, that Russia isn't going to be treated like a normal country, or at least not by the West.
11:00So, you know, I think that the idea of a ceasefire, although it's appealing, I think, to many, it's obviously very problematic and has to be, you know, if that's what it's going to be, it has to exist as part of something else.
11:18You know, we saw, obviously, in the Korean War, which my own father fought in, you know, that that ended with a ceasefire.
11:26And, of course, it's been in place since 1953.
11:29And what we've seen is that, you know, North Korea has been under sanctions ever since then.
11:38And that's the kind of, that's the kind of agreement that I would, there's a sort of result of a ceasefire that I would foresee.
11:49Some people say, oh, Russia is not North Korea.
11:51I'm not so sure.
11:52I think Russia is just a much bigger North Korea.
11:56And it seems that its leadership wants to be like North Korea.
12:01So, you know, there are other possibilities to consider.
12:07Professor, when we worried about the support from the West, from USA, from European countries,
12:14we think why Western countries support or must support Ukraine?
12:21Does it have their national interests?
12:26Which connected with the support of Ukraine?
12:29Oh, no.
12:30Because it must be, you know, real understanding.
12:34In Western countries, why they support Ukraine?
12:39Do you think that this understanding, you know, they have right now this understanding?
12:44Because if no, in any moment, you know, they could decide, sorry, we haven't money, we couldn't support Ukraine.
12:53You could decide what you want and what could you have done right now.
12:58Yeah.
12:58Well, I think that, unfortunately, there is not a sufficient understanding, I think, in the part of many others.
13:06Obviously, I mean, it's, you know, the truth of the matter is that Ukraine and Western countries, we have a common interest of, I'm so sorry, of preventing Russian expansionism.
13:26And, you know, from the West, it's actually getting, you know, a good deal of Ukrainians are doing the fighting and Western countries have been paying.
13:34So, if they don't want to pay, and if Ukrainians can't fight, what do they think is going to happen?
13:41Or is that obviously, you know, there's a possibility of Russia could overrun Ukraine.
13:46And then, it emboldened Putin, is he going to stop everything?
13:51He's made it pretty clear that he has ambitions in Eastern Europe.
13:55And if he concludes, well, if the Westerners won't even support Ukrainians fighting, why should they fight themselves?
14:01In other words, why would they want to go to the bother?
14:04In other words, that Ukrainians are used to suffering, Westerners are not.
14:10And so, you know, if there's even the least difficulty, you know, Westerners will give in, or at least so he thinks.
14:18And I think that there is not an understanding, I think, that if Western support for Ukraine ends and Ukraine, unfortunately, falls, then there's going to be war between Russia and the West at some point.
14:37And that Westerners are going to have to do what Ukrainians did.
14:43And I'm not sure that Westerners are, they don't seem to understand that this is what awaits them.
14:51And the casualties will be massive, that it will be, you know, thousands per month.
14:59That, and I think that, you know, Putin is basically, you know, thinking that they'll just, you know, that they won't be able to take it like Russians will take it.
15:12So, you know, I just think that there's just a complete lack of a measure.
15:19It reminds me of the situation during the Spanish Civil War, you know, before the main World War II began, that Western countries didn't defend the Spanish Republic.
15:32And that, you know, you know, Hitler and Mussolini supported Franco.
15:38And the Westerners just didn't think it was that much in their interest.
15:41And, of course, that's what part of, you know, what contributed to Germany in particular, thinking that they could get away with whatever.
15:51Professor, do you think that Putin will be ready to attack NATO country, for example, Baltic country, for example, next year, before his, you know, election to, you know, to rise his reputation inside the country or something like that?
16:10You know, you know, I don't think he has to worry about the election.
16:16Yeah, it's true.
16:17Right. I don't think he needs to do that.
16:20But I think that, in fact, if anything, I think he would wait till after the election.
16:27But if he feels that he has won in Ukraine, then why not attack the Baltics?
16:35It seems that this is these would be the easiest countries.
16:40You know, there were certainly studies, you know, going back to the 1990s, how the Baltics really would be very difficult for the West to defend if they were NATO members.
16:51And I think that, you know, it's I think it's highly possible.
16:58I think I think that the Russians would like to attack Poland, whom they just hate.
17:03And now we have a more reasonable Polish government in place.
17:07You know, I wouldn't be surprised if we see more Russian pressure on Poland as well.
17:16But, yeah, I think the Baltics would be would be logical because if the West won't defend Ukraine, will they really defend the Baltics?
17:27I think Putin would think that maybe they won't.
17:29Professor, do you think that there are very important misunderstandings among Western countries and countries of the Global South?
17:44Why I ask about this case?
17:50Because at the beginning of the war, we are here in Ukraine, don't want to understand the war, Russia's war against Ukraine, like, you know, regional war.
18:02We think right now that it is much more wider war, not just the region.
18:10It is not just about Russia and Ukraine.
18:14But now I think we receive another problem.
18:17Because if we look for our war, like something wider, like a process of misunderstanding or some conflicts among Western countries and global South countries, and we stay in between.
18:37And in that case, it is not a good story as well.
18:40So, that is why, do you think that in reality, Western countries have many difficulties with or many misunderstandings with countries of the Global South and how it would influence for our war?
18:57And do you think that this misunderstanding between Western countries and countries of the Global South could, you know, make Putin stronger?
19:08Well, I think it has.
19:09You know, I think that the Global South, you know, that they don't want Russia to lose.
19:20They're fearful that if Russia loses, then it will return to the unipolar world and a lot of American pressure on them about democracy or whatever that they don't want to have to, you know, face.
19:36They like the idea of a multipolar world.
19:43They have this notion that it's somehow a fairer world, even though it's not at all a fairer world.
19:49And that, you know, they see that China, as economically powerful as it is, it's not going to, it's not yet ready to intervene in places in the third world, that it's only Russia that will do this.
20:07And so what I think they're fearful of is that, you know, it's very unfortunate, you know, for Ukrainians, but that for the Global South, why should they support Ukraine?
20:19Because they don't even see it about Ukraine, it's about Russia and the West, it's about the global, you know, global South and the West, and that Russia doesn't pressure them about political or economic reforms.
20:36So they're better off with Russia.
20:41And so it is really very, very pathetic.
20:46And also they see it as an opportunity to make money.
20:50They're getting cheap oil.
20:52Some of them are trading with Russia.
20:56I mean, there was a lot of Western goods are getting into Russia via Turkey or the United Arab Emirates or Kazakhstan or Armenia or whatever.
21:10And yeah, so they're profiting, basically.
21:13So, you know, it's, yeah, they're just pursuing some very, very narrow self-interest.
21:23And I think there's just a tremendous amount of resentment.
21:26Why is the West helping Ukraine when they don't help, say, the Palestinians that, you know, oh, Russia's occupying Ukraine?
21:36Well, Israel's been occupying Palestine.
21:39Why doesn't the West do anything about that?
21:41So it's like, you know, if one really thinks that occupation is a bad thing, one should oppose it everywhere.
21:48And there is that you don't like Israeli occupation in Palestine doesn't mean you like Russian occupation in Ukraine, but it's an excuse, essentially, to not support Ukraine.
21:58And also, I think just, you know, what we're seeing is that there's just not an awful lot of knowledge in the global South, even less about Russia and Ukraine, that they don't want to see it as a colonial situation.
22:18In fact, you know, we've heard many people say, you know, what Europeans do to Europeans is not colonialism.
22:26Now, of course, you know, the Irish would disagree, the Finns would disagree, the Poles, the Ukrainians would disagree.
22:32But see, that's the trouble, in other words, if that's colonialism, then the problem is that then they're not special.
22:40In other words, that they want to see their experience of Western colonialism, you know, as very, very special and unique and terrible.
22:49They don't want to think of Russia as a colonial empire the way that the Europeans were.
22:56But, of course, it is.
22:59But this would require them, if they acknowledge that, then they kind of have to change their policy.
23:05So they don't acknowledge it.
23:06So now, you know, for those who have been supportive of Russia, like the Iranians, for example, they're in a position where that if Russia loses, they lose.
23:24They are now in a very bad position.
23:27They have tied themselves to the Russians very foolishly.
23:30And so their fate is tied with Russia's.
23:36But for others, you know, like the Saudis or the Emiratis or whomever, it's, you know, I think, you know, it's a profit, basically.
23:49That's what they're after, that they have this notion that it's best to have, you know, multiple great powers competing for their influence.
23:58In other words, they don't want to side with anyone.
24:01They want to be able to maneuver among them.
24:05So that's what they consider something to their advantage.
24:11And I think also that, you know, they just don't want to understand.
24:19Certainly at the top leadership level, you know, that they're interacting with the top Russian leadership.
24:30I mean, this is their knowledge of Russia.
24:31And they're, you know, treated very well.
24:34And sort of, you know, the tough guys, you know, who know that if you don't rule with a strong hand, there's going to be chaos.
24:45That this, you know, that they stick together.
24:48The Americans don't understand this.
24:50They just, I'm so sorry, support democracy that leads to chaos.
24:58And so, you know, they see their interest as sticking with the Russians.
25:09Professor, do you think that next year will be the years of big influence of global South?
25:19And if this is true, do you think that this is a good use for Putin, who tried to play his personal game with global South?
25:30I'm not sure why the global South would be any more important next year than any other year.
25:37The thing about the global South, with few exceptions, in other words, they're taking advantage of the war in Ukraine.
25:45But they're not actively, in other words, most of them are not sending arms to Russia.
25:53They're certainly not sending their own soldiers.
25:56In other words, that their support for Russia is more passive.
26:02They'll buy cheap Russian oil.
26:06But that they're not going to take any risks for Russia, in my view.
26:12You know, there's not going to, if it's in trouble, they're not going to do anything to help it.
26:18You know, the exceptions, of course, are, you know, Iran, North Korea.
26:22Those are the ones who are, who really are helping it and helping it tremendously.
26:29So, I don't see that changing.
26:31I don't see that, I don't see the global South as being in a position to do much more than it's doing already.
26:44Trump, many say that it is a key person for the next year because of election company, because he has possibility to be a president of the USA.
26:59And that is why many people in the European Union worried about that, about the security, about, you know, NATO, about the future of NATO and many, many other things.
27:09And as I understand, many people think very, are worried as well in USA, how everything will happen, how election will happen, what, how events will, you know, go in after the election and during the election.
27:27What do you think?
27:28Is it, is it really a problem that Trump would be president or it's just, you know, fair of some people which, you know, don't understand much more deep process?
27:41Well, I think, I think he is a problem.
27:44There's no way to sugarcoat that.
27:47But look, I think he's in a lot of trouble.
27:50There's all these court cases against him.
27:53You know, anything could happen that, you know, it's not clear to me that he's really going to be in a position to run.
28:03I mean, nothing will, the people who support him, I mean, they don't care.
28:08But the thing is, is that, look, you know, he lost the 2020 election.
28:13Why would he win the 2024 election?
28:16Now, it's, it's possible.
28:21But see, the thing is, in 2016, people didn't really know what they were getting.
28:25In other words, they, you know, people could, like, after he was elected, he was like, well, maybe he'll be reasonable, whatever.
28:30Of course, he wasn't.
28:32But now no one can have any illusions about, about what he's like.
28:37I mean, he really is pretty awful.
28:39On the other hand, I mean, we did see when he was president that despite all his, you know, his dislike with regard to the Ukrainian leadership, what have you, we did see more American assistance to Ukraine under Trump than under Obama.
29:01So, he's not totally predictable.
29:06You know, I read the John Bolton memoir, you know, his national security advisor.
29:12And one of the things is that, what struck me is that, it's not that Trump particularly liked Putin, but that Trump thought that he had the ability to work with, you know, any dictator.
29:26In other words, that this was somehow, that he felt this was his ability.
29:32Of course, it didn't work out.
29:34But that he did regard Russia as a competitor.
29:40In other words, he, you know, part of the reason he was so against the German leadership was about the Nord Stream 2.
29:47Well, why would you care about that if you weren't worried about Putin?
29:51In other words, if he is such good friends with Putin, why wouldn't Nord Stream 2 be a good thing?
29:58But for Putin, it was a bad thing.
30:00For Trump, it was a bad thing.
30:02So, it's, you know, it's not clear exactly how he would behave.
30:12And you never know, with someone like Trump, in other words, his attitude could change, you know, in a moment.
30:18In other words, that, you know, does Trump really have any reason to regard Putin as his friend anymore?
30:30You know, it doesn't seem like he really does.
30:34So, you know, I think that Trump would come in and, you know, he said, oh, he can solve the Ukraine war in a day.
30:41Well, obviously, he can't.
30:45But if he came in with that expectation that, oh, you know, the Ukraine war is only going on because Biden is president.
30:53Now, Putin will be reasonable now that Trump is president again.
30:57Well, Putin won't be reasonable.
30:59And if Trump is offended, then who knows how he'll behave.
31:06Yeah, he's, you know, so I don't know.
31:09In other words, I don't think he's, I personally don't think he's going to be elected president.
31:14Maybe it's more my hope than anything else, but I don't think he will be.
31:18And even if he is, I'm not so sure that U.S. policy will change that dramatically.
31:30But, yeah, for example, we had recently someone, a speaker come from Finland to speak at George Mason.
31:37And this guy was saying how, you know, the Trump administration were actually good years for Finland, that there was more American support for Finland than ever before.
31:49Very interesting, really.
31:50Yeah, you know, so Finland did well out of the Trump administration.
31:55So, no, I think the Finns, they really are good at dealing with bizarre people, that they're used to dealing with the Russians, that they're, yeah, they play a poor hand well.
32:14And so, you know, they're not so concerned about a new Trump.
32:19I mean, they're not going to want it, but, you know, if, you know, I think the dynamics of the Republican Party would be very different if Trump were president.
32:35In other words, you wouldn't see this so-called Freedom Caucus as active.
32:41In other words, if Trump decided that, you know, we're going to support Ukraine under whatever circumstances, he's not going to get any opposition in Congress about this, if that's what he decides.
32:54So that's one of the different, in other words, what we're seeing, it's when you have a Republican House of Representatives and a Democratic president, the kind of dynamic we have now.
33:05You know, if either of those change, then we won't see that.
33:08Professor, this year, from the point of view of people who live in, you know, live just today, we understand that there are many, many points where many countries where situation is very destabilized.
33:30What I mean, Russians war against Ukraine, the war in the Middle East, and many experts say that it is a beginning of Third World War, and that next year we will see, you know, more wars in different regions.
33:54Do you think that next year will be, you know, will be a year of, you know, destabilization in different parts of the world?
34:05Are you expecting this?
34:07Well, you know, I think that there is a lot of, that argument is possible.
34:14You know, I think if you look at the lead up both to World War I and World War II, there are a lot of little wars, you know, that were taking place, and then they suddenly kind of merged into a big war.
34:29So, and I think that, you know, saying that we're seeing now, you know, it's not just the war in Ukraine, but we're seeing the Middle East conflict, which could expand, you know, into Lebanon easily.
34:44We're seeing now, you know, Venezuela is threatening to invade Guyana.
34:53I don't think that they would even think about this if nothing else was going on, because that would be the focus of attention.
35:01I think that they're thinking about it because they might be able to get away with it, you know, because everyone's focusing on other things.
35:09And, of course, there's always the Taiwan situation and the South China Sea, you know, with naval incidents between China and the Philippines occurring pretty regularly now.
35:21So, yeah, there are a lot of problems.
35:29You know, is it possible?
35:31Now, obviously, we didn't have nuclear weapons at the beginning of World War I or World War II.
35:36And I would hope that this would still be served as a deterrent.
35:44Nevertheless, I think that, you know, if not a world war, we're going to see an awful lot of war in the world next year and that it might well increase.
35:56Professor, many people here in Ukraine think that next year will be crucial for the Russians' war against Ukraine.
36:08I agree with that.
36:13Well, you know, it could be crucial.
36:15I mean, this year could have been crucial.
36:18Yeah, it could have been crucial.
36:21And I think that at a certain point, you know, I think that Putin's real weak point is that is the toll on his own troops that this war is taking.
36:32That, you know, how long can he simply waste all these lives before there's some reaction, you know, either on the part of the troops themselves.
36:46Certainly, you know, we're seeing the wives and mothers.
36:50And there was just like during the Chechen war, we seem to see more activity on the parts of Russia's women who are against the war.
37:01And he doesn't like this.
37:02So, you know, I think that he's in a desperate situation that I think just think he keeps hoping that the West is going to give up and he'll be saved.
37:18But I, you know, things could happen in Russia at any time.
37:25And I think the real problem is at some point, do his own security services, do they decide that the costs are greater than any benefits that they're experiencing, that they're only experiencing costs?
37:43Now, you know, I've kind of hoped for this for a while, but it hasn't happened.
37:50But I think the longer the war goes on, the riskier it gets for Putin.
37:57And the last question about Russia, because at the beginning, everybody says that we need to stop Russia.
38:05But there was a different understanding of this process to stop Russia.
38:12At the very beginning, many countries say, no, it is important.
38:16It is impossible for Russia to lose.
38:20Yeah.
38:20And everybody thinks that it could, you know, bring many, many problems for the world in general because of nuclear weapons and many, many other things.
38:31But now, this year, it seems for us that Russia have time to strengthen, to recover.
38:40And now, Russia is ready to continue.
38:44And do you think this is a problem of, in understanding of Russia behavior, in Russia of action, in Russia, in understanding of Russia?
38:55Well, you know, I think that, yeah, Russia definitely is ready to continue.
39:05But I think it all depends, you know, and obviously, they're getting weapons from Iran, from North Korea.
39:10Although we read that the quality of the weapons from North Korea is not very good.
39:16There's a lot of them blow up in Russian faces.
39:20That, you know, I think, and the point is, how many men are they prepared to lose?
39:28You know, they're prepared to lose a lot.
39:30But they've lost a lot already.
39:31And the best and the brightest have fled.
39:36So it's just how long can they keep doing that?
39:39I think that, you know, obviously, their economy is stronger than we all would have hoped.
39:47They have suppliers, but it's the number of men at a certain point that, you know, this is going to be more of a problem, it seems to me.
40:03It's not limitless.
40:05You can't just do this forever.
40:07So that, I think, is his vulnerability.
40:16Professor, thank you so much.
40:17Thank you so much to be with us today.
40:20Thank you again for having me.
40:22And I wish it was under happier circumstances.
40:29And stay with us.
40:30It was Okra Live TV.
40:31It was Lovey on New Media.