00:00It's not any old obligation.
00:01I mean, you're absolutely right, of course,
00:03that not any old obligation would be enough here.
00:07It's an obligation that runs to the individual beneficiary
00:11and that concerns an individual beneficiary's entitlement
00:15to choose something.
00:16And once you're at that, you're at a right.
00:21And if the language in the statute
00:25said right, as it did in Talefsky,
00:28you would still say, oh, well, the state doesn't know
00:30that that right is enforceable.
00:33What this language does is the same thing
00:35that the rights language does.
00:37It says, you have an entitlement.
00:39It's your option to choose a doctor.
00:42Now, we've never said, oh, and the statute has to say,
00:46and this can be enforced in court.
00:49May I respond, Mr. Chief?
00:50Sure.
00:51Justice Kagan, what you said in Talefsky
00:53is that you need rights-creating language
00:55with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.
00:58So the fact that you identify individuals and that they're
01:01This is an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.
01:04The benefited class is Medicaid beneficiaries
01:07who have the right to go see the doctor of their choice.
01:09That's what this provision is.
01:11But Justice Kagan, it's missing the connective tissue
01:14to the rights-creating language.
01:15You need clear rights-creating language
01:17that the beneficiaries are subject to
01:19and that is directed to the regulated entity here, a state.
01:22And all of that connective tissue
01:23is missing because there are no clearly rights-creating words
01:26in this statute.
01:27If you would lower the bar, those provisions
01:29that we mentioned in our brief are just the start.
01:31That's already 10% of Section 1396A.
01:35The atypical high bar that you articulated in Talefsky
01:38would be abandoned, and courts will continue discovering rights
01:41in all kinds of statutes.
01:42Thank you, counsel.
01:43Justice Thomas.
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