Bolivian President Luis Arce addresses failed coup attempt

teleSUR English

The President of Bolivia, Luis Arce Catacora, discusses the failed coup attempt and incidents of June 26th, 2024, before journalists in a press conference from La Paz, Bolivia. teleSUR

Transcript

00:00We go live to La Paz, Bolivia, where President Luis Arce is offering statements 24 hours

00:10after the country faced down a failed coup attempt.

00:15I'm here to solve this problem.

00:23Despite the fact that our ministers have been informing in Casa Grande all this time, we've

00:36been here following up on what happened for us, for the President.

00:49The information that is arriving is actually in the afternoon.

01:00Between 11 o'clock and 12, we were meeting with the comrades of the Unity of Trade Unions.

01:15We participated there, and we decided in the middle of the event, our defense minister

01:33wanted to communicate with us urgently, and we asked what is it about, and he just told

01:41me his concern that the commander of the army was not responding to any phone calls, and

02:01there are information that Unity's military units were heading to La Paz, and there was

02:11no instruction for those motorized units with military effectives were actually moving

02:22to La Paz.

02:25They didn't have any authorization.

02:29As our minister of defense has said, he had this news, he called the commander of the

02:37army at that moment, General Zúñiga, and asked him what was happening.

02:49He said that General Zúñiga, he didn't know how he was going to investigate.

02:56You know the attempts of the minister of defense to communicate with him.

03:06They were in contact with a commander-in-chief of a military command, and they didn't receive

03:14any communication on the part of the three commanders of the forces.

03:21In Bolivia, we have three forces, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army.

03:30This is our army.

03:32The three commanders didn't respond to the calls.

03:39The chief commander was asking for information and didn't receive any information, and that

03:45accounts for the concern about what was happening, and that's why they just made us know that

03:53in the middle of the meeting.

03:55I ordered our defense minister to communicate himself with the chief and to insist on the

04:06phone communication with the army commander.

04:12When we personally tried to communicate with the commander, we didn't receive any response

04:30to our calls that we were doing personally.

04:35We even sent messages, and he didn't do it.

04:45Arriving at Casa Grande, I communicated with Cochihuanca, and I told him that we meet here

04:58to evaluate the situation with our vice president.

05:07We communicated with the defense minister and asked him about what he has the information.

05:16We started to evaluate with the president, with the vice president, and we heard the

05:24sirens, and when I told the minister of defense to go and see what happened, she said that

05:35it was that there were armored vehicles arriving at the square.

05:43The armored vehicles were actually coming down the street and taking all the corners

05:48of the square.

05:50Additionally, a little bit later, military police units were getting inside the square,

06:10and we clearly realized that it was an attempt, an acute attempt.

06:20We contacted all our ministers to come to Casa Grande to evaluate the situation, and

06:35we ordered everybody and all the population to inform the population what was happening.

06:44We wrote the tweet that you know, and little by little, we saw that the Plaza Murillo were

06:54being taken by the military.

07:00Immediately, our government minister called me and was in the middle of the square, and

07:08he was trying to get into the square.

07:12He wanted to try to speak with the person that was at the head of the operation.

07:19He couldn't contact that person.

07:24He came to Casa Grande and informed us of the armored vehicles, that General Zuniga,

07:32the Vice Admiral, and they were the ones that were heading personally in Plaza Murillo.

07:41Simultaneously, the police commander arrives, that also informed us that he was summoned

07:52by these commanders to join in to this coup attempt.

08:06The police commander told us that his decision was to deny, to say no, to join in those actions.

08:20Ten years, ten days before, in the anniversary of the police, he had said that he would defend

08:27the democracy.

08:30I evaluated that attitude, and of course, the situation was very clear, and we saw the

08:42images that were being broadcast by social media.

08:49We saw the intention to penetrate with this armored vehicle to this Palacio Quemado.

09:04We took the decision to go down and talk to the people that were there.

09:12At that moment, we were receiving demonstrations of solidarity from governments around the

09:19area, from international organizations, from social organizations.

09:25We also saw expression of support.

09:31The communique that was issued by the Central Union of Bolivia was to order an undeniafied

09:41strike.

09:46The Central Union of Trade Unions was also joined by other organizations.

09:58In addition to what we saw that was happening around the Plaza Murillo, where the people

10:06gathered there around the area, they were just facing the air forces that were there,

10:21because the air forces were actually against the people.

10:25We took the decision to go down and to face those who were heading this failed coup attempt.

10:36To face them, I had the command baton that characterizes me to characterize the general

10:48captain of air forces that is also used in the public acts.

10:58I take the baton.

10:59I go down to be able to face those who were heading the coup operation.

11:12To the three commanders, I ordered them to stand down, and to General Zúñiga, I ordered

11:26to redeploy all the forces, all the military forces that were deployed there in Plaza Murillo.

11:36General Zúñiga answered me that he was not going to comply with my orders, in spite of

11:43the fact that I was showing him the baton of command, which accredited me as a general

11:52captain of the air forces in Bolivia.

11:55He didn't comply with that.

12:00I also told them to advise Almarro, who was also on the same line of not complying with

12:09my orders.

12:16I also faced and told the same thing to the air force general, and I also insisted on

12:27this action, insisted about the consequences of what they were doing, and they were violating

12:36the proper rules of the air forces.

12:46They just left the area where they were standing.

12:54It was clear at that moment that we have talked with the Minister of Defense.

13:03In the moment that we were observing what was happening in the square, I was communicating

13:11with our Minister of Defense, and he told me who was the person that was at the head

13:21of this coup attempt.

13:26So I ordered him, to our Minister of Defense, that we should make an urgent change of our

13:34commanders so that he can bring the three commanders that the day before we had determined.

13:47What does this mean?

13:48The day before, on Tuesday, General Zúñiga, with any authorization, made statements that

14:05were not in line with the government line and which violated our political constitution.

14:12At that moment, I met rapidly with the Minister of Presidency and Minister of Defense.

14:23We analyzed this issue, and we decided that Zúñiga was violating the policy of the state,

14:38and also the members.

14:41He was violating our constitution, and we would not allow that.

14:46I ordered the Minister of Presidency to meet, as you know.

14:53I had a meeting with the governors, a meeting that was extended up to 7, 7.30 in the evening,

15:02and I knew that meeting was going to be long, and I ordered the Minister to meet with Zúñiga

15:12and to let him know about our decision to separate him from the command of the army.

15:23I was told afterwards, this Minister that I had met with Zúñiga, and they ended the

15:37meeting where Zúñiga said that he had understood that he had exceeded his statement and that

15:46he was willing to be in the hands of the decision that was to be taken, which the decision

15:53was communicated to Zúñiga at that moment.

15:59So that's why one of his statements that he made at the door of the Palacio Quemado

16:04really talks, speaks about loyalty and disloyalties, but the true thing, the real thing, we would

16:17not allow, we could not allow something that violated the constitution of a state, and

16:24we had to act in consequence.

16:29That way you are witness, we went to Casa Grande and we positioned ourselves, we appointed

16:39the new commanders of the military forces.

16:44This chronology that we have set is for you to know it, I know that you've been here

16:53with us from the first moment facing this coup attempt.

17:12Of course, in those moments, so tense that we were living through, the most important

17:24thing has been the people, the Bolivian people that has mobilized, and they saw that the

17:34military army was shooting at them.

17:41Some of them actually had to be treated surgically because they were hit, they were wounded.

17:50When one faces what kind of a situation, many things pass through your head, and I remember

17:58in those moments when I saw those armed vehicles in those corners in 2019, also the coup, I'm

18:16sorry, 1979, at the head of Latouche, the 1980 coup, García Mesa, young, in that moment,

18:36the people were making barricades at the University of San Andrés also, facing the

18:49tanks that were supporting the coup at that time, and I was remembering what happened

18:58in 2019.

18:59Of course, when the coup was carried out, the armored vehicles were not there as it

19:08was yesterday.

19:12The armored vehicles came afterwards, and the repression of the Bolivian people was

19:17after the coup, and I remember that repression period in 2019, but also that moment we also

19:31remember everything that we have passed in our electoral campaigns when we had our brothers

19:41and sisters in our shoulders when we were campaigning, when they were telling us what

19:49they had suffered for the coup of that year, 2019, 2020.

20:00We remember the campaigns, 2020, and we remember how, together with the Bolivian people, we

20:09were facing that, and we also could remember how, together with the Bolivian people, we

20:15celebrated the recovery of the democracy, and that gave us the courage to face the putschist

20:29that was trying to enter the Palace of Government panels, as afterwards were known by the statements

20:37by the Zúñiga in the prosecutor's office and in other instances.

20:47What they tried to do was to take the government.

20:51That's what I can say, inform now about what we have known from here, where ministers and

21:00vice ministers have been firmed as one man facing this coup attempt, that one doesn't

21:14know what consequence it would have had.

21:18We have the convictions, the democracy, and we, in the campaign of 2020, we said that

21:27we were going to express, to defend the democracy and recover the democracy for the Bolivarian

21:34people, for the Bolivian people.

21:35So that's why we faced this decisively to stop that coup attempt that we unfortunately

21:46considered that happened.

21:49These are the details that I can share with you that we have lived through in Casa Grande.

21:54Well, if you have any doubt, I can answer any questions.

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