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A Japanese ambassador’s reports to Tokyo gave American codebreakers an extraordinary view into Hitler’s plans—and helped Allied leaders assess the threat before D-Day. General Hiroshi Oshima believed his diplomatic cipher was secure, but U.S. cryptanalysts were reading his detailed accounts of German coastal defenses and private conversations with Hitler.

This World War II history documentary follows the codebreakers, the intelligence Oshima unknowingly passed to the Allies, and the deception that helped keep German forces focused on the Pas-de-Calais. Discover how Hitler’s own words reached American desks through a secret channel whose sender never realized it had been compromised.

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Transcript
00:00On November 10th, 1943, a little before lunchtime,
00:04Private Leonard Mudloff was listening to Berlin.
00:07He was not in Europe.
00:08He was in Falkir County, Virginia, about 40 miles west of Washington,
00:13on a farm that had been a dairy until the Army bought it the summer before for $127,500.
00:20The soldiers called it Vint Hill.
00:22The Army called it Monitoring Station No. 1.
00:26The first operators had set up their receivers in the barn.
00:30Through Mudloff's headphones came Morse code,
00:32and the same opening kept repeating, over and over,
00:36the way a sender repeats himself when he wants to be absolutely certain the far end is awake.
00:42Urgent message. Berlin calling Tokyo.
00:46Mudloff started copying. Not words.
00:49Blocks of letters that meant nothing to him at all.
00:52And the message did not end.
00:54It ran on past his shift, so the next man took over, and then the next.
00:59For the better part of two days, operators on that Virginia farm passed the transmission from hand to hand,
01:05like buckets on a fire line.
01:07And the sheets went by courier to a former women's college in Arlington,
01:11the headquarters of the Army's Signal Security Agency.
01:15By the evening of November 11th, the first pieces were on desks there.
01:19Think about the route that message took.
01:22It was written in an embassy in blacked-out Berlin.
01:25It was aimed at Tokyo, halfway around the planet.
01:28And on the way, without anyone touching a single wire,
01:32it passed straight through a cow farm in Virginia.
01:36Hold on to that date, November 10th.
01:38It comes back later.
01:39From a man you would not expect.
01:42The man at the other end of that transmission was no radio clerk.
01:46He was General Hiroshi Oshima of the Imperial Japanese Army,
01:51Japan's ambassador to Nazi Germany.
01:53He had served in Berlin, on and off, since 1934.
01:57He spoke fluent German.
01:59He was a personal friend of Ribbentrop.
02:01The American correspondent, William Shirer,
02:04wrote that he was more Nazi than the Nazis.
02:06And he had something almost no one outside the German high command had.
02:11Hitler's trust.
02:13Hitler received him privately.
02:15Hitler talked to him about the war.
02:18The real war.
02:19With numbers in it.
02:22What Oshima was now reporting to Tokyo,
02:24in exhaustive, soldierly detail,
02:26was a tour.
02:28For nine days at the end of October,
02:30the Germans had escorted him along the coast of France
02:33and shown him the defenses they were building
02:35against the invasion everyone knew was coming.
02:38Strong points.
02:39Gun positions.
02:41Ditches.
02:43Divisions.
02:44They showed him because he was an ally,
02:47and because they wanted Tokyo to be impressed.
02:49And a private in the 2nd Signal Service Battalion
02:52was writing it all down in Virginia.
02:55Here is the question this whole story turns on.
02:59Seven months after that afternoon,
03:00more than 150,000 Allied soldiers would go ashore in Normandy.
03:05Among the things the Allied high command knew going into that day
03:09was what Adolf Hitler himself believed was about to happen.
03:13Not a guess from a spy,
03:15and not a reading of aerial photographs.
03:17Hitler's own words,
03:19spoken in his own house,
03:21ten days before the landings.
03:23Those words reached the Americans
03:25by exactly the route this message took.
03:28The radio of a Japanese general
03:30who never once suspected anyone was listening.
03:34How does that happen?
03:36How does the most closely guarded mind in Europe
03:39leak, sentence by sentence,
03:42onto a farm in Virginia?
03:44And how does it keep happening,
03:46for years,
03:47without the man doing the leaking ever finding out?
03:50If you want to see how American army codebreakers
03:54turned an enemy ambassador's loyalty
03:56into a window on Hitler's thinking,
03:58take a second to like this video
04:00and subscribe to the channel.
04:02To understand why that message could be read at all,
04:05you need to know something unsettling about it.
04:08The cipher Oshima used
04:09was the Japanese foreign ministry's best,
04:12a machine system the Americans had nicknamed
04:15Purple.
04:16And the Americans had been reading Purple
04:18since the autumn of 1940,
04:21more than a year before Pearl Harbor.
04:24Think about what that means.
04:26On the morning of December 7, 1941,
04:30the United States was reading Japan's
04:32top diplomatic cipher.
04:34Washington had the long Japanese note
04:36breaking off negotiations
04:38before the Japanese embassy
04:40had finished typing it up.
04:41And the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor anyway.
04:45They fell because the foreign ministry in Tokyo
04:47did not know the attack plan.
04:49The Japanese military had not told the diplomats.
04:53Purple could carry only what the man
04:55at the sending end knew.
04:57And in December 1941,
04:59the men at the sending end
05:00knew almost nothing that mattered.
05:03Keep that rule in mind,
05:05because the rest of this story depends on it.
05:07A broken code is only worth
05:10what the person using it knows.
05:12That is why the long message out of Berlin
05:14in November 1943 was a different animal.
05:18This time, the man at the sending end
05:21had stood in German bunkers
05:23beside German generals.
05:25He had asked questions as a professional soldier,
05:28and he had been given professional answers.
05:31And the next time Hitler talked to him
05:34about the invasion,
05:35Oshima would not be passing on gossip.
05:38He would be repeating the Fuhrer.
05:41But before a single word of that
05:43could reach an American desk,
05:45somebody had to break purple.
05:47For 18 months,
05:49the army's best cryptanalysts failed.
05:52The chief signal officer of the army
05:55came down to their section
05:56almost every day
05:57to ask how it was going.
05:59Then, on a hot afternoon
06:00in September 1940,
06:02a 27-year-old statistician
06:04who had come to them
06:05from the Railroad Retirement Board
06:07walked over with two sheets of paper,
06:09pointed at a few lines,
06:11and said nothing.
06:12Within seconds,
06:14one of the men in that room
06:15was running in circles
06:16with his arms in the air.
06:18What had she seen
06:19that the rest of them had missed?
06:20Her name was Genevieve Grotchen.
06:2327 years old,
06:24a mathematician by training,
06:26she had spent her first working years
06:28calculating annuities
06:29for the Railroad Retirement Board.
06:31The people in her section
06:33called her Gene.
06:34On September 20, 1940,
06:37she was in the Munitions Building
06:39in Washington,
06:40in the cramped offices
06:41of the army's
06:42Signal Intelligence Service,
06:44working on the problem
06:45that had beaten everyone around her
06:47for a year and a half.
06:49Here is what they were up against,
06:50in one sentence.
06:52The Japanese machine
06:54split the alphabet
06:55into two groups,
06:56six letters in one
06:58and twenty in the other,
07:00and scrambled
07:01each group separately.
07:03The six had been cracked
07:04months earlier
07:05with pencil and paper.
07:07The twenty
07:08were a wall.
07:10Frank Rowlett,
07:11who ran the Japanese team,
07:13had been putting in
07:14fourteen-hour days.
07:15The army's
07:16chief signal officer,
07:18Major General Joseph Moborn,
07:20came down to the section
07:21almost every day
07:22to ask how it was going.
07:25Every day,
07:25the answer was the same.
07:27That afternoon,
07:29Rowlett and two of his men,
07:30Robert Ferner
07:31and Albert Small,
07:32were going over
07:33the latest work
07:33when Grotchen came over
07:35and asked if she could
07:35show them something.
07:37She laid two worksheets
07:38on the table.
07:39She pointed at a few lines.
07:41Then she stood there
07:42and waited,
07:43without a word.
07:45She had been working
07:46with six messages
07:47that had been partly
07:47reconstructed,
07:48and in the scrambled
07:49output of the twenty letters,
07:51she had found sequences
07:52that repeated.
07:53The machine was not random.
07:56It cycled.
07:57And anything that cycles
07:59can be followed.
08:01Small saw it first.
08:03He shouted,
08:04Whoopee!
08:04and ran around the room
08:06with his hands in the air.
08:07Ferner clapped and yelled,
08:09Hooray!
08:09Hooray!
08:11Rowlett jumped up and down,
08:12shouting,
08:13That's it!
08:13That's it!
08:15Grotchen's eyes
08:16filled with tears.
08:17People from other sections
08:18came to see
08:19what the noise was about,
08:20and William Friedman,
08:21the head of the whole service,
08:23pushed through the crowd.
08:24Rowlett pointed at the worksheets.
08:27Look what Gene
08:27has just discovered.
08:28They celebrated
08:29by sending out for Cokes.
08:32One week later,
08:34on September 27th,
08:35Rowlett handed Friedman
08:37two purple messages,
08:38fully deciphered.
08:40Now here is a detail
08:41I want you to remember,
08:42because it comes back
08:43at the very end
08:44of this story.
08:46Not one person
08:47in that room
08:48had ever seen
08:49a purple machine.
08:51No American
08:52would lay eyes on one
08:53for the entire war.
08:56A young lieutenant
08:57named Leo Rosen,
08:58an engineering graduate
08:59from MIT,
09:00built a working copy
09:02from Pure Deduction,
09:03assembled out of
09:04the kind of switching parts
09:05you would find
09:06in a telephone exchange.
09:07The Americans
09:08had built Japan's
09:09most secret machine
09:11without ever seeing it.
09:13And then they gave it away.
09:16On January 17th, 1941,
09:1911 months before Pearl Harbor,
09:21with the United States
09:22still officially neutral,
09:24Rosen sailed for England
09:25aboard the new battleship
09:27King George V,
09:28along with Captain
09:29Abraham Sinkov
09:30of the Army
09:31and two officers
09:32of the Navy's
09:33code-breaking section.
09:34In their baggage,
09:35they had purple machines.
09:37In early February,
09:38they walked through
09:39the gates of Bletchley Park
09:40and handed one
09:41to the British.
09:43That gift is why
09:44both Washington
09:45and London
09:46would later read
09:47Oshima's mail.
09:48It also bought the Americans
09:50something in return.
09:51A look at how the British
09:53were attacking
09:53the German enigma.
09:55But keep the direction
09:56of that trade in mind.
09:58The Purple Key
09:59went from Washington
10:00to London,
10:01not the other way.
10:02And in that same month,
10:04February 1941,
10:06Hiroshi Oshima arrived
10:08back in Berlin
10:08as Japan's ambassador.
10:11He had been there before.
10:12In the late 1930s,
10:14he had helped build
10:15the alliance
10:16between Tokyo and Berlin,
10:17then been recalled
10:18after Hitler signed
10:20his pact with Stalin.
10:21Now he was back,
10:23and the Germans
10:24treated him
10:24as one of their own.
10:26Within four months,
10:28the channel carried
10:28something only Hitler knew.
10:30In early June 1941,
10:33at his mountain house
10:34in Bavaria,
10:35Hitler told Oshima
10:37that war with the Soviet Union
10:38was coming.
10:39Oshima cabled Tokyo.
10:42On June 22nd,
10:44three million German soldiers
10:45crossed the Soviet border.
10:47Think about the rule
10:49from earlier.
10:50A broken code
10:51is worth only
10:52what the sender knows.
10:54In December 1941,
10:56the Japanese diplomats
10:57in Washington
10:58had known nothing.
10:59But the Japanese diplomat
11:01in Berlin
11:01was sitting across the table
11:03from the man
11:03who started the war
11:04in Europe.
11:06Through 1942 and 1943,
11:09Oshima kept reporting,
11:10and the reports
11:11kept getting sharper.
11:13He described his visits
11:14to the Russian front.
11:16In August 1943,
11:18he passed along
11:19that the Luftwaffe
11:20had been ordered
11:21to put fighter production
11:22ahead of bombers.
11:24That summer,
11:25American bomber crews
11:26over Germany
11:27were finding out
11:28what that meant.
11:29Here was the reason
11:31in Oshima's own cable.
11:33That October,
11:34he reported that Hitler
11:35was thinking of turning
11:36his main effort
11:37against the British
11:38and the Americans
11:39rather than the Russians.
11:41Each of those cables
11:42went out over the air,
11:44and each one came down
11:45sooner or later
11:46through an American receiver.
11:48So by the autumn of 1943,
11:50the question was no longer
11:52whether the Americans
11:52could read Oshima.
11:54It was what the Germans
11:55would decide
11:56to tell him next.
11:57What they decided
11:58was remarkable.
12:00With an Anglo-American
12:01invasion of France
12:02now certain,
12:03the German high command
12:04opened its most important
12:06defensive line
12:06to a foreign general.
12:09The Germans wanted Tokyo
12:10to know the West
12:11was a fortress.
12:13They wanted their ally
12:14to believe that any landing
12:16would be smashed
12:17on the beaches,
12:17so they let him see it,
12:19measure it,
12:20and ask questions.
12:22He asked a lot of questions.
12:24When the answers
12:25reached Arlington Hall,
12:27the analysts found
12:28a report from a man
12:29who knew exactly
12:30what a trench is for.
12:32There was one short
12:33phrase in it,
12:34about where Germany
12:35intended to fight
12:36the invasion,
12:37that mattered more
12:38to the Allied planners
12:39than all of his numbers.
12:41What did Oshima write,
12:43and why did it matter so much?
12:44On the evening
12:45of November 11, 1943,
12:48the first pieces
12:49of Oshima's report
12:50reached Arlington Hall,
12:51and the work began.
12:52It came in three long messages,
12:55and it did not arrive neatly.
12:58Sections came off
12:59the intercept sheets
13:00out of order.
13:01Some groups were garbled
13:02by static over the Atlantic
13:04and had to be pieced back together
13:06from what came before and after.
13:09Once the purple machine
13:10had turned the letters
13:11back into Japanese,
13:12the translators took over.
13:14Then they hit a problem
13:16nobody had planned for.
13:18Oshima had written
13:19the German general's names
13:20the way a Japanese ear
13:22heard them.
13:23One came through as
13:25Tsuo Tenshutein.
13:27Another as Kudanke.
13:30Somebody at Arlington Hall
13:32had to work out
13:33that the first
13:34was General Georg von Sodenstern,
13:36and the second
13:37was Admiral Theodor Kranke,
13:40commander of the German Navy
13:42in the West.
13:43So an American analyst
13:44sat at a desk in Virginia
13:46and decoded a German name
13:48that a Japanese general
13:49had spelled phonetically
13:50to get back the man
13:52Hitler had put in charge
13:54of guarding the French coast.
13:56The translators also
13:57cleaned up the language.
13:59Where Oshima wrote
14:00Nests of Resistance,
14:02the American text said
14:04Strong Points.
14:06Unneeded German titles
14:07were dropped.
14:08Some passages were paraphrased
14:10so that a busy man
14:11could read them quickly.
14:13And the man who would read them
14:14was the President
14:15of the United States.
14:17Before we get to him,
14:19look at what Oshima
14:20actually saw,
14:21because the details
14:22tell you what kind
14:23of witness he was.
14:25From October 24th
14:27to November 1st,
14:28he and several aides
14:30had traveled from Paris
14:31to the coast
14:31with German escorts
14:33along the shore of Brittany
14:34and down toward Bordeaux.
14:36He watched defensive drills.
14:39He watched night firing practice.
14:42He talked with ordinary
14:43German soldiers
14:44in their positions.
14:45Senior officers briefed him
14:46on how their forces
14:47were organized
14:48and how they meant
14:49to use them.
14:50He wrote,
14:51with evident pleasure,
14:53that his party
14:53had been wined and dined.
14:55But he was not a tourist.
14:57He was a general.
14:59And he wrote like one.
15:00He described
15:01the anti-tank ditches,
15:03triangular and cross-section,
15:05five meters across the top,
15:07three and a half meters deep.
15:09He described observation turrets
15:11built in a continuous line
15:12close to the shore,
15:13each holding two or three
15:15machine guns
15:16and a supply of grenades.
15:17He listed the calibers
15:19of the guns,
15:20what the bunkers were built of,
15:21and how the strong points
15:23were laid out.
15:24And he gave the location,
15:26strength,
15:26and weapons
15:27of German divisions
15:28along the coast
15:29from Brittany to Belgium.
15:31Picture an allied planner
15:33in London reading that.
15:35For months,
15:36the order of battle
15:37on the far side
15:38of the channel
15:38had been built
15:39from aerial photographs,
15:41agents' reports,
15:42and guesswork.
15:43Now a man
15:43who had been driven
15:44up to those positions
15:45in a staff car
15:46was filling in the blanks.
15:48The American
15:49and Army intelligence analysts
15:51who studied the report
15:52treated it as a framework
15:53for checking and correcting
15:55their estimates
15:55for the invasion.
15:57Then came the part
15:58that mattered most.
16:00Oshima explained
16:01how the Germans
16:01meant to fight.
16:03The goal was maximum effect
16:05from a minimum number
16:06of soldiers,
16:07hidden in camouflaged bunkers
16:09on the shore.
16:10If the enemy landed
16:11in one sector,
16:12fire from the neighboring posts
16:14on both sides,
16:15along with mobile forces,
16:16would annihilate the landing.
16:19Reserves would launch
16:20rapid counterattacks.
16:22The Germans planned
16:23to stop any invasion
16:24as close to the edge
16:25of the water as possible.
16:27As close to the edge
16:28of the water as possible.
16:31Aerial photographs
16:31could show you
16:32where a gun was.
16:33They could not tell you
16:35what the enemy
16:35intended to do with it.
16:37This one line did.
16:39The Germans would not
16:40trade space for time.
16:42They would not let
16:43an invader come ashore
16:44and then fight him inland.
16:46They would fight on the sand,
16:48in the first hours,
16:49with everything they had
16:50close at hand.
16:53And tucked into the same report
16:54was a crack in the fortress.
16:57Some of the reserve units
16:58in the west
16:59had recently been sent east
17:00to the Russian front.
17:02The ones left behind
17:03were under strength
17:04and still needed training.
17:06The wall was real,
17:08but the men behind it
17:09were thinner
17:09than the concrete suggested.
17:12Oshima confirmed
17:13one more thing.
17:14The Germans saw
17:16the Pas de Calais,
17:17the narrowest crossing
17:18of the channel,
17:19and roughly 200 miles
17:20northeast of the Normandy beaches,
17:22as the place they had
17:23to defend first.
17:25His own verdict was clear.
17:27He praised what he called
17:28Germany's conception
17:29of the defense of the west,
17:31and he gave an allied breakthrough
17:33almost zero chance.
17:35That is a strange thing to read
17:37when you are the allied side.
17:39The enemy's ally
17:40has just told you
17:41that you cannot win,
17:42and in the same document,
17:43he has handed you a map
17:44of where the enemy is strong,
17:46where he is thin,
17:48and how he plans to fight.
17:50On December 14th, 1943,
17:54Lieutenant Colonel Earl Cook
17:55of the Signal Security Agency
17:57forwarded the finished set
17:58through channels
17:59to the White House.
18:00By December 16th,
18:02it was in Franklin Roosevelt's hands.
18:04In five weeks,
18:06the report had gone
18:07from a farm in Virginia
18:08to the president.
18:10Sam Snyder,
18:11one of the young civilians
18:12who worked on the
18:12Japanese diplomatic traffic,
18:14said later that
18:15on some messages,
18:16American leaders
18:17were reading Oshima's words
18:18within two hours
18:19of his sending them.
18:21We were proud of our work,
18:23he said,
18:23and especially our speed
18:25in delivering it
18:25to the president.
18:27So the Americans
18:28now knew the wall.
18:29What they still did not know
18:31was the mind behind it.
18:32Because over that winter,
18:34the allies were preparing
18:35something besides an invasion.
18:38They were preparing a lie.
18:40An entire American army group
18:43that did not exist
18:44aimed straight at the Pas de Calais.
18:47A lie like that
18:49is worthless
18:49unless it is believed.
18:51And the only way
18:52to know whether
18:53Hitler believed it
18:54was to hear it
18:55from someone he trusted.
18:57So who was going
18:58to tell them?
18:58On April 24th, 1944,
19:01in the countryside
19:02of southeast England,
19:04American radio operators
19:05began talking to an army
19:07that did not exist.
19:08They belonged
19:09to the 3,103rd
19:11Signal Service Battalion,
19:13and their job
19:14was to fill the air
19:15over Kent
19:16with the chatter
19:17of the 1st United States
19:18Army Group,
19:19headquarters calling divisions,
19:22divisions calling regiments,
19:24supply reports,
19:26movement orders,
19:27complaints.
19:29None of the formations
19:30behind those messages
19:31was real.
19:32The traffic was scripted.
19:34Much of it was modeled
19:36on genuine exercise traffic
19:37that had been recorded
19:39on the new magnetic wire recorders
19:41and then rebuilt
19:42into a timetable
19:43so that the volume
19:44and rhythm
19:45of the fake army
19:46matched a real one.
19:48There was one subtle touch.
19:50A German radio intelligence operator
19:52who has listened
19:53to the same enemy
19:54for months
19:55learns to recognize
19:56individual operators
19:58by the way
19:58they key Morse,
20:00the way you recognize
20:01a friend's handwriting.
20:02So the deception
20:03used American operators
20:04who had served
20:05in North Africa
20:06and Sicily.
20:07If a German listener
20:09in France
20:09had heard that hand before,
20:11in Tunisia,
20:12he would hear it again now,
20:13from Kent,
20:15exactly where the Allies
20:16wanted him to look.
20:17And at the head
20:18of this phantom army group,
20:20on paper
20:20and in the press,
20:22was the American general
20:23the Germans respected most,
20:25George S. Patton.
20:28Remember why
20:29the Pas de Calais mattered.
20:31Oshima's report
20:32had already told the Allies
20:33that the Germans
20:34saw it as the place
20:35they had to defend first.
20:37The deception,
20:38codenamed Fortitude,
20:40was built
20:41to push on that door.
20:43It was designed
20:44to convince Hitler
20:44that the real blow
20:45would fall
20:46on the narrowest part
20:47of the channel,
20:48that anything landing
20:49elsewhere was a feint,
20:51and that the army
20:52waiting in Kent
20:53under Patton
20:53was the one to watch.
20:55Which meant that Patton
20:56had to stay
20:57exactly where he was,
20:58in England,
21:00visible.
21:01The next day,
21:03he nearly blew it.
21:04On April 25th, 1944,
21:07Patton went to the opening
21:08of a British welcome club
21:09for American soldiers
21:10in the town of Nutsford.
21:12He thought it was
21:13an informal event.
21:14He spoke for a few minutes
21:16and said that it was
21:17the evident destiny
21:18of the British
21:19and the Americans
21:19to rule the world.
21:22According to the accounts,
21:23he included the Russians,
21:24but the version that went out
21:26in the papers did not.
21:28Within days,
21:29it was a scandal
21:30on both sides
21:31of the Atlantic.
21:32Eisenhower cabled Marshall
21:34that he was seriously
21:35contemplating
21:36the most drastic action.
21:37For a while,
21:39he meant to send Patton home.
21:41In the end,
21:42he kept him.
21:43Marshall and Stimson
21:44backed the decision.
21:46Whatever else went into it,
21:48the men running the deception
21:49needed Patton in England,
21:51exactly where the Germans
21:52expected to find him.
21:54Now stop and think
21:55about the real problem here,
21:57because it is the heart
21:58of this story.
22:00A deception is a message
22:01you send to the enemy,
22:02and you can never be sure
22:04he has received it
22:05the way you intended.
22:06The dummy tanks
22:07might be photographed
22:08and laughed at.
22:09The radio traffic
22:10might be analyzed
22:11and dismissed.
22:13A captured German general
22:14might be shown
22:15the right road signs
22:16and still go home
22:18with the wrong conclusion.
22:20Then, on the day
22:21of the landings,
22:22the Germans would be
22:23waiting in Normandy,
22:24and fortitude
22:26would have done worse
22:26than nothing.
22:28It would have told them
22:29where the Allies
22:29were not going to land.
22:32So the Allies needed
22:33a mirror,
22:34some way to look
22:36into the enemy's head
22:37and see whether
22:38the lie had taken.
22:39They had more than one.
22:41At Bletchley Park,
22:43the British were reading
22:44German military signals,
22:45and American officers
22:46worked inside that operation.
22:49Those messages showed
22:50what German headquarters
22:51in France were reporting
22:52and ordering.
22:53That was valuable,
22:55but it was the view
22:56from the field.
22:57What Hitler himself
22:58believed was another matter.
23:00The man at the very top
23:01did not dictate
23:02his thinking
23:03into radio messages
23:04for the convenience
23:05of Allied codebreakers.
23:07But he did talk
23:08to his friends.
23:09And one of those friends
23:11sent home detailed reports
23:12of every conversation
23:13in a cipher
23:14an American woman
23:15had broken
23:16in an afternoon
23:17in 1940.
23:19Through the first months
23:20of 1944,
23:21the Japanese diplomatic traffic
23:23out of Berlin
23:24was watched constantly.
23:26And it told the Allies
23:27that the Germans
23:28had not seen through fortitude.
23:30But that was not
23:31the whole picture,
23:32and the planners knew it.
23:34In May,
23:36the signs turned uncomfortable.
23:38Hitler himself
23:39began to talk
23:40about Normandy.
23:41German attention shifted
23:43toward the Normandy coast
23:44and northern Brittany.
23:46A German division
23:47trained specifically
23:48to fight airborne landings,
23:50the 91st,
23:51was moved
23:52onto the Cotantan Peninsula,
23:54and it was in position
23:55by May 14th,
23:56squarely in the area
23:58where American paratroopers
23:59were going to drop.
24:00Late in May,
24:01the drop zones
24:02of the 82nd Airborne
24:03had to be moved
24:04because of it.
24:05Put yourself
24:06in Eisenhower's position
24:07in the last week of May.
24:09More than 150,000 men
24:11were going across.
24:13The weather was turning bad.
24:15And there were signs
24:16that the enemy
24:17might be looking
24:17at the right stretch
24:18of coast after all.
24:20Was fortitude
24:21still holding at the top?
24:23Or had Hitler,
24:24the man who overruled
24:26his generals
24:26whenever he felt like it,
24:28started to see through it?
24:30There was only one witness
24:31who could answer
24:32that question
24:33in Hitler's own words.
24:35On May 27th, 1944,
24:38ten days before the landings,
24:41Hiroshi Oshima
24:42was received by Adolf Hitler
24:43at the Berghof,
24:44his house
24:45in the Bavarian Mountains.
24:47Hitler was in a talkative mood.
24:49He wanted to tell
24:50his Japanese friend
24:51exactly how the Allied invasion
24:53would unfold.
24:54And he was about to describe it,
24:56step by step,
24:58to an American radio receiver.
25:00On May 27th, 1944,
25:02high above Berchtesgaden,
25:04Adolf Hitler sat down
25:05with General Hiroshi Oshima
25:07and explained how the Allies
25:09would invade Europe.
25:10He did not hedge.
25:12He spoke like a man
25:14who had thought it all through
25:15and wanted his ally
25:16to know he was not afraid of it.
25:19Oshima listened
25:20as a professional soldier would,
25:22and afterwards he wrote it down
25:24as close to word for word
25:25as he could.
25:27Here is what Hitler said
25:28as it came out
25:29of the Japanese report.
25:31Listen carefully
25:32because every clause matters.
25:35I think that diversionary actions
25:37will take place
25:38in a number of places,
25:40against Norway, Denmark,
25:42the southern part of western France,
25:44and the French Mediterranean coast.
25:47Then the second step.
25:49When the Allies, he said,
25:51had established bridgeheads
25:52in the Normandy
25:53and Brittany peninsulas
25:54and had sized up their prospects,
25:57they would come forward
25:59with an all-out second front
26:00across the Straits of Dover.
26:03Read that twice.
26:05The first time,
26:06it is frightening.
26:07Hitler said Normandy.
26:08Ten days before the landings,
26:10the man who commanded
26:11every German soldier in France
26:13named the right stretch of coast
26:14to a foreign ambassador.
26:16If you were an Allied planner,
26:18that word alone
26:19would have turned your stomach.
26:21Now read it again,
26:22the way the men
26:23watching for fortitude read it.
26:25Hitler had named Normandy,
26:27but as a bridgehead,
26:29a preliminary,
26:30something the Allies would do
26:32to test the water
26:33before the real blow.
26:34In his mind,
26:36the real blow,
26:37the all-out second front,
26:38was coming across
26:39the Straits of Dover,
26:41into the Pas-de-Calais,
26:42from the army in Kent
26:44that Patton was supposedly leading.
26:46That was the lie.
26:48And Hitler had just repeated it back,
26:50in his own house,
26:52as his own considered judgment.
26:54Think about what this means
26:56for the morning of the landings.
26:57When the Americans and British
26:59come ashore in Normandy,
27:01Hitler will see the assault
27:02he predicted,
27:03and he will read it
27:04as the opening move.
27:06He will be waiting
27:07for the second move,
27:08and while he waits,
27:09the divisions guarding
27:10the Pas-de-Calais
27:11stay where they are.
27:13That is what fortitude
27:14was built to achieve.
27:16And this was the confirmation,
27:18from the only source
27:19that could deliver it
27:20at that level.
27:21But Hitler did not talk
27:23only about beaches that day.
27:25According to records
27:26later put before
27:27the War Crimes Tribunal
27:28at Nuremberg,
27:29in a conference with Oshima
27:30and Ribbentrop
27:31that same month,
27:32he discussed what should be done
27:33with captured American airmen.
27:35He wanted the crews
27:37of American bombers
27:38treated as terror flyers.
27:40He urged that they be
27:41hanged in public.
27:43Keep that in mind.
27:44The same conversations
27:46that were giving the Allies
27:47Hitler's strategy
27:48were also recording
27:49what he wanted done
27:50to American flyers.
27:51And every word of it
27:53was going out over the air.
27:55Oshima composed his report
27:57and sent it to Tokyo
27:58on the Purple Circuit,
27:59exactly as he had done
28:00in November.
28:02Once again,
28:03the signal crossed the world.
28:05Once again,
28:06American and British receivers
28:07took it down.
28:08And once again,
28:09the machine that Leo Rosen
28:11had built,
28:12without ever seeing the real one,
28:13turned it back into Japanese.
28:16And the translators
28:17turned it into English.
28:19By the 1st of June,
28:21the decrypt was in Allied hands.
28:23Measure that against the calendar.
28:25Hitler spoke on May 27th.
28:28The landings were planned
28:29for the 5th of June.
28:30That left a margin
28:31of four or five days
28:33between the moment
28:34Hitler explained
28:35what he believed
28:35and the moment
28:36the Allies had to commit.
28:39Four or five days.
28:40A lie that has been confirmed
28:42at the very top,
28:43a few days before the landings,
28:45is worth more than
28:46any number of dummy tanks.
28:49Now go back to the rule
28:50from the very first part
28:51of this story.
28:52A broken code
28:54is worth only
28:55what the person using it knows.
28:57In December 1941,
29:00Purple had carried messages
29:01from diplomats
29:02who knew nothing
29:02of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
29:04Now the cipher
29:05was carrying
29:05the private reasoning
29:06of the man
29:07who ran the German war,
29:08written up by a general
29:10who knew how to report it.
29:12The channel had not changed.
29:13The sender had.
29:16On the night of June 4th
29:17at Southwick House
29:18near Portsmouth,
29:20Eisenhower listened
29:21to his meteorologist
29:22describe a gap
29:23in the storm.
29:24In the early hours
29:25of June 5th,
29:26he gave the order
29:27to go for the 6th.
29:29No document shows
29:30Eisenhower holding
29:31Oshima's message
29:32in his hand
29:33at that moment.
29:34What is documented
29:35is that the men
29:36responsible for the deception
29:38read that decrypt
29:39as confirmation
29:39that Fortitude
29:40was holding
29:41where it counted.
29:43And there is one more
29:44thing to notice.
29:45Oshima did not know
29:46any of this.
29:48He thought he had done
29:49his duty by Tokyo.
29:50He had been trusted
29:51by the Fuhrer
29:52and he had reported
29:53faithfully.
29:55He had no idea
29:56that his loyalty
29:57to his ally
29:57had just become
29:58one of the Allied
29:59commander's best
30:00reassurances
30:01on the eve
30:02of the largest
30:03seaborne invasion
30:04in history.
30:05On June 6th, 1944,
30:07the landings came.
30:09The Americans went ashore
30:10at Utah and Omaha,
30:11the British and Canadians
30:13at Gold, Juno,
30:14and Sword.
30:16American paratroopers
30:17came down across
30:18the Cotanta,
30:19many of them
30:20in the area
30:20the German 91st Division
30:22had moved into
30:23three weeks earlier.
30:25Now the real test began.
30:27Hitler had told Oshima
30:29what he would see
30:30and what it would mean.
30:32In the days that followed,
30:33would he do
30:34what he had said
30:35he would do?
30:36Or would he see Normandy
30:38for what it was
30:39and send the
30:40Pas-de-Calais divisions
30:41south?
30:42And this time,
30:44the man who would
30:45tell the Americans
30:46which way
30:46Hitler had chosen
30:47was once again
30:49Oshima.
30:50Within days
30:50of the landings,
30:51the answers started
30:52coming back
30:52through Berlin.
30:54About five days
30:55after the invasion,
30:56Oshima reported
30:57to Tokyo
30:57what German officers
30:58were telling him.
31:00The bombing
31:00and the shelling,
31:01they said,
31:02had made it impossible
31:03to move troops
31:04and equipment
31:04from the rear
31:05up to the front
31:06the way they had planned.
31:08That one line
31:09from inside
31:09the German war machine
31:10described exactly
31:12what Allied airpower
31:13had been trying
31:13to do since spring.
31:16Meanwhile,
31:17north of the Seine,
31:18something was not happening.
31:20The German 15th Army,
31:21the force holding
31:22the Pas-de-Calais,
31:24stayed where it was.
31:25Day after day,
31:27week after week,
31:28its divisions
31:29sat in the positions
31:30Oshima had described
31:31in November,
31:32facing the narrowest
31:33part of the channel
31:34and waiting for Patton.
31:37Hitler was doing
31:37what he had told
31:38Oshima he would do.
31:39He had watched
31:40Normandy begin
31:41and he had decided
31:43it was the bridgehead.
31:44He was waiting
31:45for the second front
31:46across the Straits of Dover.
31:48And the Americans
31:49made sure
31:50he kept waiting.
31:51On July 6th, 1944,
31:53George Patton
31:54flew to Normandy,
31:55quietly,
31:56without announcement,
31:57to take command
31:58of the Third Army
31:59when it went into action.
32:01The Phantom Army group
32:02in Kent
32:03still needed
32:04a famous commander,
32:05so the job
32:06went to Lieutenant General
32:07Leslie McNair,
32:08the man who had
32:09organized and trained
32:10the American ground forces
32:12for the whole war.
32:14To the Germans,
32:15the lie was still alive,
32:16and now it had
32:17a new face.
32:19Remember the name
32:20McNair.
32:21His part in this story
32:22ends in a way
32:23nobody intended.
32:25Fortitude held
32:26through June
32:27and into July.
32:29Only late in July
32:30was the 15th Army
32:31allowed to send
32:32a share of its strength
32:33toward Normandy.
32:34And by then,
32:35as Eisenhower later said,
32:37it was too late
32:38to change the outcome.
32:40Because by then,
32:41the American breakout
32:42had begun.
32:44On July 25th,
32:45west of St. Lowe,
32:47hundreds of American
32:48heavy bombers
32:48carpeted the German
32:50front line
32:50ahead of the First Army
32:52in the opening
32:52of Operation Cobra.
32:54Some of the bombs
32:54fell short
32:55onto American positions.
32:57Among the dead
32:58was Leslie McNair,
33:00who had come forward
33:01to watch the attack
33:02go in.
33:03The commander
33:04of the army
33:05that did not exist
33:05was killed
33:06in the opening
33:07of the battle
33:07that ended
33:08any need for it.
33:10And then the front
33:11gave way.
33:12The American divisions
33:13went through the gap
33:14and down the coast
33:15of the Cotantin.
33:17On the evening
33:17of July 30th,
33:19tanks of the 4th Armored
33:20Division rolled
33:21into Avranches,
33:22at the hinge
33:23where Normandy
33:23turns into Brittany.
33:25The way into France
33:27was open.
33:28On August 1st,
33:30Patton's 3rd Army
33:31went into action
33:32through that hinge.
33:33On August 2nd,
33:341944,
33:36Oshima sent
33:37another report
33:37to Tokyo.
33:39In it,
33:39he wrote that
33:40the 1st American army
33:41had penetrated
33:42from the Saint-Lowe area
33:43to Avranches.
33:45Stop on that sentence
33:46for a moment,
33:47because something
33:47has changed.
33:49In November,
33:50the Americans
33:51had read Oshima
33:52to learn about
33:52the Germans.
33:53Now they were
33:54reading him
33:55to learn how
33:55the Germans
33:56saw the Americans.
33:58A Japanese general
33:59in Berlin
33:59telling Tokyo,
34:00in a cipher
34:01Washington had broken,
34:02that the American army
34:04had broken through.
34:05The channel
34:06that once carried
34:07German strength
34:08was now carrying
34:09German alarm.
34:10And the alarm
34:11kept growing.
34:12On August 18th,
34:14as the German armies
34:15in Normandy
34:15were being squeezed
34:16in the pocket
34:16around Feles,
34:18Oshima warned Tokyo
34:19that even the Germans
34:21have ceased to give
34:22an explanation
34:22of the new turn
34:23in the war situation.
34:25For four years,
34:26he had passed
34:26on German confidence.
34:28Now he was reporting
34:29German silence.
34:31On September 4th,
34:32he saw Hitler again.
34:34When he wrote it up,
34:35he left out something
34:36that had been
34:37in almost every report
34:38for years.
34:39His praise
34:40for the Führer's
34:41fighting spirit.
34:42Hitler admitted to him
34:44that there would be
34:44further withdrawals.
34:46And on September 26th,
34:48Oshima wrote
34:48that the German army
34:49in France
34:50had crumbled.
34:51It had lost,
34:52he said,
34:52500,000 men
34:54since June.
34:55He predicted
34:56that the Allies
34:57would invade Germany
34:58itself,
34:59and that German resistance
35:00would end in surrender
35:02piecemeal,
35:03isolated groups
35:04giving up
35:05one by one.
35:07Put that report
35:08next to his first one.
35:09In November 1943,
35:12Oshima had given
35:13an Allied invasion
35:14almost zero chance.
35:16Ten months later,
35:17the same man
35:19in the same cipher
35:20read by the same Americans
35:22was describing
35:24a German army
35:25in France
35:25that no longer
35:26existed
35:27as an organized force.
35:30Every cable
35:31that went out
35:31from Berlin
35:32made Oshima's channel
35:33more valuable.
35:35The Allies
35:36were no longer
35:37only reading his reports
35:38for what the Germans
35:39planned.
35:40They were reading them
35:41for the state of mind
35:42at the top of the Reich,
35:44what Hitler admitted,
35:45what he still believed,
35:47what he would try next.
35:50And this is where
35:51the danger came in.
35:53A secret of this size
35:55grows more fragile
35:56the more it is worth.
35:58A single newspaper story
36:00saying that the Americans
36:01had been reading
36:02Japanese diplomatic codes
36:03since before Pearl Harbor
36:05would be enough.
36:07Tokyo would change ciphers.
36:10Oshima's reports
36:11would stop.
36:12Japanese naval
36:13and military traffic,
36:14read by the same people
36:16using the same methods,
36:17might go dark too.
36:19In September 1944,
36:22the United States
36:22was in the middle
36:23of a presidential election.
36:25The challenger,
36:26Governor Thomas Dewey
36:27of New York,
36:28had heard that
36:29the Japanese codes
36:30had been broken
36:30before Pearl Harbor.
36:32He was ready to use it.
36:34If he said in public
36:36what he knew,
36:37he could hurt Roosevelt badly.
36:39And he could close
36:40the window on Hitler.
36:42George Marshall
36:42had to stop him
36:43without ordering him,
36:45without threatening him,
36:47and without telling
36:48the president.
36:49So on September 25th,
36:51a colonel from Army
36:52Intelligence,
36:53in civilian clothes,
36:55flew to Tulsa, Oklahoma,
36:56carrying a letter
36:57that could only be handed
36:59to the governor in person.
37:01What did the Army's
37:02chief of staff
37:02put in that letter?
37:03The colonel's name
37:04was Carter Clark.
37:05He was one of the officers
37:07in charge of the Army's
37:08code-breaking intelligence
37:09in Washington,
37:10and Marshall had chosen him
37:12for a reason.
37:13This was a job
37:14for someone who understood
37:16exactly what was at stake
37:17and would say
37:18as little as possible
37:19about it.
37:20In Tulsa,
37:22on September 25th, 1944,
37:25Clark found the governor
37:26in the middle
37:26of a campaign tour.
37:28Dewey's people
37:29were suspicious
37:30of a stranger
37:31in civilian clothes
37:32who wanted to see
37:33the candidate alone,
37:34and they made him say
37:36who had sent him.
37:37Clark said,
37:39General Marshall.
37:40Dewey took the envelope.
37:42He saw the security stamp
37:44on the letter
37:44and said,
37:45That's really top,
37:46isn't it?
37:47Then he started to read
37:49and stopped.
37:51He got as far
37:52as the word cryptograph
37:53and he put the letter down.
37:55He told Clark
37:56he did not want his lips
37:58sealed on things
37:59he already knew.
38:01He already knew,
38:02he said,
38:03that the Japanese codes
38:04had been read
38:04before Pearl Harbor
38:05and he did not believe
38:07the letter came
38:07from Marshall alone.
38:09Marshall does not do
38:11things like that,
38:12he said.
38:13He was confident
38:14that Franklin Roosevelt
38:15was behind it.
38:17Think about the position
38:18Dewey was in.
38:19He was the Republican nominee
38:21for President
38:21of the United States
38:23six weeks from the election,
38:25running against a man
38:26who had been in office
38:27for 12 years.
38:28He had been told,
38:29by people he trusted,
38:31that the administration
38:32had been reading
38:33Japanese codes
38:34and had still
38:35been caught
38:36at Pearl Harbor.
38:38That was political dynamite.
38:40And now a messenger
38:41from the army
38:42was trying to take it
38:43out of his hands.
38:45Clark went back
38:46to Washington.
38:47Marshall wrote
38:48a second letter.
38:49On September 28th,
38:51Clark delivered it
38:52to Dewey in Albany.
38:54Dewey had one
38:55of his advisors,
38:56Elliot Bell,
38:57read it with him.
38:58And before he did,
38:59he called Marshall
39:00to make sure
39:01the letter was genuine.
39:03This time,
39:04the chief of staff
39:04laid out the whole case.
39:06Yes, the letter said,
39:07the Americans
39:08had broken
39:09the Japanese diplomatic cipher
39:11before the war.
39:12They had built a machine
39:13that could read it.
39:15And then came the sentence
39:16that ties everything
39:17in this story together.
39:20In brief,
39:21Marshall wrote,
39:22the dilemma is this.
39:24Our main basis
39:26of information
39:26regarding Hitler's
39:27intentions in Europe,
39:29he went on,
39:30was Baron Oshima's
39:31messages from Berlin
39:32reporting his interviews
39:34with Hitler
39:34and other officials
39:36to the Japanese government.
39:38And those messages,
39:39Marshall wrote,
39:40were still in the codes
39:42involved in the
39:43Pearl Harbor events.
39:45Marshall did not
39:46stop at Europe.
39:47He told Dewey
39:48that code-breaking
39:49had shaped the Battle
39:50of the Coral Sea,
39:52the victory at Midway,
39:53the operations
39:54in the Aleutians,
39:55and the timing
39:56of attacks
39:56on Japanese convoys.
39:59If the Pearl Harbor
40:00code-breaking
40:01became a public argument
40:02in the campaign,
40:03he warned,
40:04the enemy would find out,
40:05and the results
40:06would be utterly tragic.
40:09He asked the governor
40:10to keep it
40:11out of the campaign.
40:13Dewey put the letter away.
40:14He did not raise it,
40:16not in a speech,
40:17not in an interview,
40:18not in the last weeks
40:19of an election
40:20he went on to lose.
40:22He gave up
40:23what may have been
40:23his strongest issue
40:25for a reason
40:26he could never explain
40:27to his own voters.
40:28And Roosevelt
40:29never learned about it
40:30until after it was done.
40:32Marshall had not told
40:33the president,
40:34and he had not told
40:35the secretary of war.
40:37Now we can answer
40:38the question
40:39this story began with.
40:41How did Hitler's secrets
40:42reach the Americans
40:43through a Japanese ambassador?
40:45Part of the answer
40:46is in Berlin.
40:47Hitler talked.
40:49He trusted Oshima
40:51the way he trusted
40:52almost no one,
40:53and he wanted Tokyo
40:54to believe in German strength.
40:56So he let Oshima
40:57walk the Atlantic Wall,
40:59and he told him
41:00how the invasion
41:01would come.
41:02Every boast he made
41:03to his ally
41:04became a page
41:05in an American file.
41:07Part of the answer
41:08is in Washington.
41:10A statistician
41:11on loan
41:12from the Railroad
41:12Retirement Board
41:13spotted a repeating pattern
41:15that a room full
41:16of experts had missed.
41:17A young engineer
41:18built Japan's machine
41:19without ever seeing one.
41:21The United States,
41:23while still neutral,
41:24handed a copy
41:25to the British.
41:26A private
41:27on a dairy farm
41:27in Virginia
41:28copied Morse
41:29for two days straight.
41:30And within five weeks,
41:32a German general's name,
41:34spelled in Japanese,
41:35had been turned back
41:36into German
41:36and laid
41:37on the president's desk.
41:39But the last part
41:40of the answer
41:40is the one
41:41most people miss.
41:42Breaking the code
41:43was not enough.
41:44It had to stay broken.
41:46Remember the rule
41:47from the beginning.
41:48A broken code
41:49is worth only
41:50what the man
41:51using it knows.
41:52There is a second half
41:54to that rule,
41:54and Marshall's letter
41:56is the proof of it.
41:57A broken code
41:58is also worth
41:59only as long
42:00as the people
42:00reading it
42:01can keep quiet.
42:03Oshima's channel
42:04survived for four years
42:05of war
42:06because thousands
42:06of Americans
42:07kept a secret.
42:08From the private
42:09at Vint Hill
42:10to a candidate
42:11for president
42:11who could have
42:12used it to win.
42:13That is how
42:14Hitler's thinking
42:15reached the Americans.
42:16He told a friend
42:17and the Americans
42:19were listening.
42:20And they never once
42:21gave themselves away.
42:22And the friend
42:23never found out.
42:25Not when Berlin
42:26fell around his embassy
42:27and not when
42:28American soldiers
42:29took him into custody.
42:30He never found out
42:32in all the years
42:33he lived
42:34after the war.
42:35So what happened
42:36when the Americans
42:37finally had the man
42:38whose letters
42:39they had read
42:39for four years
42:40standing right in front
42:42of them?
42:42On July 11, 1945,
42:44Hiroshi Oshima
42:45arrived in the United
42:46States as a prisoner.
42:48The end had come
42:50quickly.
42:50In late March,
42:52with the Red Army
42:52closing on Berlin,
42:54he had sent his wife
42:55south to Bad
42:56Gastein
42:56in the Austrian Alps.
42:58In April,
42:59Hitler ordered the diplomats
43:00out of the capital
43:01and Oshima followed her.
43:04When the Reich
43:05collapsed in May,
43:06American troops
43:07reached the resort hotels
43:08where the Japanese
43:09embassy staff
43:10had taken refuge.
43:11The 101st Airborne Division
43:13needed a headquarters.
43:15Its commander,
43:16Major General
43:17Maxwell Taylor,
43:18picked the hotel
43:20where Oshima's staff
43:21were living.
43:22Years earlier,
43:23Taylor had served
43:24in Tokyo
43:25as a language officer,
43:26so the Japanese diplomats
43:28were told to clear out
43:29by an American
43:30paratrooper general
43:31in plain,
43:32colloquial Japanese.
43:34Oshima was taken
43:35into custody
43:36and shipped
43:37across the Atlantic.
43:38The Americans
43:39held him
43:39at the Bedford Springs Hotel,
43:41a grand old resort
43:42in the hills
43:43of Pennsylvania,
43:43and they questioned him
43:45at length
43:45about Germany,
43:47Hitler,
43:47and the war.
43:49Picture the room.
43:50On one side
43:51of the table
43:52sits the man
43:52whose reports
43:53had been read
43:54in Washington
43:54for four years.
43:56On the other side
43:57sit Americans
43:58who know
43:59what was in
43:59those reports,
44:00in some cases
44:01better than
44:02he remembers
44:02it himself.
44:03They know
44:04about the tank ditches.
44:06They know
44:07the date
44:07of the conversation
44:08at the Berghof.
44:09They know
44:10what Hitler said
44:11about Dover.
44:12And they do not
44:13tell him.
44:15He went home
44:16to Japan
44:17in November 1945.
44:19A month later,
44:20he was arrested
44:21and charged
44:21before the
44:22International Military
44:23Tribunal
44:24for the Far East.
44:25In November 1948,
44:27he was convicted
44:28of conspiracy
44:29to wage
44:29aggressive war
44:30and sentenced
44:31to life imprisonment.
44:33He was paroled
44:35in 1955
44:35and granted
44:37clemency
44:37three years
44:38after that.
44:39He lived quietly
44:40in the seaside town
44:41of Chigasaki
44:42and died there
44:43in June 1975
44:44at 89.
44:46As far as
44:47his biographer
44:48could tell,
44:48he never knew
44:49that his mail
44:50had been read
44:50in Washington
44:51and London
44:51the whole time
44:52he was in Berlin.
44:54Now,
44:55remember the detail
44:56I asked you
44:57to hold on to
44:57in the second part
44:58of this story?
45:00No American
45:01ever saw
45:01a purple machine
45:02during the war.
45:04Leo Rosen
45:05had built one
45:06out of logic
45:06and telephone parts.
45:08When the Japanese
45:09staff abandoned
45:10the embassy
45:10in Berlin,
45:11they broke up
45:12their own machine
45:13and buried
45:13the largest pieces
45:14in the embassy's
45:15air raid shelter.
45:17After the war,
45:18Americans dug them up.
45:20Those fragments
45:21are the only remains
45:22of a purple machine
45:23known to exist
45:24and the largest
45:25of them
45:25is now on display
45:27at the National
45:27Cryptologic Museum
45:28in Maryland.
45:30The first time
45:31Americans laid hands
45:32on the real machine,
45:34it came out of the ground
45:35at Oshima's own embassy
45:36and the other date
45:37I asked you to remember,
45:39November 10, 1943.
45:42Eisenhower
45:42would later credit
45:43the success
45:44of the Normandy landings
45:45in part
45:45to the message
45:46that arrived that day.
45:48He meant
45:49the long report
45:50about the Atlantic Wall
45:51that Private Leonard Mudloff
45:52had started copying
45:53in Fauquier County, Virginia
45:55a little before lunch.
45:57Mudloff was promoted
45:58and he left the Army
46:00in 1944
46:00as a technical sergeant.
46:03He never gave interviews
46:04about that mourning
46:05that anyone has found.
46:06For decades,
46:08nobody outside
46:08a small circle
46:09even knew
46:10what he had been listening to.
46:12When a historical marker
46:13was dedicated
46:14at Vint Hill
46:15in 2018,
46:16the station's story
46:17was finally told
46:18in public.
46:20Mudloff did not live
46:21to see it.
46:22Genevieve Grotchen,
46:23who saw the pattern
46:24that afternoon
46:25in 1940,
46:26kept working
46:27in American cryptology
46:28through the war.
46:29She died in 2006.
46:32Most of what she did
46:33stayed classified
46:34for most of her life.
46:35George Marshall's letters
46:36to Thomas Dewey
46:37became public
46:38only after the war
46:39was over,
46:40when Roosevelt was dead
46:41and the secret
46:42could no longer
46:43get anyone killed.
46:45So here is the answer,
46:46as simply as it can be put.
46:49Hitler's secrets
46:50reached the Americans
46:51because he trusted
46:52a Japanese general
46:53enough to tell him
46:54the truth.
46:55And they kept
46:56reaching the Americans
46:57because a private
46:59in a barn,
46:59a statistician
47:01from the railroad
47:01retirement board,
47:02a lieutenant
47:03who built a machine
47:04he had never seen,
47:06a colonel
47:06in civilian clothes,
47:08and a governor
47:09who chose
47:09to stay silent
47:10all made sure
47:11that general
47:12never found out.
47:15Somewhere in Virginia,
47:16on a farm
47:17that used to be a dairy,
47:18there was a pair
47:19of headphones,
47:20and on the other end
47:21of them
47:21was the most closely
47:23guarded mind
47:23in Europe.
47:25Thank you for watching
47:26this story to the end.
47:28If it held your attention,
47:29please hit like.
47:30It's the simplest way
47:32to help a story like this
47:33reach people
47:34who've never heard it.
47:36Subscribe to the channel
47:37and turn on the bell
47:38so you don't miss
47:38the next one.
47:39And tell us in the comments
47:40where you're watching from.
47:42If your father,
47:43grandfather,
47:44or uncle
47:45served in the Second World War,
47:46whether at a listening post
47:48in Virginia,
47:49on a beach in Normandy,
47:50or anywhere in between,
47:51we'd be honored
47:53if you'd share his name
47:54and the unit
47:54he served with.
47:56The American soldiers
47:57whose work
47:58never made the newspapers
47:59deserve to be remembered
48:00by name.
48:00That was the last one.
48:00time.

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