روسيا بعد بوتين: 7 وجوه للحاكم التالي

Name: روسيا بعد بوتين: 7 وجوه للحاكم التالي
Uploaded: 2026-10-18T19:04:46+00:00
Duration: 25 min 3 s
Channel: Elvira Bary

00:00After Putin, Russia may inherit the same war, the same security services, the same bureaucracy,

00:07the same sanctions, and many of the same people in power, and still become a very different country.

00:14Because Russia has spent more than two decades concentrating more and more important decisions

00:20at the very top. In a system like that, the personality of the next ruler matters enormously.

00:27So I want to try something unusual. Take the Russia Putin eventually leaves behind

00:34and change just one thing – the person sitting in the Kremlin.

00:38What if that person has the instincts of Nicholas II, or Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, or Yeltsin?

00:48I don't mean that history will literally repeat itself when waiting for another Stalin to appear

00:55with a pipe and a moustache. I mean something more useful. Each of Russia's 20th century rules had a

01:03recognizable instinct when confronted with crisis. One tried desperately to preserve the old order,

01:10another believed he had discovered a new ideology that could remake society, one modernized at almost

01:18any human cost, another patched problems as they appeared, one protected stability and appearances,

01:25one tried to ride change, and one decided the old system itself had to be destroyed.

01:31Now, give each of those political instincts Putin's Russia. Same country, same inheritance.

01:37Seven very different rulers. What happens next?

01:41I am Elvira Berry, a Russian-American writer who grew up in the Soviet Union.

01:46Today, we are going to play alternative history before the history happens,

01:50and use seven rulers from Russia's past to recognize the kinds of successors

01:56who could emerge after Putin. Here is our roadmap.

02:01The hesitant traditionalist, Nicholas II, a ruler determined to preserve

02:06what he inherited even while the country around him is changing. The prophet of a new ideology,

02:13Lenin, a successor convinced that Russia needs an entirely new idea. The modernizer, Stalin,

02:20a ruler who decides Russia must become stronger and more technologically capable,

02:26whatever the cost. The whole patcher, Khrushchev, someone who keeps fixing one crisis after another

02:33while leaving the basic system intact. The face saver, Brezhnev, a ruler whose priority is stability,

02:41avoiding humiliation, and convincing everyone that everything remains under control.

02:47The wave rider, Gorbachev, someone who realizes reality has changed and begins

02:53loosening the system to keep up with it. And finally, the rebel, Yeltsin, a ruler who decides

03:00that repairing the old order is no longer enough and starts tearing it apart.

03:06If you value this kind of research and analysis, please subscribe, give the video a like,

03:12and share it with someone who enjoys looking beyond the daily headlines.

03:17You can also help fund the research behind this video through my think tank,

03:21PayPal or Superthings. That support gives me more time for source checking, historical research data,

03:28and the kind of deep analysis that simply doesn't fit into the daily news cycle.

03:33And today I also want to use this channel for something very practical.

03:37Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure and another difficult winter is

03:42approaching. Galina Ytskovich, a volunteer born in Ukraine who has lived in New York since 1991,

03:48is raising money to buy sleeping bags for people in Ukraine. 100% of what she collects

03:54goes toward purchasing them. You will find the links below the video.

03:59If you can help keep someone warm this winter, please take a look.

04:03Now, let's give Putin's Russia to our first ruler, the hesitant traditionalist.

04:12Let's begin with Nicholas II. By most accounts, he was a kind man in private,

04:18devoted to his wife and children. His political problem was different.

04:22He believed he had inherited a sacred order that he had no right to dismantle. Preserving autocracy was

04:30one of his highest priorities. Even when the revolution of 1905 forced him to accept an elected

04:37duper, he never fully accepted the idea that political power should permanently move away from

04:43a monarch. That made one argument particularly effective with him. You must not be the czar who

04:48loses what your ancestors gave you. And reality kept colliding with that instinct.

04:54Russia's defeat in the war with Japan exposed serious military and political weaknesses and

05:01helped ignite the revolution of 1905. Nicholas made concessions when forced to, but kept trying to

05:08preserve the old system underneath them. Now, give this personality to a ruler after Putin.

05:15Our hesitant traditionalist may dislike the war. He may understand that Russia needs sanctions relief,

05:24investment, and a less militarized economy. But he inherits Crimea and four other Ukrainian regions

05:31that Moscow has declared Russian territory. Can he give away something that his predecessor

05:37declared part of Russia? More importantly, what else might start unraveling if he does?

05:44So he tries to preserve everything at once. He seeks a ceasefire without abandoning territorial claims.

05:50He wants better relationships with the West without admitting that Putin's confrontation

05:56with it failed. He may soften repression without dismantling the security system. He replaces some

06:04officials while promising the old elite that their world will remain intact. And everyone around him

06:10quickly learns how to manipulate him. If you do this, Russia will become weaker. If you concede that,

06:16you will go down in history as the man who lost the country. A ruler of this type does not

06:23want to hear

06:24unpleasant truths and gradually surrounds himself with people who confirm what he already believes.

06:30The quality of decision-making deteriorates quickly until the damage becomes too great to repair.

06:37Then the collapse of the system becomes almost inevitable. And the old Russia may lose not only

06:43its political order, but its territorial integrity as well.

06:47The Prophet of a New Ideology

06:52Lenin was a very different type of ruler. He came to power with a theory. He believed he understood how

06:59society worked, what was wrong with it, and what had to replace it. The theory had never been tested on

07:06the

07:06scale of an entire country, but Lenin treated its basic premises as truth rather than hypothesis.

07:13If the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, revolution would spread to Germany and then across Europe.

07:20Capitalism would collapse. A new society ruled in the name of workers and peasants would emerge.

07:26And Lenin was prepared to force reality into that theory. When elected institutions stood in the way,

07:33he dissolved them. When newspapers challenged Bolshevik power, they were suppressed. When political opponents

07:40resisted, terror became an acceptable instrument of government. Lenin openly defended revolutionary terror as

07:49necessary for preserving their revolution. Now, give this personality post-war Russia.

07:55Our new ideological prophet arrives when people are exhausted, disappointed, and looking for somebody to explain

08:03why so much sacrifice produced so little. And he has an answer. Putin's system failed because the wrong people

08:12corrupted it. The oligarchs stole. The generals lied. Bureaucrats betrayed the country.

08:19Russia does not need small reforms. It needs a completely new idea. That message could be

08:26enormously attractive. The new ruler might end the war very quickly, if the war interferes with his

08:33larger project. Tactical retreat didn't mean abandoning the ideology. So peace abroad would be followed by

08:41revolution at home. Confiscations, redistribution of property, destruction of Putin's old elite, and the

08:48promotion of entirely new people who promised to build a different Russia. And when the promised

08:54transformation fails to produce prosperity immediately, the ideology provides an explanation for that too.

09:01The revolution was sabotaged. That enemy interfered. Or that society has not yet been transformed deeply

09:08enough. And once you believe that you possess the formula for a better world, people who question the

09:14formula can very easily become enemies of that world. The Modernizer

09:23Stalin was not simply a tyrant. He was a tyrant with a project. By the late 1920s, the promised socialist

09:31paradise had failed to appear. The Soviet Union was poor, technologically backward, and internationally

09:38isolated. Stalin's answer was not to abandon the project, but to conclude that the country had to become

09:46strong enough to survive it. So he launched forced industrialization. The Soviet state poured resources

09:53into steel, machinery, energy, and heavy industry. Western technology and engineers played an important role,

10:01especially when the Great Depression made Soviet contracts attractive to struggling Western companies.

10:06Within a decade, the USSR had acquired an industrial base that later became crucial to its ability to

10:14fight Nazi Germany and emerge as a superpower. But the price was enormous. Forced collectivization

10:21devastated the countryside. Millions were deported, imprisoned, or sent through the Gulag system. Famine killed

10:30millions more. Consumer needs were sacrificed because Stalin considered industrial and military

10:36strength more important than individual lives or living standards. Now, put that personality in

10:44post-war Russia. The Modernizer looks at Putin's legacy and reaches a very different conclusion from Lenin's

10:52prophet. He does not need a new paradise. He needs a stronger state. He sees dependence on important

11:01technology, economic decline, weak infrastructure, and an economy still heavily dependent on natural resources,

11:08and decides Russia lost because it was not powerful enough. So he freezes or ends the war if necessary.

11:17He may even improve relations with the West temporarily if that brings machinery, technology, and investment.

11:24At home, however, the direction is the opposite. Private wealth becomes conditional. Strategic industries

11:33come under tighter state control. Defense, energy, transport, and technology receive enormous investment.

11:40Consumption can wait. Political freedoms can wait. Entire regions and industries are ordered to

11:47serve modernization. And anyone who resists becomes an obstacle to the national project.

11:53Russia may become stronger. Russia may become stronger, but Russians themselves may become poor,

11:58less free, and increasingly expendable. For this ruler, the survival and power of the state matter

12:04much more than the people who have to pay for it. The whole batch.

12:12Khrushchev was a product of Stalin's system himself. He had survived its purchase, risen through

12:19its hierarchy, and learned its political habits. After Stalin's death, the collective leadership moved

12:25against Beria, whom the other leaders regarded as dangerously powerful, and Khrushchev gradually

12:31outmaneuvered the rest. But once in charge, he inherited the country exhausted by Stalinism and still

12:39struggling to compete with a much richer West. Khrushchev's instinct was to patch whatever looked broken.

12:47Agriculture was failing. Launched the Virgin Lands campaign. Industry was too bureaucratic. Replace

12:54ministries with regional economic councils. Housing was scarce. Built millions of cheap apartments.

13:02The West was ahead. Catch up and overtake it. Some of these policies produced real improvements. Others

13:10wasted enormous resources or created new problems that required another reform. The underlying structure,

13:18however, remained largely untouched. Even his relationship with the West followed this

13:23pattern. Khrushchev denounced capitalism while expanding Soviet oil exports and building the

13:29infrastructure that would eventually connect Soviet energy to European markets. The Druzhba pipeline was

13:36began under him and entered service in 1964. Now get this personality post-Putin Russia. The whole

13:45patch probably begins with relief. Political prisoners are released. Some censorship is relapsed. Putin's

13:52most unpopular officials disappear. The new ruler announces that ordinary Russians have sacrificed enough.

13:59Then the emergencies begin. The budget needs money. Restore energy trade with Europe. Industry needs

14:06technology. Negotiate sanctions relief. The military demands resources. Increased defense spending again.

14:13Regions are running out of money. Subsidize them. Birth rates are falling. Launch another expensive national

14:20program. Every crisis gets a response. Every response creates another imbalance. And the rhetoric may

14:27contradict the policy completely. Russia can denounce the West on television while quietly trying to sell it

14:33oil, gas and metals. Compared with Putin, this ruler may seem almost refreshing. More human, less repressive,

14:40willing to admit that things need fixing. But he never asks the most dangerous question.

14:46What if the holes keep appearing because the whole system needs rebuilding? The face saver.

14:56By the time Brezhnev came to power, the Soviet Revolution had produced something wonderfully ironic. A

15:04privileged ruling class inside a state supposedly built on equality. Senior officials had better

15:10apartments, special stores, better healthcare, cars, dachos and access to goods ordinary Soviet citizens

15:17could not obtain. Brezhnev's fundamental instinct was to protect this arrangement. After decades of purchase,

15:27worse at Khrushchev's endless reorganizations, the elite wanted one thing above all – stability.

15:34Keep your position and privileges. Do not change the people above you,

15:39and nobody will suddenly destroy your life. And for a while, the bargain worked.

15:44Rising oil prices gave the Soviet Union hard currency, while oil and gas

15:48exports to the West helped finance imports and cushion domestic problems. Living standards improved

15:55for many Soviet families, even as the underlying economy became increasingly inefficient. The

16:02important thing was to maintain appearance. There were enemies somewhere outside. There were

16:09ideological battles on television. But for most people, politics became background noise. The government

16:16wanted citizens to believe that everything was stable, everything was improving, and everything was

16:22under control. Now, let this personality rule cost Putin Russia. The face saver makes a very simple

16:30offer to Putin's elite. Nobody is taking anything away from you. For ordinary Russians, the offer is similar.

16:38Politics becomes boring again. The war is frozen or quietly ended. Mobilization disappears from every

16:46day in life. Propaganda becomes less hysterical. The state tries to restore trade wherever possible and uses

16:54commodity revenues to subsidize pensions, salaries, and consumer stability. Every serious structural problem is

17:01covered with money, propaganda, or delay. For a while, this could be extremely popular. The danger comes

17:09later. The face saver does not solve a failing system. He simply pushes the real reckoning into the next

17:17generation. The wave rider. Gorbachev was different from the rulers before him because he eventually

17:27accepted a dangerous fact. Reality had changed, and the Soviet system could not simply pretend otherwise.

17:35He did not come to power intending to destroy the USSR or abolish socialism. Quite the opposite. He wanted to

17:43save the system by making it more efficient, more honest, and less isolated from the modern world.

17:48But reform created its own momentum. To repair the economy, he needed less military confrontation

17:55and better relations with the West. To repair a government, he needed more truthful information.

18:02Glassless allowed people to discuss problems that had been hidden for decades. Political reform created

18:10genuine competition. And once people were allowed to question individual mistakes, they began questioning the

18:18system itself. Gorbachev kept trying to ride that wave rather than crush it. Even in 1991,

18:25he was still searching for a way to combine political pluralism, economic reform, and preservation of

18:32the Soviet Union. In his Nobel lecture, he explicitly argued that reform had to continue while state collapse

18:38and chaos were prevented. Now give this personality post-Putin Russia. The wave rider looks around and says,

18:47we cannot continue pretending that nothing has changed. The war has changed Russia's relationship with

18:53Europe. The economy needs technology and investment. Hundreds of thousands of families have been dodged

18:59by the war. The state has accumulated censorship, repression, and secrets that cannot simply disappear.

19:05So he begins loosening the system. He seeks a settlement with Ukraine. He reduces military confrontation.

19:13Political prisoners come home. Independent media cautiously return.

19:18Elections become somewhat more competitive. Relations with Europe begin to normalize.

19:24At first, this may look controlled. Then people start asking questions.

19:30How many actually died in the war? Who became rich from it? Who ordered that?

19:36Why do some regions pay more than others? Why should governors continue taking orders from Moscow?

19:43Why should the same people remain in power? The wave rider keeps making concessions because

19:50resisting reality seems even more dangerous. But every concession creates demands for the next one.

19:57The rebel. Yeltsin was the opposite of the traditionalist. His instinct was not to preserve the

20:09oil system but to break it when he believed it had become an obstacle. He rose by attacking the

20:16communist establishment from inside it, then helped destroy the political order that had produced him.

20:22After the failed coup of 1991, he emerged as the dominant leader of the new Russian state and pushed through

20:30rapid economic and political change. The problem was that destroying institutions is much faster than

20:36building the US. Privatization transferred enormous amounts of property into private hands before Russia

20:42had strong courts, reliable property rights, and effective mechanisms for controlling corruption.

20:48By the mid-1990s, a small group of businessmen had acquired extraordinary economic and political influence,

20:56especially through the notorious Loans for Shares program. And when Yeltsin's struggle with

21:01parliament became impossible to resolve politically, in 1993 he chose confrontation. The crisis ended with

21:09military force and a new constitution that gave the Russian president exceptionally strong powers relative to

21:16parliament, which eventually led to Putin's rise. Now, give this personality post-Putin-Russia.

21:23The rebel does not want to repair the old system. He wants to tear it down. He may end the

21:29war quickly,

21:30release political prisoners, abolish censorship, remove Putin's people, and reopen Russia to the West.

21:37The rebel wants to move fast, so laws are rewritten, assets redistributed, and institutions rebuild almost

21:45simultaneously. But the old elites resist. And when parliament, courts of regional governments slow

21:52the process down, the temptation becomes enormous. We cannot let procedures stop the reforms. That is

22:00the rebel paradox. A ruler can genuinely try to destroy authoritarianism while strengthening the

22:06presidency in order to do it. And here we are again. Hello, dictatorship.

22:11And this brings us to a much older Russian problem. For centuries, Russia repeatedly built systems

22:19in which the fate of the country depended disproportionately on the person at the top.

22:24Long ago, there was a practical logic behind concentrating power. Fragmented territories facing

22:31raids, wars, and scarce resources needed a prince who could raise troops, collect taxes, and provide

22:38protection. But modern Russia no longer needs a medieval prince with a private army. Today,

22:44an extraordinarily strong presidency survives for different reasons. It protects a system in which

22:50access to power and property depends heavily on loyalty to the center. A more institutional system

22:56changes the logic completely. Leaders come and go. Laws remain. Privileges are limited. And losing office

23:04does not mean losing everything. Then the future of an entire country no longer depends

23:10so dramatically on whether the next ruler happens to be a Nicholas, a Stalin, a Brezhnev, or someone

23:17entirely different. Before you go, I want to ask you something. Have you ever watched a workplace,

23:22school, organization, or community you knew well become almost unrecognizable after one new person took

23:29charge? And what was the first moment you realized the rules had changed? Tell me about it in the comments.

23:37I am especially interested in those small early signs that seemed insignificant at first, but later made

23:45perfect sense. And please remember Galenetskovich's fundraiser for sleeping bags for Ukraine. This window may be

23:54extremely difficult for people living through attacks on the country's energy infrastructure.

23:59And something as simple as a warm sleeping bag can make a very real difference. The links are in the

24:06description below. If this video gave you a useful way of thinking about Russia after Putin, please like it,

24:14subscribe, and share it with someone who might enjoy this kind of historical thought experiment.

24:19And if you want to help make this kind of independent research possible, you can support the channel

24:24from my ThinkThing, PayPal, or SuperThings. That support helps fund source checking, historical

24:30research, translation, and the time it takes to go much deeper than the daily headlines. If you are listening

24:37on Spotify, please follow the show so you don't miss the next episode. Thank you for watching. I'll see you

24:43in the next one.

25:01I'll see you in the next one.

روسيا بعد بوتين: 7 وجوه للحاكم التالي

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