The Dark Side (Frontline, 2006)

CETICOS

After 9/11, Vice President Richard Cheney seized the initiative. He pushed to expand executive power, transform America’s intelligence agencies and bring the war on terror to Iraq. But first, he had to take on George Tenet’s CIA for control over intelligence.

Transcript

00:00:00A CIDADE NO BRASIL

00:00:30And the vice president would lead the charge.

00:00:32He's the most powerful vice president in the history of our country.

00:00:35And define the war on terror.

00:00:37Things are going to happen that the public's not going to know about.

00:00:41We weren't going to play by the old set of rules.

00:00:44It's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal to achieve our objective.

00:00:48Tonight on Frontline, the inside story from the dark side.

00:01:08A CIDADE NO BRASIL

00:01:13Police operator, where is the emergency?

00:01:15A CIDADE NO BRASIL

00:01:19Flight department 408, where's the fire?

00:01:21This is another call in regards to the World Trade Center.

00:01:23My secretary called in just before 9 o'clock and said an airplane had hit the World Trade Center.

00:01:28I'm going to die, aren't I?

00:01:29No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

00:01:30I'm going to die.

00:01:31I'm going to die.

00:01:32I'm going to say your prayers.

00:01:33I'm going to connect to the Manhattan side apartment, okay?

00:01:36Hold on.

00:01:36So we turned on the television and actually saw the second plane hit.

00:01:42Operator 2235, which is emergency.

00:01:44We're not ready to die, but it's getting bad.

00:01:53My secret service agents came in and said, sir, we have to leave immediately, and grabbed

00:01:58me and hoisted me up and moved me very rapidly down into an underground facility under the

00:02:03White House.

00:02:07The secret service had received a report that an airplane was headed for the White House.

00:02:18Oh, my goodness, there is smoke pouring out of the Pentagon.

00:02:22Within short order, we had word the Pentagon's been hit.

00:02:26We had a report that there were six airplanes that might have been hijacked, and that's what

00:02:31we started working off of was that list of six.

00:02:34They scrambled the Air Force.

00:02:37The vice president said he was authorized to order them to shoot down commercial airliners.

00:02:42Richard Clark was in the bunkers.

00:02:44He had recommended that we use force to shoot down passenger aircraft, if those passenger

00:02:52aircraft were hijacked, and if it looked like they were about to take out a significant target

00:02:56like the White House or the Capitol.

00:03:01On the phone to the Pentagon, Cheney talked about the shoot-down order with his oldest political

00:03:06ally, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld.

00:03:09Has that directive been transmitted to the aircraft?

00:03:12The vice president answered, yes, it has.

00:03:16By 10.39 in the morning, Cheney mistakenly believed the military had taken down at least

00:03:21two aircraft.

00:03:22It is my understanding they've already taken a couple of aircraft out, he said.

00:03:28We can't confirm that, Rumsfeld replied.

00:03:31We're told that one aircraft is down, but we do not have a pilot report that did it.

00:03:37The aircraft, United Airlines Flight 9-3, had just crashed in Pennsylvania.

00:03:43Cheney believed he had been responsible for shooting it down.

00:03:48He was very firm, calm, cool, making decisions clearly.

00:03:55He immediately begins to take charge of what's going to happen in Washington.

00:04:03It's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal to achieve our objective.

00:04:08I think the vice president felt he kind of looked death in the eye on 9-11.

00:04:163,000 Americans died.

00:04:19The building that the vice president used to work in blew up.

00:04:23People died there.

00:04:26This was a cold slap in the face.

00:04:29This is a different world you're living in.

00:04:31And the enemy's still out there.

00:04:34And the enemy could come after you.

00:04:37That does cause you to think things differently.

00:04:44The vice president would become the chief architect of the war on terror.

00:04:49There would be new laws enhancing executive power.

00:04:53Robust action at home and abroad.

00:04:56And above all, secrecy.

00:04:59We have to work toward the dark side, if you will.

00:05:02We've got to spend time in the shadows and in the intelligence world.

00:05:05A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly,

00:05:09without any discussion, using sources and methods

00:05:12that are available to our intelligence agencies.

00:05:18We're, what, 30 of us standing around.

00:05:20And when the, as soon as the second aircraft smashed through the second tower,

00:05:24everyone said, Bin Laden.

00:05:26It was Bin Laden.

00:05:27This is the attack that Bin Laden's been promising.

00:05:30The CIA had been warning the White House about Bin Laden.

00:05:34But they had missed how and when it would happen.

00:05:37We were fighting these guys.

00:05:39And, and they won a huge victory on that day.

00:05:42And it was a huge defeat for us.

00:05:46George Tenet, the director of central intelligence,

00:05:50a seasoned political operator,

00:05:53wanted official Washington to know the CIA already knew who was responsible.

00:05:59He sent deputies out for briefings.

00:06:02We were given the CIA's initial assessment of what had happened.

00:06:06And, and they listed how Qaeda is the most likely source of this attack.

00:06:15On the afternoon of September 11th, the Pentagon is still smoking.

00:06:19Donald Rumsfeld dictates to one of his aides,

00:06:22We've got to see somehow how we could bring Saddam Hussein into this.

00:06:28Judge Weatherhit S.H. Saddam Hussein at the same time.

00:06:32Not only UBL, Rumsama Bin Laden.

00:06:35Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Cheney,

00:06:39all cut their teeth in the Cold War,

00:06:42in the contest between nation states.

00:06:44They're not comfortable with thinking that the world's greatest power

00:06:48can be threatened by a couple of Arabs with long beards

00:06:52squatting around a desert campfire in Afghanistan.

00:06:55It doesn't register.

00:06:57All that day, Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney

00:07:00were in close contact with the president.

00:07:03They argued there would have to be retaliation,

00:07:06not just against Bin Laden,

00:07:08but also against nations that may have helped al-Qaeda,

00:07:11nations like Iraq.

00:07:15Good evening.

00:07:17We will make no distinction

00:07:18between the terrorists who committed these acts

00:07:21and those who harbored them.

00:07:28And later that evening,

00:07:30Don Rumsfeld took the opportunity to raise Iraq.

00:07:34The night of 9-11,

00:07:36at a small group meeting of the principals,

00:07:39Rumsfeld actually puts Iraq on the table

00:07:43and says, part of our response

00:07:45maybe should be attacking Iraq.

00:07:49It's an opportunity.

00:07:51The president was now the focus

00:07:53of a long-standing ambition of the vice president

00:07:56and his allies to deal with Saddam Hussein.

00:07:59I mean, when you really think about

00:08:01all of these chess pieces moving,

00:08:03with significant players,

00:08:05seasoned in fighters,

00:08:07almost in every chair.

00:08:08Now take these two characters,

00:08:10Cheney and Rumsfeld,

00:08:11and move them into the two key slots

00:08:15around a young and generally inexperienced president,

00:08:18certainly in foreign affairs.

00:08:20It's something of a mismatch.

00:08:23But Cheney had a competitor.

00:08:26Back when they were assembling the Bush administration,

00:08:29Cheney had tried hard to keep George Tenet out.

00:08:32The word I was getting here

00:08:34from Vice President-designed Cheney's staff

00:08:37is that there was no way

00:08:39that George Tenet was going to stay around.

00:08:42Not much about Tenet appealed to Cheney.

00:08:45He was a holdover from the Clinton administration,

00:08:48a Democrat.

00:08:50But he'd worked in the Senate

00:08:51at the National Security Council

00:08:55and knew something about

00:08:56the personal side of politics.

00:08:59Tenet, after all,

00:09:00renamed the CIA headquarters

00:09:02after George W. Bush's father,

00:09:05after George Herbert Walker Bush.

00:09:07And it was a signal of his deft touch

00:09:10as a political manager that he did this.

00:09:14Bush 41 recommended Tenet to his son,

00:09:17and they immediately hit it off.

00:09:19He's a very gregarious,

00:09:22enjoyable friend to have.

00:09:23He wraps his hand around you,

00:09:26chewing on an unlit cigar.

00:09:28He loves to talk sports.

00:09:30He's a man's man.

00:09:32They met nearly every morning,

00:09:34Tenet personally delivering

00:09:35the presidential daily brief, the PDB.

00:09:39It's very easy to see how Tenet

00:09:40and George W. Bush

00:09:41would have gotten along well at these.

00:09:43They're both men who aren't going

00:09:45to spend a lot of time

00:09:46pulling apart nuances

00:09:47of international relations.

00:09:49They're interested in short, sharp facts,

00:09:52a clear sense of direction.

00:09:54Tenet, like the president,

00:09:55is casual in his demeanor.

00:09:58It's easy to imagine at these briefings

00:09:59that two men who didn't know each other at all

00:10:01discovered that they were similar personalities.

00:10:05Some at the CIA worried

00:10:07that Tenet might become

00:10:08just a little too close to the president.

00:10:11Now, I do believe

00:10:12that you can get too close

00:10:14and become,

00:10:16if you will,

00:10:17partisan to the policy.

00:10:20You can be captured

00:10:21by the being

00:10:24close to the seat of power.

00:10:26And I think you have to be very careful.

00:10:30But on the night of 9-11,

00:10:32out at CIA headquarters,

00:10:34George Tenet was all business,

00:10:35pushing hard to prepare a counterattack.

00:10:39We had been working on this for years.

00:10:41Where everybody else

00:10:42is looking for their maps on Afghanistan,

00:10:45we're ready to rock,

00:10:46ready to roll.

00:10:48And it really took momentum

00:10:49when George Tenet said,

00:10:51OK, update the plan,

00:10:53have it ready by tomorrow.

00:10:55They come blazing forward

00:10:57with a fully architected plan.

00:10:59We are going to spread this

00:11:00over 80 countries.

00:11:01We are going to go at it

00:11:03with this eight-pronged attack.

00:11:07Tenet and Kofor Black

00:11:08vividly delivered the message.

00:11:11Kofor Black,

00:11:12who was the chief of CTC,

00:11:13said, you know,

00:11:14we're going to put their heads on pikes

00:11:15and we want flies crossing their,

00:11:18you know, crawling across their dead eyes.

00:11:20And that kind of,

00:11:22kind of headquarters hero talk.

00:11:24You know,

00:11:24the president loves operational guys.

00:11:28Black does a great presentation.

00:11:30You know, Black has been waiting

00:11:32his whole life for this, basically.

00:11:34He's very theatrical.

00:11:35This is serious business.

00:11:36We've been attacked.

00:11:37This is war.

00:11:38People are going to die.

00:11:39And my guy is going to die.

00:11:41He can talk the talk of bloodlust.

00:11:45You know, he's very vivid.

00:11:47The president loves this.

00:11:49Tenet wanted the CIA

00:11:50to take the lead.

00:11:52But Dick Cheney favored

00:11:54the Pentagon and Rumsfeld

00:11:55and deeply distrusted the CIA.

00:11:58They all knew that

00:12:00after Tenet left the morning briefing,

00:12:02Dick Cheney would still be there.

00:12:04I think the personal relationship

00:12:06with the president

00:12:06that George Tenet had

00:12:07was still that of an employee.

00:12:09It doesn't begin to touch

00:12:11the decades of working together

00:12:14that Cheney and Rumsfeld had.

00:12:16You haven't had that kind

00:12:18of strong relationship

00:12:19between a vice president

00:12:21and a secretary of defense.

00:12:22We have never had a vice president

00:12:24as powerful as Dick Cheney.

00:12:26And we have never had

00:12:27a secretary of defense

00:12:28who probably is feared

00:12:30as much as Donald Rumsfeld.

00:12:35Once, 35 years ago,

00:12:37Cheney had worked for Rumsfeld.

00:12:40It began in the Nixon administration

00:12:42when Rumsfeld was looking

00:12:43for a staff aide.

00:12:45One day, Don called me

00:12:47and said,

00:12:47there's a young intern

00:12:49on the Hill named

00:12:50Dick Cheney, Frank.

00:12:52I'm thinking of hiring him.

00:12:54I'd like you to interview him

00:12:55and see what you think.

00:12:56So I interviewed Dick

00:12:58and called Don and said,

00:13:00I think this guy's pretty good.

00:13:01You ought to hire him.

00:13:03They would be closely linked

00:13:04for more than three decades.

00:13:06The difference between

00:13:07these two people,

00:13:09Rumsfeld and Cheney,

00:13:10is Rumsfeld,

00:13:11he'll come right at you.

00:13:12There's nothing indirect about him.

00:13:15Cheney tends to be very low-keyed.

00:13:18It's just a difference in style

00:13:20between the two guys.

00:13:22Politically, they're really,

00:13:23the guys, their views of the world

00:13:25and their views of government

00:13:26are very similar.

00:13:28Then, as Gerald Ford took office,

00:13:30they took over running the White House.

00:13:33I happened to be talking

00:13:34to former President Ford,

00:13:36and I asked how did this happen,

00:13:38and he said,

00:13:38Don Rumsfeld,

00:13:39when I picked him

00:13:41as White House chief of staff,

00:13:43he said,

00:13:44I'll accept,

00:13:44but there's one thing

00:13:45I have to have,

00:13:47and that is,

00:13:47I want to bring in

00:13:48a guy named Dick Cheney.

00:13:49And Ford said,

00:13:50I haven't even met him.

00:13:52But he agreed.

00:13:53And so,

00:13:55Rumsfeld gave political life

00:13:57to Dick Cheney,

00:13:58to say the least.

00:14:00They were formidable

00:14:01bureaucratic infighters,

00:14:03and one day,

00:14:04they proved it,

00:14:06literally remaking

00:14:07the Ford administration

00:14:08in a legendary maneuver

00:14:10performed entirely

00:14:11behind the scenes.

00:14:13In really a couple of days,

00:14:15the so-called Halloween massacre,

00:14:16they managed to cut

00:14:18Henry Kissinger's job in half,

00:14:20and the vice president,

00:14:22Rockefeller,

00:14:23is swiftly marginalized.

00:14:25William Colby,

00:14:26then running the CIA,

00:14:27is replaced with George H.W. Bush.

00:14:32Rumsfeld moves

00:14:33to be secretary of defense.

00:14:35Cheney moves up

00:14:36to Rumsfeld's job

00:14:37as chief of staff.

00:14:38It's an extraordinary

00:14:40tactical flourish.

00:14:42After the Ford administration,

00:14:44Rumsfeld made his fortune

00:14:45in private industry.

00:14:46Cheney spent 10 years

00:14:48in Congress,

00:14:49where he was immersed

00:14:50in intelligence matters.

00:14:52And then he became

00:14:53secretary of defense

00:14:54for the first president, Bush.

00:14:57In the shadow of Colin Powell,

00:14:59he had quietly managed

00:15:01the military in the Gulf War.

00:15:04Now, he and Rumsfeld

00:15:06wanted the military

00:15:07to come up with a plan

00:15:08for attacking al-Qaeda

00:15:09in Afghanistan.

00:15:11But the Pentagon

00:15:12was caught flat-footed.

00:15:14The military

00:15:15was totally unprepared

00:15:16in the wake of 9-11

00:15:17for anything

00:15:19that needed to be done

00:15:20in Afghanistan.

00:15:21They had no plans

00:15:22on the shelf.

00:15:23They had no idea

00:15:24of what was required.

00:15:26The secretary of defense

00:15:27called his generals

00:15:29at central command.

00:15:30Tommy Franks

00:15:31was the four-star.

00:15:33Mike DeLong

00:15:34was his number two.

00:15:35We had no plan.

00:15:37I mean, to be honest,

00:15:38you have operational plans

00:15:40for different parts

00:15:41of the world.

00:15:42There was none

00:15:43for Afghanistan.

00:15:45Rumsfeld was angry.

00:15:46He wanted quick action

00:15:48with a small force.

00:15:49And he didn't mince words

00:15:50with Tommy Franks

00:15:51about it.

00:15:52The tensions

00:15:53were really high.

00:15:56And Franks was

00:15:57not getting any more sleep

00:15:59than I was.

00:15:59And, by the way,

00:16:01he drinks maybe

00:16:0215 cups of coffee a day,

00:16:05smokes two packs

00:16:06of cigarettes,

00:16:07cigars,

00:16:08and chews.

00:16:09So he's running

00:16:12on adrenaline

00:16:13and caffeine

00:16:14and nicotine.

00:16:16And so it doesn't take much

00:16:18to scratch that line.

00:16:19And he and Rumsfeld

00:16:20went at it.

00:16:23Rumsfeld would scramble,

00:16:25but Tennant

00:16:26and his counterterror teams

00:16:27were way ahead of him.

00:16:29And I think that's

00:16:30a bitter pill

00:16:31for the Pentagon,

00:16:32this great historical moment.

00:16:33They're a public servant,

00:16:34after all.

00:16:35In some ways,

00:16:36they wait their whole life

00:16:37to be called to duty

00:16:38at a moment like this.

00:16:39And the Pentagon

00:16:40is largely on the sidelines,

00:16:43watching.

00:16:44And watching,

00:16:45of all people,

00:16:46the CIA.

00:16:47Oh!

00:16:54At Camp David,

00:16:55four days after 9-11,

00:16:57George Bush would hear

00:16:58the formal arguments

00:16:59for and against,

00:17:00including Iraq

00:17:01in the war plan.

00:17:03Hard to describe

00:17:04the feeling in the room.

00:17:05I mean,

00:17:06they were focused.

00:17:08They began

00:17:09with Afghanistan.

00:17:10But Cheney's

00:17:12former Pentagon deputy,

00:17:13Paul Wolfowitz,

00:17:14brought up Iraq.

00:17:15There was discussion

00:17:16of Iraq

00:17:17and whether Iraq

00:17:19was behind this

00:17:19and whether Iraq

00:17:22should be included

00:17:22in any targeting.

00:17:24They made Saddam Hussein

00:17:26out to be

00:17:27the greatest threat

00:17:27to the United States

00:17:28and the source

00:17:29of all evil,

00:17:30if not in the world,

00:17:31and certainly

00:17:31in the Middle East.

00:17:33That discussion

00:17:33went back and forth,

00:17:34back and forth,

00:17:35back and forth.

00:17:35The agency argued

00:17:37that that was

00:17:38not appropriate,

00:17:41not the right conclusion

00:17:41to draw at this point.

00:17:44Secretary of State

00:17:45Powell weighed in

00:17:46on Tenet's side.

00:17:48But Cheney

00:17:49had no faith

00:17:50in the CIA.

00:17:51I think there's

00:17:52one thing

00:17:52that influences

00:17:53him,

00:17:54at least in my conversations.

00:17:56He remembered,

00:17:57as clearly as I remembered,

00:17:59how wrong intelligence

00:18:00had been in 1991.

00:18:02They had been wrong

00:18:03about the collapse

00:18:05of the Soviet Union,

00:18:06the Iranian revolution,

00:18:08Saddam's invasion

00:18:09of Kuwait,

00:18:10and more.

00:18:12There was a massive

00:18:13nuclear program

00:18:14in Iraq,

00:18:15nuclear weapons

00:18:16development program,

00:18:17that was probably

00:18:19nine to 18 months

00:18:21away from having

00:18:22its first nuclear

00:18:23weapon detonation,

00:18:24and that CIA

00:18:26had totally missed it.

00:18:28We had bombed

00:18:30everything we could

00:18:31bomb in Iraq

00:18:32but missed

00:18:33an enormous

00:18:35nuclear weapons

00:18:36development facility.

00:18:38Didn't know it was there,

00:18:39never dropped

00:18:40one bomb on it.

00:18:41That's at the forefront,

00:18:42at least in my conversations

00:18:43with him,

00:18:44about Iraq.

00:18:45You know,

00:18:46they were wrong before,

00:18:47they didn't get the evidence,

00:18:48how do we know

00:18:49what they know now?

00:18:50There's no doubt

00:18:51that the Dick Cheney

00:18:52comes back into office

00:18:53eight years later,

00:18:54nine years later,

00:18:56has that as one

00:18:57of the things

00:18:58burnt into his memory,

00:18:59that Iraq wants

00:19:01a nuclear weapon,

00:19:02Iraq was that close

00:19:03to getting a nuclear weapon,

00:19:04and CIA hadn't a clue.

00:19:06Thank you.

00:19:07Thank you very much.

00:19:08Thank you very much.

00:19:09At the end of all

00:19:10of this deliberation,

00:19:11the president says,

00:19:12thank you all very much,

00:19:13this has been

00:19:14a very good discussion,

00:19:15I'm going to think

00:19:16about all of this

00:19:18on Sunday,

00:19:19and I'll call you

00:19:19together Monday

00:19:20and tell you

00:19:21what I've concluded.

00:19:23The stakes for Cheney

00:19:24and Rumsfeld

00:19:25were high.

00:19:26If the CIA prevailed,

00:19:28they could lose control

00:19:30of how and where

00:19:31the war on terror

00:19:32would be fought.

00:19:34And Monday,

00:19:35we all assemble

00:19:36in the cabinet room,

00:19:37and the president

00:19:38lays down about

00:19:3912 decisions,

00:19:41just like that,

00:19:42machine gun fashion.

00:19:43What did he say?

00:19:44Well, of course,

00:19:45the thing that stands out

00:19:46in my memory,

00:19:47because it hit me vividly,

00:19:50was he said,

00:19:51I want CIA in there first.

00:19:55It was a body blow

00:19:56to Cheney and Rumsfeld.

00:20:00Rumsfeld's military machine

00:20:01would be taking a back seat

00:20:03to the CIA

00:20:04and George Tenet.

00:20:14My team of seven officers,

00:20:17including myself

00:20:18and three air crew,

00:20:19flew in on the 26th of September.

00:20:22When I began

00:20:23to distribute money,

00:20:25$200,000 here,

00:20:26$250,000 for this,

00:20:28I think that the Afghans

00:20:30were convinced

00:20:31that we were sincere.

00:20:33It was a new kind of war

00:20:35against an invisible enemy.

00:20:38You read the stories

00:20:39about what these people

00:20:40did on the ground

00:20:41in Afghanistan,

00:20:42and it's like

00:20:43you could make movies out of it.

00:20:45It's so fantastic.

00:20:47The plan was all about

00:20:48size and speed

00:20:50and using just the right

00:20:52CIA officers.

00:20:53And they had to be guys

00:20:55that we knew

00:20:55that we could trust.

00:20:57Kofor Black told me,

00:20:59one-third of your men will die.

00:21:00Be prepared for that.

00:21:02I accept it.

00:21:03You need to accept it.

00:21:04Proceed aggressively.

00:21:06I want you killing the enemy

00:21:07in 48 hours.

00:21:11Find them and destroy them.

00:21:13They would spend millions

00:21:14to buy the Northern Alliance,

00:21:16ragtag fighters

00:21:17led by brutal warlords.

00:21:19It's going to be

00:21:20a multi-pronged threat attack

00:21:22where we work with locals.

00:21:24We compromised enemies.

00:21:26We used cash.

00:21:28We provided humanitarian aid.

00:21:30But once the covert side

00:21:31of the CIA plan was finished,

00:21:33they needed the U.S. military,

00:21:36Don Rumsfeld's military.

00:21:38They would wait and wait

00:21:41for almost a month.

00:21:42We were there for just about

00:21:44a month by ourselves

00:21:45out in Nevada.

00:21:47We were the only Americans

00:21:48in country for almost a month.

00:21:53By late October,

00:21:54at CIA headquarters,

00:21:56they were worried.

00:21:57We were already making plans

00:21:58for a winter siege.

00:22:00And we had meetings

00:22:01on the budget,

00:22:01like how we would budget for this.

00:22:03And, you know,

00:22:04the military and our people

00:22:05and the Northern Alliance people

00:22:06would be there through the winter.

00:22:10Then, there was a fiery NSC meeting.

00:22:13The CIA had been complaining

00:22:15Rumsfeld was dragging

00:22:16his feet in Afghanistan.

00:22:18It was said Rumsfeld

00:22:20didn't like taking orders

00:22:21from the CIA.

00:22:23There was a lot of jealousy

00:22:24that Tennant had a leg up.

00:22:27And Rumsfeld was about

00:22:28three yards back.

00:22:32Rumsfeld went to the president,

00:22:33said, the CIA has to work for me

00:22:35or this isn't going to work.

00:22:37I've got a lot of respect

00:22:39for Rumsfeld

00:22:40as a bureaucratic infighter.

00:22:42He never loses a battle

00:22:43because if he loses a battle,

00:22:46he'll refight the next morning.

00:22:48The president finally agreed.

00:22:51Rumsfeld would now be in charge.

00:22:54That's what happened.

00:22:55CIA works for Rumsfeld.

00:22:57Army special ops teams

00:22:59were airlifted to Afghanistan

00:23:00and the military side

00:23:03of Operation Jawbreaker

00:23:04could begin in earnest.

00:23:06And it wasn't until

00:23:07the night of the 19th of October

00:23:09or the morning of the 20th

00:23:11that the first special forces

00:23:13A-team came in.

00:23:15The Northern Alliance

00:23:17had a chance on horseback.

00:23:20The special ops teams

00:23:22with global position devices

00:23:23calling in airstrikes.

00:23:28Made short work

00:23:30of the Taliban forces.

00:23:37Finally, in mid-November,

00:23:39the capital, Kabul, fell.

00:23:42And I was absolutely convinced

00:23:43that that would happen

00:23:44and that the Taliban

00:23:46would break quickly.

00:23:47That could have happened

00:23:48in October, early October.

00:23:51It was mission accomplished.

00:23:53We'd like the survivors

00:23:55of 9-11 to know

00:23:56that those of us in the business

00:23:58consider it the CIA's finest hour.

00:24:00We went in to kick ass

00:24:02and we did.

00:24:07It was a CIA success story.

00:24:10George Tenet and the CIA

00:24:11were riding high.

00:24:13Now they wanted to take on

00:24:15al-Qaeda all over the globe.

00:24:17Now he had the place

00:24:20at the table,

00:24:21the role in American

00:24:22national security

00:24:23that hearkened back

00:24:25to the glory days

00:24:26of the CIA in the 50s

00:24:28and the 60s

00:24:29and even during

00:24:30the Second World War.

00:24:32But Tenet's

00:24:32man-of-the-hour status

00:24:34was already being undercut

00:24:35behind closed doors.

00:24:39Dick Cheney

00:24:39had quietly placed loyalists

00:24:41throughout the administration.

00:24:43and they were already in motion.

00:24:47Many of the people

00:24:48who worked for Cheney

00:24:50when he was defense secretary

00:24:51end up in senior jobs

00:24:53in the administration.

00:24:55And his network

00:24:55is positioned

00:24:57almost everywhere

00:24:58in the government

00:24:58that's important.

00:24:59That's how they were able

00:25:00to galvanize so much power.

00:25:02He aggregated the power

00:25:04at key national security centers.

00:25:06At the Pentagon,

00:25:07Rumsfeld was joined

00:25:09by Wolfowitz

00:25:10and Fythe,

00:25:11Cambon,

00:25:12Richard Pearl.

00:25:13The important thing

00:25:15that unites them

00:25:16is their belief

00:25:17in the primacy

00:25:18of the military tool,

00:25:20that it's been

00:25:21an underused tool.

00:25:25Over at Colin Powell's

00:25:26State Department,

00:25:27Cheney brought in

00:25:28John Bolton.

00:25:29Bolton's not

00:25:30President Bush's man.

00:25:32He's Dick Cheney's man.

00:25:35At the White House,

00:25:36Cheney's national security staff

00:25:38was larger than that

00:25:39of any vice president

00:25:40in history.

00:25:40He went out

00:25:42and had his chief of staff,

00:25:45Scooter Libby,

00:25:45appoint what amounts

00:25:46to a whole second

00:25:47National Security Council.

00:25:49It became a new source

00:25:51of power

00:25:52within the whole

00:25:53foreign policy community.

00:25:55It's an agency

00:25:56all its own.

00:25:57And he relied

00:25:58on Rumsfeld

00:25:59and the insiders

00:26:00at the Pentagon

00:26:01to create their own

00:26:03intelligence capability.

00:26:04He starts to put in place

00:26:06a new capability

00:26:08that's not yet fully developed,

00:26:10but that the outlines are

00:26:11we need to figure out

00:26:14how to gather

00:26:14more intelligence ourself,

00:26:16the military,

00:26:18not rely so much

00:26:19on the CIA.

00:26:20There were a lot

00:26:21of seniors

00:26:21in the Department of Defense

00:26:22that were dismayed

00:26:25that they weren't able

00:26:25to respond

00:26:27as quickly as CIA.

00:26:29And I think

00:26:30it has been shown

00:26:32over the past

00:26:32several years

00:26:33that the Defense Department

00:26:34has tried to increase

00:26:35its role

00:26:36in the intelligence community

00:26:37and to chew away

00:26:40at CIA's

00:26:40traditional authorities

00:26:41and responsibilities.

00:26:43The internal struggle

00:26:44was revealed

00:26:45in those morning briefings

00:26:46between Tenant,

00:26:47the President,

00:26:48and Cheney.

00:26:49Every morning,

00:26:50the presidential daily brief,

00:26:52the PDB would be given.

00:26:53It would be given both

00:26:53to the President

00:26:54and the Vice President.

00:26:55And Cheney complained

00:26:56numerous times

00:26:57that the information

00:26:58coming from the CIA

00:27:00was not very good.

00:27:02Cheney wanted information

00:27:04that linked

00:27:04Osama bin Laden

00:27:05and Saddam Hussein.

00:27:07But they weren't getting

00:27:08that information

00:27:09from the CIA.

00:27:10And so he put pressure,

00:27:12I think,

00:27:13on Rumsfeld

00:27:14and on the Pentagon

00:27:15to come up

00:27:17with their own estimates.

00:27:19Inside the Pentagon

00:27:20bureaucracy,

00:27:21Rumsfeld could easily

00:27:23and quietly grow

00:27:24a nearly invisible operation.

00:27:26They needed an office

00:27:27that would produce

00:27:28the intelligence

00:27:29that the CIA

00:27:30wouldn't produce.

00:27:32Rumsfeld said,

00:27:33I can solve your problem,

00:27:34and he put Douglas Feith

00:27:35on that issue.

00:27:38So they're going to do

00:27:39their own analysis.

00:27:41And they're going to show

00:27:42what the CIA

00:27:43has been missing

00:27:44all along

00:27:45about the true relationship

00:27:47between Saddam

00:27:48and al-Qaeda.

00:27:50They needed people

00:27:51with experience

00:27:52in the world

00:27:52of intelligence,

00:27:53but they hired

00:27:55politically connected

00:27:56policy analysts.

00:27:57I got a phone call.

00:27:59Next thing I know,

00:27:59I'm being detailed

00:28:00on over to

00:28:01Doug Feith's office,

00:28:02and that I would be joined

00:28:03by Dave Wormser,

00:28:05who today works

00:28:07in the office

00:28:08of the vice president.

00:28:10They worked in a vault

00:28:11deep inside the Pentagon.

00:28:14They had what is known

00:28:16as all-source clearances,

00:28:18total access

00:28:18to intelligence information.

00:28:20I went into the system,

00:28:22our classified system,

00:28:24to see what did we know

00:28:25about terrorist groups

00:28:27and their relationships,

00:28:29as well as their

00:28:30connection and associations

00:28:33with not only al-Qaeda,

00:28:36but also with state sponsors.

00:28:39The information

00:28:40was rarely vetted.

00:28:42Instead,

00:28:43it moved up

00:28:44the chain of command

00:28:45to the office

00:28:46of the vice president.

00:28:47And this became

00:28:49material that was then used,

00:28:51sort of in white paper-like fashion,

00:28:53to be leaked to journalists

00:28:55or to create links

00:28:56between Saddam Hussein

00:28:57and al-Qaeda.

00:28:58One story

00:28:59involved the leader

00:29:01of the 9-11 attacks,

00:29:03Mohammed Atta,

00:29:04who allegedly had met

00:29:05with an Iraqi intelligence agent

00:29:07in Prague.

00:29:08We were looking

00:29:09for connections,

00:29:10and that was one of them.

00:29:12And then subsequently,

00:29:14and then I did

00:29:14some additional research

00:29:15and talking to people

00:29:16who were in touch

00:29:18with the Czechs.

00:29:19They sent it up

00:29:20to the vice president's office.

00:29:21It's been pretty well confirmed

00:29:23that he did go to Prague

00:29:24and he did meet

00:29:25with a senior official

00:29:27of the Iraqi intelligence service.

00:29:28We came to

00:29:29a different conclusion.

00:29:30We went over that

00:29:32every which way

00:29:33from Sunday.

00:29:34I mean,

00:29:34we looked at it

00:29:36from every conceivable angle.

00:29:38We peeled open the source

00:29:39and examined the chain

00:29:41of acquisition.

00:29:42We looked at photographs.

00:29:43We looked at timetables.

00:29:45We looked at who was where, when.

00:29:47I believe something did occur

00:29:50for two reasons.

00:29:51Number one,

00:29:53I think it's the prime minister

00:29:54who has always refuted

00:29:57the allegation

00:29:58that it was made up.

00:30:00Very early on,

00:30:01both CIA and FBI

00:30:02knew it wasn't true

00:30:03because the FBI

00:30:04had Atta in Florida

00:30:05at the time.

00:30:07And number two,

00:30:10I'm told there was a photograph

00:30:12of the meeting.

00:30:13The 9-11 commission report

00:30:15would later find

00:30:16that there was no photograph

00:30:18and Atta was not in Prague

00:30:20at that time.

00:30:21And I sought to get it,

00:30:22for our people

00:30:23to get that photograph,

00:30:24and they never did,

00:30:26to my knowledge,

00:30:27or at least they never got it

00:30:29so that I could see it.

00:30:30I want to be very careful

00:30:31about how I say this.

00:30:32And despite the CIA's

00:30:34conclusion that the story

00:30:35wasn't true,

00:30:37Mohammed Atta,

00:30:38who was the lead attack...

00:30:39The vice president

00:30:40continued to tell it.

00:30:41...did apparently travel

00:30:42to Prague...

00:30:43He would repeat it regularly

00:30:44for the next two years.

00:30:46Public author,

00:30:46the Czechs alleged

00:30:47that Mohammed Atta,

00:30:49the lead attacker,

00:30:49met in Prague

00:30:50with a senior Iraqi

00:30:51intelligence official

00:30:52five months before the attack,

00:30:54but we've never been able

00:30:55to develop any more

00:30:56of that yet, I think.

00:30:57I remember vividly

00:30:58in the driveway outside

00:30:59of the West Wing,

00:31:00Scooter Libby grabbing me.

00:31:03from the vice president's office

00:31:04and saying,

00:31:05I hear you don't believe

00:31:07this report that Mohammed Atta

00:31:09was talking to Iraqi people

00:31:11in Prague.

00:31:12And I said,

00:31:13I don't believe it

00:31:13because it's not true.

00:31:15And he said,

00:31:15you're wrong.

00:31:16You know you're wrong.

00:31:18Go back and find out.

00:31:19Look at the rest of the reports

00:31:20and find out that you're wrong.

00:31:23And I understood

00:31:25what he was saying,

00:31:26which was,

00:31:27this is a report

00:31:28that we want to believe

00:31:29and stop saying

00:31:30it's not true.

00:31:32It's a real problem

00:31:33for the vice president's office

00:31:34that you,

00:31:35the counterterrorism coordinator,

00:31:37are walking around

00:31:38saying that this isn't

00:31:39the true report.

00:31:40Shut up.

00:31:41That's what I was being told.

00:31:49That winter,

00:31:50the CIA was still at war.

00:31:53The Taliban had fallen.

00:31:55Now it was Osama bin Laden's turn.

00:31:57I'm looking for bin Laden right away.

00:32:00I want to start killing him

00:32:01and his people immediately.

00:32:04We had intelligence

00:32:06that continued to develop

00:32:07that bin Laden

00:32:08and Zawahiri

00:32:09were in Afghanistan,

00:32:11probably in the eastern areas,

00:32:13hiding out there.

00:32:16The CIA tried to put together

00:32:18a team to chase bin Laden.

00:32:20It wasn't easy.

00:32:22I asked the army special forces

00:32:24if they'll send people in.

00:32:25They say,

00:32:25no,

00:32:26we're not going down there.

00:32:27It's not stable.

00:32:27You don't have a reliable ally.

00:32:30The conditions for al-Qaeda's retreat

00:32:32were quite favorable.

00:32:33And the United States

00:32:35did not do

00:32:36the one thing

00:32:36that the Pentagon

00:32:38had within its power

00:32:40to do,

00:32:41which was to move

00:32:42regular U.S. troops

00:32:43into a blocking position

00:32:45behind these mountains.

00:32:48We could come from

00:32:49the north, west, and south,

00:32:52but we couldn't block the east.

00:32:54It's rugged, rugged terrain,

00:32:55and we didn't have

00:32:56enough U.S. troops.

00:32:58How do you block

00:32:59this entire mountain line?

00:33:01It's like blocking

00:33:02the border of New Mexico

00:33:03from Mexico

00:33:04and hoping you can keep people

00:33:06from going both ways

00:33:07with tunnels underneath,

00:33:09hundreds of them.

00:33:13We could all feel it slipping away

00:33:15as week after week

00:33:16after week went by

00:33:18and the U.S. had

00:33:19no military units

00:33:20on the ground

00:33:21except a few special forces.

00:33:24So, on his own

00:33:26and without the permission

00:33:27of the Defense Department,

00:33:29CIA officer Bernstein

00:33:30sent a small group

00:33:31to Nangarhar province.

00:33:33Based on intelligence

00:33:34that we have,

00:33:35that bin Laden

00:33:35has fallen back

00:33:36with about 1,000 people,

00:33:38and then we come upon

00:33:39his camp at Milawa.

00:33:41The CIA urgently

00:33:43called the Pentagon.

00:33:46They were given

00:33:47air support,

00:33:48but not the Army Rangers.

00:33:50And then four guys,

00:33:52two CIA officers,

00:33:54and two JSOC

00:33:55with about 10 Afghan guards

00:33:56calling the first

00:33:5856 hours of airstrikes

00:33:59against the mother load

00:34:01of Al-Qaeda

00:34:02down below them.

00:34:12It was a nice beginning

00:34:14to what would be

00:34:14about a 16-day battle.

00:34:16My captain, come on.

00:34:20We actually,

00:34:21I'm convinced,

00:34:22wounded him.

00:34:23He was there at Tora Bora.

00:34:24I don't think there's

00:34:25any question now

00:34:27that bin Laden

00:34:29was at Tora Bora

00:34:30and was wounded

00:34:31in some way.

00:34:32The CIA officers

00:34:34in the field

00:34:35told headquarters

00:34:36the border

00:34:36had not been closed

00:34:37and bin Laden

00:34:39had escaped.

00:34:48That winter,

00:34:49a story circulated

00:34:50that military resources

00:34:53were already

00:34:53being aimed at Iraq.

00:34:56One United States senator,

00:34:58the chairman

00:34:59of the Senate

00:34:59Intelligence Committee,

00:35:00remembers a private

00:35:02conversation

00:35:02with General Franks.

00:35:04The general said,

00:35:05Senator,

00:35:06I would like to speak

00:35:07with you privately.

00:35:08We went into his room

00:35:09and he proceeded

00:35:10to tell me

00:35:11that they weren't

00:35:13fighting a war

00:35:14in Afghanistan,

00:35:15that they were,

00:35:15in fact,

00:35:16beginning to redeploy

00:35:18assets,

00:35:18and he particularly

00:35:19mentioned special

00:35:20operations personnel

00:35:22and the Predator

00:35:23unmanned aircraft

00:35:24as examples

00:35:25of assets

00:35:27that were being

00:35:28redeployed

00:35:28from Afghanistan

00:35:29to get ready

00:35:30for Iraq.

00:35:33General Franks

00:35:34has denied

00:35:34Senator Graham's

00:35:35version of the story.

00:35:38But on the ground

00:35:39in Afghanistan,

00:35:41CIA officers say

00:35:42they noticed

00:35:43a shift toward Iraq.

00:35:45You could see

00:35:46changes being made

00:35:48in the U.S. military

00:35:49staffing in Afghanistan

00:35:51that the Green Beret units,

00:35:53the 5th Special Forces group,

00:35:54were being pulled out

00:35:56to refit

00:35:58and get ready

00:35:59for Iraq.

00:36:01And it was clear

00:36:02that the kind of guys

00:36:04that I think a lot of us

00:36:06believed were essential,

00:36:07U.S. military personnel

00:36:08with special operations

00:36:09capabilities,

00:36:11were being pulled away.

00:36:16Three months after 9-11,

00:36:18the Vice President

00:36:19went on Fox News.

00:36:21I never say anything

00:36:22is inevitable,

00:36:22but if I were Saddam Hussein,

00:36:24I'd be thinking very carefully

00:36:25about the future

00:36:27and I'd be looking

00:36:28very closely

00:36:29to see what happened

00:36:30to the Taliban

00:36:31in Afghanistan.

00:36:34The Vice President

00:36:35continued to assert

00:36:37a connection

00:36:37between al-Qaeda

00:36:38and Iraq,

00:36:39but the CIA

00:36:40kept saying

00:36:41it wasn't true.

00:36:43We said

00:36:44in that time frame

00:36:45that we had no evidence

00:36:46linking Iraq

00:36:47to al-Qaeda

00:36:49and to those attacks.

00:36:52Tenet had even

00:36:53ordered a massive

00:36:54agency search

00:36:55for any connection.

00:36:57Tenet, to his credit,

00:36:59had us go back

00:37:0210 years

00:37:02in the agency's records

00:37:04and look and see

00:37:06what we knew

00:37:07about Iraq and al-Qaeda.

00:37:08And I was available

00:37:10at the time

00:37:10and I led the effort.

00:37:11And we went back

00:37:1210 years,

00:37:13we examined

00:37:14about 20,000 documents,

00:37:16probably something

00:37:17along the line

00:37:18of 75,000 pages

00:37:19of information.

00:37:21And there was no connection

00:37:23between Iraq and Saddam.

00:37:24So that was his job.

00:37:25And he told the president,

00:37:26here's what I think.

00:37:27And the president

00:37:28didn't like it, fine.

00:37:29But he,

00:37:31I never saw him

00:37:32hold back

00:37:33on what I knew.

00:37:35He told him

00:37:36everything that I knew,

00:37:37he told the president.

00:37:38Like what?

00:37:40Well, things

00:37:41that were going on.

00:37:42Here's,

00:37:44it's the al-Qaeda

00:37:45in Afghanistan,

00:37:46it's not the Iraqis,

00:37:48it's not the Iranians.

00:37:50If they do have

00:37:52something to do with it,

00:37:53it'll be a side issue,

00:37:54but that's not

00:37:55the main issue now.

00:37:56Boom,

00:37:56just like that.

00:37:57So from the very beginning,

00:37:59he'd say,

00:37:59it's al-Qaeda.

00:38:00It's al-Qaeda

00:38:01in Afghanistan.

00:38:03And Bush is hearing that?

00:38:04Yep.

00:38:04He was hearing that?

00:38:05Colonel Mustard

00:38:06in the library

00:38:07with the candlestick.

00:38:08I mean,

00:38:08here it is.

00:38:09Yeah.

00:38:16The CIA,

00:38:17the war on terror.

00:38:24Of the thousands

00:38:25of prisoners

00:38:25being taken off

00:38:26the battlefield,

00:38:27the agency

00:38:28was in charge

00:38:29of a handful,

00:38:30high-value terrorists,

00:38:32HVTs.

00:38:35and they had a special way

00:38:36of dealing with them

00:38:37known as rendition.

00:38:40One rendition story

00:38:41involves the HVT

00:38:42Ibn Sheikh al-Libi.

00:38:45Bin Laden made his escape,

00:38:46left Sheikh al-Libi

00:38:47in command of the al-Qaeda

00:38:50forces there,

00:38:51and he's captured.

00:38:51So we captured Sheikh al-Libi.

00:38:55What you want

00:38:56from that individual

00:38:57is to try to get information

00:38:59that will lead you

00:38:59to another success,

00:39:01either on the battlefield

00:39:02or in some other way.

00:39:05He's ferried off to Egypt

00:39:07to torture him.

00:39:08And we know

00:39:09that he's going to be tortured.

00:39:11Anyone who's worked

00:39:13on Egypt,

00:39:14who's worked in other countries

00:39:15in the Middle East,

00:39:16knows that.

00:39:17Egyptians torture him,

00:39:19and he provides

00:39:20a lot of information.

00:39:22The information

00:39:23from al-Libi

00:39:24found its way

00:39:25into the intelligence system.

00:39:27And it says

00:39:28that Saddam Hussein

00:39:30provided training

00:39:31in chemical weapons

00:39:32to al-Qaeda.

00:39:34And that secret

00:39:35intelligence unit

00:39:36at the Pentagon

00:39:36turned the information

00:39:38about Saddam and al-Qaeda

00:39:39and chemical weapons

00:39:40into an official report.

00:39:43The test

00:39:44of an intelligence officer

00:39:45is not so much

00:39:46the ability

00:39:46to accumulate information,

00:39:48it's to judge

00:39:49between different pieces

00:39:50of information.

00:39:52There is what you could call

00:39:54intelligence information

00:39:55available to prove

00:39:57almost any case

00:39:59that you wanted to prove

00:40:01if you were

00:40:02a non-discerning

00:40:06intelligence amateur.

00:40:08That information

00:40:09turned out to be correct.

00:40:10I heard it not only

00:40:12from al-Libi,

00:40:12but we heard it

00:40:13from some people

00:40:16from the INC,

00:40:18the Iraqi National Congress,

00:40:22and then we'd take

00:40:23their information

00:40:23and put it back

00:40:24into the intelligence systems.

00:40:27The intelligence

00:40:28provided by the torture

00:40:29of al-Libi

00:40:30moved through the system.

00:40:32A lot of that information

00:40:33is funneled in the form

00:40:34of intelligence reports

00:40:36to the vice president,

00:40:37to the secretary of defense,

00:40:38in fact,

00:40:39to the entire administration.

00:40:42It is the kind

00:40:43of information

00:40:44the office

00:40:44of the vice president,

00:40:46the OVP,

00:40:47began to stockpile.

00:40:50In fact,

00:40:51all roads

00:40:52in the war on terror

00:40:53run through the OVP.

00:40:55It has a political arm

00:40:57and a policy side,

00:40:59and then there's legal.

00:41:03They believed

00:41:04in expanding

00:41:05the president's

00:41:05executive powers.

00:41:07In terms of the

00:41:08executive power issue,

00:41:10you know,

00:41:10clearly,

00:41:10I think 9-11

00:41:12is a moment

00:41:13of preparation

00:41:14meeting opportunity.

00:41:19Cheney was convinced

00:41:21the power of the president

00:41:22had been whittled away

00:41:23by Congress

00:41:24and the courts.

00:41:25Can you tell us

00:41:26how and when

00:41:26did you first meet

00:41:27President Nixon?

00:41:28He viewed

00:41:29the searing moments

00:41:30of the Nixon administration

00:41:31which he was there

00:41:33in the front seats for

00:41:34as a diminution

00:41:36of what the president

00:41:37ought to be.

00:41:39They are now

00:41:40boarding the helicopter,

00:41:41walking through

00:41:41the honor guard.

00:41:42The president now

00:41:43at the door.

00:41:44And he saw

00:41:45the years since

00:41:46as a time where

00:41:47essentially

00:41:48that damage

00:41:49was not repaired.

00:41:51Within days

00:41:52of 9-11,

00:41:54Cheney's legal insiders

00:41:55saw a chance

00:41:56to rebuild

00:41:57the president's power.

00:41:58The laws,

00:41:59they were written,

00:42:00and the constitution

00:42:01that we have,

00:42:01gives the president

00:42:02a lot of power

00:42:03in wartime.

00:42:03The president

00:42:04is the commander-in-chief.

00:42:05The vice president's

00:42:06legal counsel,

00:42:07David Addington,

00:42:09headed a group

00:42:09of lawyers

00:42:10who argued

00:42:11the president

00:42:12could authorize

00:42:13whatever means

00:42:14were necessary

00:42:15to fight

00:42:15the war on terror.

00:42:17And it is

00:42:18amazing what it says.

00:42:20It basically says

00:42:22that the commander-in-chief

00:42:24can disregard

00:42:26any other law

00:42:28during time of war.

00:42:29They're looking

00:42:30to expand

00:42:30executive power.

00:42:319-11 comes,

00:42:33and it is

00:42:34a state of emergency.

00:42:36And a state of emergency

00:42:37gives a host

00:42:40of people

00:42:41in the administration

00:42:42at the top

00:42:43a chance

00:42:45to try some things

00:42:46that they've been

00:42:47thinking about trying

00:42:48for a long time.

00:42:51By the spring of 2002,

00:42:54the U.S. government

00:42:55was chasing down

00:42:56suspected terrorists

00:42:57all over the world.

00:42:58But the signals

00:42:59were clear.

00:43:01The push

00:43:02for what Cheney

00:43:02considered

00:43:03the real war

00:43:04on terror

00:43:04was about to begin.

00:43:07This is a man

00:43:08of great evil.

00:43:09He knows

00:43:10we're deadly serious.

00:43:11Our friends and allies

00:43:13in the region

00:43:13know we're deadly serious,

00:43:14and that we do need

00:43:16to find a way

00:43:17to address this problem.

00:43:18clearly by 2002

00:43:19in the springtime,

00:43:21it was almost

00:43:22taken for granted

00:43:23that we were going

00:43:24to go to war

00:43:24with Iraq,

00:43:25in addition to

00:43:26having missed

00:43:27Osama bin Laden.

00:43:29It was a nightmare,

00:43:30and I know

00:43:31Tennant was briefed

00:43:32repeatedly

00:43:32by the head

00:43:33of the bin Laden

00:43:33department

00:43:34that any invasion

00:43:35of Iraq

00:43:36would break the back

00:43:37of our counterterrorism program.

00:43:39Cheney's view,

00:43:40supported by the president,

00:43:42I think everybody knows

00:43:43from meetings

00:43:45with the doors shut

00:43:46that,

00:43:47that this is kind

00:43:48of the way

00:43:48we have to do

00:43:49this thing.

00:43:50I don't think

00:43:51there's any doubt

00:43:52at this point

00:43:54as to

00:43:56what will be done.

00:43:59At Central Intelligence

00:44:00headquarters,

00:44:01they were wondering

00:44:03where that left

00:44:04George Tennant.

00:44:05He could fight them,

00:44:07he could join them,

00:44:09or he could retire.

00:44:11I think it was a very

00:44:13personal and pensive

00:44:14time for George.

00:44:15I think he asked himself

00:44:16whether or not

00:44:18he wanted to continue

00:44:19on that road

00:44:20and to be part of it.

00:44:22So I think he had

00:44:24some sort of long nights.

00:44:28Tennant had an opportunity

00:44:29after the Afghan war

00:44:31to declare victory

00:44:32and go home.

00:44:34He didn't take

00:44:34that opportunity.

00:44:36I would imagine

00:44:37that he regrets it.

00:44:40Since the time

00:44:41of Harry Truman,

00:44:42the director

00:44:43of Central Intelligence

00:44:44has come to the White House

00:44:46to tell the unvarnished truth

00:44:48to the president.

00:44:49But George Tennant

00:44:50also carried the burden

00:44:52of his new friendship.

00:44:54You get this friendship factor

00:44:56that enters into it,

00:44:57so it eliminates

00:44:58the objectivity,

00:45:00a lot of it.

00:45:02It's a Faustian bargain

00:45:04because ultimately

00:45:05anyone who heads

00:45:06an intelligence agency

00:45:08has got to speak

00:45:09if he's serving

00:45:09the interests,

00:45:10truth to power.

00:45:12You're committed.

00:45:13You're committed

00:45:14and every day that you go,

00:45:15you're committed more.

00:45:16I think you have to be

00:45:19independent enough

00:45:21and distant enough

00:45:23that you can say,

00:45:24Mr. President,

00:45:25that's not the way

00:45:26we see it,

00:45:27or Mr. Vice President

00:45:28or Mr. Secretary.

00:45:30that's not our view of it

00:45:32and then follow up

00:45:34with why that's not our view.

00:45:36Tennant believed

00:45:37he'd proved al-Qaeda

00:45:38and Iraq were not connected.

00:45:41He hoped the war fever

00:45:42would pass.

00:45:44But then,

00:45:45to strengthen their case,

00:45:47the imminent danger

00:45:48of weapons

00:45:49of mass destruction.

00:45:51The evidence is overwhelming

00:45:52and one of the things

00:45:53we need to do

00:45:54is to make the case,

00:45:55lay it out there.

00:45:56This is the evidence.

00:45:57This is what he's done.

00:45:58This is what he's doing.

00:45:59This is the threat

00:46:00to the United States

00:46:01and to our friends

00:46:02around the world.

00:46:04Even inside the CIA,

00:46:06it was conventional wisdom

00:46:08that Saddam probably

00:46:09had the weapons.

00:46:11But a lot of the information

00:46:13going to the vice president's office

00:46:15was coming from

00:46:16that secret intelligence office

00:46:18at the Pentagon.

00:46:20And their ready source

00:46:21of intelligence,

00:46:23Ahmad Chalabi

00:46:23of the Iraqi National Congress.

00:46:25At that time,

00:46:27we had INC

00:46:28constantly shoving crap at us.

00:46:30They were providing information

00:46:32that they thought

00:46:33that we wanted to hear.

00:46:35They were feeding the beast.

00:46:38This was part

00:46:40of a broad campaign

00:46:41to pollute

00:46:42the U.S. policy process

00:46:44by feeding it

00:46:46false information.

00:46:47But information

00:46:48that would basically

00:46:51confirm fears already held,

00:46:53conceptions already held

00:46:55by the administration

00:46:56that Saddam Hussein

00:46:57was in imminent danger

00:46:58and had to be dealt with.

00:47:03A secret decision

00:47:04to go to war with Iraq

00:47:06was imminent.

00:47:07But the inner circle

00:47:09was fighting its own war

00:47:11about the war.

00:47:12I think the discord

00:47:14within the foreign policy

00:47:15inner circle

00:47:16around Bush

00:47:17is very, very high.

00:47:20By now,

00:47:21Tenet's only ally

00:47:22in the administration,

00:47:23the Secretary of State,

00:47:25was openly facing off

00:47:27against Cheney and Rumsfeld.

00:47:29It became personal

00:47:31between Powell and Cheney.

00:47:34It also became personal

00:47:36between Powell and Rumsfeld.

00:47:38So you have this collision

00:47:40of worldviews.

00:47:42You have personal animosity.

00:47:46The vice president

00:47:47took the WMD arguments

00:47:49out into the country.

00:47:53Simply stated,

00:47:54there is no doubt

00:47:56that Saddam Hussein

00:47:57now has weapons

00:47:58of mass destruction.

00:47:59There is no doubt

00:48:00that he is amassing them

00:48:01to use against our friends,

00:48:04against our allies,

00:48:05and against us.

00:48:06And there is no doubt

00:48:08that his aggressive

00:48:09regional ambition...

00:48:09Congress would soon

00:48:10have to vote on the war.

00:48:12That Saddam has resumed

00:48:14his efforts

00:48:14to acquire nuclear weapons.

00:48:16But much of what they knew

00:48:17came from Cheney

00:48:18on television.

00:48:21They brought in

00:48:22George Tenet.

00:48:23We had a meeting

00:48:24of the Senate Intelligence Committee,

00:48:26a closed meeting

00:48:26with Director Tenet,

00:48:28and several of us

00:48:29asked him,

00:48:30what did the

00:48:31national intelligence estimate

00:48:33say about this issue?

00:48:35The national intelligence estimate,

00:48:37that, the NIE,

00:48:39is the highest level document

00:48:40generated by the intelligence agencies.

00:48:43National intelligence estimate

00:48:45becomes the truth

00:48:46accepted by the United States government.

00:48:49They hold this thing up,

00:48:51the NIE,

00:48:52and they say,

00:48:52on page six,

00:48:53it says so-and-so,

00:48:55and that is an irrefutable truth.

00:48:58The answer that we got

00:48:59from Director Tenet

00:49:01is we've never done

00:49:02a national intelligence estimate

00:49:04on Iraq,

00:49:06including its weapons

00:49:07of mass destruction.

00:49:08Stunning.

00:49:09We do these

00:49:10on almost every

00:49:13significant activity,

00:49:14much less significant

00:49:16than getting ready

00:49:17to go to war.

00:49:18We were flying blind.

00:49:21The fact of the matter is,

00:49:23the CIA didn't want

00:49:24to produce one.

00:49:25The White House

00:49:26didn't want one

00:49:27because they didn't want

00:49:28to allow any venting

00:49:30of whatever opposition

00:49:32there was

00:49:32to what they wanted

00:49:33to be the conventional wisdom

00:49:35on weapons

00:49:35of mass destruction.

00:49:37And Tenet said

00:49:39the CIA was primarily

00:49:40focused on al-Qaeda,

00:49:41not really paying attention

00:49:43to WMD and Iraq.

00:49:45It was an intense period.

00:49:47We still were heavily engaged

00:49:49on trying to counter al-Qaeda,

00:49:51the war on terrorism.

00:49:53And so there were

00:49:54a lot of things

00:49:54on George's plate.

00:49:57And he was working,

00:49:59you know,

00:50:00from sunup to sundown

00:50:01and past that

00:50:02seven days a week.

00:50:04We said,

00:50:05we don't care.

00:50:06This is the most important

00:50:07decision that we,

00:50:09as members of Congress,

00:50:11and that the people

00:50:12of America are likely

00:50:13to make in the

00:50:15foreseeable future.

00:50:16We want to have

00:50:17the best understanding

00:50:18of what it is

00:50:20we're about

00:50:20to get involved with.

00:50:23Congress demanded

00:50:24that the White House

00:50:25prepare an NIE.

00:50:29Tenet was supposed

00:50:30to provide

00:50:30a tough-minded analysis

00:50:32of the WMD allegations

00:50:33in a hurry,

00:50:35a process that ordinarily

00:50:36takes months or years

00:50:38would be reduced

00:50:39to just over two weeks.

00:50:41I know some of the people

00:50:42who did that,

00:50:43and it's, you know,

00:50:44a mind-boggling task

00:50:46to have to put together

00:50:48an NIE in that amount

00:50:49of time,

00:50:50and particularly

00:50:50in those kinds

00:50:51of very charged

00:50:53circumstances.

00:50:56Many members

00:50:57of the CIA

00:50:57believed the vice-president

00:50:59himself was determined

00:51:00to control the content

00:51:01of the NIE.

00:51:03The vice-president

00:51:04and his chief-of-staff,

00:51:05Scooter Libby,

00:51:06had made about

00:51:07ten trips

00:51:08to CIA headquarters,

00:51:09where they personally

00:51:10questioned analysts.

00:51:13I was at the CIA

00:51:14for 24 years.

00:51:15The only time

00:51:15a vice-president

00:51:16came to the CIA building

00:51:17was for a ceremony,

00:51:18to cut a ribbon,

00:51:19to stand on the stage,

00:51:21but not to harangue analysts

00:51:22about finished intelligence.

00:51:25Many, many of them

00:51:26have told me

00:51:27they were pressured,

00:51:27and there are a lot of ways

00:51:29pressure takes a lot of forms.

00:51:31The questions every morning,

00:51:33the tasks,

00:51:35the requests

00:51:35to look into this angle

00:51:37one more time,

00:51:38turn over that rock again.

00:51:41If you didn't find

00:51:42anything last week,

00:51:43look again,

00:51:44see if there's something

00:51:45there about that connection.

00:51:47So you start looking

00:51:48very hard

00:51:49for anything at all

00:51:50that will support

00:51:51that answer

00:51:53that the vice-president

00:51:54wants,

00:51:55that the defense

00:51:56department wants.

00:51:58From NBC News

00:51:59in Washington,

00:52:00this is Meet the Press.

00:52:02Today on Face the Nation,

00:52:04Condoleezza Rice

00:52:05on Iraq and Iran

00:52:06and a debate...

00:52:06From Washington,

00:52:07this week,

00:52:08with ABC News Chief Washington...

00:52:10Intelligence analysts

00:52:11listen to speeches

00:52:12and read newspapers, too,

00:52:14and they can see

00:52:15what senior policymakers

00:52:17are saying publicly,

00:52:18and they can make

00:52:19their own judgments

00:52:20about, well,

00:52:21does this really conform

00:52:22or does it not conform

00:52:23with what our analytic judgments are?

00:52:26And there was,

00:52:27there was a clear tension.

00:52:29One particular Sunday morning,

00:52:31September 8, 2002,

00:52:33serves as an example.

00:52:35It began with

00:52:36for the New York Times story.

00:52:39Iraq has sought

00:52:40to buy thousands

00:52:41of specially designed

00:52:42aluminum tubes,

00:52:43which American officials

00:52:44believe were intended

00:52:45as components of centrifuges

00:52:47to enrich uranium.

00:52:49There were a number

00:52:50of other headlines

00:52:51based on faulty information

00:52:53that Judy Miller

00:52:54would write.

00:52:55She would go

00:52:56and interview

00:52:57a senior

00:52:58Bush administration official

00:53:00on, say, a Saturday

00:53:03and it would be

00:53:04off the record.

00:53:06And then Condi Rice

00:53:07is on a show

00:53:08on Sunday morning

00:53:09and she points

00:53:10to the paper and says...

00:53:11We do know

00:53:12that there have been

00:53:13shipments going

00:53:14into Iraq,

00:53:15for instance,

00:53:16of aluminum tubes

00:53:17that really are only suited

00:53:19to high-quality

00:53:21aluminum tubes

00:53:21that are only really suited

00:53:23for nuclear weapons programs,

00:53:25centrifuge programs.

00:53:27It is just before

00:53:28the delivery

00:53:29of the NIE

00:53:29to Congress.

00:53:31It is that he now

00:53:31is trying

00:53:33through his

00:53:34illicit procurement network

00:53:35to acquire

00:53:36the equipment

00:53:38he needs

00:53:39to be able

00:53:39to enrich uranium,

00:53:40specifically aluminum tubes.

00:53:42There's a story

00:53:43in the New York Times

00:53:43this morning.

00:53:45But we don't want

00:53:46the smoking gun

00:53:47to be a mushroom cloud.

00:53:48The smoking gun

00:53:49is an interesting phrase.

00:53:51The media blitz,

00:53:52the visits

00:53:53by the vice president

00:53:55and his chief of staff.

00:53:57Some in the CIA

00:53:58say it was all

00:53:59a kind of subtle

00:54:00arm-twisting.

00:54:01But later,

00:54:02in a controversial report,

00:54:04the Senate Select Committee

00:54:05on Intelligence

00:54:06found no pressure.

00:54:08The committee

00:54:09did not find

00:54:10any evidence

00:54:10that administration officials

00:54:12attempted to coerce,

00:54:13influence,

00:54:14or pressure analysts

00:54:15to change their judgments.

00:54:18Politicization,

00:54:19real politicization,

00:54:19rarely works that way.

00:54:21That is to say,

00:54:22you know,

00:54:23blatant,

00:54:23crude,

00:54:24arm-twisting.

00:54:26It's always

00:54:27far more subtle.

00:54:29In early October,

00:54:31Tennant delivered

00:54:31the hastily produced

00:54:33NIE.

00:54:34This was the top

00:54:35secret NIE.

00:54:37Much of the evidence

00:54:38was outdated

00:54:39from the 1990s.

00:54:41There were four

00:54:42or five new allegations.

00:54:44The aluminum tubes,

00:54:46mobile biological,

00:54:47chemical,

00:54:48and nuclear programs

00:54:49were alleged,

00:54:49and there were

00:54:50some footnotes

00:54:51where technical

00:54:52disagreements were aired.

00:54:54The CIA's assessment

00:54:55was sheep-herded

00:54:57by a national

00:54:58intelligence officer

00:54:59who works very closely

00:55:01with the vice

00:55:01president's office.

00:55:03It's a flawed,

00:55:04fatally flawed document,

00:55:06and it should never

00:55:07have seen the light of day.

00:55:07When I read the NIE,

00:55:10I thought they were

00:55:10protecting sources

00:55:11and methods

00:55:12and trying to paint

00:55:14just an adequate job

00:55:16to get past the vote,

00:55:17that there must be

00:55:18more there.

00:55:20When I read it in 2003,

00:55:23after I took this responsibility,

00:55:26there's an old Peggy Lee song

00:55:27that I like

00:55:28that came to mind,

00:55:29If That's All There Is.

00:55:36The NIE was kept

00:55:37in a locked room

00:55:38where Congress

00:55:39could read it,

00:55:40but few did.

00:55:42In mid-October,

00:55:43they voted overwhelmingly

00:55:44in favor of the

00:55:46Iraqi War Resolution.

00:55:49A declassified version

00:55:50of the NIE,

00:55:51known as the White Paper,

00:55:53was prepared by the CIA

00:55:55and released

00:55:56three days later.

00:55:57And one of the surprising

00:55:59things about it

00:56:00was it was

00:56:01of a very high

00:56:02production level.

00:56:04Graphs,

00:56:05photographs in color.

00:56:08It was an advocacy piece.

00:56:10What does it say to you?

00:56:12Well, it says to me

00:56:12that the decision

00:56:14had been made

00:56:15that we're going to

00:56:15go to war with Iraq.

00:56:17All of this other

00:56:17was just window dressing

00:56:19and that the

00:56:21intelligence community

00:56:22was being used

00:56:24as almost

00:56:25a public relations

00:56:27operation

00:56:28to validate

00:56:30the war

00:56:31against Saddam Hussein.

00:56:34Paul Piller,

00:56:35a veteran high-ranking

00:56:36CIA analyst,

00:56:38was one of the primary

00:56:39authors of the White Paper.

00:56:41It was clearly

00:56:42requested and published

00:56:43for policy advocacy purposes.

00:56:46This was not

00:56:46informing a decision.

00:56:48What was the purpose of it?

00:56:50The purpose was

00:56:50to strengthen

00:56:52the case

00:56:53for going to war

00:56:53with the American public.

00:56:55Is it proper

00:56:56for the intelligence community

00:56:58to publish papers

00:56:59with that purpose?

00:57:00I don't think so.

00:57:03And I regret having

00:57:04had a role in that.

00:57:07Paul Piller is a man

00:57:08that I have

00:57:09tremendous respect for

00:57:10and who I think

00:57:11is an ideal

00:57:13intelligence officer.

00:57:15If there was

00:57:16pressures that

00:57:17resulted in Mr. Piller

00:57:18not being happy

00:57:21with what he

00:57:22finally authored,

00:57:23I can only imagine

00:57:24those pressures

00:57:25must have been

00:57:26extraordinary

00:57:27because he is a man

00:57:29that I would

00:57:29want my son

00:57:30to model himself

00:57:31after.

00:57:33So to me,

00:57:34that says

00:57:35the pressure

00:57:36from the White House

00:57:36through Mr. Tennant

00:57:37and professional

00:57:39CIA officers

00:57:40was nearly overwhelming.

00:57:46George Tennant

00:57:47had relied

00:57:48on his connections

00:57:49in Congress

00:57:50as a source

00:57:50of protection

00:57:51and power.

00:57:53To some of them,

00:57:54now,

00:57:55he was as flawed

00:57:56as the NIE

00:57:57he had delivered.

00:58:00I thought

00:58:00that this wasn't

00:58:01a man

00:58:02who was strong enough

00:58:03to stand up

00:58:04to the President

00:58:04of the United States

00:58:05and say,

00:58:05Mr. President,

00:58:06you are about

00:58:07to make

00:58:07a very serious

00:58:08mistake.

00:58:10And here are

00:58:10the reasons,

00:58:11here's what we know,

00:58:12here's what we don't

00:58:14know about

00:58:15the situation

00:58:16in Iraq

00:58:17and it does not

00:58:18warrant us

00:58:20leaving

00:58:20a victory

00:58:22which is

00:58:23imminent

00:58:24in Afghanistan

00:58:25and attainable

00:58:27in Afghanistan

00:58:28to start

00:58:29a war

00:58:30in an environment

00:58:31in which we are

00:58:32largely ignorant.

00:58:38the problem

00:58:39rested not

00:58:40with his

00:58:41relationship

00:58:41with George Bush

00:58:42but probably

00:58:43with Rumsfeld

00:58:44and Cheney

00:58:45who,

00:58:46you know,

00:58:47apparently

00:58:48simply

00:58:51were so overwhelmingly

00:58:53better at

00:58:54the bureaucratic

00:58:55infighting

00:58:56that they were

00:58:57able to isolate him

00:58:58and in a sense

00:59:00perhaps allowed him

00:59:01to kind of

00:59:02forced him

00:59:02into becoming

00:59:03more of a cheerleader

00:59:05for what was going,

00:59:06what the direction

00:59:07the administration

00:59:08was taking

00:59:08than he should have been.

00:59:10George Tenet's

00:59:11conversion moment

00:59:12occurred in the

00:59:13Oval Office

00:59:15when the president

00:59:16was given

00:59:16a presentation

00:59:17of the WMD case

00:59:19against Saddam Hussein.

00:59:21The president said,

00:59:22is this all we got?

00:59:25And the answer was,

00:59:27should have been,

00:59:28yes, sir.

00:59:29Unfortunately,

00:59:29that's all we got.

00:59:30His instincts were right.

00:59:32He saw

00:59:32that there wasn't

00:59:35a lot there

00:59:35but I guarantee you

00:59:36that's everything we had.

00:59:39We gave him

00:59:40our best shot

00:59:41and the president said,

00:59:42I don't,

00:59:43is that all you got?

00:59:44And what did Tenet say?

00:59:46Slam dunk.

00:59:48That was a slam dunk conversation.

00:59:51He certainly knew

00:59:52it wasn't a slam dunk.

00:59:53He knew

00:59:54and would have had to know

00:59:56that the data

00:59:57was not of a character

00:59:59that one could describe

01:00:00even in a loose manner

01:00:02and certainly not

01:00:02in the Oval Office

01:00:03to the president

01:00:04who has expressed doubt

01:00:06about the presentation

01:00:07he's just heard.

01:00:08Don't worry, Mr. President,

01:00:10that's a slam dunk.

01:00:11The data was not that solid.

01:00:13Then they said,

01:00:14well, if that's true, George,

01:00:15if this is right

01:00:17and this is,

01:00:18we're going to have

01:00:18to say it differently.

01:00:20You're going to have

01:00:20to come up with

01:00:21different ways

01:00:21to saying this

01:00:22because a normal person

01:00:24is going to look at this

01:00:24and say,

01:00:25is that all you got?

01:00:26Quite frankly,

01:00:27the thing I find

01:00:28hardest to understand

01:00:29in this entire story,

01:00:32where was the

01:00:32National Security Advisor,

01:00:35Condé Rice?

01:00:35she should immediately

01:00:37have said to any DCI,

01:00:40not just George Tenet,

01:00:40anyone who did that

01:00:42in the Oval Office,

01:00:43no, you go back

01:00:45and you come back

01:00:46with a better case.

01:00:47Here are the doubts

01:00:48the president's expressed.

01:00:50Let's see what's there.

01:00:53But it was allowed to slide.

01:00:55Here again,

01:00:55I think it was allowed to slide

01:00:57because we all know

01:00:58he's got weapons.

01:01:03Mr. Speaker,

01:01:04the president

01:01:05of the United States.

01:01:08The State of the Union speech,

01:01:10a public recitation

01:01:12of the NIE.

01:01:13Saddam Hussein

01:01:15has gone to elaborate lengths,

01:01:17spent enormous sums,

01:01:19taken great risks

01:01:20to build and keep

01:01:21weapons of mass destruction.

01:01:23It was all there,

01:01:25the aluminum tubes.

01:01:26Our intelligence sources

01:01:27tell us that he has attempted

01:01:28to purchase high-strength

01:01:29aluminum tubes

01:01:30suitable for nuclear

01:01:32weapons production.

01:01:34A controversial assertion

01:01:35that Saddam was buying

01:01:36nuclear material

01:01:37would become known

01:01:38as the 16 words.

01:01:41The British government

01:01:42has learned that Saddam Hussein

01:01:43recently sought

01:01:44significant quantities

01:01:45of uranium from Africa.

01:01:48The controversy

01:01:49would be called

01:01:49yellow cake.

01:01:51The CIA had examined

01:01:53the story.

01:01:54No one is endorsing it.

01:01:56Everyone is saying

01:01:56it really does sound

01:01:57implausible.

01:01:58We never took it seriously.

01:02:00I mean, we looked at it,

01:02:00but there was never

01:02:01any real substance to it.

01:02:03The vice president

01:02:04had heard of a defense

01:02:06intelligence report

01:02:07that the African nation

01:02:08of Niger had sold

01:02:10500 tons of uranium,

01:02:12known as yellow cake,

01:02:13to Iraq.

01:02:14He said,

01:02:15this is important,

01:02:16this is interesting to me.

01:02:17Tell me about it.

01:02:19I was briefed that

01:02:20an allegation had reached

01:02:21the office of the vice president,

01:02:22and the office of the vice president

01:02:25had asked the CIA

01:02:26to look into it.

01:02:27I knew a lot about uranium mining.

01:02:29I knew a lot about Niger.

01:02:31The CIA sent Wilson to Niger.

01:02:33He found no evidence

01:02:35of a yellow cake sale.

01:02:38Yet, it was put in the NIE.

01:02:41A foreign government service

01:02:42reported that as of early 2001,

01:02:45Niger planned to send

01:02:47several tons of pure uranium,

01:02:49probably yellow cake,

01:02:50to Iraq.

01:02:51There were serious questions

01:02:52raised about yellow cake,

01:02:53and that's why the people

01:02:55in the intelligence community

01:02:56advised the White House

01:02:57not to use it publicly.

01:02:59And that's why it was not used

01:03:00in the intelligence community's

01:03:01own unclassified product,

01:03:03because there were doubts

01:03:04about the credibility

01:03:05of the report

01:03:06that was turned out

01:03:06to be fabricated.

01:03:09Tennant, in the past,

01:03:10had worked hard

01:03:11to get yellow cake

01:03:12off the agenda,

01:03:13and he thought he had.

01:03:15But it had found its way

01:03:16into the NIE

01:03:17and been put in

01:03:19the State of the Union.

01:03:19I know personally

01:03:22when I listened

01:03:23to that State of the Union speech

01:03:26and I heard about

01:03:27uranium and yellow cake,

01:03:29I turned to the people

01:03:30I was with, my family,

01:03:32and said,

01:03:33we are going to war in Iraq.

01:03:35May God continue to bless

01:03:37the United States of America.

01:03:42The vice president

01:03:43had been the driving force

01:03:45to this moment.

01:03:46Now, on the brink of war,

01:03:49one last stop.

01:03:50The secretary of state.

01:03:52He was about to deliver

01:03:53the case against Saddam Hussein

01:03:55at the United Nations.

01:03:58Powell gets a speech

01:04:00written by Scooter Libby,

01:04:03sent to him,

01:04:04and he's told,

01:04:06this is the kind of speech

01:04:06we would like you

01:04:07to give at the UN.

01:04:09It's very strange.

01:04:10for the vice president's

01:04:12senior advisor

01:04:12to be writing the speech

01:04:13and saying to the secretary,

01:04:15to say,

01:04:16this is what you should be saying.

01:04:18Powell was skeptical

01:04:19of Libby's speech.

01:04:21He turned to Tenet for help.

01:04:23He took the initiative

01:04:24to tell his staff,

01:04:26INR, and CIA,

01:04:28we're going to have to go through this.

01:04:29I don't like this.

01:04:30So his mind was already

01:04:32attuned to the fact

01:04:34that he wanted to make it

01:04:35better than he saw it.

01:04:37Secretary Powell

01:04:38was not reluctant at all

01:04:40to throw things out completely.

01:04:41We threw the meeting

01:04:42between Mohammed Atta

01:04:44and Iraqi intelligence

01:04:46operatives in Prague out.

01:04:49Powell and his senior staff

01:04:51spent the weekend

01:04:52at CIA headquarters.

01:04:53I sat in the room

01:04:55looking into

01:04:56George Tenet's eyes,

01:04:58as did the secretary of state,

01:05:00and heard

01:05:01with the firmness

01:05:04that only George could give it.

01:05:06And I don't mean

01:05:07terminology like slam dunk,

01:05:09although he was a

01:05:09basketball aficionado

01:05:11and used that kind

01:05:12of terminology a lot.

01:05:13But I mean

01:05:14eyeball-to-eyeball contact

01:05:16between two of the most

01:05:18powerful men

01:05:19in the administration,

01:05:20Colin Powell

01:05:20and George Tenet.

01:05:22And George Tenet

01:05:23assuring Colin Powell

01:05:25that the information

01:05:26he was presenting

01:05:28at the UN

01:05:28was ironclad.

01:05:32But even at that time,

01:05:34inside the CIA,

01:05:35there were serious doubts

01:05:37about the accuracy

01:05:38of a central part

01:05:39of Powell's speech.

01:05:40It, too,

01:05:41had come from the NIE.

01:05:43Baghdad has mobile facilities

01:05:45for producing bacterial

01:05:47and toxin BW agents.

01:05:49These facilities

01:05:50can evade detection

01:05:51and are highly survivable.

01:05:53The source for this information

01:05:54was codenamed

01:05:55Curveball.

01:05:57Curveball was a relative

01:05:59of a senior official

01:06:00of the INC,

01:06:02the Iraqi National Congress,

01:06:03headed by Akhmachalabi.

01:06:05Curveball claimed

01:06:06that he was an engineer,

01:06:08young engineer,

01:06:09out of the University of Baghdad.

01:06:10And among the things

01:06:12he had designed,

01:06:13helped design,

01:06:14were this trailer,

01:06:15which was to be a mobile

01:06:16biological production facility.

01:06:18His story had been given

01:06:20to the American

01:06:21Intelligence Network

01:06:22by the Germans.

01:06:23But they could not verify

01:06:25the accuracy of his claims.

01:06:27For a service to say,

01:06:28we have this source,

01:06:30and here's what he reports,

01:06:31but we can't vouch for it

01:06:33one way or another,

01:06:34that's a little, you know,

01:06:35that should be a flag

01:06:38right there.

01:06:40But as Curveball's allegations

01:06:42became a crucial part

01:06:43of the NIE,

01:06:45what few knew,

01:06:46including Secretary Powell,

01:06:48was that Curveball

01:06:49was the sole source

01:06:51for most of the information.

01:06:53He was not told the truth

01:06:55when he was at the agency.

01:06:56When he was going over the data,

01:06:58he was told this was based on

01:06:59not one source,

01:07:00but multiple sources.

01:07:02One of the sources he was told

01:07:03it was based on

01:07:04was already known

01:07:05to be a fabricator.

01:07:06He was not told

01:07:07that the Germans

01:07:08had denied the U.S. access to it.

01:07:10He was not told

01:07:11that there had been warnings

01:07:12from the Germans

01:07:13that this guy was,

01:07:15to say the least,

01:07:18undependable alcoholic.

01:07:20So all the fine grain stuff

01:07:23that might have caused him

01:07:24even then not to use it,

01:07:26he wasn't given an opportunity

01:07:28to hear firsthand.

01:07:34In February of 2003,

01:07:37Secretary Powell arrived

01:07:39at the United Nations

01:07:40to put his personal prestige

01:07:41on the line.

01:07:43Colin Powell was

01:07:44the most powerful voice

01:07:46within the administration

01:07:48cautioning against

01:07:49the dangers of going to war

01:07:51and the costs,

01:07:53human, political, diplomatic.

01:07:55At the end of the day, however,

01:07:57Colin Powell is a team player.

01:08:00He wasn't going to walk away

01:08:01from the administration

01:08:04on the eve of going to war,

01:08:06which was not only

01:08:07abandoning his commander-in-chief,

01:08:09but also the troops,

01:08:11many of which he still knew.

01:08:13Let me turn now

01:08:14to nuclear weapons.

01:08:16Powell insisted

01:08:17George Tenet sit in camera range

01:08:19right behind him.

01:08:21The usual allegations were made.

01:08:23Saddam Hussein is determined

01:08:25to get his hands

01:08:26on a nuclear bomb.

01:08:27Aluminum tubes.

01:08:29That he has made

01:08:30repeated covert attempts

01:08:31to acquire

01:08:32high-specification aluminum tubes.

01:08:35I think on the aluminum tubes,

01:08:37that test data was cooked,

01:08:39and it was portrayed upward

01:08:40in a very dishonest fashion.

01:08:44Curveball.

01:08:45We have first-hand descriptions

01:08:47of biological weapons factories

01:08:49on wheels and on rails.

01:08:51The source was an eyewitness,

01:08:53an Iraqi chemical engineer

01:08:55who supervised one

01:08:57of these facilities.

01:08:58He actually was present during...

01:09:00George Tenet knew

01:09:01we had no agents inside Iraq.

01:09:04George Tenet knew

01:09:05that on the case of Curveball,

01:09:07no American had ever

01:09:08talked to Curveball directly.

01:09:10No American had been given

01:09:11his name by the Germans.

01:09:13And you go down the line,

01:09:15he knew the holes in the data.

01:09:16And Powell used that information

01:09:19from Sheikh al-Libbi,

01:09:20who was rendered

01:09:21and tortured in Egypt.

01:09:23I can trace the story

01:09:24of a senior terrorist operative

01:09:26telling how Iraq provided training

01:09:28in these weapons to al-Qaeda.

01:09:31Fortunately, this operative

01:09:33is now detained,

01:09:34and he has told his story.

01:09:36But this information

01:09:37had been coerced

01:09:38out of al-Libbi.

01:09:40Eventually, he would recant

01:09:41and admit he made it up.

01:09:43Leaving Saddam Hussein

01:09:45in possession of weapons

01:09:46of mass destruction

01:09:46for a few more months or years

01:09:48is not an option.

01:09:50Not in a post-September 11th world.

01:09:56A nighttime artillery barrage.

01:09:58Marines shoot it out

01:09:59with Iraqi soldiers.

01:10:00The push has been relentless.

01:10:04In three weeks, it was over.

01:10:06The scenes of free Iraqis

01:10:07celebrating in the streets,

01:10:08riding American tanks,

01:10:09tearing down the statues

01:10:10of Saddam Hussein

01:10:11in the center of Baghdad

01:10:12at our breathtaking.

01:10:13Cheney has a dinner

01:10:15at the residence

01:10:17and has his chief aide,

01:10:19Scooter Libby, Wolfowitz,

01:10:21Ken Adelman,

01:10:22and Cheney's wife.

01:10:24And it's kind of celebration

01:10:26that they'd done it.

01:10:27We got it right.

01:10:29And they talked at that dinner

01:10:30about we're going to find weapons

01:10:32of mass destruction.

01:10:33Don't worry.

01:10:34And it was a celebration.

01:10:45early on in the war,

01:10:47it seemed quite clear

01:10:48that they were not going to find

01:10:49major stockpiles of weapons,

01:10:53that we were looking

01:10:55at kind of an empty shell.

01:10:58Finding the weapons

01:10:59was left to the CIA.

01:11:01They hired former U.N.

01:11:03Weapons Inspector David Kaye.

01:11:05Before long,

01:11:06he called Tennant.

01:11:07From very early on,

01:11:09I said,

01:11:09things are not panning out

01:11:11the way you thought

01:11:12they existed here.

01:11:14And it was specific cases,

01:11:15whether we're talking

01:11:16about the aluminum tubes

01:11:17or we're talking

01:11:19about the nuclear program

01:11:20in general

01:11:21or the biological program,

01:11:23the chemical program.

01:11:24Powell received the bad news

01:11:26directly from Tennant.

01:11:28I remember these scenes

01:11:30where he would come

01:11:30through my door

01:11:31and he'd say,

01:11:31well, George,

01:11:32you just called me.

01:11:33And he took another pillar out.

01:11:37Another substantial aspect

01:11:38of my presentation is gone.

01:11:42He took it like a soldier,

01:11:44but it was a blow.

01:11:46I mean, it was a blow to me.

01:11:48I mean, I wrote out my resignation.

01:11:50I put it in my center drawer,

01:11:54typed it myself.

01:11:55I wouldn't even make

01:11:56my staff assistant type it.

01:11:58Dear President Bush,

01:11:59I've come to the point

01:12:01in my service

01:12:02where I no longer can serve

01:12:05given the nature

01:12:05of your farm policy

01:12:06and so forth,

01:12:07and therefore,

01:12:08I respectfully submit

01:12:09my resignation.

01:12:10And once a week or so,

01:12:11I would take it out

01:12:12and look at it

01:12:12and fold it back up carefully

01:12:14and put it back

01:12:14in my center drawer,

01:12:16never having the

01:12:18intestinal fortitude

01:12:19to submit it.

01:12:21and I won't speak

01:12:25for Colin Powell,

01:12:26but I tell you,

01:12:27it really affected me.

01:12:36Then one day,

01:12:37the vice president

01:12:38received a news clipping

01:12:39from the New York Times.

01:12:41I have little choice

01:12:42but to conclude

01:12:43that some of the intelligence

01:12:44related to Iraq's

01:12:45nuclear weapons program

01:12:47was twisted

01:12:48to exaggerate

01:12:49the Iraqi threat.

01:12:50I sat down

01:12:51and wrote this article

01:12:52of 1,500 words

01:12:53for the New York Times

01:12:54entitled,

01:12:54What I Did Not Find in Africa

01:12:56and basically laid out

01:12:58the trip,

01:12:59laid out my conclusions.

01:13:01The vice president

01:13:02wrote a note to his staff.

01:13:04Have they done

01:13:05this sort of thing before?

01:13:06Send an ambassador

01:13:07to answer a question.

01:13:09Do we ordinarily

01:13:10send people out pro bono

01:13:11to work for us?

01:13:13Or did his wife

01:13:14send him on a junket?

01:13:16Wilson's wife,

01:13:17Valerie Plame,

01:13:18was a CIA officer.

01:13:21Cheney and his staff

01:13:22already had reason

01:13:23to be suspicious

01:13:24of the CIA.

01:13:29I interviewed

01:13:29a number of people

01:13:30that were active-duty

01:13:32CIA people

01:13:33still working there

01:13:34at the time

01:13:34who were telling me

01:13:35a lot of things

01:13:36about what was happening

01:13:37and how intelligence

01:13:38was being abused

01:13:39and how they were

01:13:40being pressured.

01:13:42And these aren't

01:13:43the kind of things

01:13:43that you can normally

01:13:46get CIA people

01:13:47to talk to,

01:13:48especially people

01:13:48you haven't developed

01:13:50a long relationship with.

01:13:51These were people

01:13:52who were sort of

01:13:54almost pounding

01:13:55at the doors

01:13:55to get this information out.

01:13:59The president's team

01:14:00is facing another

01:14:02stinging critique

01:14:02over what...

01:14:03Reporters were being

01:14:04told about curveball,

01:14:05the aluminum tubes,

01:14:07the vice president's visits.

01:14:09unions because many

01:14:10in the intelligence

01:14:10community feel

01:14:11they're taking the heat

01:14:12for the failure to find...

01:14:13There have been

01:14:14more leaks

01:14:16and discussions

01:14:16kind of outside

01:14:18what I would consider

01:14:19to be the appropriate

01:14:20level than I've ever seen before.

01:14:23One of the effects

01:14:24is that it really

01:14:25irritates the White House

01:14:27and that is not a useful

01:14:28situation to be in.

01:14:30There was a substantial

01:14:32group of people

01:14:32in the White House

01:14:33who believed

01:14:35that elements

01:14:36of the Central Intelligence

01:14:37Agency

01:14:37were opposed

01:14:39to the president's

01:14:40re-election

01:14:42and might even

01:14:43be running

01:14:46a quasi-covert action

01:14:48to prevent

01:14:50the president's

01:14:51re-election.

01:14:52Mr. Silver's arriving

01:14:54right now.

01:14:54Yes.

01:14:55All right.

01:14:56Roll on this, guys.

01:14:57It would be

01:14:57two and a half years

01:15:00Armed with subpoena powers,

01:15:02after hundreds of hours

01:15:03of grand jury testimony,

01:15:05a special prosecutor

01:15:06began to shine a light

01:15:08into the dark side.

01:15:10I'm Pat Fitzgerald.

01:15:11I'm the United States

01:15:12Attorney,

01:15:12appearing before you today

01:15:13as special counsel

01:15:14in the CIA leak investigation.

01:15:17A few hours ago,

01:15:19a federal grand jury

01:15:20sitting in the District

01:15:21of Columbia

01:15:22returned a five-count

01:15:23indictment

01:15:24against I. Lewis Libby,

01:15:25also known as

01:15:26Scooter Libby,

01:15:27the vice president's

01:15:28chief of staff.

01:15:29The investigation

01:15:30has uncovered

01:15:31what appears to be

01:15:32a covert campaign

01:15:33waged against

01:15:34the Central Intelligence Agency.

01:15:36The grand jury's indictment

01:15:37charges that Mr. Libby

01:15:39committed five crimes.

01:15:41The indictment charges

01:15:42one count of obstruction

01:15:43of justice

01:15:44for the federal grand jury,

01:15:45two counts of perjury...

01:15:46Libby has pled not guilty

01:15:48to these charges,

01:15:49but the indictment

01:15:50suggests the OVP

01:15:52tried to discredit

01:15:53Joseph Wilson,

01:15:55that Libby told

01:15:56at least two reporters

01:15:57Wilson's wife

01:15:59worked for the CIA

01:16:00and that others

01:16:01in the administration

01:16:02had done the same.

01:16:04Her name did appear

01:16:05in this column.

01:16:06I've always speculated

01:16:08that the reason

01:16:09Mr. Libby

01:16:09and Mr. Rove

01:16:11and maybe others

01:16:14were speaking

01:16:15about my wife

01:16:16and impugning

01:16:17my integrity

01:16:18was not so much

01:16:20to get revenge

01:16:20against me,

01:16:21although I think

01:16:22that was part of it.

01:16:23But the rational reason

01:16:24for doing so

01:16:25was to send a shot

01:16:26across the bow

01:16:26to others

01:16:27who might be willing

01:16:28to come forward

01:16:28and challenge

01:16:29the administration

01:16:29on its use of information

01:16:32to justify

01:16:33the invasion of Iraq.

01:16:36Then,

01:16:37as the 16-word

01:16:38controversy continued,

01:16:40according to Libby's

01:16:41grand jury testimony,

01:16:43the vice president

01:16:44told him

01:16:45he was now authorized

01:16:46to reveal

01:16:47top-secret information

01:16:49from the NIE

01:16:50to a reporter.

01:16:52Defendant's participation

01:16:54in a critical conversation

01:16:55with Judith Miller

01:16:56occurred only after

01:16:58the vice president

01:16:58advised defendant

01:17:00that the president

01:17:01specifically

01:17:01had authorized defendant

01:17:03to disclose

01:17:03certain information

01:17:04in the NIE.

01:17:08Libby testified

01:17:09that he met

01:17:10with New York Times

01:17:11reporter Judith Miller

01:17:12in this Washington restaurant,

01:17:14and he says

01:17:15in their off-the-record

01:17:16conversation

01:17:17about the Yellow Cake story

01:17:18that he told her

01:17:20the CIA

01:17:21was responsible

01:17:22for it.

01:17:24Defendant understood

01:17:25that he was to tell Miller,

01:17:27among other things,

01:17:28some of the key judgments

01:17:29of the NIE,

01:17:30and that the NIE

01:17:31stated that Iraq

01:17:32was vigorously trying

01:17:34to procure uranium.

01:17:37Three days later,

01:17:38the president

01:17:39was in Uganda.

01:17:41As the reporters

01:17:42were invited in,

01:17:43he would take a question

01:17:44that allowed

01:17:45the administration

01:17:46to publicly blame

01:17:47the CIA

01:17:48and George Tenet

01:17:49for the Yellow Cake story.

01:17:50I have a question, sir.

01:17:51Sure.

01:17:52Why, can you explain

01:17:53how an erroneous

01:17:54piece of intelligence

01:17:55on the Iraq-Niger connection

01:17:57got into your

01:17:58State of the Union speech?

01:17:59Are you upset about it,

01:18:00and should somebody

01:18:00be held accountable, sir?

01:18:02I gave a speech

01:18:03to the nation

01:18:03that was cleared

01:18:04by the intelligence services,

01:18:07and it was a speech

01:18:09that detailed

01:18:09to the American people

01:18:10the dangers posed

01:18:12by the Saddam Hussein regime.

01:18:15George Tenet

01:18:16has admitted

01:18:16he never read

01:18:17the advanced copy

01:18:18of the State of the Union speech.

01:18:21Now, the president

01:18:22had weighed in.

01:18:27I don't know

01:18:28what George Tenet felt

01:18:28as he saw

01:18:29that unfold,

01:18:31but I can imagine

01:18:33that he

01:18:36was dismayed

01:18:37and increasingly

01:18:41resentful.

01:18:42that he was being

01:18:43singled out

01:18:45for blame.

01:18:46At the same time,

01:18:48he's such an

01:18:50operator

01:18:50and such a student

01:18:51of Washington

01:18:52that surely

01:18:53he understood

01:18:53what was happening,

01:18:54that he was

01:18:56being asked,

01:18:57in effect,

01:18:58to fall on his shield

01:18:59so that the president

01:19:01could be re-elected.

01:19:03I think it is true

01:19:04that George Tenet

01:19:08wanted to be a player,

01:19:09and he understood

01:19:11that if you

01:19:12didn't give

01:19:14the policy makers

01:19:15what they wanted,

01:19:16he believed,

01:19:17I think wrongly,

01:19:18that you weren't

01:19:20a player

01:19:20and therefore

01:19:22your views

01:19:22wouldn't be taken

01:19:23and you wouldn't be

01:19:24invited into the

01:19:25closed meetings,

01:19:26et cetera.

01:19:27He traded

01:19:28integrity

01:19:29for access

01:19:30and that's a bad

01:19:31bargain

01:19:32any time in life.

01:19:33It's particularly

01:19:34a bad bargain

01:19:35if you're running

01:19:36an intelligence agency.

01:19:44Today,

01:19:46George Tenet,

01:19:47the director

01:19:47of the CIA,

01:19:49submitted a letter

01:19:50of resignation.

01:19:54I met with George

01:19:55last night

01:19:56in the White House.

01:20:00I, um,

01:20:03had a good visit

01:20:04with him.

01:20:06He, uh,

01:20:08told me he was

01:20:09resigning

01:20:10for personal reasons.

01:20:12The CIA

01:20:13would have

01:20:14a new director

01:20:14and there would

01:20:15be a bloodbath.

01:20:17Dozens of high-ranking

01:20:18officials would leave.

01:20:20I didn't mind

01:20:21thinking that CIA

01:20:23was a dangerous,

01:20:25difficult organization.

01:20:27I didn't mind

01:20:29them thinking

01:20:29that we were

01:20:30even evil

01:20:31at some times.

01:20:32but I didn't

01:20:34like them

01:20:34thinking we were

01:20:35incompetent.

01:20:36If that is a view

01:20:38of your intelligence

01:20:38organization,

01:20:39you have a real problem.

01:20:41In the farthest

01:20:42reaches at headquarters,

01:20:43one could find

01:20:44the weapons inspector,

01:20:46David Kaye.

01:20:47It's almost comical

01:20:48to me,

01:20:48and in fact,

01:20:49I laughed at the time

01:20:50because it was

01:20:50so much like

01:20:51a poor spy novel.

01:20:53I was given

01:20:54an office

01:20:54that didn't have

01:20:55a working telephone

01:20:57that was surrounded

01:20:58by packing cases.

01:21:01at the depths

01:21:02of Langley

01:21:05with a secretary

01:21:06that usually

01:21:07wasn't there.

01:21:08And I mean,

01:21:09you'd have to have

01:21:10been pretty dumb

01:21:10not to have caught

01:21:11the signals.

01:21:13What he said to me

01:21:15is these guys

01:21:15really don't want

01:21:17the message.

01:21:18The message wasn't

01:21:19there are no weapons

01:21:21there.

01:21:21The message was

01:21:22our system

01:21:23completely broke down

01:21:25and failed.

01:21:26it gave not only

01:21:28the wrong answer,

01:21:30it mishandled

01:21:31every piece

01:21:32of evidence

01:21:33that we had.

01:21:39At Christmastime

01:21:40in 2004,

01:21:41they gave out

01:21:42the highest honor

01:21:43the president

01:21:44can bestow,

01:21:45the Medal of Freedom.

01:21:47The insiders

01:21:48from the War on Terror

01:21:49were there.

01:21:50Don Rumsfeld,

01:21:51whose Pentagon

01:21:52had by now

01:21:53inherited most

01:21:54of the intelligence

01:21:54function.

01:21:58Scooter Libby

01:21:59was there.

01:22:01Colin Powell,

01:22:03he would resign soon.

01:22:04Ladies and gentlemen,

01:22:05the recipients

01:22:06of the Presidential

01:22:07Medal of Freedom.

01:22:08L. Paul Bremer III,

01:22:11General Tommy R. Franks,

01:22:13George J. Tennant.

01:22:16I presume that

01:22:17for President Bush

01:22:18it was a signal

01:22:19that he wasn't

01:22:22making Tennant

01:22:22a scapegoat.

01:22:29It would be

01:22:29the natural thing

01:22:30to do, right?

01:22:34You've seen

01:22:35this episode

01:22:36of I, Claudius.

01:22:38You put the knife

01:22:39in one side

01:22:41and the medal

01:22:41on the other side

01:22:42and that's politics.

01:22:49Watching it all

01:22:50was the man

01:22:51who had been

01:22:51at war

01:22:52since that first

01:22:52day

01:22:53on September 11th.

01:22:56Cheney pretty much

01:22:56got everything

01:22:57he wanted for

01:22:58in terms of the CIA.

01:23:00Tennant left.

01:23:01He kept his mouth

01:23:01shut about

01:23:02all the things

01:23:03that went on,

01:23:04about what kind

01:23:04of influence

01:23:05Cheney might have had.

01:23:07They still have

01:23:08a CIA,

01:23:08but all the power

01:23:10is now with

01:23:11his team

01:23:11over at the Pentagon.

01:23:13They're gathering

01:23:14more power every day

01:23:15in terms of intelligence.

01:23:17so largely

01:23:18Cheney won.

01:23:20The vice president

01:23:21and George Tennant

01:23:22declined Frontline's

01:23:24requests

01:23:24for on-camera interviews.

01:23:42Next time

01:23:43on Frontline World

01:23:44in Zimbabwe.

01:23:46He was once

01:23:47a national hero,

01:23:48but now

01:23:49his country

01:23:50is falling apart.

01:23:51Going undercover,

01:23:52Alexis Bloom

01:23:53tells the tragic story

01:23:54of people

01:23:55risking their lives

01:23:56to escape

01:23:57only to be herded back

01:23:58to Mugabe's

01:23:59broken country.

01:24:01Anger, despair,

01:24:02some people

01:24:03have just given up.

01:24:04This story

01:24:05and more

01:24:05on the next

01:24:06Frontline World.

01:24:16To order Frontlines

01:24:17of the Dark Side

01:24:18on videocassette

01:24:19or DVD,

01:24:20call PBS Home Video

01:24:22at 1-800-PLAY-PBS.

01:24:25and more on the next

01:24:27and more on the next

01:24:46episode.

01:24:46In the next

01:24:49episode of The Dino

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