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For educational purposes
"THE DEFENDERS OF BRITAIN"
The Spitfire and Hurricanes of the RAF were the shield of Britain during the dark days of the Battle of Britain.
In comparison to the huge diversity of aircraft developed by Germany, the RAF concentrated on constantly improving a few tried and tested machines which served Britain well, throughout the course of the war.
This is the story of the fighters which saved a nation.
"THE DEFENDERS OF BRITAIN"
The Spitfire and Hurricanes of the RAF were the shield of Britain during the dark days of the Battle of Britain.
In comparison to the huge diversity of aircraft developed by Germany, the RAF concentrated on constantly improving a few tried and tested machines which served Britain well, throughout the course of the war.
This is the story of the fighters which saved a nation.
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LearningTranscript
00:03In June 1940, Adolf Hitler had ordered the final preparations for his invasion of the British Isles.
00:11Codenamed Operation Sea Lion, it was to be the signal for the panzer divisions to make the short hop across
00:17the channel.
00:19As usual, they were fully expected to enjoy success against the survivors of the British Expeditionary Force,
00:25who had emerged from the debacle of the fall of France.
00:29There were only two obstacles in his way.
00:32One was the Royal Navy, still the strongest naval force in the world,
00:37and the other was the RAF, which had escaped more or less intact from the disastrous French campaign.
00:44In eliminating both these obstacles, Hitler proposed that his aircraft were to lead the way.
00:51After playing their part in the invasion of Poland, Holland, Belgium and France,
00:55they were ordered to sweep the skies over the English Channel clean of defensive aircraft
01:01and prepare the way for Germany's inevitable victory.
01:06In the dark days following the retreat from Dunkirk, things were looking black in Britain.
01:12It seemed like nothing could stop the might of the German military machine.
01:41To be continued to ask perhaps a few years after pounding,
02:21What did the defense of Britain seem to have a haphazard affair?
02:45The Germans had more aircraft, and the British were at a disadvantage from the outset.
02:52New tactics had to be developed.
02:55These tactics were to enable the Allied forces to gain air superiority, ultimately, on Berlin.
03:13These tactics were initially formed in the last days of the First World War.
03:17It was here that the effective use of bombers was first seen.
03:21The inability of the early fighters to overcome the bombers completely was also demonstrated.
03:28It was Stanley Baldwin, chief of the British Air Staff from 1919 to 1929,
03:33and later Prime Minister, who summed it all up in a single phrase.
03:38The bomber will always get through.
03:41The British fight forces in the interwar years were really the Cinderella arm,
03:45I would suggest not just of the RAF, but perhaps of all of Britain's armed forces.
03:50Under the considerable influence of Lord Hugh Trenchard, who was chief of the Air Staff for much of this period,
03:56and in conditions of colonial policing, where air supremacy was virtually guaranteed,
04:01by far the greatest intellectual and financial effort during the interwar years went into the acquisition of a bomber force
04:09and bombing tactics.
04:12In those far-off days, the fighter aircraft were not that much faster than the bombers.
04:18This meant that raids, especially if made under the cover of darkness, proceeded virtually without interference.
04:25The bomber still enjoyed prominence when the Royal Flying Corps was combined with the Royal Naval Air Service to emerge
04:32as the Royal Air Force.
04:35In the formative years of the Royal Air Force, the threat of bombing and counter-bombing were deemed to be
04:40strong enough to ward off any attack on Britain itself.
04:45Large forces of bombers were stationed where they could threaten massive counter-attacks across the Channel.
04:52Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was banned from owning an air force.
04:57All this was to change after 1933.
05:24As Germany was seen to be re-arming, the bomber forces in Britain had to be re-orientated for an
05:30attack.
05:33As the clouds of war gathered once more over Europe, Germany was recognised as the real threat.
05:41This threat was assessed by Sir Hugh Dowding, created Commander-in-Chief of the New Fighter Command in 1936,
05:47who pleaded with the Chief of Air Staff to allow a defensive fighter force to be formed.
05:53Before the war, I'd been trained as a bomber pilot, and then as war started, I was told that I
06:02had to return to the active list,
06:05and at the end of my instructor rating test, being told that I was no longer a bomber pilot, but
06:16was the adjutant and instructor to 41 Squadron.
06:22And as I had never flown a fighter airplane in my life, I was a little bit, shall I say,
06:31worried.
06:32Fighter aircraft suffered conspicuous under-investment, so that as late as 1938, the vast majority of fighter commands' aircraft were
06:42in fact relatively obsolescent.
06:44Biplane fighters, which were relatively slow, had relatively poor rates of climb, and which could not certainly hope to engage
06:52the Luftwaffe's fighters on equal terms.
06:54Only in 1938 and 1939 were desperate attempts made to remedy this parlous situation.
07:01This overdue initiative was implemented just in time, and was to prove decisive in meeting Hitler's threat of invasion.
07:21The war erupted in 1939.
07:24Poland, Norway, Denmark, France, and the Low Countries all fell under the German onslaught.
07:33Now stationed in France and the Low Countries, the German aircraft were able to fly deep into the British heart.
07:40This was the final prelude to invasion.
07:45Luckily, the foresight of Dowding had laid the foundations for the defense.
07:51Though they were undoubtedly slender, they proved to be adequate, but only just.
07:57Crucial in this preparation had been Air Ministry specification F-7-30.
08:02This laid down the guidelines for the creation of a single-seat fighter aircraft.
08:07It was the products of this new legislation that would meet the onslaught in the Battle of Britain,
08:13where the Hurricane and the Spitfire were to establish their places in aviation history.
08:29Of the two principal British fighters operating in 1940, the Hawker Hurricane was of more conventional design.
08:37Its airframe construction could be traced back to the earliest military aircraft of World War I.
08:42The necessary strength and rigidity were provided by a metal tube framework, which was covered with wood and fabric.
08:50This produced a fuselage that could resist even the exploding cannon shells fired by the German aircraft.
09:03The new aircraft was in effect a monoplane version of Hawker's existing Fury biplane.
09:10Both aircraft were designed by Sidney Cam, who had become Hawker's chief designer in 1925.
09:18The design was almost finished when, in 1935, it had to be changed to meet a more advanced Air Ministry
09:25specification.
09:27This called for the mounting of eight machine guns, and a new wing had to be designed to carry these
09:33extra guns.
09:42The final version carried four .303 Browning machine guns in each wing.
09:47They were mounted near to the wing root, the strongest part of each wing.
09:52For economic reasons, this final design used as many as possible of the existing tools and jigs,
09:59although Cam did have an eye for the latest developments.
10:01He knew of the promise of the new PV-12 engine under development by Rolls-Royce.
10:07It was this 12-cylinder, liquid-cooled engine capable of producing 1,030 horsepower that he chose to power his
10:17design.
10:18In November 1935, the prototype F-36-34 first flew, powered by the Rolls-Royce engine that was now known
10:27as the Merlin C.
10:31In many ways, this traditional aircraft was appreciated by the Hawker Company long before the Air Ministry.
10:38With a top speed of 328 miles per hour and a service ceiling of 34,200 feet, its performance was
10:45not far short of its main rival in battle, the Messerschmitt Bf 109E.
10:51The construction of the airframe made it possible for remarkable repairs to be improvised in squadron workshops, enabling damaged fighters
11:00to make a quick return to the air in the coming defensive battles of the Battle of Britain.
11:06This led the directors of Hawkers to authorise tooling for production of 1,000 aircraft in March 1936, three months
11:14before the government placed a contract for 600 aircraft.
11:18These were to provide three crucial months, as although the politicians were by now aware that war was imminent, every
11:25second was now vital if Britain was to produce a model fighter force to meet the threat of the new
11:31Luftwaffe.
11:34In this respect, the hurricane was actually something of a halfway house between the biplanes of the early 1930s and
11:41the Spitfire, which was to follow it.
11:44Outclassed by the Messerschmitt Bf 109 on paper, the experience of the Battle of Britain showed that in the hands
11:50of a skilled pilot, it could still achieve remarkable success.
11:551,715 Hurricanes took part in the Battle of Britain and claimed 80% of the German aircraft credited to
12:03fighter command.
12:27It was the Spitfire that was to capture the minds of a generation.
12:32Its famous elliptical winged silhouette, sweeping across the sky as it engaged its enemy, was to become the lasting image
12:39of the Battle of Britain.
12:44Mitchell, the designer of the Spitfire, had previously created the seaplanes which had won three Schneider Cup races.
12:51In the years 1929 to 1931, the partnership between Mitchell and Rolls-Royce was formed that won the race three
12:59times in succession, gaining the cup outright.
13:02The partnership would go on to develop the Spitfire.
13:08Working to the same specification as Cam, Mitchell chose a radically new way of construction for his airframe.
13:15The fuselage was in three sections, a tubular case for the engine, a monocoque or single shell centre part, and
13:23a detachable tail section.
13:25Even the design of the wing was revolutionary.
13:28The spar that carried them was made up of girders that fitted inside one another.
13:33Each was a different length.
13:35This meant strength was provided where it was most needed.
13:39The spar was thickest at the wing root and hollow at the wing tip.
13:45Further strength was provided by covering the leading edge with heavy gauge metal, while the rear was thinly clad.
13:52This balanced lightness with strength, where it was most needed.
13:58Like Cam, Mitchell had to take account of the change in air ministry specification for eight machine guns.
14:08This wing had to be redesigned to accommodate its specification, and this resulted in the unusual shape which characterised the
14:16Spitfire.
14:22Not only did the Spitfire look magnificent, but it delighted the pilots who flew it.
14:28Although it could often prove lethal for a novice caught in a spin or on landing, it was a pleasure
14:33to fly.
14:34I was put on Spitfires. The Spitfire handled very well.
14:39There were quite obviously, and many things that concerned me, which were not perfect.
14:50One of them was the harmonisation of the guns, which had been set by the Central Armament Establishment,
15:01and which very soon, at the beginning of the war, we found was mistaken.
15:07The result of this was, of course, that harmonisation was changed unilaterally by the squadrons,
15:16to what was called a lethal cone, where the guns were arranged so that the furthest ones met at 400,
15:27the middle two met at 250, and the inner two met at 200,
15:32so that, you know, it was a little bit more fraught for the target than it had been before with
15:39all these guns spraying around.
15:53Mitchell was never to see his creation in what was to be its finest hour.
15:57The cancer that had dogged his health throughout the designing of the Spitfire was to claim his life in 1937.
16:05His legacy was to be remembered for creating one of the aircraft that won the Battle of Britain.
16:13The first stage of that battle was known to the Germans as the Canal Kampf, the air battle over the
16:20Channel.
16:22The air battles over the English Channel in the early summer of 1940 can perhaps best be seen as a
16:28prelude to the Battle of Britain proper.
16:31Generated by the Germans' desire to clear English shipping from the Channel as a prerequisite for Operation Sea Line, the
16:38amphibious assault on southern England,
16:39and by a strategic desire to paralyse Britain's Imperial communications,
16:45the battle lasted essentially from early June, soon after the fall of Dunkirk, right through to early August.
16:52During that period, something like 26 British convoys were attacked in the English Channel,
16:56leading to a series of relatively intense air combats over the English Channel as fire to command trying to protect
17:03those convoys.
17:04We were supposed to intercept whenever they were coming over the Channel or the Isle of Wight or somewhere like
17:09that, you see.
17:10In fact, the first time I saw an enemy aircraft, there were 12 of us and there were 300 plus
17:16of him coming in, you see,
17:18which was rather surprising, made it more difficult for him because there were fewer of us to shoot at than
17:23there were of them for us to shoot at as well.
17:33From the start, it was an uneven battle.
17:37Germany could call upon some 1,055 fighters, 316 Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers and 1,131 bombers.
17:48These were opposed to the 591 serviceable fighters of Fighter Command.
17:53Hard decisions were going to have to be made on the British side of the Channel.
17:59During the six weeks following the fall of France, each side skirmished warily, often in treacherous weather.
18:16One of the problems, of course, with the Spitfire and the Hurricane was that you were not able really to
18:27intercept bombers at night except by chance.
18:34One of the jobs I did just before the war was to process the experiments that were made in Night
18:44Interception in July 1939.
18:47And everybody agreed that flying a Spitfire or a Hurricane at night was absolutely marvellous.
18:54But they never actually saw any of the targets.
18:59And that made people at the top realise that interception at night was going to be extremely difficult.
19:08The average fighter pilot only had about five hours night flying experience on his fighter aeroplane and it would be
19:22a good idea to have just a bit more.
19:24There were spasmodic night bomber raids launched against towns all over Britain.
19:29Sweep after sweep of BF 109s were directed against southern England in search of Dowding's fighters.
19:36When this failed to draw them out, heavily escorted bomber raids struck at convoys and coastal targets.
19:44This rare footage shows a dive bomber attack on British shipping in the Channel.
19:49As a result of the rising losses from actions like these, intense political pressure came to bear on Dowding to
19:56call out the fighters.
19:57And the Navy added to this as British shipping was suffering intolerable losses.
20:04As a result of the British fighters, they must suffer losses that could not be afforded.
20:14Despite the losses in shipping, Dowding always sought to commit his fighters sparingly.
20:20He knew there would be greater need for the limited resources in the battle that was to come.
20:27During this phase, Fighter Command learnt a disturbing lesson.
20:32Again and again, the worst British losses were suffered when its fighters were outnumbered by a force of BF 109s.
20:39The British victories that had been recorded were against lone bombers.
20:43They had to get more fighters into the air to match the Germans, but already the British pilots were tired
20:49from repeated scrambles day after day.
20:53Aircraft were also being lost at an alarming rate.
20:56This really was a battle of nerves.
21:00During a scramble, every 30-second delay in takeoff resulted in a 1,000-foot disadvantage, as the time taken
21:07to climb to a high enough altitude to sweep down on the enemy was lost.
21:12By the end of July 1940, Fighter Command had lost 118 aircraft.
21:19Even though the vastly improved production from the factories was able to restore each squadron to strength, with reserve aircraft,
21:27one valuable resource was lost forever.
21:3080 flight commanders and pilots had been killed.
21:35The RAF did, however, enjoy two major advantages over the Luftwaffe.
21:41Firstly, the Messerschmitt 109 had a severely limited range, and by the time they had reached England, they frequently only
21:48had enough fuel for 20 or 30 miles of combat before they had to return home.
21:53With spitfires or hurricanes approaching from home bases, this was an important factor.
22:00The second advantage was at first less obvious, but in practice was almost as crucial.
22:06Any RAF pilots who bailed out over southern England could be back at his squadron and flying again within a
22:12few hours.
22:14German pilots who were shot down became prisoners and were lost forever.
22:19If we were shot down, we could bail out and generally enter friendly territory.
22:23They were generally shot down into the sea or under friendly territory.
22:28And you see, a lot of our Poles suffered because of that, because of mistaking for Germans.
22:33And we had Poles in the squadron, we had French in the squadron.
22:37We had the only Norwegian, in fact, John Skow.
22:42The others had all gone after Norway, they'd gone to Canada for retraining, but John Skow stayed and he joined
22:48us.
22:49And he put his nationality down as RAF.
22:52He wouldn't join the Norwegian Air Force.
22:54The mixed squadrons, I think, probably had a better morale than most of the others.
22:59And, of course, we didn't hate the Germans like the Poles did, or the Czechs.
23:05They hated the Germans, you see.
23:07And when they went into battle, they were really serious about it.
23:12We were fairly serious, but not as serious as they were.
23:18Useful lessons were learned during this time.
23:20The WAF radar operators had learned that it was vital for them to trust their instincts
23:25and make educated guesses about what they were seeing.
23:29With the German Air Force operating so close, radar was of limited value.
23:35It took only five minutes for a German aircraft to cross the channel, but 15 for a British fighter to
23:41reach the altitude to intercept it.
23:43However, even this limited advance warning radar was to become a vital link in the chain of the fighter direction
23:49system, of which it was a part.
23:51The fighter command's control and information systems were very sophisticated.
23:59With a series of groups and then information being disseminated down to sectors and then down to the squadrons themselves,
24:09information from radar and indeed from the observation corps on the coast gave very detailed and accurate information about Luftwaffe
24:18raids.
24:19This enabled squadrons to be rested if there were no major raids approaching or to be scrambled if there were
24:27imminent attacks.
24:29And this meant that RAF fighter squadrons could be rested sufficiently to keep up and to cope with the pressure
24:37of the battle.
24:40Developed between the wars, the radar system in use at the time of the Battle of Britain worked by sending
24:45out pulses of radio waves.
24:48These were reflected by any aircraft along the line of the beam and these reflections received at the tower.
24:55The operator watched a cathode ray tube and from the time difference between the outwards pulse and its reflection determined
25:03the distance of the aircraft.
25:06The information gathered by the radar was passed to the operations room.
25:10Here the senior staff had the whole picture laid out before them on a plotting board and took the necessary
25:16command decisions.
25:18These were passed down to sector airfields and onto the satellite airfields from which the fighters were scrambled to meet
25:24their targets.
25:26The British aircraft carried signal devices that identified it as a friend to the radar which could then be used
25:32to steer the aircraft onto their targets.
25:34The pilots were absolutely ecstatic about the efficiency of radar reporting of approaching hostile aeroplanes and their follow up by
25:54the observer corps.
25:57I think I could sum it up fairly well by saying that the mood of the chaps was that you
26:04send them over and we'll knock them down.
26:06However, it is worth bearing in mind that numerous technical glitches were suffered by radar in 1940.
26:12That the system sometimes broke down across quite large sectors of the coastline.
26:19And that in particular the delay in processing the information between when radar picked up the Germans and when the
26:26information got to the RAF squadrons.
26:28Could sometimes mean that the German squadrons were dozens of miles away from where radar had plotted them by the
26:34time that fighter squadrons were vectored against them.
26:37As a result, radar, although a factor in the winning of the Battle of Britain, was perhaps not quite as
26:44decisive as is sometimes alleged.
26:47Radar was supplemented by the work of the Royal Observer Corps, who watched the skies along the channel with more
26:53conventional instruments, telescopes and binoculars.
26:58Yet the aerials of the various radar stations stood out clearly on many hilltops.
27:03It was against these sights that the Germans next turned their attention in an attempt to blind fighter command.
27:13The first attack began on the 12th of August, 1940.
27:17A flight of Bf 109s was dispatched to draw off the fighter cover.
27:22Then the main force of Stukas made for the radar stations.
27:26Many were shaken as the high explosives rained down around.
27:30The station at Ventner, on the Isle of Wight, was off the air for three crucial days.
27:37The original German concept was sound, but the planning and its execution left much to be desired.
27:44Apart from Ventner, little lasting damage was done to the system, and fighter direction control continued to operate.
27:52Germany's leaders, Goering, chief amongst them, still believed that this was the way forward.
27:58He gave the orders that there should be an all-out attack as soon as it was convenient.
28:02This attack was to be against the radar stations and forward airfields.
28:07This was Adlerangriff, the Eagle attack.
28:29For all the grand words in planning, Eagle attack started in confusion.
28:34The original order gave instructions that it should commence soon after August 5th.
28:39It was not until the 13th that the weather permitted any sort of attack.
28:44The order was given, yet shortly after take-off, it was retracted.
28:49Many of the German bombers did not receive the recall instructions.
28:55About 7am, a force of Dornier DO-17s bombed the coastal bases at Sheerness and East Church with great accuracy.
29:04They did extensive damage.
29:06But they lacked their fighter escort, and thus suffered greatly at the hands of the British Fighter Command.
29:14As the day went on, the German attack became more coherent.
29:19The orders went out for massive attacks on the airfields of Fighter Command throughout Southern Britain.
29:25In the late afternoon, there was a major attack on Dettling Airfield in Kent.
29:29While BF 109s engaged the British fighters, Stuka dive bombers attacked the airfield.
29:37Sixty-seven British airmen were killed in the mess halls.
29:41Twenty-two aircraft were wrecked on the ground.
29:44The operations block was destroyed.
29:47But German intelligence had got it wrong.
29:50Dettling was not a Fighter Command station.
29:53The losses to the British bombers were painful, but they could be afforded.
29:58Meanwhile, the Stukas and Messerschmitts were highly vulnerable on their return journey.
30:04These people had been trained as fighter pilots, and all these fighter tactics and so on.
30:12Not a great deal of thought had been given to the fact that they were expected to fight not once,
30:22but many times.
30:24And to do that, they had to get safely home every time, and sometimes in quite bad weather.
30:31Although each fighter base had a direction finder, which allowed this let down procedure, which was quite common in civil
30:43airliners, to be used for fighter aeroplanes.
30:50But they were not practiced in it.
30:55By now, new tactics were being developed by the British.
30:58At the start of the war, the British attack formation was composed of three fighters in either Live Astern or
31:05Vic formation.
31:06This proved vulnerable to attack from above or behind.
31:11The traditional mode of attack from out of this formation was for the aircraft to peel off in turn and
31:16sweep down on the enemy.
31:18Then, each fighter would take its turn to fire a burst at the target.
31:22This soon became useless against an enemy that refused to fly a straight and steady course while being shot at.
31:29Early in the war, the British adopted the German tactic of flying in groups of two or four.
31:34The aircraft worked in pairs.
31:36The leader of each pair led the attack on the enemy, while his wingman looked after the defence of both
31:42aircraft from attacks by enemy fighters.
31:44This proved highly successful.
31:47I hated flying with people shooting at me when they were coming towards me, because apart from the bullets, they'd
31:53run into each other and nasty.
31:57The Germans very rarely did head-on attacks. Very rarely.
32:02And we didn't do very many head-on attacks with them, because they did what we'd call picking tactics.
32:07You see, they would dive down on you, shoot at you, and dive up again.
32:10And you couldn't stay with them when they zoomed up, so you just did a turn watching them all the
32:15time, you know.
32:17And you just had to watch them. And if you could keep an eye on them, and every time he
32:23dived on you, you'd turn into him, and make it more difficult for him to shoot at you.
32:28As the battle wore on, some British pilots were becoming increasingly angry about being sent in only squadron strength against
32:36a huge force of enemy aircraft.
32:39Flying ace Douglas Bader proposed a new tactic.
32:42When the order to scramble came, all the available aircraft formed into a big wing, rather than squadron by squadron.
32:50This wing could then be directed to the enemy, who was then engaged on more or less equal terms.
32:56Later in the war, it would be these tactics that would enable the Allies to have almost complete control of
33:01the skies as they flew their bombing raids into the German heartland.
33:06During the Battle of Britain, however, the tactic had limited success.
33:10These big wings took a long time to form up.
33:13They were not ready to engage enemy bombers until after they had dropped their bombs and were on their way
33:18home.
33:20Douding and the other leaders knew that if it came to a war of attrition, Britain would lose the battle,
33:26and probably the war itself.
33:29There were just not enough aircraft and pilots available to slug it out with the Germans on equal terms and
33:36win.
33:37Perfecting the tactic of sending small numbers of fighters against greater numbers of bombers was Britain's only real option.
33:48Meantime, Fighter Command could only hope to achieve victory in Adlarangrif by simply surviving.
33:56This victory was hard to achieve.
33:58For 25 days, the raids followed the same pattern.
34:03Airfields and aircraft factories were targeted as the German Air Force tried to blast the RAF from the sky.
34:10Then, on September the 7th, as if by a miracle, the pattern changed.
34:25It was about 4pm that the controllers reported a build-up of enemy aircraft.
34:29It seemed that almost a thousand planes were close to the English coast.
34:34It looked like the battered sector airfields were about to take another pounding.
34:39All the 21 squadrons around London were scrambled to meet them.
34:43The sight that greeted them when they made contact with the Germans was astounding.
34:50The formation covered 800 square miles of sky.
34:54It was clear that their target was London.
34:58Bombs rained down on the docks in the East End, wreaking havoc throughout Britain's capital.
35:04The sudden assault on London came as a result of the personal orders of Göring
35:09and was in response to a British bomber command attack on Berlin.
35:14Göring had ordered the switch from bombing airfields to bombing cities
35:18in a vain attempt to carry favour with Hitler, who had been outraged by the RAF attack on Berlin.
35:25It was a major tactical error.
35:28Herman Göring's decision on the 7th of September 1940 to focus the Luftwaffe's attention against port and industrial targets in
35:37the London area,
35:38rather than against the RAF's airfields, was a critical error of judgement.
35:43One can see the reasons why the Germans did this.
35:45In their own terms of reference, it made complete sense, as by early September 1940, the RAF's fighter command, other
35:52than 11 group,
35:54were rather reluctant to commit themselves to battle at least on a large scale.
35:58And as far as the Germans were concerned, this was their task, to draw into battle and to destroy all
36:03the fighter command.
36:05And hammering RAF fighter command on the anvil of London, as the Germans put it, was the way that they
36:09saw of doing this.
36:33The first big German assault of the day was broken up by a big wing formation before it reached the
36:38capital.
36:38The scattered German bombers were forced to bomb at random across southern England.
36:44Later in the day, a second formation met a similar fate.
36:47The refuelled and rearmed Hurricanes and Spitfires totaled 170 aircraft.
36:53Although this left no reserves, at last British fighters were engaging the enemy in sufficient numbers to inflict decisive losses.
37:04Goering had lost sight of his strategic priorities, and by diverting the attention of the Luftwaffe away from the relentless
37:11bombing of British airfields and factories, he gave the RAF time for repairs and reinforcements.
37:18The British pilots were also recovering because they were having to fly fewer sorties each day.
37:24Although the attacks on London did draw the rest of fighter command into battle, they did so on fighter command's
37:30terms, allowing Lee Mallory's big wings and the fighters of number 10 group in particular to commit to battle in
37:36a truly effective fashion.
37:38Plus, of course, Goering insisted simultaneously that German fighters be tied closely to the Luftwaffe bombers, so that although the
37:46RAF fighters were there now for them to engage, they could not do so on good terms.
37:50Had they but realised it, the Germans were, by early September 1940, within an ace of winning the Battle of
37:57Britain, in particular by virtue of the near destruction of number 11 group.
38:01So, in other words, their attacks on London were based on a flawed strategic assumption, i.e., the perceived need
38:08to destroy all of fighter command before launching the invasion attempt against Britain.
38:13What they needed to do in early September 1940 was simply to consolidate their position over Sussex and Kent, preventing
38:20RAF fighter command from trying to interfere with that, and they would create the local air superiority that was all
38:26that they actually needed to launch the invasion attempt.
38:41Autumn rolled on. The weather began to deteriorate, and the failure of the German Air Force to destroy their British
38:48counterparts during the summer months had profound consequences on the future course of the war.
38:53Autumn rolled on. On September 17th, a secret German communication was intercepted. It effectively ordered the postponement of the invasion
39:03of Britain indefinitely.
39:11The Battle of Britain had been won by the hurricanes and spitfires of Fighter Command.
39:19The RAF's Fighter Command lost 827 fighters, whereas the Luftwaffe lost 1,218 aircraft, both bombers and fighters, to Fighter
39:29Command and British Air Defences.
39:31Of course, none of these figures really tell us anything in their own right. What really mattered were the consequences
39:37of the battle.
39:39Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion and later cancelled the whole idea.
39:45In that sense, then, the RAF Fighter Command had proved its ability to contest airspace over Britain during daylight, although
39:56not at night.
39:58But beyond that, German power in Europe was unaffected.
40:03Britain had been saved, but it would take many years before Britain could actually carry the war to Germany.
40:10Even during the Battle of Britain, aircraft design did not stand still.
40:15It was in this period that perhaps the most remarkable aircraft of the war came into its own.
40:20This was the Mosquito.
40:23Developed by de Havillands from their earlier Comet aircraft, the Mosquito was ideal for a number of different tasks.
40:31Variations were produced to fill roles such as Pathfinder Bomber, Convoy Escort, Night Fighter, Photo Reconnaissance and Ground Attack aircraft.
40:41Designed under the direction of R.E. Bishop between 1938 and 1940, it was originally conceived as a high-speed
40:48bomber.
40:48It was manufactured almost entirely out of wood, moulded plywood, which was a non-strategic material and therefore easier to
40:56obtain in large quantities.
40:59Of all the variations built, the Mosquito had arguably its greatest success as a night fighter.
41:06Painted black, fitted with radar, and armed with 4.303 machine guns or a 20mm cannon, they were deadly efficient.
41:15Crews flying the Mosquito as a night fighter racked up the majority of the night kills of the RAF.
41:21The Mosquito was very unusual in the fact that it was popular with both the crew and the commanders.
41:29At the same time, CAM, the designer of the Hurricane, was also developing a new fighter.
41:37The resulting aircraft was the Hawker Typhoon.
41:41The prototype flew in February 1940, but the Sabre engine caused a lot of trouble, particularly in cold weather.
41:49The general outcome was that the final performance of the Typhoon was far below that needed for a fighter.
41:56CAM's design was still traditional and heavy, and the poor performance of the Typhoon was due largely to the design
42:02of the airfoil.
42:04It was only really effective on operations below 20,000 feet.
42:10These disadvantages to a fighter provided the Typhoon with another role.
42:14It was developed as a ground-attack aircraft.
42:17The Typhoon had a strong airframe, which meant that up to two 1,000-pound bombs or eight rocket projectiles
42:24could be fitted under the wings.
42:27Together with the four 20mm cannon, this made it extremely effective against German armor.
42:33The Typhoon perhaps came into its own during the D-Day landings.
42:37Here they were deployed using a cab rank technique.
42:41They flew standing patrols from which they could be called at a moment's notice to give close ground support for
42:47the troops.
42:48In this way, this aircraft was to spearhead the RAF's tactical assault.
42:54Throughout the Battle of Britain and beyond, the work of Fighter Command was a partnership with others.
43:01During the late summer of 1940, when Britain stood alone, it seemed that the Spitfires and the Hurricanes were acting
43:07alone in the defense of southern England.
43:09In fact, this was not the case.
43:12Their effective performance depended on the actions of others at the radar stations, the operation centers, and beyond.
43:20Just before the battle really started, a little cover that had been noticed underneath the propeller of the Merlin engine,
43:32or the propeller boss of the Merlin engine, was uncovered.
43:38And it was found that an American constant speed unit fitted exactly in every one.
43:48The splines of the drive went straight into this Merlin engine, and you just ended up four nuts.
43:56And there you had a constant speed unit.
44:00These propellers, you see, came to the squadron in August 1939, and people were a bit puzzled when they were
44:13told they were de Havilland propellers.
44:15And they were clearly marked Hamilton Standard, Hartford, Connecticut, so that the Battle of Britain was fought on American fuel,
44:26American propellers, and so on.
44:30Things that people are not always aware of as they perhaps should be.
44:39After the Battle of Britain, as the nature of the role that fighter command was being asked to play in
44:44the war changed from defensive to offensive, closer links were being forged with the other arms of the military machine.
44:52Aircraft like the Typhoon and the Mosquito, originally conceived to fulfill a defensive role, were very soon taking the conflict
44:59of the enemy.
45:01These attacks were usually made in concert with moves by ground forces, pushing forwards to drive back the enemy.
45:09Fighter command also formed close links with bomber command.
45:12The tactic of the big wing was developed so that large flocks of escorting fighters could accompany the heavy bombers
45:19on their raids into Germany.
45:22The Allies had now achieved the necessary complete air superiority.
45:28These large numbers could sweep down on any defending fighters and ensure clear skies from which the bombers could do
45:35their work.
45:36In short, the roles had been reversed.
45:41Fighter command had come through the dark days of the summer of 1940.
45:46At times, their resources in terms of men and machines had been stretched to breaking point and beyond.
45:53The pilots of the Hurricanes, the Spitfires and the other aircraft of Fighter Command had held firm in the face
46:00of overwhelming odds.
46:02Their actions had ensured the defence of the cities and industry of a nation at war.
46:09But only just.
46:18Now, whether we actually knew what the German plan was will always be a matter of debate.
46:29But I would put forward the idea that the British had a colonel of the intelligence corps serving in the
46:42German high command.
46:44And so it might well be that we got a better idea of what they were up to than we
46:52let on at the time.
46:53The main factors in the British victory are actually quite varied.
47:00First of all was the foresight of Sir Hugh Diding in creating Fighter Command, building it into a strong organisation
47:09and pushing forwards modern fighter types and the development of radar.
47:17Combined with this was the fighting ability of the British pilots and their ability to keep going through a period
47:28of intense activity lasting for months.
47:32We'll see you tomorrow.
47:34My next time.
47:34My next time.
47:41Thanks very much.
47:45I'll see you soon.
47:45Take care.
47:46Bye.
47:46You're so welcome.
47:47Bye.
47:47Bye.
47:55Bye.
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