The situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz continues to escalate, with new developments raising concerns about global trade, energy security, and geopolitical stability. In this video, we break down the latest events, explain why the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most strategically important waterways, and explore how rising tensions could impact oil prices, international shipping, and the global economy.
Whether you're following world news, geopolitics, or financial markets, this analysis provides the key facts and context behind the headlines.
📌 **In this video:**
* Why the Strait of Hormuz is so important
* The latest developments and escalating tensions
* Potential impact on global oil markets
* Effects on international trade and shipping
* What could happen next
If you enjoy in-depth geopolitical analysis and global affairs, be sure to **Like**, **Subscribe**, and turn on notifications so you never miss an update.
#Hormuz #StraitOfHormuz #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #WorldNews #GlobalTrade #OilPrices #BreakingNews #Shipping #EnergyMarkets
Whether you're following world news, geopolitics, or financial markets, this analysis provides the key facts and context behind the headlines.
📌 **In this video:**
* Why the Strait of Hormuz is so important
* The latest developments and escalating tensions
* Potential impact on global oil markets
* Effects on international trade and shipping
* What could happen next
If you enjoy in-depth geopolitical analysis and global affairs, be sure to **Like**, **Subscribe**, and turn on notifications so you never miss an update.
#Hormuz #StraitOfHormuz #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #WorldNews #GlobalTrade #OilPrices #BreakingNews #Shipping #EnergyMarkets
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NewsTranscript
00:00If it wasn't apparent before 2026, it certainly is now.
00:04The Strait of Hormuz is one of, if not the, most important maritime choke points in the world.
00:09Due to a freak circumstance in both geography and geology,
00:13roughly half of all of the world's proven oil reserves are located around the Persian Gulf,
00:17west of the narrow Strait of Hormuz.
00:20As a result, because of the combined exports of countries around the Gulf,
00:23like Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE,
00:27roughly one-fifth of all the entire world's crude oil and LNG supplies
00:32travel through the Strait of Hormuz in a given year,
00:35which is the lifeblood that primarily fuels the economies of Asia,
00:38like India, China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia.
00:42And on top of all of that oil and gas,
00:43approximately 30% of the world's supply of fertilizer transits through the Strait as well,
00:48while the notoriously arid Gulf states also import about 85% of their collective food supply through the Strait as
00:55well.
00:55The ability for Iran to enforce a blockade over the Strait and shut all of the Strait down
01:00was historically always viewed as being a theoretical doomsday sort of scenario that would probably never actually happen.
01:07For decades, expert analysis had long concluded that the consequences Iran would suffer by blockading the Strait
01:14were going to be too great for them to ever even try.
01:16It was assumed that Iran would require a massive military effort to shut down the Strait.
01:21It was assumed that Iran would be reluctant to shut down the Strait
01:25out of a fear of invoking a retaliatory blockade on their own oil exports through Hormuz
01:29that similarly funds a third of their own government.
01:32And it was assumed that Iran would be fearful of shutting down the Strait
01:36because it would inevitably incur a massive, overwhelming military response from the United States
01:42that would threaten the survival of the regime itself.
01:45But as it turned out in the end,
01:46all of those historical expert assumptions held for decades were proven to be brutally wrong.
01:52After the U.S. and Israel launched a massive war against Iran with regime change as the openly stated objective,
01:59the regime felt as if they had nothing left to lose by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz
02:03and holding the trade through it hostage.
02:05And they ended up being able to do it for months with nothing other than cheap,
02:09mass-produced drones, small vessels, and naval mines.
02:12But they were also able to continue exporting all of their own oil through the Strait
02:16until the U.S. Navy eventually imposed their own blockade on the Strait on Iranian shipping.
02:21The entire might of the U.S. military, from all of its bases in the Middle East
02:26and from no less than three forward-deployed aircraft carrier strike groups,
02:30proved incapable of breaking Iran's grip over the Strait.
02:33The shutdown of all the trade through the Strait,
02:36including the immediate blocking of one-fifth of the world's oil and gas supplies,
02:40caused massive global economic damage and particularly harmed the Gulf states.
02:45While Washington and Tehran have theoretically agreed to negotiate a more permanent peace deal,
02:51the Hormuz Genie also can never be put back in the bottle again now.
02:55Iran's success at shutting the Strait down for so long
02:58and forcing the U.S. and Israel to the negotiating table in the process
03:02has made the Islamic Republic realize just how much geographic power and leverage they truly have.
03:08Iran now plainly understands that it can simply continue to hold Hormuz and the global economy hostage
03:14whenever it wants something else from the world again at any point in the future
03:19and that nobody, not even the mighty U.S. military, will be capable of actually stopping them.
03:25That lesson that Iran has learned has also not been lost on the Gulf states,
03:29who've themselves now realized that they need to rapidly diversify their exports and imports away from Hormuz,
03:35or they'll continue facing this Iranian blackmail repeatedly again in the future
03:39that they won't be able to do anything to stop.
03:42Two of the countries in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
03:46had both the geographic potential and the foresight to have made contingency plans around Hormuz before this war.
03:52During the 1980s, when Iraq and Iran were at war with each other
03:56and both of them were busy blasting merchant shipping across the Persian Gulf,
03:59Saudi Arabia decided that it would be strategically prudent to build a new pipeline across their country's territory
04:05from the oil fields in the Persian Gulf over to their Red Sea coastline
04:09so that they could divert at least some of their oil exports around the Strait of Hormuz during a time
04:14of crisis.
04:15Simply called the East-West Pipeline,
04:18it was constructed precisely out of the fear that Iran could one day shut down the Strait of Hormuz
04:23and to hedge against it.
04:25Then, after theory became reality in early 2026,
04:28with Iran actually shutting the Strait down,
04:31the Saudis were able to use the East-West Pipeline
04:33to divert approximately 7 million barrels of oil per day
04:36from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea around Hormuz,
04:40an enormous volume that effectively represented the entirety of Saudi Arabia's usual export volume.
04:46Iran attempted to target the East-West Pipeline with drone and missile attached during the war,
04:51but it proved to be a very difficult target to actually hit.
04:54The vast majority of the East-West Pipeline is buried several feet underground,
04:59which makes it effectively invisible to most aerial sensors and attacks.
05:03And then, even if you didn't know the exact route,
05:05hitting the pipeline beneath the ground requires incredible accuracy,
05:09while explosions are also mostly absorbed by the ground,
05:13which makes it difficult to damage large sections of it.
05:16Iran targeted some of the pipeline's more vulnerable above-ground pumping stations
05:20with missiles and drones instead,
05:22but the Saudis were always able to quickly repair the inflicted damage
05:25within only a matter of days.
05:27In the end, the East-West Pipeline enabled Saudi Arabia
05:30to be hardly affected by Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz at all.
05:34In April of 2026, more than a month deep into the war,
05:38the IMF reported that it projected Saudi Arabia's economy
05:41to still grow by 3.1% across the year,
05:45down only 1.4 percentage points from its pre-war projection.
05:50Similar to the Saudis,
05:51the UAE also had a pre-existing hedge in place
05:54to get around Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz too,
05:57but it proved less adequate than the Saudis' workaround did.
06:01Dubbed the Hamshan-Fujira Oil Pipeline,
06:03or also the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline,
06:06the UAE opened this pipeline in the summer of 2012
06:09for precisely the same reason that the Saudis
06:12had built their East-West Pipeline,
06:14to reduce their strategic dependency
06:16on sending their oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.
06:19It enables the UAE to pump oil from the Persian Gulf
06:22to the city of Fujairah,
06:23which is safely on the other side of the Strait of Hormuz
06:26on the Gulf of Oman.
06:28However, it only enabled the UAE
06:30to move around 1.8 million barrels of oil per day
06:33around the Strait of Hormuz during the war,
06:35which was only about half of their pre-war exports.
06:38So the UAE was incapable of getting the other half
06:41of their usual exports out of the country during the war.
06:44And this is a disadvantage
06:45that they never intend to experience again.
06:48They are already fast-tracking the construction
06:51of a brand new twin pipeline
06:53to follow along the route
06:54of the existing Abu Dhabi Pipeline,
06:56which will effectively double their export capacity
06:58around the Strait of Hormuz
07:00and enable them to continue exporting
07:01pretty much all of their usual oil
07:03in the event that the Strait gets shut down again in the future.
07:06This new twin pipeline to Fujairah
07:09is currently expected to be finished
07:11and operational by the end of 2027.
07:14And when it's done,
07:15both Saudi Arabia and the UAE
07:17will be able to divert nearly all
07:19of their usual oil exports
07:20around the Strait of Hormuz
07:22in the event of another crisis,
07:24significantly reducing
07:25Iran's potential leverage over them.
07:27The other countries in the Persian Gulf,
07:29however,
07:30by the circumstances of geography,
07:32are not as fortunate.
07:33Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq
07:35all possess no geographic ability
07:37to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz
07:39across their own territory.
07:41Instead,
07:42these countries all have to rely
07:43on the graces of their neighbors
07:45during the Hormuz crisis
07:46to continue their usual exports and imports,
07:49which makes their abilities
07:49to resist Iran's closure
07:51of the Strait of Hormuz
07:52significantly more challenging.
07:54To illustrate the consequences of this,
07:56consider the divergence
07:57in economic projections right now
07:59for 2026 between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
08:02As I previously noted,
08:03the IMF expects that
08:05Saudi Arabia's economy
08:06will grow by 3.1% in 2026,
08:09down only 1.4 percentage points
08:11from their pre-war forecast,
08:13largely because Saudi Arabia
08:15was still able to transfer
08:16the vast majority of their oil exports
08:18around the closed Strait of Hormuz.
08:21Qatar, with no such geographic possibility,
08:24has a dramatically worse outcome now.
08:26The IMF currently projects
08:28that Qatar's economy
08:29will contract by 8.6% this year,
08:32largely as a result of the war
08:34and the blockage
08:34on all of their LNG exports
08:36moving through Hormuz for months.
08:38And that's after their economy
08:40grew by 2.8%
08:42the year previously in 2025.
08:44Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait
08:46all currently have no pipelines
08:48that connect anywhere
08:49beyond the Persian Gulf,
08:50while Iraq has very few.
08:53Almost all of Iraq's oil reserves
08:55are either concentrated
08:56in the south near the Persian Gulf
08:58or in the mountainous north
09:00in the Kurdish-majority areas.
09:02As a result,
09:03more than 90% of Iraq's oil exports
09:05have historically moved
09:06through the Persian Gulf,
09:08which means that after Iran
09:09shut the Strait of Hormuz down,
09:11Iraq's oil exports
09:12completely collapsed
09:13along with the country's oil production.
09:16All four of these countries
09:17had few alternatives
09:18to get around Iran's blockage
09:20of the Strait of Hormuz.
09:21And so,
09:22they were all forced
09:22to largely improvise
09:23their logistics on the spot.
09:25Iraq came up with a route
09:26they called
09:27the Pipeline on Wheels,
09:29a trucking route
09:29from the oil fields
09:30in Iraqi Kurdistan
09:31that transported oil
09:33and trucks across Syria
09:34toward the Baniyas refinery
09:36and export facilities
09:37on the Syrian Mediterranean coast,
09:39which was able to safely transport
09:41around 200,000 barrels of oil
09:43per day around
09:44the Strait of Hormuz closure.
09:46While impressive,
09:47that still only represented
09:49about 6% of Iraq's
09:51pre-war oil exports.
09:52The only other route
09:53that Iraq had
09:54around the Strait of Hormuz
09:55was its Kirkuk-Sehan oil pipeline,
09:57extending from the oil fields
09:59in Iraqi Kurdistan
10:00through Turkey
10:00to the Turkish port of Sehan
10:02on the Mediterranean.
10:03However,
10:04it too only has
10:05a maximum capacity
10:06of around 200,000 barrels per day,
10:09a fraction of Iraq's
10:10usual production capacity.
10:12In the aftermath of the war,
10:13Iraq is now seeking
10:15to nearly quadruple
10:16the Kirkuk-Sehan oil pipeline's
10:18capacity
10:18to 770,000 barrels per day instead,
10:22and they plan to accomplish it
10:23within only a few months' time.
10:26Before the war,
10:27the port of Khor Fakan
10:28on the UAE's Gulf of Oman coast
10:30primarily served
10:31as a transshipment port.
10:33Containers arrived by ship
10:35and were transferred
10:35directly onto another ship,
10:37and very few containers
10:38actually left the port by rove.
10:40Only around 100 trucks a day
10:42usually even did so.
10:43But after the Strait of Hormuz
10:45shut down,
10:46all of that changed dramatically.
10:48Khor Fakan suddenly became
10:49the UAE's primary gateway port
10:52outside of Hormuz,
10:54enabling ships arriving
10:55from Europe,
10:56Asia,
10:56and Africa
10:57to unload
10:57without having to cross
10:58through Hormuz
10:59into the Persian Gulf.
11:01Containers could be unloaded
11:02at Khor Fakan
11:03and then driven
11:04on highways inland,
11:05which proved to be
11:06a godsend
11:07for maintaining
11:08the imports of food
11:09and other goods
11:10for the UAE,
11:11Saudi Arabia,
11:12Qatar,
11:12Bahrain,
11:13Kuwait,
11:14and Iraq
11:14during the war.
11:16In a flash,
11:17the number of trucks
11:18arriving at Khor Fakan
11:19exploded from only
11:20around 100 a day
11:21to more than 7,000 a day,
11:24while the numbers
11:25of weekly container
11:26movements through the port
11:27exploded from about
11:282,000
11:29to 50,000 as well.
11:31Almost overnight,
11:33the Arab states
11:33around the Persian Gulf
11:35essentially recreated
11:36the historical
11:37overland caravan routes
11:38across the deserts
11:39that they had used
11:40to rely upon
11:41before the advent
11:42of large-scale maritime
11:43trade through the Gulf.
11:45But while trucking
11:46around the Strait of Hormuz
11:47proved sufficient enough
11:48for imports of food
11:49and other consumer goods,
11:51it was never going
11:51to be sufficient enough
11:52to replace oil exports.
11:54A popular meme
11:55that surfaced
11:56on the internet
11:56during the war
11:57was this idea
11:58posted to X
11:59by a man named
11:59Harif Goenka,
12:01an Indian billionaire
12:02industrialist
12:03who proposed
12:03trucking oil
12:04through the deserts
12:05of Arabia
12:05around the Strait of Hormuz.
12:07It was accompanied
12:08by scathing commentary
12:09like,
12:10Bro thinks they can
12:11just mad max
12:12a couple million
12:12barrels of crude
12:13through the deserts
12:14of Oman every day.
12:15In reality,
12:16replacing all
12:17of the lost oil exports
12:18through the Strait of Hormuz
12:19with trucking
12:20was never going
12:21to be feasible.
12:22The area
12:23of the Arabian Peninsula
12:24between the Persian Gulf
12:25and the Arabian Sea
12:26is known as
12:26the Rub al-Khali
12:27or the Empty Quarter,
12:29a vast,
12:30inhospitable,
12:31and almost completely
12:32empty desert
12:33with very few roads
12:34and other infrastructure
12:35traversing anywhere
12:36across it.
12:37As a result,
12:38somebody on a Reddit
12:39thread about this meme
12:40calculated that it would
12:41take a minimum
12:42of 55,000 tanker trucks
12:45just to match
12:45the capacity
12:46that usually flows
12:47through the Strait of Hormuz.
12:49It would mean
12:50filling up
12:50and sending off a truck
12:51every 0.8 seconds,
12:5324 hours a day.
12:55And if you placed
12:56all of these trucks
12:56end-to-end,
12:57they'd be twice as long
12:59as the entire current route
13:00through the desert
13:01and back.
13:02Which means
13:02that the Saudis
13:03and Omanis
13:04would have to construct
13:05dramatically more
13:06road infrastructure
13:07through one of the most
13:07inhospitable environments
13:09on Earth
13:09to meet the demand.
13:11That's not something
13:12that can be accomplished
13:12on such short notice,
13:14obviously.
13:15Which means
13:15that trucking
13:15all of the lost oil
13:17around the Strait of Hormuz
13:18was never going to be
13:19a feasible option
13:20during wartime.
13:21Now,
13:22in the aftermath
13:22of the war,
13:23there were multiple
13:24logistical strategies
13:25floating around
13:25in the Persian Gulf
13:26to eliminate everybody's
13:28remaining over-dependency
13:29on the Strait of Hormuz
13:30going forward.
13:31Qatar is usually
13:32the world's leading exporter
13:33of liquefine natural gas
13:35or LNG.
13:36But,
13:37as is obvious,
13:38all of Qatar's LNG exports
13:39have no choice
13:40but to travel
13:41through the Strait of Hormuz
13:42and when it's blocked,
13:43they currently have
13:44no alternative.
13:45To resolve this,
13:46Qatar would need
13:47to either construct
13:47a gas pipeline
13:48through the UAE's territory
13:50to either Fujaira
13:51or Oman,
13:52or they would need
13:53to construct
13:53a much longer
13:54gas pipeline
13:55through the territory
13:56of Saudi Arabia
13:57to the Red Sea
13:58or even further
13:59across Saudi territory
14:00in the countries
14:01of the Levant
14:01towards the Mediterranean coast.
14:04And none of these options
14:05are particularly palatable
14:06for them.
14:07Wherever the pipelines
14:08end up at,
14:09Qatar would need
14:10to construct brand new,
14:11ultra-expensive
14:12liquefaction facilities
14:14outside of the Gulf
14:15in order to turn
14:16the gas into liquid
14:17for export
14:18on board the tanker ships,
14:19which will increase
14:20the cost required
14:21for them substantially.
14:23At the same time,
14:24Qatar would be
14:24effectively exchanging
14:25their dependence
14:26on Iran
14:27for exports
14:27through the Strait
14:28of Hormuz
14:28towards a dependence
14:29on the UAE
14:30or Saudi Arabia
14:31for pipeline exports
14:32instead,
14:33two countries
14:34whom Qatar
14:35has had highly strained
14:36relations with
14:37in the recent past.
14:38It wasn't that long ago,
14:40just between 2017
14:41and 2021,
14:42when both Saudi Arabia
14:44and the UAE
14:45severed their relations
14:46with Qatar
14:47and enforced
14:47a complete land,
14:48sea,
14:49and air blockade
14:50over the country.
14:51So Qatar would be
14:52reluctant to put
14:53their critical
14:53alternative gas
14:54export routes
14:55through either
14:56of these countries,
14:56but they also
14:57don't really have
14:58any other option.
14:59One of the biggest
15:00obstacles standing
15:01in the way
15:01of the Gulf states
15:02from diversifying
15:02their logistics
15:03around the Strait
15:04of Hormuz
15:04historically
15:05was the inconvenient
15:06space on the board
15:07that was occupied
15:08by the Assad regime
15:09in Syria.
15:10For more than
15:11half a century
15:12while the Assad family
15:13dominated Syria,
15:14Syria's foreign policy
15:16was kept in close
15:16alignment with the
15:17Iranians and the
15:18Russians
15:19and in fierce
15:19opposition to
15:20the Western world.
15:22That,
15:22along with the
15:23devastating civil war
15:24that wrecked
15:25Syrian society
15:26for more than
15:2613 years
15:27between 2011
15:28and 2024,
15:30meant that the
15:30geographic space
15:31occupied by Syria
15:33was long off limits
15:34to pipelines
15:35and trucking routes
15:36for the Gulf states
15:36who were attempting
15:37to build alternative
15:38infrastructure paths
15:39around the Strait of Hormuz.
15:41This elimination
15:42of Syria's geography
15:43from consideration,
15:44in addition to the
15:45elimination of
15:46Israel's geography
15:47because of the Arab
15:48state's opposition
15:49to Israel,
15:50meant that in
15:50recent history,
15:52the only possible
15:53path for pipelines
15:54and trucks to take
15:55away from the
15:55Persian Gulf
15:56towards the
15:56Mediterranean
15:57had to take
15:58the long route
15:59through Iraq,
16:00through the Zagros
16:01mountains in
16:02northern Iraq,
16:03and then across
16:03Turkey's Anatolian
16:05peninsula towards
16:05the Turkish
16:06Mediterranean coast
16:07instead.
16:08In 2024,
16:10before the Assad
16:10regime unexpectedly
16:11collapsed,
16:12the Iraqi government
16:13approved of a new
16:14crude oil pipeline
16:15project from their
16:16southern oil fields
16:17to the Jordanian
16:17port of Aqaba
16:18on the Red Sea
16:19through only Iraqi
16:20and Jordanian
16:21territory,
16:22avoiding both Syria
16:23and Israel.
16:25Two years later,
16:25in May of 2026,
16:27more than a month
16:27deep into the Iran
16:28war and the closure
16:29of the Strait of Hormuz,
16:31Iraq announced
16:31that construction
16:32on this Basra-Aqaba
16:33pipeline had finally
16:34been fast-tracked
16:35and begun,
16:36and that once it
16:37was finished,
16:37it would enable
16:38the Iraqis to
16:38transfer roughly
16:39two and a half
16:40million barrels of oil
16:41per day around
16:42the Strait of Hormuz
16:43to the Red Sea,
16:44or about 70%
16:46of their usual
16:46total oil exports.
16:48$1.5 billion
16:50for the project
16:51has already been committed,
16:52although no completion date
16:53has yet been officially announced.
16:55Whenever it is finished,
16:56however,
16:57in combination
16:57with the pipeline
16:58on wheels
16:59and the projected expansion
17:00of the Kirkuk-Sehan
17:02crude oil pipeline,
17:03Iraq will be able
17:04to join both
17:04Saudi Arabia
17:05and the UAE
17:06in being able
17:07to divert nearly
17:07all of their oil exports
17:09around the Strait of Hormuz
17:10during another crisis
17:11in the future.
17:12The geographic advantage
17:14of being able
17:14to run pipelines
17:15through Syria's territory
17:16towards the Mediterranean coastline
17:18was always widely recognized
17:20by everyone
17:21from very early on,
17:22of course.
17:23But history
17:24and geopolitics
17:25just frequently intervened
17:26to make any pipelines
17:27across Syrian territory
17:29effectively impossible.
17:31After Syria
17:32first gained
17:32their independence
17:33from France
17:34in 1946,
17:35the U.S.
17:36heavily backed
17:36the construction
17:37of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline,
17:39or TAP line,
17:39from the giant oil fields
17:41of Saudi Arabia
17:42on the Persian Gulf
17:43through Jordanian
17:44and Syrian territory
17:45onwards
17:45to Lebanon's
17:46Mediterranean coast.
17:48However,
17:49in order to take
17:49the shortest possible path
17:51to the Mediterranean
17:51while avoiding Israel,
17:53the route of TAP line
17:54ran through
17:55the Golan Heights region
17:56of far southwestern Syria,
17:58which, of course,
17:59was later taken over
18:00by the Israelis
18:00during the Six-Day War
18:02of 1967.
18:03The Israelis then came
18:04to control this section
18:06of the TAP line,
18:06and while they continued
18:07to allow Saudi oil
18:08to flow through it,
18:09the pipeline
18:10became a frequent
18:11target of sabotage
18:12by Palestinian militant groups
18:14that degraded its capacity.
18:16After years
18:17of nearly constant bickering
18:18between the Saudis
18:19and Syria
18:20and Lebanon
18:20over transit fees,
18:22the emergence
18:22of supertankers
18:24moving through
18:24the Strait of Hormuz,
18:25and frequent pipeline
18:26breakdowns
18:27due to all
18:28of the sabotage attempts,
18:29the section
18:30of the pipeline
18:30beyond Jordan
18:31extending through
18:32the Golan Heights
18:32and Lebanon
18:33was permanently
18:34shut down in 1976,
18:36eliminating TAP line's
18:37direct access
18:38to the Mediterranean.
18:40And then,
18:40the rest of the pipeline
18:41through Jordan
18:42was also shut down
18:43by the Saudis
18:43in 1990
18:44in retaliation
18:46for Jordan's support
18:47of Saddam Hussein's
18:48invasion
18:48and conquest of Kuwait.
18:50And it's remained
18:51completely inoperable
18:52ever since then.
18:53Another crude oil pipeline
18:55across Syria
18:56was constructed
18:56in the 1950s
18:57between the Iraqi city
18:58of Kirkuk
18:59and Syria's Mediterranean
19:00port of Baniyaz.
19:02But Israeli forces
19:03bombed the pipeline
19:04during the 1956
19:05Suez Crisis,
19:06while later in 1982,
19:08the Assad regime
19:09shut the pipeline
19:10down completely
19:11after they aligned
19:12with the Iranians
19:12against Saddam
19:13during the Iran-Iraq war.
19:15Whatever was left
19:16of the pipeline
19:17was then bombed again
19:18by the Americans
19:19during the 2003
19:20invasion of Iraq,
19:21and has been permanently
19:22inoperable
19:23ever since then.
19:24The idea of building
19:25a natural gas pipeline
19:26from Qatar
19:27directly to Europe
19:28via Turkey
19:29is another grand project
19:31that's been discussed
19:32for decades now.
19:33Qatar possesses
19:34the third largest
19:35proven reserves
19:36of natural gas
19:37in the world.
19:38But as a tiny peninsula
19:39that's hemmed in
19:40by Saudi Arabia,
19:41it has always relied
19:42on exporting its gas
19:43in liquid form
19:44aboard tanker ships
19:45to markets
19:46through the Strait of Hormuz
19:47instead of through pipelines.
19:49Constructing a gas pipeline
19:51from Qatar to Europe
19:52would benefit Qatar
19:53by providing them
19:53with a major bypass
19:55around the Strait of Hormuz,
19:57while it would also
19:57benefit Europe
19:58by providing them
19:59with more direct access
20:00to piped gas
20:01from Qatar,
20:02reducing the reliance
20:03on piped gas
20:04from Russia.
20:05The shortest
20:05and most geographically
20:06easy route
20:07for this proposed
20:08gas pipeline to take
20:09has always been
20:10across Saudi Arabia
20:11and then through Jordan
20:12and Syria
20:13into Turkey
20:13and onwards to Europe.
20:15But because of how
20:16the pipeline
20:16would inherently reduce
20:18Europe's reliance
20:19on Russian gas,
20:20the Russians pressured
20:21their allies
20:22and the Assad regime
20:23to suddenly abandon
20:24all of their plans
20:25for the pipeline
20:26completely in 2011.
20:27and shortly after that,
20:29the civil war erupted
20:30in Syria
20:31that destroyed most
20:32of the pipeline infrastructure
20:33in the country
20:34that still remained
20:35and which also kept
20:36Syria's territory
20:37completely off limits
20:38to any further consideration
20:39for more than a decade.
20:41Roughly 6,300 kilometers
20:43worth of oil and gas pipeline
20:45still existed in Syria
20:46immediately before the civil war,
20:49while the country
20:49was also domestically producing
20:50around 380,000 barrels
20:53of oil per day.
20:54But across the civil war,
20:55the pipelines,
20:56pumping stations
20:57and export facilities
20:58in Syria grew
20:59to become symbols
21:00of the Assad regime's authority,
21:02in addition to military objectives
21:03and major sources of revenue.
21:05By the time the Assad regime
21:07finally collapsed
21:08near the end of 2024,
21:10swaths of Syria's
21:11energy transportation network
21:12had been heavily damaged
21:14or looted
21:14or otherwise made dysfunctional.
21:16The country's domestic oil production
21:18plummeted from 380,000 barrels
21:21per day pre-war
21:22to only 110,000 barrels
21:24per day post-war,
21:26while the nation's
21:26rail infrastructure
21:27was similarly devastated as well.
21:30Out of the roughly 1,500 miles
21:32worth of railways
21:33that existed in Syria
21:34before the war,
21:36more than 60% of them
21:37were either damaged
21:38or knocked out of service
21:39throughout the course of the war,
21:41leaving only about 600 miles left
21:43that are still operational today
21:45that are usually
21:46under very heavy constraints.
21:48Thus, Syria has a long history
21:50going back decades now
21:52of having pipelines
21:53running across its territory
21:54getting targeted
21:54and destroyed during conflicts.
21:57And so the newly stabilized government
21:58that's taken over the country
21:59since 2024
22:00certainly has their work cut out
22:03to show that that history
22:04won't also be its future.
22:07Still,
22:07now that the long civil war in Syria
22:10is generally seen as being over
22:12and with the anti-Western Assad regime
22:14out of the picture,
22:15there might finally be an opportunity
22:18to take advantage of Syria's geography
22:20as a natural energy corridor
22:21between the Persian Gulf and Europe.
22:24Achman al-Shara,
22:25Syria's new president,
22:26has recently proposed reviving the old
22:28but still never realized
22:30four seas project,
22:32which envisions transforming Syria
22:34into a central logistics node
22:35for pipelines, railways, and highways,
22:38linking the Mediterranean,
22:39the Persian Gulf, the Caspian,
22:41and Black Seas all together,
22:43and turning Syria
22:44into an alternative
22:45overland logistics corridor
22:47around both the Strait of Hormuz
22:48and the Suez Canal,
22:50which have been frequently menaced
22:51by Iran and the Houthis in Yemen.
22:54And in many ways,
22:55this vision is already starting
22:56to take a little bit of hold.
22:58The pipeline on wheels,
23:00the oil trucking route
23:01between northern Iraq
23:02and the Syrian coast
23:03that was improvised
23:04while Iran was shutting down
23:05the Strait of Hormuz
23:06during the war,
23:07is still operational.
23:08The old Arab gas pipeline
23:10is once again operational
23:11and carrying Egyptian gas
23:13into southern Syria,
23:14while the recently constructed
23:15Kilis Aleppo pipeline
23:16is also operational
23:18and carrying Azerbaijani gas
23:20through Turkey's pipeline network
23:21into northern Syria.
23:23For the Persian Gulf states,
23:24additional major interlocking
23:26infrastructure corridors
23:27across Syria
23:28are also currently being considered
23:29as a part of this
23:30four seas initiative.
23:32The first,
23:33between the Persian Gulf
23:34and Syria's Mediterranean coast,
23:36consists of two possible projects.
23:38The long-discussed natural gas pipeline
23:40from Qatar to Syria
23:41that will enable Qatar
23:42to diversify their gas exports
23:44around the Strait of Hormuz,
23:45in addition to another proposal
23:47to revive the long-defunct
23:48Tap Line corridor
23:49between the oil fields
23:51of Saudi Arabia
23:51and the Syrian Mediterranean coast
23:53as well,
23:54giving the Saudis
23:55the ability to diversify
23:56their oil exports
23:57around both the Strait of Hormuz
23:58and the Suez Canal.
24:00Another corridor
24:01between Iraq and Syria
24:02proposes restoring
24:04and expanding
24:04the long-defunct
24:05Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline
24:07as well,
24:08giving Iraq another option
24:10to get their own oil exports
24:11around the Strait of Hormuz too.
24:13To help facilitate
24:14all of these plans,
24:15the Trump administration
24:16in the United States
24:17has substantially lifted
24:18sanctions on Syria,
24:20including restoring Syria's access
24:22to the SWIFT
24:23Global Payments Network.
24:24Both Chevron
24:25and ConocoPhillips
24:26have already signed
24:27preliminary agreements
24:28with Syria,
24:30including the country's
24:31first-ever offshore
24:32oil and gas development project,
24:34while Qatari-U.S.-Turkish consortia
24:36have already signed
24:37a multi-billion-dollar
24:39energy deal
24:39with Syria as well.
24:41And in addition
24:42to these pipeline corridors
24:43across Syria,
24:44new railways
24:45are being planned as well.
24:47Turkey, Jordan,
24:48and Syria's new government
24:49have already signed
24:50a trilateral
24:51Memorandum of Understanding
24:53to resurrect
24:54the long-defunct
24:55Hejaz Railway,
24:56a rail project
24:57originally constructed
24:58all the way back
25:00during the Ottoman period
25:01that connected Saudi cities
25:02like Medina to Damascus
25:04and the Mediterranean coast.
25:06Large sections
25:07of the Hejaz Railway
25:08were destroyed
25:09by the Arab Revolt
25:10during the First World War,
25:12however,
25:12and over the decades
25:13that followed,
25:14the rest was split apart
25:15by new borders,
25:16dismantled for scrap,
25:17or simply abandoned.
25:19It has been dysfunctional
25:20for virtually all
25:21of living memory,
25:22but reviving it today
25:24could open up
25:25a new critical import
25:26route for food
25:27for Saudi Arabia
25:28and the Gulf states
25:29that currently
25:29overwhelmingly rely
25:31on the Strait of Hormuz
25:32for 85%
25:33of their food imports.
25:35The Saudis have even
25:36suggested developing parts
25:37for even all
25:38of the railway
25:39as a high-speed train network
25:40with speeds
25:41of 125 miles per hour,
25:43which would become
25:44the second high-speed railway
25:46to ever open
25:46in the Middle East
25:47after Saudi Arabia's
25:48own Haramain high-speed railway
25:50between Mecca,
25:51Jeddah,
25:52and Medina.
25:53Building out all
25:54of this infrastructure
25:55across Syria
25:55could serve multiple
25:57geopolitical aims.
25:58It can enable
25:59the Persian Gulf states
26:00to diversify their exports
26:01and imports away
26:02from the Strait of Hormuz,
26:03and undermine Iran's capability
26:05to hold the global economy
26:06hostage again.
26:08It can help Europe
26:09diversify their own
26:10energy import destinations
26:11and further reduce
26:12their reliance
26:13on Russian energy.
26:14While it can also
26:15help underwrite Syria's
26:16economic reconstruction
26:17and recovery
26:18in the wake of their civil war
26:19through lucrative transit fees
26:21and through kick-starting
26:22their own oil production
26:23back up again as well.
26:24Nonetheless,
26:25there are still
26:26a lot of headwinds
26:28going against the Syria plan.
26:30In 2021,
26:31the World Bank estimated
26:32that the cost
26:33of fully rebuilding Syria
26:34back to its pre-war
26:35level of development
26:36was a staggering
26:39$400 billion,
26:40which has no doubt
26:41grown over the years
26:43of further war
26:44and deterioration
26:45since then.
26:45Rebuilding Syria's
26:47railway network
26:48alone might cost
26:49as much as $5 billion.
26:51And that doesn't
26:52even include
26:53any of the plans
26:54for restoring
26:55the Hejaz Railway
26:56or building out
26:57a new high-speed
26:58railway line
26:58that didn't even
26:59exist pre-war.
27:01Rebuilding Syria's
27:02wrecked infrastructure
27:03will be expensive enough,
27:05let alone building out
27:06any brand new infrastructure,
27:08while the historical risks
27:09associated with
27:10Syria's instability
27:11probably won't
27:12just go away either.
27:14Both the proposed
27:15Qatar gas pipeline
27:16and the restored
27:17Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline
27:19would travel through
27:20vast expanses
27:22of sparsely populated desert
27:23where remnants of ISIS
27:25and Iranian-backed
27:26Shiite militias
27:27continue to remain active,
27:29meaning that securing
27:30the safety of all
27:31of these pipeline routes
27:32across Syria
27:33is far from a certainty.
27:35While possibly
27:36even more problematically,
27:37the largest and fastest
27:39growing energy market
27:40for the Gulf producers
27:41isn't even in Europe at all.
27:43It's in the other direction
27:44in Asia.
27:45The overwhelming majority
27:47of the Persian Gulf's
27:48energy resources
27:49flow to the east,
27:50and that share
27:51is continuing to grow
27:52with every passing year
27:53as Europe continues
27:54to decarbonize
27:55and increases its LNG imports
27:57from the United States.
27:59Building massively
28:00time-consuming,
28:01expensive,
28:02and geopolitically risky
28:03infrastructure across Syria
28:05to the Mediterranean
28:05works to get around
28:07the Strait of Hormuz,
28:08but it's also in the
28:10opposite direction
28:11where most of the
28:12Persian Gulf's exports
28:13are actually heading towards,
28:14which reduces a lot
28:16of the project's
28:17potential usefulness.
28:18Nonetheless,
28:19the geopolitical benefits
28:21of undermining
28:22what is currently
28:23Iran's greatest
28:23geographic advantage,
28:25its ability to threaten
28:26and close the Strait of Hormuz,
28:28might alone outweigh
28:30all of the various
28:31possible drawbacks.
28:33Iran may have been able
28:34to use this leverage
28:35over Hormuz
28:35to come out ahead
28:36during this most recent war,
28:38but if the Gulf States,
28:40America,
28:40and Europe
28:41can claw that leverage
28:42away from Iran
28:43by diversifying
28:44their pipeline
28:45and railway routes
28:46around the Strait of Hormuz,
28:48Iran might very well
28:50end up losing the peace
28:52in the long term
28:53by losing its ability
28:54to credibly do the same thing
28:55again in the future.
28:57And in that future,
28:58during another potential
28:59conflict with Iran,
29:01the Iranians
29:02will be the ones
29:02who will be in the much,
29:03much worse position
29:05to negotiate from.
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