- 2 weeks ago
For educational purposes
Many of the decisive battles of World War II were fought in the sector where Army Group South had been tasked to operate.
The conquest of Crimea, the catastrophic battle of Stalingrad, the counterstrike and clearing at Kharkov and the failed Operation Citadel are just some of the huge battles fought in this captivating look of the soldiers who served in the southern part of the gigantic advance into Russia.
The relentless battle between Hitler and Stalin that stretched along the Eastern Front reached a peak of intensity and decisiveness in the area of Army Group South, it was this sector that bore witness to the siege of Sevastopol, the horrors of Stalingrad and the fury of Operation Citadel.
There are few superlatives to describe the conditions and experiences of the more than 3 million men originally tasked with the strategic capture of the oilfields in the Caucasus, few could have foreseen the demolition of such a vast force, nor the brutality in which the battles were to be fought.
Many of the decisive battles of World War II were fought in the sector where Army Group South had been tasked to operate.
The conquest of Crimea, the catastrophic battle of Stalingrad, the counterstrike and clearing at Kharkov and the failed Operation Citadel are just some of the huge battles fought in this captivating look of the soldiers who served in the southern part of the gigantic advance into Russia.
The relentless battle between Hitler and Stalin that stretched along the Eastern Front reached a peak of intensity and decisiveness in the area of Army Group South, it was this sector that bore witness to the siege of Sevastopol, the horrors of Stalingrad and the fury of Operation Citadel.
There are few superlatives to describe the conditions and experiences of the more than 3 million men originally tasked with the strategic capture of the oilfields in the Caucasus, few could have foreseen the demolition of such a vast force, nor the brutality in which the battles were to be fought.
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LearningTranscript
00:05The dramatic events which were played out on the Russian front during the titanic struggle between Hitler and Stalin reached
00:13a peak of intensity and decisiveness on the southern front, the area of Army Group South.
00:36It was this sector which witnessed the terrible siege of Sevastopol, the disaster at Stalingrad, the fury of Operation Citadel,
00:45and the horrors of the Korsen Pocket.
00:52It is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of World War II was decided here.
01:00It is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of World War II was decided here.
01:44When Hitler decided on his surprise attack on Russia, the Army High Command produced a plan which envisaged a strike
01:51by three separate Army groups.
01:54This huge mass of men included over three and a half million German soldiers, supported by 3,500 tanks.
02:09Army Group North was to strike through the Baltic states and drive on towards Leningrad.
02:15Army Group Center was poised to strike at Moscow, and Army Group South was ordered to drive into the southern
02:22part of the USSR.
02:23The initial targets were Odessa and the Crimea, but the final strategic objective was the capture of the oil fields
02:32in the Caucasus.
02:36Army Group South was commanded by Field Marshal Gerhard von Rundstedt.
02:41He had at his disposal three separate subsidiary armies, the 6th Army, initially commanded by von Reichenhau,
02:49the 11th Army, commanded by von Schobert, and the 17th Army, under Stulpnagel.
02:56They were supported by a powerful armoured formation known as Panzer Group I, under the leadership of von Kleist.
03:03Air cover was provided by Luftflotter 1, under General Keller.
03:09Field Marshal Geert von Rundstedt was a well-known and well-respected German military leader.
03:16He had played a key role in the invasion of France in 1940,
03:21and had been amongst German units who had come closest to Paris in 1914, during the beginning of the First
03:26World War.
03:28He was well-respected by the commanders underneath him, and by the troops.
03:33He was known as a somewhat reserved and haughty individual,
03:38but nevertheless represented a very obvious symbol of traditional German military excellence.
03:49Unlike the other two Army Groups, Army Group South was not entirely composed of German divisions.
03:55A considerable portion of the 11th Army was made up of Romanian forces.
04:01Although these men could and would fight with great courage,
04:05their training and equipment was certainly inferior to the Wehrmacht.
04:14The principal reason for the inclusion of Romanian formations in Army Group South
04:18was the fact that von Rundstedt's Army Group was to act in close cooperation with the Romanian 3rd and 4th
04:25Armies.
04:27The Romanians were to join with the Germans as allies for the unheralded assault on Russia.
04:33That great surprise attack was codenamed Operation Barbarossa.
04:39It was launched on June the 22nd, 1941.
04:46In the first phase of the German invasion of Russia and operations in the south,
04:53the Romanian forces were really a considerable advantage.
04:57While von Rundstedt was held up, in a sense, in the northern part of the southern theatre,
05:03the Romanians were able to drive through the Soviet lines
05:06and begin the first of a series of major outflanking movements.
05:10And in terms of movements further east into the whole of the southern theatre,
05:16theatre, I think it can be said that the Romanians were an important and significant assistance to the Germans.
05:26There's been a historical tendency to blame the Romanian formations for all the ills that the German army suffered
05:34on the southern area of the front during the war.
05:38In actual fact, it is a historical irony that in some ways the presence of so many Romanian troops
05:43was beneficial to the German army, for it made up the numerical deficit
05:48that the German armed forces suffered from
05:51and enabled them to present a continuous front right across from Leningrad to the Black Sea.
05:58That being said, there is no doubt that the Romanian armies were of inferior quality
06:03to their German counterparts.
06:05They were less well-equipped and less well-led.
06:08In the Battle of Odessa in the early stages of the campaign of 1941,
06:12it would be true to say they did not distinguish themselves.
06:15Eventually, we were reliant upon German help to overcome the Russian opponents within Odessa.
06:22With the benefit of hindsight, it could be interpreted as an omen of the ill things to come,
06:28but Army Group South was, from the outset, the least successful of the three Army Groups
06:33during the initial onslaught.
06:39While Army Group North and Centre reported incredible advances of hundreds of miles,
06:45Army Group South encountered tough resistance from the Red Army's south-west and southern fronts.
06:59What happened with Army Group South, when it launched the initial attacks in June and July 1941,
07:09it came up against very stiff Soviet resistance.
07:13First of all, the south-western front, what had formerly been the Kiev Special Military District,
07:19was enormously strong.
07:21It perhaps was the strongest of all the Soviet fronts.
07:24This was the front in which the Soviet command had earlier argued that it was the force
07:30which should launch the counter-strike against the Germans.
07:33So in terms of armor, in terms of aviation, in terms of infantry, and in terms of support,
07:39this was a formidable opponent, and von Rönnstedt rapidly discovered this,
07:44and admits both in his own war diary and in the German high command war diary,
07:49they made very slow progress indeed.
07:56By the standards of any other campaign,
07:59the initial gains made by Army Group South would have been outstanding,
08:03but compared to the other two German Army Groups, progress was relatively slow.
08:12Since 1940, the Russian high command had been anticipating the main blow in the south.
08:19They understood the German desire to occupy areas of the eastern Ukraine
08:24to acquire agricultural and economic resources.
08:27The Russian high command therefore placed its best formations of the highest quality
08:31and the greatest quantity of mechanized forces in the south
08:35to oppose what they anticipated being the main German blow.
08:39In the very earliest hours of the war therefore in the south,
08:42Army Group South was forced to fight its way forward
08:45in altogether more bitter and prolonged battles
08:48than its counterparts on the rest of the front.
08:52Bit by bit, however, objectives were being taken,
08:57and in July, after tough fighting,
09:00Army Group South was able to report its first great success,
09:03the capture of a huge pocket of 100,000 encircled Russian troops near Uman.
09:10There was more to come.
09:22With the help of Panzer Group 2 from Army Group Centre,
09:26von Kleist's Panzer Group 1 was able to complete the encirclement
09:30of a further huge pocket of dazed Russian prisoners outside Kiev.
09:38Army Group South had played its part in the largest victory in history.
09:44The unfortunate captives had nothing to celebrate.
09:52The problem with the German army and the Soviet prisoners
09:56is the Germans had not made any preparations at all
09:58for the reception of such enormous bodies of prisoners as were taken.
10:02After all, the encirclement in the Battle of Kiev in 1941
10:08resulted in a prisoner total of 650,000 men.
10:14The basic problem was that Army Group South
10:17was required to conduct its operations with maximum speed
10:21in order to acquire the maximum terrain before the winter weather arrived,
10:26which would make the conduct of mobile operations extremely difficult.
10:29This was to some extent incompatible in transport terms
10:33with due adequate care and provision of Russian prisoners of war
10:37and the provision of proper housing facilities and foodstuffs.
10:41Therefore, it's fair to say that in common with their sister formations,
10:45Army Group South, did not cater for the interests of Russian prisoners of war.
10:55When columns of prisoners were marched to their assembly points,
11:00if any prisoner was ill or fell down or was wounded, he was simply shot.
11:04They treated the prisoners from Central Asia especially bestially,
11:08under the mistaken idea that even some of them were Jews, which they weren't.
11:13And so that group of prisoners, Red Army soldiers from Central Asia,
11:18as I say, suffered perhaps more than others,
11:21though all others suffered extremely badly.
11:28What happened near Kiev actually was quite interesting
11:32because although there was a large tally of prisoners there,
11:35what the Germans did was to release quite a number of prisoners
11:39into the community to show the occupied population
11:43that the Germans really weren't as bad as people thought.
11:49Other successes in the opening year of the campaign for Army Group South
11:52included the capture of the port of Odessa
11:55after a three-month siege by the Romanian Fourth Army.
12:01There was also the successful seizure of the Crimean Peninsula,
12:05most of which was in German hands by October 30, 1941.
12:10Only the fortress city of Sevastopol remained to the Soviets,
12:14but the city was already under siege by the German 17th Army
12:18who bombarded the defences mercilessly
12:21while the planes of Luftflotte 1
12:23kept up a merciless reign of death from the skies.
12:47While the defenders of Sevastopol were bottled up,
12:50the rest of Army Group South rolled onwards
12:53through the Korsan Peninsula,
12:55which was the scene of further heavy fighting.
13:15By the end of October,
13:17only Group South held a line which ran from approximately Kharkov in the north
13:21to the Black Sea in the south.
13:25The limit of the advance in that first year of the war
13:28proved to be the city of Rostov-on-Don.
13:50The forces of Army Group South,
13:52with their supply lines massively overstretched
13:55and the troops exhausted could, at present,
13:58do no more for Adolf Hitler.
14:00It was not enough for the Fuhrer.
14:07During the bitter winter of 1941,
14:10fierce Russian counterattacks began to push the German forces backwards.
14:15Rundstedt, for the first time in the campaign,
14:18asked for permission to withdraw.
14:24Field Marshal Geert von Rundstedt
14:26had actually wanted to halt the operations of Army Group South
14:29as early as the 4th of November 1941,
14:32because he believed that Army Group South
14:34was advancing too far to sustain its combat power.
14:38Hitler refused.
14:39In late November 1941,
14:42Marshal Timoshenko,
14:44leading the Russian forces in the southern area of the front,
14:46launched a Russian counteroffensive
14:48in the area of Rostov.
14:50On the 28th of December,
14:521st Panzer Army,
14:53in agreement with Rundstedt,
14:56decided to evacuate Rostov
14:58and requested permission
15:00to withdraw 80 miles to the west
15:02in order to take up a reasonable defensive position
15:05for the winter months behind the river Mios.
15:08Hitler again refused
15:10and on the 1st of December,
15:12removed von Rundstedt from his position
15:14as the commander of Army Group South.
15:17But it made no difference on the ground.
15:21The withdrawal from Rostov
15:22had to be carried out
15:23as a matter of military necessity.
15:25The situation was just too difficult
15:28and the German forces withdrew,
15:30in good order,
15:3140 miles west of Rostov.
15:33It was the first retreat of the war
15:36in the south.
15:40When Field Marshal von Bock took over Army Group South
15:42as an emergency measure,
15:45he assumed that Army Group South
15:47was more or less safe
15:49and that all it basically had to do
15:51was simply to ride out the winter.
15:53If it was able to ride out the winter,
15:55then in fact the situation would be fine.
15:58But the situation changed very rapidly
16:00because what the Soviet command entertained
16:02was a major offensive operation in the south.
16:05This was a major, major threat
16:07and that Army Group South
16:10had to do all it could
16:12to hold back these Soviet offensive drives,
16:16which penetrated
16:17quite some considerable distance.
16:20But like many things,
16:22the Soviet drive simply ran out of steam.
16:24It ran out of logistical support.
16:26It suffered from very heavy losses.
16:27So from that point of view,
16:29Army Group South did manage to survive,
16:32but not without very considerable losses
16:35and not without a number of severe crises
16:37which really shook the command from top to bottom.
16:451941 had been a successful year
16:47for the German army in Russia
16:49by any standards.
16:50Although they had not captured
16:52Moscow or Leningrad,
16:53they stood at the gates of both of these cities
16:55and could choose to strike at either.
16:59The natural expectation
17:01was that the focus for the 1942 campaign
17:03would again be a German attempt on Moscow.
17:08But Hitler managed to deceive the world.
17:11The strategic focus for the campaign of 1942
17:15would actually fall upon Army Group South.
17:28Even Hitler recognised that all three German army groups
17:32in Russia could not attack at the same time,
17:35and he deftly switched the whole emphasis
17:37onto the campaign in the South.
17:40In doing so,
17:41he caught Stalin completely off balance.
17:48For the summer campaign of 1942,
17:51codenamed Operation Blue,
17:53Army Group South,
17:54now under the command of Fedor von Bock,
17:56was strongly reinforced
17:58so that almost half of the entire German armed forces in Russia
18:02were allocated to the sector controlled by Army Group South.
18:10For more effective command and control of such a huge army,
18:14the command was split into two separate subgroups,
18:17Army Group A and Army Group B.
18:20While Army Group B drove off from Kharkov
18:23in the direction of Stalingrad,
18:25Army Group A was to attack from positions around Rostov
18:28in order to extend the German conquest
18:31into the Caucasus Mountains
18:32and to capture the precious oil fields
18:35which Germany desperately required
18:37in order to sustain her war effort.
18:41I think it's important to recognise
18:43that by 1942 there was a different war on.
18:48By now, the Second World War
18:50had developed into a confrontation
18:51between Germany and Great Britain,
18:54who had the largest empire in the world,
18:56the United States,
18:58the largest economy in the world,
18:59and the Soviet Union,
19:00which possessed the largest army in the world.
19:03It appeared to be absolutely imperative, therefore,
19:06the Germans strike the Russians such a blow in 1942
19:10as to either knock them out of the war completely
19:13or render them simply no more than a nuisance
19:16before turning to deal with arguably
19:18the more powerful combination
19:20of the United States and Great Britain.
19:22Therefore, German commanders tended to look
19:25towards the southern area of the Soviet Union
19:27with its oil reserves, its economic resources
19:30and its agricultural riches.
19:39Once Army Group South had recovered
19:41from the heavy fighting of the winter
19:43and the famous Russian mud set in,
19:49then Army Group South was geared up
19:52for really decisive operations
19:54on the Soviet German front.
19:57The idea was to break through
19:59the Soviet Southwestern front
20:01and then swing into the Caucasus,
20:03which would accomplish quite a number
20:07of strategic objectives,
20:08but mainly, of course, Hitler's insistence
20:11that it was essential to reach the oil of the Caucasus.
20:14That was the first thing.
20:15So Operation Blau, which was embodied in this,
20:17was extremely important.
20:21The German summer campaign of 1942
20:24was to prove one of the most spectacularly successful
20:27of the entire war.
20:29It began with the capture of Sevastopol.
20:40After bitter fighting,
20:42the defences of the city,
20:43which had endured a siege lasting 258 days,
20:47were finally battered into submission
20:49by the heaviest guns in the German armory.
21:03The Wehrmacht could now continue to advance
21:07without fear for the rear area,
21:09but the men of Army Group South
21:11were marching into hell.
21:21That hell was created by the Luftwaffe,
21:24who pounded the city of Stalingrad
21:26to rubble from the air.
21:29They hoped to terrify the garrison into surrender.
21:32In fact, they created a ready-made defensive position,
21:36which was to produce some of the most terrible scenes
21:39of World War II.
21:59Army Group B had reached the city of Stalingrad
22:02at the beginning of September.
22:04Almost immediately,
22:06a fierce battle, which would last for two months,
22:08commenced for control of the city.
22:15Although the fighting was intense and unusually heavy,
22:18there were few portents of the disaster
22:21which was shortly to follow.
22:28While Army Group B was dealing with the events
22:31around Stalingrad,
22:32Army Group A pushed deeper into the Caucasus,
22:35and by November had reached Maikop,
22:38the very farthest point of the German advance.
22:43Wehrmacht forces had travelled the length
22:45of European Russia
22:46and now approached the borders with Iran and Turkey,
22:502,000 miles from home.
22:52They were now nearer to Cairo than Berlin,
22:56and there was a serious discussion
22:57of the possibility of Army Group South
22:59linking up with Rommel's Africa Corps.
23:03The German army in the south
23:05was able to drive right through
23:06to the gates of the Caucasus.
23:08It took Rostov,
23:10and in the period of July and August,
23:13this precipitated a major crisis
23:15in the Soviet high command.
23:18It led Stalin, by the way,
23:20in July and August,
23:21to argue that this was the greatest crisis
23:22that they had faced.
23:23He issued a draconian order,
23:26a really draconian order,
23:28that those who showed signs of cowardice
23:31or unauthorised retreat should be shot.
23:35Others who wavered in the line of duty
23:37should be sent to penal battalions.
23:39And this was a measure,
23:41certainly a public and open measure,
23:43of how grave the crisis had become
23:45for the Red Army.
23:47But there was one other important feature
23:49which was rather baffling
23:50to the German high commander
23:52and even to Hitler himself.
23:54What they thought would ensue
23:56would be major encirclement battles,
23:59more or less on the pattern
24:00of the summer of 1941,
24:03and they didn't take place.
24:04There was no huge encirclement
24:06of the Red Armies.
24:08Armies which had, in a sense,
24:10begun to withdraw
24:11in perhaps a better order
24:13than in 1941.
24:14And so, therefore,
24:17the huge encirclement battles
24:20didn't take place.
24:30The capture of the oil fields
24:33of Maikop
24:33was enormously significant
24:35for Germany.
24:37Of less strategic significance
24:38was this famous propaganda exercise.
24:42A specially trained mountaineer
24:44was dispatched
24:45to climb Mount Elberus,
24:46the highest mountain
24:47in the Caucasus.
24:49Overcoming Russian resistance
24:51and natural hazards,
24:53the party planted the German flag
24:55on top of the mountain.
24:56It was a symbolic gesture,
24:58but perhaps it symbolized
25:00the wrong thing for Hitler.
25:02It actually symbolized
25:03that the limit of the German advance
25:05had been reached.
25:12Ominous clouds
25:13were gathering further
25:15to the north at Stalingrad.
25:16The storm
25:17was now about to break.
25:21Army Group B
25:22was directed to strike forward
25:24to Stalingrad.
25:25And the Sixth Army
25:27under Paulus
25:28was very successful.
25:29It penetrated
25:30the Soviet fronts.
25:33It broke over the Don.
25:35It arrived
25:36at the approaches
25:37to Stalingrad
25:39and in a very daring move
25:41by a panzer unit,
25:43actually managed
25:44to slice the city in two
25:45by driving to the north
25:46and reaching the Volga.
25:49Whereupon,
25:50huge alarm bells rang
25:51in Moscow.
25:52But taking part
25:54of the city
25:55didn't mean
25:56that they'd occupied
25:57the city.
26:06For two months,
26:08the Sixth Army
26:09had been grinding
26:09its way towards
26:10capturing the city,
26:12which was named
26:12after Stalin himself.
26:14They had almost succeeded.
26:17The relentless
26:18and bloody fighting
26:19had led to the capture
26:21of four-fifths
26:22of the now-ruined city.
26:41I think the paradox
26:42about the Battle of Stalingrad
26:43is this,
26:44that neither side
26:45expected to fight it.
26:46The Germans didn't
26:47and the Russians didn't.
26:50Stalingrad,
26:51in a sense,
26:52blew up in their faces
26:54and for a number of reasons,
26:55partly military,
26:56but I think also
26:57political and psychological
26:59on the part
27:00of Hitler and Stalin.
27:01The Battle of Stalingrad
27:02became what it was.
27:04It became a test of will.
27:05It became a test of commitment.
27:07It became a test of capability.
27:09It became a political signal.
27:12And in the attempt
27:13to reduce Stalingrad,
27:15the city itself,
27:16then, of course,
27:16Sixth Army got drawn
27:18closer and closer
27:20into the city itself.
27:24Although it was holding on
27:25by its fingertips,
27:27the Red Army did know
27:28that the German army
27:29was being pushed
27:29to the very limits
27:30of its capacity.
27:50both sides of the thinly stretched line
27:53to the north and south
27:54of Stalingrad
27:55were held by low-quality
27:56Romanian, Hungarian,
27:58and Italian troops.
28:00It was upon these divisions
28:02that the Russian attack
28:03would break.
28:07Many of the German high command
28:09were aware of the dangers,
28:10soldiers, and Zeitzler,
28:11the chief of staff,
28:13actually flew to Hitler's headquarters
28:14in order to plead for permission
28:16for a withdrawal
28:17before the coming Soviet offensive
28:19had even begun.
28:21But Hitler was emphatic.
28:23He refused to move his troops
28:25from the Volga,
28:26and the rest is history.
28:34In late November 1942,
28:38the ferocious Russian
28:39counterattack began.
28:58It was an ideal target
29:02for encirclement
29:03as the Russians first of all
29:04struck from the south
29:05around the Birkotova bell
29:07south of Stalingrad
29:08and struck from the north.
29:10This was a major change
29:12in Soviet plans.
29:13The original Soviet plan
29:14had been directing
29:15attacks on the Sixth Army
29:17from the north,
29:18which were really futile attacks,
29:20which didn't accomplish
29:21anything at all.
29:23So that in the Soviet high command
29:26under Zhukov and Vasilevsky,
29:28it was decided
29:28that something else
29:29must be done.
29:30So it wasn't only a question
29:31of encircling the Sixth Army
29:32within the city itself.
29:34It had to be a wider encirclement,
29:36and thus it became
29:36a double encirclement.
29:37You encircled the army
29:40in the city itself,
29:41but you made sure
29:42that it was fully encircled
29:43by attacking on the wider flanks.
29:48The encircled Sixth Army
29:50under von Paulus
29:51was ordered to hold firm
29:53and await relief
29:54by a new force
29:55known as Army Group Don
29:56under the command
29:58of von Manstein.
30:02Army Group Don
30:04doggedly fought its way
30:05to within 30 miles
30:06of Stalingrad,
30:08but von Paulus refused
30:09to break out
30:10without a direct order
30:11to do so from the Führer.
30:15In the early stages
30:16of the encirclement
30:17in late November 1942
30:19and the first days
30:21of December 1942,
30:23the German Sixth Army,
30:24if given permission,
30:26could have broken
30:26out of the encirclement.
30:28The main reason for this
30:30is that while the Russians
30:31encircled the German Sixth Army
30:33at Stalingrad,
30:34they perceived
30:35that they would be encircling
30:36in the region
30:37of 80,000 to 100,000 men.
30:39In actual fact,
30:40it is clear
30:41from the historical sources
30:42that they encircled
30:43in the region
30:44of 250,000 men.
30:46If, therefore,
30:47in late November
30:48and December 1942,
30:50von Paulus,
30:51the commander
30:51of the German Sixth Army,
30:52had been given permission
30:53to break out
30:54up to the southwest,
30:55it seems reasonable
30:56to assume
30:57that the German Sixth Army
30:58would still have retained
30:59the combat power
31:00to achieve this.
31:04As supplies dwindled
31:05and the airlift promised
31:07by a boastful Göring failed,
31:09the Sixth Army weakened
31:11and died
31:12and the remnants surrendered
31:14in February 1943.
31:3390,000 men marched
31:35into captivity.
31:36Only 5,000 would survive
31:38to see Germany again.
31:57The disappearance
31:58of a complete army
31:59from their German order
32:00of battle
32:01was a catastrophic blow
32:02to the German forces
32:03fighting in the south.
32:05But there was worse news
32:07to come.
32:09In the wake
32:10of the capture
32:11of Stalingrad,
32:12the Russian forces
32:13took advantage
32:14of the huge gap
32:14which appeared
32:15in the German lines
32:16and surged on
32:17to recapture Kharkov.
32:29The situation
32:30looked bleak indeed
32:31for Army Group South
32:32and there was a real danger
32:34that Army Group A
32:35would be trapped
32:36in the Caucasus.
32:37von Kleist
32:38had to practically beg
32:40Hitler for permission
32:41to withdraw
32:42and only succeeded
32:43in getting his armies
32:44away by the skin
32:45of their teeth.
32:47Had the Sixth Army
32:48not held out
32:49for so long
32:49in Stalingrad,
32:50it is unlikely
32:51that Army Group A
32:53would have been able
32:54to escape from
32:54the Caucasus
32:55which they did
32:56by the narrowest
32:57of margins
32:58in January 1943.
33:05Hitler, having been made aware
33:07of the threat
33:07to Army Group A
33:08in the Caucasus region
33:10of the Soviet Union
33:11on the 27th of January 1943,
33:15fully ten days
33:16before the Stalingrad pocket
33:17was finally liquidated,
33:19authorised the withdrawal
33:20of those forces
33:21of Army Group A
33:22which were within
33:23the Caucasus regions
33:24into the main area
33:25of European Russia.
33:26It is quite clear
33:28that this decision
33:29to permit the strategic withdrawal
33:30of Army Group A
33:31saved it from being trapped
33:32in the Caucasus region
33:34and eventually destroyed
33:35in a manner similar
33:36to the German Sixth Army
33:37part of Army Group B.
33:40If the Sixth Army
33:42had withdrawn
33:43from Stalingrad
33:43it might have pulled
33:44part of the roof down
33:45on the whole German front
33:46and therefore
33:48facilitated the movement
33:49of more Soviet forces
33:51who would have been
33:51free to attack.
33:52They might then
33:53have been able
33:53to seal off entirely
33:54the Caucasus
33:55and trap not only
33:56the Sixth Army
33:56but the 17th Army
33:57and the Panzer Groups
33:58as well.
33:59So the argument is
34:01that by tying down
34:03substantial Soviet forces
34:05it was a sacrifice
34:09which was worthwhile
34:10and while Sixth Army
34:13was forced to surrender
34:15what nevertheless happened
34:17was the withdrawal
34:19and retrieval
34:20of 17th Army
34:21and 1st Panzer
34:22from the Caucasus
34:23was virtually guaranteed.
34:28Army Group A
34:30escaped from the Caucasus
34:31just in the nick of time.
34:32By February
34:33the Russians were
34:35on the eastern outskirts
34:36of Rostov
34:37and in the north
34:38had surged on
34:39to recapture Kharkov
34:40in February 1943.
34:44At this desperate juncture
34:47the German forces
34:49Field Marshal
34:49von Manstein
34:50emerged as the saviour
34:52of Army Group South.
34:54Not only did he manage
34:56to stabilise
34:57the crumbling situation
34:58and so thwart
35:00any further Russian advance
35:01he also managed
35:03to get the German forces
35:04moving onto a counter-attack.
35:18Against Hitler's orders
35:19the 1st SS Panzer Corps
35:22commanded by Paul Hauser
35:23had to abandon Kharkov
35:25in order to save themselves
35:26from imminent destruction.
35:29under the guidance
35:30of von Manstein
35:31they now attacked
35:32the city once more
35:33and recaptured it
35:35in the bloody fighting
35:36which became known
35:37as the Third Battle
35:38for Kharkov.
35:53Kharkov was just one
35:55of a string of successes
35:56for Manstein.
35:57By the summer of 1943
35:59he had produced
36:00the amazing reversal
36:01of fortunes
36:02that is often referred to
36:03as Manstein's miracle.
36:06When all seemed lost
36:07and it looked as if
36:08the entire Soviet German
36:09wing was crumbling
36:13it was Manstein
36:14who took command of this.
36:16He launched a counter-stroke
36:17which really pushed
36:19the Russians entirely
36:20off balance
36:21and even more important
36:22it did provide
36:24a configuration
36:25of the front
36:26just before
36:26the spring months
36:28set in.
36:37It is fair to say
36:38that the counter-offensive
36:40that Manstein launched
36:41in late February
36:43and March 1943
36:44remains one of the most
36:46impressive military achievements
36:47of the 20th century
36:49by one of the most
36:50impressive military commanders
36:51that the world
36:52has witnessed.
36:54On the other hand
36:55one should not
36:56exaggerate its importance.
36:58It did provide
36:59the Russians
37:00with a bloody nose
37:01which taught them
37:01a very severe lesson
37:03not to underestimate
37:04the resilience
37:05of the German army.
37:07On the other hand
37:08while Manstein
37:09took back
37:09a considerable amount
37:10of territory
37:11including the fourth largest
37:13city of the Soviet Union
37:14Kharkov
37:14from the Russian forces
37:16all that he actually
37:17managed to achieve
37:18in strategic terms
37:19was to return
37:20the German army
37:21to the line
37:22from which it had begun
37:23its major operations
37:24in the southern area
37:25of the Soviet Union
37:26in June 1942.
37:30These victories
37:31turned a disastrous defeat
37:32into a stable platform
37:34from which Hitler
37:35was able to launch
37:36the last great
37:37German offensive
37:38of World War II
37:40Operation Citadel.
37:42It was high noon
37:44for the German forces
37:45in Russia.
37:48Both sides were aware
37:49it was make or break
37:51whichever side
37:53accomplished
37:54a decisive blow
37:55it would be
37:57in real terms
37:58decisive
37:59and I think
37:59that's the significance
38:01of the Battle of Kursk.
38:05Army Group South
38:07provided the southern wing
38:08of the massive
38:09German offensive
38:10at Kursk.
38:10The spearhead
38:12was the 4th Panzer Army
38:13led by General Hoth.
38:16It was these men
38:17who fought
38:17the greatest tank battle
38:19in history
38:19which saw thousands
38:21of machines clash
38:22outside the village
38:23of Prokhorovka.
38:26If the Germans
38:27really wanted
38:27finally to plant
38:28the dagger
38:29you know
38:30right in the heart
38:31of the Soviet Union
38:32they had to get
38:32through there
38:33and the idea was
38:34to break through
38:35to Kursk
38:35and then swing
38:36and then drive
38:37on Moscow.
38:39so it was
38:40if you like
38:41a strategic battle
38:43with the idea
38:43of a coup de grace
38:44behind it
38:45I mean
38:45this was
38:46as I've said
38:47to be decisive
38:48and it had to be
38:48really decisive.
38:51The battle
38:52for the Kursk salient
38:54was a colossal affair
38:55but the defenders
38:56had the edge.
38:58The well-prepared
38:59Soviet defenses
39:00ground down
39:01the attacking
39:02German forces
39:03which included
39:04the famous
39:04Leibstandarte Division
39:06supported with
39:07the new
39:08Tiger tanks.
39:16The new generation
39:18of German armor
39:19in the face
39:19of the Panther
39:20was first seen
39:21at Kursk
39:22as was
39:23the ill-fated
39:24Elephant heavy
39:25tank destroyer
39:26seen here.
39:35Despite the lavish
39:36promise of new
39:37equipment
39:37tactically
39:39Operation Citadel
39:40could be called
39:41a draw.
39:42The Germans
39:43made some progress
39:44both in the north
39:45and the south
39:45of the Kursk salient
39:46but strategically
39:48the battle
39:49was a disaster.
39:54In purely
39:55military terms
39:56I don't think
39:56there's any doubt
39:57that Kursk
39:58was the decisive
39:59turning point
39:59on the eastern front.
40:01However,
40:02in psychological terms
40:03most people
40:04would argue
40:05that the battle
40:05of Stalingrad
40:06and its impact
40:07upon the German army
40:08was actually
40:09more significant
40:10and that in some
40:11respects therefore
40:11Kursk only tended
40:13to confirm
40:14the emergence
40:16of Russian
40:17military competence
40:19on the eastern front
40:20which would deny
40:20the Germans
40:21the victory
40:21that they were seeking.
40:23After the battle
40:24of Kursk
40:24however it is clear
40:25that the German army
40:27no longer
40:27retained the capability
40:29to launch
40:29large scale
40:30operational offensives
40:31against the Red Army.
40:33After Kursk
40:34the Red Army
40:35had seized the initiative
40:36completely
40:37at the strategic
40:38operational
40:39and indeed
40:39the tactical level.
40:44Germany had now
40:45lost the initiative
40:46on the Russian front.
40:49There would never again
40:50be the opportunity
40:51for a full scale offensive.
40:56With their confidence
40:57sky high
40:58after Kursk
40:59the Red Army
41:00surged on
41:01and drove the men
41:02of Army Group South
41:03back from the river Donets
41:04to a new defensive line
41:06on the river Nye.
41:09Although the situation
41:10was grave
41:11it was not yet terminal
41:13but at this juncture
41:14Adolf Hitler intervened
41:16and his fateful intervention
41:18sealed the fate
41:19of Army Group South.
41:29Despite the obvious danger
41:31Hitler refused
41:32to allow the 17th Army
41:34to retreat
41:34from the Crimean peninsula
41:35and insisted
41:37that the Crimea
41:37be held at all costs.
41:41Hitler regarded
41:43the Romanian oil fields
41:44of Ploesti
41:45as being absolutely
41:46essential
41:47to the German military effort
41:48and thought
41:49that if the Russian
41:50air force
41:51was able to gain
41:52a foothold
41:52in the Crimea
41:53it would bring
41:54these oil fields
41:55under sustained fire
41:56thus denying
41:57the German army
41:58the ability
41:58to utilise them.
42:00This he believed
42:01would completely
42:02compromise
42:02the German army's
42:03mobility
42:04denying it the opportunity
42:05to defeat
42:06the Red Army
42:07he saw as the major threat
42:08to the survival
42:09of the German state
42:10and nation.
42:12He still had
42:13full confidence
42:14in the Luftwaffe
42:15and Kriegsmarine
42:16to rescue the army
42:17in case they could not
42:18be relieved
42:18but he was wrong.
42:24The 17th Army
42:25remained trapped
42:26in the Crimea
42:27and finally surrendered
42:28in May 1944
42:30when some 80,000 survivors
42:33marched into captivity.
42:36No, if Hitler
42:36had been flexible
42:39which he wasn't
42:40which was essentially
42:41one of the serious problems
42:42on the Soviet-German front
42:44then the 17th Army
42:45could have been saved
42:47and retrieved.
42:49What happened
42:49it was simply bottled up
42:50and it was waiting there
42:52for eventual destruction
42:53and that happened
42:54in so many instances
42:56on the Soviet-German front.
42:58Hitler having
42:59got hold of the idea
43:00from the crisis
43:02of 1941-42
43:03that there was
43:04much profit to be gained
43:05from holding fast
43:06from standing fast.
43:08I mean his concern
43:09about the implications
43:11of withdrawal
43:12not only trapped
43:13the 17th Army
43:15it trapped many other armies
43:17and at a time
43:18actually looking
43:19at the whole strategic scene
43:21where mobility
43:22and mobile defense
43:23was the order of the day
43:25and many German generals
43:27recommended this
43:28then of course
43:29to do the very opposite
43:30to lock people up
43:31to deprive them
43:32of a chance to survive
43:35or even a chance
43:36to use their capabilities
43:38well it simply amounted
43:39to the equivalent
43:41of a death sentence.
43:46From now on
43:47only bitter fighting retreats
43:49awaited Army Group South.
43:51They still put up
43:52some incredible resistance.
43:54The dogged fighting retreat
43:56which allowed 30,000 trapped soldiers
43:58to escape from a pocket
43:59near Corson
44:00is a lasting testament
44:02to courage in adversity.
44:04Although 30,000 German troops
44:07managed to escape
44:08from the pocket
44:08the condition of these troops
44:10shocked senior German commanders.
44:13It is quite clear
44:14that the Stalingrad complex
44:16the deep fear
44:17of being encircled
44:18by Russian forces
44:19was beginning
44:20to have a severe impact
44:21on the tactical
44:22and operational capabilities
44:24of the German army
44:25against a Red Army
44:26that was now proving itself
44:28altogether more capable
44:31of inflicting
44:32these kind of defeats
44:33through large-scale
44:34manoeuvre operations
44:35upon the German army
44:36than it had been of doing
44:38in the years 1941 and 1942.
44:40Therefore
44:41the Winter Battles
44:42of 1943-44
44:44can be regarded
44:45as an important
44:46transitional period
44:47in which the German army
44:49lost its ability
44:50to conduct large-scale
44:51operational manoeuvre operations
44:53and the Red Army
44:54gained a new ability
44:56to do so
44:56with a skill
44:58and panache
44:59bettered only
45:00by the German army
45:01in its golden years
45:02of 1939-42.
45:12General Hub's
45:13famous fighting withdrawal
45:15in March 1944
45:16was another stirring
45:18feat of endurance
45:19and tenacity
45:20but the writing
45:21was on the wall
45:22for the Wehrmacht
45:23in Russia.
45:25So it was this switch
45:26this rapid switch
45:27from the strategic defensive
45:29to the strategic offensive
45:33which had a decisive part
45:35to play
45:36in the nature
45:36of the Soviet operations
45:37and the idea
45:38was really to move
45:39as fast and as far
45:40as they could
45:41to recover
45:42as much territory
45:43as they could
45:44and Stalin constantly urged
45:45these armies
45:47onward and forward
45:48and from
45:49I would say
45:51the early
45:53or late winter
45:53of 1943
45:55the danger
45:56to the German
45:58southern wing
45:58increases
45:59and increases
46:00and the climax
46:02comes in
46:03late winter
46:04or early spring
46:05of 1944
46:06by which time
46:07the Russians
46:07have driven deeply
46:08into the Ukraine
46:09they've taken Kiev
46:10by the way
46:10and it appears
46:12that they are even
46:12moving further
46:13and faster
46:15to the west
46:18The destruction
46:19of Army Group Center
46:20in June 1944
46:22created a huge gap
46:24in the German front
46:25in Russia
46:25In order to manage
46:27the overstretched forces
46:28of Army Group South
46:29it was again divided
46:31into two separate commands
46:33Army Group North Ukraine
46:35under Modal
46:36and Army Group South Ukraine
46:38under Shona
46:42I would say
46:43and many would agree
46:44that the damage
46:44to the German southern wing
46:46by that time
46:46was almost irreparable
46:49The Russian advance
46:51was now a headlong dash
46:53despite some tenacious resistance
46:55during the fierce summer battles
46:56of 1944
46:57there was little
46:59that could now be done
47:00to prevent the final defeat
47:09On the 20th of September 1944
47:12the Army Group South title
47:14was again revived
47:15and bestowed
47:16on a scratch group
47:17of formations
47:18fighting under General Freisner
47:20but the inevitable
47:22could not be delayed
47:23much longer
47:32For a time
47:33the rather pathetic rumor
47:35that Army Group South
47:36was about to join forces
47:37to fight with the Americans
47:38against the Russians
47:39gained currency
47:40but by now
47:42they were clutching
47:43at straws
47:48Operation Spring Awakening
47:49designed to roll back
47:51the Red Army
47:52proved to be
47:53the final offensive
47:53by the Wehrmacht
47:54in the east
47:55and the last remaining forces
47:58of Army Group South
47:59under their last commander
48:01General Rendulic
48:02surrendered near Vienna
48:04in May 1945
48:10The long struggle
48:11was finally over
48:24in the west
48:57Transcription by CastingWords
48:58CastingWords
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