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For educational purposes
"The Forgotten Soldiers of the Russian Campaign"
This is how the soldiers in Army Group North described their war in Russia.
June 1941 saw Hitler launch his audacious bid to conquer Russia and his attempt to succeed where Napoleon had failed.
Army Group North swept through the Russian defences and closed in on the iconic city of Leningrad in less than two months.
So began the now infamous siege that would cost the lives of soldiers and civilians alike, and coin the phrase "the eternal war of the poor man".
Away from Leningrad a titanic struggle ensued all along the front line, including operations in and around the Baltic Sea, Norway and Finland.
While huge battles took place at Stalingrad, Kursk and Moscow, Army Group North maintained a prolonged siege at Leningrad.
Suddenly in 1944 the front exploded to life, and a desperate struggle for life and death began, during when Army Group North began the dangerous retreat back to the border of the Reich.
"The Forgotten Soldiers of the Russian Campaign"
This is how the soldiers in Army Group North described their war in Russia.
June 1941 saw Hitler launch his audacious bid to conquer Russia and his attempt to succeed where Napoleon had failed.
Army Group North swept through the Russian defences and closed in on the iconic city of Leningrad in less than two months.
So began the now infamous siege that would cost the lives of soldiers and civilians alike, and coin the phrase "the eternal war of the poor man".
Away from Leningrad a titanic struggle ensued all along the front line, including operations in and around the Baltic Sea, Norway and Finland.
While huge battles took place at Stalingrad, Kursk and Moscow, Army Group North maintained a prolonged siege at Leningrad.
Suddenly in 1944 the front exploded to life, and a desperate struggle for life and death began, during when Army Group North began the dangerous retreat back to the border of the Reich.
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LearningTranscript
00:02There are almost too few superlatives to describe the titanic struggle fought out between Hitler and Stalin.
00:10It was the greatest land campaign in history, involved the most participants, saw the highest casualties, and witnessed the largest
00:18tank battle ever fought.
00:24The temperatures varied from the scorching heat of the summers in the Caucasus.
00:30To the bitter cold of an arctic winter outside Leningrad.
00:35It was here that the men of Army Group North fought and died.
00:39Constantly short of manpower and material, they considered themselves to be the forgotten men of the Russian front.
00:50It is no surprise that they christened the pitiless war that they were fighting, the eternal war of the poor
00:57man.
01:04Most of the poor men of Army Group North were destined never to return to Germany.
01:09The ceaseless demands of the cruelest conflict in history would ultimately claim the whole Army Group as its victim.
01:17The electrician.
01:18Heavy奥
01:19The electrician.
01:31Any related show?
01:35The electrician.
01:46It is only the frostb Damoric near the East.
02:06In late 1940, when Adolf Hitler finally confirmed to the general staff
02:11that he had irrevocably decided to attack Russia,
02:14a plan was swiftly conceived which envisaged a three-pronged advance
02:18by three huge army groups, totaling over three and a half million men.
02:35The German grand strategy was for three great parallel advances.
02:39The first aimed at Leningrad in the north,
02:41the second at Moscow in the center, and the third at Odessa on the Black Sea.
02:50As the name suggests, Army Group North formed the northern wing of the German attack on Russia.
02:57In June 1941, the time of the attack,
03:01Army Group North was commanded by Field Marshal Ritter von Lieb
03:04and was composed of two subsidiary armies.
03:08The 16th Army, initially commanded by Field Marshal Bush,
03:12and the 18th Army, commanded by General von Kuchler.
03:16For the initial thrust into Russia under the Barbarossa Directive,
03:21Army Group North enjoyed the support of a powerful tank force
03:24designated as Panzer Group 4 under the leadership of General Hoffner.
03:29For air support, Army Group North could call upon Luftflotte 1,
03:34commanded by General Keller.
03:36The Stukas of Luftflotte 1 were to provide the flying artillery
03:40for the lightning attack of June 22nd.
03:51Naval support was available from the powerful Battle Group North
03:55under the command of General Admiral Karls,
03:58seen here, planning the campaign with his senior commanders.
04:03The commander of Army Group North was Field Marshal Ritter von Lieb,
04:08who had successfully commanded German Army Group C
04:11in the attack on France in 1940.
04:13He was extremely well-supported by some of the most capable commanders
04:17that the German army had within its ranks.
04:21Obviously, they could draw on their experience from the war in the West,
04:26but the quality of the commanders, the type of performance they got,
04:29is shown quite clearly by the really extraordinary success
04:33of Army Group North,
04:35success which was achieved in a matter of 48 hours,
04:38and which actually ripped the Soviet front apart.
04:46For the great assault on Russia,
04:49Army Group North could count on over 800,000 men,
04:52organized into three armored divisions,
04:55three motorized infantry divisions,
04:5720 infantry divisions,
04:59and three security divisions.
05:05Army Group North was by no means the armored juggernaut of popular legend.
05:10Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk into battle,
05:13like the soldiers of Napoleon over a century earlier.
05:17In 1941, the mechanized era had not yet fully dawned,
05:22and Army Group North needed 200,000 horses
05:25to draw their guns and equipment.
05:39The Army Group could deploy 1,200 guns.
05:43In terms of tanks and aircraft,
05:45it was comparatively poorly supplied
05:47compared to Army Group South and Center,
05:49but Army Group North could still boast 600 tanks
05:53and 430 aircraft.
05:58Army Group North tends to be treated in some respects
06:01as the poor relation in comparison to Army Group Centre
06:04and Army Group South.
06:05But initially, at least,
06:07although they had less numbers,
06:10the formations at the disposal of Army Group North
06:12actually achieved their objective
06:14with a greater skill and speed
06:16by the end of July
06:17than any of the other German Army Groups.
06:19This is perhaps because,
06:21although they have less numbers,
06:22they have perhaps a greater degree of quality
06:24within their ranks and their German formations,
06:27and the frontage and physical area they have to cover
06:30is less than, for example, Army Group Centre,
06:32and in particular, Army Group South.
06:35Army Group North was to meet the Northwest Front
06:38under Kuznetsov.
06:40In theory, the Russian forces were larger
06:42and more generously supplied with tanks, guns, and aircraft.
06:47In practice, the Red Army as a whole
06:49proved to be so demoralized by internal disruptions
06:52that they were disastrously unprepared.
06:55In addition, much of the Russian equipment
06:57was obsolete or unserviceable,
06:59with the result that in the opening battles,
07:01at least, there was to be no real contest.
07:09During the early stages of the campaign,
07:12the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte 1
07:15played their familiar role
07:16as the German storm broke against Russia.
07:20The initial moves followed the classic blitzkrieg pattern.
07:24No declaration of war
07:25and a fast-moving assault designed to disorientate
07:28and confuse the Russian Army.
07:37As the forces of Army Group North
07:39scythed into the Baltic states,
07:42Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.
07:45These lightning advances were greeted with joy
07:48by the citizens of cities like Riga,
07:50where the Estonian population
07:52viewed the German armies as liberators.
08:04A great deal of the naval effort
08:06throughout the campaign
08:07lay in suppressing Soviet naval activity
08:10by laying thousands of mines,
08:13a task which continued
08:14even in the face of fierce air resistance.
08:19These ships of Carl's battle group
08:22continued with the task of minelaying
08:24despite the attentions of the Red Air Force.
08:38On land, the presence of a strong armoured force
08:41in the form of Panzer Group 4
08:43gave Army Group North
08:44some much-needed tank support
08:46during the headlong advance into Russia.
08:49For as long as they were in support
08:51of Army Group North,
08:52the tanks of Panzer Group 4
08:54played an invaluable role.
08:55But even with the panzers,
08:57the swift advances of June and July
08:59ground to a halt
09:01against the tough defences
09:02of the Stalin line,
09:04which were encountered in August
09:05and early September.
09:10Like all German operations in Russia
09:13from quite an early stage,
09:15it became apparent to the commanders,
09:17to the troops,
09:18the commanders and the high command,
09:20that in fact the tasks they had taken on
09:23and the tasks they may have to take on
09:25were beginning far to exceed
09:27the resources to hand.
09:30To compound the problems
09:32of the battles for the Stalin line,
09:35Panzer Group 4 was withdrawn
09:36from Army Group North
09:37in the autumn of 1941
09:39in order to support Army Group Centre
09:42in Operation Typhoon,
09:44the final drive on Moscow.
09:50No German Army Group
09:51could afford to lose tanks.
09:53It couldn't afford to lose anything,
09:54as a matter of fact,
09:55given the conditions of war in the east.
09:57It was a very severe blow
09:59that Panzer Group 4
10:01was removed from Army Group North.
10:04Certainly in the early part of the war,
10:07perhaps from July, August
10:09until the end of December,
10:10that was not so serious.
10:12But in 1942,
10:13it really became critical.
10:15It's rather easy to suggest
10:17that the loss of Panzer Group 4
10:18in September 1941
10:20was directly responsible
10:22for the failure of Army Group North
10:24to take its strategic objective of Leningrad.
10:27This is perhaps too simple.
10:29It is by no means certain,
10:30given the nature of the terrain
10:32and the difficulty of the objective,
10:34namely taking a city as large
10:35and as well defended as Leningrad,
10:37that the presence of Panzer Group 4
10:39would have guaranteed
10:40taking of this major city.
10:42Nevertheless, clearly,
10:43its removal does not help
10:45the cause of Army Group North.
10:47It meant that Army Group North
10:48was denied the one formation
10:51that had the size,
10:53the speed and the fighting power
10:55to advance quickly
10:56towards the region of the city of Leningrad
10:59and to cut it off
11:00in the interior of the Soviet Union.
11:04The disappearance of Panzer Group 4
11:07proved to be a forerunner
11:08of things to come.
11:10From that point onwards,
11:11the evidence was clear
11:13that Army Group North
11:14was considered to be
11:15the poor relation
11:16among the three German Army groups.
11:19It soon became obvious
11:21that they could expect
11:22to receive no substantial
11:23additional support of any kind,
11:25and the group therefore
11:27had to fight for most of the campaign
11:28with no substantial reserves
11:31at its disposal.
11:32It seemed that the decisive battles
11:35on the Eastern Front
11:36would be fought elsewhere.
11:39In general terms,
11:41the forces were adequate
11:42for the immediate tasks
11:44which Army Group North
11:45had to fulfill.
11:47That's proved by the events themselves.
11:48It wasn't a poor relation
11:51by any sense of the word.
11:53It was a very accomplished command,
11:55and it did manage to achieve
11:58what Hitler really ordered
12:00should be done,
12:01which namely was
12:02to seize the Baltic states,
12:03to move right up to Leningrad,
12:04and establish the Baltic states
12:06more or less as a base
12:07for further operations in Russia.
12:12Nevertheless, it's fair to say
12:13that from October 1941 onwards,
12:16when Hitler tends to oscillate
12:18between determining Ukraine
12:20as a strategic objective,
12:22or Moscow, which of course
12:23was the strategic objective
12:24of the Army Command,
12:25all along,
12:26Army Group North
12:27does tend to come a poor third
12:29in terms of allocation
12:30of resources
12:31for the achievement
12:32of its strategic objective,
12:33which is Leningrad.
12:34It is fair to say
12:36that it is the failure
12:37of the Army High Command
12:38and of Hitler
12:39to provide it with the resources
12:40which prevents Army Group North
12:43from achieving its objective.
12:46In the North,
12:47the fighting for the Stalin Line
12:49proved to be
12:50an attritional nightmare,
12:51with German casualties
12:53mounting to First World War levels.
12:55But after a hard-fought series
12:57of gruelling battles
12:58in which the SS Police Division
13:01particularly distinguished itself,
13:03the Stalin Line
13:04was finally broken
13:05in late August
13:06and Army Group North
13:08surged onwards.
13:17The only ominous development
13:19for the Germans
13:20at this point
13:21was the appearance
13:22on the battlefield
13:23of the Russian medium
13:24T-34 tank
13:25and the heavy KV-1.
13:30Both of these machines
13:32were clearly superior
13:33to the German tanks
13:34and were all but impervious
13:36to most German
13:37anti-tank weapons.
13:41General Erhard Raus,
13:42who fought with Army Group North,
13:45left a clear account
13:46of the first encounter
13:47with the new Russian armor.
13:51Then, there suddenly appeared
13:53for the first time
13:54a battalion of heavy enemy tanks
13:56of previously unknown type.
13:58The tank overran
14:01the armored inventory regiment
14:02and broke through
14:03into the artillery position.
14:05The projectiles
14:06of all defense weapons
14:07except the 88mm flak
14:10bounded off
14:11the thick enemy armor.
14:13The 100 German tanks
14:15were unable to check
14:16the 20 Russian dreadnoughts
14:18and suffered losses.
14:20Several Czech-built tanks,
14:22T-36s,
14:23which had bogged down
14:24in the grain fields
14:25because of mechanical trouble,
14:26were flattened
14:27by the enemy monsters.
14:29The same fate
14:31befell a 150mm medium
14:33howitzer battery,
14:34which kept on firing
14:35until the last minute.
14:37Despite the fact
14:38that it scored numerous
14:39direct hits
14:40from as close a range
14:41as 200 yards,
14:43its heavy shells
14:43were unable to put
14:44even a single tank
14:46out of action.
14:48The situation
14:49became critical.
14:50Only the 88mm flak
14:52finally knocked out
14:53a few of the Russian KV-1s
14:55and forced the others
14:56to withdraw into the woods.
15:07The only bright sign
15:08for the Wehrmacht
15:09was that the new Russian tanks
15:11were still in relatively
15:12short supply
15:12and their battle drill
15:14was poor.
15:15And once the scattered
15:16formations had been dealt with,
15:17the road to Leningrad
15:19once more lay open.
15:23In the first two months
15:25of the Barbarossa campaign,
15:26June 1941
15:27and July 1941,
15:29I think it's reasonable
15:30to say that
15:31Army Group North
15:32actually performed better
15:33than Army Group Centre
15:34and Army Group South.
15:36Army Group Centre
15:38was remarkably successful.
15:39It did not succeed
15:41in completely destroying
15:42the formations
15:43opposed to it,
15:44although it did succeed
15:45in denying them
15:46the ability
15:46to operate effectively.
15:48Army Group North,
15:49on the other hand,
15:50was the one formation
15:51which had achieved
15:52by the end of July
15:53all of the operational objectives
15:55put forth for it
15:57by the Army High Command.
16:04It destroyed for all practical purposes
16:06the Soviet North Western Front.
16:08It virtually eliminated
16:09two Russian armies
16:10and indeed
16:12it swept up
16:14to the outskirts
16:15of Leningrad
16:16and that was
16:16a very considerable
16:17achievement.
16:19And the collapse
16:21of the Soviet
16:22North Western Front
16:24was,
16:25in many respects,
16:27a real catastrophe
16:28for the Red Army.
16:29It brought Stalin
16:30to, I think it's fair
16:33to say,
16:33the point of despair.
16:35That is a measure
16:36of the pressure
16:37and the effectiveness
16:38which Army Group North
16:39had been able
16:39to bring to bear
16:40on the Soviet side.
16:43Leningrad's fate
16:44hung by a thread
16:45at the beginning
16:46of September.
16:50As Army Group North
16:52drove headlong
16:53towards Leningrad,
16:54a further huge
16:55haul of confused
16:57Russian prisoners
16:57was taken
16:58and a large body
16:59of Russian troops
17:00isolated in what
17:02became known as
17:02the Iranian-bound pocket
17:04on the Baltic coast
17:05to the west
17:06of Leningrad.
17:08The Iranian-bound pocket
17:09was a small sliver
17:11of Russian-held territory.
17:13It was an area
17:14of ground
17:14that was never really
17:15taken by Army Group North
17:17and it was to prove
17:18a constant tactical thorn
17:20in their side.
17:21When Army Group North
17:22burst into the Soviet Union
17:24in June 1941,
17:26they literally swept
17:27forward at high speed
17:28and as the Army Group North
17:31swept forward,
17:32it either destroyed
17:33or simply moved
17:36the Soviet armies away.
17:38But one tiny bridgehead
17:39remained.
17:40Elements of the 8th Army,
17:41which had suffered
17:42catastrophically
17:43from the attack,
17:44they were pushed
17:45right up to the coast
17:46and there,
17:47inside Oranienbaum,
17:48parts of 8th Army
17:49were locked up
17:50and they were locked up
17:50there for virtually
17:52three years.
17:53That bridgehead
17:54acquired enormous
17:56strategic significance.
17:57The Iranian-bound area
18:00enabled the Russians
18:01to protect
18:02the island of Kronstadt.
18:04The island of Kronstadt
18:05was a vital naval base
18:06directly to the west
18:08of Leningrad,
18:09which enabled
18:10the Soviet forces
18:11in the region,
18:11both naval and army,
18:13to prevent the German forces
18:14of Army Group North
18:15from completely denying
18:17Leningrad
18:18the resources
18:18which enabled it
18:19to survive
18:20the subsequent siege
18:21of Leningrad.
18:23On September 4th, 1941,
18:28Senior Lieutenant Darius
18:29of the 1st Panzer Regiment
18:30radioed back
18:32to headquarters
18:32that his unit
18:34had reached Leningrad.
18:36Other units
18:37from Army Group North
18:37pressed on
18:38to capture Schuselberg
18:40to the east
18:41of Leningrad.
18:43With further German units
18:45and their Finnish allies
18:47pressing down
18:47from the north
18:48and the German advance
18:49cutting the rail link
18:50to Leningrad,
18:51the fate of Leningrad
18:53and with it
18:5330 Russian divisions
18:55appeared to be sealed.
19:03Contrary to their own expectations,
19:05the men of Army Group North
19:06were not to be asked
19:07to mount a full-scale attack
19:09on the city
19:09and after a series
19:11of hotly contested battles
19:12for the outskirts,
19:13Hitler uncharacteristically
19:15ordered his troops
19:16to take Leningrad
19:17by means of a long
19:19drawn-out siege.
19:21It has been suggested
19:23that he was unnerved
19:25by the remote-controlled explosions
19:27which the Russians
19:28had used so effectively
19:29in Kiev.
19:31It is a decision
19:32which still provokes
19:34debate today.
19:37There are two explanations
19:38really for the failure
19:40of Army Group North
19:41to take Leningrad.
19:42One is that
19:43the competing priorities
19:45of Hitler
19:45and the Army Group High Command
19:47denied Army Group North
19:49the resources
19:49to successfully take
19:50a city of this size
19:51quickly.
19:53Secondly,
19:54Hitler's reaction
19:55to the experience
19:56of the Sixth Army
19:58in Kiev
19:58in August
20:00and September
20:01of 1941
20:03persuaded him
20:04that no German troops
20:06should ever be made
20:08vulnerable
20:08by committing themselves
20:09to the inner cities
20:10and streets
20:10of major cities
20:12such as Kiev,
20:13Moscow or Leningrad.
20:15There is a great
20:16historical irony in this
20:17given what happened
20:18from November 1942
20:20onwards
20:20in the city of Stalingrad.
20:22But in 1941
20:23Hitler was deeply,
20:25deeply reluctant
20:26to commit German
20:27infantry troops
20:28in particular
20:29to urban built-up areas
20:31where they will be vulnerable
20:32to Soviet counteractions
20:34to vicious murderous warfare
20:38where they will not be able
20:39to indulge
20:40in superior German training
20:41which was designed
20:42more for open maneuver
20:43warfare
20:44in the rural areas
20:45of the Soviet Union.
20:49Faced with that prospect,
20:51Hitler literally drew back.
20:53What he then decided
20:54was that Leningrad
20:56should be encircled
20:57and it should be starved.
20:58It should be starved to death
20:59and starved into surrender.
21:01It was the most unfortunate
21:03fact of life in Leningrad
21:04that German aerial attacks
21:06destroyed one of the main
21:08food centers in Leningrad
21:09at the very beginning
21:10of the siege.
21:11That was one point.
21:12By 1941, by December,
21:14people were dying
21:14at their desks
21:16and I looked the records up
21:17and this is the first case,
21:19I think it's about
21:19December 5th,
21:21the first case
21:22of recorded cannibalism
21:23in Leningrad.
21:31With the commencement
21:32of the siege of Leningrad,
21:34a relatively stable front line
21:35appeared in the northern
21:36sector of the front.
21:38The 16th Army fought
21:40on the right flank
21:41of the northern sector
21:42where it was adjacent
21:43to the left wing
21:44of Army Group Centre.
21:46The 18th Army fought
21:48on the left flank
21:49of the 16th Army
21:50and as such,
21:51formed the extreme northern end
21:53of the front line.
21:56Army Group North
21:57was to remain
21:58doggedly committed
21:59to the northern flank
22:00of the German armies
22:01fighting on the eastern front
22:03for the entire duration
22:04of the war.
22:20As events unfolded,
22:22it soon became clear
22:23that beyond the siege
22:24of Leningrad,
22:25the northern sector
22:26was to be considered
22:27by both sides
22:28to be of secondary importance.
22:30The men of Army Group North
22:32soon became convinced
22:33that they were fighting
22:34what they referred to
22:35as the eternal war
22:36of the poor man.
22:42Casualties along the whole
22:43of the Russian front
22:44had been enormous,
22:45but only 67,000 replacements
22:48were allocated
22:48to Army Group North,
22:50as against 131,000
22:52to Army Group Centre
22:53and 119,000
22:55to Army Group South.
23:01When it came to allocating
23:03fresh divisions
23:04from the reserves,
23:05the situation
23:06was even less favourable.
23:08Of 21 new divisions
23:09released by Army High Command
23:11in the autumn of 1941,
23:13only three were allocated
23:15to Army Group North.
23:17It was a further indication
23:18of things to come.
23:26One unexpected benefit
23:28for the Army Group
23:29was the occasional support
23:30which they received
23:31from German naval units
23:33operating in the Baltic.
23:35As one flank
23:37rested on the Baltic Sea,
23:39Army Group North
23:39was the only formation
23:41which could look
23:41for substantial support
23:42from the Kriegsmarine.
23:44The German Navy
23:45played a quite significant role
23:47in the Soviet-German war.
23:48When it comes to the Baltic,
23:50what the Germans had done,
23:51they'd really sealed
23:52the Baltic up by minefields.
23:54In other words,
23:54they had trapped
23:55what Soviet submarines
23:56there were.
23:57And obviously,
23:58since the German advance
24:01along the Baltic coastline
24:02had deprived
24:03the Baltic fleet
24:04of its bases,
24:05the Baltic fleet
24:05for all practical purposes
24:06was bottled up
24:07in Leningrad.
24:08So its function there,
24:091941 and 1942,
24:11was simply to supply
24:12whatever fire support
24:14it could from
24:14the guns of the big ships.
24:20On the deficit side,
24:22the 18th Army
24:23had to become involved
24:24in a number of
24:25amphibious operations
24:26to capture the Baltic Islands,
24:27which placed a great strain
24:29on what were already
24:31severely limited resources.
24:44throughout the whole course
24:46of the war,
24:47the lack of powerful
24:48reinforcements
24:49severely limited
24:50the strategic options
24:51available for the Army
24:53group command
24:53and required a great deal
24:55of juggling
24:56of available divisions
24:57to maintain both
24:58the extended front line
25:00and the siege of Leningrad,
25:02which was to drag on
25:03for almost three years.
25:07Leningrad was besieged
25:09in the technical sense
25:10of the word.
25:11That is true.
25:11The Germans had closed
25:12right up on the city
25:14and into the outer suburbs
25:17virtually.
25:19But it was never
25:20entirely closed,
25:21that ring.
25:22And the important thing,
25:24the important factor there
25:25was the role of the Finns.
25:27The Finns did not move
25:29right in or on to Leningrad.
25:31That was the first thing.
25:33And secondly,
25:34Field Marshal Manaheim
25:35of the Finnish Army
25:36had made it clear
25:36that he would not
25:37under any circumstances
25:39take part in a direct attack
25:41on Leningrad itself.
25:42That was one of the conditions
25:43with which Finland
25:45entered the war.
25:46He was very mindful
25:47of the political conditions
25:48as he was of the military conditions
25:50because Finnish-Soviet relations
25:52had a certain history
25:54behind them.
25:56This meant, therefore,
25:57the German and Finnish counterparts
25:59were never able
26:00to completely cut off
26:01Leningrad from the rest
26:02of the world.
26:03For example,
26:04the Russians were able
26:05to get in resources
26:06across Lake Ladoga
26:07to the north and east
26:09of the city.
26:10From the winter of 1942 onwards,
26:13the railway line
26:14to the east of Leningrad
26:15from Tikvin
26:16managed to connect Leningrad
26:18with the rest of the Soviet Union
26:20which was able to provide forces
26:21to enable the inhabitants
26:23of the city
26:24to survive the siege.
26:26I talked to one
26:27of the Soviet negotiators
26:29with respect to the Soviet-Finnish
26:31peace talks
26:33later on in the war
26:35and he said
26:35the Russians did not forget
26:37what the Finns had done
26:39or rather what the Finns
26:40had not done
26:41because if the Finns
26:42had really moved forward
26:44and closed that ring
26:46then it would have really meant
26:48the death of Leningrad.
26:51after the war
26:52it became clear
26:53from the war diaries
26:54of the 16th and 18th armies
26:56that the commanders
26:57of both formations
26:58had intentionally prohibited
26:59even during calm periods
27:01the removal of a unit
27:03from the front
27:03in order to grant it
27:04a period of rest.
27:06It was better to keep
27:08the divisions of the front
27:09and assign them
27:10to a narrower sector
27:11as otherwise
27:12a reserve unit
27:13which had been removed
27:14from the northern front
27:15was certain to be taken
27:16by the supreme command
27:18and assigned to more
27:19pressing pressure points
27:20on either the central front
27:22or the southern front.
27:27Although the northern front
27:29was regarded
27:29as being of secondary importance
27:31that is not to suggest
27:33that it was in any sense
27:34a backwater.
27:35There was still a great deal
27:36of terrible fighting
27:37in very difficult terrain
27:39with extensive swamps
27:41and few roads
27:42through the vast sections
27:43of trackless forest
27:44which presented
27:46a logistical nightmare.
27:50Army Group North
27:51and the Soviet divisions
27:53which faced it
27:54fought really under
27:56extremely difficult conditions.
27:58All conditions
27:58on the eastern front
27:59were difficult
28:00but here the climate
28:01and the terrain
28:02operated in a very
28:04different fashion.
28:05Obviously it's very cold.
28:07Much of it is
28:08marshy and boggy.
28:09That's the first thing.
28:11The second thing is
28:12it's not really
28:12or wasn't really
28:13so very well blessed
28:14with roads.
28:16So transportation
28:17and logistics
28:17were very difficult indeed
28:19and it would be wrong
28:21to call it a separate war
28:22which it wasn't.
28:23It certainly wasn't
28:24a separate war
28:25but it was a war fought
28:26on very particular terms.
28:29When action took place
28:30it was really very savage.
28:32The losses on the Soviet side
28:33were enormous.
28:35Both Army Group North
28:35and the Red Army
28:37and the Red Army formations
28:38opposing them.
28:39They're stamped with a kind of
28:41I don't know
28:42gloomy tragedy.
28:43the atmosphere,
28:45the actions
28:46all seem in a way
28:47not quite a war apart
28:50but they seem in some respects
28:51to be a world apart.
29:02By October of 1941
29:05the first partisan attacks
29:07had begun to cause
29:08severe difficulties
29:09in the rear areas.
29:11These attacks
29:12were compounded
29:12by the fact
29:13that the underdeveloped
29:14infrastructure of Russia
29:15meant that there were
29:16very few roads
29:17or railways
29:18which could be used
29:19as an alternative
29:20to those blocked
29:21by partisan activity.
29:27The Russian winter
29:28was a nightmare
29:29along the whole length
29:31of the front
29:31but it was Army Group North
29:33which bore the brunt
29:35of the most extreme
29:35Russian winters.
29:37It is impossible
29:38to exaggerate
29:39the cruel realities
29:40of fighting
29:41in the ferocious winters
29:43of northern Russia.
29:54The Northern Front
29:55as so-called
29:57was really the area
29:59where northern Norway,
30:00Finland
30:01and the Soviet Union
30:02met.
30:03It was naturally
30:04therefore characterised
30:05particularly
30:05in the winter months
30:07by snow combat conditions.
30:10Initially at least
30:11in Operation Reindeer,
30:13Operation Polar Fox
30:14and Operation Silver Fox
30:16the 20th German
30:17Mountain Army
30:18in conjunction
30:19with its Finnish allies
30:20sought to
30:21invade the territory
30:22of the northernmost
30:24reaches of the Soviet Union
30:25and in particular
30:26cut the railway line
30:28from the arctic port
30:29of Mamansk
30:30into the interior
30:31of the Soviet Union.
30:33However,
30:34the Soviet 14th Army
30:35proved from the beginning
30:36of the war
30:37an extremely formidable
30:38opponent
30:39to the extent
30:40that by the time
30:41the operations
30:42of the 20th Mountain Army
30:43were curtailed
30:44in August 1941
30:45it had actually suffered
30:47the highest percentage
30:48loss of any
30:49of the German
30:49arm and formations
30:51which took part
30:51in Operation Barbarossa.
30:54For the remainder
30:55of the war
30:55on the eastern front
30:56the 20th Mountain Army
30:58had a very low priority
31:00for the German
31:01high commanders
31:01who in effect
31:02have a military stalemate
31:04in which each side
31:06keeps a watch
31:07over the other
31:07but is not prepared
31:08to commit the resources
31:10to launch a decisive
31:11operation
31:11against their enemies.
31:15In addition
31:16to their geographical
31:18and climatic difficulties
31:19the fighting spirit
31:20of the Red Army
31:21facing Army Group North
31:22was no less intense
31:24than that displayed
31:25on the other sectors.
31:27The Siege of Leningrad
31:28has become synonymous
31:29with endurance
31:30and suffering
31:31but there was also
31:32a great deal
31:33of intense combat
31:34as a series
31:35of miniature battles
31:36rolled backwards
31:37and forwards
31:37around the siege lines
31:39outside Leningrad.
31:58in addition to this
31:59relatively static
32:00and drawn out battle
32:01for Leningrad
32:02there were continuous
32:03fiercely contested
32:04struggles around
32:05Demiansk
32:06in the sector
32:07of the 16th Army
32:08from 1941
32:09through to 1943.
32:20By early 1943
32:22the Demiansk salient
32:24had begun to shrink
32:25until finally
32:26it represented
32:27a strange
32:28mushroom-shaped
32:29protrusion
32:29into the Russian lines.
32:31Under increasing
32:32Russian pressure
32:33even Hitler
32:35was eventually forced
32:36to rescind his
32:37no-retreat policy.
32:39The Demiansk salient
32:40was evacuated
32:42in a masterpiece
32:42of military planning
32:44which saw 80,000
32:45German troops
32:46slip away
32:47from almost certain capture.
32:51Demiansk was
32:51the longest
32:53encirclement
32:54that's from
32:54the German encirclement
32:56during the war
32:57and it had one
32:59very extraordinary
33:00and singular feature
33:01about it.
33:03The German forces
33:04which were encircled
33:06and trapped
33:06by the Russians
33:08clearly had to be supplied
33:10and they couldn't be
33:11supplied by land
33:12and therefore
33:12the option was
33:14to be supplied
33:15by air
33:16and Göring
33:17in the Luftwaffe
33:17gave assurances
33:19that they could be
33:19supplied by air
33:20and they were.
33:21There's no doubt about it
33:22because finally
33:23in 1943
33:24they managed to break out
33:25through a special corridor
33:26which they blasted
33:27for themselves
33:28and the Demiansk
33:30encirclement
33:31ended successfully.
33:32what was important
33:33about it
33:34was the lessons
33:35which the German
33:36high command
33:37and the Luftwaffe
33:38in particular
33:39did draw
33:39that it was possible
33:41to supply
33:42encircled German forces
33:43by air
33:44and of course
33:45the next encirclement
33:46was Stalingrad.
33:47One of the reasons
33:48why Sixth Army
33:49does not break out
33:50of the entrapment
33:51at Stalingrad
33:52when most authorities
33:53agree it was quite
33:54capable of doing so
33:55is that Hitler
33:56believes that the
33:57Sixth Army
33:58can be sustained
33:59in the pocket
33:59by the resources
34:01of the Luftwaffe
34:02and he quotes
34:03the example
34:03of the Demiansk pocket
34:05as providing
34:06categorical evidence
34:07of this.
34:08The Demiansk situation
34:10however was rather
34:11different.
34:11The provision
34:12of the pocket
34:13was done during
34:13the summer months
34:14the number of troops
34:15in the pocket
34:16were much less
34:1790,000
34:18and the 250,000
34:20trapped
34:20in the Stalingrad pocket
34:21therefore
34:22the Demiansk pocket
34:24and the implications
34:25drawn for him
34:26by Adolf Hitler
34:26play a major role
34:28in determining
34:29the fate
34:29of the German Sixth Army
34:31and its encirclement
34:32and annihilation
34:33at Stalingrad.
34:36Despite coming
34:37very close to victory
34:38Army Group North
34:39was never able
34:40to completely
34:41close the ring
34:42around Leningrad
34:43and the High Command
34:44continued to draw
34:45desperately needed
34:46divisions
34:46away from Army Group
34:48North sector
34:48in order to feed
34:50other hard-pressed
34:51sectors.
34:52The result
34:53of this attrition
34:54from two directions
34:55was that a ferocious
34:57Soviet offensive
34:58in January 1944
34:59finally broke
35:01the resistance
35:02of Army Group North
35:03and raised
35:04the siege.
35:17the siege of Leningrad
35:19in 1944
35:20forced Army Group North
35:22to fall back
35:23to a new defensive front
35:24composed of a series
35:26of partially constructed
35:27defenses
35:27known as
35:29the Panther Line.
35:31The Panther Line
35:32envisaged a series
35:34of fortifications
35:35incorporating
35:35the River Dnieper
35:36in the southern
35:37and central regions
35:38of the Soviet Union
35:39the River Dvina
35:41running up towards
35:42Lake Pipus
35:42and Lake Piscoff
35:43on the northern front
35:44to the town of Narva
35:46on the Baltic coast
35:47of Estonia.
35:48It was envisaged
35:50that through
35:51fortifications
35:51and German troops
35:53retreating behind the line
35:54the German Army
35:55as a whole
35:56be able to gain
35:57something of a respite
35:58in which it would be
35:59able to hold
36:00the Soviet Army at bay
36:01while the armoured
36:02formations
36:03and the air formations
36:04of the German Army
36:05were repaired
36:06and returned to the fray
36:07to renew combat
36:08with their Soviet foes
36:09in their usual style
36:10and numbers.
36:11However
36:12the Panther Line
36:13was occupied
36:14merely as an afterthought
36:16the German Army
36:17suffered defeats
36:18which meant
36:19it simply did not
36:20have enough troops
36:20in order to man
36:21the Panther Line
36:22effectively.
36:23In those areas
36:24where adequate defences
36:25had been prepared
36:26on the Panther Line
36:27and where adequate
36:28numbers of German troops
36:29armour and aircraft
36:30were available
36:31it proved a very
36:33formidable obstacle
36:34for the Soviet Army
36:35to overcome.
36:36This would tend to suggest
36:37that if it had been
36:38properly prepared
36:39as part of a coherent
36:40overall strategic plan
36:42the Panther Line
36:43could have been held
36:44or at the very least
36:45would have caused
36:45the Soviet Army
36:46great difficulties.
37:09The Panther Line
37:10was only ever
37:11going to provide
37:12a temporary solution
37:13to the mounting problems
37:15of Army Group North.
37:16The destruction
37:17of the neighbouring
37:18Army Group Centre
37:19in June 1944
37:20tore a huge gap
37:22in the German lines
37:23and left the right flank
37:25of Army Group North
37:25vulnerable
37:26to a Soviet attack.
37:33Hitler was forced
37:34to sanction
37:35another series
37:35of withdrawals.
37:37From there
37:38they were forced
37:38to retreat
37:39in relatively good order
37:40towards Germany
37:41fighting a series
37:43of ferocious
37:43defensive battles
37:44as they went.
37:45the most notable
37:46of these
37:47being the defence
37:48of Narva
37:49in 1944.
37:55Narva plays
37:56a very important part
37:57not only
37:59in the Soviet-German war
38:00but in Russian history.
38:02Narva was
38:03the monumental defeat
38:04of Peter the Great
38:05in 1700
38:06at the hands
38:07of the Swedes.
38:08It had an even more
38:08important operational
38:10significance
38:10because of course
38:11it's a gateway
38:12to Estonia.
38:13In fact the Germans
38:14were holding Narva
38:15initially
38:16with 12 German divisions
38:18and organised
38:19into what was called
38:20Abteilung Narva
38:21which was a special
38:22force grouping.
38:24The defence of Narva
38:25was a bitterly fought
38:27encounter.
38:28A breakthrough here
38:29would have compromised
38:30many German troops
38:31in the Baltic regions
38:32of Estonia and Latvia.
38:34The European SS
38:35along with the German
38:37218th Division
38:38and the 58th Division
38:39managed to hold off
38:41the Leningrad Front
38:42under the command
38:43of General Govorov.
38:44in January
38:45and February
38:45and March
38:46of 1944.
38:48It is a bitterly
38:49attritional contest.
38:50It is not characterised
38:52by sophisticated
38:53tactical money
38:53but by armoured
38:54formations.
38:55The German formations
38:57and those European
38:59SS volunteer
38:59contingents within them
39:01are saved
39:02by the early
39:03spring thaw
39:04in late March
39:051944
39:05which produced
39:07floods
39:08of at least
39:09one foot deep
39:10of an area
39:10of 100 to 150
39:12miles square.
39:12and indeed
39:13there are German
39:14reports which recognise
39:15Soviet tanks
39:16are sinking down
39:17to their turrets
39:18in the mud.
39:21The incredible resistance
39:22offered by Army Group
39:24Narva,
39:25a scratch formation
39:26drawn from the slender
39:27resources of Army Group
39:28North,
39:28represents an impressive
39:30example of military
39:31improvisation
39:32and stands comparison
39:33with the other
39:34German defensive battles
39:36fought elsewhere
39:37in Russia
39:38and Italy.
39:39The mainstay
39:41of resistance
39:41in Narva
39:42was the 3rd
39:43SS Panzer Corps
39:44which included
39:45the long-serving
39:46SS Police Division
39:47along with the new
39:48SS Viking Division
39:50comprised of volunteers
39:51from different nationalities.
40:01By October 1944
40:03the situation
40:04around Narva
40:05was hopeless
40:05but unlike
40:07the countless garrisons
40:08squandered by Hitler
40:09in a pointless series
40:11of hold-at-all-cost
40:12orders
40:12Army Group Narva
40:14managed to escape
40:15and rejoin
40:16Army Group North.
40:19Constant retreat
40:20was now the order
40:22of the day
40:22as the Army Group
40:24was driven back
40:24through the Baltic states
40:25towards Germany
40:26but Army Group North
40:28would never make it home.
40:41While the Red Army
40:43rolled on
40:43towards Berlin
40:44the men of Army Group North
40:46were finally cornered
40:47in the Courland
40:48peninsula of Latvia.
40:51There
40:51the battered remnants
40:52of the Army Group
40:53held off all attacks
40:55by the Red Army
40:55for six long months.
40:58They were under siege
40:59from late October 1944
41:01through to May 1945.
41:28in January 1945
41:30the two armies
41:32which had served
41:33since 1941
41:34as Army Group North
41:35were renamed
41:36Army Group Courland
41:37and the hard-won mantle
41:39of Army Group North
41:40was transferred
41:41to a scratch assembly
41:43of beaten units
41:44under the command
41:45of a swift succession
41:46of temporary leaders.
41:48But the spirit
41:49of the men
41:50of Army Group North
41:51remained behind
41:52in Courland.
42:03The strange thing is
42:04that the German divisions
42:05which found their way
42:07to Courland
42:10were sidelined.
42:11They were stuck there.
42:12They were blockaded there.
42:13There was nothing
42:14they could do.
42:14They couldn't make
42:15any contribution
42:15to the operations
42:18in East Prussia
42:19and elsewhere.
42:21It was, in many respects,
42:23a very wasteful
42:24and almost irresponsible gesture
42:26on the part of Hitler.
42:27So here was
42:28a considerable force
42:31which would have made
42:32and could have made
42:33a considerable contribution
42:34to German defensive battles
42:36but it wasn't there.
42:37It wasn't available.
42:38It was simply bottled up.
42:39And so the Russian,
42:42the Soviet decision
42:43was quite sensible.
42:44Leave them.
42:45We will deal
42:46with them later
42:46which of course
42:47they did.
42:51Despite everything
42:52that the besieging
42:54Red Army
42:54could throw at them
42:55the surviving elements
42:57of the 16th
42:58and 18th Armies
42:59now officially known
43:00as Army Group Courland
43:02continued to resist
43:03all further attempts
43:05to force them
43:05into surrender.
43:09Fighting for the
43:10Courland Peninsula
43:11was grindingly
43:12attritional
43:13in nature.
43:14It was not
43:15like the rest
43:16of the Eastern Front
43:17characterised by
43:18large armoured formations
43:20sweeping across
43:21the front
43:21in impressive
43:23sophisticated
43:24operations of manoeuvre.
43:26In the Courland
43:26fighting
43:27the German formations
43:28trapped in this region
43:29were gradually
43:30slowly
43:31but surely
43:32in unspectacular fashion
43:34pushed back
43:35into something
43:35of a geographical
43:36cul-de-sac
43:37by the Red Army.
43:44They were well served
43:46to the bitter end
43:47by the ships
43:47of the Kriegsmarine
43:48who managed
43:49to evacuate
43:50some divisions
43:50recalled to Germany.
43:53On occasion
43:53they even managed
43:55to bring in
43:55some much needed
43:56reinforcements.
43:59Here the German Navy
44:00did have an important
44:01role to play
44:02when the Red Army
44:03began to advance
44:04along the Baltic coast
44:05and to break
44:05into East Prussia
44:06because what the German Navy
44:07had to do,
44:08one,
44:08was it at all possible
44:10to try and contain
44:11Soviet naval operations
44:12which were beginning
44:13to expand
44:14but even more important
44:15they had in fact
44:17a very grievous burden
44:18to transfer
44:20and evacuate
44:20as many of
44:21German civilians
44:23and German military units
44:24who had been trapped
44:25to transfer them
44:26along the Baltic coast
44:27and back into
44:28German territory.
44:29So the naval aspect
44:31of that closing period
44:32of the war
44:32does demonstrate
44:34the German Navy
44:35doing whatever it could
44:37to fend off
44:38the kind of disaster
44:39which was
44:40absolutely pending.
44:43The Kriegsmarine
44:45was absolutely vital
44:46in explaining
44:47why German troop formations
44:49fought bitterly
44:51to the end
44:52for the apparently
44:53pointless territory
44:54of the Kualan Peninsula.
44:56The Kualan Peninsula
44:58from the Army's point of view
45:00was militarily useless
45:01and indeed
45:02many German commanders
45:04in this region
45:04in late 1944
45:06and spring of 1945
45:08constantly requested
45:10Hitler
45:10to give up
45:11the Kualan Peninsula
45:12and release
45:13the 26 German divisions
45:15that were fighting there
45:16in order to use them
45:17to bolster the defence
45:18of what they considered
45:19to be more important
45:21military regions
45:22such as for example
45:23eastern Prussia.
45:24On the other hand
45:26the German Navy
45:27had used the Baltic Sea
45:29throughout World War II
45:31as a training ground
45:32for its submarine commanders
45:33and Dönitz
45:35the committed Nazi
45:37who was in charge
45:38of the German Navy
45:39by this stage of the war
45:40regarded retention
45:42of the Gulf of Danzig
45:43and the Baltic Sea
45:44as being essential
45:45in order to train
45:47his submarine commanders
45:48to use the new
45:50and extremely powerful
45:51new submarine
45:52the type 21
45:53that the German Navy
45:55was developing
45:56towards the end
45:56of the war
45:57therefore the Kriegsmarine
45:58plays a critical role
46:00in explaining
46:00why the German formations
46:02fight so bitterly
46:03for the Kualan Peninsula
46:05however in the end
46:06the very Kriegsmarine
46:07that provides the reason
46:09for the battle
46:09of the Kualan Peninsula
46:10and which supplies
46:11the German troops
46:12within it
46:13and eventually forced
46:14to evacuate them
46:16from the Kualan Peninsula
46:17and concede the area
46:18to the Soviet Union
46:19with no particular
46:20strategic gain
46:21to show for it
46:24the survivors
46:25of the old
46:26Army Group North
46:27maintained their
46:28cohesion
46:28and fighting ability
46:29until the final surrender
46:31on May the 8th
46:321945
46:34almost four years
46:36since they had first
46:37moved into Russia
46:40on that day
46:43203,000 men
46:44began the long march
46:45into Soviet captivity
46:48many would never return
46:49and others
46:50were held as slave laborers
46:53until 1955
46:55a high price to pay
46:57for their long defense
47:05of the three huge army groups
47:07which Hitler sent
47:08into Russia
47:09it could be argued
47:10that Army Group North
47:11was the most successful
47:13in carrying out
47:14the tasks assigned to it
47:16although the campaign
47:17ultimately ended
47:18in failure for them
47:19the men of Army Group North
47:21retained their military
47:22cohesion
47:23with some units
47:24achieving the rare
47:25distinction
47:25of serving for the whole
47:27four years of the Russian war
47:29in the same
47:30Army Group
47:35鞍
47:35chapter 3
47:36has been
47:36in order for their
47:36Sponsored
47:36at brend
47:41international
47:41Principles
47:41the
48:01余 précis
48:02Тогда
48:02I don't know.
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