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00:28The
00:36THE END
01:00August 9th, 1945.
01:03A B-29 bomber was returning from Nagasaki
01:06after delivering the second atomic bomb.
01:12Whatever else it was,
01:14it was the bomb that brought peace to the world.
01:19Five days after Nagasaki, Japan surrendered.
01:26The scars on the victims of prison camps
01:28were no less terrible than the scars
01:30on the victims of Nagasaki and Dresden.
01:35The consequences of war were foul.
01:51Yet within ten years,
01:53the same men who built the bomb
01:54to bring to an end tyranny
01:56which had respect for neither men's bodies nor minds
01:59would be involved in the production
02:01of a far more terrifying weapon,
02:03the hydrogen bomb.
02:06They would be men whose daily lives were remote from war,
02:10university teachers, lecturers, research workers.
02:13The chief characters would be men
02:14who had been deeply involved
02:15in the production of the first atomic bomb.
02:18One of them, Robert Oppenheimer,
02:20the so-called father of the atom bomb.
02:21In that sense, it was not innocent.
02:23The first bomb we set off,
02:24they all had fissionable material.
02:26The first bomb we set off was dirty.
02:29It was set off practically at ground level,
02:31a fireball touched the ground,
02:32and a great deal of radioactive contamination
02:35for those days was in fact spread.
02:37It was a very dirty bomb.
02:39The bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were clean.
02:42They were exploded high in the air.
02:44No casualties were produced by fallout.
02:48There may have been a few on a global scale,
02:50a handful,
02:51but all the hundreds of thousands of people
02:53who were died
02:53and others who were maimed and injured
02:56from radiation and from blast
02:57did this without benefit of fallout.
03:00Nevertheless,
03:01I vastly prefer that dirty bomb
03:03to those clean ones.
03:05Another to be intimately concerned
03:07with the hydrogen bomb
03:08would be a man of vastly different character
03:10and views from Oppenheimer.
03:11In his turn,
03:12he would be known as the father of the hydrogen bomb,
03:15Edward Teller.
03:16We must have the clean weapons
03:17to save the innocent bystanders,
03:20to save our allies,
03:21and when we defend ourselves
03:23against enemy attack,
03:25to save our own people.
03:27We must have these clean weapons
03:29and stoppage of nuclear tests
03:32would prevent us effectively
03:34from developing them.
03:37By trying to be super cautious now,
03:40we may unnecessarily sacrifice
03:42millions of human lives
03:44in a dusty nuclear war later.
03:47The story of the hydrogen bomb
03:49begins in a more innocent scientific age,
03:52if not a more innocent political one.
03:54Some of the ideas behind it
03:56can be traced back
03:57as far as the early 1930s,
03:59as far back as Stalinist Russia,
04:01and to this man,
04:03George Gamow,
04:04then 27 years old.
04:06Gamow had lectured
04:07to the Soviet Academy
04:08describing how vast sources of energy
04:10could be derived
04:11not from the uranium atom,
04:13as in the case of the atomic bomb,
04:15but from fusion,
04:16the joining together
04:17of atoms of hydrogen,
04:18the reaction which takes place
04:20on the sun.
04:21After the lecture,
04:22an official offered
04:23to put the electric works
04:25of Leningrad at Gamow's disposal
04:26so that he could experiment
04:28with these thermonuclear reactions.
04:31But the dictatorships
04:32of Central Europe
04:33had created a climate
04:34of restricted freedom
04:35in which scientists,
04:36like many others,
04:37preferred not to work.
04:39Gamow joined the trail
04:40of refugees eventually
04:42to the United States,
04:43taking his ideas with him.
04:49In America,
04:50he was to meet others
04:51interested in thermonuclear reactions.
04:54Enrico Fermi, for example,
04:55who used Sweden
04:56and the award of the Nobel Prize
04:58as a convenient escape route
05:00from Mussolini's Italy.
05:02At the ceremony,
05:03Fermi refused to give
05:04the fascist salute
05:05to the King of Sweden.
05:07It was a gesture
05:08condemned in Italy
05:09as being
05:10un-Roman
05:11and unmanly.
05:15Hans Betta,
05:17a refugee
05:17who left Germany
05:18during the Nazi persecutions
05:20of 1933,
05:22was another physicist
05:23interested in the thermonuclear problem.
05:26And so was the Hungarian,
05:28Edward Teller.
05:30It was Teller
05:31who was most enthusiastic
05:32at the prospect
05:33of turning this work
05:34on atomic fusion
05:35into a weapon.
05:36He had fallen passionately in love
05:38with the ideals
05:39he believed his new country stood for.
05:41He had brought to America
05:42an intense fear of Russia.
05:45I believe
05:46that the Russians
05:47have acquired this knowledge.
05:49He was ebullient
05:50and over-forthright.
05:51He inspired devoted followers
05:53in the scientific field
05:55but antagonized others.
05:57In 1943,
05:59he went to the atomic bomb laboratory
06:00at Los Alamos
06:01to work on theoretical problems.
06:04The director of this laboratory
06:06was Robert Oppenheimer,
06:07the young American scholar
06:09who had distinguished himself
06:10in European universities
06:11and was now working
06:12under the military administration
06:14of General Leslie Groves.
06:16Oppenheimer did not discourage
06:17the new theoretical work
06:18which a number of scientists
06:20and, in particular,
06:21Teller,
06:22were keen to work on.
06:23But for him,
06:24a new thermonuclear weapon
06:25was only of secondary importance.
06:27Oppenheimer's job
06:28was to make an atomic bomb
06:29and he refused to be deviated
06:31from this task
06:32by the interest of Teller.
06:33As an administrator
06:34and as a scientist,
06:36he did his job brilliantly.
06:38By July 1945,
06:41he was able to watch
06:42the result of his work
06:43come to fruition
06:43in the Alamogordo desert
06:45of New Mexico.
07:12He quoted the Hindu poet,
07:14I am become death,
07:16the destroyer of worlds.
07:19He had delivered the goods.
07:22Everything was ready
07:23for Hiroshima.
07:29When the Hiroshima
07:31and Nagasaki bombs
07:32had done their work,
07:34Oppenheimer told Teller
07:35that he believed
07:36that this was no longer
07:37the time or climate
07:38to go ahead
07:38with plans
07:39for a new thermonuclear bomb.
07:58The price of peace
08:00was inestimable.
08:01The price of the atomic bomb
08:03was $2,000,000,000.
08:06And just as Piccadilly Circus
08:07and Times Square
08:08shouted out its success,
08:10so did the bomb laboratories.
08:11The people who had built it
08:13in their secret hideaways
08:14in New Mexico and Tennessee
08:15celebrated victory.
08:17But the celebrations
08:18of these men,
08:19men like Robert Oppenheimer
08:21and Enrico Fermi,
08:23were tinged with a feeling
08:24of revulsion
08:25at the results of their work.
08:26It was work which
08:27some succeeding generations
08:29would condemn.
08:31Some scientists,
08:33Sir George Thompson,
08:34for example,
08:34talked about the consequences
08:36of their fellow scientists' work
08:37at literary luncheon parties.
08:40If, which God prevent,
08:43there is another war
08:44and atomic bombs are used,
08:47I do not believe
08:48that the number of people killed
08:50will necessarily be greater
08:52than in this war.
08:54It may well be less.
08:56Now at least,
08:57we know what to expect.
08:59And I believe
09:00that the knowledge
09:01will be the greatest force
09:02on the side
09:03of peace and sanity.
09:08But Professor Jode's concept
09:10of sanity
09:11differed from that
09:12of the scientist.
09:13I think that this is
09:15the greatest single disaster
09:17in the history of mankind.
09:19Will nobody ever stop
09:21the scientists?
09:22Will somebody put them
09:23in a bag and tie them up?
09:25Or into a lethal chamber?
09:29Before they've completed
09:31our destruction.
09:32There has, I think,
09:34run through the country
09:35an almost universal reaction
09:38of fear and horror.
09:42There's a woman I heard,
09:43the lips attendant at Hampstead,
09:45saying on the two mornings
09:46after it was announced,
09:48makes it wonder
09:50what's going to happen
09:50to one's kiddies
09:51in 20 years' time.
09:53It does indeed.
09:55They know or they feel
09:57that of all the countries,
10:00we have the most to lose
10:01and the least to gain
10:03by this thing.
10:04Russia and America
10:05might survive it.
10:07We should go down
10:08in a wilker of devastation
10:10directly the next war
10:12was declared.
10:14To some,
10:15the continuation
10:16of the manufacture
10:17of atomic weapons
10:18seemed pointless.
10:19The cream of the physicists
10:20could well afford
10:21to leave the shacks
10:23and the prefabricated buildings
10:24where they had performed
10:25their most intense work.
10:27Now was the time
10:28to turn their backs
10:29on the old schoolhouse
10:30in the New Mexican mountains
10:31for their homes
10:32in the university towns
10:34of Princeton,
10:35Berkeley, Oxford
10:36and Cambridge
10:36and to take up
10:38their teaching
10:38and university research.
10:44War was over.
10:46The bomb laboratories
10:47were allowed to run down
10:49in strength and purpose.
10:50In 1945,
10:52the Atomic Club
10:53had only one member,
10:54the United States,
10:55who suspected
10:56that Britain had enough
10:57information to become
10:58the second member.
11:00Britain was the United States' ally.
11:02There were no mutual fears.
11:04Russia was an ally,
11:05but there were fears.
11:11The balance of power
11:13was in the West.
11:14Would it always remain there?
11:16General Groves,
11:18the garrulous military head
11:19of Los Alamos
11:19and the man under whom
11:21physicists such as
11:22Oppenheimer and Teller worked,
11:23estimated that it would take
11:25Russia 20 years
11:26to produce an atomic bomb.
11:27It might once have been
11:28thought of as a threat,
11:29but it was now a sideshow.
11:32On Groves' reckoning,
11:33it would be 1965
11:34before Russia could make
11:35a repeat performance
11:36of Hiroshima.
11:40Could the American
11:41general's estimate
11:42of the Russian marshal's
11:43atomic potential
11:44be inaccurate?
11:46Of two things,
11:47there was no doubt.
11:49Stalin had both
11:50the physicists
11:50of the required calibre
11:52and he had the resources
11:53of power and materials.
11:55But did Stalin's physicists
11:56have the knowledge
11:57with which to make
11:58an atomic bomb
11:59from these resources?
12:01There were some
12:02who believed that he did
12:04and that this knowledge
12:05had been given scot-free
12:06by the United States
12:08in a document issued
12:09in August 1945
12:10by the Secretary of War.
12:12This report
12:13was virtually a recipe
12:15for the preparation
12:16of an atomic bomb.
12:17It was on sale
12:18in the United States
12:20at 40 cents a copy
12:21and in Britain
12:22at half a crown.
12:31In December 1945
12:33the three foreign ministers
12:34Burns, Bevin and Molotov
12:36agreed to invite
12:38France, China and Canada
12:39to sponsor with them
12:41a resolution
12:42proposing to the
12:43General Assembly
12:43of the United Nations
12:44the creation of a commission
12:46for atomic energy
12:47which would attempt
12:48to take steps
12:49to prevent the use
12:50of nuclear power
12:51for destructive purposes.
12:55But atomic testing
12:57was still being carried out
12:58to the extent
12:59that the United States
13:00was accused of seeking
13:01international control
13:02with one hand
13:03and testing bombs
13:04with the other.
13:06Atom diplomacy
13:07was the cry.
13:09Underwater tests
13:10were planned
13:11for Bikini Atoll
13:12in the South Pacific.
13:13A few feared
13:14these tests.
13:15Some feared
13:16that they would annihilate
13:17all the fish
13:18for miles around
13:19or even that they
13:20would start
13:21a chain reaction
13:22in the seawater
13:22which would kill
13:24all life on earth.
13:48But as far as
13:49the general public
13:50was concerned
13:51there was apathy
13:52towards the rights
13:52and the wrongs
13:53of continued manufacture
13:54of atomic weapons.
14:00The mushroom
14:01was becoming
14:02an acceptable fungus
14:03in man's garden.
14:05In America
14:06a group of scientists
14:07tried to waken
14:08the general public
14:09from this apathy
14:09and founded a periodical
14:11in which they tried
14:12to explain
14:12the social
14:13and political consequences
14:14of atomic power.
14:16Its cover design
14:17became a clock
14:18approaching midnight.
14:19As the time
14:20for atomic scientists
14:21and the world
14:22ran out
14:22its hands
14:23neared the end
14:24of time.
14:28Another group
14:28wrote a book
14:29giving descriptions
14:30of Hiroshima
14:31along with a terrifying
14:32account of an imaginary
14:33attack on New York.
14:34It made clear
14:35that even the pillars
14:36of Manhattan society
14:37would not survive
14:38nuclear bombardment.
14:40But Manhattan
14:42like the rest of the world
14:43had no wish
14:44to believe
14:44that it was skating
14:45on thin ice.
14:51In Washington
14:52a special committee
14:53under Senator
14:54Brian McMohan
14:55had begun
14:56to consider evidence
14:57to decide
14:57whether there should
14:58be civilian
14:58or military control
15:00of new atomic developments.
15:02The army
15:03were suspicious
15:03of the egghead's motives
15:04as much as the scientists
15:06were frightened
15:06by the possibility
15:07of military control.
15:10The test
15:11of an atomic bomb
15:12on ships of war
15:14represents a forward step
15:16in military thinking.
15:18We know what the bomb
15:20did in Hiroshima
15:21and Nagasaki.
15:22We must know
15:23in times of peace
15:25what it will do
15:26to ships
15:26in time of war.
15:28We must find out
15:29whether the day
15:30of heavy warships
15:31and amphibious landing
15:33is now history.
15:35The scientists won.
15:36In July 1946
15:38the McMahon bill
15:39was approved
15:40and a commission
15:40of civilians
15:41was charged
15:42with the responsibility
15:43for all problems
15:44of atomic energy.
15:45Dean Acheson
15:46the acting secretary
15:47of state
15:48had appointed
15:48a special board
15:49to outline
15:50the conditions
15:50under which
15:51the United States
15:52would agree
15:52to share its secrets
15:54if secrets they were
15:55with the rest
15:56of the world.
15:57Acheson appointed
15:58to head this board
15:59the man who had
16:00concluded
16:01the Tennessee Valley
16:01Authority deal
16:02with Wendell Wilkie
16:04in 1939
16:05and who was now
16:06the chairman
16:07of the authority.
16:08He was David Lillianthold.
16:10Thanks Dave.
16:11That's a lot of money
16:12for a couple old
16:13Indiana boys
16:13to be handling
16:14and for that
16:15I'm going to give you
16:16a deed for all
16:17of our Tennessee
16:17Electric Power Company
16:18properties.
16:21Good luck Dave.
16:23The report Lillianthold
16:25was to produce
16:25was to become known
16:27as the Acheson
16:28Lillianthold Report.
16:30But there was no doubt
16:31that Robert Oppenheimer
16:32the one time head
16:33of Los Alamos
16:34was the person
16:35on the board
16:35who best understood
16:36the issues involved.
16:37The success
16:38of the atomic bomb
16:39project had made
16:40Oppenheimer before the war
16:41an unknown young physicist
16:43into a public figure.
16:44He had become
16:45widely known
16:46as the principal author
16:47of the atomic bomb
16:48in his own words
16:49more widely
16:50than the facts warranted.
16:51He was deluged
16:52with requests
16:53to take part
16:53in scientific
16:54and public affairs.
16:56The Acheson Lillianthold
16:57report was produced
16:58under his quiet
16:59but strong influence.
17:01This report
17:02was the basis
17:03of proposals
17:04presented not by a scientist
17:05but by the ageing
17:06Wall Street
17:07speculator-turned-statesman
17:08Bernard Baruch
17:09a man with the reputation
17:11of a miracle worker.
17:14He presented it
17:15at the first session
17:16of the Atomic Energy
17:17Control Commission
17:18of the United Nations
17:19in June 1946.
17:21We propose this.
17:24One manufacturer
17:26of atomic bombs
17:27shall stop.
17:29Two existing bombs
17:32shall be disposed of
17:33pursuant
17:34to the terms
17:35of the treaty.
17:37And three
17:38the authorities
17:40shall be in possession
17:41of full information
17:42as to the know-how
17:44for the production
17:46of atomic knowledge.
17:48We are here
17:50to make a choice
17:51between the quick
17:53and the dead.
17:55That is our business.
17:58It was thought
17:59at the time
18:00that uranium sources
18:01were scarce
18:02throughout the world.
18:03Russia
18:03with the resources
18:04of the Ural Mountains
18:05at her disposal
18:06knew differently
18:07and had little time
18:08for these utopian suggestions.
18:10The American plan
18:11was rejected.
18:12It was the beginning
18:13of the haggling
18:14over atomic control
18:15which was to go
18:16on and on
18:17for years.
18:19Delegates walking
18:20out of disarmament
18:20conferences
18:21became a familiar
18:22and bizarre sight.
18:28It was not only
18:29between Russia
18:30and the United States
18:31that there was a gulf.
18:32The McMahon Act
18:33had prevented
18:33any further military cooperation
18:35with the wartime allies
18:36Britain and Canada.
18:38But there was no way
18:39of preventing any country
18:40going it alone.
18:42In Britain
18:42a research establishment
18:44at Harwell
18:44was already scarring
18:46the Berkshire Downs.
18:47And if Britain
18:48was taking steps
18:49towards an atomic bomb
18:50what then of Russia?
18:52If Russia was lagging
18:54six years behind
18:55the American atomic effort
18:56when the war ended
18:57how far was she behind
18:58now?
18:59There were still
19:00no signs whatever
19:01of any form
19:02of international control.
19:06But the general mood
19:08of a western world
19:09less than one year
19:10removed from war
19:11was not towards
19:12bomb manufacture.
19:13This was the year
19:14of justice
19:15after war.
19:23punishment was being
19:24handed out
19:25at both ends
19:26of the axis.
19:44If the war criminals
19:45trials were not
19:46distasteful
19:46the causes
19:47and the weapons
19:48of war were.
19:49A group of scientists
19:50wrote to the editor
19:51of the New York Times
19:53we would like
19:54to suggest
19:54a declaration
19:55of policy
19:56of the following
19:57nature
19:57by the president.
19:59One
19:59the United States
20:00will at once
20:01stop the production
20:02of bombs
20:02from material
20:03currently produced.
20:05Two
20:05for one year
20:06we will stop
20:07accumulating purified
20:08plutonium
20:09and uranium.
20:10But this was not
20:11the view of every
20:12scientist who had
20:13worked on the atomic bomb.
20:15At Los Alamos
20:16scientific interest
20:17in the thermonuclear
20:18weapon did not die.
20:20As a final attempt
20:21to maintain
20:21the super bomb program
20:22in April 1946
20:24a meeting of 30 physicists
20:26said that a hydrogen bomb
20:28was both feasible
20:29and practicable
20:30and could be assembled
20:31in two years.
20:34One of the physicists
20:35at the conference
20:36was a German refugee
20:37who had taken
20:38British citizenship
20:39Klaus Fuchs.
20:43The United States
20:44Atomic Energy Bill
20:46had been passed
20:46by both houses
20:47of Congress
20:48and the decision
20:49had been taken
20:50to appoint
20:50an Atomic Energy Commission
20:52and to give to it
20:53the responsibility
20:54for all problems
20:55of atomic energy.
20:57Every aspect
20:57from the crude ore
20:58to the nuclear fuel
20:59and factories
21:00would come under its control.
21:02The death penalty
21:03would be imposed
21:03for the passing
21:04of information.
21:06Truman called it
21:07the most important branch
21:08of the government
21:08to be created
21:09in a hundred years.
21:11The man who was made
21:12chairman of the commission
21:13was David Lillian, though.
21:16My four associates
21:17and I come to our
21:18new responsibilities
21:19with varied backgrounds
21:21and experience.
21:23And this very fact
21:24is probably
21:25the best assurance
21:27that we will be able
21:29to work out
21:30policies and programs
21:31for the development
21:33of atomic energy
21:33that will be
21:35in accord
21:36with the universal
21:37aspiration
21:38of the American people
21:39that this great
21:40new force
21:41shall be devoted
21:42to the enrichment
21:43of human life
21:44and the added strength
21:47and happiness
21:47of our country.
21:49Lillianthal's aims
21:50were noble enough,
21:51but his appointment
21:52was not without opposition.
21:53It was strongly
21:55opposed by the adversaries
21:56of any form
21:56of nationalization
21:57of power production.
21:58The commission
21:59had only one
22:00scientist member,
22:01Robert Backer.
22:03Another member
22:04was Louis Straws,
22:05a man who described
22:06himself as a
22:07Black Hoover Republican.
22:09From a humble childhood,
22:11Straws had risen
22:12from being a travelling
22:12shoe salesman
22:13to become a prosperous banker.
22:15During the first
22:16three years
22:17of the commission,
22:18dissenting votes
22:19were cast against
22:19only twelve
22:20formal decisions.
22:21On each occasion,
22:23a dissenting vote
22:24was cast by Louis Straws.
22:26He had become interested
22:27in the views
22:28of a number
22:29of physicists
22:29on the possibility
22:30of a superweapon.
22:32Teller was most
22:33frequently heard,
22:34but it was Robert Oppenheimer
22:35who was appointed
22:36to be chairman
22:36of Lillianthal's
22:38General Advisory Committee.
22:41Only a few months
22:43after the announcement
22:44of the appointment,
22:45the name of Oppenheimer
22:45was once again
22:46in the news.
22:49Frank Oppenheimer,
22:50Robert's brother,
22:51was headlined
22:52by the New York Times
22:53for July 12, 1947
22:55as a communist.
22:56The news seemed
22:58to have no great
22:58implication for Oppenheimer
23:00at the time.
23:04Many months
23:05had passed
23:05since bombs
23:06were used in anger.
23:08Hiroshima
23:08was far away
23:09in time and place.
23:12Now it was
23:12the silly season
23:13for weapons.
23:25Let whoever wanted
23:27to play with explosives
23:28play with them.
23:29What was the worry?
23:31The worry
23:31was a United States
23:33B-29 bomber
23:34which had returned
23:35from a scientific
23:36observation mission
23:37in the Far East
23:38in August 1949,
23:40carrying photographic plates.
23:42when the plates
23:43were developed
23:44they showed
23:44not the usual
23:45streaks from cosmic rays
23:46but large areas
23:48of fogging
23:48and other unusual tracks,
23:50tracks which could
23:51have been made
23:52by the testing
23:53of an atomic bomb.
23:56But the United States
23:58had not exploded
23:58an atomic bomb
23:59in 1949.
24:01At once aircraft
24:02equipped with radiation
24:03detecting devices
24:04were sent to investigate.
24:05The news was
24:06unmistakable.
24:08The radioactivity
24:09was a result
24:09of an atomic explosion
24:10somewhere in Soviet Asia.
24:12Russia
24:13had the atomic bomb.
24:15It was news
24:16to make the western world
24:17think and think hard.
24:19There was no doubt
24:20that some American leaders
24:21had underestimated
24:23Soviet science
24:24and overestimated
24:25the value
24:26of atomic secrets.
24:27Edward Teller,
24:28like many other scientists,
24:30found the news critical
24:31and consulted Oppenheimer.
24:33In years ahead
24:34he was still expressing
24:35the view
24:36he held in 1949.
24:38And if the relative efforts
24:41continue
24:42as they have been
24:44since the war
24:45there is no doubt
24:47that in a few more years
24:49the Russians
24:49will leave us behind
24:51and way behind.
24:53He was strongly
24:54of the opinion
24:55that this was now
24:56the time
24:56to go all out
24:57and make a hydrogen bomb.
24:58The Atomic Energy Commission
25:00urgently needed advice.
25:01Should a crash program
25:03on a new super weapon
25:04which could dwarf
25:05the Russian atomic bomb
25:06be put into operation?
25:07They put their question
25:08to the General Advisory Committee
25:10under Oppenheimer.
25:11The committee
25:11handed back its report
25:13and said
25:13in determining
25:15not to proceed
25:16with the super bomb
25:16we see a unique opportunity
25:18of providing by example
25:20some limitations
25:21on the totality of war.
25:24The committee
25:25rejected any commitment
25:26towards the development
25:27of a hydrogen bomb.
25:30Enrico Fermi
25:31was one of two
25:32physicist members
25:33of the Advisory Committee
25:34who added a rider
25:35to the recommendations
25:36which ended
25:38we believe
25:39it is important
25:39for the President
25:40of the United States
25:41to tell the American public
25:43and the world
25:43that we think
25:44it is wrong
25:45on fundamental
25:46ethical principles
25:47to initiate
25:48the development
25:49of such a weapon.
25:51Truman did not
25:52take the scientist's advice
25:53as to what he should
25:54tell the American people.
25:56He had already told them
25:57of Stalin's atomic bomb
25:58now nicknamed
25:59in a friendly fashion
26:00Joe One.
26:02He received
26:03the Atomic Energy Commission's views
26:04based on the Oppenheimer
26:06Committee's advice
26:06recommending its opposition
26:08to the hydrogen bomb program.
26:11One of the commissioners
26:12in dissent
26:13was Louis Straws
26:14and some scientists
26:16agreed.
26:16They pointed out
26:17that Russian scientific progress
26:18should not be underestimated.
26:20They were right
26:22for reasons
26:22they did not suspect.
26:28On January 27th, 1950
26:30a passenger
26:31on the mid-morning
26:32London train
26:33from Didcote
26:33was the Harwell physicist
26:35Klaus Fuchs.
26:37Waiting to meet him
26:38at Paddington Station
26:39was a police inspector.
26:41That day
26:42Fuchs made a statement
26:44beginning
26:44I am Deputy Chief Scientific Officer
26:47acting rank
26:48at the Atomic Energy Research
26:49Establishment Harwell.
26:51My father was a parson
26:52and I had a very happy childhood.
26:55His trial
26:55at the Old Bailey
26:56was to tell
26:57what Washington learned
26:58on the day of his arrest.
27:00Fuchs had been communicating
27:01all the atomic secrets
27:03to which he had access
27:04to the Russians
27:05and Fuchs had attended
27:06early conferences
27:07on the hydrogen bomb.
27:09The news hit Washington hard
27:11and must have eliminated
27:12any doubts
27:13which remained
27:13in the President's mind.
27:18Four days later
27:19Truman overrode
27:20the recommendation
27:21of the General Advisory Committee
27:22and directed
27:23that works should go ahead
27:24with a hydrogen bomb.
27:27Many statesmen
27:29and most military men
27:30approved.
27:31The President's decision
27:33on the hydrogen bomb
27:34was a wise one.
27:37Necessary
27:38for our own security
27:41which really means
27:42the peace of the world.
27:44Let's face the facts.
27:46We tried again and again
27:48to reach an understanding
27:50but Russia refused.
27:52Russia still refuses.
27:54Unless and until
27:55we can secure world peace
27:58by sound, enforceable agreement.
28:01We must maintain our lead
28:04in the atomic field.
28:05We must not ignore
28:07or the hydrogen bomb.
28:09We owe this
28:10to our children.
28:12Louis Strauss
28:13had won his battle.
28:15That day
28:16he resigned
28:16from the Atomic Energy Commission
28:18and was able
28:19to congratulate Truman
28:20on his decision.
28:23At Los Alamos
28:24all that the physicists
28:26had behind them
28:27were eight years
28:28of thermonuclear fantasies,
28:30theories,
28:30and calculations.
28:31Now those who wished
28:33could begin work
28:34and Edward Teller
28:35set about recruiting scientists
28:36to build the hydrogen bomb.
28:39Only the previous October
28:40he had thought
28:41he had enlisted
28:41the valuable services
28:42of Hans Bethe.
28:45But still not all scientists
28:46were happy with this
28:47go-ahead for the new
28:48superweapon
28:49and Bethe was one of them.
28:52He published an article
28:53which compared
28:54the blast effect
28:54on New York City
28:55of a uranium bomb
28:56with that of a hydrogen bomb.
28:58He warned that a war
29:00fought with hydrogen bombs
29:01would be compared
29:02to the warfare
29:03of Genghis Khan.
29:05Security officers
29:06took over the plant
29:07where Bethe's article
29:08was being published
29:09and deleted
29:09classified statements in it.
29:13It had appeared
29:14only a few months
29:15after Oppenheimer
29:16had said
29:16that he still did not think
29:18that the United States
29:19should build
29:20a hydrogen bomb.
29:31The Korean War
29:32which broke out
29:33on June 25th 1950
29:35and within six months
29:37of Truman's decision
29:38hotted up the
29:39lukewarm opinions
29:40of the scientists.
29:46Communist forces
29:47were already
29:48within 20 miles
29:49of Seoul
29:49the capital of South Korea.
29:51An American soldier
29:52on the second retreat
29:53from Seoul
29:54was to call this
29:55the war we can't win
29:57we can't lose
29:58we can't quit.
30:01It was also
30:02the first war
30:03in which both sides
30:04might have access
30:05to atomic weapons.
30:15For Edward Teller
30:17this was now
30:17the crucial point.
30:18with full approval
30:20and with tight security
30:21he could put his program
30:22into top gear.
30:24He had still
30:26only a handful
30:26of scientists
30:27behind him
30:28but some
30:28who had had moral qualms
30:30about the production
30:30of the superweapon
30:31now shifted their ground.
30:35Hans Bethe appeared
30:36in order to check
30:37the group's
30:37theoretical calculations.
30:39Scientifically
30:40it was an immense problem.
30:42Not until June of 1951
30:44were some of America's
30:45leading scientists
30:46ready to meet Oppenheimer
30:47at Princeton
30:47to discuss the best way
30:49of building a hydrogen bomb.
30:51They included some
30:52who had once
30:53shown opposition
30:53to the manufacture
30:54of a thermonuclear weapon
30:56Enrico Fermi
30:57for example
30:57as well as some
30:58of the hydrogen bomb's
30:59leading proponents
31:00under Edward Teller.
31:01The meeting began
31:03with little interest
31:04in his most recent ideas.
31:06It ended
31:06with everyone
31:07without exception
31:08and including Oppenheimer
31:09being enthusiastic
31:10about the possibilities.
31:17But among
31:18air force
31:18and military leaders
31:19there were some
31:20who in spite of
31:21Oppenheimer's enthusiasm
31:22were distinctly worried
31:23about his opposition
31:24on technical grounds
31:26to their plans
31:26for atomic weapons
31:27in their strategy.
31:28The air force
31:30had decided
31:30to depend upon
31:31large fleets of bombers
31:32as its striking power.
31:35Soon after the Russians
31:36exploded their first
31:37atomic bomb
31:38this force
31:38known as
31:39the Strategic Air Command
31:41was revitalized
31:43with a new tough commander
31:44the cigar-chomping
31:45Curtis LeMay.
31:47LeMay immediately
31:48ordered the speeding up
31:49of new
31:49intercontinental bombers.
31:53He put his men
31:54on a round-the-clock alert.
31:58Many felt
31:59that the Strategic Air Command's
32:01atomic striking power
32:02might goad Russia
32:03into the development
32:04of counter-atomic weapons.
32:07Many,
32:08particularly scientists
32:09like Oppenheimer
32:10believed that
32:11the United States
32:11military forces
32:12should be primarily
32:13defensive
32:14and not offensive.
32:16The air force
32:17found this attitude
32:18disturbing
32:18because they believed
32:19that the scientists
32:20who held this view
32:21were ignorant
32:22of air power.
32:24The alternative
32:25to the Strategic Air Command
32:27was to rely
32:28on a defensive concept
32:29and Oppenheimer
32:30contributed to studies
32:32of a defense system
32:33from which emerged
32:34the Dueline,
32:35an interlocking system
32:36of radar stations.
32:38But meantime,
32:40the enthusiasm
32:40of the Princeton
32:41meeting of scientists
32:42had begun
32:43to bear its fruit.
32:44By November 1st, 1952,
32:46the atomic laboratories
32:47were ready to test
32:48the world's first
32:49thermonuclear weapon
32:51in the Marshall Islands.
32:53The test island
32:54was called Elugilab,
32:5520 miles north of Parry
32:57and Eniwetok,
32:58the two base islands
32:59of the atoll.
33:02On the small
33:04and naked island
33:04was built a shed
33:05which housed the device,
33:07a scientist's
33:08awesome box of tricks
33:10which was the result
33:11of months
33:11of bitter political wrangling
33:13and the culmination
33:14of years of work
33:15of dozens of physicists.
33:22And there was still
33:23only a 50% chance
33:25that the box
33:25would perform
33:26its most deadly trick.
33:358, 7, 6, 5,
33:404, 3, 2, 1.
34:03It had flowered
34:04into the greatest explosion
34:06on the face
34:06of the earth,
34:07at least the greatest
34:08we knew of.
34:12Elugilab
34:12had disappeared.
34:14It left behind
34:15a crater into which
34:15some cynical mathematician
34:17calculated
34:17would fit 14
34:19Pentagon buildings.
34:26Three days later,
34:27on November the 4th,
34:29the presidential elections
34:30took place.
34:34The outgoing president
34:35would be able
34:36to tell his successor
34:37that he had a new string
34:38to his atomic bowl.
34:42The hydrogen bomb
34:43had at last
34:44restored the balance
34:45of power
34:45to the side
34:46of the United States.
34:47Or had it.
34:48It was at least
34:49six years
34:50since Klaus Fuchs
34:51had given information
34:52to Russia
34:52about the American
34:53thermonuclear effort.
34:55If Russia
34:56had begun work
34:56immediately,
34:57then she might have
34:58as much as
34:59four years lead.
35:01There were new faces
35:02on the old balconies
35:04and there were new mines
35:05in the laboratories.
35:06Was it possible
35:07that in war
35:08Russia could meet
35:09an American hydrogen bomb
35:10with a similar weapon?
35:12But any immediate danger
35:14of a ding-dong nuclear war
35:15was temporarily removed
35:17by a ceasefire in Korea.
35:20On July 27th, 1953,
35:23at Panmunjom,
35:24the American general
35:25and the Russian-born
35:26Korean general
35:27silently led
35:28their delegations
35:29into a peace pagoda
35:30made of tar paper
35:31and straw mat
35:32to sign 18 copies
35:34of the armistice.
35:35Nine of these
35:36were in United Nations blue,
35:38nine in Communist red.
35:40After ten minutes,
35:41they rose and walked out
35:43without having spoken
35:44a word to each other.
35:46The Korean war
35:48was over.
35:50There was little rejoicing
35:52in the world
35:52at the news,
35:53but there was a relief
35:54of the tension
35:55between the Communist
35:55faction and the West.
35:57It was a relief
35:58which didn't last long.
36:00Six weeks later,
36:01the Russian premier,
36:02Malenkov,
36:03announced to the Supreme Soviet
36:04that the United States
36:05no longer had a monopoly
36:07of hydrogen bomb production.
36:11Dwight Eisenhower,
36:13less than a year
36:14after his election,
36:15was the first president
36:16of the United States
36:17to have to face the fact
36:18that his country
36:19could be destroyed
36:20by an enemy.
36:22The choice that spells
36:24terror and death
36:25is symbolized
36:26by a mushroom cloud
36:28floating upward
36:28from the release
36:29of the mightiest
36:31natural power
36:31are yet uncovered
36:32by those who search
36:34the physical universe.
36:36The energy that it typifies
36:38is, at this stage
36:40of human knowledge,
36:41the unharnessed blast.
36:44In its wake,
36:45we see only sudden
36:46and mass destruction,
36:47erasure of cities,
36:49the possible doom
36:50of every nation
36:51and society.
36:53This horror
36:54must not be.
37:03There was fear
37:04of the bomb
37:04and there was
37:05the fear
37:06of the enemy
37:06which might own the bomb.
37:08A senator from Wisconsin,
37:10Joseph McCarthy,
37:10set out to heighten
37:11this fear
37:12of the East
37:12by the West.
37:16In America,
37:17communists,
37:18some real,
37:18many imaginary,
37:20were being hounded.
37:22I know this hurts you,
37:23Mr. Welch.
37:33Mr. Welch here
37:35has been
37:37filibustering this hearing.
37:38He's been talking
37:39day after day
37:40about the way
37:41he wants to get
37:42anyone painted
37:42with communism
37:43out before sundown.
37:45Have you no sense
37:47of decency, sir,
37:49at long last?
37:50Have you left
37:51no sense of decency?
37:55My answer
37:56to these charges
37:57is short,
37:58simple,
37:59and direct.
38:00I am not
38:01and never have
38:02been disloyal.
38:03I am not
38:04and never have
38:05been a communist.
38:06I am not
38:08and never have
38:08been a fellow traveler.
38:10I am not
38:11and never have been...
38:12It was not good
38:12to be a citizen
38:13of the United States
38:14and to have had
38:15connections with communism.
38:17One such citizen
38:18whose brother
38:18was known
38:19to have been
38:19a communist party
38:20cardholder
38:21was Robert Oppenheimer.
38:23There were reported
38:24stronger connections.
38:26During the last two years,
38:27Oppenheimer's influence
38:28with the Atomic Energy Commission
38:29had declined.
38:30It was to decline
38:31still further.
38:32On July the 3rd, 1953,
38:35the Republican
38:36Louis Strauss
38:36was reappointed
38:37chairman
38:37of the Atomic Energy Commission
38:39under the Eisenhower administration.
38:44Before the end of that year,
38:46Strauss was discussing
38:47with Eisenhower
38:48the implications
38:49of an FBI investigation
38:50in the matter
38:51of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
38:59On December 3rd,
39:01Oppenheimer was in England
39:02delivering the BBC
39:03Wreath Lectures
39:04on Science
39:05and the Common Understanding.
39:07Within a lifetime,
39:09what we learned at school
39:10has been rendered
39:11inadequate
39:12by new discoveries
39:13and new inventions
39:14and the ways
39:16that we learned
39:16in childhood
39:17are only very meagerly adequate
39:19to the issues
39:20that we are called on
39:21to meet in maturity.
39:23On the same cold
39:25winter afternoon,
39:26a telephone call
39:27from President Eisenhower
39:28summoned Strauss
39:29to his office
39:30to direct that a blank wall
39:32be placed between Oppenheimer
39:33and any secret information
39:35until a hearing
39:36had been completed.
39:39Oppenheimer's decision
39:40to the Atomic Energy Commission
39:41was that he would submit
39:43to a hearing
39:44by a personnel security board.
39:49The board began its sittings
39:51on April the 12th, 1954
39:52in some temporary wartime offices
39:55in Washington
39:56in order to establish
39:57whether Robert Oppenheimer's
39:58security clearance
39:59should be suspended.
40:02The man who had once
40:04sat with committees
40:04to give them his advice
40:05on atomic matters
40:07now sat before one
40:08to face accusations.
40:10Accusations that he had been
40:11a communist fellow traveller,
40:13that he had contributed
40:14to communist party funds,
40:16and that his opposition
40:17to the hydrogen bomb program
40:18had slowed down
40:19its development.
40:21It was supposedly
40:22an administrative hearing,
40:23but the procedure
40:24was that of a trial
40:25with statements from
40:27and bitter cross-examination
40:28of Oppenheimer
40:29and his one-time colleagues.
40:31His 50th birthday
40:32fell in the middle
40:33of the proceedings,
40:34which revealed
40:35his private life,
40:36his thoughts,
40:37and his weaknesses
40:38in frightening detail.
40:40For 12 years,
40:42every trivial incident
40:43of his life
40:44had been pitilessly dissected
40:45by government secret agents.
40:47One close relationship
40:49with a man named Chevalier,
40:50a university lecturer,
40:51had been traced back
40:52to 1942.
40:57Chevalier had been approached
40:59by a contact
40:59who suggested
41:00that he had a means
41:01of getting technical information
41:02to Russian scientists.
41:06Chevalier secretly
41:07told Oppenheimer
41:08of the meeting.
41:09Oppenheimer,
41:10when later questioned
41:10by security officers,
41:12lied about the affair,
41:13apparently to protect
41:15this man, Chevalier.
41:19This unimportant incident
41:21took on tremendous
41:22significance
41:23at the hearings
41:23because it cast doubt
41:25on the truth
41:25of the rest
41:26of Oppenheimer's evidence.
41:30In 500,000 words
41:32of testimony,
41:33the Betters
41:33and the Fermis,
41:35as well as the Groves,
41:36all testified
41:37as to his loyalty.
41:39But it was the evidence
41:40of a minority
41:41of Oppenheimer's
41:42fellow physicists,
41:43evidence which set out
41:44to show his reluctance
41:45to a hydrogen bomb program,
41:47which ultimately condemned him.
41:48It was the evidence
41:49of men such as Edward Teller,
41:51the so-called father
41:52of the hydrogen bomb
41:53was condemning
41:54the so-called father
41:55of the atom bomb.
41:57The Personnel Security Board
41:59had reached a decision,
42:01a decision against Oppenheimer.
42:04In refusing to reinstate
42:06his security clearance,
42:07the board said
42:08that Oppenheimer
42:09had shown a serious disregard
42:10for the requirements
42:11of security
42:12and had been susceptible
42:13to influence
42:14which could have
42:15serious implications
42:16for the country.
42:17His conduct
42:18on the hydrogen bomb program
42:19was found
42:20to be sufficiently disturbing
42:21to raise a doubt
42:22whether his future participation
42:24would be in the interests
42:25of security.
42:29But the three-man board
42:31did not return
42:31a unanimous decision.
42:33The only scientist,
42:34Ward Evans,
42:35said,
42:35I personally think
42:36our failure to clear
42:37Dr. Oppenheimer
42:38will be a black mark
42:40on the escutcheon
42:41of our country.
42:42Apart from its effect
42:44on Oppenheimer,
42:45his condemnation
42:46at the hearings
42:46caused a great schism
42:47in the world's
42:48scientific community.
42:49Members of the
42:50Great Brotherhood
42:51who ten years before
42:52had drunk
42:52to the success
42:53of their work.
42:54Men who from the outside
42:55appeared to have produced
42:56their vast and terrible weapons
42:58in answer to the call
42:59of patriotism
43:00and their country's
43:01immediate needs,
43:02now found their
43:03moral quandaries
43:04and personal vacillations
43:05exposed in a stark,
43:07unflattering glare.
43:08But there was yet
43:09to be a bitter postscript.
43:12The inscrutable surface
43:14of Mother Earth
43:15was to experience
43:15her children's
43:16latest creation,
43:17a transportable
43:19hydrogen bond.
43:20It was to be
43:21750 times as powerful
43:23as the Hiroshima weapon.
43:25It was to have
43:26a premature
43:27and undesirable fame.
43:29At 5.30 in the morning
43:31of March 1st, 1954,
43:33the Japanese fishing boat
43:34the Fortunate Dragon
43:36had dropped anchors
43:3771 miles from Bikini
43:38and 14 miles outside
43:40the restricted area
43:41of the Pacific
43:42testing ground.
43:46At 6 o'clock,
43:47the crew saw flashes
43:48of fire as bright
43:49as the sun itself
43:50rising into the sky.
43:52But coming from the west,
43:566 minutes later,
43:57they heard the explosion.
44:03For a few hours,
44:04they worked at their nets.
44:06Then a fine white ash
44:07began to fall.
44:09One of the crew
44:10noticed the rubber bands
44:11holding on his cotton gloves
44:12crumbling
44:13and falling to pieces.
44:1614 days later,
44:17the fortunate dragon
44:18arrived in Japan.
44:20Its crew,
44:21by this time,
44:22suffering from
44:23radiation sickness.
44:38One man died
44:39within a few months.
44:41He was called
44:42by his countrymen
44:43the first martyr
44:45of the hydrogen bomb.
44:47But had there been
44:48another martyr,
44:51Icarus had flown
44:52too near the sun.
44:55Oppenheimer,
44:55the man who had been
44:56asked by his country
44:57to build an atomic weapon
44:58and had done the job well,
45:00had been pilloried
45:01for what he did not do.
45:04Edward Teller, too,
45:05had been asked
45:05to build a weapon
45:06and there was no doubt
45:07that he had done
45:08his job well.
45:09In 1962,
45:10President Kennedy
45:11presented him
45:11with the Enrico Fermi Award.
45:15Dr. Teller
45:16was one of a number
45:17of Europeans
45:17who came to
45:19the United States
45:19and played a
45:20most significant role
45:21in World War II
45:24and has contributed
45:26immeasurably
45:27to the security
45:27of the United States
45:28since that time.
45:30It is really wonderful
45:32for me
45:32to receive this award,
45:35most particularly
45:37because
45:39every one
45:40of its
45:42previous recipients
45:44is a man
45:48whom
45:49I admire,
45:51for whom
45:52I have
45:52a warm friendship
45:54and with whom
45:55it is the greatest
45:56honor to be
45:57associated.
45:59The Fermi Award
46:00had never been made
46:01to Robert Oppenheimer,
46:02but time in one sense
46:04is a great healer.
46:05Almost ten years
46:06after his condemnation,
46:08the political
46:08and scientific
46:09climates had changed.
46:11Twelve months
46:11after his own
46:12Fermi Award,
46:13Edward Teller
46:14added his name
46:15to the ballot paper,
46:16nominating Oppenheimer
46:17as the next recipient.
46:18Since the war,
46:21you have continued
46:23to lead
46:24in the search
46:25for knowledge
46:26and you have
46:28continued to build
46:29on the major
46:30breakthrough
46:31achieved by
46:33Enrique Fermi.
46:35You have led
46:36in developing
46:37an outstanding
46:38school
46:38of theoretical
46:40physics
46:41in the United States
46:42of America.
46:44For these
46:45significant
46:46contributions,
46:48I present
46:49to you
46:50on behalf
46:51of the
46:51Atomic Energy
46:52Commission
46:52and the people
46:54of the United
46:55States
46:56the Enrique Fermi
46:58Award
46:59of 1963.
47:08Thank you,
47:10Mr. President.
47:16And perhaps
47:17the least
47:17important
47:18to you,
47:18$50,000
47:20check
47:20from the
47:21Treasury
47:21of the
47:21United States.
47:29But the
47:30findings
47:30of the
47:30Security Board
47:31have nonetheless
47:32never been
47:33rescinded.
47:34I think
47:35it's just
47:36possible,
47:36Mr. President,
47:38that it has
47:38taken some
47:39clarity
47:39and some
47:40courage
47:41to make
47:42this award
47:42today.
47:44That would
47:44seem to me
47:45a good
47:46offer
47:46for all
47:47our futures.
47:49These words
47:50I wrote down
47:51almost a
47:52fortnight ago
47:53in a somber
47:55time
47:55that gratefully
47:56and gladly
47:57speak to me
47:58to me.
48:05Many
48:06scientists
48:06suffered,
48:07some died,
48:08building the
48:09weapons they
48:09believed would
48:10benefit their
48:11country and
48:12mankind.
48:13Yet judgments
48:13as easy
48:14as that
48:15of the
48:15common man's
48:16philosopher
48:16are still
48:17heard.
48:19Will nobody
48:20ever stop
48:20the scientists?
48:22Won't somebody
48:23put them in a
48:23bag and tie
48:24them up?
48:25Or into a
48:26lethal chamber?
48:27efficace.
48:33It's
48:33serious.
48:41Good
48:41bye.
48:42quarter
48:43good
48:43Good
48:44day.
48:47Good good
48:48last
48:48good
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