- 6 months ago
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:10The borders of today's Middle East, and indeed many of its intractable problems,
00:15stem from the division of the region in the years during the First World War and shortly afterwards.
00:22We're joined today by Dr. Neil Faulkner, author of this new book, Lawrence of Arabia's War,
00:29subtitled The Arabs, the British, and the Remaking of the Middle East in World War I.
00:34And we're going to look at what happened into the Middle East during those years
00:39and the shadow cast into today's world.
00:42Neil, welcome.
00:45At the time of the First World War, the Middle East was the centre of a clash of empires.
00:49Could you explain?
00:51Yeah. I mean, it had been dominated by the Ottoman Empire really since the 16th century,
00:57and they controlled the whole of the region that we now describe as the Middle East.
01:01It stretched all the way from the Persian Gulf right through into the Balkans,
01:06and in another direction it was stretching all the way from the Nile right up to the Caucasus.
01:12Huge, great imperial complex.
01:14Very traditional empire, though, and increasingly it was preyed upon by the new European imperial powers of the age,
01:23powered, of course, by industry.
01:25So the British and the French and the Russians, they all had designs on the declining, as it was then,
01:32Ottoman Empire.
01:33So the First World War in the Middle East was a war of empire.
01:37And British policy towards the Middle East centred on three contradictory goals.
01:42A secret agreement with France to partition the region,
01:45a promise, the Balfour Declaration, to create a Zionist state in Palestine,
01:49and this promise to create an Arab state if the Arabs rose up against the Ottomans.
01:54I mean, these contradictions could not be resolved, surely.
01:56No, they couldn't, and the British knew that at the time.
01:59I mean, they had basically committed themselves to supporting the creation of a united Arab,
02:06independent Arab state after the war to encourage the revolt of the Arabs in the Hejaz region of Western Arabia,
02:14because they wanted them on side, obviously, to weaken the Ottoman Empire,
02:19but also because they were very worried, actually, about the Ottoman empires,
02:25the Ottoman sultan's appeal to jihad.
02:27He'd called for a jihad, a holy war, against the British and the French and the Russians.
02:33They wanted to undercut that appeal to jihad.
02:35But at the same time, they'd done a deal with their French and Russian allies to carve up the Middle
02:40East.
02:41That was the secret Sykes-Picot agreement.
02:44And at the same time, they were in negotiations with the international Zionist movement,
02:50and they committed themselves to supporting...
02:53They didn't say they were going to support an independent Zionist state,
02:57but they created the basis for that by committing themselves to allowing the Zionists to create a Jewish homeland in
03:04Palestine.
03:05Now, at the beginning of the war, did Britain underestimate the Ottomans' ability to fight a war?
03:11I mean, they suffered a couple of very serious military reverse at the beginning.
03:14Yes, and I think the British probably weren't alone in that.
03:18I think the general view was that the Ottoman Empire would be a walkover.
03:22It was a traditional empire.
03:24It was basically agricultural.
03:26It had very little industrial infrastructure.
03:29It had a very rudimentary transport system.
03:32I think the assumption was that up against powerful industrial states like Britain, France,
03:38the Ottoman Empire would be relatively easily defeated.
03:42I think what they had underestimated was the extraordinary resilience of the Ottoman, Turkish, Islamic soldier
03:51defending what he considered to be his home territory against those he regarded as infidel invaders.
03:59Because the first attempt to seize Istanbul, the landings on the Gallipoli, fairly well known, ended in defeat.
04:06But also they suffered a humiliating defeat in Iraq as well in 1916.
04:09Yes, they did.
04:10I mean, the defeat on Gallipoli is more famous, but equally spectacular in its own way
04:16was this defeat that they suffered in Iraq in April of 1916, where you had the largest British army surrender,
04:27mass surrender, in history up until that point.
04:30It's only been surpassed since by the surrender at Singapore.
04:33Which, of course, was an imperial humiliation in 1916.
04:35Absolutely, yes.
04:37So, how important in this?
04:39Here we have the British, the Turks had attacked, first of all, let's get the chronology of this.
04:43The Turks had begun operations by attacking the Suez Canal, which was really important for the British, wasn't it?
04:48Yes, the British were very, very sensitive about Suez, because, of course, Suez was the main communications line
04:54connecting the homeland with the Indian Empire.
04:57And the Indian Empire was a source of food, raw materials, manpower, and so on.
05:02And those resources were being fed into the kind of mincing machine, really, that Europe had become by this time.
05:10Very, very sensitive, therefore, to the security of the Suez Canal, which is why they'd taken over Egypt, incidentally, in
05:171882,
05:18and effectively turned it into a British colonial possession.
05:22It was because they needed to secure Suez.
05:24And I think that's why, initially, they put large numbers of troops into Egypt to defend the canal,
05:30and then began to push them across Sinai towards Palestine.
05:34And it was really to try and get the Ottoman Turks as far away from the Suez Canal as they
05:38could.
05:39That was the initial objective.
05:40And then that succeeded.
05:42The Turks were pushed back.
05:44And the intention then became to broaden the aims of the war into effectively a war of imperial conquest in
05:52the Middle East.
05:53So, how important to this was the revolt by the Arabs?
05:57And can you go with some background to this?
05:58There'd been a correspondence between Sharaf Hassan of Mecca and McMahon in Egypt, the British government,
06:05promising an Arab state, and eventually there was a rebellion.
06:08Yeah.
06:09I mean, the negotiations go on, in fact, for years.
06:13I mean, there is initial discussion of this even before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
06:18And then it intensifies with this famous exchange of letters, known as the McMahon Correspondence,
06:25where eventually, effectively, Hussein gets a commitment from the British that they will support an independent United Arab State after
06:34the war.
06:35And that becomes the basis for the revolt.
06:37And then there's a flow, of course, of British gold, British guns, British grain to sustain that revolt.
06:43Now, what I think has sometimes been said about it, the Arab revolt, is it was a bit of a
06:48sideshow of a sideshow.
06:50And the main fighting was on the Western Front, or it was in Palestine, at least, in terms of the
06:54Middle East.
06:55And I think what the evidence suggests is that that's not right, that in actual fact this was a guerrilla
07:01insurgency on an enormous scale,
07:04which tied down huge numbers of Ottoman soldiers, so that at the height of the war there were more Ottoman
07:12soldiers trying to contain the insurgency on the east of the Jordan
07:16than there were Ottoman soldiers fighting Allenby's British army, which was enormous, a third of a million men west of
07:23the Jordan in Palestine.
07:25So, T.E. Lawrence had been an intelligence officer in Cairo, previously an archaeologist like yourself, an intelligence officer.
07:33He was sent to Arabia to help foster that revolt, which had begun, but was not going too well.
07:39How important was he?
07:41Well, there's huge debate about this, Chris.
07:45I mean, so many different points of view on this.
07:47My view is this.
07:49I think Lawrence was a seminal figure.
07:52I think what the Arab leaders were interested in doing was creating the embryo of a modern state, because they
07:58had this nationalist aspiration.
08:01I think what the conventional British officers who were advising them wanted them to do was more or less the
08:06same.
08:06You need to create conventional forces to fight a conventional war.
08:10What's special about Lawrence is he wasn't in either of those boxes.
08:14He was a maverick, a misfit in many ways.
08:17He identified very strongly with the Arab cause.
08:20He identified particularly with the Bedouin of the desert.
08:24And I think he was able to think outside the box and to think about the war in a very
08:30different way,
08:31and to try and go with the grain of traditional Arab warfare, traditional desert warfare, and say,
08:37let's inflate this.
08:38Let's inflate traditional Bedouin raiding into a guerrilla insurgency.
08:43The kind of thing that we might in a later period call a national liberation struggle, where the guerrilla is
08:48pitted against the conventional army.
08:50And this is an interesting thing.
08:52It was the British-led campaign in Palestine and then into Syria.
08:55It involved a very modern form of industrial warfare, but also this guerrilla warfare, a traditional war.
09:02How did that play out?
09:03Yeah, no, I mean, that's a very good way of putting it, that you've got conventional warfare on one side
09:07of the Jordan in Palestine,
09:09and you've got irregular warfare against a conventional army on the other side.
09:13And I think the two things work in parallel in an extremely effective way.
09:19But it is worth saying this, it's worth saying that without the flow of British guns, British gold, and British
09:27grain to the Arabs,
09:29the insurgency would have been on a much smaller scale.
09:32Now, here's a caveat, which is very important, really, for understanding the subsequent history of the Middle East.
09:38The leaders of the Arab revolt were tribal reactionaries.
09:42They were not putting forward a programme for radical change that could appeal to the ordinary peasantry, the ordinary people
09:49of Syria and Iraq.
09:51They weren't, for example, proposing a major programme of land reform to end the poverty of the peasantry.
09:56So the revolt was quite shallow.
09:59It didn't sink deep roots into Arab society.
10:02It was very, very dependent on British support for traditional Bedouin-style tribal raiding.
10:09So it's not quite the kind of conflict which, for example, we see playing out in Algeria much later, or
10:15in Vietnam much later.
10:17And I think that's one of the reasons why it's relatively easy for the British and the French, after the
10:23war, to turf the Arabs out.
10:25Now, meanwhile, something else was going on.
10:27I mean, the Ottoman Empire had been an Ottoman Empire.
10:30It wasn't a Turkish Empire.
10:31But what we'll be able to see in the course of the war is the emergence of a Turkish state.
10:37And the armies that they're really fighting against increasingly are Turkish armies.
10:41Yeah, no, it is very interesting.
10:42What the Arab revolt seems to do is to undermine the loyalty of the Ottoman Arab units.
10:50Lots of Arabs, of course, are fighting on the Ottoman side.
10:53But increasingly, they're just not reliable, and they have to be pulled out of the line, moved to other places,
10:59so that the people who are filling the line increasingly are Anatolian peasant conscripts, Turkish peasant conscripts.
11:06And I think what is also happening as the internal character of the Ottoman Empire evolves into something that is
11:13more Turkish,
11:15what you're getting is the embryo of Turkish nationalism beginning to come together.
11:20And by the end of the war, you've got a kind of stiffening, despite the defeats, despite the loss of
11:28Syria,
11:29despite the rout in Syria, you've got a stiffening of that Ottoman-Turkish resistance
11:34as the British get to the borders of what is now Turkey.
11:39Now, here we have Lawrence sent into Arabia conducting these spectacular guerrilla operations sometimes.
11:44But he knew about the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British-French partition in the Middle East.
11:49And yet, he seemed to believe that if they could get, particularly if the Arab army could get to Damascus
11:54first,
11:54somehow they could offset this. I mean, was he wishful thinking of his part?
11:57Well, I mean, a key thing that I refer to in the book is that there is, what happened, there's
12:06no record of this,
12:06so we have to assume it happens, but I think the evidence is overwhelmingly that it did happen.
12:11There was a discussion, a private discussion between Lawrence and Faisal,
12:15where Lawrence said, because he knew, he told Faisal about the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
12:20So he brought Faisal into his confidence.
12:24And I think those two men, the Arab tribal leader, the British wartime officer who's become a liaison officer
12:32and a guerrilla leader, these two men, I think, enter into a sort of conspiracy.
12:38And what Lawrence wants to see happen is for the Arabs to get first to Aqaba,
12:43to give them a forward base, to move into Syria, and then to get into Damascus.
12:48And I think Lawrence's reasoning, and Faisal's, is that if they can do that,
12:53if they can project Arab military power into Damascus,
12:56they're going to be in with a fighting chance of defeating the implementation of Sykes-Picot.
13:02Yeah, when they take Damascus, the British commander arrives and instantly tells them,
13:07no, we're handing it over to the French.
13:09Absolutely.
13:09And Lawrence has left, in many ways, from reading the book, a broken man.
13:13Yes. Now, you see, I think what makes Lawrence such a supremely interesting character,
13:19if you're trying to get a handle on, you know, the last century of Middle Eastern history,
13:24is that he's very sensitive, he's very conscientious, he is genuinely committed to the Arab cause,
13:32in a flawed way, in my view.
13:33I think he's got allusions about British imperialism.
13:36But he has, he genuinely identifies with the Arab cause.
13:40And I think he's crippled by guilt by the end of the war,
13:44because he emerges from it with the sense that he's led men into battle on the basis of a lie.
13:50He's led men to their deaths, very often, on the basis of a lie.
13:54And he can't cope with it.
13:55And he does suffer a mental breakdown, which unfolds in the years after the war.
14:01I think he's quite close to suicide, within sort of two or three years of the war.
14:05And I think Seven Pillars of Wisdom, his great war memoir,
14:09is in many ways an act of catharsis by a psychologically broken man,
14:15who never really recovers fully.
14:16But at the same time, he's also been projected, both in Britain and in the United States,
14:21as this great war hero.
14:22And Britain really needed a war hero at the time, didn't they?
14:25Yeah, no, that's right.
14:26And, I mean, initially, that's exactly what he was.
14:29Lawrence, you know, the generals who had led the carnage on the Western Front were extremely unpopular.
14:36There was a tremendous revulsion against the whole experience of the war.
14:41I mean, the entire global system was shaken to its foundations by a wave of revolution, starting in 1917.
14:48So I think the British elite was very much looking for a hero,
14:53somebody they could put up on a pedestal.
14:55And so Lawrence is that for a while.
14:58And then, and to some degree still is, but I think, of course, later on, you know,
15:05in the kind of post-colonial period, he's been examined in a much more critical and rounded way,
15:12most famously in the David Lean movie.
15:14I mean, the David Lean movie does actually explore the role of British imperialism in the Middle East,
15:20and the way in which Lawrence is greatly damaged by what he sees as his involvement in this great betrayal
15:27of the Arabs.
15:27Now, this book, in part, was from 10 years of archaeological research you did in Jordan into the Arab revolt.
15:33Would you like to tell us about that?
15:34Yeah, well, we did nine seasons altogether, and we put a team of about 30 people into the field for
15:40two weeks each year.
15:42And what we were doing, essentially, was we were mapping all of the sites that we could relate to the
15:47revolt.
15:48So it was railway stations, hilltop forts, trenches, block houses, campsites, and so on.
15:56The most interesting thing, I think, was where we located one campsite, an overnight campsite, that had been used by
16:03Lawrence himself.
16:04That was the Tooth Hill camp.
16:06And we also investigated the site of the Halat Amar ambush, where Lawrence blew up a train.
16:12There's a very detailed description of it in Seven Pillars of Wisdom.
16:15It was in September 1917.
16:18It's probably the event on which David Lean's reconstruction of a train demolition is loosely based in the film.
16:25And we found evidence that suggested very, very strongly that the account that Lawrence was giving in Seven Pillars of
16:33this event and of many others, actually, was very, very reliable.
16:37People have suggested that Seven Pillars of Wisdom, there's a lot of lying and charlatanism about it, you know, can't
16:43really be trusted.
16:44The archaeological evidence suggests very strongly that his description of the war can be relied upon.
16:51And you've found some artefacts, haven't you?
16:53We've found lots.
16:53Yes, I have brought one in, actually, to show you.
16:55This tiny little object has become famous because there's been widespread news coverage of it.
17:05We think that it was fired by Lawrence himself.
17:12And the reason for thinking that is that it's from a model 1911 Colt Automatic, which is a new kind
17:21of American gun, which we happen to know he owned.
17:23And it was in absolutely the right place for it to have been fired by Lawrence.
17:28It was with a group of bullets that had been fired by, from British rifles, and the British, of course,
17:34were supplying the arrows with their rifles.
17:36So we're pretty sure that that bullet was actually fired by Lawrence.
17:41The partition of the Middle East went ahead straight after the First World War.
17:46There was a Treaty of Repel, I think it was, where the French, the British, et cetera, divided it up.
17:51But that is the border, they are the borders which are still there today, aren't they?
17:55Yeah, I mean, the final settlement was 1921.
17:58There was a conference in Cairo.
18:01Churchill presided over it.
18:02He was then the colonial secretary.
18:04Lawrence was there as an advisor.
18:06Gertrude Bell was there, an advisor, lots of other people.
18:09And it was really 21 that finally, the Cairo conference in 21, that finally settled it.
18:14And effectively what you had was lines drawn in the map, because some bits were going to the British, some
18:21bits were going to the French.
18:22How they were going to administer Palestine was different from how they were administering Transjordan, as it was then called,
18:29different again from Iraq.
18:30So you had that dividing up of the Middle East, which creates the borders of today's Middle East.
18:37And I really do think that one of the reasons why the Middle East has been so divided, so conflict
18:43-ridden, has experienced so much human suffering because of that, has to be rooted in what the imperial powers are
18:51doing at this time.
18:51And it's quite easy, because today we often say that oil is at the root of all this.
18:54But actually this predates oil in the sense that they found oil in what's now Iran.
18:58Yes.
18:59But they hadn't found those oil fields in Arabia or Iraq and so on.
19:02So it wasn't quite the burning issue that...
19:05No, that's right. It does go back before oil.
19:08I mean, oil, they had some oil in Iran that they were beginning to exploit.
19:12And the Royal Navy, actually quite important in this, was making the transition from coal power to oil power.
19:18So the British were very interested in oil.
19:20But you're absolutely right.
19:21It was nowhere near as important as it subsequently becomes.
19:24And what this shows us is that the imperial powers are interested in the Middle East because of oil, but
19:28not just because of oil.
19:30Also, at this time, because it was an absolutely crucial communications highway, above all because of the Suez Canal.
19:38And the British in particular, with their Indian Empire and their Far Eastern imperial interests, desperately, desperately keen to keep
19:45control of this region.
19:46And the irony is, is that, you know, just at the aftermath of the First World War, the British Empire
19:51reached its height in terms of its geographical expansion.
19:55But really, it's beginning to crumble to dust because it's facing rebellions here, which it can no longer police.
19:59Yeah, no, that's right.
20:00I mean, the British Empire, we need to remind ourselves that after 1918, as a result of the First World
20:06War, the British Empire was bigger than ever before.
20:08It ruled over more people than ever before.
20:11And yet, already, it was experiencing overstretch.
20:15And it was facing revolts in a whole series of places.
20:19In Ireland, of course, it loses control of a large part of Ireland as a result of war between 1919
20:24and 1921.
20:26It attempts to support a Greek invasion of Turkey.
20:31Obviously, that is defeated, and there's a confrontation between the British Army and the Turkish nationalists in 1922 across the
20:40Straits, where previously the Gallipoli campaign had been fought.
20:43They face a revolt in Iraq, just as the French face a revolt in Syria.
20:48In the 1930s, of course, there's going to be a big revolt in Palestine.
20:52So I think it's right to say that there's an expansion of the British Empire to its greatest extent at
20:59this time, but it's also now facing a major, major problem of overstretch.
21:04And we're seeing that in these revolts of the subject peoples that are bubbling up.
21:08So is it lazy history?
21:10Can we say that the problems, the overwhelming problems the Middle East faces today, the existence of the State of
21:15Israel, the problems of Palestine, the civil war, and so on?
21:19So all of this flows from decisions made in the main by British politicians in those years during and shortly
21:25after the First World War.
21:26Yes. I think if you want to understand the modern Middle East, you need to know what the British Empire
21:30is doing between 1916 and 1921.
21:33They create the modern Middle East, yes.
21:35And we've had many books about Lawrence Arabia, a blockbuster film which you mentioned, many TV programmes.
21:42Why another one?
21:43Well, I mean, what the book tries to do is to look at the whole experience of the conflict in
21:49a multidisciplinary way.
21:50So it's not just military history, it's also political history, it's also looking at the anthropology and the sociology, how
21:56do these societies work?
21:58It's all of that, and it's looking at what's happening east of the Jordan, the Arab Revolt, and west of
22:06the Jordan, the campaign in Palestine, at the same time,
22:08and seeing it all as a single military process that is transforming the region.
22:13So it's a holistic study of the war in the Middle East between 1914 and 1918.
22:19And for a book which is critical of Britain and British imperialism, it's received some quite good reviews in the
22:25right-wing media.
22:25Yes, it has. I mean, a good review in The Spectator and a good review in The Daily Telegraph as
22:31well,
22:32which is quite pleasing because it is a radical text, it is an anti-imperialist text,
22:37but I hope it will appeal to a very, very broad readership indeed,
22:41because obviously I stand by everything I say in it,
22:44and I think that all of us need to face up to the reality of what the British Empire is
22:50responsible for
22:51in the crisis which the Middle East has been in, in some sense, for the last hundred years.
22:57Dr Neil Falkner, thank you very much indeed.
23:01This is Chris Banbury thanking you for tuning in,
23:03and I hope you learnt something about what created today's Middle East,
23:08and also what created some of the problems that we're having to live through in that most vital region.