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Air Crash Investigation S26E07 Divided In Crisis
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00:01V1, rotate.
00:03As Air Algerie Flight 6289 lifts off from Tamanrassit, Algeria.
00:09Gear up.
00:10Air traffic controllers hear an explosion.
00:21The plane crashes into the desert.
00:24102 people are killed.
00:28Investigators examine engine debris found on the runway.
00:32Looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guideway.
00:35They know an engine failed, but not why the pilots couldn't recover.
00:40Pilots are expected to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine.
00:46The investigation reveals a crew that was struggling, not with the plane.
00:51Let go. Take your hand away.
00:52I let go. I let go.
00:54But with each other.
00:55which one of them is actually flying the plane?
01:20It's early afternoon in the middle of the Sahara Desert in Algeria.
01:25The crew of Flight 6289 readies for its upcoming journey at the remote Tamanrassid-Aguinar airport.
01:39There are 97 passengers on board.
01:43Among them, members of the local football team headed to a tournament and military personnel.
01:51Though there are some European nationals, almost everyone on board is Algerian.
02:06Now the instrument transfer switches, normal.
02:12In the cockpit, pre-flight checks are underway.
02:17Your damper, on.
02:22Today's flight is operated by Air Algerie, a state-owned national carrier.
02:28Air Algerie is a publicly-owned company that is owned by the country of Algeria.
02:33The country takes a lot of pride in this particular airline
02:38because it is the face name of the country as it goes all around the world.
02:4762.89 passengers, weather.
02:50Yes, the wind is calm, temperature 23, QNH 1020, QFE 965.
02:58Copy, we'll call you back for engine start.
03:0244-year-old Fatima Yousfi is the first officer of this flight.
03:07She is Algeria's first female commercial pilot.
03:12The female first officer was one of the first women to be hired in an airline in Algeria,
03:19which would be a big deal in such a male-dominated field, especially in that country.
03:25As the first woman to pilot a Boeing 747 trans-oceanic flight,
03:31Lynn Ripplemeyer knows what it's like to blaze a trail.
03:37Aviation was then and still is in some cases a boys club.
03:44Back in the beginning of when women were initially beginning in aviation here in the States,
03:50maybe it's like it was for her, that it was unusual.
04:00Tamaracet, 62.89. We request clearance for Qardaya.
04:04Received. We will call you back.
04:10Hey, Buala.
04:11Hey.
04:12We've got some Tamaracet football players back there.
04:15Oh. Tell them we're rooting for them this weekend.
04:1948-year-old Captain Bualem Benawicha has over 10,000 flying hours.
04:25A thousand of those hours are on the Boeing 737.
04:29The captain was highly experienced, had been flying for over 20 years
04:32and then flown all kinds of aircraft from small aircraft to large jetliners.
04:3762.89, Tamaracet.
04:40Go on.
04:41Start approved. Call back for taxi.
04:43Roger.
04:46At 3 p.m., the pilots get clearance to start up the engines.
04:53Okay, before start checklist. Fuel quantity.
04:569,800 kg.
04:59Pumps?
05:02On.
05:05Flight 62.89 is a Boeing 737-200, an early generation of the popular twin-engine jetliner.
05:15The Boeing 737 is one of the most common types of commercial airliners in the world,
05:21and there are different variations of it.
05:24The Boeing 737-200 is an original version of the 737,
05:30so it's an older model, and it's not as highly sophisticated in technology as the current 737s.
05:42Flight 62.89 will be departing from Tamaracet,
05:46with a scheduled stop in Gardaia, and then on to the capital, Algiers.
05:51The total flying time is approximately three hours.
06:01That is taxi, Air Algerie, 62.89.
06:0662.89, Tamaracet. Taxi onto runway 02 and backtrack.
06:11Wind 030 at 10 knots.
06:14Roger.
06:15Taxing for runway 02, then backtracking 62.89.
06:22As they taxi to the runway, passengers settle in for the journey.
06:39We are ready, 62.89.
06:4362.89 Tamaracet, cleared for takeoff runway 02.
06:47Wind 330 at 12 knots.
06:50Cleared for takeoff on runway 02 at Aljiri.
06:5362.89.
06:545, 2, 3, 4, 3, 4, 5, 5, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
07:03You have 90 knots.
07:06100 knots.
07:22B-1, rotate.
07:29But seconds after takeoff...
07:32Gear up.
07:35A loud explosion rocks the airplane.
07:43Bismillah, what's going on?
07:45The pilots assess the situation.
07:48Let's go, let's go.
07:49I let go, I let go.
07:53Passengers sense something has gone wrong.
07:58We have a small problem, 6289.
08:016289, command officer.
08:06The 737 is approaching a stall.
08:166289, are you in an emergency?
08:26Don't think.
08:27Don't think.
08:29Don't think.
08:30The pilots make desperate attempts to recover the aircraft.
08:36But their efforts are in vain.
08:39The plane goes into a freefall.
08:42The passengers brace themselves.
08:54The plane bursts into flames and skids across the desert just outside Tamanrasset Airport.
09:03Emergency response is immediately activated, and firefighters rush to the scene.
09:15The impact and fire that ensued afterwards made survival very unlikely for the passengers in the aircraft.
09:24But then, against all odds, rescuers discover a survivor, not within the wreckage, but lying in the distant sand, clinging
09:34to life.
09:35A gentleman seated all the way in the back, that didn't have a seatbelt on, so when the airplane crashed
09:41and broke apart, he was thrown free.
09:45He shows only faint signs of life, as an ambulance rushes him to hospital in critical condition.
09:53Defying all expectations, the man's condition soon stabilizes, and he begins to recover.
09:59This passenger's luck cannot be overstated in what was Algeria's worst aviation accident at the time.
10:08He is the sole survivor out of 103 passengers and crew.
10:14While the country mourns the tragic loss of a football squad, Algerian and French families grieve their loved ones, and
10:23soon demand answers.
10:29The investigation into the crash of Flight 6289 is conducted by a commission of inquiry established by the Algerian Ministry
10:39of Transport.
10:40They receive support from several international agencies, including the NTSB, America's National Transportation Safety Board.
10:51I was the U.S. accredited representative for this accident to assist the Algerians.
10:56Initially, I wasn't going to travel to the scene.
10:58However, the U.S. ambassador to Algeria requested our assistance.
11:05While Algerian investigators await the arrival of their American colleagues, they interview the Taman-Rasset air traffic controller.
11:16Did the pilots indicate that there was an issue?
11:21The first officer called only seconds after takeoff.
11:30Pilots typically are hesitant to call Mayday, Mayday, or announce some type of emergency, particularly if they really don't know
11:40what the situation and the critical nature of the situation is.
11:45And what was the problem?
11:48They didn't say, but I heard something that sounded like an explosion.
11:54Seconds later, the plane was falling out of the sky.
11:59You said an explosion.
12:02That's what it sounded like.
12:05Like a bomb?
12:10Couldn't say.
12:15so in 2003 algeria was not the safest place there was bombings and terrorist
12:19activities because they were coming out of 11 years of civil war
12:26when the plane fell was it in one piece yes it was investigators found the airplane intact
12:34there are no claims of responsibility by terrorists so it pretty much ruled out that
12:40there was some type of nefarious means to bring the aircraft down can you describe how the plane fell
12:48it was nose up and crashed near the threshold of runway 20
12:57the controller and other witnesses saw that the airplane was struggling to climb had a nose high
13:04pitch attitude and then impact the ground eyewitnesses recall that the plane struggled
13:11to gain enough lift to remain airborne an indication it was in a stall
13:18one week after the incident Algerian investigators are joined by a member of the NTSB
13:27air traffic controller and witnesses described seeing a stall and one witness remarked that the landing
13:34there was down if the landing gear is still down while the aircraft is trying to climb it creates
13:41a lot of drag on that airplane it takes a lot of thrust and a lot of power to maintain
13:47the climb
13:48to overcome all that drag from the landing gear that would affect a plane's ability to climb but that
13:56alone wouldn't cause a stall that has to have been something else to the load sheets yes right here
14:04one of the big questions is about the aircraft weight because if you're too heavy you won't climb as
14:10well as if you're within the weight envelope investigators review the plane's load sheet to see if the plane was
14:18overweight before takeoff it's like the first officer made some corrections here while reviewing the load
14:26sheet the first officer notices the fuel weight is wrong and changes it from 8800 kilograms to the
14:34correct amount of 9800 kilograms so with those corrections the way to take off would have been
14:4748,708 kilograms and the maximum weight allowed at takeoff would be 49,500 kilograms
14:54the first officer noticed that there was a thousand kilo difference and passenger count was a little
15:01bit off which didn't make a whole lot of difference in the overall weight and balance but did show that
15:06she was very attentive in her duties the aircraft weight was right up against the maximum takeoff weight
15:13even though it was heavy the aircraft weight shouldn't have affected the performance too much
15:18what mechanical failure
15:21i did the maintenance reports
15:26investigators make sure that the maintenance is clean and the aircraft has a clean bill of health
15:31prior to the flight
15:35it was up to date in its maintenance cycle no work deferred no technical exemptions the maintenance reports provide no
15:45leads
15:46maybe there was an environmental factor at play take a look at this did the location of the airport have
15:55something to do with the stall temperatures 23 degrees celsius so it's hot tamaraset is in a harsh desert climate
16:05and the high temperatures can affect the aircraft performance and climb
16:11and the airport sits at 4518 feet above sea level at this altitude the air is already thin if you
16:19factor in the heat it's high density altitude that affects the performance of the air
16:25the airplane so it's generating much less lift over the wings so it takes longer to get the airplane airborne
16:32so just a few pounds below max takeoff weight high elevation airport high temperature landing gear extended
16:40that could definitely cause a plane to stall
16:44but that doesn't explain the explosion
16:47right
16:47what are we missing
16:56investigators study the crash site of flight 6289 for evidence that could explain the explosion heard seconds after takeoff
17:06so the first point of impact is here
17:145396 feet from the takeoff point
17:17skidded through the airport perimeter fence across the road and came to rest here less than 300 feet outside of
17:25the airport
17:34the plane's destroyed by the fire the main wreckage is practically in one piece except for the rear section
17:40and look at this debris
17:43this was on the runway right about here
17:48engine debris
17:52on the runway we found a large quantity of engine debris which is indicative of an engine shelling
17:56when a large quantity of engine blades are thrown out the back end of an engine
18:04it's an old adage in accident investigation
18:07what fails first falls first
18:12so if they find debris prior to finding the wreckage then they know that happened prior to the accident
18:18so one of the engines blew out
18:20that must have been the explosion the controller hurt
18:25what caused the engine failure
18:29we needed to get our eyes on those engines to determine which failed and why it failed
18:35investigators begin a visual inspection of the plane's engines starting with the right one
18:41take a look at the fan blades
18:44heavy deformation
18:47it was definitely rotating at the time of impact
18:51on the right engine we showed that it was turning at impact
18:54we don't know what exactly what level of thrust it was rotating at
19:00if the right engine was operating on impact
19:04then did the left engine fail
19:10these turbine blades have far fewer deformations than the right engine
19:14looks like it was barely moving
19:17the hot section is completely torn apart
19:21in an engines hot section fuel is ignited in the combustion chamber
19:26generating a powerful stream of hot air that spins the turbine blades
19:33the damage is evidence that the left engine failed
19:37we knew that the failure was in the hot section
19:40so we had to follow every lead that we could to determine where the failure occurred
19:51there's a bunch of blades missing from the hot section
19:55the missing pieces are most likely the debris that we found on the runway
19:59we found that the hot section was basically corn cobbed as we say
20:04there was not many blades left in the hot section and there was metal all over the place
20:10what caused the blades to break
20:13let's get some of these parts out on the table
20:16we wanted to further tear down the engine
20:19we wanted to look at the failures under the microscope
20:21we wanted to look at the metallurgical aspects of the failure
20:24we wanted to look to see if there was a bird strike
20:28investigators begin by examining components from the hot section
20:31in search of pre-existing defects
20:36managed to remove the sediment from the nozzle vein
20:45nozzle guide vanes direct the hot air flow in the combustion chamber
20:49to the blades of the high-pressure turbine causing them to spin
20:59interesting
21:14looks like there's a fatigue crack in the nozzle guide vanes
21:19investigators find evidence of fatigue cracks in two of the left engine's nozzle guide vanes
21:26this type of cracking occurs over time and as the engine ages
21:29these cracks get slightly larger and eventually they will fail
21:33and it will destroy the entire engine
21:38if this was a progressive failure why wasn't it caught earlier
21:45this type of cracking is typical of an older engine and it's a progressive failure
21:49so that gets us into the question of what was the maintenance history
21:52what was the inspection criteria that was used by the operator
21:57investigators look into the engine's repair history
22:02it looks like the left engine was completely overhauled four years ago
22:07when would have been the last time they looked at the nozzle guide vanes?
22:10during the hot section maintenance inspection which was last year
22:15any mention of cracking?
22:17any work done on any of them?
22:21inspections of the hot section are meant to catch fatigue cracks
22:25so why weren't these found?
22:28since this was an Algerian registered aircraft
22:31it falls under the authority of the Algerian Civil Aviation Authority
22:34for oversight of the inspection
22:37not the FAA which typically has more stringent requirements
22:42the crack formed at some point
22:44it was missed during the inspection last year
22:47it grew and grew until point of failure and then blew out at takeoff
22:51that explains why the engine failed
22:54not why the plane stalled
22:57pilots are expected to demonstrate their ability
23:00to fly out of a situation either on takeoff or landing where they've lost an engine
23:07investigators examined the crew's training records
23:10to determine if they knew how to handle a single engine failure on takeoff
23:17the first officer's last exercise in engine failure during takeoff was four months ago
23:22the captain's training was even more recent only two months before the crash
23:26they both should have known what to do in this situation
23:31they've got the airplane veering to the left
23:35there's no way they didn't know that engine failed
23:39so what did they actually do?
23:46investigators prepare to listen to the cockpit voice recorder from Air Algerie flight 6289
23:54it was very important for us to listen to the CVR to determine how the pilots dealt with this engine
23:59failure
24:00got it queued up to right before takeoff
24:18they hear the sound of the engine failing five seconds after takeoff
24:25bismillah
24:26what's going on
24:29let go, let go
24:30I let go, I let go
24:35they transferred control in the middle of an emergency
24:38that didn't even sound like a proper transfer
24:41he just took the controls
24:43for another pilot to take control
24:46from the pilot who is flying
24:48the pilot needs to say I've got it
24:51taking control of the airplane
24:52without saying he was taking control
24:55made things worse
24:56for him and for the first officer
24:58the captain is the pilot monitoring
25:00he shouldn't be taking over
25:01he should be diagnosing the problem
25:03so
25:04do either of them identify a left engine failure
25:10after handing over control to the captain
25:12the first officer realizes they aren't properly configured to climb with only one engine
25:20get up or are we okay
25:23but there's no response from the captain
25:27we have a small problem 6289
25:306289
25:33just seconds after the engine failure
25:36the situation deteriorates as the plane begins to stall
25:45there are no attempts by the pilots to work together to identify or troubleshoot the problem
25:52let go, take your hand away
25:53I let go, I let go
25:54let go, take your hand away
25:56I let go
25:59seconds later the ground proximity warning activates
26:03indicating the plane is getting dangerously close to the ground
26:08please
26:08take your hand away
26:11both pilots really didn't know what the other was doing
26:14didn't know what the other expected of them
26:16and may well have been working at cross purposes
26:20and as a result of that the team performance broke down
26:25don't sink
26:27don't sink
26:32I don't hear a single mention of engine failure
26:35and why was he telling her to let go so many times
26:37was she trying to take back control of the plane
26:40which one of them is actually flying the plane
26:43when all is said and done
26:44the pilots did not work together
26:46without more information from the flight data recorder
26:49we really don't know exactly what they did to control the airplane
26:54Investigators turned to the flight data recorder
26:57or FDR from flight 6289
27:00to determine how the pilots tried to recover from the loss of the left engine
27:05Flight data recorders are important to investigators
27:08because it gives them information on how the pilots were operating the airplane
27:13and how they were managing the critical situation they were in
27:19not much here
27:21older plane, older FDR
27:25it doesn't actually tell us how the pilots were handling the engine failure
27:30because we only had five parameters on the FDR
27:33we had to go to Boeing and ask for a detailed aircraft performance analysis
27:37to determine what happened on this accident flight
27:43using the FDR's limited data
27:47Boeing's performance study includes a reconstruction of engine operations
27:51and flight controls in the final moments of the flight
27:57so there is the left engine losing its thrust after it blows out
28:02that's odd
28:04the data from the fully functioning right engine shows something unexpected
28:10look at the thrust from the right engine
28:12yes it seems to be going up and down
28:15but we know it was working fine
28:17that can only mean one thing
28:23Bismillah, what's going on?
28:26the team finds evidence of thrust being added to the right engine
28:31let's go, let's go
28:32and then pulled back
28:34I let go, I let go
28:37when one engine fails
28:39what you need is maximum power on the other engine
28:42not reduce it
28:44so thrust is pulled down
28:47then back up
28:48then down
28:50then back up again
28:53we have a small problem, 6289
28:566289, comment on set
29:02let go
29:03let go
29:06it's as if they were having some sort of a tug of war
29:10they shouldn't have been
29:12first officer did the right thing
29:14by increasing the power of the right engine
29:17what likely happened is that the captain wasn't fully aware of which engine had failed
29:21however the first officer knew that the left engine had failed
29:26and was trying to push up the throttle on the right engine
29:28to keep them from stalling
29:34let go
29:34let go, take your hand away
29:35I let go, I let go
29:36let go, take your hand away
29:38I let go, I let go
29:39don't think
29:41don't think
29:44the captain's basically telling the first officer to get out of his way
29:48to leave him alone
29:49to let him be in charge of the airplane by himself, which he was
29:56knowing that the left engine had failed
29:57the first officer might have been trying to help things out by increasing the power on the right engine
30:03please
30:04take your hand away
30:11the moment the captain reduced the thrust on the right engine
30:14and never returned it to takeoff thrust
30:16with the gear down, it doomed the flight
30:22pilots should have been able to work together to recover the plane
30:26these planes are designed to fly with a team
30:29pilot flying, pilot not flying
30:31both have very specific roles that they are trained
30:35to do
30:37but especially in emergencies
30:39they stay in their roles
30:40they help each other, they work as a team
30:43and this crash could have been avoided if they would have done that
30:48why didn't the crew of Air Algerie Flight 6289 work together to prevent the loss of 102 lives
30:59ok, I'll queue it up to the pre-flight preparations
31:05investigators returned to the cockpit voice recording of Flight 6289
31:10to understand why there was a lack of coordination between the two pilots
31:26they listen as the first officer works through the pre-flight checklist
31:30they're surprised by what they don't hear
31:35where's the captain?
31:37is she doing the flight preparation by herself?
31:48we found that the first officer was actually in the cockpit by herself conducting most of the pre-flight work
31:55without the captain
31:59it's unusual for the captain not to be present during the pre-flight
32:04because there are responsibilities that the captain has to get his side of the airplane ready
32:10it's just inappropriate for the captain not to be in the cockpit during the pre-flight
32:15and it's actually kind of rude
32:18it's only after the first officer completes the pre-flight preparations that the captain enters the cockpit
32:25the last Q&H 1019
32:281019 Roger
32:30good afternoon captain
32:31how are we looking?
32:33good
32:34I completed the pre-flight checklist
32:36I tested your oxygen and everything is set to go
32:39good, good
32:43Captain Benwisha is late
32:45leaving his responsibilities to the first officer
32:48when the captain showed up
32:50when the captain showed up he was not in the mindset of getting brought up to speed
32:54or being part of the team of setting the cockpit up for the flight
33:01heading
33:02020
33:04altitude
33:06investigators then hear the pilots performing their before start checklist
33:11280
33:12you know, I could have been on the team with those boys back there
33:16give me a break
33:17who's the third voice?
33:20flight attendant?
33:23the only male flight attendant is the chief flight attendant
33:29takeoff speeds
33:31as part of the checklist the first officer reviews the takeoff speeds
33:38V1, 144 knots
33:41VR, 146 knots
33:43are you saying you were good enough to turn pro?
33:46yeah
33:47I was a good footy player
33:49you wanted a scout come watch me play
33:50yeah, they were scouting you to mow the pitch
33:56V2, 150 knots
33:57ok, that's enough, I understand
33:59can we go?
34:01I got it, I got it, let's go
34:08so the captain is just carrying on a conversation with his friend
34:10while they're doing their before start checklist
34:13what is even worse is he cuts her off before they could even finish it
34:18one of the most important parts of the information that she was trying to give
34:23were the takeoff speeds
34:24and then there should have been a briefing of an engine failure departure
34:31at this airport that was a special departure that needed to be briefed
34:35it was ignored
34:39did the captain become more focused once they began to taxi?
34:44roger
34:45taxiing for runway is 0-2
34:48what investigators find most shocking is what they hear next
34:57where are we eating tonight?
34:59that place across from the hotel
35:01oh, you always go back to the same place
35:04I like what I like
35:05we are now cheers
35:07plenty of good spots to eat
35:10they are completely distracted
35:12they're violating every sterile cockpit rule
35:16during critical phases of flight
35:19extraneous conversations and non-essential conversations
35:21between the crew members are prohibited
35:23not only is the captain dismissing the first officer
35:26he has this casual attitude about basic safety practices
35:31it's possible he was more interested in talking to the flight attendant
35:35than reviewing the briefing with the first officer
35:37it's possible that he had been through so many pre-flight takeoff briefings
35:42that at that time he felt it was unnecessary
35:49bismillah
35:50what's going on?
35:55let go, let go, let go
35:56I let go, I let go
35:57as a result of his dismissive attitude
35:59the captain is unprepared to properly respond
36:03when the crisis occurs shortly after takeoff
36:09had the pilots completed their pre-flight safety briefing
36:13their response to the engine failure might have been very different
36:24gear up
36:28engine failure, left engine
36:30and then, fly V2 plus 25
36:32lowering the nose to 12 degrees
36:35V2
36:38gear up
36:39once the plane was stabilized
36:41the pilots could have returned safely to the airport
36:45engine failure is actually a relatively common occurrence
36:49every pilot needs to be prepared and trained
36:52so instead of letting the first officer fly the plane while he diagnoses the issue
36:57he tries to do everything himself
36:58and transferring control during an emergency situation
37:02there was never a positive transfer of control
37:05the captain just took the control yoke away from the first officer
37:11so he injected himself in the emergency
37:19let go, let go
37:20I let go, I let go
37:22the captain took control
37:24at the worst possible time
37:26when he was out of the loop
37:27and by not assigning responsibility to her
37:30he gave himself the responsibility of doing two things at once
37:34diagnosing the nature of the engine problem
37:36and then flying the airplane
37:39please
37:40by trying to fly the plane and diagnose the problem on his own
37:45the captain took on too much
37:49it put the first officer in a very difficult position
37:53she's now in the supportive role, the non-flying role, waiting to be told what to do
37:59and he's not giving any helpful orders other than let go
38:07why would an experienced captain so brazenly dismiss his first officer's help
38:13risking the lives of everyone on board
38:21investigators look into the pilots' backgrounds
38:23in an attempt to understand why the captain took over from his first officer in the midst of an emergency
38:31so the captain actually had twice as many flying hours as the first officer
38:36the captain was both qualified as a captain on a 737 but also as a first officer on a 767
38:43perhaps his attitude was that flying the 737 was not that big of a deal
38:49because I fly a 767 which is much more sophisticated and highly technical
38:55but she had more hours on the 737
38:58not only did she have more experience flying the 737
39:01that's the only plane that she was flying
39:05I think there's a good chance that had she been left alone
39:08she would have flown the airplane out of the scenario that we saw in this accident
39:13the question is would he have reacted the same way if the first officer was a man
39:20in 2003 at the time of this crash
39:24here in the states female airline pilots only constituted less than 6% of the pilot population
39:30and it really hasn't changed that much in the 20 years since then
39:35the first officer was Algeria's first female commercial airline pilot
39:41my friend male pilots in this part of the world
39:46aren't used to sharing a cockpit with women
39:51I think Algeria is becoming fairly westernized
39:53but in some cultures there is the feeling that a man has to be up in the cockpit in case
39:58anything goes wrong
40:00why did this captain take control from the first officer when she was doing an okay job at that point
40:06and I think you can't rule out the possibility that there may have been some gender stereotyping on his part
40:13that played a role in it
40:16sadly this accident was totally preventable
40:24investigators now have a clear picture of what led to the crash of flight 6289
40:32V1 144 knots
40:36VR 146 knots
40:37you are saying you were good enough to turn pro
40:39after arriving late and allowing the flight attendant into the cockpit
40:44the captain interrupted a crucial pre-flight safety briefing
40:49V2 150 knots
40:51okay that's enough I understand
40:53can we go?
40:55I got it I got it let's go
40:56the captain demonstrated a lax attitude towards cockpit protocols
41:04fatigue cracks in a nozzle guide vane in the plane's left engine were reaching their braking point
41:10and when the guide vane failed
41:13it set off a chain reaction
41:15high speed metal fragments ripped the engine apart
41:20let go let go
41:22I let go I let go
41:23when crisis struck
41:25the captain decided he needed to be the one to handle the controls
41:29and took over flying from his first officer before even identifying the problem
41:35the engine failure alone was not the cause of this accident
41:39engines fail and pilots are trained to handle those emergencies
41:46failing to retract the landing gear after the engine failure made recovery more difficult
41:52let go take your hand away
41:54I let go I let go
41:55let go take your hand away
41:56I let go
42:05it was the captain's assumption of control of the aircraft without properly identifying the nature of the emergency
42:12his failure to raise the landing gear and his lack of adherence to standard operating procedures that eventually doomed the
42:21flight
42:23as a result of this accident
42:25algeria's commission of inquiry makes several recommendations
42:31they recommend that air algeri along with other operators ensure that their crew resource management training programs emphasize the importance
42:40of handover procedures and task sharing in the cockpit
42:45but in the 1980s they had captains who were trying to fly a team airplane solo
42:53so a lot of training went into it to teach that your best resource is your team
42:58you support each other and work together as a team for the safety of the airplane
43:05the fact that the captain insisted on taking over control of the airplane at that critical moment
43:12cost everybody on that airplane their lives
43:17I felt particularly affected when I saw that the accident was preventable
43:23and I think the investigators did the best job they could trying to discover why the crew made the errors
43:28that they did
43:29the next time that happens people won't die as a result of that
43:34for Lynn Rippelmeyer
43:35it's one more example of why the industry needs to continue evolving
43:41the airlines now are much more open to hiring women
43:47to not having gender bias
43:48realizing that women do have a lot to contribute to the industry
43:55and I think it's up to women now to step up to the plate and take the opportunities that the
44:00career offers
44:01they're amazing
44:02you
44:02you
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