American Experience - Season 37 Episode 07 Kissinger Part Two - video Dailymotion

Horizon.Cast

American Experience - Season 37 Episode 07 Kissinger Part Two    #EnglishMovie #cdrama #drama #engsub #chinesedramaengsub #movieshortfull

Transcript

00:00:00Richard Nixon is getting his daughter married at the White House.

00:00:23In the meantime, behind the scenes,

00:00:25this fellow Daniel Ellsberg has leaked the secret history of the Vietnam War to the New York Times.

00:00:35And on the same Sunday, where there's the picture of Trisha Nixon being married,

00:00:40there's this story about the Pentagon Papers.

00:00:44Daniel Ellsberg, ex-Pentagon employee, made history by leaking to the New York Times,

00:00:48the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret study of Vietnam policy.

00:00:53Pentagon Papers were 7,000 pages of secret history of the war in Vietnam,

00:00:58commissioned by Robert McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense,

00:01:01who became disillusioned with the war and wanted a full record of how we got into it and how it went wrong.

00:01:10Nixon reads his newspaper and his daily briefings and doesn't care about it.

00:01:15Most of the Pentagon Papers are about Johnson and Kennedy. They're not about him.

00:01:19Hello?

00:01:19Mr. President, I have Dr. Kissinger calling you.

00:01:21Okay.

00:01:22But for some reason, Henry Kissinger reads this story in the New York Times and goes ballistic.

00:01:29It's treasonable. There's no question. It's actionable. I'm absolutely certain that this violates all sorts of security laws.

00:01:37What, what do we do about it?

00:01:39Kissinger is convinced that Daniel Ellsberg, if he had access to the Pentagon Papers,

00:01:46has access to what's going on in Cambodia. And he's obsessed that Ellsberg's next step is to

00:01:52release information about the secret bombing campaign in Cambodia.

00:01:57Ten years in prison was very cheap if they could contribute to ending this war.

00:02:01Ellsberg was the Kissinger protege. And so,

00:02:04Kissinger is worried that the finger eventually is going to come back at him.

00:02:09Kissinger describes Ellsberg as unhinged.

00:02:13Of course, that son of a bitch. I know him well. He was annoying.

00:02:16Oh, well, from early 69 on, he just went off his rocket. Just totally wild. And he's moved into a more

00:02:24and more and more in transition, uh, radical position.

00:02:28So it's Kissinger that gins up Nixon about Ellsberg.

00:02:32Kissinger's son of a bitch. We've got to get here. We've got to get here.

00:02:38Kissinger's frantic, self-protective reaction to the exposure of the Pentagon Papers

00:02:44drives Nixon to a place which eventually becomes the first step towards Watergate.

00:02:48Kissinger's fixtures over Portugal.

00:03:08so

00:03:14in

00:03:15I don't know.

00:03:45From the very beginning of Nixon's administration, Kissinger was running all the major elements of foreign policy.

00:04:01The three major immediate objectives were all with communist countries, China, Russia, and Vietnam.

00:04:06The broad strategy was to know where you want to go over the long run, to see how the pieces fit.

00:04:14So what you did with one country, how it would affect another country.

00:04:18And I think Kissinger felt you had to reconcile the just with the possible.

00:04:24Vietnam to Kissinger and to Nixon was a thorn in their side.

00:04:36They wanted it off page one so they could get to all the kind of things that Nixon had on his very expansive and aggressive foreign policy plate.

00:04:44You couldn't do those until you had the Vietnam question settled.

00:04:50The United States seemed hemmed in in Vietnam.

00:04:54We seemed unable to do anything right.

00:04:58But Kissinger recognized that there was a lot of power in taking the initiative.

00:05:02Before they came to power, both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger thought what might be done with China.

00:05:27I think it took the two of them spending time together contemplating the great chessboard of the Cold War to realize that if we can only establish some communications with China, that could be helpful in a number of ways.

00:05:46It could help you with the Vietnam problem.

00:05:48It could also help you with the Soviets.

00:05:52We had, for the last few decades, assumed that communism was a seamless whole.

00:05:56Well, suddenly not so much.

00:05:59In the late 60s, you started to see friction and then clashes between the Soviets and the Chinese along border areas.

00:06:05And you had people in the intelligence community saying, hey, rather than being on the same team, these guys are in different teams.

00:06:13There's actually a split, which we began to call the Sino-Soviet split.

00:06:17A disputed frontier between the dragon and the bear.

00:06:22A war broke out, a border dispute between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

00:06:29More importantly, there was an ideological battle for leadership of the communist world.

00:06:37This was the setting within which Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger developed perhaps the boldest ploy in all of Cold War statecraft.

00:06:48Mao's China was probably the most closed country in the world.

00:06:58There were very few people who went in there.

00:07:01There really was this place on the moon.

00:07:04Nobody really knew what was going on inside.

00:07:08Mao's policies had reduced China to one of the lowest standards of living in the world.

00:07:14I was born in late 1959, 10 years after the communists took over China.

00:07:30Mao was our red sun, was the savior of China.

00:07:35We were schooled on all this anti-Western propaganda.

00:07:39I grew up seeing these famous Korean war movies called Heroic Children.

00:07:48And in it, you see American soldiers played by Chinese actors with fake noses and white powder.

00:07:59And they were incredibly ridiculous creatures who would be mauled down by Chinese machine guns.

00:08:05So that was the very cartoonish picture of Americans that we had in our head.

00:08:16As we came into office, one week after his inauguration...

00:08:21You, Richard, Milhouse, Nixon...

00:08:23Nixon sent a memo to Kissinger and said, get in touch with the Chinese, see what we can do.

00:08:28One week, you can see his priority.

00:08:29This is where the story gets the most cloak and the most dagger.

00:08:36The process of trying to get in touch with Beijing started almost immediately in 1969.

00:08:43But it was extremely difficult because the Chinese were extremely hard to get to.

00:08:48The Chinese had no diplomatic representatives anywhere in the world.

00:08:51Even having an address where you could confidentially and reliably communicate with the Chinese didn't exist.

00:09:01So what they had to do is find discreet intermediaries who could play that role.

00:09:07Of all countries, it turned out to be Pakistan that made the connection happen.

00:09:15Today's highlight is the new ambassador from Pakistan and his family.

00:09:19And what would happen is that the Chinese would send a secret message which would end up with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington who would call on Kissinger with the message.

00:09:30In January 1971, we had sent a message and we hadn't heard back for months.

00:09:36And indeed, we got quite nervous.

00:09:40Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, were great believers in the subtle approach.

00:09:46And so the faintest of signals were sent out from Beijing to the effect that there might possibly be a conversation worth having.

00:10:01April of 1971, in Japan, an American ping-pong team was playing in international ping-pong matches.

00:10:10And one of the participants in that was the People's Republic of China.

00:10:14What happened was there was a young, sort of a hippie ping-pong player with long hair and tie-dyed shirts, and he got on the wrong bus.

00:10:25It was the Chinese bus.

00:10:27And met their star player.

00:10:30And they kind of got to be friends.

00:10:33And on the basis of that, I think Zhou Enlai saw a little flash of light.

00:10:39One of the coaches from the People's Republic approached the Americans about the possibility of them coming to China to play exhibition.

00:10:49This was an extraordinary moment and received incredible coverage in the American media.

00:10:55The first films are now coming out of red China of the visit by the first U.S. group ever invited by the Chinese communists.

00:11:03Today, Premier Zhou Enlai met the visiting players.

00:11:06He told them their visit opens a new door.

00:11:08It was a signal that, yes, there was an opportunity to send an American representative to Beijing.

00:11:18The question was, who would that be?

00:11:22Secrecy was crucial, and that meant that Nixon could only really entrust it to the one person who already knew that this was his cherished goal.

00:11:33And that was Henry Kissinger.

00:11:34I knew nothing about China.

00:11:38That's a great qualification for a secret mission, but it happens to be true.

00:11:43I had the same thought in the 50s that everyone else did, that the Chinese were revolutionary near-madmen.

00:11:56We had to set up what the cover store would be.

00:12:01So we go on a public trip to four countries.

00:12:07And we stop, of course, in Pakistan.

00:12:11Henry's cover was going to be that he's got a stomachache.

00:12:14Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger is staying an extra day in Pakistan because of an upset stomach.

00:12:19So, at 2 a.m., we're driven to the Islamabad airport by the defense minister.

00:12:27The four of us get on the plane.

00:12:31And so here we are flying toward Beijing.

00:12:34None of the world knows where we are.

00:12:37We were exhilarated and anxious.

00:12:39I mean, this was a gamble.

00:12:40This is no sure thing.

00:12:47He landed in a military airport in Beijing.

00:12:50And, of course, we drove in automobiles where the curtains were down.

00:12:54Nobody could see us.

00:12:55Kissinger was deeply impressed by Zhou Enmai, the Chinese premier.

00:13:03And this was one of the great meetings of minds that happened in his career.

00:13:09He was a man of extraordinary intelligence.

00:13:13One of the most intelligent people I've ever met.

00:13:15He had an extraordinarily expressive face.

00:13:20He understood English, though he did not admit it.

00:13:23So, his face registered while you talked to him.

00:13:28The driving force was hopes that if we could pull China more into our orbit,

00:13:34we could resolve the Vietnam War.

00:13:38Most of the military equipment going to North Vietnam was coming through China.

00:13:43I remember him telling Zhou Enmai,

00:13:46we don't want to wake up in the morning in the second term

00:13:49reading battlefield reports from Vietnam.

00:13:52One term was enough.

00:13:55The Chinese had two major goals.

00:13:57One was to balance the Soviet Union, which is increasingly threatening them.

00:14:02And the other was coming out of diplomatic isolation.

00:14:05The key issue, of course, we had to get around was the Taiwan issue.

00:14:09And so Kissinger made it clear to the Chinese

00:14:12that the United States would withdraw some of its forces from Taiwan

00:14:16if the Vietnam War came to an end.

00:14:23Toward the end of the talks,

00:14:25it was finally raised that President Nixon would come to China.

00:14:29I think Kissinger did have a recognition something big had happened.

00:14:35After all, he had gotten to the top of China.

00:14:39And he had, in effect, triggered an invitation for Nixon himself.

00:14:48I do remember how jubilant he was when he returned from his secret trip.

00:14:53I had never seen him like that before.

00:14:55He was just vibrating with excitement.

00:15:01Kissinger briefs Nixon,

00:15:03and Nixon schedules a national television speech.

00:15:07Good evening.

00:15:07The secrecy was such that people thought it was about Vietnam.

00:15:12It hit the nation on a Sunday night as a complete surprise.

00:15:15I have taken this action because of my profound conviction

00:15:21that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions

00:15:27and a better relationship between the United States

00:15:31and the People's Republic of China.

00:15:35Details of Henry Kissinger's secret trip,

00:15:37which led to that announcement,

00:15:38were spelled out today in a factual account

00:15:40which makes most detective story fiction seem bland.

00:15:43Henry, can you just tell us,

00:15:45do you feel encouraged as a result of your trip to Peking?

00:15:49I think we made some progress.

00:15:53The Taiwanese ambassador was visibly upset.

00:15:56I got a 20-minute notice last night.

00:16:00I couldn't believe it.

00:16:01We think that's not the kind of thing a friend and an ally

00:16:04should do to another.

00:16:06Observers may argue over whether Dr. Henry Kissinger

00:16:14is a secret swinger or a square masquerading as one,

00:16:18but there's no doubt he is the deputy president on this trip.

00:16:21The brilliant, elusive intellectual

00:16:23who has structured the substance of the top-level talks

00:16:26will be at the president's side throughout.

00:16:30We heard this official announcement

00:16:33that Nixon was coming to China.

00:16:35I still remember rounds of school briefings

00:16:39to prepare in case you should encounter

00:16:43any Americans on the street.

00:16:46The correct attitude is not too arrogant

00:16:49and not too obsequious.

00:16:54And I remember when Nixon actually landed.

00:16:59Somehow I have a sense

00:17:01this was a super important moment

00:17:04that's going to, in some ways, change your life.

00:17:08The first American president ever to do so

00:17:11steps onto Chinese soil.

00:17:12The meetings with Mao Zedong took place

00:17:20in an area adjacent to the Forbidden City

00:17:23called Zhongnanhai,

00:17:25and that's where Mao held court.

00:17:27The fact that Chairman Mao arranged

00:17:29an immediate meeting with the American chief of state

00:17:31in his home

00:17:32is considered significant by diplomatic observers.

00:17:34Just to be there was to be in the most forbidden,

00:17:40inaccessible place on earth.

00:17:42I think it must have been quite exhilarating.

00:17:46It's one of those few experiences you have

00:17:49when you are an adult

00:17:51which have some of the quality of childhood about them

00:17:54that everything is totally new.

00:17:56We were used to these elegant Mandarin discourses

00:18:02by Zhou Enlai.

00:18:04What we got from Mao

00:18:05was laconic phrases, allegories,

00:18:08either that were brilliant

00:18:09and we stupid Westerners couldn't understand

00:18:12or he was slightly senile.

00:18:15Mao was a great performer.

00:18:18He said a Chinese phrase.

00:18:21He said the wind and rain are coming

00:18:24so the swallows are busy.

00:18:27Kissinger's reaction was,

00:18:29oh, that was so deep,

00:18:31it would take me several days

00:18:32to fully grasp that.

00:18:34But in fact,

00:18:35this is a very tacky,

00:18:37trite Chinese, you know, sort of saying.

00:18:41Kissinger ate it right up.

00:18:44Zhou and Nixon sit down for conversations

00:18:46which last for more than 30 hours.

00:18:49The result is the Shanghai Communique.

00:18:52You can see the mastery of Kissinger's diplomacy

00:18:54by looking at what's called

00:18:55the Shanghai Communique,

00:18:57which is how do you get around the problem

00:18:59that the United States basically thinks

00:19:01Taiwan is the real China.

00:19:03So what did they do

00:19:05to put the Taiwan question aside?

00:19:08They agreed on this very guileful solution

00:19:11where the United States,

00:19:13there's a word in Chinese,

00:19:15they said it was,

00:19:16we acknowledge,

00:19:18we take note of the fact

00:19:21that China says Taiwan is part of China.

00:19:26It's masterful in its obfuscation and vagueness,

00:19:31but it somehow satisfied everyone.

00:19:33It was a dream come true

00:19:40for Richard Nixon himself

00:19:41and also for Henry Kissinger.

00:19:45This was good news

00:19:47after an unremissing diet of bad news

00:19:50over Vietnam and over Cambodia.

00:19:53It felt as though

00:19:55they were changing the subjects

00:19:57of the American conversation.

00:20:00We have witnessed

00:20:01through the miracle of satellite television

00:20:05the sights and sounds

00:20:07of a society that has been closed

00:20:10to Americans for over two decades.

00:20:15Opening to China was maybe in the 20th century

00:20:18the most strategic move

00:20:20that any president has ever made.

00:20:23It was the height of the Cold War.

00:20:25China and the Soviet Union were allies

00:20:28and we peeled off China.

00:20:31It was that simple.

00:20:33I think to see the real politic

00:20:36played out was very sobering.

00:20:39The whole thing was part

00:20:41of a geopolitical game

00:20:43to balance the Soviet Union.

00:20:46Nixon and Kissinger

00:20:48had no interest

00:20:49in helping improve

00:20:51the political situation in China.

00:20:56They had no thoughts

00:20:57not a iota of thoughts

00:21:00about human rights.

00:21:02At one level

00:21:03how could I expect anything more?

00:21:08I think it's a mistake

00:21:09to see Kissinger's realpolitik

00:21:12as an absence of morality.

00:21:13What he sees as the moral good

00:21:17is the preservation

00:21:18of American security.

00:21:21Where I think

00:21:22we begin to enter

00:21:23into a moral grey area

00:21:26for Kissinger

00:21:27is what means are acceptable

00:21:29in order to achieve that end.

00:21:32And I think

00:21:33he had very few limits.

00:21:36every president

00:21:39every national security advisor

00:21:41takes decisions

00:21:43in which there are priorities

00:21:45accorded to countries

00:21:47and in which evils are ranked

00:21:49not just according to their

00:21:50moral magnitude

00:21:52but more importantly

00:21:53according to their

00:21:54strategic magnitude.

00:21:56The East Pakistan

00:22:04crisis erupted

00:22:06at the time

00:22:08that Pakistan

00:22:09was our only channel

00:22:11of communication

00:22:12to China.

00:22:12We were in the process

00:22:15of arranging

00:22:17my secret trip

00:22:19in the precise period

00:22:21that West Pakistan

00:22:22was trying to put down

00:22:24the uprising

00:22:25in East Pakistan.

00:22:28The partition

00:22:29of British India

00:22:31had produced

00:22:31a strange situation

00:22:33in which there were

00:22:34essentially

00:22:34two parts to Pakistan.

00:22:37What we know today

00:22:38as Pakistan

00:22:39was West Pakistan.

00:22:41What we know today

00:22:42is Bangladesh

00:22:42was East Pakistan.

00:22:45East Pakistan

00:22:46and West Pakistan

00:22:47did not share a language

00:22:48they did not share culture

00:22:50they did not share history

00:22:51it's a complete recipe

00:22:53for conflict.

00:22:56In 1970

00:22:57the residents

00:22:59of East Pakistan

00:23:00voted overwhelmingly

00:23:01for a different government

00:23:03from the West Pakistanis.

00:23:05The eastern portion

00:23:07is beginning to revolt

00:23:08against the authority

00:23:10of the West Pakistani government

00:23:11it's got it's own

00:23:14elected parliament

00:23:15it's own elected leadership

00:23:16a man named Mujib

00:23:18and it's on the verge

00:23:20of civil war.

00:23:20And for me

00:23:21and for me

00:23:22and for me

00:23:23and for me

00:23:24and for me

00:23:25and for me

00:23:26and for me

00:23:27Yaya Khan

00:23:27is the channel

00:23:28through which

00:23:29Nixon and Kissinger

00:23:30are communicating

00:23:31with China

00:23:32and it's absolutely vital

00:23:34that he remain in power.

00:23:36President Yaya Khan

00:23:38of Pakistan

00:23:38flies to East Pakistan

00:23:40tomorrow

00:23:40to try to talk

00:23:41his opposition

00:23:42into obeying

00:23:43the central government.

00:23:45In Dhaka

00:23:46I was the junior

00:23:47political officer

00:23:48at 1.26

00:23:51in the morning

00:23:52of the 26th of March

00:23:54all hell broke loose.

00:23:58The West Pakistani military

00:24:00were unleashed

00:24:01with a vengeance

00:24:02automatic weapons

00:24:04right outside

00:24:05of our bedroom.

00:24:08The Pakistanis

00:24:09murdered large numbers

00:24:11of the opposition politicians

00:24:13in their beds at night

00:24:14killed their families

00:24:16raked Dhaka

00:24:18at the capital

00:24:19of East Pakistan

00:24:20with artillery

00:24:21wantonly killing

00:24:23innocent civilians.

00:24:26The Pakistani army

00:24:27went into Dhaka University

00:24:30and just rounded up academics

00:24:32including my uncles

00:24:34and disappeared them.

00:24:38I mean what was happening

00:24:39was genocide

00:24:41before our very eyes.

00:24:44We are in the process

00:24:45of attempting

00:24:46to negotiate

00:24:47a ceasefire

00:24:48in the Dhaka area

00:24:49in order to be able

00:24:51to evacuate

00:24:51the Americans.

00:24:53The Nixon administration

00:24:54had lots of information

00:24:57about what's happening.

00:24:59They're getting

00:24:59real-time reporting

00:25:01from the U.S. consulate

00:25:03in Dhaka.

00:25:04These foreign service officers

00:25:06have seen that kind

00:25:07of violence before

00:25:08and they're saying

00:25:09this is in a completely

00:25:11different category.

00:25:12We've never seen

00:25:14anything like this.

00:25:16None of them are liable.

00:25:17There's enormous pressure

00:25:19on Nixon and Kissinger

00:25:20to cut aid

00:25:22and military support

00:25:23for Pakistan

00:25:25but they choose

00:25:26not to do that.

00:25:28We were absolutely

00:25:30mortified that our government

00:25:31was not responding

00:25:33in what was

00:25:34a humanitarian disaster

00:25:37inflicted by a government

00:25:38that we supported.

00:25:39So a number of us

00:25:41especially younger officers

00:25:43felt that we needed

00:25:44to send in

00:25:45an expression of dissent.

00:25:48Our government

00:25:49has failed

00:25:50to denounce

00:25:51the suppression

00:25:51of democracy.

00:25:53Our government

00:25:54has failed

00:25:55to denounce atrocities.

00:25:57Our government

00:25:58has evidenced

00:25:59what many will consider

00:26:00moral bankruptcy.

00:26:02We've been in touch

00:26:04of course

00:26:04with the Pakistanis

00:26:05through messages

00:26:06that were sent

00:26:06to President Yahya

00:26:08and incidentally

00:26:09he's been very forthcoming.

00:26:11We can't be blamed for.

00:26:12There are many areas

00:26:13in the world

00:26:14that we just can't

00:26:16we can't be responsible for.

00:26:19I was shocked

00:26:20by the lack of reaction

00:26:22from Kissinger

00:26:23and Nixon.

00:26:25They seemed

00:26:26unaffected by it

00:26:29except in

00:26:30the sense

00:26:31that they wanted it

00:26:32to go away.

00:26:33As far as Kissinger

00:26:36was concerned

00:26:36these lives

00:26:38in South Asia

00:26:39they just

00:26:40didn't matter.

00:26:42We've never

00:26:43covered the bodies

00:26:44of my uncles.

00:26:47There could have been

00:26:48an arms cut off

00:26:49there could have been

00:26:50stronger measures

00:26:51taken against Pakistan

00:26:52which were not taken.

00:26:55Ultimately

00:26:56it comes down

00:26:57to Kissinger's assessment

00:26:58that what matters

00:27:00is China

00:27:00and what happens

00:27:03in East Pakistan

00:27:04is almost

00:27:04a footnote

00:27:05relative to

00:27:06these larger objectives.

00:27:09There are governments

00:27:11in power

00:27:12that may not meet

00:27:14all our criteria

00:27:16for democratic principles

00:27:17but the alternative

00:27:19to which

00:27:20are likely to be

00:27:21positively hostile

00:27:22to our interests

00:27:23to manipulate

00:27:25the domestic politics

00:27:27of another country

00:27:27is always

00:27:28an extremely

00:27:29complicated matter

00:27:31and you can start

00:27:33a process

00:27:33which you cannot

00:27:34control

00:27:35and you may not

00:27:35know how to do it.

00:27:41My first encounter

00:27:43with the great man

00:27:45was when

00:27:46there was a luncheon

00:27:47at our residence.

00:27:51My father was

00:27:51for the affairs minister

00:27:52and in this luncheon

00:27:54there was a big

00:27:55debate

00:27:56and Kissinger says

00:27:58look

00:27:59I don't care

00:28:00about Latin America

00:28:00I don't care

00:28:02about your development

00:28:03history doesn't

00:28:05go through the south

00:28:06history comes

00:28:07from Russia

00:28:09to Japan

00:28:09to Europe

00:28:10and to the United States

00:28:12the south

00:28:12has no importance.

00:28:18Kissinger

00:28:19called Chile

00:28:20a dagger pointed

00:28:21at the heart

00:28:22of Antarctica

00:28:22he did not think

00:28:24that Latin America

00:28:25was important

00:28:26he in fact said

00:28:27Latin America

00:28:28is not important.

00:28:30Chile was probably

00:28:31the country

00:28:32that first

00:28:32had a stable

00:28:34democracy

00:28:34in the region

00:28:35we had a democracy

00:28:37even before

00:28:38some European countries

00:28:39Salvador Allende

00:28:41was a person

00:28:42who had

00:28:43represented

00:28:44the hopes

00:28:45of the poor

00:28:45in Chile

00:28:46for decades

00:28:47and poor people

00:28:49felt that

00:28:49he was

00:28:50their leader.

00:28:53Allende

00:28:53was head

00:28:54of the Socialist Party

00:28:55he believed

00:28:56in the need

00:28:57for social change

00:28:59redistribution

00:29:00of wealth

00:29:00and that this

00:29:01could be done

00:29:01through the ballot box.

00:29:04There is a sense

00:29:05in Kissinger

00:29:06that Allende's

00:29:08example

00:29:08could proliferate

00:29:10all over the continent

00:29:11and he considers

00:29:13that one must

00:29:14stop the contagion.

00:29:17Allende

00:29:17made no secret

00:29:19of his

00:29:19determination

00:29:21to bring about

00:29:22a revolutionary

00:29:23transformation.

00:29:25Nobody wanted

00:29:26another Cuba.

00:29:28And so

00:29:28when any

00:29:29left-wing leader

00:29:30showed signs

00:29:31of coming to power

00:29:32in a Latin American

00:29:33country

00:29:34the red lights

00:29:35started flashing

00:29:36on the dashboard

00:29:38in the situation room.

00:29:39In the Cold War

00:29:43every inch

00:29:45of territory

00:29:45matters.

00:29:47It's a zero-sum game.

00:29:49Any victory

00:29:50for the communists

00:29:51is a loss

00:29:52for the United States.

00:29:55And so

00:29:55all eyes

00:29:56were on Chile

00:29:57on September 4th

00:29:581970

00:29:59as this election

00:30:01took place.

00:30:01The presidential

00:30:10election in Chile

00:30:11in 1970

00:30:12is a three-way race

00:30:13in which

00:30:14Salvador Allende

00:30:15wins

00:30:1636.6%

00:30:18of the vote.

00:30:20But this must

00:30:21be ratified

00:30:22by Congress

00:30:22so there is

00:30:24a chance

00:30:25for those

00:30:25who are against

00:30:26Allende

00:30:26to try

00:30:27to find a way

00:30:28to stop Allende

00:30:29from becoming president.

00:30:30Kissinger talks

00:30:33to CI Director

00:30:34Richard Helms

00:30:35on the phone

00:30:35and basically says

00:30:36we cannot let Chile

00:30:38go down the drain

00:30:39and Helms says

00:30:39I'm with you.

00:30:41And they start

00:30:42to plot out

00:30:43how they are going

00:30:44to keep Allende

00:30:44from actually

00:30:46being inaugurated

00:30:47as president.

00:30:51Kissinger says

00:30:52I don't see

00:30:53why we should

00:30:54let a country

00:30:54go communist

00:30:55just because

00:30:55of the irresponsibility

00:30:57of its own people.

00:31:00President Nixon

00:31:03called in

00:31:04to Richard Helms

00:31:04and Kissinger

00:31:05to the Oval Office

00:31:06and Helms

00:31:08took handwritten

00:31:08notes on

00:31:09Nixon's orders.

00:31:11Save Chile.

00:31:12Don't tell

00:31:12the ambassador.

00:31:14Make the economy

00:31:14scream.

00:31:1548-hour game plan.

00:31:18Nixon authorizes

00:31:19two tracks

00:31:20and then Kissinger

00:31:21carries these out.

00:31:23Track one

00:31:23is essentially

00:31:24an attempt

00:31:25to bribe

00:31:26the Chilean

00:31:26members of Congress

00:31:27from ratifying

00:31:28Allende.

00:31:30Track two

00:31:30is what becomes

00:31:31infamous.

00:31:33It is an effort

00:31:34to help

00:31:35the Chilean military

00:31:36institute a coup

00:31:38against Allende.

00:31:40The Chilean

00:31:41consultants

00:31:43that the CIA

00:31:44had

00:31:45and Kissinger

00:31:47had at the time

00:31:47recommended

00:31:48the kidnapping

00:31:50of the commander-in-chief

00:31:51of the armored forces.

00:31:53That meant

00:31:54General Schneider.

00:31:55General Rene Schneider

00:31:58head of the

00:31:58Chilean armed forces

00:31:59was pro-constitution.

00:32:02He was the principal

00:32:03obstacle

00:32:03to any coup plot

00:32:05involving the military

00:32:06and so he

00:32:07had to be removed

00:32:09neutralized

00:32:10eliminated.

00:32:13They sent machine guns

00:32:14through the pouch

00:32:15of the American embassy

00:32:16and 30,000 dollars

00:32:19for the general

00:32:19who was in charge

00:32:20of the Santiago.

00:32:22On October 22nd

00:32:26General Schneider

00:32:27got into his car

00:32:28the car drove

00:32:30three or four blocks

00:32:31it was intercepted

00:32:32by several other

00:32:34vehicles

00:32:34filled with thugs

00:32:35one thug

00:32:37got out

00:32:37with a sledgehammer

00:32:38and started smashing

00:32:39in the windows.

00:32:41General Schneider

00:32:42had a gun

00:32:44and he tried

00:32:45to defend himself

00:32:46and they killed him.

00:32:48Henry Kissinger

00:32:49gets on the phone

00:32:50with Richard Nixon

00:32:51as General Rene Schneider

00:32:53lies dying

00:32:54in a military hospital

00:32:56and he says

00:32:57the first step

00:32:59of the coup plot

00:32:59took place

00:33:00but such an incompetent bunch

00:33:02these Chilean military officers

00:33:03that the rest of the plot

00:33:05is not going forward.

00:33:06The shock

00:33:13that this murder

00:33:15produced

00:33:15in Sinan society

00:33:16instead of

00:33:18weakening Allende

00:33:19gave an enormous strength

00:33:21to the

00:33:22election of Allende

00:33:23Allende therefore

00:33:26was proclaimed

00:33:26president

00:33:27ten days later.

00:33:31Kissinger does not give up

00:33:32he wants Allende

00:33:34out of there.

00:33:34So there's an American effort

00:33:37to undermine

00:33:38his government

00:33:39and that includes

00:33:41cutting off loans

00:33:43and aid

00:33:43funding opposition parties

00:33:46opposition media

00:33:47and fomenting strikes.

00:33:50The first thing

00:33:52that Nixon said

00:33:53after the election

00:33:53of Allende

00:33:54was

00:33:54make the economy scream.

00:33:56In fact

00:33:57the economy screamed.

00:34:00A country becomes

00:34:01tense

00:34:02becomes polarized

00:34:03and then you have

00:34:04a society

00:34:05which was a healthy society

00:34:07in political terms

00:34:08that becomes

00:34:09absolutely

00:34:10out of control.

00:34:14Army, Navy, Air Force

00:34:16and National Police

00:34:17staged the coup

00:34:18that ends 46 years

00:34:19of democratic rule

00:34:20in Chile.

00:34:21The military moves in.

00:34:23The palace is surrounded.

00:34:24September 11th, 1973

00:34:28the Chilean military

00:34:30undertook

00:34:31a very violent coup.

00:34:33They launched

00:34:34rocket attacks

00:34:35bombarding

00:34:36the Moneda palace.

00:34:46Allende was there

00:34:48in the presidential palace.

00:34:50He began

00:34:50talking on the radio

00:34:51He persuaded

00:34:55the rest of the people

00:34:56who were inside

00:34:57to leave the palace.

00:35:00When they were

00:35:01leaving the palace

00:35:02one of the doctors

00:35:03of Allende

00:35:04decided

00:35:04that he would

00:35:05come back

00:35:06to where the

00:35:07office of the president

00:35:08was

00:35:09and he saw

00:35:10Allende sitting

00:35:11with the machine gun

00:35:12here

00:35:13and he shot himself.

00:35:14There is no

00:35:18direct evidence

00:35:19that Nixon

00:35:20and Kissinger

00:35:21knew about that coup

00:35:22in advance

00:35:24and there's no evidence

00:35:25that they helped

00:35:26plan it.

00:35:28But they were thrilled

00:35:29that Allende

00:35:29was gone

00:35:30and they immediately

00:35:31threw U.S. support

00:35:32behind Pinochet.

00:35:36Augusto Pinochet

00:35:37was the commander-in-chief

00:35:38of the army

00:35:39at the moment

00:35:39in which the coup happened.

00:35:40Pinochet came late

00:35:44to the conspiracy

00:35:45to organize a coup

00:35:47and in order

00:35:49to persuade

00:35:50those who had been

00:35:51from the first moment

00:35:52in favor of the coup

00:35:54he had to be

00:35:55more brutal

00:35:55than them

00:35:56when he took power.

00:36:01Pinochet

00:36:02began rounding up

00:36:03leftists

00:36:04and suspected subversives

00:36:06gathered them up

00:36:08in a series

00:36:08of detention centers

00:36:09including

00:36:10the National Soccer Stadium

00:36:12and it began

00:36:13the process

00:36:14of executing

00:36:15many of them.

00:36:17Many were tortured

00:36:18for information

00:36:19many more

00:36:20were tortured

00:36:21simply for

00:36:22the purpose

00:36:23of instilling

00:36:24the Chilean population

00:36:25with fear.

00:36:28There were thousands

00:36:28of people killed

00:36:29thousands of people tortured

00:36:31thousands of people

00:36:32who had to live

00:36:33abroad forever.

00:36:34I would say

00:36:34that it is

00:36:35incomparable

00:36:36to any other event

00:36:37in our history.

00:36:40after the coup

00:36:42Nixon seems preoccupied

00:36:44that the United States

00:36:45might be exposed

00:36:46and Kissinger says

00:36:48we didn't do it

00:36:49I mean we helped them

00:36:51quote

00:36:52create the conditions

00:36:53as best as possible.

00:36:58You would think

00:36:59that as a refugee

00:37:00from Nazi Germany

00:37:01that Kissinger

00:37:02would be deeply committed

00:37:03to democracy

00:37:04but he seemed to think

00:37:06that it was not

00:37:07a problem at all

00:37:07to have dictators

00:37:08be on the side

00:37:09of the U.S.

00:37:10in the struggle

00:37:10against communism

00:37:11and in cases like Chile

00:37:13he was clearly willing

00:37:15to subvert democracy.

00:37:18The argument

00:37:19that Kissinger makes

00:37:20is that everything

00:37:21that he is doing

00:37:22is in the service

00:37:23of the best outcome

00:37:24for the world.

00:37:25He's thinking about

00:37:26the global chessboard

00:37:27and the fact that

00:37:28there are going to be

00:37:29people suffering,

00:37:30dying on the ground

00:37:32that to him

00:37:33is a necessary consequence

00:37:34of pursuing policies

00:37:35that are going to

00:37:36result in global stability.

00:37:38Russia puts on

00:37:45its annual May Day

00:37:45show of strength

00:37:46in these just-released

00:37:47films from Moscow.

00:37:50The Soviet Union

00:37:51at the beginning

00:37:53of the Nixon administration

00:37:54had good reason

00:37:55to think that they

00:37:56were winning the Cold War.

00:37:58The United States

00:37:59was bogged down

00:38:00in Vietnam

00:38:02but that wasn't

00:38:02its only problem.

00:38:04With every passing year

00:38:06the Soviets built

00:38:07more nuclear weapons

00:38:09until they achieved parity

00:38:10and then overtook

00:38:12the United States

00:38:13in terms of the size

00:38:14of their nuclear arsenal.

00:38:16From 1945

00:38:18from Hiroshima

00:38:19until the early 70s

00:38:22it's a breakneck race

00:38:23to build more nuclear weapons.

00:38:26This was a very

00:38:26unstable situation

00:38:27and there was

00:38:28no obvious end to it.

00:38:31When the decision

00:38:32of peace and war

00:38:33involved the survival

00:38:34of tens of millions

00:38:35of people

00:38:36you're no longer

00:38:37playing power politics

00:38:38in the traditional sense.

00:38:40To conduct

00:38:42confrontation politics

00:38:43when the stakes

00:38:44are going to be

00:38:45determined by nuclear weapons

00:38:47is the height

00:38:48of irresponsibility.

00:38:49This is what we mean

00:38:50by detente.

00:38:52Detente

00:38:53is a French word

00:38:55that really just

00:38:56meant

00:38:56improving

00:38:57relations.

00:38:59It was about

00:39:00buying some time

00:39:02reducing the risk

00:39:03of World War III

00:39:04and trying to recover

00:39:06from what was

00:39:07becoming

00:39:08the insolvable

00:39:09problem of Vietnam.

00:39:13Kissinger

00:39:14definitely saw

00:39:15a role for the Soviet Union

00:39:17in the resolution

00:39:18of Vietnam

00:39:19and he

00:39:20is very

00:39:21clear

00:39:22that

00:39:23he's interested

00:39:24in getting help

00:39:25from them

00:39:26and bringing this

00:39:27to a close.

00:39:28Kissinger

00:39:29would creatively

00:39:30suggest the possibility

00:39:31of a summit meeting

00:39:32and the Soviets

00:39:33would say

00:39:35niet.

00:39:37This changed

00:39:38with the opening

00:39:40to China.

00:39:41When we opened

00:39:43to China

00:39:43the Soviets

00:39:44suddenly realized

00:39:45that we had

00:39:46to pick a canvas

00:39:47to paint on

00:39:49than they had calculated

00:39:50and in that sense

00:39:52there was leverage.

00:39:53The Soviets

00:39:55who are looking

00:39:56at the world stage

00:39:57are saying

00:39:57wait a minute

00:39:58we've just

00:39:59been outflanked

00:40:00and if we don't

00:40:01get into

00:40:02talks with the Americans

00:40:03and strike a deal

00:40:05that makes us

00:40:06an equal superpower

00:40:07the Chinese

00:40:09are going to

00:40:10replace us.

00:40:11Good evening

00:40:12President Nixon

00:40:13has announced

00:40:13that he'll be

00:40:14going to Moscow

00:40:15next May

00:40:15for a summit

00:40:16conference

00:40:17with Soviet leaders.

00:40:18It will be

00:40:18the first trip

00:40:19to the Soviet Union

00:40:20by an American

00:40:21president

00:40:21since Franklin Roosevelt

00:40:22journeyed to Yalta

00:40:23in the waning days

00:40:24of World War II.

00:40:29Kissinger and Nixon

00:40:30accepted an invitation

00:40:31to stay in the Kremlin.

00:40:35I mean

00:40:35whether you

00:40:36as president

00:40:37of the United States

00:40:37would have wanted

00:40:38everything you did

00:40:39in your guest room

00:40:41bugged

00:40:42and photographed

00:40:42I don't know

00:40:43but that's

00:40:44what Henry agreed

00:40:45to do.

00:40:47So they stayed

00:40:49in the Kremlin.

00:40:51The Soviet leadership

00:40:53had installed

00:40:54Leonid Brezhnev

00:40:55not the sharpest knife

00:40:57in the drawer

00:40:57intellectually

00:40:58let's put it that way.

00:41:00Brezhnev is a classic

00:41:01communist party

00:41:02apparatchik

00:41:03who's risen to the top

00:41:05by being very careful

00:41:07at playing all sides

00:41:09against each other.

00:41:11He's not a thug.

00:41:13He's not very far

00:41:14from a thug.

00:41:15The most surreal

00:41:22moment in their relationship

00:41:24must have been

00:41:25when Brezhnev

00:41:26treated Kissinger

00:41:27to a visit

00:41:28to his hunting lodge.

00:41:32Henry Kissinger

00:41:33was not the kind

00:41:34of person

00:41:34who goes

00:41:35shooting wild boar

00:41:37as a recreational

00:41:38pastime.

00:41:39They put out

00:41:41the food

00:41:41and sit in the tower

00:41:42and shoot

00:41:43the poor bastards

00:41:44as they come

00:41:44by to feed.

00:41:47When he had chilled

00:41:48about three poars

00:41:49a gun

00:41:50out of what else

00:41:50he unpacked

00:41:52the picnic

00:41:53and said

00:41:54look I'm going

00:41:54to talk to you

00:41:55privately.

00:41:55And he said

00:41:56look you would

00:41:57be our partners

00:41:57you would be

00:41:58I did not have

00:41:58the work.

00:42:00I participated

00:42:01in a meeting

00:42:02with Brezhnev

00:42:03at his dacha.

00:42:04It was an evening

00:42:05devoted to Vietnam.

00:42:06The meeting

00:42:08was just

00:42:08three or four

00:42:09top Soviet leaders

00:42:10including Brezhnev

00:42:11took turns

00:42:12lambasting

00:42:13Nixon

00:42:13about his

00:42:14Vietnam policy

00:42:16all of which

00:42:17was to show

00:42:18Hanoi how tough

00:42:19they were.

00:42:20And we met

00:42:21for four hours.

00:42:23And I remember

00:42:23Nixon leaning

00:42:24over to Kissinger

00:42:25saying you know

00:42:26Jesus Christ

00:42:27we got to get out of here.

00:42:28At that point

00:42:29Brezhnev says

00:42:30well now we're

00:42:30going upstairs

00:42:31for dinner.

00:42:34The whole mood

00:42:35changed.

00:42:36Everyone got

00:42:37half drunk.

00:42:38And then

00:42:39toward the end

00:42:39of that dinner

00:42:40Brezhnev says

00:42:42to Nixon

00:42:42I think Kissinger

00:42:43should go off

00:42:43and negotiate

00:42:44with my people

00:42:45on the SALT agreement.

00:42:48SALT was

00:42:49the first

00:42:51treaty

00:42:52ever negotiated

00:42:53to limit

00:42:54the growth

00:42:55of what

00:42:56were euphemistically

00:42:57called

00:42:57strategic arms.

00:43:02We go back

00:43:03to Moscow.

00:43:04We needed a Xerox

00:43:06the SALT treaty

00:43:07because it was

00:43:07being signed

00:43:08and suddenly

00:43:10the Xerox machine

00:43:11wouldn't work

00:43:12anymore.

00:43:12And so Henry

00:43:13goes to the Xerox

00:43:15machine.

00:43:15He grabs the treaty.

00:43:17He holds it up

00:43:17to the chandelier

00:43:18and he says

00:43:20General Antonov

00:43:21Antonov was our

00:43:22KGB minder.

00:43:23He said

00:43:23General Antonov

00:43:25can I have

00:43:25six copies

00:43:26of this

00:43:27please.

00:43:30SALT one

00:43:31was signed.

00:43:33One of the results

00:43:33was the

00:43:34anti-ballistic

00:43:34missile treaty

00:43:35and agreement

00:43:36to shell

00:43:37the elaborate

00:43:37and expensive

00:43:38anti-ballistic

00:43:39missile apparatus

00:43:40in the US

00:43:41and the Soviet Union.

00:43:43The first

00:43:44SALT agreement

00:43:45was not

00:43:46a trivial

00:43:47achievement.

00:43:48Of course

00:43:49it didn't stop

00:43:50the Soviets

00:43:51building nuclear

00:43:52warheads

00:43:53but I think

00:43:54from Kissinger's

00:43:55point of view

00:43:55you'd created

00:43:56a new basis

00:43:57for the relationship

00:43:58and you'd at least

00:44:00created a mode

00:44:01within which

00:44:02arms limitation

00:44:03could be

00:44:05achieved.

00:44:08The psychological

00:44:09impact

00:44:10was powerful.

00:44:12Powerful because

00:44:13we're acknowledging

00:44:14we're vulnerable

00:44:15to each other

00:44:15and we're saying

00:44:17hey this is crazy

00:44:18to keep spending

00:44:19money this way

00:44:20and threatening

00:44:21each other.

00:44:23My recollection

00:44:24is they let

00:44:25Nixon go

00:44:26on Soviet television

00:44:27which was

00:44:28unheard of

00:44:29we couldn't

00:44:30believe it.

00:44:31Dobre Vetscher

00:44:32I deeply

00:44:34appreciate

00:44:34this opportunity

00:44:35your government

00:44:36has given me

00:44:37to speak directly

00:44:38with the people

00:44:39of the Soviet Union

00:44:40to bring you

00:44:41a message of friendship

00:44:42from all the people

00:44:44of the United States.

00:44:45The SALT agreement

00:44:46at the time

00:44:47was seen almost

00:44:48as the end

00:44:48of the Cold War.

00:44:50To many Americans

00:44:51the idea that

00:44:52the Soviets

00:44:52and the Americans

00:44:53could actually meet

00:44:55and negotiate

00:44:56about their arms

00:44:57signaled that

00:44:58we were not headed

00:44:59toward nuclear destruction.

00:45:02What it really did

00:45:03was establish

00:45:04a relationship

00:45:05of trust.

00:45:06They weren't

00:45:07two enemies

00:45:08on either sides

00:45:09of the barricades

00:45:10anymore.

00:45:12But detente did not

00:45:14end the Vietnam War.

00:45:16The Vietnamese

00:45:17Communist Party

00:45:17was not going

00:45:18to abandon

00:45:19the idea

00:45:20of reunifying Vietnam

00:45:21simply because

00:45:22Moscow said so.

00:45:24I think Nixon

00:45:25and Kissinger

00:45:25and a lot

00:45:26of other people

00:45:26saw the North Vietnamese

00:45:28as being linked

00:45:30to and run

00:45:31by the Russians

00:45:32and the Chinese

00:45:33and they weren't.

00:45:34They were running

00:45:35the war themselves

00:45:36for their own

00:45:37national mission.

00:45:38This was the 17th

00:45:45private meeting

00:45:46and the fourth time

00:45:46in the last two months

00:45:47that Kissinger

00:45:48has met secretly

00:45:49with Lei Duc-Tho

00:45:50and Zuan Huy.

00:45:51He left the meeting

00:45:52grim-faced

00:45:53and solemn

00:45:53without answering questions

00:45:55giving no indication

00:45:56of what happened inside.

00:45:59The pace of negotiation

00:46:01with the North Vietnamese

00:46:02picked up

00:46:04in 1971-72.

00:46:07A big question

00:46:08was what exactly

00:46:10Kissinger was playing for.

00:46:12Was he playing

00:46:13for the long-term survival

00:46:16of South Vietnam

00:46:17or was he playing

00:46:20for a decent interval,

00:46:21a respectable amount

00:46:23of time

00:46:23that South Vietnam

00:46:25would survive

00:46:26long enough

00:46:27for, say,

00:46:29Richard Nixon

00:46:30to get re-elected?

00:46:31Mr. Nixon

00:46:34is running

00:46:34for a second term

00:46:35but as he does

00:46:36what happens

00:46:37in the war

00:46:38is his responsibility.

00:46:42Nixon and Kissinger

00:46:43could sometimes

00:46:44sound as if

00:46:45they were focused

00:46:46on getting through

00:46:47the 72 election

00:46:48and after that

00:46:49the fate of South Vietnam

00:46:50would really

00:46:51not be their problem.

00:46:53If you read

00:46:54some of the tapes

00:46:55there's one place

00:46:57where Nixon and Kissinger

00:46:58are talking

00:46:58and Kissinger says

00:47:00to Nixon

00:47:00well Mr. President

00:47:01if Saigon

00:47:02collapses before

00:47:03the election

00:47:04you really have

00:47:04a problem

00:47:05but if it collapses

00:47:07afterwards

00:47:07it doesn't really matter.

00:47:09The question is now

00:47:11how can we maneuver it

00:47:12so that it can look

00:47:13like a settlement

00:47:14by election day

00:47:15but if the process

00:47:17is still open

00:47:17we can get that done

00:47:20and we can screw

00:47:21them after election day

00:47:23if necessary.

00:47:25The North Vietnamese

00:47:26worried about Nixon

00:47:27getting re-elected.

00:47:29Their latest

00:47:29defensive had been

00:47:30blunded by our

00:47:31military response.

00:47:33They thought Nixon

00:47:34might be anxious

00:47:35for a settlement

00:47:36before the election.

00:47:38The breakthrough

00:47:40came in early October

00:47:41when Le Docteau

00:47:42handed us

00:47:43a counterproposal

00:47:44which essentially

00:47:45left the South

00:47:45Vietnamese government

00:47:46in place.

00:47:48As soon as

00:47:50Le Docteau read out

00:47:51his proposal to us

00:47:52we called for a break

00:47:54in the negotiations.

00:47:56Then Henry and I

00:47:56went outside

00:47:57in the Paris garden

00:47:58and we shook hands

00:48:00and smiled at each other

00:48:01and said

00:48:01we've done it.

00:48:04Kissinger was overjoyed

00:48:06and he was absolutely

00:48:08convinced that

00:48:08the October agreement

00:48:10was a real achievement

00:48:11for American diplomacy.

00:48:14Kissinger went back

00:48:15to Washington

00:48:16and on the 26th of October

00:48:19had a famous press conference

00:48:20where he said

00:48:22peace was at hand.

00:48:23Months of secret meetings

00:48:25days of persistent rumors

00:48:27reached their climax

00:48:28as presidential advisor

00:48:30Henry Kissinger

00:48:31met with reporters.

00:48:33We believe

00:48:34that peace

00:48:36is at hand.

00:48:38What he overlooked

00:48:40of course

00:48:40was whether he could

00:48:41get the South Vietnamese

00:48:42to agree.

00:48:45Henry and I

00:48:45were quite optimistic

00:48:47that with some nudging

00:48:48and reassurance

00:48:49about support

00:48:50in the future

00:48:51that President Tu

00:48:52would be so pleased

00:48:53that we'd get him aboard.

00:48:56But we went in there

00:48:57and we ran into

00:48:57a buzzsaw.

00:48:59The Saigon government

00:49:00controlled radio

00:49:01says any separate

00:49:02agreement

00:49:03between North Vietnam

00:49:04and the United States

00:49:05will not concern

00:49:06South Vietnam

00:49:07in any way.

00:49:08There were about

00:49:09100,000

00:49:10North Vietnamese troops

00:49:11in South Vietnam

00:49:13at the time

00:49:14and the South Vietnamese

00:49:15government

00:49:15wanted them out.

00:49:17But the agreement

00:49:19did not insist

00:49:20that North Vietnamese troops

00:49:21withdraw from

00:49:22South Vietnam.

00:49:24The South Vietnamese

00:49:25government blows up.

00:49:27They're absolutely furious

00:49:28and they make that clear

00:49:30immediately

00:49:31that this is

00:49:33completely unacceptable.

00:49:34It's a sellout.

00:49:36We excluded them

00:49:38entirely from the

00:49:39negotiation

00:49:40of their own fate.

00:49:42I mean this is

00:49:42a negotiation

00:49:43about the future

00:49:44of South Vietnam.

00:49:46Henry Kissinger

00:49:46confirming Radio Hanoi's

00:49:48claim that October 31st

00:49:49had been tentatively

00:49:50agreed upon

00:49:51as the date

00:49:51for signing

00:49:52of Vietnam

00:49:52ceased fire.

00:49:54But Kissinger

00:49:54went on to say

00:49:55Saigon's President Thieu

00:49:56declined to go along

00:49:57until more guarantees

00:49:58were given.

00:50:00I think he believed

00:50:01that we had such leverage

00:50:03on the South Vietnamese

00:50:04and that they didn't

00:50:06really have a choice.

00:50:07Richard Nixon

00:50:12re-elected president

00:50:14by one of the largest

00:50:15margins in history.

00:50:17The mandate he sought

00:50:18he got.

00:50:21After the election

00:50:23we re-engaged

00:50:24the North Vietnamese

00:50:25in negotiations

00:50:26and not only

00:50:28did we not make progress

00:50:29but they began

00:50:30to slip back

00:50:31on some of the

00:50:32concessions they'd made.

00:50:33I was extremely depressed

00:50:36because things

00:50:36had reached a point

00:50:37where we were so close

00:50:39to a settlement

00:50:39and the thing

00:50:40blew up again.

00:50:41I want Hanoi

00:50:42that we would do something.

00:50:44I didn't tell them what

00:50:45because I didn't know

00:50:46what we were going to do.

00:50:48Kissinger said repeatedly

00:50:49this raggedy ass

00:50:50fourth rate country

00:50:51has a breaking point.

00:50:53I'm going to find it.

00:50:55Nixon was of the view

00:50:57that something shocking

00:50:58had to be done.

00:51:01And I think Nixon

00:51:02turned out to be right.

00:51:03Nixon and Kissinger

00:51:08decide on a massive

00:51:10bombing campaign

00:51:11the so-called

00:51:13Christmas bombing.

00:51:19North Vietnam

00:51:20has gone through

00:51:21another day

00:51:22of the most intense

00:51:23bombing in the history

00:51:24of the Indochina war.

00:51:25North Vietnamese

00:51:26officials claim

00:51:27that thousands

00:51:28of civilians

00:51:28have been killed

00:51:29or wounded

00:51:29and that large

00:51:30sections of Hanoi

00:51:31have been wiped out.

00:51:33the Christmas bombing

00:51:35inflicted tremendous damage

00:51:38not only to their soldiers

00:51:39but to the civilians.

00:51:41It was just inflicting

00:51:42as much damage

00:51:43as you could.

00:51:45A lot of people said,

00:51:47oh, this is heartless

00:51:48and lots of innocent people

00:51:50were killed.

00:51:50Now, I'm sure

00:51:51there was some

00:51:52collateral damage,

00:51:54but basically we did

00:51:55hit military targets.

00:52:00Kissinger believed

00:52:01the Christmas bombings

00:52:02actually drove Hanoi

00:52:04back to the bargaining table.

00:52:05Good morning from New York.

00:52:08Peace is not only at hand,

00:52:09it is here.

00:52:11There's to be issued

00:52:12a new order

00:52:12on the ceasefire

00:52:14which is to go into effect

00:52:16roughly 36 hours from now

00:52:20and which we hope

00:52:21and expect

00:52:23will be implemented

00:52:25fully.

00:52:26The Paris agreement

00:52:29to end the war

00:52:30and restore the peace

00:52:31failed to do either.

00:52:32It did not end the war,

00:52:33it did not end the fighting

00:52:34and it did not bring about

00:52:36peace and stability

00:52:37to Vietnam.

00:52:39All that it achieved

00:52:40was allowing

00:52:41the United States

00:52:42to withdraw militarily

00:52:43from Vietnam.

00:52:46Kissinger knew full well

00:52:47that the fighting

00:52:48would resume

00:52:50even before the ink

00:52:51would dry

00:52:52on the piece of paper.

00:52:55Nixon and Kissinger

00:52:56definitely knew

00:52:57the deal they signed

00:52:58in January 1973

00:53:00would condemn

00:53:01South Vietnam

00:53:02to eventual defeat.

00:53:13Ladies and gentlemen,

00:53:16the President

00:53:17of the United States.

00:53:22We stand on the threshold

00:53:25of a new era

00:53:26of peace

00:53:27in the world.

00:53:301972 was

00:53:32the landslide victory

00:53:33but Watergate

00:53:35of course

00:53:36begins to sink Nixon

00:53:37despite the massive

00:53:39re-election

00:53:39and begins to erode

00:53:42that landslide

00:53:43support

00:53:44almost immediately.

00:53:46There's this

00:53:48tick, tick, ticking

00:53:49coming from

00:53:51closets

00:53:51in file cabinets

00:53:53in the White House

00:53:54because

00:53:54a bunch of

00:53:56ding-dongs

00:53:56had been caught

00:53:57burglarizing

00:53:58the Democratic

00:53:59National Committee

00:53:59headquarters.

00:54:00The Watergate

00:54:01bugging case

00:54:02involves a bizarre

00:54:03break-in

00:54:04at Democratic Party

00:54:05headquarters

00:54:06in which two men

00:54:07connected with the

00:54:08Nixon re-election

00:54:09campaign

00:54:09were arrested.

00:54:11From that point on,

00:54:13everything else

00:54:14goes on backburners

00:54:16while Nixon

00:54:16focuses almost

00:54:17exclusively

00:54:18on dealing

00:54:20with this

00:54:20threat

00:54:21to his

00:54:22presidency.

00:54:24When he came

00:54:25under attack

00:54:26for Watergate,

00:54:27Richard Nixon

00:54:28hoped that

00:54:28his way out

00:54:29was yet more

00:54:31foreign policy

00:54:31success.

00:54:33And if Kissinger

00:54:34could deliver

00:54:35success,

00:54:36somehow Nixon

00:54:37could extricate

00:54:38himself from

00:54:39the scandal.

00:54:40This was the

00:54:42moment when

00:54:42Nixon decides

00:54:43to appoint

00:54:44Kissinger to

00:54:45Secretary of State.

00:54:46The Senate

00:54:47today approved

00:54:48the nomination

00:54:49of Henry Kissinger

00:54:50as Secretary of State

00:54:51so a country boy

00:54:52from Firth, Germany

00:54:53becomes the first

00:54:54American Secretary

00:54:55of State

00:54:56ever born

00:54:57in another country.

00:54:58The time I became

00:55:00Secretary of State,

00:55:01the executive authority

00:55:02of the president

00:55:03was eroding

00:55:04at an alarming rate.

00:55:05One of my jobs

00:55:08was to give

00:55:08the impression

00:55:09that we were

00:55:10capable of

00:55:10a purposeful

00:55:11foreign policy

00:55:12in this miasma

00:55:13of a president

00:55:14who was on the

00:55:15verge of being

00:55:16indicted or impeached.

00:55:19If you're going

00:55:20to have a crisis

00:55:21in which you face

00:55:22the possibility

00:55:23of impeachment,

00:55:25Kissinger is

00:55:25the one firm thing.

00:55:27He becomes

00:55:28the indispensable man.

00:55:31October 6,

00:55:321973,

00:55:34a surprise attack

00:55:35and the holiest

00:55:36of days.

00:55:38With the outbreak

00:55:40of the Yom Kippur War,

00:55:42Kissinger faced

00:55:43the most complex

00:55:44problem of his career.

00:55:49The Yom Kippur War

00:55:51began with an attack

00:55:52by the Egyptian army

00:55:54crossing the Suez Canal

00:55:56and the Syrian army

00:55:57attacking

00:55:58in the Golan Heights.

00:55:59The Israelis

00:56:01had an inkling

00:56:02that something

00:56:02might occur,

00:56:04but they did not

00:56:05realize how effective

00:56:06the Egyptian

00:56:07and Syrian

00:56:07assaults would be.

00:56:116.30 on

00:56:12October 6,

00:56:141973,

00:56:15my assistant secretary

00:56:17woke me up

00:56:18and said,

00:56:19there's some trouble

00:56:20on the Suez Canal.

00:56:22And if you get

00:56:23on the phone

00:56:23right away,

00:56:24you can get it

00:56:24under control.

00:56:25We're in the

00:56:28Situation Room

00:56:29with the Secretary

00:56:30of Defense

00:56:30and the Director

00:56:31of the CIA

00:56:32and everybody's

00:56:33wringing their hands,

00:56:34including me

00:56:35in the back bench.

00:56:36Henry,

00:56:37sharing the meeting,

00:56:39says,

00:56:39there's an opportunity

00:56:40here.

00:56:42Henry always was

00:56:43looking for the

00:56:43opportunity.

00:56:45He immediately

00:56:46saw that we

00:56:47could use this,

00:56:48if we'd play

00:56:49our cards right,

00:56:49to begin negotiations

00:56:51between Israel

00:56:52and some of

00:56:53its neighbors,

00:56:54and also to begin

00:56:55to displace

00:56:56Soviet influence

00:56:57in that region.

00:57:02There was panic

00:57:03inside the Israeli

00:57:04government.

00:57:06The Israelis

00:57:06were running

00:57:07short of ammunition,

00:57:08and so they

00:57:09appealed desperately

00:57:10for resupply

00:57:12from the United States.

00:57:14Kissinger wanted

00:57:15to ensure

00:57:16that Israel

00:57:17got the upper hand.

00:57:21We would try

00:57:21to prevent

00:57:22military victory

00:57:24achieved by Soviet arms.

00:57:26So we started

00:57:27an airlift

00:57:28and put in

00:57:29overwhelming

00:57:30amounts of arms.

00:57:33Now,

00:57:34the counteroffensive

00:57:34has begun.

00:57:36Israelis claim

00:57:37to have knocked out

00:57:38most of the bridges

00:57:39the Egyptians

00:57:40laid across the canal.

00:57:42By the middle

00:57:42of October,

00:57:44the momentum

00:57:44had shifted

00:57:45in favor of Israel.

00:57:49The Israelis

00:57:50had struck back

00:57:51and they had

00:57:52surrounded

00:57:52the Egyptian army.

00:57:55Kissinger knew

00:57:56that if we could

00:57:57freeze that moment,

00:57:58you might have

00:57:59a psychological

00:58:00impetus

00:58:01on both sides

00:58:01to finally talk

00:58:02to each other.

00:58:05Kissinger said

00:58:05to the Israelis,

00:58:06you're in a very

00:58:07strong position

00:58:08right now,

00:58:10but don't overdo it.

00:58:11Take your win,

00:58:12and then

00:58:13we get serious

00:58:15about the diplomacy.

00:58:15Kissinger gets

00:58:19a ceasefire

00:58:20just in time

00:58:22for the Egyptian

00:58:22position

00:58:23not to collapse.

00:58:25He can then

00:58:26embark on a negotiation.

00:58:32You get this phenomenon

00:58:33that becomes known

00:58:35as shuttle diplomacy.

00:58:38Kissinger is going

00:58:39back and forth

00:58:40between various

00:58:41Middle Eastern capitals

00:58:42to meet separately

00:58:43with Middle East leaders.

00:58:47He knew

00:58:48you could only

00:58:49make progress

00:58:50if you talked

00:58:50to each side,

00:58:51understood its needs,

00:58:53that it wouldn't work

00:58:54just through cables.

00:58:55This was too emotional,

00:58:57too precarious.

00:58:58You had to go

00:58:59in person

00:59:00to Sadat

00:59:00and go in person

00:59:02to go to Meir

00:59:03and then go back

00:59:05to the other

00:59:05and explain

00:59:06where they were willing

00:59:08to move ahead

00:59:09and where they really

00:59:09had a need

00:59:10to dig in.

00:59:13They negotiated

00:59:14with Kissinger.

00:59:15They didn't negotiate

00:59:16with each other.

00:59:18And Kissinger

00:59:18frequently used

00:59:20American guarantees

00:59:21to get the parties

00:59:22to agree.

00:59:25Were you ever so tired

00:59:26you couldn't remember

00:59:27whether you were talking

00:59:27to Sadat

00:59:28or Barbara Walters?

00:59:29That distinction

00:59:30I never lost.

00:59:31What about that?

00:59:32But there's one thing

00:59:37that keeps you going

00:59:38which is that you know

00:59:40there's nothing

00:59:41more important

00:59:41you could possibly

00:59:42be doing.

00:59:43And that has

00:59:45an exhilarating effect.

00:59:49Kissinger literally

00:59:50spends most of two years

00:59:52going from Damascus

00:59:54to Cairo

00:59:55to Tel Aviv

00:59:56and Jerusalem

00:59:57meeting with one leader

00:59:59after another

00:59:59cajoling them

01:00:00negotiating

01:00:02at a detailed level

01:00:03and as he himself says

01:00:05it's literally

01:00:05a Middle Eastern bazaar.

01:00:07Henry

01:00:08when I met him

01:00:09for the first time

01:00:10in November 73

01:00:12I found him

01:00:13quite acquainted

01:00:15with the

01:00:16minute detail

01:00:17of all the dimensions.

01:00:19For that

01:00:20we didn't spend

01:00:22except one hour

01:00:23and after that

01:00:23we felt that

01:00:24we are friends

01:00:25since years

01:00:26and years before.

01:00:28The massive achievement

01:00:30for Kissinger

01:00:31was Sadat's decision

01:00:32to essentially

01:00:33throw the Soviets

01:00:34out of Egypt

01:00:35and to take Egypt

01:00:37the most important

01:00:38biggest Arab state

01:00:39essentially

01:00:40out of the conflict

01:00:42and into friendship

01:00:44with the United States

01:00:44and eventually

01:00:45a few years later

01:00:46into peace with Israel.

01:00:48Now

01:00:49that came

01:00:50at the expense

01:00:52of

01:00:52the Palestinian question.

01:00:54He left this issue

01:00:56of the Palestinians

01:00:57to kind of

01:00:58fester away

01:00:59unaddressed.

01:01:01Whatever you solve

01:01:03in foreign policy

01:01:04is not final.

01:01:06It's simply

01:01:07an admissions ticket

01:01:08for some other crisis.

01:01:12Good evening.

01:01:13The news

01:01:14is dominated tonight

01:01:15by one explosive story.

01:01:17White House

01:01:18mounted an elaborate

01:01:19cover-up operation

01:01:20in the Watergate affair.

01:01:22There was of course

01:01:23the projects

01:01:24including

01:01:24wiretap tapping

01:01:26electronic surveillance

01:01:27and photography.

01:01:29The number two man

01:01:29in the Nixon

01:01:30re-election campaign

01:01:31today

01:01:31admitted his own guilt

01:01:32in the planning

01:01:33and cover-up

01:01:34of Watergate.

01:01:35Sources say

01:01:35there is no question

01:01:36that the president

01:01:37knew of the cover-up

01:01:38operation

01:01:38which may be

01:01:40the most damning

01:01:40accusation of all.

01:01:44As the Watergate

01:01:45scandal dragged on

01:01:46it seemed like

01:01:47the president

01:01:48and his closest aides

01:01:49were being drawn

01:01:50into the mire

01:01:51and Americans

01:01:53were relieved

01:01:55to see

01:01:55that at least

01:01:56Kissinger was

01:01:57untainted

01:01:57by the scandal.

01:01:59He survived

01:02:00Watergate

01:02:01largely because

01:02:01he was seen

01:02:02as the only adult

01:02:04in the room.

01:02:08This was the height

01:02:09of Kissinger's fame.

01:02:11This was when

01:02:12he was like

01:02:12a kind of

01:02:13diplomatic version

01:02:15of Superman.

01:02:17Kissinger was

01:02:18the most admired

01:02:19man in the United

01:02:20States.

01:02:21He was

01:02:22tremendously popular.

01:02:26The world

01:02:26was so happy

01:02:27that the United States

01:02:28was finally getting

01:02:29out of Vietnam

01:02:30that Henry Kissinger

01:02:31received the Nobel

01:02:32Peace Prize.

01:02:34But his Vietnamese

01:02:35colleague,

01:02:37Le Duc Toh,

01:02:37said,

01:02:38this is not the end

01:02:38of the war

01:02:39and I'm not accepting

01:02:40the Peace Prize.

01:02:44In Oslo,

01:02:45several thousand

01:02:45Norwegian students

01:02:46demonstrated today

01:02:47against the awarding

01:02:48of the Nobel Peace Prize

01:02:50to Secretary of State

01:02:51Henry Kissinger.

01:02:51I was on the playground

01:02:57and some kid

01:02:58came up to me

01:02:59and said,

01:02:59you know,

01:03:00my parents

01:03:01don't think

01:03:01your father

01:03:02should have won

01:03:02the Nobel Peace Prize.

01:03:04And I apparently

01:03:06replied,

01:03:07that's okay,

01:03:08neither does my mother.

01:03:09perhaps the most

01:03:12important goal

01:03:13any administration

01:03:14can set itself

01:03:15is to work

01:03:16for a world

01:03:17in which

01:03:18the award

01:03:19will become

01:03:21irrelevant

01:03:21because peace

01:03:24will have become

01:03:24so normal.

01:03:26Of course,

01:03:27he was

01:03:28deeply honored,

01:03:29but I think

01:03:30it also presented

01:03:31a huge headache

01:03:32for him

01:03:33because he knew

01:03:34that it would not

01:03:35be well received

01:03:37by President Nixon.

01:03:40Knowing Richard Nixon,

01:03:42it must have

01:03:43driven him crazy

01:03:44that Kissinger

01:03:45was the one

01:03:46awarded the

01:03:47Peace Prize.

01:03:48He managed

01:03:50to keep his

01:03:51jealousy

01:03:52under control

01:03:53to a great extent

01:03:54in part because

01:03:55he needed

01:03:56Kissinger more and more.

01:03:59The relationship

01:04:00between Nixon

01:04:01and Kissinger

01:04:01begins to reverse.

01:04:03There is a way

01:04:04in which Nixon

01:04:05now is almost

01:04:06pleading for reassurance

01:04:07and support

01:04:08from Kissinger.

01:04:10I've even considered

01:04:11the possibility

01:04:12of, frankly,

01:04:14just throwing myself

01:04:16on the sword.

01:04:17No,

01:04:17nothing.

01:04:17What the hell?

01:04:20That is out

01:04:21of the question

01:04:22with all due respect,

01:04:23Mr. President.

01:04:23That cannot be considered.

01:04:26You have saved

01:04:27this country,

01:04:28Mr. President.

01:04:29The history books

01:04:29will show that

01:04:30when no one

01:04:32will know

01:04:32what Watergate means.

01:04:36Henry Kissinger

01:04:37often said to me

01:04:39that there was

01:04:39a Shakespearean quality

01:04:41to Richard Nixon's

01:04:43presidency.

01:04:45The culmination

01:04:46of the tragedy

01:04:47is Nixon's

01:04:49final agonized

01:04:51decision

01:04:52to resign.

01:04:54One day,

01:04:56Kissinger goes over

01:04:56to the White House

01:04:57and they talk

01:04:58and there's this

01:05:00moment where

01:05:02Nixon says,

01:05:03Henry,

01:05:03I'm not a praying man,

01:05:05but pray with me.

01:05:06And you have

01:05:07this amazing scene

01:05:09of the two of them

01:05:10on their knees

01:05:11praying in the White House.

01:05:12I remember him

01:05:15coming home

01:05:16that night

01:05:17and this sense

01:05:18of sorrow

01:05:19and compassion

01:05:21that he had

01:05:22for Nixon

01:05:23at that moment.

01:05:25The human problem

01:05:26of a man

01:05:27who had spent

01:05:28all of his life

01:05:29trying to become

01:05:31president,

01:05:32whose personality

01:05:33really did not lend

01:05:36itself to politics.

01:05:37He didn't like

01:05:37to meet new people.

01:05:39He didn't like

01:05:40to give direct orders.

01:05:41He made himself

01:05:42do all these things

01:05:44and everything

01:05:46collapsed on it.

01:05:58And repeat after me,

01:06:00I, Gerald R. Ford,

01:06:01do solemnly swear.

01:06:02I, Gerald R. Ford,

01:06:04do solemnly swear

01:06:05that I will support

01:06:06and defend

01:06:07the Constitution.

01:06:08Gerald Ford

01:06:09was as different

01:06:10in personal,

01:06:12temperamental terms

01:06:13from Richard Nixon

01:06:14as it's possible

01:06:15to imagine.

01:06:19And yet,

01:06:21when Ford

01:06:22became president,

01:06:24one of the very

01:06:25first decisions

01:06:25that he took

01:06:26was to keep

01:06:27Kissinger on

01:06:29in both roles,

01:06:30National Security Advisor

01:06:31and Secretary of State.

01:06:33Kennedy said that

01:06:36as soon as Nixon

01:06:37was gone,

01:06:38Kissinger would lose

01:06:39his Teflon position

01:06:41and become

01:06:42the lightning rod

01:06:43in turn.

01:06:45And so it proved.

01:06:47Good evening

01:06:48to all of you

01:06:49from California.

01:06:50Within a relatively

01:06:51short time

01:06:52of Nixon's departure,

01:06:54the attacks

01:06:55on Kissinger

01:06:56began.

01:06:57Dr. Kissinger

01:06:59is quoted

01:06:59as saying

01:07:00that he thinks

01:07:01of the United States

01:07:02as Athens

01:07:03and the Soviet Union

01:07:04as Sparta.

01:07:06The day of the U.S.

01:07:07is past

01:07:07and today

01:07:08is the day

01:07:09of the Soviet Union.

01:07:10But peace

01:07:11does not come

01:07:12from weakness

01:07:13or from retreat.

01:07:15My father

01:07:16had played

01:07:17such a dominant role

01:07:18for six years

01:07:19that in the nature

01:07:21of American politics,

01:07:23it's almost inevitable

01:07:24that you become

01:07:25a focal point

01:07:26and that the

01:07:27the worm turns.

01:07:36At 7.30 a.m.

01:07:38on April 17, 1975,

01:07:41the war in Cambodia

01:07:42was over.

01:07:43It was a unique war

01:07:45for no country

01:07:46has ever experienced

01:07:47such concentrated bombing.

01:07:49On this,

01:07:50perhaps the most gentle

01:07:51and graceful land

01:07:52in all of Asia,

01:07:54President Nixon

01:07:55and Mr. Kissinger

01:07:56unleashed 100,000 tons

01:07:58of bombs,

01:08:00the equivalent

01:08:01of five Hiroshima's.

01:08:03Then out of the forest

01:08:05came the victors,

01:08:06the Khmer Rouge,

01:08:08whose power had grown

01:08:09out of all proportion

01:08:10to their numbers.

01:08:12The Khmer Rouge

01:08:13was essentially

01:08:14an insignificant movement

01:08:17up until 1970.

01:08:20And the question is,

01:08:21how is it that

01:08:21this relatively marginal force

01:08:24were able to seize power

01:08:25in five years?

01:08:28The bombing did not create

01:08:29the Khmer Rouge,

01:08:30but it was a powerful

01:08:31recruitment tool.

01:08:34A horror began

01:08:35almost immediately.

01:08:37Phnom Penh,

01:08:37a city of two and a half

01:08:38million people,

01:08:40was forcibly emptied

01:08:41within hours

01:08:41of their coming.

01:08:43Within 24 hours,

01:08:45they announced

01:08:46that the city

01:08:47would have to be evacuated.

01:08:48they emptied the hospitals

01:08:51while people were still

01:08:52in the middle of surgery.

01:08:54Patients were left to die

01:08:55on the gurneys,

01:08:57and that was just the beginning

01:08:59of the killing.

01:09:01The Khmer Rouge

01:09:02interrogated

01:09:04and then exterminated

01:09:05anyone they suspected

01:09:07of opposing them.

01:09:07I have yet to find

01:09:14anyone

01:09:15who have not been

01:09:16affected by a loss.

01:09:19We have a Khmer word

01:09:20which is

01:09:20it's a broken spirit.

01:09:23It's that

01:09:24when the spirit

01:09:24has been so broken

01:09:26under fear,

01:09:27under terror,

01:09:29that it doesn't recover.

01:09:30I think the tragedy

01:09:33of Cambodia

01:09:34is directly attributable

01:09:36to the policies

01:09:38of Kissinger and Nixon.

01:09:40There's no question

01:09:41that our continued

01:09:42bombing of the countryside,

01:09:44which was savage

01:09:45and relentless,

01:09:46led to the rise

01:09:47of the Khmer Rouge.

01:09:49The North Vietnamese

01:09:50had bases

01:09:51in not only Cambodia

01:09:53but Laos.

01:09:54They were coming over,

01:09:55killing American troops

01:09:56and South Vietnamese

01:09:57and then retreating.

01:09:59So they spread the war

01:10:00to these countries

01:10:00we did not spread it.

01:10:02You say in your book

01:10:03that you considered

01:10:04bombing North Vietnam

01:10:05so that you had

01:10:06the alternative

01:10:07of bombing North Vietnam

01:10:08and not embroiling Cambodia.

01:10:11Cambodia was embroiled.

01:10:12It is an absurdity

01:10:13to say that a country

01:10:15can occupy

01:10:16a part of another country,

01:10:17kill your people

01:10:18and that then

01:10:19you are violating

01:10:20its neutrality

01:10:21when you respond

01:10:23against the foreign troops

01:10:25that are on

01:10:25that neutral territory.

01:10:27It is total hypocrisy.

01:10:29They were all

01:10:29supposed to be

01:10:30well-intended decisions.

01:10:32My father who died,

01:10:34my oldest brother

01:10:35who is still missing

01:10:36to this day,

01:10:37are they the victims

01:10:38of geopolitics

01:10:39and of decisions

01:10:40made with good intentions

01:10:42but that led to disaster?

01:10:44Yes, absolutely.

01:10:47Sometimes it makes me wonder

01:10:48about the hierarchy

01:10:50of suffering

01:10:50and the unequal value

01:10:52that's attributed

01:10:53to people's lives.

01:10:55Some lives are worth

01:10:56more than others, right?

01:10:58Some countries

01:10:59are worth sacrificing

01:11:00in order that others

01:11:01can prosper.

01:11:07Good evening.

01:11:08The fighting is over

01:11:09for American ground soldiers

01:11:10in Vietnam.

01:11:12The extraction

01:11:13of the last combat soldiers

01:11:14is a slow process.

01:11:16While the men wait,

01:11:18they happily donate

01:11:19some of their

01:11:20leftover ammunition

01:11:21to their South Vietnamese

01:11:23replacements.

01:11:24It is now their war.

01:11:27Ultimately,

01:11:28when the United States

01:11:29extricated itself

01:11:30from the Vietnam War,

01:11:32the South Vietnamese government

01:11:33hobbled along

01:11:35for two years.

01:11:36So great was

01:11:37the South Vietnamese

01:11:38entire dependence

01:11:39upon the United States

01:11:40that in no way,

01:11:41shape, or form

01:11:42could it stand

01:11:42on its own.

01:11:43I'm still hopeful

01:11:46that the United States

01:11:49could respond

01:11:49positively

01:11:50to our request

01:11:51for aid.

01:11:52Sir, Mr. Kissinger

01:11:53said today

01:11:53that that aid

01:11:54is not approved.

01:11:55The collapse

01:11:55of your country

01:11:56is inevitable.

01:11:57Can you share

01:11:57that assessment?

01:12:01I still think

01:12:02that the aid

01:12:02would be forthcoming.

01:12:09If my father

01:12:10had one regret

01:12:12that he often

01:12:12expressed to me,

01:12:14it was that

01:12:15Congress prevented

01:12:17the United States

01:12:18from having

01:12:19an ongoing military

01:12:21role after

01:12:22the peace accords.

01:12:25He believed

01:12:25that there was

01:12:26a path

01:12:27for at least

01:12:28preventing

01:12:29the human catastrophe

01:12:31that occurred

01:12:31in Vietnam

01:12:32after we withdrew

01:12:34and that we

01:12:36failed to do that.

01:12:36We consider

01:12:39we have

01:12:40a moral obligation

01:12:41to the tens

01:12:42of thousands

01:12:43of people

01:12:43who worked

01:12:44with us

01:12:44relying on us

01:12:46for 15 years

01:12:48and we are

01:12:48positive that

01:12:49the American people

01:12:50will fulfill

01:12:50that obligation.

01:12:51Thank you,

01:12:52Mr. Secretary.

01:12:52When the North

01:12:57Vietnamese began

01:12:57the final assault

01:12:59in April of 1975,

01:13:01the regime

01:13:01basically disappeared

01:13:03overnight.

01:13:04Saigon,

01:13:05April the 30th,

01:13:068 o'clock.

01:13:07The last American

01:13:08helicopter on the roof

01:13:09of the American

01:13:10embassy prepares

01:13:11to lift off

01:13:12the last of the

01:13:13evacuees

01:13:13fleeing before

01:13:14the advancing

01:13:15communist armies.

01:13:16I felt

01:13:20great anger

01:13:21at the United

01:13:23States government.

01:13:24We had deceived

01:13:25and misled

01:13:26not only ourselves

01:13:28but we had

01:13:29deceived and misled

01:13:30a whole people

01:13:31in South Vietnam.

01:13:37There was a chance

01:13:38given his talents

01:13:40that Henry alone

01:13:41might have been able

01:13:43to end that war

01:13:44much, much earlier

01:13:46that he did not.

01:13:49I find that,

01:13:50like the rest of the war,

01:13:52rather unforgivable.

01:13:55At the end of the day,

01:13:57when Kissinger was alone

01:13:58with his own thoughts,

01:13:59I think he would have

01:14:01admitted to himself

01:14:02that South Vietnam

01:14:04did not have the ability

01:14:06to defend itself.

01:14:08I think all of the

01:14:10allegations to say

01:14:11that Congress

01:14:12lost the will to fight,

01:14:13that the American people

01:14:14lost the will to fight,

01:14:15that the media

01:14:16misreported that war

01:14:17was a way for him

01:14:19to assuage his guilt.

01:14:22The collapse

01:14:23of South Vietnam

01:14:24and the evacuation

01:14:26of Saigon

01:14:26was without doubt

01:14:29the saddest moment

01:14:31of my governmental

01:14:32experience.

01:14:33I am un-reconstructed

01:14:38in my conviction

01:14:38that Vietnam

01:14:40did not have to fall,

01:14:42that we did that

01:14:43to ourselves.

01:14:46He was not a monster,

01:14:48but he was wrong,

01:14:50and the result

01:14:51was millions of people,

01:14:53not just American soldiers,

01:14:5455,000 plus,

01:14:56but millions

01:14:57of Indo-Chinese,

01:14:58Laos, Cambodia,

01:15:00South Vietnam,

01:15:01and North Vietnam

01:15:01died as a result

01:15:03of this horrendous,

01:15:04horrendous mistaken effort.

01:15:10With 272 electoral votes,

01:15:14James Earl Carter,

01:15:16the next president

01:15:16of the United States.

01:15:20Our new president

01:15:21and secretary of state

01:15:23deserve the understanding

01:15:25and the support

01:15:26of all Americans.

01:15:28I expect

01:15:29to lead

01:15:31a happy

01:15:32and full life

01:15:34once I leave

01:15:36the government.

01:15:39One of Kissinger's

01:15:40most impressive achievements

01:15:42was staying famous

01:15:44for 50 years.

01:15:45Secretary of state,

01:15:47Dr. Henry Kissinger,

01:15:49do you have any final words

01:15:51for the American public?

01:15:53No.

01:15:53He institutes

01:15:55this kind of remarkable

01:15:56self-levitation feed

01:15:58where he stays

01:15:58in the public eye

01:15:59for nearly half a century,

01:16:02partly because

01:16:03he devotes

01:16:03his entire life

01:16:04to foreign policy.

01:16:06He's advising leaders.

01:16:08You know,

01:16:09I'm here

01:16:09as a private citizen.

01:16:11I'm here

01:16:11as a private citizen.

01:16:13I'm not speaking

01:16:13of my personal view,

01:16:14not necessarily

01:16:16Governor Reagan's.

01:16:17He's giving speeches,

01:16:19going to conferences.

01:16:20he's a ubiquitous

01:16:22presence on television.

01:16:24He was always

01:16:25invited to opine

01:16:26on whatever crisis

01:16:27is happening

01:16:27at the moment.

01:16:29I think that

01:16:29the warning

01:16:30of the president

01:16:30that a continuation

01:16:31of repression

01:16:32could harm

01:16:33U.S.-Chinese relations

01:16:34was correct.

01:16:35He publishes

01:16:36hundreds of articles

01:16:37and op-eds

01:16:38and many books,

01:16:40putting out

01:16:40his own version

01:16:41of history.

01:16:42Dr. Kissinger

01:16:43has a new book

01:16:43hitting bookstores

01:16:44tomorrow.

01:16:46If you looked

01:16:47at his schedule

01:16:48on any given day,

01:16:49it was packed

01:16:50with meetings,

01:16:52breakfasts,

01:16:53lunches,

01:16:53TV interviews.

01:16:55He stayed in the game

01:16:56because he loved

01:16:58international relations

01:16:59and he loved power.

01:17:03Throughout the long years

01:17:06out of government,

01:17:07Henry Kissinger

01:17:08fought to uphold

01:17:10his reputation

01:17:11against all comers.

01:17:13If an Allende

01:17:13were to come

01:17:14to power tomorrow,

01:17:15you would not feel

01:17:17that you could recommend

01:17:18such action

01:17:19as you thought

01:17:20appropriate in 1970.

01:17:21No, I'm not saying that.

01:17:22No criticism

01:17:23went unanswered.

01:17:25The statement

01:17:26Henry Kissinger

01:17:26is a war criminal

01:17:27is not a piece

01:17:28of rhetoric.

01:17:29It's not a metaphor.

01:17:30It's a job description

01:17:31and it might feature

01:17:33an indictment.

01:17:34I want to know

01:17:35how you would amend

01:17:36your testimony today.

01:17:37Why should I amend

01:17:40my testimony?

01:17:42He was determined

01:17:44that he would be

01:17:46the one to write

01:17:47his own history.

01:17:49But it really was

01:17:50a double-edged sword

01:17:51because he kind of

01:17:52made himself

01:17:53a big target

01:17:54and in many ways

01:17:56became a kind

01:17:57of scapegoat

01:17:58for all the failures

01:17:59of American foreign policy.

01:18:00When people attack

01:18:09Kissinger by saying

01:18:11you're dealing

01:18:12with tyrants

01:18:12or you're ignoring

01:18:14human rights,

01:18:15they don't remember

01:18:17the agonizing choices

01:18:18that had to be made.

01:18:20After all,

01:18:20preserving civilization

01:18:21is a human right

01:18:23as well.

01:18:24The average person

01:18:25thinks that morality

01:18:27can be applied

01:18:28as directly

01:18:30to the conduct

01:18:31of states

01:18:32to each other

01:18:33as it can

01:18:34to human relations.

01:18:37That is not always

01:18:38the case

01:18:39because sometimes

01:18:40statesmen

01:18:41have to choose

01:18:42among evils.

01:18:44I think he thought

01:18:46whatever he was sacrificing

01:18:47of American values,

01:18:49he was doing so

01:18:50for American interests.

01:18:53My view of that

01:18:54is that the sacrifice

01:18:55of values

01:18:57was intrinsically

01:18:59a sacrifice

01:18:59of interests.

01:19:02One of the sources

01:19:03of strength

01:19:03that the United States

01:19:04has is the story

01:19:05that we've been telling

01:19:05around the world,

01:19:06which is a story

01:19:07about freedom

01:19:08and equality

01:19:10of peoples

01:19:10and nations.

01:19:12Yeah, I think

01:19:12Kissinger's theory was

01:19:14it's the credibility

01:19:15of being willing

01:19:16to use power,

01:19:18being willing

01:19:18to kill a lot of people,

01:19:20being willing

01:19:20to destroy countries,

01:19:22to send a message

01:19:23to other potential adversaries.

01:19:26This is what happens

01:19:27if you challenge

01:19:27the will

01:19:28of the United States.

01:19:30I think the fundamental

01:19:31problem with that

01:19:32is it just obliterates

01:19:34the credibility

01:19:35of the story

01:19:35that we tell.

01:19:37My father

01:19:38was a realist,

01:19:40but it was realism

01:19:41in the cause

01:19:43of principles

01:19:44that he believed

01:19:45in deeply.

01:19:47He was not

01:19:48just trying

01:19:48to advance

01:19:49the power

01:19:50of the United States

01:19:51in some kind

01:19:52of Darwinian struggle.

01:19:55He was advancing

01:19:56the strength

01:19:57of the United States

01:19:58in his mind

01:19:59because America

01:20:00was the last,

01:20:02best hope

01:20:03of humanity,

01:20:04and he had experienced

01:20:05that personally.

01:20:08The final days

01:20:10of his life

01:20:11were deeply revealing.

01:20:14He was transported

01:20:15back to the trauma

01:20:16of his childhood.

01:20:17he was right

01:20:19back there.

01:20:21He was speaking

01:20:22German.

01:20:23He was afraid

01:20:25that pogroms

01:20:26were at the door.

01:20:28He was showing

01:20:29the deep-seated

01:20:31injury that

01:20:32he had experienced

01:20:33as a child.

01:20:34But there was also

01:20:36a tremendously

01:20:37moving

01:20:38final

01:20:40hallucination.

01:20:42He was lying

01:20:46in a bed

01:20:47looking out

01:20:48on this garden

01:20:48that he loved

01:20:49in Connecticut.

01:20:50And he imagined

01:20:52that his brother

01:20:53who had died

01:20:54a couple of years

01:20:54earlier

01:20:55was outside

01:20:56building a platform.

01:20:59It wasn't clear

01:21:00whether this was

01:21:01some kind of

01:21:01train stop

01:21:02or a platform

01:21:04for my father

01:21:06to ascend

01:21:07onto,

01:21:08but it seemed

01:21:08to give him

01:21:09a great deal

01:21:10of peace.

01:21:11at an early age

01:21:14I have seen

01:21:16what can happen

01:21:16to a society

01:21:17that is based

01:21:19on hatred

01:21:20and strength

01:21:22and distrust

01:21:23and that I

01:21:25experienced

01:21:26then

01:21:26what America

01:21:28means

01:21:29to other people.

01:21:32It's hope

01:21:32and it's idealism.

01:21:34and it's idealism.

01:21:37It's idealism.

01:21:38And you have to

01:21:54it's idealism.

01:21:54But it's idealism.

01:21:55It's idealism.

01:21:56American Experience Kissinger is available with PBS Passport and on Amazon Prime Video.

01:22:26American Experience Kissinger is available on Amazon Prime Video.

American Experience - Season 37 Episode 07 Kissinger Part Two

Category

Transcript

Be the first to comment

Recommended