00:00कर दो कर दो हुआ कि जो इस बार जो फ्रेस्टा है उनकी जो प्लब्धियान
00:29I am very proud of you.
00:31And today, Brigadier Rajiv Williams, who has given his work in the 1999 of Cargill,
00:38and has been given his work in the country,
00:40a huge loss of money.
00:41Sir, you are very proud of your TV.
00:43Thank you very much.
00:44You have given us a surprise here.
00:46But it is very happy that you want to cover this operation
00:50which has fought in Indian Army.
00:53Especially, you want to cover the Cargill operation.
00:57If you ask questions, I will try and of course give you a response.
01:04Yes, absolutely.
01:05I would like to know this,
01:07that in that direction,
01:09and now that the scene of the scene has come,
01:11whether it is a technique or equipment,
01:14how do you see it?
01:16Look, all the operational aspects have evolved.
01:23Now, you have to look at the background,
01:26and then you have to look at the environment,
01:29and the environment that was on your plate.
01:31So you have to look at the level of the challenges,
01:33and see how the technologies have evolved.
01:35And particularly, the doctrines have evolved.
01:38Now 25 years ago, it's been 26 years ago and if you talk about it, there are changes.
01:50We have been 20 years ago and in 20 years I see how many advances are coming.
01:58We have to adapt to technology.
02:01When we adapt to our practical doctrines, there are changes.
02:08But the man behind the weapon, the man behind the machine needs to be motivated.
02:15The psychological dimension needs to be strong.
02:19The mind and mind should be equipped with that equipment.
02:25He is technologically advanced in that equipment,
02:29using that equipment in an environment which is very difficult.
02:34So, if you are in the time of work,
02:37at that time, the atmosphere, the leadership,
02:42it was a different type of leadership.
02:45It was a different atmosphere, different equipment.
02:48Troops are the same.
02:51Officers and men are the same.
02:53But technology makes changes in doctrinal principles.
02:59If you remember the time of work,
03:01then it was a very important time.
03:03It was a very important time.
03:04It was a very important time.
03:05It was a very important time.
03:06It was a very important time.
03:07It was a very important time for you.
03:08What was the time of work that you still have in your eyes?
03:11Every soldier who participated in the work,
03:18in the war,
03:20or who could not reach there,
03:24but that national will,
03:27whether it was military or civilians,
03:30that national will,
03:32and when you saw it,
03:34that made such a difference,
03:37that the moral of the troops,
03:40which helped in Cargill,
03:43whether it is Tiger Hill,
03:44Toro Ling,
03:45or Kalubar Ranges,
03:47or any of the heights you have captured,
03:51or any of the heights you have captured.
03:53This is impossible.
03:55And our experience is not only here,
03:57but also in Tiyachin.
03:59The chief of Malik was also written,
04:04that this operation,
04:06which was in our battalion operation in Siachin,
04:09which was made of Bhanai Singh,
04:11which was made of Paranweer Chakra,
04:13that was made of Bhanai Singh,
04:15which was made of Bhanai Singh,
04:16which was made of Bhanai Singh,
04:17which was made of our team,
04:20and that was made of Toreo Ling,
04:22and Tiger Hill operation,
04:23which was made of Tiger Hill operation.
04:25So, you can see these things,
04:27in this period,
04:29when it was made of Bhanai Singh,
04:32which had formed in the intermediate region,
04:34which had led by Bhanai Singh,
04:36which had led by the third force.
04:38Why did the troops also help?
04:40The targets,
04:42especially when they were helped
04:44with the troops,
04:45which was in the military sector,
04:47and the administrative base,
04:50which had the troops at the border,
04:52it was very impacting.
04:55So these things you see in today's time, and I won't say much about this, but drones warfare, loitering munitions, and how many ranges you fire beyond the visual range PVR missiles, this is a different technology.
05:19Now you are sitting on your side, and this is a failure. But one thing we think is that in this fight, you have to have a very clear aim.
05:35And in which way you achieve that aim, the end result is very clear in your mind.
05:43And if we were in that fight, in that time, and see for the work, then Musharraf has done this work, and has occupied heights.
05:59With what aim? Very limited aim.
06:01That in a little while, the line of communication is from Srinagar, which goes to Daras, Kargil, Kargil, and Siyachin,
06:15We are occupying this to try and have an effect on Siyachin.
06:22Why did Kargil happen?
06:25Kargil happened, as I think.
06:30But he did not plan it out till the end. As a result, we have to occupy that aim in mind.
06:40But he did not have to bear with all. He did not plan it out till the end.
06:46As a result, he was unsuccessful. But there was a line of control. But he did not have to bear with all.
06:56He did not plan it out till the end. As a result, he was unsuccessful.
07:02But there was a line of control. But the aim was very clear. That is what war is.
07:14The aim of Srinagar was to demonstrate the power of this technology that you have done there.
07:22But the basis came again. And the problems came again. But there were a fine solution.
07:28So these are very important things that we have to understand.
07:32When we talk about Srinagar, we are talking about Srinagar.
07:35If I know about Srinagar, what do you think about Srinagar?
07:39Is that the operation of Srinagar was successful? Or did you think that it could be something else?
07:46No, I did not say about Srinagar. I have written a little bit on it.
07:51And it is necessary that the information warfare, which was a forte in Kargil's time.
07:59I was handing the media, hugely, the entire media.
08:03That was the first televised war in Kargil.
08:07And I think that the information warfare could have been much better.
08:15And they say that Pakistan had done a far more advanced information campaign against us.
08:23But it was not sustainable.
08:29Whatever the information warfare was done, the lies were caught through again.
08:35Information warfare should be such that,
08:37when we think that we have done this,
08:42and after 20 years, they were saying something right.
08:46It was just one year, people think that they are saying something wrong.
08:51Look at this.
08:53When this discussion started in America,
08:55about what losses have happened in Srinagar,
08:58they are saying that they are not saying the right thing.
09:02So, I am saying that information warfare is a very important tool in any war.
09:07Yes, people, you have told me that you have written some books.
09:10So, what are the names of the books in the books?
09:12What are the names of the books?
09:14Because now we are sitting in the world,
09:16and we are talking about the books.
09:17No, we are talking about the books.
09:20And I am so proud of the fact that,
09:22having participated in Siyachin operations,
09:26we have written a book called The Long Road to Siyachin.
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