- 2 hours ago
In this special broadcast of India First, Executive Editor Gaurav Sawant discusses the escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, marked by Saudi airstrikes in Mukalla and the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen. The panel, including Lt Gen Syed Atta Hasnain, Ambassador Anil Trigunayat, Dr. James Dorsey, and Dr. Wael Awad, analyses the impact on the region and Pakistan. A major focus is Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, who claimed ‘divine help’ during Operation Sindoor against India. Gen Hasnain predicts 2026 could be the ‘year of doom’ for Munir amidst internal and external challenges. The discussion also explores the geopolitical shifts in the Red Sea, the UAE's expanding influence in Pakistan's economy through the Fauji Foundation, and the potential for a new Middle East order involving Israel.
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NewsTranscript
00:00So let's try and make sense of these tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Pakistan caught in between.
00:07An opportunity for Aasem Muneer or a threat for Pakistan.
00:12Joining me on India first, Lefton Channel Syed Atta Hasnain, former Kashmir Corps commander,
00:16someone who watches developments in the region very closely.
00:20Ambassador Anil Trigunyad, former ambassador to Libya, Jordan and Malta.
00:24Dr. Vail Awad is a very well-respected political analyst and a senior international journalist.
00:31Dr. James Dossey is adjunct senior fellow at the Raja Ratnam Institute of International Studies,
00:37again an expert on Middle East and counterterrorism.
00:40Gentlemen, wish you all a very happy new year. Welcome on India first.
00:44Dr. Dossey, your reading of the Saudi Arabia-UAE tensions, has it caught the world quite by surprise, especially the bombing?
00:53Essentially, Saudi and national interests diverge, and also their strategies in the region diverge.
01:01Saudi Arabia is first and foremost interested in security.
01:05It borders on Yemen.
01:07It has a 700-kilometer-long border with Hadramaut, one of the provinces that is currently in play.
01:16And it is once a unified Yemen.
01:22Its basic strategy throughout the region is to support legitimately recognized governments,
01:29irrespective of whether or not they have failed.
01:33On the other hand, you have the United Arab Emirates,
01:36whose strategy is really based on exploiting situations in failed states,
01:43whether that is Yemen, whether that is Sudan,
01:47whether that is Libya.
01:49And it supports often rebel or secessionist forces
01:53in an effort to gain control of key strategic nodes,
01:58that is to say, ports, nodes of transport, nodes of finance.
02:04And whether or not that is in the benefit of the country in question
02:09is not a concern that the UAE considers to any great extent.
02:17Okay.
02:18Dr. Awad, the UAE announced a voluntary withdrawal of its remaining counterterrorism units from Yemen
02:23following these Saudi airstrikes in Mokala.
02:26They also cited personal safety and recent developments.
02:29But is this a tactical pullback, a strategic repositioning,
02:34or has Saudi Arabia shown its supremacy, sir?
02:39Thank you for having me and Happy New Year to you and all your guests and viewers.
02:42In fact, the fact of the matter remained that the Saudis and the Emirati were together in 2015
02:48in the coalition formed by the two governments fighting the Houthis' influence and expansion in Yemen.
02:54And therefore, there was both of them at the same coin side
02:58that they are willing to see defeating the Houthis
03:03and leaving the legitimate government recognized internationally of Adan,
03:07which is supported by Saudi Arabia and Emirates.
03:10But however, over the years, the Saudis and the Emiratis differ in their strategy and objective.
03:17While Saudi Arabia may look into Yemen as a weak government,
03:21and there is much better than disintegration of Yemen,
03:24the Emirati had their own groups of supporting inside Yemen.
03:27And the differences came to the light, Gaurav,
03:30only in 2019 when the Southern Transitional Council,
03:37supported by Emirati,
03:39fought with the legitimate government of Adan.
03:42And then the Saudis and the Emirati differences smeared over the years,
03:46but it was under the ground until the Fujairah incidents happened
03:50where the two ships were, as Saudi said,
03:53has been bombed because they bombed after they dislodged their shipment in Al-Mukalla port in Yemen.
04:01Therefore, the Saudis have asked the Emirati to withdraw it in 24 hours.
04:06And I think the Emirati understood the message from Saudi Arabia
04:09because this is touching its national interest,
04:12and immediately they withdraw.
04:14However, it doesn't mean that they have lost the influence still.
04:17They are very much influential in the Southern,
04:20in the SDC, the Southern Transitional Council.
04:22And they have quite influence also in many parts of Yemen.
04:26But I think the coming days,
04:28it will show more what will be the response
04:31from the Saudi toward the Emirati influence there.
04:34Okay.
04:35General Hasnain, the fact that Saudi Arabia carried out an airstrike,
04:38is that crossing a certain red line?
04:40And is that making a statement?
04:42And does that indicate, if not supremacy,
04:44but superiority of Saudi Arabia militarily?
04:48Or is this just the first step?
04:50There could be retaliation.
04:52It could be in any way,
04:53including the proxy reinforcement of forces or rebels by the UAE.
05:00Thank you, Gaurav.
05:01First of all, a happy new year to you and all our viewers,
05:04my colleagues on the panel.
05:06This is a very, very fascinating subject,
05:08which has not really been discussed anywhere around the world.
05:11Let me try and give a slightly different perspective to it.
05:14While we have looked at Yemen,
05:15both my previous speakers have spoken about Yemen,
05:19we must also remember that the UAE is not looking at expanding its footprint of influence
05:25only in Yemen.
05:26It has gone into Libya.
05:28It has gone to Chad.
05:29It has gone to Sudan.
05:30It has gone to Somaliland.
05:32This entire area of the Red Sea,
05:34the lanes flowing through this,
05:36the energy flowing through this.
05:38UAE is obviously punching much above its weight
05:42and for quite some time.
05:45The Saudis,
05:46peeved perhaps to a very great extent,
05:49now are looking at pushing back
05:52and also seeking their position under the sun
05:56in the Gulf politics,
05:58in Gulf influence,
05:59which they feel probably is getting diluted
06:02by the UAE presence all around.
06:05And this seems to be the point of contention here in Yemen,
06:09where the whole thing has come to a head here.
06:12A very strong message is being conveyed by the Saudis
06:16that it could lead to physical conflict.
06:19I don't think it will come down to conventional warfare.
06:23Although at the moment,
06:25what we are seeing is all the ingredients
06:27of a typical hybrid situation,
06:30proxies,
06:31a little bit of air warfare,
06:33drugs,
06:34you know,
06:35looking at shipping lanes
06:36and things of that nature.
06:38What we have to remember
06:39at the bottom of this entire emerging rivalry
06:43is the fact that the Saudis
06:46actually look at being what the Emiratis already are,
06:51which is that they are much more influential.
06:54They have a great amount of soft power
06:56all over the Middle East and the Gulf region.
06:59This is something
07:00that the Saudis aspire for 2030,
07:032032.
07:04Yes.
07:05So Ambassador Trigunayat,
07:06does this show that the Arab world
07:07is now divided in more ways than one?
07:09Some argue Israel also has a role to play in this.
07:12There are others who say
07:14that Saudi Arabia is very keen,
07:16the power,
07:17the economic power,
07:18the influence,
07:19you know,
07:19that's wielded by UAE.
07:22They are now telling,
07:23Saudi Arabia is telling businessmen
07:25to invest in Saudi Arabia,
07:27to open offices in Riyadh.
07:29And all of this
07:30is just one more way
07:31that that war for economic influence
07:34is being,
07:36you know,
07:37out there on the ground this way, sir.
07:39Thank you, Gaurav,
07:41and Happy New Year to you
07:43and all esteemed panelists
07:45as well as to your audience.
07:47This is not something
07:48that has happened today.
07:51Since the Arab Spring,
07:52we have witnessed
07:53that most of these Gulf countries,
07:56especially Saudi Arabia,
07:58UAE, Qatar,
07:59and Turkey and Egypt,
08:00on the other hand,
08:02have weaponized their foreign policy.
08:04And there's a result of that.
08:05Now they want to achieve
08:07their strategic objectives
08:09of controlling various key ports
08:12and be maritime powers
08:13in that sense.
08:14And that's where the UAE
08:15comes into the picture.
08:17UAE went in with Saudi Arabia
08:19in 2015
08:20to attack Yemen,
08:21to fight the Houthis.
08:22But by 2019,
08:24they had decided
08:24it was an unachievable objective.
08:26And they walked out of it.
08:28And they follow
08:29a very smart diplomacy.
08:30But at the same time,
08:32they also have limitations
08:33to their power
08:34because Saudi Arabia
08:35is an acknowledged leader
08:37in the region,
08:38irrespective of whichever way
08:40you look at it.
08:41And Saudi Arabia
08:42has also reformed.
08:44Then I would like to say
08:45that what we are witnessing
08:47in the region is
08:47when we have
08:49these younger leaders,
08:50they are less patient.
08:52But today, of course,
08:54the tactical withdrawal
08:55or whatever you may call it
08:56of the counterterrorism forces
08:58of UAE,
08:59but also
09:00the Southern Transition Council
09:03has agreed to withdraw
09:04from Hyderabad.
09:06So that will take away
09:07the immediate escalatory
09:09letter out of the scheme
09:11of things.
09:11But that doesn't mean
09:12it's going anywhere.
09:14You know,
09:14recently it is said
09:15that Crown Prince
09:16Mohammed bin Salman
09:17was meeting Trump
09:19and he asked him
09:20to rein in
09:21the Emiratis
09:22in Sudan
09:23as a result of that.
09:25So I think that
09:27there is going
09:28to be a problem.
09:29We have seen
09:30what happened
09:30in 2017
09:32to blockade of Qatar.
09:34And when Crown Prince
09:35wanted to normalize ties
09:36with Qatar
09:37and lift the blockade,
09:38Emiratis were not very happy.
09:40So there is divergence.
09:41That coming to the
09:42Israeli question,
09:43that is also
09:44very much
09:44at play there,
09:45especially after
09:46the Somali land.
09:47So we should not
09:48be surprised
09:48if Israel
09:50or some other country
09:52which are under
09:53the influence
09:53of Emiratis
09:54could recognize
09:55Southern Transition Council
09:56tomorrow as the leader
09:58of the Sudan Yemen.
09:59So we might see
10:00once again...
10:00And where does this leave...
10:01Okay, and I want to bring in
10:02you know, Dr. Dorsey
10:04once again into this conversation.
10:05Where does this leave Pakistan?
10:07Pakistan is considered
10:08close both to Saudi Arabia
10:09and to the UAE.
10:10It depends on both
10:12for money.
10:13Pakistan has gone to
10:13both the countries
10:14with a begging bowl.
10:16And Pakistan has forces
10:17deployed for the defense
10:18of Saudi Arabia.
10:19Does that put Pakistan
10:21on a sticky wicket
10:22with UAE, Dr. Dorsey?
10:25Obviously, Pakistan
10:26is going to have to
10:27walk a fine line.
10:28I do think you have
10:29to keep in mind
10:30that the Emirati influence
10:32in Pakistan
10:33has expanded significantly,
10:36particularly
10:36its economic influence.
10:39You saw the recent
10:41plan for
10:43part of the loan
10:45that the UAE
10:46gave to Pakistan
10:47to that to be translated
10:48into equity
10:49in the Fauci Foundation,
10:51which is the
10:52entity that controls
10:54the Pakistani military's
10:56vast interests
10:57in the economy.
10:59You've seen
11:00the agreement
11:01with the Pakistan
11:03telecommunications company,
11:05the foremost
11:06internet and communications
11:08company in the country.
11:11The same is true
11:12for the ports.
11:13In contrast to China
11:15with Gwadar,
11:16the UAE
11:17has invested
11:18in both Karachi
11:19and Port Qasim,
11:20the most important
11:21ports in Pakistan.
11:24So UAE influence
11:26in Pakistan
11:27is very significant.
11:29They also just got
11:30two mining
11:31licenses in Balochistan,
11:34something that the Saudis
11:35had been eyeing
11:36in the past.
11:37So the Emirati influence
11:39in Pakistan
11:39is not to be
11:41underestimated
11:42and in many ways
11:43may be greater
11:44than that of Saudi Arabia,
11:46despite the fact
11:47that Saudi Arabia
11:48signed the defense
11:49treaty with Pakistan.
11:52Interesting.
11:53And that defense
11:54treaty,
11:55Dr. Wailawad,
11:55the Saudi-Pakistan
11:56military pact
11:57would mean
11:58Pakistan has to
11:58deploy forces
12:00to defend Saudi Arabia
12:01in case of any
12:02escalation with Yemen,
12:03additional forces.
12:04So how do you see
12:04this pan out
12:05vis-a-vis both
12:07now Iran
12:07and the UAE
12:08at a time,
12:10you know,
12:10as Dr. Dorsey
12:11pointed out,
12:12UAE's financial
12:12influence is increasing,
12:144G foundation
12:15shares being taken
12:16by UAE
12:17and the Pakistani
12:18military,
12:19at least a major
12:20part of the
12:20co-commanders,
12:21they prefer going
12:22to Saudi Arabia
12:23because of the
12:23money that they
12:24get there
12:24being deployed
12:25there every year.
12:27Well, I think
12:28the Pakistani
12:29have been involved
12:30in the Yemeni war
12:30despite the fact
12:31that they have
12:32denied of sending
12:33their own troops
12:33into there,
12:34but they have
12:34been always supportive
12:35from the Saudis
12:36point of view
12:37when it comes to
12:38the Yemen
12:39and when it comes
12:40to the safeguard
12:40of the kingdom.
12:42Therefore,
12:42we know that
12:43for always
12:43there has been
12:44a battalion
12:44of the Saudi army
12:46inside the monarch
12:48and they have
12:49been protecting
12:49them over the years,
12:50but however,
12:51of recently
12:52this development
12:53in Yemen
12:53is as I have
12:54been listening
12:55to the panelists,
12:56I think it's
12:57very important
12:58to highlight
12:58three major points
13:00irrespective
13:00of Pakistan rule.
13:01Pakistan will always
13:02be whoever
13:03pay more,
13:04they will be
13:04siding with them,
13:05therefore they cannot
13:06side away
13:07from Saudi Arabia.
13:09But I think
13:09the major issue
13:10here,
13:10the geopolitical
13:11importance of Yemen
13:12where they,
13:13because of the global
13:14trade,
13:14it comes from
13:15Bab al-Mandeb
13:16and passed
13:16into the Red Sea
13:17where more than
13:1814% of the oil
13:19trade takes place
13:20from there.
13:20And the United
13:21States with Israel
13:22have been advocating
13:24of a military bridge
13:25between Djibouti
13:26and Adan for years
13:27that they wanted
13:28to control this passage
13:29and they're accusing
13:30the Houthis
13:31of blocking it
13:32after the Israelis
13:33war on Gaza
13:35and on the Palestinians.
13:36And then we realize
13:37that the elephant
13:38in the room
13:39is Israel
13:39where they have
13:40also recognized
13:41the Somaliland.
13:42That's also important
13:43not to forget
13:45the oil field
13:46in Hadramut area
13:47which is the bordering
13:48Saudi Arabia
13:49which is around
13:501,300 kilometers
13:51that Saudi
13:52having with Yemen.
13:53And they cannot,
13:54you know,
13:54sacrifice their
13:55national security
13:56because the moment
13:58Yemen break away
13:59like Somaliland,
14:01it is meant
14:01that Saudi Arabia
14:02at the verge
14:03of collapse
14:04and that is what
14:04the Netanyahu
14:06government wanted
14:06to see a total collapse
14:08of all the Arab nations
14:09that can be disintegrated
14:11and therefore
14:12the greater Israel
14:13can be achieved.
14:14So that,
14:15therefore,
14:15the Saudis
14:16who are looking
14:17for 2030,
14:18after 2030,
14:19as a leader
14:20of the regional
14:21country,
14:21Arab world,
14:22they wanted
14:23to make sure
14:24that they are
14:24the ones
14:25who can safeguard
14:26their own interests
14:27at first place
14:28and also safeguard
14:29the interests
14:30of Yemeni
14:30not to see it
14:31as disintegrated,
14:32especially
14:33at this geopolitical
14:34change is taking
14:35so much steps
14:36and deteriorating
14:37in the Middle East.
14:39Oh, absolutely.
14:40And so much
14:41happening just
14:42as 2026 begins,
14:44Ambassador Trigoniad.
14:45Would this indicate
14:45more trouble
14:46if I were to come
14:47back to our point
14:48on where does
14:50Pakistan stand
14:51in all of this?
14:52Field Marshal
14:53Aasem Munir
14:53has battles
14:54on multiple fronts.
14:55Reports say Pakistan,
14:57there are many
14:57core commanders
14:58who are not in favor
14:59of deploying a brigade
15:00on the Gaza border
15:01at all,
15:02plus now the call
15:03to deploy
15:03perhaps a division,
15:05a division plus
15:06in Saudi Arabia.
15:07At least that is
15:08what commentators
15:09in Pakistan are saying.
15:10What does this mean
15:11in your view
15:11for Aasem Munir?
15:15Gaurav,
15:15I maintain
15:16that Pakistan
15:17has this
15:18uncanny ability
15:20to encash
15:21its nuisance value
15:22with anyone
15:23and everyone
15:24because it's
15:24a rentier state.
15:25It's available.
15:26They have signed
15:27an agreement
15:27with Saudi Arabia
15:28and in fact
15:29today itself
15:30they have signed
15:31another agreement
15:32with Saudi Arabia
15:32in the economic domain.
15:34So they continue
15:35to work with everybody
15:36and they are trying
15:37to be a little bit
15:38an interlocutor
15:40right now
15:40between UAE
15:41and Saudi Arabia
15:42so that this
15:43doesn't pan out.
15:44You remember
15:45the former
15:45chief of staff,
15:46army staff,
15:47Ryan Sharif
15:48was heading
15:49the coalition forces
15:50even though
15:50Pakistan was not
15:51a party to it.
15:52But of course
15:53it is,
15:54it will be walking
15:55a thin line
15:56if it takes sights
15:58and at the moment
15:59I don't think
16:00it's going to take sights.
16:01It has its own
16:02begging ball
16:02out to everyone
16:03but he's ready
16:04to support
16:05and in the meantime
16:06they already committed
16:0725,000 forces
16:08and already 25,000
16:10are deployed
16:10in Pakistan.
16:12Their sorties
16:12are paying
16:13pilots
16:14are attacking
16:15in Yemen.
16:16All the Yemen fight
16:17was taken out
16:19by the Saudis.
16:20They were getting
16:21$7,500
16:21per sortie.
16:23The Pakistani pilots
16:24were being paid.
16:25So they have been there.
16:26I mean I don't see
16:27that Pakistan
16:28is in docks
16:30as far as
16:30this particular
16:31equation is concerned.
16:33Okay.
16:33General Hasnain,
16:34given Pakistan's
16:35internal situation
16:36whether it's in
16:37Khaywar Pakhtunkhwa
16:37province
16:38or in Balochistan
16:39tensions along
16:40the line of control
16:41with India
16:41and during line
16:43with the Taliban
16:43regime in Afghanistan
16:44can Asim Munir
16:46afford to deploy
16:47additional forces
16:47either in Saudi Arabia
16:48or this question
16:50of a brigade
16:51plus minus
16:52on the Gaza border?
16:53Very interesting
16:55question, Gaurav.
16:56I remind you
16:57that way back
16:58in 1981
16:59Pakistan provided
17:02two brigades
17:03to Saudi Arabia
17:05for the protection
17:06of the royal family
17:07and these were
17:08ultimately used
17:09in the Gulf War
17:09also in 1990.
17:12They withdrew
17:12in 1991
17:13when India's
17:15third strike corps
17:16came up
17:16in Bhopal
17:17and that was the time
17:18when they were forced
17:19to bring back
17:19those formations
17:20to make up
17:21the balance of forces.
17:23Considering the fact
17:24that at that time
17:25Afghanistan
17:26was not alive
17:28and today
17:28the Duran line
17:29is on fire
17:30virtually,
17:31two of Pakistan's
17:32corps,
17:33that's both
17:34their 9 corps
17:37and the other
17:387, I think,
17:409 corps,
17:4011 corps
17:41which are both there,
17:4211 and 12 corps
17:43which are both
17:44deployed
17:44on the Afghan border.
17:46considering that fact
17:48the balance
17:49today is
17:50very, very
17:51even
17:52and for Pakistan
17:53to pull out
17:54troops anything
17:55more than a brigade
17:56or so
17:56will to my mind
17:58be a bit of a
17:59challenge
17:59but as you said
18:01a division strength
18:02is what would be
18:03demanded perhaps
18:04from Pakistan
18:05and that will be
18:06at some risk
18:07if they
18:08go ahead
18:09and do that.
18:09Okay.
18:12Dr. Dawsey,
18:13can Field Marshal
18:14Aasem Munir
18:15say no
18:15to Donald Trump
18:16on that issue
18:17of deploying forces
18:18in Gaza
18:19and if he were
18:20to say no
18:21what would be
18:22the consequences?
18:23At this point
18:24he wouldn't be
18:25the only one
18:26saying no.
18:27What you basically
18:28is you have
18:29a situation
18:30in which
18:30a number of
18:31countries
18:32that have been
18:32identified
18:33as potential
18:34contributors
18:34to an
18:35international
18:36stabilization
18:36force in Gaza
18:37have really said
18:39that they need
18:40to have a
18:41clear mandate
18:42they've also
18:43sort of defined
18:43what they would
18:44like to see
18:45that mandate
18:45to be
18:46and they further
18:47also made
18:49clear under
18:50what conditions
18:51they will
18:51and will not
18:52participate.
18:53So at this
18:54point Pakistan
18:54would be in
18:55good company
18:56and therefore
18:57probably would
18:58be in a position
18:59in which
18:59he could say
19:00no or
19:00yes but.
19:04Okay.
19:05Now in case
19:06and let me
19:07push this a
19:07little further
19:08in case
19:09they were
19:09to say
19:10no here
19:10but they
19:12would have
19:12to deploy
19:12forces
19:13should
19:13tension
19:14spike
19:14in Saudi
19:15Arabia
19:16or that
19:16is also
19:17something
19:17that has
19:18already
19:18been contained
19:19the fact
19:20that Pakistan
19:21has already
19:22chosen a side
19:23in Libya
19:24does that
19:25put Pakistan
19:26at odds
19:26with the
19:27United Nations
19:28you know
19:29the talk
19:29of supplying
19:29JF-17
19:30Thunders
19:31to the
19:32rebel forces
19:32in Benghazi
19:33Dr.
19:34Dossi?
19:34Essentially
19:36again I
19:39think we've
19:39got to go
19:39back to
19:40that the
19:41UAE and
19:42the Saudis
19:42are very
19:43different
19:43strategies
19:44in other
19:45words
19:45the United
19:47Arab Emirates
19:48does not
19:49necessarily
19:49support the
19:50territorial
19:51integrity
19:52of states
19:52on the
19:53contrary
19:54it is
19:55willing to
19:55do business
19:56and to
19:56support
19:57secessionist
19:58and rebel
19:58forces
19:59that's
20:00something
20:00the
20:00Pakistanis
20:01can say
20:01no to
20:02because
20:03for all
20:04practical
20:04matters
20:05it would
20:06be a
20:06violation
20:06of
20:07international
20:07law
20:08because
20:08it's
20:08a
20:08challenge
20:09to
20:09the
20:10sovereignty
20:10of
20:10a
20:11country
20:11and
20:12to
20:13its
20:13territorial
20:14integrity
20:14so
20:15I think
20:16in those
20:16circumstances
20:17yes
20:18the
20:18Pakistanis
20:19could
20:19say
20:19no
20:20okay
20:21Ambassador
20:22Trigunyad
20:23some say
20:23Asim Munir
20:24has already
20:24sent his
20:25family to
20:25the United
20:25States
20:26there are
20:26co-commanders
20:27who are
20:27not very
20:28happy
20:28with him
20:30staying on
20:31with Asim Munir
20:31staying on
20:32as army
20:32chief
20:33along with
20:34being chief
20:34of defense
20:35forces
20:35internally
20:37does this
20:38mean more
20:38trouble or
20:39more challenges
20:39for Asim Munir
20:40of course
20:42he has many
20:43challenges
20:44and challenges
20:44will come
20:45from within
20:45not from
20:47without
20:47so I
20:48believe that
20:49he has
20:50problems
20:50but at the
20:51same time
20:51I mean
20:52if one were
20:52to see
20:53and what
20:53is happening
20:54in Pakistan
20:54and the way
20:55people are
20:55looking at
20:56it
20:56they have
20:57tried to
20:57do a
20:58good job
20:58in communicating
20:59to their
20:59own people
21:00that Asim Munir
21:01has some
21:02kind of
21:02invincible
21:03fellow
21:03so he is
21:04riding a bit
21:05high on
21:05that
21:05and that
21:06is something
21:07that comes
21:08out as an
21:08observation
21:09but he
21:09indeed has
21:10I mean
21:10they always
21:11go in the
21:12same way
21:12as his
21:13predecessors
21:13have gone
21:14okay
21:15okay
21:15okay
21:15General
21:16Asim Munir
21:18in one
21:18of his
21:18speeches
21:19said words
21:20to the
21:21effect
21:21that
21:21you know
21:22he felt
21:22Allah's
21:23blessings
21:24during
21:25Operation
21:25Sindur
21:26and that
21:26the gods
21:27were on
21:27his side
21:28or whatever
21:29else
21:29he may
21:30have meant
21:30and that
21:31only the
21:31state can
21:32issue a
21:32fatwa
21:33what does
21:35all of
21:35this
21:35indicate
21:36is he
21:37fighting
21:38on multiple
21:38fronts
21:39and he
21:39needs
21:40more than
21:41just his
21:41military
21:42or just
21:43his
21:44army
21:45with him
21:46there are
21:46many who
21:46say even
21:47within the
21:47army
21:47some
21:48co-commanders
21:48are not
21:49in his
21:49favor
21:49there are
21:50some
21:50in the
21:50ISI
21:50who are
21:51very upset
21:51with him
21:51especially
21:52after action
21:52that's been
21:53taken against
21:53General
21:54Faiz Hamid
21:54former DGISI
21:55does that
21:56indicate that
21:57he's now
21:57seeking divine
21:58intervention
21:58to protect
21:59himself
22:00see
22:01Gaurav
22:01this is a
22:02historical
22:03thing with
22:03the Pakistan
22:04army
22:04every commander
22:06who comes
22:06there
22:07ultimately
22:08thinks he's
22:08God's own
22:09Allah's own
22:10this is what
22:11Sia also
22:11thought at
22:12one time
22:13in this
22:14case of
22:15Asim Munir
22:15he's a
22:16Hafiz
22:16and he
22:17sort of
22:18takes advantage
22:19of that
22:20by quoting
22:21all kind
22:21of scriptures
22:22in different
22:22public gatherings
22:23and has
22:24created
22:25a persona
22:26around himself
22:27an aura
22:28of larger
22:29than life
22:29such
22:30personalities
22:31historically
22:32always meet
22:34their doom
22:34at some
22:35stage
22:35and very
22:36very violent
22:37doom
22:37I can tell
22:38you
22:38what happened
22:39on the
22:399th of
22:39February
22:402023
22:41at Lahore
22:41we all
22:42remember that
22:43the kind
22:43of incidents
22:44which happened
22:45there
22:45and which
22:46were
22:46mishandled
22:47even under
22:47his command
22:48and so
22:49there are
22:50all kinds
22:51of things
22:52which are
22:52going on
22:53with the
22:53Pakistan
22:53army
22:54at the
22:55moment
22:55no doubt
22:56he has
22:56consolidated
22:57power
22:57the kind
22:59of perception
23:00management
23:00he's
23:00managed to
23:02do
23:02as a result
23:03of Operation
23:04Sindur
23:04is
23:05something
23:06which is
23:06to his
23:06advantage
23:07at the
23:07moment
23:07but that
23:08is only
23:09short term
23:09to my
23:10mind
23:10that is
23:10only a
23:11short term
23:11kind of
23:12an advantage
23:12he's tying
23:13himself in
23:14too many
23:14knots
23:15internationally
23:16in every
23:17direction
23:17if you
23:17look
23:18he's tying
23:18himself
23:19in knots
23:19therefore
23:202026
23:21may be
23:22the year
23:23of his
23:23doom
23:23very
23:25interesting
23:25you should
23:25predict
23:26that
23:262026
23:27may be
23:27the year
23:28of doom
23:28for Asim
23:29Munir
23:29Dr.
23:29Vail Awad
23:30Pakistan
23:31and the
23:31UAE
23:31supporting
23:32you know
23:32the Haftar
23:33forces in
23:34Benghazi
23:34and you
23:36know
23:36the Saudi
23:37Arabia
23:37and UN
23:38being in
23:38favor of
23:38the
23:38dispensation
23:39in Tripoli
23:40as Dr.
23:41James
23:41Dossi
23:41was also
23:42pointing out
23:42in the
23:43long run
23:43or in
23:44you know
23:44as 2026
23:45advances
23:46could this
23:46mean more
23:46trouble
23:47for Pakistan
23:48vis-à-vis
23:49other Arab
23:50nations
23:50also and
23:51not just
23:51the United
23:51Nations
23:52well I
23:53think
23:54let us
23:54be very
23:55frank
23:55on this
23:56point
23:56I think
23:57the
23:57United
23:58States
23:58pampering
24:00Pakistan
24:00again
24:01is
24:01not out
24:03of the
24:03blue
24:03actually
24:04it is
24:04also
24:05meant
24:05that
24:05the
24:06Pakistani
24:06have
24:06a
24:07role
24:07to
24:07play
24:07whether
24:08it
24:08is
24:08in
24:09the
24:09West
24:09Asia
24:09whether
24:10it's
24:10the
24:10North
24:10African
24:11affairs
24:11whether
24:11it's
24:12in
24:12the
24:12Islamic
24:12world
24:13and
24:13that's
24:13why
24:14we
24:14see
24:14more
24:14prominent
24:15alliances
24:16between
24:16Turkey
24:17and
24:17Pakistan
24:18in
24:19many
24:19fields
24:19and
24:20therefore
24:20with the
24:21Gulf
24:21country
24:22however
24:22the
24:23if
24:23we
24:24as
24:24I
24:24remember
24:25and
24:25as
24:25I
24:25assessed
24:26that
24:27the
24:27moment
24:27the
24:28United
24:28States
24:28put
24:28its
24:29hand
24:29with
24:29any
24:30country
24:30it
24:30will
24:31increase
24:31and
24:31enhance
24:32its
24:32fall
24:32down
24:33so
24:33I
24:33think
24:33Pakistan
24:34if
24:34they
24:34do not
24:35recognize
24:35their
24:36national
24:36interest
24:37they
24:37will
24:37be
24:37facing
24:38the
24:38music
24:38very
24:39soon
24:39because
24:39involvement
24:40with
24:40such
24:41kind
24:41of
24:41a
24:41scenario
24:42of
24:42the
24:42new
24:42world
24:43order
24:43or
24:43the
24:43Middle
24:44East
24:44new
24:44order
24:45is
24:46really
24:46going
24:47to
24:47create
24:47a
24:47mess
24:47and
24:48Pakistani
24:48will
24:49be
24:49fought
24:50against
24:50that's
24:50why
24:50they're
24:51not
24:51sending
24:51to
24:51Gaza
24:52because
24:52they
24:52don't
24:52know
24:53the
24:53rule
24:53and
24:54terms
24:54and
24:54conditions
24:55to
24:55the
24:55international
24:56forces
24:56in
24:57Gaza
24:57what
24:57Israel
24:58will
24:58be
24:58dictating
24:59against
24:59them
24:59are
24:59the
25:00international
25:00forces
25:01or
25:01assisting
25:02Israel
25:02and the
25:02American
25:03against
25:03the
25:04Palestinians
25:04so I
25:04don't
25:04think
25:05they
25:05are
25:05going
25:05to
25:05play
25:06with
25:06the
25:06sentiment
25:06however
25:07there
25:07is
25:07also
25:08another
25:08wider
25:08perspective
25:09picture
25:09we
25:10need
25:10to
25:10look
25:10maybe
25:10in
25:11some
25:11other
25:11time
25:12is
25:13the
25:13now
25:13ending
25:14of
25:14political
25:14Islam
25:15is
25:15one
25:15of
25:15the
25:16main
25:16card
25:16for
25:16the
25:16United
25:17States
25:17and
25:17the
25:17West
25:18including
25:19Israel
25:19that
25:19they
25:20want
25:20to
25:20end
25:20it
25:20in
25:20the
25:21Arab
25:21world
25:21and
25:21Islamic
25:22world
25:22and
25:22therefore
25:23would
25:23ending
25:24political
25:27Islam
25:28mean
25:28the rise
25:29of
25:29radical
25:29Islam
25:30or
25:30the
25:31radical
25:31elements
25:32you know
25:32that's
25:32a
25:33debate
25:33perhaps
25:33for
25:33another
25:34day
25:34but
25:34I
25:34want
25:34to
25:35thank
25:35all
25:35my
25:40as
25:40always
25:41many
25:42thanks
25:42for
25:42joining
25:42me
25:42here
25:43on
25:43this
25:43India
25:43First
25:44special
25:44broadcast
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