- 1 hour ago
Stefan Molyneux digs into the incentives at play in a free market justice system, weighing the trade-offs between stopping crime and rehabilitating offenders. He points out how aiming to wipe out criminal behavior entirely isn't practical, and stresses the value of stepping in early. He argues for a system that uses the least punishment needed to actually help people turn things around, while considering the costs of locking folks up. Molyneux also touches on ways to encourage judges to hand down fair sentences, the problems with repeat offenses, and the past wrongs that many offenders have dealt with. He wraps up by pushing for more conversation about reforming justice.
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LearningTranscript
00:00All right, interesting, puzzling, deep and detailed problem, which we're going to earn
00:08back, see you're back, over the next little while, next few minutes, and that is incentives
00:15in a free market justice system.
00:19Very, very, very interesting.
00:23So, let's first of all look at the ideal and then look at how incentives might work to
00:28sort those out.
00:30So, the ideal, of course, is prevention, to not have criminals in the first place.
00:35I understand it's completely utopian to say there will be no criminality.
00:40You know, we can get there probably over time as a species, but there will be, certainly
00:48in the transition period or, you know, when you've got people coming and going to a free
00:52society from more primitive societies or more status societies, there could in fact be criminality
00:57and so on.
00:58And let's just say, for the sake of argument, that randomly people are just born to be bad.
01:04So, here's the challenge.
01:08We want to prevent, and that's sort of taken into account with the stuff I've talked about
01:14before, that parents who are raising children would have to submit those children to brain
01:20scans that would track the development of empathy or the presence of trauma patterns in the brain
01:25to have early intervention prevent sociopathy, psychopathy, cold, callous, evil, whatever,
01:32from developing.
01:33So, the prevention is key, but let's just say that there's a certain amount of criminality.
01:39So, what you want to do if prevention has failed is you want to provide the minimum punishment
01:46with the maximum chance of curing the criminal.
01:52I mean, you don't want to provide no negative feedback because that doesn't work, but you want
01:58to provide the minimum punishment that has the highest chance of fixing the criminal, of
02:07curing the criminal, or at least of curing the person of crime.
02:11So, to take an extreme example that would be immoral if you were to lock up, you know,
02:16was it criminal law with Kevin Bacon and so on, where he played a guy unjustly imprisoned
02:22in solitude for years.
02:23So, if you were to, you know, blindfold and randomly torture a man and keep him in solitary
02:32confinement and barely allow him to sleep for 20 years, he would emerge a completely insane
02:39and dangerous wreck of a human being, right?
02:41So, that would be excessive punishment, also it would be immoral, but that would be excessive
02:45punishment that would have a negative effect.
02:49If you don't punish at all, then the person clearly does not process negative consequences
02:58to others, right?
02:59So, if you go and steal, you don't process negative consequences to others.
03:04It's just kind of a game of what you can get away with.
03:07It's like a dog trying to sneak a treat or, you know, if you leave some bacon on the countertop
03:14and the dog makes his way up, he'll just eat it because, I don't know, he may hide it or
03:18whatever, but he doesn't really process the consequences too well, so he's just going to
03:22eat the bacon and he doesn't really consider it theft and there's no moral reasoning that
03:27you can have with him.
03:29And when moral reasoning is not working, then negative consequences are the only chance for
03:36the person to learn better.
03:38Now, of course, somebody, we're going to just say they've been raised in a free society,
03:42so somehow they got past all the scans that show the development of sociopathy and somehow
03:49they get past all of the moral reasoning that would go on in the education of children in a
03:54free society, the teaching of UPB and empathy and the value of the deferral of gratification
04:00and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
04:01So, they've gotten past all of that.
04:02So, in a free society, if someone is a criminal, it means that they are not responding to moral
04:09reasoning.
04:11And again, as far as people coming in from outside the society, I mean, that would be
04:15interesting, right?
04:16You wouldn't need anyone to come in from outside the society in particular, so who knows what
04:21the borders would be like, but I imagine it would all be very strict, right?
04:26So, moral reasoning doesn't work with criminals.
04:30And so, the only thing that is going to deter them is punishment, in the same way that if
04:37a dog does something you don't like, you might punish the dog with like a stern tone or I don't
04:42know.
04:42I don't know how you punish them.
04:43I'm not a dog expert by any means, but I assume that there's negative consequences if
04:49you're going to train a dog.
04:51Well, positive consequences, I suppose, it's how you train dolphins or whatever, right?
04:55You just give them some herring when they do something that you want, right?
04:59So, you want the minimum punishment with the greatest chance of deterrence.
05:07You don't want to punish too little, which isn't going to cure the criminal.
05:12You don't want to punish too much, because not only does that make apprehending the criminal
05:18difficult, but you then, if you have an excess of punishment, the criminal becomes kind of
05:25psychotic and embittered and full of anger and dysfunction and so on and, you know, really
05:29can't do much good in society.
05:32So, there's a sweet spot.
05:33It's an Aristotelian mean.
05:35Too little punishment is bad.
05:37Too much punishment is bad.
05:38I mean, if you had the death penalty for shoplifting, then all that would happen is the shoplifter
05:44would fight to the death to resist being apprehended, right?
05:48And so, it wouldn't really work very well.
05:52I mean, I guess there'd be a deterrence there, but I think most people would consider that
05:56too harsh.
05:57The other thing, too, of course, is that it is certainly possible for people to commit
06:05crimes and then become productive members of their society, whatever you think of Marky
06:10Mark or Mark Wahlberg's career as an actor and a rapper, I guess, right?
06:17Whatever you think of that, he was involved in criminal activity when he was younger.
06:23I think he put a guy's eye out or something in some sort of street brawl or something like
06:27that.
06:27So, he was involved.
06:29Gérard Depardieu, I think, was involved in criminal activity when he was younger.
06:33I think, don't quote me on this, but it's something like he stole cars or he was part
06:36of some sort of crime ring.
06:39You know, a lot of teenagers will experiment with shoplifting.
06:42I did a little bit, too.
06:44So, there are people who commit crimes from minor to major who then do end up being productive
06:53members of society as a whole.
06:56So, you don't want to lock those people up forever if Mark Wahlberg, who's generated, I
07:03don't know, hundreds of millions of dollars of value in his movies, if he had been locked
07:10up when he was violent as a youth, then I guess society would have missed out on foul-mouthed
07:19talking bear comedies.
07:20Again, whatever you think of his movie career.
07:24Obviously, some people like it, so I'm not a huge fan, but whatever, right?
07:30So, you don't want to punish too little, you don't want to punish too much.
07:32So, then the question is, how do you find that sweet spot?
07:37Like, you want to give someone a chance, right?
07:42So, somebody is a thief, they steal a couple of cars, you put them in prison, or whatever
07:47the equivalent would be in a free society, you put them in prison, and then what?
07:55Well, if you release them and they go back to their lives of crime, or their life of crime,
08:00then you've done a bad thing, because it's cheaper to keep someone in prison if releasing
08:08them simply has them go back to a life of crime.
08:12It's cheaper to keep a man in prison than it is to have a bunch of people have their
08:17car stolen forever and ever, amen.
08:19So, you could probably keep someone in prison in a free society for sort of the equivalent
08:25of $20,000 to $30,000 a year, if that person goes out and steals a $40,000 car, that's more
08:32than a year's worth of value, or it could be two years, 18 months to two years' worth
08:36of value, that they have just destroyed.
08:39So, it's cheaper to keep them in, unless if they just steal one car, right?
08:43If they steal two cars, you get it, right?
08:45Now, how do you keep people in prison cheaply?
08:47So, one of the problems I've had with modern government prisons is that, first of all,
08:56you give the inmates a whole bunch of weights.
08:59I'm not sure about that.
09:01Honestly, I'm not sure about turning out the super muscle tanks of human beings from prisons.
09:08I'm not saying, I mean, maybe give them some cardio, although even that could be a problem,
09:13but turning them into big physical dangerous specimens is probably not ideal.
09:17But, one of the issues that I have, of course, is that they don't learn, they don't get a
09:25resume in prison.
09:26They don't get skills that are going to translate as much as humanly possible into outside productive
09:32work.
09:32They can to some degree, of course, right?
09:34But it's not sort of a central part of it.
09:36So, one of the challenges having people in prison is, if you have them performing labor
09:42at below market rates, then you're throwing other people out of work, right?
09:47So, if they're fixing potholes, then you're throwing the people who fix potholes out of
09:51work.
09:52So, that's a challenge.
09:53So, it's hard to know exactly how you should deal with people and getting them good economic
10:01skills going forward.
10:03And, of course, a lot of people who commit crime are IQ 85, which doesn't give them a
10:08whole lot of options when it comes to an advanced economy, get a job and making money and so
10:15on.
10:15That doesn't give them a lot of options.
10:18So, somehow, you have to find a way to give them practical skills and have them perform
10:23labor that at least has them pay for some part of their own incarceration.
10:30And, obviously, the prisoners should cook their own food.
10:32It would be great if the prisoners could grow their own food.
10:35It would be great if the prison could be more of a self-sufficient island of economic
10:42activity so that they're not taking jobs away from anyone else.
10:46They clean, they maintain, they repair, they grow their own food, they cook, they, you know,
10:51all of that.
10:51They can, you know, fashion their own plates and implements and whatever.
10:56And so, whatever they can do, you want to try and aim them to be as self-sufficient as
11:00possible so that they're not a drain on the general economy.
11:03And you also want to give them as many useful skills as possible so that when they leave
11:08the prison, they can have jobs, they have a resume of some kind, they have some productive
11:14skills that provide value.
11:18But at the same time, you don't want them taking away jobs or lowering the wages of economically
11:25productive and honest people.
11:27So, again, trying to make it as self-sufficient as possible.
11:29Asteroid mining, yeah, that's it.
11:31Actually, once you get into space, it's pretty hard to escape.
11:34So, space prisons would be pretty cool.
11:38So, you need to get the right balance of incentives to punish just enough to impress
11:45the negatives of the bad behavior on the mind of the prisoner, since moral reasoning
11:49hasn't worked, but not destroy their capacity to be productive in society as a whole.
11:57And give them as many economic skills as possible when they get out.
12:01And that's a very tough challenge.
12:06And, you know, it's easy to say, balance these things and get the sweet spot.
12:09But the question is, of course, and it's just theoretical, right?
12:12But how would you design a system?
12:14So, you would want to reward the police, and I'm just going to use general status terms
12:21here.
12:21It would be somewhat different in a free society, but we'll just use the general status
12:24terms.
12:24So, you'd want to pay the police per conviction, not per arrest.
12:32If you pay them per arrest, they'll just arrest a bunch of people and make money that way
12:36and so on.
12:36And again, you know, they'll be good people, but we always want to have the incentive to
12:40match the morals because, in general, in conflicts between money and morals, well, it's
12:47pretty easy for money to win out, it seems.
12:50I mean, just look at COVID, right?
12:51So, you would want to pay, or at least give bonuses to the police per conviction, not
13:01just per arrest.
13:04How do you deal with the judges?
13:07Well, with the judges, you can't pay them per conviction, right?
13:10You can pay the police per conviction because the police aren't in charge of the convictions,
13:14but you can't pay the judges per conviction, obviously.
13:17Everybody knows this.
13:18You can't pay the judges per conviction because then you'll just have judges convict people
13:22in order to get their bonuses.
13:24So, how do you judge the judges?
13:27How do you incentivize the judges?
13:30So, we have a jury system.
13:33So, the judge does not determine, again, we're going to go with a jury system rather than a
13:39judge system, at least just for the time being.
13:42So, with the jury system, the judge cannot determine the guilt or innocence, can only give instructions
13:49and maintain the rules of evidence and the chain of custody and all of that sort of stuff.
13:56So, the judge, though, sentences.
14:01So, how do we incentivize the judge to not sentence too short and not sentence too long?
14:11I mean, you can have all these guidelines, and it is actually kind of wild how complicated
14:15the guidelines are for sentencing in America and other places.
14:19It's almost like a computer algorithm that you figure out where the sentencing goes.
14:24The judge usually has some discretion, but there are definitely guidelines.
14:27So, how do you do that?
14:30Well, the ideal for society is for somebody to go to prison for as little time as it takes
14:38for them to become productive members of society.
14:41If a car thief can go to prison for six months and emerge with good skills and maybe some counseling
14:49and maybe some whatever, right?
14:51A lot of people are criminals because they're angry at a society that failed to protect them.
14:56I mean, not that I was any kind of big criminal, but the couple of times I shoplifted, it wasn't
15:01sort of a conscious thought, but I had no respect for society's rules because society had done
15:05absolutely nothing to protect me at all from violence and abuse.
15:12And so, I had no particular respect.
15:15So, one of the ways in which criminals are helped is, let's say that they're criminals as
15:23the result of child abuse, and let's say there's some proof, right?
15:25And then arresting those who abused them would go a long way towards reducing their anger
15:32against society.
15:33So, if a guy was a car thief at the age of 19 because his father beat the hell out of
15:40him until the age of 17, then arresting the father for child abuse would go a long way
15:48towards restoring the credibility of society in moral matters to the young man.
15:56So, let's say that the sweet spot is about six months, six months of punishment, and he
16:01comes out.
16:02Any more than that, you risk him being embittered any less than that.
16:05There's not enough negative consequences, and maybe it isn't enough time to have some
16:09kind of therapy to make him into a better person or have him become better or something
16:13like that.
16:14So, maybe six months is about right, but it changes per individual.
16:19It changes, you know, the first time, second time, or whatever it is, right?
16:22And I think the third time, they're just gone.
16:24Like, the third time, they're just away forever, right?
16:27But how do you incentivize?
16:29So, some of the thoughts that run through my mind is that the monetary bonus for the judge
16:42is that the judge gets, say, two percentage points of the man's income for a couple of
16:49years after he leaves the prison.
16:54That, of course, would require for the judge to have it go well enough that he's economically
17:00productive and is able to get a job.
17:04And, of course, the commitment to get a job would certainly be one of the requirements of
17:08being released.
17:11So, maybe the judge would get two percentage points for a couple of years of the guy's
17:16gross income as if he held and kept a job.
17:20And that would give the judge a great incentive to release him at the sweet spot where it
17:26was worth him getting a job, but he wasn't so traumatized by prison or his loss of freedom
17:29that he would become economically less productive.
17:32Because the purpose of the judicial system is to have the man turn from a life of crime
17:38into a life of economic productivity.
17:41And if the judge shares in that economic productivity to a small degree, then the judge has an incentive
17:49to release him at such time as he has the maximum chance to get and keep a job.
17:57Now, look, obviously, there's ways in which this might not work.
18:00Everything's open to corruption.
18:01I'm just sort of spitballing here about possible ways that this could work.
18:06So, what we want to do is we want to pay people for the optimal outcomes.
18:13The best possible outcomes is what we want to pay people.
18:15So, if the judge gets a bonus based upon the productivity in the free market of the criminal
18:23or the ex-inmate of the prison, if the judge gets incentivized, that's good because you're
18:31paying the judge in part based upon the most positive outcome, which is the criminal who's
18:37released from prison getting and keeping a job for a long period of time.
18:41So, that's good.
18:43What about the negatives, right?
18:45Because if you release the man too soon, maybe you get a little bit extra in terms of work.
18:53Maybe he's supposed to be in prison for two years, but you leave him out.
18:56You get him out a year early.
18:57You get an extra 2% of his income, whatever it is, right?
18:59So, $2,000 per $100,000, whatever it is, right?
19:04So, what then?
19:06You have to have a balancing incentive in case the judge lets the guy out too soon.
19:12So, one of the ways that you know you've let the guy out too soon is he goes back to
19:16his life of crime.
19:17So, what happens?
19:18Well, I initially had sort of talked about if the judge lets a murderer out and the murderer
19:26kills someone that the judge should be charged with murder or at least be charged as an accessory
19:31to the crime, like the getaway driver in a bank robbery or something like that, right?
19:36But, of course, what that would mean is that judges would never let murderers out because
19:41it would be just too risky, right?
19:44Even at the potential 2% of the murderer's job income.
19:49Well, that's not enough of an incentive, so that probably would be too harsh.
19:55And I don't know whether, you know, the recidivism rate in most places in, say, America is like
19:5980%, right?
20:00So, 4 out of 5 people released from prison end up back in prison.
20:04And that means that the recidivism rate is higher because they could be committing crimes.
20:09The remaining 20%, probably at least 10% of them, if not more, are committing crimes but
20:14aren't getting caught or doing something shady but not getting caught.
20:17And I assume that's the higher IQ people who got caught sort of by accident.
20:22So, how do you incentivize the judges to keep the prisoners, to keep the criminals in prison
20:30long enough that the negative consequence is most likely to change their action, but again,
20:35not so long that they become embittered and can't function in society anymore.
20:39So, what I would say is that if the judge lets a criminal out of prison and the criminal commits
20:51another crime, then the judge is penalized in some financial manner for the length of the
20:59sentence that results in the new crime.
21:03So, let's say somebody steals a car, they go to jail for six months, they steal another
21:08car, they go to jail for three years, then the judge would be responsible for some percentage
21:15of the economic cost and damage of the person who recommitted a crime.
21:22So, now you have balanced incentives, right?
21:25The judge has an incentive to release the prisoner so that he can gain some portion of the prisoner's
21:31earnings, but not so soon because if the criminal commits another crime, then the judge is responsible
21:39for some of the financial costs of the commission of committing the crime.
21:43So, let's say it's 2% that the judge gets, so if the guy makes $50,000 a year, the judge gets $1,000 a year.
21:53Let's say the guy steals a $50,000 car, then the judge has to pay 2% of that.
22:01Maybe it's part restitution to the owner of the car.
22:05And, of course, if the guy steals $100,000, then the judge has to pay $2,000 or something like that, right?
22:13So, you want to balance these incentives.
22:16And, of course, this would probably be quite a, or at least a somewhat sophisticated or complicated algorithm,
22:22but you would need to balance things out.
22:25Because if the judge has to pay the costs of crimes that are recommitted,
22:32he has an incentive to keep the person in prison.
22:35But, of course, if he makes money from somebody who leaves prison and gets a productive job,
22:43he has an incentive to let go of the prisoner.
22:49So, he has benefits from release if the criminal becomes a productive member of society,
22:58and he has penalties if the person recommits a crime.
23:05Now, let's say somebody's got an IQ of 85, they're a murderer, what would the incentives be?
23:11Well, the incentive would be, let's just say, at 2%.
23:16So, the incentive would be if the prisoner gets released after a certain amount of time,
23:22I imagine it would be quite a bit of time because it's murder.
23:25So, the prisoner gets released and goes to get a productive job,
23:31but he's not very smart, so maybe he doesn't earn very much, right?
23:35So, maybe he earns $20,000 a year or $30,000 a year, right?
23:43So, at $30,000 a year, the judge is really not making very much, right?
23:50He's making like $600 a year.
23:53On the other hand, if the guy goes and kills someone,
23:58and let's say that a life is worth a million dollars,
24:02then the judge has to pay 2% of that, right?
24:06Judge has to pay $20,000.
24:09And I apologize, I don't have my calculator.
24:12I think we're pretty much on the money, but I think that's...
24:16So, you look at the incentives, right?
24:18They're not very well balanced, or to put it in another way,
24:23they're balanced towards caution.
24:26The judge would have to be...
24:27And, you know, you could actually do the math for this
24:29to figure out the probabilities,
24:32but the judge would have to be virtually certain,
24:37given the disparity of incentives, right?
24:39$300,000.
24:41A couple of hundred bucks a year of income versus $20,000.
24:44If he kills someone, he'd have to be pretty certain.
24:48That the murderer was cured.
24:51And, of course, from a societal standpoint,
24:54there is an economics to this as well.
24:56And the economics is, let's say somebody's not particularly smart,
24:59so they can't add much economic value,
25:01but let's say, along with that unintelligence
25:03and the sweet spot for criminality, as we know,
25:05is sort of around IQ 85.
25:07Less than that, you can't plan.
25:08More than that, you can defer gratification and get a job.
25:12But around 85, so somebody with an IQ of 85,
25:15you know, can't produce much value in society.
25:19And if they also have a violent temper
25:21and hurt, maim, brutalize, paralyze, or kill people,
25:26then the negatives far outweigh the positives
25:30of having people in society.
25:33Having those sorts of people in society.
25:35And, anyway, I'm not talking prevention.
25:37Like, I'm not talking like,
25:38well, somebody has an IQ of 85,
25:40so let's lock them up,
25:41because that would be unjust,
25:42because they haven't committed a crime.
25:43But once somebody has committed a crime,
25:45and it would be interesting to view these statistics,
25:48although I'm sure they're not kept
25:49for a variety of politically correct reasons,
25:51but it would be interesting
25:53to run the numbers.
25:58And certainly there would be probabilities.
26:02Now, of course, the judge could take out insurance,
26:04blah, blah, blah,
26:05but then the insurance companies
26:06would simply be charging the judge
26:07based upon the risk of letting somebody out of prison.
26:11But if somebody is not smart and a murderer,
26:16the odds of them being a productive member of society
26:18to the point where taking the risk
26:19of additional murders is worth it
26:21is probably quite low.
26:22Again, I'm just saying this off the seat of my pants
26:25kind of mental calculations.
26:27But if you look at it,
26:28that the upside is only a couple of hundred bucks
26:31for the judge,
26:31but the downside would be $20,000,
26:33it's pretty hard.
26:35to justify.
26:38And whether or not you would want
26:41a murderer with a very high chance
26:44of recommitting crime,
26:47whether you would really want someone like that
26:48out in society again,
26:50I mean, it's pretty questionable.
26:53I mean, one of the reasons
26:54why people want to come to the West
26:55is we spend a lot of years,
27:00centuries, in fact,
27:01killing off or disabling reproductively
27:04through prison or expulsion,
27:07transportation to Australia.
27:09We took the most violent out of our society.
27:13Then, unfortunately,
27:15those with the capacity for violence,
27:16but with high moral standards
27:20got killed off in the World Wars
27:21and it's hard to sort of say
27:23exactly who's left,
27:24but not much.
27:26That's really,
27:27I mean, really,
27:28the West died in 1914.
27:29The rest has just been
27:30after twitches.
27:31so trying to find the right balance
27:35of incentives is really important.
27:37It would be interesting to know
27:39and there would be lots of reports on this
27:42and I assume that the punishments
27:43and rewards would have to be set
27:45by a conglomeration of insurance companies,
27:47of DROs,
27:48but how many murderers
27:52are safe to release?
27:54I would argue very few.
27:57I mean,
27:57I mean,
27:58sort of two points come to mind.
27:59One is the Shawshank Redemption,
28:00that there's that old guy
28:01who's bagging groceries,
28:03who kills himself,
28:04and we're supposed to be real,
28:05real sorry for the criminal
28:07who spent many,
28:08many, many years in prison.
28:10Supposed to feel sorry for him.
28:12It's like,
28:12nope,
28:12no,
28:13because,
28:13you know,
28:13it's easy to feel sorry
28:14for old murderers
28:16when they're too feeble to do much,
28:18but,
28:19you know,
28:20it's only age that took them out,
28:21not any kind of moral reform.
28:24The other is,
28:25oh gosh,
28:26what was that movie
28:27with Tim Burton
28:30and Sean Penn
28:31and Susan Sarandon
28:34about a guy
28:35who was a,
28:36he had this crazy hair
28:37and it was really horrible
28:40because you're supposed to have sympathy
28:41for this guy
28:42because he's going to the,
28:44he's going to get to,
28:46electrocuted
28:47or whatever,
28:48he was some capital punishment thing
28:49and he's being dragged
28:51and he's crying
28:52and he's sad
28:52but at the same time
28:53you're seeing flashbacks
28:55of his sexual assault
28:56and it's,
28:57you know,
28:57it's just all kinds
28:57of terrible stuff.
28:59Or there was a sort of lengthy,
29:01in Boston Legal,
29:02there was a lengthy,
29:03there was a black guy
29:04being strapped down
29:05and you're supposed to have
29:05all kinds of sympathy
29:06for the guy
29:08who was a murderer
29:10or something
29:10because he's now
29:11getting a lethal injection
29:13and you're supposed to feel
29:14really sad
29:15and it's all very manipulative
29:16and all of that
29:17and,
29:18anyway,
29:19I mean,
29:20I don't,
29:21if a murderer,
29:22I mean,
29:23imagine it wasn't
29:23human intervention
29:24like some,
29:25some guy who wiped out
29:26an entire family,
29:28right,
29:28some,
29:29you know,
29:29horrible family annihilator,
29:32if he had a heart attack
29:34in prison,
29:35who would,
29:35who would really feel
29:36any loss?
29:37Well,
29:37nobody.
29:39In cold blood
29:39or Truman Capote,
29:40right,
29:41somebody who just
29:41kills an entire family,
29:43well,
29:44that's,
29:44it's pretty bad
29:45and I don't,
29:47I don't care,
29:48like,
29:48I don't really care,
29:49I don't have this,
29:50oh,
29:51the tender potential
29:52human soul
29:53of redemption,
29:55the,
29:55a female urge
29:57to see everyone
29:59as redeemable
30:00is very toxic
30:01and,
30:02and the only reason
30:03that,
30:04that urge developed
30:05was because
30:06they were kept
30:06far away
30:07from judgment
30:09and punishment,
30:10right,
30:10the women were kept
30:11far away from
30:12the legal system
30:12which allowed them
30:13to develop
30:13all of this sentiment
30:14mentality
30:14which is applied
30:15to taking care
30:17of the elderly,
30:18oh,
30:19he's going to reform,
30:20he's going to change
30:20and it also is applied
30:21to babies and toddlers
30:23and little kids
30:23which is fine
30:25and healthy
30:25and good,
30:26we need it,
30:27but it's just,
30:27you know,
30:27with regards to
30:28criminals and predators,
30:30you know,
30:30women will look at
30:31lion cubs
30:31and say,
30:32oh,
30:32so cute
30:33and all men see
30:34are lions
30:36that are easy to kill
30:36now but hard to kill
30:37later,
30:38right,
30:38that's,
30:38that's generally
30:39how,
30:40how men see things.
30:41Women look at,
30:42if you've got
30:43some mortal enemy
30:44and they're all
30:44these little kids,
30:45it's like,
30:45well,
30:45just going to grow up
30:47to be people
30:47who want to kill us,
30:48so they don't have
30:49a huge amount of value
30:50to me,
30:51right,
30:51that's the difference
30:52as a whole
30:52between the male
30:53and female
30:54and female
30:56sympathy for the
30:57underdog is great
30:58but not when
31:00it takes complete
31:01control over the
31:02legal system
31:02and the punishment
31:03system because
31:04then you get
31:04all of this
31:05anarcho-tyranny
31:06nonsense where
31:07the only crime
31:08is self-defense.
31:10So,
31:10of course,
31:10you know,
31:11this is not
31:11any kind of
31:12final,
31:13so of course
31:14this isn't any
31:15kind of
31:15final answer
31:17to this
31:18challenging problem,
31:19it's just a sort
31:20of potential
31:21mental framework
31:21for dealing
31:23with this
31:24kind of stuff.
31:26You want to
31:26balance the incentives
31:27to try and hit
31:28that sweet spot
31:29as often as possible,
31:30you can't do it
31:31perfectly,
31:32of course,
31:32because there's still
31:33free will,
31:35but the amount
31:36of criminality
31:36that will be around
31:37after peaceful
31:38parenting becomes
31:39widespread
31:39is so small
31:41that it is
31:43almost impossible
31:44for us
31:44to conceive of
31:46because we live
31:46in a world
31:48full of the products
31:48of coercive
31:49and violent
31:50parenting.
31:50So,
31:51I hope this helps,
31:52I hope they find
31:52this of interest,
31:53I'd love to hear,
31:54hear your thoughts
31:54about how best
31:55to try and balance
31:57these incentives
31:58and so
31:59freedomain.com
32:00slash donate
32:00to help out the show,
32:01I really,
32:02really would appreciate it
32:03and I hope you guys
32:04are having
32:05a wonderful day
32:06and lots of love
32:07from up here,
32:07we'll talk to you soon,
32:08bye.
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