From 1985 to 1988, Richard Barlow worked inside the CIA, tracking Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program. In a shocking revelation quoting Pakistan’s nuclear architect AQ Khan, Barlow exposes the chilling ideology behind Pakistan’s atomic bomb program — the urgent need for a 'Muslim Bomb' to rival global powers.
00:00Extremely sad tale. You've suffered so much just for telling the truth about one of a rogue nation's nuclear program.
00:07Well, you know, that's partially true. But, you know, that's the story.
00:15But really, my primary sin was not telling the truth. Although I did.
00:22And the primary sin, because as I've tried to explain, you know, people in the executive branch, they withhold the truth from Congress and lie all the time.
00:41You know, when you're talking about top secret intelligence, Congress doesn't always know that they're not being told the truth. You understand? Right.
00:49My primary sin was was getting people arrested. Because then the truth comes out. Do you understand? Yeah.
00:58And that is. If if this was just about me, we wouldn't be here right now.
01:08But what happened to me is emblematic of our government's handling of A.Q. Khan and Pakistan's nuclear program, because not only did they shut down from doing anything about that in 1988, 87, 88.
01:29They did nothing for the next 24 years. During which period, as I predicted, it was it was always very clear that while Pakistan's primary motive for developing nuclear weapons was to counter India, for sure.
01:52But it was also very clear. But it was also very clear from A.Q. Khan and the general's perspective, it was it was it was not just the Pakistani bomb.
02:01It was the Islamic bomb, the Muslim bomb. I mean, you can see. I mean, I think A.Q. Khan was even quoted once as saying, well, we've got the Christian bomb.
02:13We've got the Jewish bomb, we've got the Hindu bomb, we need a Muslim bomb, you know, and it was very clear to me that Pakistan intended to provide nuclear weapons technology to other Muslim countries, which is what happened, you know.
02:31And, you know, this is this is towards the concluding section of this this broadcast that we're talking to each other.
02:40You know, you know, you know, General Baig, who took over after General Zia's crash that happened, did go to Iran.
02:49And when he came back, he did mention that, you know, they were sort of brothers in a way.
02:56And your point about an Islamic bomb, I guess it's even more relevant now because there is renewed interest in Iran's nuclear program that President Trump has claimed is after he bombed it, that it's not it's it's been set back.
03:12But tell me, how closely linked is Iran's nuclear program to Pakistani nuclear technology or A.Q. Khan, proliferated technology?
03:27Oh, I mean, there in my opinion, there is no way that Iran could ever have developed gas centrifuges without the centrifuges that Khan and Pakistan provided them.
03:42You know, in the early 1990s, you know, in the early 1990s, along probably with nuclear weapons plans.
03:48I mean, let me put you this way.
03:50At the very least.
03:52It might have been impossible, I think.
03:55Like I said, this is very difficult.
03:59Making gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons is no small undertaking.
04:05You know, it knocked at the very least decades, many decades off of.
04:10The Iranian nuclear program.
04:14Yeah, I think now it looks to me.
04:17Remember, I'm out of it for years.
04:19I don't have any access to intelligence, but the Iranian program is now quite advanced in terms of their gas centrifuges.
04:26They've done a lot of work on their own, but they were they never could have gotten started without Pakistan's help.
04:32You know, in the book Fallout by Douglas France and Catherine Collins, they talked about the other side of the CIA, the DO that went ahead and busted AQ Khan and his network.
04:51Apart from the P1, P2 sort of centrifuge technology, they also found G4, which was a more advanced form of the centrifuge.
05:03Pakistan.
05:04Yeah, Pakistani centrifuges.
05:06But they also found blueprints of Chinese warheads, of Pakistani warheads, also in AQ Khan's document seizure.
05:15So tell me, like, what kind of technology do you think was passed on to Iran or North Korea by this network of AQ Khan, which I believe was actively supported by the Pakistani deep state?
05:31What do you think was passed?
05:34Yes.
05:34What kind of technology?
05:36Clearly, you just described what was passed.
05:41Advanced Pakistani nuclear weapons designs, advanced Pakistani centrifuges, you know.
05:48Did you also come across the same intelligence when you were there?
05:52No, because I was no longer there when this happened.
05:57I had, I can just speak personally, I was not aware of any evidence that Pakistan had, let me backtrack, I was extremely concerned that this is what was going to happen from day one, okay, that this was the intent of AQ Khan, General Begg, etc., right?
06:25But I had no evidence they had actually done it by the time I was removed from that equation in 1989.
06:36This happened after that?
06:38Correct.
06:39Yeah.
06:39Yeah.
06:40I mean, I've seen references in the media that the first couple of centrifuge transfers took place in 1987.
06:49I was not aware of that, that's all I can tell you.
06:52I don't know where they got that information, but even in the books, I mean, the vast majority of it happened in the 1990s, the early 1990s.
07:02And while I was in the intelligence community working for the FBI, that was not my area of responsibility anymore.
07:14The kind of intelligence, the kind of intelligence, hard target stuff that I did for the FBI, it had to have a U.S. nexus to it, if you understand.
07:27It's different than the CIA.
07:29So, I wouldn't have been following that part, you know, in general.
07:35You know, you paid...
07:36Years later, I was certainly aware of it.
07:39Yeah.
07:40Absolutely.
07:40Years later, sure.
07:42In conclusion, Mr. Barlow, so you've obviously paid a very heavy price for the nature of the work that you did exposing Pakistan's nuclear trade and other assorted activities.
07:57What lessons do you think us in South Asia over here should learn about what you went through, the way the United States functions, and the almost constant Pakistani nuclear blackmail that this region has to face?
08:17Well, I mean, I think the lesson for all of us is that it was too little too late.
08:25We should have dealt with this back in the 1980s, before...
08:33I mean, the bust of Khan is kind of a joke.
08:36I mean, you bust Khan after he's transferred top-secret centrifuges and nuclear weapons plan to some of the most dangerous states in the world?
08:46I mean, it was too late, you know.
08:48I mean, sure, they stopped the Libyan thing, but I doubt that the Libyans could have done much with what they received from him anyway.
08:55But in terms of the current situation in South Asia, I mean, I think certainly the greatest fear in Washington is that the wrong people take control in Pakistan.
09:12That's a huge fear in Washington.
09:16And if that happens, all bets are off.
09:25It's all bets.
09:26I mean, I think it won't be the same way for the other people.
09:28So, when you have to go to the other people, you don't get away from the United States, it's going to be the same way.
09:29There's a huge fear in Japan.
09:29There have to be the beautiful fear in Washington.
09:32So that's what we know when you're talking about here is such a huge fear in the world.
09:35But we're not in the same way.
09:38It's very much fear in the same way.
09:39I don't say the fear in the world.
09:42So, I don't think the fear in the world thatale is because of how this feels like the anger is or the fear in the world.
09:45So that we actually see there's a huge fear in the world that we can't be on this way.
09:48So, go ahead and where you can see it cause it.
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