- 6 months ago
How complacency and negligence by government agencies and oil companies helped lead to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
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00:00Frontline is made possible by the financial support of viewers like you, and by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
00:12Tonight, the search for a culprit in Alaska's worst oil spill has focused most intensely on Exxon's Captain Hazelwood.
00:20But a Frontline investigation reveals it was a long history of broken promises and institutional complacency that led to the spill.
00:28I think that everybody just got so interested in spending their oil money that they just stopped regulating.
00:35If they had have done what they promised to do, this would never have happened.
00:41Tonight on Frontline, anatomy of an oil spill.
00:52From the network of public television stations, a presentation of KCTS Seattle.
00:58WNET New York, WPBT Miami, WTVS Detroit, and WGBH Boston.
01:06This is Frontline, with Judy Woodruff.
01:10Good evening.
01:14It has now been almost a year since the Exxon Valdez spilled 11 million gallons of oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound.
01:23Today in Anchorage, a jury heard final arguments in the criminal negligence trial of Captain Joseph Hazelwood.
01:30Last month, the Justice Department indicted the Exxon Corporation on five criminal counts,
01:36including willful wrongdoing and failing to ensure the tanker was operated by a competent crew.
01:43In a year of efforts to fix the blame for the spill, most of the attention is focused on Exxon and its captain.
01:50But tonight's Frontline investigation reveals that responsibility must also be shared by the people and institutions
01:57whose job it was to prevent and contain the great spill.
02:02The U.S. Coast Guard, the state of Alaska, and the Alieska Pipeline Company.
02:08Tonight's program was produced by Oregon Public Broadcasting.
02:12The producer was Michael Myrendorf.
02:15It was written and reported by John Tuttle.
02:18It is called Anatomy of an Oil Spill.
02:25We're approaching the tanker.
02:30And we're slowed down through the ice field here.
02:33Really can't see anything.
02:36These are the first pictures of the Exxon Valdez,
02:39taken while 11 million gallons of crude oil were still pouring out into Prince William Sound.
02:45We're approaching the Exxon Valdez.
02:48She's hard to ground.
02:50The vessel's got a list.
02:53Is there?
02:55Peers?
02:57Maybe not.
02:58Three hours after the wreck,
03:00Dan Lawn was on one of the first boats to reach her,
03:03and Lawn had a video camera.
03:05They're shifting.
03:06This is the port side of the vessel.
03:09We're at our stern.
03:12Smell oil over here on this side, on the downwind side.
03:17And they're shifting the boarding ladder to the starboard side
03:20so we can try and get aboard without getting the vessels in the oil.
03:26We're looking at the hull of the ship.
03:28You can see a black oil line right here.
03:31The vessel has lost 105,000 barrels of oil so far.
03:40By morning light, the ship had spilled more than a quarter million barrels
03:44in an oil slick a mile and a half long.
03:47Dan Lawn was on board representing the state of Alaska.
03:50His job as a state employee was to monitor cleanup response.
03:55Six hours after the grounding,
03:56he stood on the ship and scanned Prince William Sound
03:59for a sight of the approaching cleanup crews.
04:02And at midday, he was still waiting.
04:04Then you can see we're basically really not leaking anything at this point in time.
04:12Now, what are people beginning to say on board the vessel?
04:15Where the hell is the response equipment?
04:17Overhead in Prince William Sound, planes and helicopters were circling.
04:25Television crews taking the pictures that would play on the network news.
04:30Fourteen hours after the grounding,
04:32while Lawn and others were still waiting for the response equipment,
04:36East Coast viewers would watch their nightly newscasts
04:39and see the Exxon Valdez grounded and alone in its oil.
04:43Still waiting for crews, skimmers, and boom
04:46that were based only 28 miles away.
04:50Good evening.
04:51An oil tanker ran aground today
04:53off the nation's northernmost ice-free port,
04:56Valdez, Alaska.
04:57The first pictures are just in,
04:59and the consequences are costly.
05:02The spill is one of the nation's biggest and worst,
05:06and from the first hours,
05:07television brought the images home,
05:09starting with the pictures of the ship on Bly Reef.
05:12There will be uncounted pictures of oil-coated sea otters.
05:18At least a thousand otters were killed by the oil.
05:21And pictures of birds,
05:23their feathers weighted by oil,
05:24struggling to keep their heads above water.
05:27And pictures of dead birds,
05:29some of an estimated quarter of a million dead birds.
05:34Pictures of people working the beaches,
05:36wiping oil-covered rocks with paper towels,
05:38or steam-cleaning the Alaskan coastline
05:41with high-pressure hoses.
05:44Television will also carry a sense of Alaskans' rage
05:47and frustration with the spill
05:48and Exxon's failing clean-up.
05:51Yeah, white-wing scooter again.
05:53White-wing scooter.
05:54If you wear the oil's thin,
05:59there's nothing alive.
06:03Everything's dead.
06:05It's horrible.
06:07I don't know what it's going to do with the fish.
06:12Fruit-o-beg crude.
06:15We haven't seen one live animal in this whole cove.
06:19There should be gulls.
06:20There should be sea lions.
06:22We haven't even heard the sound of a bird.
06:27This is why we've got to pick up the dead birds
06:31on the beaches,
06:33because the predators are eating these birds.
06:39I would probably say it died of oil contamination
06:42from ingesting oiled birds.
06:51Hey!
06:52You know how many exciting people it takes to drive a boat?
06:55How many?
06:56One in a fifth.
06:57From the day of the grounding,
06:58the question of blame is focused on Captain Joseph Hazelwood.
07:02The question's been made of your drinking problem.
07:04Can you tell us about the factor in your not being on the bridge?
07:07No, the captain has no comment.
07:09While what happened in Prince William Sound
07:11may have been portrayed as one man's bad judgment,
07:13The facts show the wreck and the magnitude of the damage
07:17required the bad judgment of a lot of people
07:20in big oil and government over a period of years.
07:23Why have I been saying for 12 years,
07:26and my predecessor's been saying for 12 years,
07:29this was going to happen,
07:30and why didn't the oil industry do something about it?
07:36Why didn't the state and federal agencies do something more about it?
07:43If they hadn't done what they promised to do,
07:48this would never have happened.
07:50Why do we let them go on with broken promises?
07:53Some of the promises Dan Lawn remembers date back nearly 20 years.
08:01They're promises made by the federal government and the oil companies.
08:05Promises of safeguards and controls to prevent a spill like the Exxon Valdez.
08:11Promises that if a spill were ever to happen,
08:13it would be contained and cleaned up.
08:16On March 24th, 1989,
08:19the world learned the promises had not been kept.
08:23The 11 million gallons of oil that polluted Prince William Sound
08:36came from Alaska's North Slope,
08:39above the Arctic Circle,
08:40800 miles to the north near Prudhoe Bay.
08:45Discovered in 1968
08:47and part of an estimated 10 billion barrel deposit,
08:50the North Slope fields are the biggest in North America.
08:53In 1969, the oil companies announced plans
08:57to build an 800-mile-long buried pipeline across Alaska,
09:01Prudhoe Bay to the ice-free Port of Valdez.
09:05From there, tankers would bring the oil south.
09:08The companies were so confident, they bought the pipe.
09:12Construction would begin in 1970,
09:14and oil would flow in 1972.
09:16But the industry hadn't reckoned on the burgeoning environmental movement.
09:22They admit that there's going to be environmental damage of all sorts here.
09:26They admit there are going to be oil spills,
09:29the possibility of major ones.
09:30They admit that the permafrost along the pipeline is going to melt.
09:34They admit the wilderness is going to be destroyed.
09:36They admit the scenery is going to be defaced.
09:38The pipeline debate would last four years until 1973
09:42when the United States found itself running short of fuel.
09:46Then Congress abruptly cut off the environmentalists' court challenges
09:50and approved the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
09:53One witness to the signing was Alaska's Senator Mike Gravel.
10:19Gravel had been at the center of the debate
10:21and heard the promises made.
10:24Sixteen years later, he remembers being told
10:26oil spills at sea would not be a problem.
10:29We are given all kinds of representations
10:32by industry and government that, yes,
10:34the technology is there,
10:36we'll have the equipment on at station,
10:38and it will be able to just scoop this stuff up
10:41before it causes any serious problem.
10:44And this equipment will be available 24 hours a day,
10:48and have no fear as long as oil is moving through Prince William Sound.
10:53We can handle technically.
10:56We have the technology to technically handle the problem if it arises.
11:00In the years of delay, the oil industry had reworked its pipeline plan
11:09and created Alieska,
11:11ultimately a consortium of seven oil companies
11:14to build and operate the pipeline.
11:16Conceived as a buried pipe,
11:19in its final design,
11:20much of it was built above ground on refrigerated support posts
11:24and insulated to protect the permafrost.
11:27No longer straight,
11:28the Alaska pipelines zigzagged across the landscape
11:31to better absorb both the extremes in temperature
11:34and the shock of earthquakes.
11:37And there were ramps and underpasses for caribou.
11:40The environmentalists had failed to stop the pipeline,
11:43but the project that went in had been redesigned to meet many of their demands.
11:48The state's representative during the pipeline's construction was Chuck Champion.
11:52As the pipeline was constructed,
11:54it was literally designed on a mile-by-mile basis,
11:57whether it was above ground or below ground mode.
12:00Literally state-of-the-art technology was developed
12:04on-site as the pipeline was constructed.
12:07It was literally a miracle of technology as it was built.
12:10What happened when the Alaskan pipeline got to the water in Valdez?
12:15Well, that's another story.
12:17We went from the latest state-of-the-art technology
12:20to technical obsolescence
12:24when we took the oil out of the pipeline
12:27and put it into the tankers.
12:28Before the first barrel of oil through the pipeline,
12:33the pipeline company assumed responsibility for spill response
12:36along the pipeline, in the harbor,
12:39and finally in Prince William Sound.
12:42Records show in 1971
12:44at a Department of Interior hearing in Anchorage,
12:47an Alieska consultant was unequivocal,
12:50promising an oil spill response plan
12:52that would make operations at Port Valdez
12:54and, in Prince William Sound, the safest in the world.
12:58A plan that he said would deal promptly and effectively
13:01with any oil spill
13:03so that its effect on the environment will be minimal.
13:07Alieska would handle the spills.
13:09The job of monitoring Alieska's readiness
13:11went to the Coast Guard and to the state of Alaska.
13:15Randy Bayless worked for the Alaskan Department
13:17of Environmental Conservation
13:19and he supervised state inspections
13:21from the opening days of the terminal.
13:24In the beginning, there was serious oil response.
13:27They had fairly good equipment.
13:30For all we knew, it was state-of-the-art.
13:33They had a dedicated crew
13:34and for the first couple of years,
13:37the management of the terminal was done very well.
13:43If you go back and look at the records,
13:44they would report and clean up spills
13:47of teaspoon or quarter teaspoon size.
13:51They would dig up the...
13:52like if a crankcase were dripping oil
13:55underneath an automobile or a truck
13:56or something like that
13:57and they'd find a spot of oil on the gravel,
13:59they'd clean that gravel up.
14:01They'd dig it up and replace it with cream gravel
14:03and take the dirty gravel to the incinerator.
14:08At Pipeline Milepost 800
14:10at the south end of the pipeline at Valdez,
14:12a meter counts the barrels of oil
14:15moving through the pipe.
14:17The number changes faster than the eye can follow.
14:21At peak production,
14:23more than two million barrels of oil
14:24pass through the pipeline every day.
14:27And because Alaska owns the Prudhoe Bay land,
14:30the state has a one-eighth share
14:31of the price of every barrel.
14:34The most authoritative estimates
14:36say that through 1987,
14:38Alaska's share of the oil bonanza
14:40was $24 billion.
14:42The federal government collected
14:44another $19 billion.
14:46And oil company profits
14:47are estimated at over $40 billion
14:49after taxes.
14:51A profit of over $400,000 an hour.
14:55$400,000 an hour for every day and night
14:58since the oil started flowing in 1977.
15:03The Alaska Pipeline is a cash cow.
15:06If there's any economic instrument
15:08that can afford to pay for a safe program,
15:13it's got to be the Alaska Pipeline.
15:15I think that everybody just got so interested
15:17in spending their oil money
15:18that they just stopped regulating,
15:21stopped looking at
15:23what was going wrong at the terminal.
15:25And with this kind of complacency,
15:27things just went to hell.
15:30Randy Bayless was gone by 1979,
15:33but not before he hired Dan Lawn.
15:36Now 43 years old,
15:37Lawn is the DEC's acknowledged expert
15:40on the Alieska terminal.
15:42And for most of his 12 years with the DEC,
15:45Dan Lawn has been raging about Alieska.
15:48The mindset over there is,
15:50they're God,
15:50they can do any damn thing they want,
15:52don't question what they're doing.
15:54Dan was the only voice in the wilderness in 83.
15:56I mean, everybody else,
15:58I mean, he was screaming,
15:59pay attention to me,
16:00things are going to hell here.
16:03People are quitting,
16:04they're not replacing people,
16:06equipment's breaking down,
16:08nothing works.
16:09And that has been a real battle with them.
16:11You get someone trained,
16:15and they know they're going to do it,
16:16then they change management,
16:17and you have to start all over again.
16:21And, you know, it's always,
16:22they don't want to spend any money.
16:25In mid-1984,
16:26Dan Lawn put his concerns in a memo
16:28to his superiors
16:29with the state of Alaska's
16:31Department of Environmental Conservation.
16:33The memo's key line,
16:35we can no longer ignore
16:37the routine monitoring of Alieska
16:39unless we do not care
16:41if a major catastrophic event occurs.
16:44Basically, I pointed out
16:46that they've allowed
16:46the system to deteriorate.
16:49It's continued to deteriorate.
16:50They put very little back
16:51into the system
16:52to keep it operational,
16:55protecting the environment.
16:58Lawn's memo also pointed
16:59to a deterioration
17:01in state monitoring
17:02that is under-budgeted
17:04and under-staffed office
17:05was a signal to Alieska
17:06the state was no longer interested
17:08in inspecting the terminal.
17:11But the memo went in
17:12just when the State Department
17:13of Environmental Conservation
17:14was cutting back.
17:16Dan Lawn's boss in those years
17:18was Bill Ross.
17:19It was a very difficult time
17:21for the department,
17:22for the state,
17:23and for all Alaskans.
17:25Essentially,
17:26with the collapse
17:26of the oil crisis
17:27that occurred in 1984 and 1985,
17:30the overall state revenues
17:31went from over $4 billion a year
17:34to much less than $2 billion a year.
17:37And DEC's budget
17:38was under stress accordingly.
17:42In the boom years,
17:43Alaskan government
17:44had committed itself
17:45to a higher level of service,
17:47paid for with oil revenues.
17:50When oil prices dropped,
17:51state government
17:52had to make cuts in services.
17:54And while oil
17:54might support the state,
17:56there was no full-time
17:57state employee
17:58watching the billion-dollar
18:00oil terminal at Valdez.
18:02You know,
18:02we do a lot of other things.
18:04The department
18:04does a lot of other things
18:05besides just look after
18:06the terminal.
18:07We deal with drinking water
18:08and waste water.
18:10Dan Lawn was monitoring
18:11Alieska,
18:12and he was also inspecting
18:13sewer systems,
18:15restaurants,
18:15and landfills.
18:16I've been told,
18:18well, we don't have any money,
18:19we don't have any people,
18:21can't get more people,
18:23can't get more help.
18:25In the winter of 1986,
18:27the state of Alaska
18:28tested Alieska's response capability
18:30in a drill that assumed
18:3260 barrels of oil
18:33had been spilled
18:34during the loading of a tanker.
18:36Oranges were used to simulate oil
18:38because oranges float,
18:40they're easy to see,
18:41and if Alieska failed to test,
18:43oranges are less polluting
18:45than crude oil.
18:47The drill was coordinated
18:49from a helicopter overhead
18:50as floating booms
18:51were hauled out
18:52to surround
18:53and contain the oranges.
18:56Inside the boom,
18:57the mock spill
18:57was funneled into skimmers
18:59where endless belts
19:00scooped the oranges inside.
19:03Alieska failed
19:03a similar drill in 1984.
19:06This time,
19:07the pipeline company
19:08did better,
19:09except in the judgment
19:10of Dan Lawn,
19:11who gave them
19:11less than passing marks.
19:14Other people
19:15that were there
19:15gave them
19:16a little higher mark,
19:18so when you weigh
19:19all the averages,
19:20they got just barely passing.
19:22Lawn's attitude
19:23did not go unnoticed
19:24at Alieska.
19:27We've got to get down
19:28to verse 4.
19:29At one point,
19:30Dan Lawn started
19:31taking a video camera
19:32into Alieska
19:33during routine
19:34water and air pollution
19:35inspections at the terminal.
19:37You see the smoke
19:38in the background.
19:39It was already
19:41drifted away
19:42from the vessels here.
19:43The pipeline company
19:45responded with
19:46an announcement
19:46cameras were now
19:47forbidden
19:48without prior approval.
19:49Dan had a
19:50combative relationship
19:52with Alieska.
19:53In my experience,
19:57it was one
19:58that was
19:58professional in nature.
20:00Alieska for years
20:01has said
20:02Lawn's a hard ass
20:03and a troublemaker.
20:06They don't like
20:08what it is
20:08that I say
20:09because I say
20:11the truth.
20:12I see what's going on
20:13and I report it.
20:14They don't like that.
20:16Alaska newspapers
20:17quoted one
20:17Alieska official
20:18saying Dan Lawn
20:20was a jerk
20:20and a troublemaker.
20:22And as head
20:23of Alieska,
20:24George Nelson
20:25reluctantly admits
20:26he went even further
20:27than name-calling.
20:28He went to Dan Lawn's boss
20:30and tried to get
20:30Lawn fired.
20:32Well, what I
20:33suggested was
20:35that the kind
20:36of working relationship
20:37both of us
20:39would want
20:39between Ross
20:40and
20:41between Alieska
20:43and the state
20:44was difficult
20:46because
20:46of the way
20:48certain people
20:49in
20:50State Department
20:52of Environmental
20:53Conservation
20:53operated.
20:54Dan Lawn?
20:55Yes.
20:58And the question is
20:59did you suggest
21:00he'd be fired?
21:01I suggested
21:02we would never have
21:03the kind
21:03of working relationship
21:04down there
21:06as long
21:08as certain individuals
21:09remained in Valdez.
21:11Lawn's boss
21:11remembers his reaction
21:13to the suggestion.
21:14I just felt
21:14that that was
21:15an egregious
21:17violation
21:19of any kind
21:20of reasonable
21:20good taste
21:21and a total
21:22lack of understanding
21:23of how
21:23any kind
21:24of civil service
21:25system works
21:25or that any
21:26kind of sort
21:27of employment
21:28justice works.
21:30It just
21:30was water
21:32off my back.
21:33I mean,
21:33there was George
21:34committing yet
21:35another social
21:35gaffe
21:36and I gave it
21:37no credence
21:38whatsoever.
21:39Along with drills,
21:40the pipeline
21:41company was
21:41required to have
21:42a contingency
21:43plan.
21:45At three-year
21:45intervals,
21:46Alieska had
21:47to spell out
21:47how it would
21:48respond in the
21:49event of an
21:49oil spill.
21:51The contingency
21:52plan that was
21:52in effect at the
21:53time of the
21:54Exxon Valdez
21:55had been signed
21:55in 1987
21:57and had taken
21:58a year and a
21:59half to negotiate.
22:00I think that
22:01Alieska's attitude
22:03in all regulatory
22:05compliance matters,
22:06at least during
22:07my tenure,
22:08was let's see
22:09if we can do
22:10as little as
22:10possible and
22:11let's see if we
22:12can take as
22:12long as possible
22:13before we have
22:14to agree to do
22:15it.
22:18One sticking
22:19point would be
22:20Prince William's
22:21sound and whether
22:22the new contingency
22:23plan would
22:23describe how
22:24Alieska would
22:25deal with a
22:26catastrophic oil
22:27spill.
22:29The state was
22:29demanding a
22:30scenario for a
22:31200,000 barrel
22:32spill.
22:34Alaska wanted
22:34plans spelled
22:35out for
22:36responding to a
22:37spill that today
22:38sounds remarkably
22:39like what happened
22:40with the Exxon
22:40Valdez.
22:42Through those
22:42negotiations, the
22:44state's representative
22:44was Paul O'Brien.
22:46The whole idea of
22:47the scenario was to
22:48assess generally
22:49the steps they
22:49would take and
22:50the length of
22:50time it would
22:51take them to
22:52respond under
22:54those conditions.
22:55And in this
22:55case, with the
22:56200,000 barrel
22:57scenario, this is
22:58something they did
22:58not want to put
22:59down on paper?
23:00Initially, they
23:01did not want to.
23:02That's correct.
23:03And their
23:03reasons?
23:04Their reasons, as I
23:05stated before, were
23:06that it was an
23:08unlikely event and
23:09they just were not
23:10comfortable putting
23:10down an unlikely
23:12event, a highly
23:13improbable event in
23:14their contingency
23:16plan.
23:16Alieska's Bill
23:17Howitt explains the
23:18pipeline company's
23:19position.
23:20State law, and this
23:22is well known in the
23:23contingency planning
23:24process, state
23:26regulations require
23:27that Alieska clean
23:28up the most likely
23:29spill within 48
23:31hours.
23:31And the most likely
23:32spill is?
23:33And the most likely
23:34spill, as determined
23:35by a study that we
23:37put together, it was
23:38done for us by
23:39Woodward Clyde, and
23:40stated in the
23:41contingency plan, and
23:42approved by the
23:43state when they
23:44approved the
23:44contingency plan, is
23:46between 1,000 and
23:472,000 barrels.
23:48Obviously, nobody
23:49expected a 200,000
23:50barrel spill.
23:51I won't say that
23:52nobody ever expected
23:53a 200,000 barrel
23:55spill, because
23:56anything is possible,
23:59no matter how
24:00unlikely.
24:01Yeah, it's shut
24:02down at 1340, load
24:03is confirmed.
24:04The consulting firm
24:05of Woodward Clyde had
24:06produced a statistical
24:07report that predicted
24:09in the expected 30-year
24:10lifetime of the oil
24:11terminal at Valdez, the
24:13most likely spill would
24:14be 1,000 to 2,000
24:16barrels of oil.
24:17They predicted a
24:18catastrophic spill, a
24:20spill like the Exxon
24:21Valdez would happen
24:22once in 241 years.
24:25Convinced the study
24:26was right, Alieska's
24:28equipment, its crews
24:29and their training were
24:30geared to the spill
24:31Alieska expected, a
24:33spill 175 times smaller
24:36than the Exxon
24:36Valdez.
24:38Alieska was confident,
24:40and Lon was not.
24:44This is amateur video
24:54taken on board the oil
24:55tanker Thompson Pass on
24:57her voyage north to
24:58Valdez.
25:00The Gulf of Alaska is
25:01known as the mother of
25:02storms.
25:03Ships making the run on
25:05taps, the Trans-Alaska
25:06pipeline system, are
25:08repeatedly stressed and
25:09stretched by wave
25:10action.
25:14Naval architect, Virgil
25:15Keith.
25:17We are finding in the
25:18taps fleet there's a much
25:19higher degree of
25:20cracking, fatigue cracking,
25:23than there are in the rest
25:24of the fleet, and that's
25:25primarily due to the rough
25:26weather.
25:30When a tanker runs through
25:32the Gulf of Alaska or high
25:34sea state, it develops
25:35fatigue, so it's continually
25:37bending back and forth, much
25:38akin to the way you would
25:39bend a paper clip back and
25:41forth.
25:41The tanker can develop
25:42cracks, and if you don't
25:45watch that, the cracks can
25:46propagate, and again, you
25:48could lose the entire
25:49tanker.
25:53Coast Guard inspectors had
25:55found cracks in the Thompson
25:56Pass before, and wary of
25:58her condition, a curtain of
25:59boom was put around the
26:00tanker when she arrived in
26:02Valdez.
26:03As the Thompson Pass was
26:05being topped off, a leak
26:06was discovered.
26:07It was the largest oil spill
26:09we had at that time.
26:11It turned out there was
26:12about a 12-foot crack in
26:13the bottom of the ship.
26:151,700 barrels of oil seeped
26:17out of the Thompson Pass,
26:19and Dan Law inspected the
26:20Alieska cleanup.
26:22They haven't used any of
26:23these skimming devices all
26:24day.
26:25We'd go over there, and we'd
26:26watch them, and they'd work,
26:27and we'd leave, they'd quit
26:28working.
26:29What did the Thompson Pass
26:30spill prove?
26:32It proved what I've been
26:33saying for 12 years.
26:34They don't have the
26:35commitment to clean up the
26:36goddamn oil.
26:38Alieska concedes the job
26:39took time, but George
26:40Nelson says the cleanup plan
26:42worked beautifully.
26:43And I believe various state
26:46officials have been quoted
26:47as saying Alieska did a fine
26:49job in cleaning that plan,
26:51cleaning the spill up, so
26:52all in all went very well.
26:54By Alieska's definition, the
26:56Thompson Pass was the worst
26:57spill the terminal was ever
26:59likely to face.
27:00shortly after the Thompson
27:03Pass spill, you know, it
27:05made Alaska news and made
27:07national news, and I happened
27:09to be in a position where I
27:11was interviewed and asked a
27:13question as, are we going to
27:14have a major event, and are we
27:16going to be able to handle it,
27:17or words to that effect?
27:18And of course, I said, of
27:20course we're going to have a
27:21major event.
27:22It's a matter of the odds.
27:23And are we going to be able to
27:25handle it?
27:25No.
27:25Just three months after the
27:29Thompson Pass came that major
27:31event.
27:34Less than three hours out of
27:35port, the Exxon Valdez went
27:37aground in calm seas on a known
27:39and well-charted reef, virtually
27:42unzipping her hull, breaching
27:44eight of her 11 cargo tanks.
27:47Four million gallons of oil poured
27:49out of the ship in the first half
27:51hour.
27:53Alieska's plan, its contingency
27:55scenario, called for response
27:57gear reaching the spill in five
27:59hours.
28:00I mean, these guys should have
28:01been here in five hours, and
28:02what did it take them?
28:03Fourteen?
28:05On the night of the spill, this
28:06contingency barge that would
28:08take needed cleanup gear to the
28:10spill was in the wrong place and
28:12covered with snow, neither loaded
28:14nor ready.
28:16Skimmers, crew, and equipment
28:17would wait while the barge was
28:19prepared.
28:20The Alieska explanation?
28:22Well, it's my understanding that
28:23the plan did not require that the
28:25barge be loaded, okay, that have
28:29all the equipment on it.
28:30Wrong, says Dennis Kelso, head of
28:32the DEC.
28:33If you don't have the equipment
28:35configured so you can do the oil
28:36spill response, then obviously
28:39you're not carrying out what the
28:41plan requires.
28:43This isn't some, nobody suggested
28:45they ought to have a barge there to
28:47serve as a planter.
28:48The fact that the barge was unloaded, or
28:51whatever the state of the barge was at
28:53the time of the spill, in no way had
28:57any effect on what the spill was or
28:59what the damage may or may not be
29:01resulting from the spill.
29:03I don't follow you.
29:04Well, I'm saying, again, this goes back
29:06to the point, Coast Guard testimony, I
29:10believe, that if Alieska had been out
29:13at Bly Reef anchored to the thing,
29:16you know, ready, it wouldn't have
29:18made any difference.
29:19We didn't have, the equipment we had
29:22in our plan, as approved in the 87
29:24plan, was to deal with a thousand to
29:27two thousand barrels spill, okay.
29:30We did not have the equipment at the
29:34terminal, the plan didn't call for it,
29:37we didn't have it to take out, deal
29:39with a 268,000 barrel spill, whatever
29:41the amount of spill it is.
29:43The facts back George Nelson.
29:45Once Alieska reached the wreck, its
29:47equipment quickly proved inadequate.
29:50Working in a sea of 250,000 barrels of
29:53oil, in three days, the skimmers
29:55collected only 3,000 barrels, a little
29:58more than one percent of the spill.
30:02What Alieska would do is start the
30:04transfer operation that successfully
30:06retrieved a million barrels of oil still
30:09inside the tanker, without a fire.
30:11And without her capsizing.
30:14But state officials say, that wasn't
30:16enough.
30:17There was both a promise and a legal
30:18obligation, and neither was kept.
30:22Alieska had given assurances for years
30:26of two things.
30:27One, there would never be a tanker spill
30:30like this one.
30:32And second, that if there was a spill of
30:33any kind, Alieska was ready to step in,
30:38do the right thing, use the state-of-the-art
30:39equipment and solve the problem.
30:41Neither of those promises was kept.
30:43Yes, we have taken a lot of heat, and part
30:46of that heat, a great amount of that
30:47heat, I think, is due to people, and perhaps
30:51rightfully so, don't understand what a
30:53scenario is.
30:53A scenario is not a guarantee.
30:55It was a suggestion the way it may work.
30:59In light of their performance, it appeared
31:01that the Alieska contingency plan was the
31:05greatest piece of maritime fiction since
31:06Moby Dick.
31:08The state of Alaska also claimed surprise
31:11that Alieska transferred responsibility
31:13for the cleanup.
31:15Eighteen hours after the spill, Alieska had
31:18handed the job off to Exxon.
31:20So news reports of the failed cleanup pointed
31:22to Exxon and not the pipeline company.
31:25And Exxon, from the beginning, was assuring
31:27reporters that with the right equipment,
31:30the spill was controllable.
31:31We will be staffed up to clean up whatever
31:36the effect of it is.
31:38The spill was on a Friday.
31:40Time ran out Sunday.
31:42In those three days, mechanical skimmers
31:44picked up little oil.
31:46A nighttime test of burning the oil was
31:48described as successful but never repeated.
31:50And for reasons lawyers will be arguing
31:53for years to come, chemical dispersants
31:56that could break up the oil were tested
31:58but never applied in time.
32:01Seventy hours after the spill, storm winds
32:03forced workers back to shore and spread
32:05the oil beyond control.
32:08It's unbelievable.
32:09That slick is moving like it's on a superhighway.
32:13As the nation watched, the oil slick
32:15contaminated more than a thousand miles
32:17of Alaskan coastline.
32:19Exxon would spend nearly $2 billion
32:21while having to concede it was impossible
32:24to clean the Alaskan beaches.
32:26The beaches could only be treated.
32:31Federal studies show that in major spills,
32:33no more than 15% of the oil is recovered.
32:36One barrel recovered of every six spilled.
32:39In Prince William Sound, where the oil rushed out
32:46in a matter of hours, the success rate was much lower.
32:49Only one barrel in 25 spilled was actually recovered.
32:55California Congressman George Miller,
32:56who chaired one investigation at Prince William Sound.
32:59We must understand that we have no ability
33:02to manage and to clean up those spills.
33:05What took place in Prince William Sound
33:08was simply sort of the movement and guidance
33:13of oil around the sound,
33:16basically at the behest of Mother Nature
33:19with sort of public relations going on.
33:23I mean, essentially no oil was cleaned up
33:24in Prince William Sound.
33:26And we've got to understand that.
33:28On the night of March 23rd, 1989,
33:34as the Exxon Valdez finished loading its cargo
33:36at the Valdez terminal, everyone knew.
33:39A major oil spill cannot be cleaned up.
33:42It has to be prevented.
33:44But by now, the safeguards and controls
33:46that were once in effect here at Valdez
33:48were reduced to far less than what was expected
33:51or promised or needed.
33:54The holes in the system were so big,
33:56the Exxon Valdez was about to sail through.
33:58It's a little bit like courting a woman.
34:07You know, you make a lot of promises
34:09and then after you've won the woman,
34:12these promises aren't always realized.
34:15And so we were being courted by industry
34:17and industry was using its influence
34:20with the government.
34:21So everybody was saying,
34:22boy, we can do this, we can do that,
34:23and we will do this and we will do that.
34:25When the government and the oil companies
34:27were planning oil transport through Prince William Sound,
34:30the worst fears had been tanker groundings and collisions.
34:33The major concern was at the mouth of the bay
34:37and an underwater mountain that breaks the surface
34:40in the middle of the Valdez Narrows.
34:43Every tanker coming into or leaving Valdez
34:46would have to get around Middle Rock.
34:49Beyond the Narrows,
34:50the worry was tankers colliding in Prince William Sound.
34:53During the planning of the terminal,
34:55there was consideration of a radar system
34:57that would have covered the entire sound,
35:00but in the end, it was rejected as too expensive.
35:03Also ruled out was a navigation system
35:06called Loran Sea Retransmit,
35:08which would have given the Coast Guard
35:10a constant updating of tankers' positions
35:12within the sound.
35:13This morning, I signed a special message to the Congress
35:17covering the entire subject of oil spills.
35:22Through the Nixon and Carter administrations,
35:24there'd been a national debate
35:25over whether American oil tankers
35:27would be required to have double bottoms.
35:30So that if they do strike a reef
35:31or something, that the oil spills will be minimized.
35:34Double bottoms offer an extra layer of protection
35:36in the event of a grounding.
35:39After the wreck on Bly Reef,
35:40a Coast Guard study will conclude
35:42that had the Exxon Valdez
35:44had the cushion of a double bottom,
35:46the size of the oil spill
35:47could have been reduced as much as 60%.
35:50But in the end,
35:52the Coast Guard decided
35:53not to require double bottoms,
35:55not to install Loran Sea Retransmit,
35:58and not to have full radar coverage
36:00of Prince William Sound.
36:01And we were given those assurances
36:03by industry and by government officials
36:07who were responsible to police industry.
36:09because it just wasn't industry alone.
36:12I would not have relied upon
36:14the promises of industry alone.
36:18I wanted the government
36:19to be party to the process
36:21to guarantee that they're going to deliver
36:23on their promises.
36:24And we thought that we had that put in place,
36:27and unfortunately,
36:29it didn't stay in place.
36:31It was put in place,
36:32but it didn't stay in place.
36:33Yeah, part of the Exxon Valdez,
36:40we're just underway from Berth 5 here,
36:42we'll favor the north side,
36:43and reach a port to port.
36:46At 25 minutes past 9, March 23rd,
36:49the Exxon Valdez radioed the Coast Guard.
36:52The ship was leaving the marine terminal
36:54at Valdez with a cargo
36:55of 1,250,000 barrels of crude oil,
36:59and entering the Coast Guard's
37:01Vessel Traffic Service,
37:03a safety system designed
37:04to prevent oil spills.
37:06What was the Coast Guard telling you
37:08about how well they were going to watch,
37:10how well they were going to monitor
37:11the tanker?
37:11Oh, my God, they made commitments to,
37:15you know, they were having traffic lanes,
37:17they were going to act
37:18as the FAA would in air traffic control.
37:21This was sea traffic control.
37:23In the beginning,
37:24sea traffic control meant
37:25only one tanker at a time
37:27was allowed in the Valdez Narrows.
37:29And in Prince William Sound,
37:31separate lanes for inbound
37:33and outbound traffic
37:34with careful separation
37:35to avoid collisions.
37:37At the time,
37:38everything was taken quite seriously,
37:39that there was a mission
37:41to be performed,
37:42and the role was to essentially
37:44control the tanker traffic.
37:46James Woodle,
37:47commander of the Valdez Coast Guard
37:48station 10 years ago,
37:50a time, he says,
37:51when the Coast Guard exercised
37:53control over tanker traffic.
37:54We did control the speed of the ships
37:56and the movements of the vessels
37:59within the port.
38:00Do you use the word control?
38:02Very firm control.
38:04Don Bollinger,
38:04this is Valdez.
38:05Roger, covering that.
38:07We'll be standing by 13 and 16.
38:09In the beginning,
38:10firm control
38:11at the Valdez Coast Guard station
38:13meant there were always
38:14at least three people on duty,
38:16day or night.
38:17A radio operator,
38:19a radar watch person,
38:20and a supervisor
38:21would follow a ship's course
38:23on radar and plot it.
38:24actually mapping
38:25the ship's location
38:26every three minutes
38:27while it was in the Valdez Narrows
38:29and every six minutes
38:31as long as it was in radar range.
38:35Valdez traffic.
38:37Exxon Valdez.
38:39Exxon Valdez traffic.
38:41At 11.24 that night,
38:43the licensed government pilot
38:44who'd come on board
38:45at the terminal
38:46had safely navigated
38:48the Exxon Valdez
38:49through the Narrows
38:50and into Prince William Sound.
38:52The pilot would later testify
38:54he smelled liquor
38:55on the captain's breath,
38:56but he said nothing.
38:58A small boat
38:59picked up the pilot
39:00and Captain Joseph Hazelwood
39:01made his report
39:02to the Coast Guard on shore.
39:03Yes, we've departed the pilot,
39:07or disembarked the pilot,
39:08excuse me,
39:09and this time
39:11hooking up to C-speed.
39:13What are you right now?
39:23226.
39:24Okay, 227 would be fine.
39:26Pilots were one safeguard
39:28against disaster.
39:30When the pipeline opened,
39:31federal regulations
39:32required a pilot
39:33on board every tanker
39:34to guide the ship
39:35between the oil terminal
39:37and the Gulf of Alaska.
39:38We can make turns
39:39for six knots now.
39:41But in practice,
39:41the pilots were on board
39:42only a short distance
39:44between the terminal
39:45and the Sound
39:46to get the tankers
39:47around Middle Rock.
39:51For the rest of the Sound,
39:53tanker captains
39:54would serve as pilots.
39:56On the Exxon Valdez,
39:57that was Captain Joseph Hazelwood.
40:00Twelve years of experience
40:01seemed to bear out
40:02the Coast Guard's confidence.
40:04Prince William Sound
40:05was not difficult to navigate.
40:07Some 8,800 tankers
40:09had made the run
40:10in and out of Valdez
40:11without a collision
40:12or a grounding.
40:15Had someone laid out
40:16the scenario of a ship
40:17running aground on Bly Reef,
40:19I don't think anyone
40:19would have believed him.
40:21Commander Steve McCall,
40:22who was in charge
40:23of the Coast Guard station
40:24the night of the Exxon Valdez,
40:26McCall remembers
40:27what he calls
40:28a comfort level.
40:30You know, the experience
40:31comfort level
40:32was not as much
40:35of a need
40:35for us to do things.
40:37The ships
40:38stayed in line
40:42and followed
40:43and went along.
40:44Over the years,
40:45the Coast Guard
40:45had reduced its inspections
40:46of tankers
40:47coming in to Valdez.
40:49It cut back
40:50on staffing at the station
40:51and eliminated
40:52round-the-clock supervision
40:53at the radar consoles.
40:55And in 1987,
40:57to reduce paperwork,
40:58the station cut back
40:59on manual plotting
41:00of the ship's courses.
41:03The number of tankers
41:04coming in and out
41:04of the port
41:05really didn't justify,
41:07if you wanted to look
41:07at economics,
41:08I guess,
41:08keeping the system there.
41:13When the pipeline opened,
41:14the Coast Guard
41:15was the traffic cop
41:16for Prince William Sound.
41:17Twelve years later,
41:19it had become
41:20an information service.
41:22I don't think
41:22we ever really
41:23directed vessels
41:24in the sense
41:24of an air traffic controller.
41:26We never told them
41:27steer here,
41:28steer there.
41:29The master of the vessel
41:30is the one
41:31who is ultimately
41:32responsible
41:33for making decisions
41:34on board his vessel.
41:35We are just
41:36providing information.
41:38Okay,
41:39I was just about
41:39to tell you
41:40that judging
41:42my radar,
41:43I will probably
41:45divert from
41:47the TSS
41:48and end up
41:50the inbound lane.
41:52There's no conflicting
41:53traffic.
41:53Over.
41:54At 11.25,
41:56one minute
41:57after the pilot
41:57was gone,
41:58the captain
41:59of the Exxon Valdez
42:00radioed the Coast Guard
42:01saying he was
42:02accelerating to sea speed.
42:04And because of
42:05ice in the water,
42:06he was steering his ship
42:07out of the traffic lane.
42:09Okay,
42:09Exxon Valdez,
42:10over.
42:11First off,
42:12the Coast Guard
42:15had promised us
42:16safe transportation lanes
42:18and a system
42:20that would have
42:22kept those ships
42:22in those lanes.
42:23If the Coast Guard
42:24had followed up
42:26on that commitment,
42:27that accident
42:28would have never happened
42:29and we would not
42:29be having this interview.
42:33The Coast Guard's
42:34vessel traffic lanes
42:35had begun to
42:36disintegrate
42:37a decade earlier,
42:38along with the glacier
42:39at the north end
42:40of the sound.
42:42In 1979 and 80,
42:44the Columbia Glacier
42:45began to retreat
42:46and with its melting,
42:48more and more ice
42:49drifted into
42:49Prince William Sound.
42:51By 1989,
42:53it was routine practice
42:54for tanker captains
42:55to radio the Coast Guard
42:56they were moving
42:57out of their assigned
42:58traffic lane
42:59to avoid ice.
43:00Permission was granted
43:01just as routinely.
43:03How much of a hazard
43:04is ice up there?
43:06The ice that we saw,
43:07I would say,
43:08at proper speed,
43:09none.
43:10James Woodle
43:11was in command
43:12of the Valdez
43:12Coast Guard station
43:13when the glacier
43:14first began its retreat.
43:17According to Woodle,
43:18a moraine below
43:19the glacier
43:19keeps the larger icebergs
43:21grounded
43:21until they melt
43:22or break up.
43:24Woodle says
43:24the smaller ones,
43:26called growlers
43:26or bergy bits,
43:28are no hazard.
43:29A tanker at five knots
43:30coming against ice,
43:32the ice would tend
43:33to just roll off
43:34the hull,
43:35the bow of the ship.
43:36The factor
43:39is air is speed.
43:41In other words,
43:41if you're going
43:41to maintain
43:42a cruising speed
43:43of 12, 14 knots
43:44and go through ice,
43:46then there could be damage.
43:47By 1986,
43:49the tankers
43:50were paying
43:50no attention
43:51to the tanker lanes
43:52whatsoever.
43:53The tankers
43:54simply departed
43:55the tanker lanes
43:56at their convenience.
43:57Walter Parker,
43:58chairman of the
43:59Alaskan State Commission
44:00investigating
44:01the oil spill.
44:02His explanation
44:03of why the Exxon Valdez
44:05didn't slow down
44:06for the ice,
44:07why she was accelerating
44:09to sea speed,
44:10and why she left
44:11the traffic lanes.
44:12Why did they leave?
44:14Because it was
44:14company policy
44:15for a lot of companies,
44:16including Exxon,
44:18to encourage
44:19their captains
44:22to get up
44:22to sea speed
44:23as soon as they
44:24dropped the pilot,
44:25maximize
44:26the time element,
44:29and if there was
44:30ice in your path,
44:31why leave the
44:32tanker lanes
44:32and go around
44:33the ice.
44:34And that wasn't
44:35the decision
44:35of Captain Hazelwood,
44:37that was the decision
44:38of the companies.
44:40The faster a tanker
44:42moves oil,
44:43the higher a company's
44:44profit.
44:45The Alaska Oil
44:46Spill Commission
44:46believes that's why
44:48the Exxon Valdez
44:49was outside
44:50the traffic lanes
44:50on March 24th.
44:52It was conscious
44:54policy decision,
44:55it wasn't complacency.
44:57Save a buck?
44:58Yeah,
44:59yeah,
44:59save very tiny bucks
45:01compared to the
45:01amount of money
45:03that flows through
45:03Valdez.
45:06Valdez traffic,
45:07Exxon Valdez,
45:08WSUB,
45:09over.
45:10Valdez traffic,
45:11over.
45:12At the present time,
45:14I'm going to
45:14alter my course
45:15to 2-0-0
45:17and reduce speed
45:19about 12 knots
45:20to one my way
45:22through the ice.
45:23At 11.30,
45:25the captain
45:25of the Exxon Valdez
45:26reported both
45:27a course change
45:28and a reduction
45:29in speed.
45:31Later in the investigation,
45:32monitoring gear
45:33will show
45:33instead of reducing speed,
45:35a computer program
45:36had been initiated
45:37on board the ship
45:38to gradually
45:39accelerate the engine
45:40to sea speed.
45:4211.30,
45:44and the last transmission
45:45from the Exxon Valdez
45:46before she went aground.
45:48Once we're clear
45:49of the ice
45:50on our call vehicle,
45:51they will give you
45:52another shot.
45:53Over.
45:54Roger that, sir.
45:54We're waiting
45:55to your call.
45:55To have extended body.
46:00Back at the Coast Guard
46:01radar station
46:02sometime just after
46:0311.30,
46:04the Exxon Valdez
46:06faded on the screen
46:07and the radar watchperson
46:09assumed the ship
46:10was out of range.
46:11Once there'd been
46:12consideration
46:13of a better radar system,
46:15including a radar site
46:16on Bly Island.
46:18But to save money,
46:19there has never been
46:20full radar coverage
46:21of the sound.
46:2311.47,
46:25unseen from shore
46:26and with no chance
46:27of outside warning,
46:28the Exxon Valdez
46:29was headed south
46:30and increasing its speed.
46:33Pilotage,
46:34radar,
46:35radio,
46:35traffic lanes,
46:36monitoring and control.
46:38The safeguards
46:39were used up
46:39just as things
46:40were about to go
46:41very wrong
46:42on board the tanker.
46:45On the bridge
46:46at 11.53,
46:47the ship's third mate
46:48will remember
46:48the captain
46:49giving him instructions
46:50on how and when
46:51to correct the course.
46:53Then the captain
46:54left for his quarters.
46:56Exxon regulations
46:57require the captain
46:58to stay on the bridge
46:59through Prince William Sound,
47:01but now the ship's
47:02third mate
47:03was in control
47:04of the Exxon Valdez.
47:06The third mate
47:06was not a qualified
47:08ship's pilot.
47:09In fact,
47:09he had little experience
47:10maneuvering the Exxon Valdez
47:12at all,
47:13and he had worked
47:14long hours
47:15while the ship
47:15was taking on
47:16its cargo of oil.
47:18We believe
47:19that it was
47:20a very tired crew
47:22that,
47:24in total,
47:25that took
47:25the Exxon Valdez
47:28away from the dock
47:29on March 23rd.
47:32Another conclusion
47:33of the Alaska Commission.
47:34The wreck
47:35would have been
47:35less likely
47:36if crew members
47:37hadn't had to do
47:38double duty
47:39during the loading.
47:40It's our strong feeling
47:42that the Coast Guard
47:43has not factored
47:44fatigue
47:44and all the other
47:46elements
47:47necessary
47:47in a satisfactory
47:48crew level,
47:50and it's monitoring
47:51of the industry
47:52requests
47:52to drop positions.
47:55These industry
47:55requests
47:56have been led
47:57by Exxon.
47:57It's not true
47:58of the entire industry.
48:01Exxon leads
48:02the industry
48:03in construction
48:03of new tankers
48:04like the Exxon Valdez,
48:06ships with more
48:07automation
48:08and smaller crews.
48:10Frontline talked
48:11with several Exxon
48:12officers who believe
48:13fatigue is a growing
48:14threat.
48:15If someone happens
48:16to get sick
48:17or hurt,
48:18then there's no,
48:19like I say,
48:19there's no backup
48:20you have.
48:21Basically,
48:22with the amount
48:22of people you have,
48:23if something should
48:24happen to one person,
48:25you're breaking the law
48:26in running the ship
48:27because now you can
48:29no longer give
48:30your people
48:30the minimum amount
48:31of rest.
48:32This is the only
48:33Exxon officer
48:34who would discuss
48:35his concerns
48:35on camera
48:36and only
48:37if we altered
48:38his appearance
48:39and voice.
48:40He says officers
48:41are consumed
48:42by paperwork
48:43at the expense
48:43of maintaining
48:44the ships.
48:46Workers,
48:46he says,
48:47are more and more
48:47stressed,
48:48more and more
48:49fatigued.
48:50It's just a strange
48:51feeling,
48:51you know,
48:52when you've been
48:52up 48 hours
48:53and then you
48:54have to deal
48:55with, you know,
48:55ships coming at you
48:56or fishing boats
48:58and fog
48:58and heavy weather
48:59and ice,
49:01you know,
49:02fog signals blowing
49:03and at the same time
49:04navigating the vessel.
49:05without the proper rest
49:07a person is totally
49:09inefficient
49:09and beyond that
49:10probably dangerous.
49:12The Exxon Corporation
49:13gave Frontline
49:14a one-sentence answer
49:15to the charges
49:16of undermanning.
49:18With respect to the grounding
49:19of the Exxon Valdez,
49:21there is no indication
49:22that manning levels
49:23or fatigue
49:24on the ship
49:25in any way contributed
49:26to the vessel
49:27running aground
49:27on Bly Reef.
49:29There's never
49:29any one reason.
49:31The captain
49:32could have been,
49:33and I don't know
49:34whether he was
49:34drunk or not,
49:36but the fact is
49:37that you had
49:38an unqualified man.
49:40One man.
49:41If there had been two,
49:43for example,
49:43that tanker
49:44very likely
49:44would not have
49:45run aground.
49:48At 11.55,
49:50the third mate
49:50was the only officer
49:52on the bridge
49:52of the Exxon Valdez.
49:56At 11.55,
49:57he says he gave
49:58the order
49:58to the man
49:59at the wheel,
50:00a course correction,
50:0110 degrees
50:02right rudder
50:03to move the ship
50:04back towards
50:05the channel.
50:0812.01,
50:09the mate says
50:10when the ship
50:10failed to respond,
50:12he ordered
50:12a sharper turn,
50:1320 degrees
50:14right rudder.
50:16An alarm
50:16set to go off
50:17when the rudder
50:18fails to respond
50:19to wheel commands
50:20never sounds.
50:22Nor does the ship's
50:23fathometer,
50:24an onboard alarm
50:25that should go off
50:25when the ship
50:26ventures into
50:27shallow water.
50:30At 12.03,
50:32the third mate
50:33will order
50:33hard right rudder,
50:35and as the Exxon Valdez
50:36began to turn,
50:37the mate called
50:38the captain
50:39in his quarters
50:39to say he thought
50:40the ship
50:41was in serious trouble.
50:43It was a turn
50:44made too late.
50:46While the two men
50:46talked,
50:47the Exxon Valdez
50:48went aground,
50:49ripping open
50:50on Bly Reef.
50:52Yet for the next
50:5222 minutes,
50:54no one
50:54except the crew
50:55of the Exxon Valdez
50:56knew anything
50:57was wrong.
50:58Finally,
50:59at 12.26,
51:0122 minutes
51:02after the grounding,
51:04Captain Joseph Hazelwood
51:05radioed the Coast Guard
51:06at Valdez.
51:08Yeah,
51:09it's Valdez back.
51:11We've,
51:13it should be
51:14on the radar there,
51:15we've fetched up
51:16hard ground
51:18north of
51:20Goose Island
51:21off Bly Reef.
51:22and
51:25at least
51:27we'll get some oil
51:30and
51:32we're gonna
51:32be here for a while
51:34and
51:34if you want
51:37to
51:38say it on the fight over.
51:42In Valdez,
51:51the watchperson
51:51on duty
51:52would put down
51:53his paperwork,
51:54adjust his radar
51:55and immediately
51:56see the Exxon Valdez
51:58on the reef
51:59where it had been
52:00for 22 minutes.
52:03Are you just about,
52:04uh,
52:05about a mile
52:06north Bly Reef?
52:08I mean,
52:09you can go on.
52:11You know,
52:11for want of a,
52:12of a shoe,
52:13the horse was lost
52:13and on to,
52:14to the loss of the war.
52:16If,
52:16if any one of these links
52:18had remained in that chain,
52:19it would not have failed
52:20and that ship
52:21would not have gone
52:22on Bly Reef.
52:33Today in Valdez,
52:35there are a few signs
52:36of complacency
52:37or a comfort level.
52:38If that comfort level
52:39ever existed,
52:40it was lost
52:41along with 11 million gallons
52:42of crude oil
52:43in Prince William Sound.
52:45In the aftermath,
52:46all sides agree.
52:48Prevention
52:48was always the answer.
52:51One year
52:52after the Exxon Valdez,
52:54the state,
52:54the federal government
52:55and the oil companies
52:57are trying to make good
52:58on the promises
52:59of the 1970s.
53:02Across the bay
53:03from the terminal,
53:04a flotilla
53:05of new response vessels
53:06stand ready
53:07for emergencies.
53:09And at the terminal,
53:10all tankers
53:11are surrounded by boom
53:12as they're loaded.
53:15Okay, thank you.
53:16One hour before
53:17a tanker leaves the terminal,
53:19its captain
53:20is tested for alcohol.
53:21We're all clear
53:22on both ends.
53:23Okay.
53:24Votage stopped.
53:25Shipped inside.
53:26The government pilots
53:27who steer the ships
53:28through the narrows
53:29stay on board
53:30until the tankers
53:31reach Bly Reef.
53:33And the tankers
53:34no longer travel alone.
53:36They're accompanied
53:36by both a tug
53:37and a second boat
53:38carrying spill cleanup gear.
53:41And back in Valdez,
53:43the Coast Guard
53:43doesn't just watch,
53:44it manually plots
53:46the ship's progress
53:47at regular intervals
53:48for as long
53:49as they can be seen
53:50on radar.
53:53A year after the accident,
53:55plans are underway
53:56for a new radar system,
53:58one better able
53:58to penetrate the bad weather
54:00and follow ships
54:01through the sound.
54:03One year too late,
54:04the high standards
54:05demanded
54:05when the pipeline
54:06was built
54:07are being extended
54:08to the terminal,
54:09to the tankers,
54:11and into Prince William Sound.
54:15One other change
54:16in Valdez.
54:17Dan Lon's bosses
54:18with the state of Alaska
54:20have demoted him.
54:21The reason,
54:22expressed in a confidential memo,
54:24was, quote,
54:25Lon's lack of objectivity
54:27and professional manner
54:28towards those we regulate.
54:30Lon was pulled off
54:31inspection
54:32of the cleanup effort.
54:33He no longer
54:34inspects at Alieska.
54:36It was a matter of time
54:37for this Exxon Valdez
54:38to run aground
54:39or whatever ship,
54:40could have been any tanker.
54:42But it was a matter of time.
54:45Right in his warnings,
54:47in the aftermath,
54:48Dan Lon finds himself
54:49a prophet
54:50in his own land.
54:52I wish to hell
54:52that it had never happened.
54:54I would rather have been wrong
54:55a thousand times over
54:56than to be,
54:57have this spill
54:58and someone say,
54:59Lon, you're vindicated.
55:03It's too big a price
55:05to pay.
55:17In the years
55:18since the spill,
55:19there is also
55:19some bad news
55:20about the Alaska pipeline.
55:22When it opened,
55:23claims were made
55:24that the pipeline
55:25was virtually rust-proof.
55:27And over the years,
55:28both the U.S.
55:29and Alaska
55:30drastically cut back
55:31on their inspections
55:32of the pipe.
55:33But recently,
55:34new ultrasonic monitors
55:36discovered
55:37there are now
55:37hundreds of corroded spots
55:39along the pipeline walls.
55:42An Alieska official
55:43said,
55:43quote,
55:44we think we are
55:45on top of the problem
55:46and we are quite certain
55:48we won't have a leak.
55:50Thank you for joining us.
55:52I'm Judy Woodruff.
55:53Good night.
55:54Next time on Frontline,
55:59in Poland,
56:00euphoria over the collapse
56:01of communism
56:02has given way
56:02to impatience
56:03with the slow pace
56:04of economic change.
56:06I don't care
56:06who's in the government
56:07if I can't buy anything
56:08for my kid.
56:09What good does it do me?
56:11Trust Mazowiecki's government?
56:13What am I supposed
56:14to wait for?
56:14I can't afford
56:15two pounds of sausage.
56:17Frontline examines
56:18the rough road ahead
56:19for the new
56:19Solidarity government
56:20in Poland,
56:21the morning after.
56:24And then,
56:25I'll be right back Guy.
56:26I'll be right back.
56:26I'll be right back.
56:27I'll be right back.
56:58Frontline is produced for the documentary consortium by WGBH Boston, which is solely responsible for its content.
57:28Frontline is made possible by the financial support of viewers like you and by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
57:39For videocassette information about this program, please write to this address.
57:44This is PBS.
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