China's push for mega dams driven by energy-hungry tech and AI, researcher says

FRANCE 24 English

India fears a planned Chinese mega dam in Tibet will reduce water flows on a major river by up to 85 percent during the dry season, according to four sources familiar with the matter and a government analysis seen by Reuters, prompting New Delhi to fast-track plans for its own dam to mitigate the effects. FRANCE 24 speaks to Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School. He says the main driver behind China's push to build mega dams is power-hungry technologies like AI.  Visit our website: http://www.france24.com  Like us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/FRANCE24.English  Follow us on Twitter: https://twitter.com/France24_en

Transcript

00:00This is Apropos. Critics in New Delhi describe the project as an existential threat.

00:08China is building the world's largest dam on a river that runs through Tibet and India,

00:14prompting concerns about the effects the megastructure could have on downstream states.

00:19The project has prompted the Indian government to fast-track plans for its own dam to mitigate the effects.

00:25Monte Francis has the details.

00:26This is currently the largest hydropower plant in the world in central China,

00:33but Beijing is building another that, when finished, would be three times as powerful as the current record holder.

00:39The construction site for the Motto hydropower station is located along the Yarlang-Cangpo River in Tibet,

00:46which China annexed in 1951.

00:49India, worried that China will weaponize its control of the river,

00:52has planned to build a dam of its own in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

00:56But when workers from India's largest hydropower company move survey equipment in at the construction site,

01:03nearby villagers vandalized the machinery and even demolished a nearby bridge.

01:09If the dam is constructed, how will we earn our livelihoods?

01:13So we will not allow the dam to be constructed.

01:16If the dam is built, the soil will be washed away.

01:18We produce our crops on this soil.

01:20The battle over who controls the flow of water from a glacier on the Tibetan Plateau

01:26affects millions of people living downriver in India, China and Bangladesh.

01:32India's fears appear to be founded.

01:34A report by an Australian-based think tank concluded that control over the rivers in the Tibetan Plateau

01:40would effectively give China a chokehold on India's economy.

01:44But villagers who live near the site of the Indian dam say their own country's plans

01:49would effectively destroy their way of life.

01:52If the government forcefully moves forward with this project,

01:56the existence of our community will vanish from the map because the people will be scattered.

02:02There is no plan to relocate the people of this valley.

02:06As for China's massive project, Beijing denies there would be a negative impact for those downstream,

02:13saying it expects to start generating energy from the dam by the early to mid-2030s.

02:19For more on What's at Stake, we're joined by Rana Mitter,

02:22S.T. Lee Chair in U.S.-Asia Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School.

02:27Rana, thanks so much for being with us this evening.

02:30As we heard in Monty's report, China saying there's nothing to worry about here,

02:34but both India and Bangladesh have voiced concerns about this project.

02:39Are those concerns warranted in your view?

02:43How will these countries be affected?

02:46Sharon, yes, there are genuine reasons for concern.

02:50Although China has tried to make the case that there's really nothing to worry about here,

02:55in practice, many analysts and many politicians for decades have been wondering

02:59whether one of the major possible causes of a conflict in the Himalayan region

03:04might be actually what some people call a water war.

03:07In other words, access to big rivers like the ones we've been talking about here,

03:11not just in terms of the actual water flow, but the use of them for hydroelectric power.

03:17The fact is that India and China are geopolitical rivals.

03:20They have moved a little closer to each other in recent weeks and months,

03:24partly because they both have issues with the current US administration.

03:29But the basic bottom line here is that control of the river further up the source,

03:35which enables China to use the hydroelectric power,

03:39may well cut off India's ability to do that.

03:41And that suggests that there is a sort of zero-sum potential conflict,

03:46not necessarily military, but certainly political, coming up between the two.

03:50And would that explain then what China's motive is here?

03:53Is it effectively weaponising water, as some are claiming in India?

04:00I don't think that's the primary purpose.

04:03I think the primary purpose actually is really quite simple.

04:05China needs huger and huger amounts of energy.

04:09To take one issue that's been hugely in the news recently,

04:13but people don't always associate with water, AI, artificial intelligence.

04:17It's well known that outside the United States,

04:19China is probably the leading global provider when it comes to AI.

04:25But to make AI work, you need massive data farms,

04:27which need massive amounts of electricity to go into them.

04:30And China is still a very energy-hungry country.

04:33As it becomes one of the world's major tech providers,

04:35it needs lots more energy.

04:37And huge mega-dam projects like this providing hydropower are green.

04:41They don't provide fossil fuel pollution,

04:44and therefore they don't contribute to climate change in the same sort of way.

04:47So that's good.

04:48But also the huge demands they make mean that China is likely to prioritise

04:52essentially getting maximum power out of the dam

04:55and deprioritise good relations with the neighbour.

04:58So no, I don't think the primary purpose is to weaponise the river,

05:01but that may be the secondary effect of this immense hunger for power and electricity.

05:07And locals as well concerned about India potentially constructing a mega-dam of its own.

05:12But how exactly can it go about mitigating against what might happen here

05:17if it doesn't go ahead and build that down?

05:19I think that it's going to be very tough indeed,

05:23because India is also immensely energy-hungry

05:26and also desperately needs to reduce the amount of fossil fuel emissions

05:31that are engendering climate change in India,

05:34as they are indeed in China.

05:37One of the possibilities, but again, geopolitically,

05:39it's very, very tricky,

05:40is to come to a better agreement with Pakistan,

05:43its neighbour with which actually since the 1960s,

05:45it's had an agreement over the waters on the Indus River.

05:49The problem with that is that, as is very well known,

05:52India and Pakistan have perhaps an even worse relationship in military terms

05:56than India and China.

05:57In fact, they nearly came to war.

05:59They came to a small but potentially very dangerous conflict earlier this year.

06:05Without that, I suppose it's really incumbent on India to decide

06:08if it wants to go big on nuclear power.

06:10That's the other non-fossil fuel-based pathway, aside from hydro.

06:16But the problem with that is that you can't just whip up

06:18a nuclear power station overnight.

06:20It takes time.

06:21There are issues with earthquake zones.

06:23None of these, frankly, is a very easy solution

06:26to this real problem for India.

06:28And is there a risk, realistically,

06:30that China might move to exploit these rivers

06:33so that it can have more control, so to speak,

06:36over the Indian economy?

06:37You've referred to the economy a little earlier.

06:40I think there's a risk that China would think about using that possibility.

06:46I don't think it's their primary purpose.

06:48But if you think about the way in which, overall,

06:50China has really moved towards making much more use of its control

06:53over water, maritime issues in general,

06:57South China Sea, the Taiwan Straits,

06:59these days China has tremendous capacity in naval power.

07:03Obviously, naval power isn't so usable on rivers.

07:05But the idea that you might use water as a means to essentially conduct

07:09very robust and sometimes, frankly, confrontational diplomacy,

07:13that's not outside the realm of possibility.

07:17Essentially, though, having said that,

07:19there is one factor in the last few weeks that may push in the other direction.

07:23China has seen that India, having become at least a partner,

07:27if not a full ally of the United States,

07:29is now really not happy with the Trump administration.

07:33It feels that the Trump administration has put heavy tariffs on India

07:36and that India essentially has not been given the kind of bargain

07:39it was expecting in terms of being a good security partner

07:43for the United States.

07:44In that context, it does look likely that the India-China dialogue,

07:49which was really quite frozen for a while,

07:51might begin to revive.

07:52I think recently the foreign ministers of both countries

07:54did, in fact, meet each other.

07:56If China wants to create that medium-term warmth with India,

08:00it will know that basically building an immense dam

08:03that might actually hem in India's energy choices

08:07would be a very confrontational gesture to make.

08:09So that kind of diplomacy might just push China

08:11in a different direction.

08:13Yeah, because how might that relationship be affected long-term

08:16by such a massive project?

08:18If this project goes ahead and if China gets that control,

08:24don't forget, not just on the waters into India,

08:26but also into Bangladesh and other parts,

08:29potentially, of the region beyond,

08:32then it will give China a tremendous amount of power,

08:34but it also creates a vulnerability,

08:36because every time that something is done

08:37that goes against the interests of India or Bangladesh,

08:40it will create a diplomatic crisis.

08:42And there's a question about how many diplomatic crises

08:45China actually wants to navigate at any one time,

08:47simply saying nothing to see here

08:49is probably not going to be enough.

08:51In the longer term, India and China

08:54have two of the biggest economies in Asia,

08:56let alone the world,

08:58and it seems unlikely that either one

09:00is simply going to cut the other one off.

09:02So there are negotiations here

09:03that are potentially doable around

09:05a combination of security, energy, environment, and trade,

09:10but they'll involve both sides

09:11having to have much deeper, much franker,

09:13much more complex conversations

09:15than either has had, really since the 1960s,

09:17when a massive war between India and China in 1962

09:20really broke off relations between the two

09:23for a long time in the modern sense.

09:25So it demands some pretty,

09:27how will it be, subtle diplomacy,

09:30which neither side yet has shown a very good sign

09:32of being able to do,

09:33but this may be the moment at which that has to change.

09:36And Rana, how, finally then,

09:37would you rate the possibility of,

09:40you know, all of this prompting

09:41some kind of wider regional conflict?

09:45Sharon, I don't think regional conflicts

09:47in the end are the most likely outcome

09:49because in the end,

09:50the economic growth that all of these countries,

09:53India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

09:55desperately want,

09:56is in some sense dependent

09:57on there not being huge conflicts in the region.

09:59But the fact is that China

10:00is the most powerful actor in the region,

10:03and therefore it has the responsibility

10:04to make sure that its actions

10:06are negotiated diplomatically

10:08and in business terms

10:09and not simply imposed on the region.

10:12The ability to do that

10:13would show that China

10:14actually has diplomatic subtlety.

10:16Right now, that's a challenge

10:16that lots of its neighbours

10:17really are throwing at it,

10:19and it's not clear yet

10:20whether it's able to respond

10:21in a way that doesn't just satisfy

10:23the domestic Chinese audience,

10:24but also the regional Asian audience,

10:26which China says that it wants to do so much

10:29to try and woo and bring onto its side.

10:33Rana, thank you so much

10:33for that very enlightening analysis.

10:35We do appreciate your time on the programme.

10:37That's Rana Mitter,

10:39ST Lead Chair in US-Asia Relations

10:41at the Harvard Kennedy School.

10:44Well, that's it from us.

Category

Transcript

Be the first to comment

Recommended