- 5 months ago
The personal and political history of Saddam Hussein.
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00:00Frontline is a presentation of the Documentary Consortium.
00:09Allied forces advance deeper into occupied Kuwait today,
00:13pounding Iraqi Republican Guard positions,
00:18and even entering Kuwait City.
00:21Thousands more Iraqi soldiers surrendered to the Allies.
00:25But Saddam Hussein still continues to defend himself,
00:30even as his last-ditch efforts to withdraw with honor are rebuffed.
00:35He is trying to save the remnants of power and control
00:40in the Middle East by every means possible.
00:44And here, too, Saddam Hussein will fail.
00:49Tonight on Frontline, Saddam Hussein's rise to absolute power.
00:53Why has he risked his life and regime by confronting the West?
00:57He is wrapping himself in probably the most important thing in Islamic history,
01:02to stand up for a cause, to fight, knowing in advance that you might lose.
01:08Is he, in fact, a shrewd tactician, gambling on his own political survival?
01:12This man is the quintessential survivor.
01:14We must remember that.
01:16Tonight on Frontline, correspondent Hodden Carter examines
01:19The Mind of Hussein.
01:23With funding provided by the financial support of viewers like you
01:31and by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
01:40This is Frontline.
01:42In Iraq, Saddam Hussein has been held in fear and adulation.
01:57In the West, he's become the very embodiment of evil.
02:01Eyewitness accounts of the cruel and senseless suffering
02:05endured by the people of Kuwait.
02:08Summary executions, routine torture, Hitler revisited.
02:15Others see him as a cold and calculating politician.
02:18I think there's much more to be said, if one wants to make comparisons,
02:22to compare him to someone like Stalin, who he publicly admires,
02:27not for Marxist ideology, but really for Stalin's grasp of party organization,
02:33for the ruthlessness of the use of force,
02:35and for his determination to pursue his goals come what may.
02:39Some people who have called him don't know anything about him,
02:48don't know anything about the situation.
02:49He is a very cold calculator, but he believes very much in using force to impose his will.
03:00And a psychiatrist who has analyzed him for the U.S. government agrees that Saddam is not insane.
03:06Saddam is not crazy.
03:08He has the most dangerous personality configuration,
03:14what we call malignant narcissism.
03:17Such extreme self-absorption, he has no concern for the pain or suffering of others.
03:23A paranoid outlook, no constraint of conscience,
03:26and will use whatever aggression is necessary in pursuit of his own messianic drives.
03:36Good evening, I'm Hodding Carter.
03:45Saddam Hussein is, in one respect, no mystery.
03:49Thug and patriot, nationalist and self-serving tyrant,
03:53his type can be found around the world.
03:55But Saddam Hussein is also unique,
03:58emerging from a specific time and place.
04:02Over the past several weeks, with BBC reporter John Ware,
04:05we've talked to people who grew up with Saddam,
04:08worked with him, were defeated by him, and who have studied him.
04:12With their help, we'll try to determine what drove him
04:16into a seemingly suicidal conflict with the world's greatest military power.
04:21And as he bargains over withdrawal,
04:24what he still hopes to gain from the war.
04:27To answer those questions is to tell the story of his life.
04:31April 28th is Saddam Hussein's birthday.
04:39In Iraq, it is a national holiday.
04:43While Saddam is feared and hated by many Iraqis,
04:47he has also enjoyed a genuine popularity.
04:50He has not only created a personality cult,
04:53but his control of the country is total.
04:56There is no government.
04:57There is one person.
04:59There is no budget.
05:02At all.
05:03There is no budget decided by a government.
05:06It is one person who decides to pay there or pay there or pay there.
05:09So every bit of Iraq incomes go to Saddam Hussein.
05:15And when he do anything,
05:17his system says this is a gift from the president.
05:22So they make any person feel that even his daily living is a gift from his president.
05:28Hafidahullah.
05:30God protects him.
05:31Because he is giving us food,
05:33giving us water,
05:33giving us air to breathe,
05:35giving us sky to live under.
05:38So everything is a gift from that one person.
05:44Saddam Hussein's life started in a small village much like this.
05:48It is a part of his populist appeal.
05:51He is at home squatting with peasants.
05:53His background is hazy,
05:55rewritten by official biographers.
05:57It is known that he was born in 1937
06:00and left home at an early age.
06:05He came to Baghdad when he was 10 years old
06:08to live with his uncle and to seek an education.
06:11He apparently lived up to the Arabic translation of his name,
06:15Saddam,
06:16the one who confronts.
06:18It's said he arrived in the Iraqi capital with a gun.
06:21As a child,
06:27Saddam Hussein used to see lots of guns
06:29hanging on the walls at his home.
06:31In those days,
06:32an Iraqi would boast of having a gun or dagger.
06:35If you wanted to be seen as a strong man,
06:37you had to carry a gun.
06:39He saw the gun as a way of showing his strength.
06:42At school,
06:43the teenage Saddam had his problems with authority.
06:46My headmaster told me that
06:49he liked to expel Saddam from the school.
06:53When Saddam heard about this decision,
06:57he came to his headmaster's room
06:59and threatened him to death.
07:01He said,
07:01I will kill you.
07:02If not,
07:03you were a threat against me
07:05to expel me from the school.
07:08Saddam's political education
07:10as an Iraqi nationalist
07:11began with his uncle Kairala,
07:13who had been jailed for anti-British activities.
07:17He apparently also taught him about hate.
07:20Years later,
07:21Saddam would have printed and distributed
07:23one of his uncle's pamphlets.
07:25It was entitled,
07:27Three Things God Should Not Have Created,
07:30Persians, Jews, and Flies.
07:34The main influence on Saddam's personality,
07:38I believe,
07:39the hatred against the West,
07:42which was in the 50s and 60s
07:47because of the creation of Israel,
07:50because of prevention of the Arab unity,
07:53because of the domination of the British
07:55on the whole area.
07:57this hatred is still there.
08:02But you crossed the map to Iraq,
08:04another dangerous part that Britain dealt with
08:06before it was too late.
08:08He was born into the cauldron of post-colonial rule
08:11in a land still controlled by Britain.
08:15After World War I,
08:17Britain had redrawn the maps of the Middle East,
08:20stitching Iraq together from several separate pieces.
08:22The British then granted Iraq independence,
08:26but installed a puppet king.
08:29In 1941,
08:30they put down a revolt against the monarchy.
08:33Iraq remained a prisoner of the West's will.
08:37In 1958,
08:39while Iraq's King Faisal was visiting Britain,
08:42another conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy
08:44was underway at home.
08:47The coup succeeded.
08:49Its leader was General Abdul Karim Qasim,
08:52one day after the coup,
08:57the U.S. sent troops to the Middle East.
09:00We saw this as the beginning of a violent revolution
09:03that was going to overturn governments
09:04all the way across the Arab world,
09:06and we went in to stabilize it,
09:07starting in Beirut.
09:10President Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon.
09:15Though concerned with the civil war there,
09:17he was motivated primarily by the Iraqi revolution
09:20and the threat of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf.
09:26Meanwhile, back in Baghdad,
09:28Qasim's takeover was also being opposed
09:30by a small underground group of Arab nationalists
09:33called the Ba'ath Party.
09:34The Ba'ath Party in the 50s and even early 60s
09:39was a small party,
09:41but it has a wide, very wide support
09:44within the Arab people
09:47who were aiming to liberate the Arab countries,
09:53to unite them in one state,
09:55and to liberate Palestine.
09:58The party started out as a clandestine party
10:00and hence it's built on a well-known cell system
10:03that we know.
10:03People in this cell don't know people in that
10:05and so on.
10:07But since the party is also hierarchical,
10:10you move up the party
10:11and you're carefully watched,
10:13you're carefully vetted.
10:15Saddam Hussein was 20 when he joined the party.
10:18I met him when he was quite young
10:21with another two Ba'ath fellows.
10:24He was very aggressive.
10:26Now he was talking about
10:27how to overthrow this regime,
10:30the Qasim regime,
10:31to shoot everybody and to wipe out
10:34and to make the street of Baghdad
10:37a lake of blood.
10:39He used that lake of blood frequently.
10:44Inspired by Egyptian President Gamal Nassau's
10:47defiance of the British and French at Suez,
10:50Saddam had become a dedicated revolutionary.
10:53He was now drawn into a conspiracy.
10:56The Ba'ath leadership selected him
10:58to join a squad to assassinate Qasim.
11:01He was young, strong, brave,
11:04loyal to the party,
11:05ready to obey orders and to kill.
11:13Saddam's role in the failed assassination attempt
11:15has been dramatized in an Iraqi film.
11:21Saddam himself is portrayed
11:23as the fearless leader of the hit squad.
11:26In real life,
11:27his role was smaller.
11:31He put himself as a leader of the group
11:33who tried to kill Qasim.
11:35He was the most junior member of the group.
11:38His doctor remembers Saddam's wound.
11:40It was a very superficial wound to the shin.
11:44A bullet just penetrated the skin
11:45and stopped there,
11:46the shin of his leg.
11:47I don't recall whether it was the right or left leg.
11:51And during the night,
11:52he cut it by a razor blade
11:54and took the bullet out.
11:56So I treated the wound,
11:57I cleaned it and dressed it,
11:59and that's all.
12:02Because of the failed coup,
12:03Saddam fled to Cairo.
12:05He became a student of law
12:09at the university
12:09during a turbulent time.
12:14He apparently never finished a course,
12:17caught up instead in student politics,
12:20the Ba'athist party in exile,
12:22and in Egypt's own revolution
12:24under the charismatic
12:26Gamal Abdel Nasser.
12:29Nasser's pan-Arabism
12:30appealed to the young Saddam.
12:32All Arab nationalists,
12:35and that would have included
12:36people of Saddam Hussein's age group,
12:39would have looked at
12:41President Nasser
12:43both as a savior
12:44and as a model
12:46for a future Arab leader.
12:48I would have thought
12:49it not only colored his thinking,
12:52but also it must have colored
12:54his aspiration for leadership.
12:55This coffee shop
13:01was a meeting place
13:02for Cairo's political activists
13:04in the early 1960s.
13:07As a young political refugee,
13:09Saddam amazed the owner
13:10by appearing to enjoy
13:12near diplomatic status.
13:16He was rowdy with the waiters,
13:19rowdy with the customers,
13:20and used to sit by the pavement
13:22and tease the girls.
13:23He behaved badly in many ways.
13:26Once he had a fight
13:26with some Yemenis.
13:28He brought in an axe
13:29and they hit each other.
13:30He had two Iraqis with him.
13:32They switched off the lights.
13:34They hit and injured each other,
13:35so I called the police.
13:37But the police sided with him
13:39because he was under
13:40Nasser's protection.
13:42Patrons, however,
13:47also recall him
13:48as a man
13:48who had the quality
13:49of a born leader.
13:50He had, they remember,
13:52a natural air of authority.
13:53We were in the cafe
13:56and we had some quarrel
13:58outside the cafe.
13:59When we went,
14:01I found a young man
14:04who was Saddam Hussein
14:08gave order to these
14:11factions which fight together
14:16and all of them
14:17suddenly stopped the quarrel
14:20and it surprised me very much.
14:24And when I came back
14:26to my seat inside the cafe,
14:29I asked my friend
14:31about this young man.
14:34He told me,
14:35it's a very important man.
14:36He is a representative
14:37of the Ba'ath Party in Egypt.
14:40But in February 1963,
14:43events in Baghdad
14:45brought Saddam home.
14:46Qasim had been assassinated
14:48by the Ba'athists.
14:50To convince the people
14:52on the streets
14:53of Qasim's death,
14:54the Ba'athists
14:55and their military partners
14:56displayed Qasim's corpse
14:58on television.
15:02But nine months later,
15:04the Ba'athists themselves
15:05were overthrown by the army.
15:07They'd fallen prey
15:08to doctrinaire splits
15:09and divisions
15:11between their military
15:12and civilian wings.
15:14For Saddam,
15:15these were important lessons
15:16about power
15:17and how not to lose it.
15:20I think he learned
15:21the lessons
15:22that it's unwise
15:23to share power
15:24with other groups.
15:26The Ba'ath in 63
15:27had shared power
15:27with the military.
15:28The military outmaneuvered them
15:30and they were forced
15:32out of power.
15:33The second lesson
15:34he learned from that
15:35was to put the military
15:37in the barracks,
15:38get the military
15:39out of political power
15:40and put them
15:40in the barracks
15:41and he's been remarkably
15:42successful in doing that
15:43for a long period of time.
15:47Third, I think he learned
15:49from that experience
15:50never to allow splits
15:51in the leadership.
15:52And this, I think,
15:54is what we call
15:55his paranoia,
15:57that he is unduly suspicious
16:00of any thoughts even,
16:02of dissent or opposition,
16:04which must be crushed.
16:06And he's very good
16:06at crushing them.
16:09Suspecting Saddam
16:10of subversion,
16:11the military regime
16:12jailed him.
16:13There he began
16:14to plot the future.
16:16He would become
16:16a brilliant
16:17and sometimes
16:18subtle tactician,
16:19but his basic tactic
16:20was the crudest of all,
16:22to restore discipline
16:23to the Ba'ath party
16:25through selective terror.
16:26People who were with him
16:28in the prison in 1965
16:30told me that he was keen
16:34to read books about Hitler,
16:39about Stalin,
16:41things like that,
16:44which helped him to know
16:46how he could seize power,
16:49how could he manage
16:50keeping power in his hand,
16:55how he could get rid
16:57of his opponent,
16:58things like that.
17:01In July 1968,
17:03the Ba'athists seized power again,
17:05this time under President
17:07Al-Bakar.
17:08The young Saddam
17:09had connections.
17:11Bakar was Saddam's cousin,
17:13and he entrusted
17:13his 31-year-old relative
17:15with the most important job
17:17of all,
17:18running the state security apparatus
17:20to extinguish dissent
17:22both inside
17:23and outside the party.
17:26The curious thing is
17:28that when the Ba'ath party
17:29came to power,
17:30its secret organizations
17:31remained secret,
17:33even though they
17:33no longer needed to be.
17:35One wonders why the party
17:37should remain secret
17:38when it's in power.
17:40Here we should take into account
17:42the psychology
17:43of the leader Saddam,
17:45a man who's afraid of society,
17:47who doesn't trust his neighbors.
17:49These features
17:50have left their mark
17:50on Iraq
17:51since the Ba'ath party
17:52came to power.
17:53The state
17:54doesn't trust its neighbors.
17:56The party organization
17:57doesn't trust its members.
17:59The government
18:00doesn't trust its ministers.
18:03All this reflects
18:04the psychology
18:05of fear and terror
18:06in which Saddam
18:07has always lived.
18:08In 1968,
18:13Asami Ali
18:14was a journalist
18:14in Baghdad.
18:16After publishing
18:16secret Ba'ath documents,
18:18he found himself
18:19being interrogated
18:20by Saddam Hussein.
18:21I felt I am
18:24in front of
18:25a very powerful person.
18:27That is the man
18:28who will decide
18:29my destiny.
18:31He was very serious
18:32and he said
18:33we are different
18:34from the former regime.
18:36He said
18:37we are going
18:38to clean Iraq
18:40from all the weak people,
18:43from unwanted people.
18:46so we have a message.
18:52We have a plan
18:53to do it
18:54and we are going
18:56to do it.
18:57That message
18:59was soon delivered
19:00to the Iraqi people.
19:03The public came
19:04in their thousands
19:05to Liberation Square
19:06to witness the fate
19:08of those the Ba'athists
19:09claimed had plotted
19:10against them.
19:11When we went there,
19:12there were many speakers
19:13there.
19:13They were speaking
19:14about
19:15against Zionism,
19:18against the traitors,
19:19against the policy
19:23of Ba'ath's government.
19:24What they are going
19:25to achieve,
19:27what they are going
19:28to wipe out
19:28all the traitors
19:29inside,
19:30like those people
19:31hanging there.
19:32All the traitors
19:32will be hanged.
19:35You could see
19:35the bodies
19:36very closely.
19:38These were hanged
19:39for, by that time,
19:40about four hours.
19:41And you could see
19:43because the neck
19:44was broken,
19:45and it's actually
19:46stretched to about
19:47one foot long.
19:49I myself in particular
19:50remember I was pushed
19:51right against
19:52one of the hanged bodies.
19:54I must remember
19:55my head hitting
19:56one of the shoes
19:56of one of the hanged men.
19:59Up to that time,
20:00people could be critical,
20:02they could criticize
20:02the government
20:03or statements
20:04made by Ba'athist officials,
20:09including the president
20:10at that time
20:11and Saddam Hussein
20:12as well.
20:14I realized that
20:17this can no longer
20:18continue
20:19and that we have
20:21to be careful
20:22about what we say.
20:23In the early years
20:25of the new Ba'athist government,
20:272,000 political opponents
20:28were executed
20:29or disappeared
20:30at the hands
20:31of state security.
20:33Even the man
20:33Saddam put in charge
20:35of the service
20:35was executed
20:36for plotting
20:37against the Ba'athists.
20:39Saddam then restructured
20:40the security operation.
20:42Saddam was very instrumental
20:43in developing
20:44the security apparatus
20:46for the regime
20:47and used it
20:49not only as a way
20:50to provide the regime
20:52with intelligence
20:53and prevent coup plots,
20:56but also to purge
20:57the regime
20:58one by one
20:59of its enemies
21:00and of his enemies
21:01so that Saddam
21:03was able to build
21:04a power base
21:05for himself
21:05and it took
21:07probably about
21:08a year and a half
21:09before Saddam
21:10really emerged
21:10as the number two man
21:11behind Bakker
21:12through a series
21:13of systematic purges
21:14and consolidation
21:15of power.
21:17He created
21:18three separate networks.
21:21The Internal
21:22State Security Service,
21:24the Amun,
21:26reorganized with the help
21:27of the KGB.
21:29Military Intelligence,
21:31or the Estakabrat,
21:33to gather military information
21:34from abroad
21:35and carry out assassinations.
21:39And watching over both of them,
21:41the Ba'ath Party's own
21:42internal intelligence service,
21:44the Mukhabrat.
21:45This was by far
21:46the biggest and most important
21:48intelligence service of all.
21:50It also kept an eye
21:51on the police,
21:52the army,
21:53and other mass organizations.
21:55The idea was
21:56that the Mukhabrat
21:57should literally penetrate
21:58every street.
21:59every member of the party
22:02would be responsible
22:03for a block of streets.
22:05He would have to know
22:06who are the people there
22:09who are against
22:10the Ba'ath Party,
22:11who don't like
22:12Ba'ath ruling Iraq.
22:14This actually set
22:15the infrastructure
22:16and I think
22:17is the most dangerous
22:18way of keeping security
22:20because making
22:21neighbors,
22:23spying on neighbors,
22:25relative spying
22:26on relatives.
22:27Long before Saddam
22:30became president,
22:31he knew he would have
22:32to penetrate
22:33the family itself
22:34to keep control
22:35of the revolution.
22:36Children were
22:37an early target.
22:42Young pioneers
22:42pay homage
22:43to the one they call
22:44the Magnificent Warrior.
22:46This hero worship
22:47by children
22:48began in the early 1970s
22:50when Saddam urged them
22:52to call him uncle.
22:53And in 1977,
22:59Uncle Saddam
23:00made this appeal
23:01to the Iraqi family.
23:02Teach them
23:03to criticize
23:04their mothers
23:04and fathers
23:05respectfully
23:06if they hear them
23:07talking about
23:08organizational
23:08and party secrets.
23:11You must place
23:11in every corner
23:12a son of the revolution
23:13with a trustworthy eye
23:15and a firm mind
23:16that receives
23:17its instructions
23:17from the responsible
23:18center of the revolution.
23:20As Saddam's power
23:23and influence
23:24grew in the 70s,
23:25it was clear
23:26that he had designs
23:27on the presidency itself.
23:29But he also knew
23:30that his cousin,
23:31al-Bakr,
23:32had powerful support
23:33from the army.
23:35So,
23:35with meticulous cunning,
23:37he began to plot
23:38against the military
23:39establishment.
23:41One of Saddam's
23:42first targets
23:42was Bakr's
23:43defense minister,
23:45Hardan al-Takriti.
23:46A former
23:47Air Force commander,
23:48Hardan was one
23:49of the president's
23:50favorites.
23:51But he had lost favor
23:52in a policy dispute.
23:54Publicly,
23:55Saddam supported him.
23:57Privately,
23:57he had other plans
23:58to make sure
23:59Hardan would not
24:00stand in his way.
24:03Hardan was ordered
24:04to leave the country.
24:06He went to the airport.
24:07Saddam gave instructions
24:09to the airport
24:09to stop the airplane
24:11so that he can go
24:13and say goodbye
24:15to Hardan.
24:15He went to the airport,
24:17he went up the plane
24:18and he kissed him
24:19goodbye.
24:20So,
24:20people felt that
24:21this man must be
24:22innocent.
24:23I mean,
24:23Saddam has nothing
24:24to do with his blood.
24:26But only a few weeks
24:27later,
24:27he arranged an assassination
24:29and he killed him
24:30in Kuwait.
24:32Sixteen generals
24:33were imprisoned
24:34or executed.
24:36Saddam was at
24:37al-Bakr's side,
24:39young
24:39and clearly ambitious.
24:42Why did al-Bakr
24:43trust the much
24:44younger man?
24:46Because Saddam
24:47is one of his
24:48relatives
24:48and Saddam
24:49a young man,
24:51so al-Bakr said,
24:52thought,
24:53that Saddam
24:54would have no ambition
24:54to take his place
24:55at least for the
24:56first 20 years.
24:58So he trusted him
25:00and he brought him
25:01and he pushed him up.
25:04And he was wrong?
25:06Yes,
25:06he was wrong.
25:08Systematically,
25:09Saddam had removed
25:10Bakr's closest colleagues.
25:12In July 1979,
25:14Bakr resigned
25:15for reasons,
25:16he said,
25:17of ill health.
25:20Saddam,
25:20the new president,
25:2142 years old,
25:23would trust
25:23no one
25:24but himself.
25:26Saddam has said,
25:29I can judge
25:30a conspirator
25:31against me
25:33from his looks.
25:35And a look
25:36is enough
25:36for me to know
25:38he's a conspirator.
25:39and when he believes
25:40somebody is a conspirator,
25:41I think he deals
25:42with him
25:43before
25:44the would-be
25:45conspirator
25:46would move
25:47against Saddam.
25:52He is able
25:53to read
25:53between the lines
25:54and also
25:55to read
25:56people's eyes.
25:57Anyone who goes
25:58to see him
25:59discovers that
26:00the first thing
26:00the president does
26:01is look them
26:02in the eyes.
26:03He does rely heavily
26:04on his sixth sense,
26:06on his instinct
26:07of just knowing
26:08when something
26:09is fishy.
26:10Those around him
26:11could never rest easily,
26:13not knowing
26:14what the president
26:14was thinking
26:15or what plots
26:16he suspected.
26:18They would soon
26:19find out.
26:21His first major purge
26:23took place
26:23in 1979
26:24at a special meeting
26:26of the Ba'ath
26:26party leadership.
26:28Saddam Hussein
26:29insisted it be videotaped.
26:31What follows
26:32is a numbing
26:32spectacle of terror.
26:33The business
26:35of the meeting
26:36is very grave.
26:37The delegates
26:38await anxiously
26:39as Saddam
26:39prepares to speak.
26:41He claims
26:42that this time
26:42his failed
26:43sixth sense
26:44has failed him.
26:45A senior Ba'ath
27:07party official
27:08then rises
27:09to confess
27:10the existence
27:10of a major plot.
27:12Then people start
27:13to call for
27:13a wider purge.
27:15Ali Hassan
27:16al-Majid
27:17for example
27:17who's his cousin
27:18and who was
27:19the governor
27:20of Kurdistan
27:21responsible
27:21for the severe
27:22repression
27:22of the Kurds
27:23and was also
27:24initially in charge
27:25of the occupation
27:25of Kuwait.
27:26He says to him
27:27what you have done
27:29in the past
27:30was good.
27:31What you will do
27:32in the future
27:33is good.
27:33But there's
27:34this one small point.
27:36You have been
27:37too gentle.
27:38Too merciful.
27:40Saddam says
27:40yes that's true.
27:41People have criticized.
27:42It's bizarre.
27:43People have criticized
27:44me for that.
27:45He says
27:45but this time
27:46I've shown no mercy.
27:48Half an hour
27:49into the proceedings
27:50and the first
27:51conspirator
27:52is plucked
27:52from the audience
27:53and led away
27:54to certain execution.
27:58Saddam meanwhile
27:59is looking relaxed
28:01drawing on a cigar
28:02but when he begins
28:04to speak
28:04his tone
28:05becomes severe.
28:06more conspirators
28:20are led away
28:20and as the numbers
28:22grow
28:22the mood rises
28:23to a frenzy
28:24of anticipation
28:25for no one
28:26can be certain
28:27that he might
28:28not be next.
28:29If you can imagine
28:33what it was like
28:34to be sitting there
28:36am I about
28:37to be executed
28:37and then
28:38as he is doing this
28:40to luxuriantly
28:41light up a cigar
28:43the absolute
28:46lack of feeling
28:47for human suffering
28:48and the total
28:49sadistic power
28:50over their lives
28:51really quite
28:52awe-inspiring.
28:53In a rising
28:55crescendo
28:55of desperation
28:56to prove
28:57their loyalty
28:58the surviving
28:59Ba'athists shout
29:00long live the party
29:01long live the party
29:03God save Saddam
29:05from conspirators.
29:08Saddam meanwhile
29:09can be seen
29:10reaching for a tissue.
29:13The tears
29:13are contagious.
29:17Then to guarantee
29:18the loyalty
29:19of his high command
29:20Saddam goes
29:21to sit among them.
29:23He then invites
29:24them to form
29:25the firing squad
29:26to execute
29:27their former comrades.
29:30Saddam has neatly
29:30lured his colleagues
29:32into sharing guilt.
29:34When one
29:35just expediently
29:36deals out
29:37death
29:38for the sake
29:39of control
29:40one doesn't have
29:41to be personally
29:41involved.
29:42In fact
29:43Saddam reminds me
29:45of Joseph Stalin
29:46in some ways
29:47who similarly
29:48took an enjoyment
29:49in the
29:50dealing out
29:51sadistically
29:52life and death
29:54to his ministers
29:55almost whimsically.
29:57A few days later
29:58crowds celebrating
29:59the executions
30:00chant Saddam's name
30:02an early expression
30:04of the personality
30:04cult that he would
30:06refine over the
30:07next decade.
30:10Iraq was a
30:11disparate group
30:13of peoples
30:13of different religions
30:15of different
30:15ethnic backgrounds
30:17and he needed
30:17an ideological glue
30:19to solidify
30:20the country.
30:21So this is why
30:22he created a mythology
30:23around himself.
30:24It's why he tried
30:25to create a common
30:26history that was
30:27a history of greatness.
30:29It's why he's used
30:30terror and repression
30:31to homogenize
30:32his people
30:33because the only way
30:35that Saddam saw
30:36that he could stabilize
30:37Iraq
30:38and rule Iraq
30:39was by pulling
30:43the country together.
30:43He also had the benefit
30:46of oil.
30:47Iraq has the world's
30:48second largest reserves
30:50and Saddam was going
30:51to use them.
30:53I think he used
30:54the oil revenue
30:55in a very intelligent way.
30:58During the years
30:591980,
31:001989,
31:0290,
31:03the total income
31:04of Iraq
31:05from oil
31:06was on average
31:0812 billion dollars
31:10a year
31:10and the credit line
31:12and various loans
31:13that the United States,
31:15Britain and others
31:15have given him,
31:16the total income
31:17during these 10 years
31:19amounted to about
31:20223 billion dollars.
31:23So there was plenty
31:25in the kitty
31:27not only to spend
31:28on military infrastructure
31:30as we have seen recently,
31:32but also to spend
31:33on social,
31:35educational
31:36and projects
31:39where the greater masses
31:41have benefited.
31:43This has increased
31:44his adulation
31:45and it was a two-way
31:49kind of something
31:51given by the leader
31:52and something
31:53gratefully received
31:54by the population
31:56at large.
31:57American scholar
31:59Christine Helms
32:00met Saddam
32:01for the first time
32:01in Baghdad
32:02in 1979.
32:04The president
32:05insisted on broadcasting
32:06her three-hour-long
32:08interview with him
32:09on national television.
32:12Saddam is a man
32:12who if you look back
32:13over the past 20 years
32:15has always been
32:16an activist,
32:18a doer.
32:19He creates things
32:20that are happening.
32:21He's looking down the road.
32:22This is the visionary
32:23aspect about him.
32:25His main concern
32:26has always been
32:26survival of the Iraqi state,
32:28maintaining the territorial
32:29integrity of the Iraqi state,
32:31minimizing domestic
32:32discontent,
32:33whether through the use
32:35of force
32:35or the Iraqis
32:37have a phrase,
32:38kadu'ayn,
32:38the carrot and the stick.
32:42He is also
32:42utterly pragmatic,
32:44prepared to change course
32:45when it seems necessary.
32:49For years,
32:50the Kurds have been
32:51fighting for independence
32:52from Iraq.
32:55Even before he was president,
32:57Saddam had courted
32:58Kurdish leaders
32:59and signed an agreement
33:00conceding their major demands.
33:02He charmed
33:05all the Kurdish leadership.
33:09We felt he was knowledgeable,
33:11he was young,
33:12he was determined,
33:13and it seems
33:14he was very,
33:15very well briefed
33:16on our demands,
33:18so sometimes
33:19he would pronounce
33:20some of our demands
33:21before we saying them.
33:23But Saddam's promises
33:29meant nothing.
33:30The agreement was broken
33:31and for over a decade
33:33the guerrilla war
33:34continued.
33:36Saddam would launch
33:37ever more savage
33:38reprisals,
33:39which finally reached
33:41their nadir
33:41at Halabja
33:42in 1988.
33:44It was genocide
33:47with poison gas.
33:495,000 people died.
33:59He is more willing
34:00to push things
34:01to extreme.
34:02He is more willing
34:03to make the mean
34:05suit the end
34:06to get his way
34:07than other people.
34:11When he has an adversary,
34:13he will raise the stakes
34:15so high
34:16that the adversary
34:17backs down.
34:18He will push things
34:19to the bitter end
34:20and he certainly is
34:22a stubborn,
34:23extraordinarily
34:24persistent man.
34:26He is also
34:27vainglorious.
34:29After the Iran-Iraq war,
34:30he built a memorial
34:31arch in Baghdad
34:33called
34:34the Victory Swords.
34:36What Saddam did
34:37is he had
34:38casts done
34:40of his arms
34:41and hands
34:42and he had
34:43huge
34:44forearms
34:46cast
34:47in a foundry
34:48in Britain
34:49that had to be
34:50trucked back
34:51to Iraq
34:52in pieces.
34:53So,
34:54out of the ground
34:55in Baghdad
34:56are these
34:56two extraordinary
34:57forearms
34:58holding on
34:59to swords.
35:01Pouring out
35:02of nets
35:03that are sort of
35:03attached to these arms
35:04are thousands
35:06and thousands
35:06of Iranian helmets.
35:08I mean,
35:08actual helmets
35:09that were taken
35:09from the bodies
35:10of dead Iranians.
35:12Helmets blown up
35:12by shrapnel,
35:13helmets with
35:14bullet holes in them.
35:15And to me,
35:16this says something
35:17about Saddam
35:18and something
35:18about his regime.
35:25Saddam Hussein
35:29invaded Iran
35:30in 1980
35:31with America's
35:32implicit approval.
35:34The Iran-Iraq war
35:35lasted for eight years.
35:37Over one million died.
35:40Here was proof
35:41of his incredible control
35:42over his population,
35:44his ability
35:45to mobilize
35:45his resources,
35:47human and physical,
35:48and even more importantly,
35:50his ability
35:51to motivate them.
35:52He fought that war
35:54with a sort of
35:54a social contract
35:55with his people,
35:56that he would try
35:57to fight it
35:57so as to keep
35:58casualties down,
36:00but if the chips
36:01were down,
36:02they were expected
36:02to go in and fight.
36:04And by and large,
36:05they did.
36:06So I think he learned
36:07that he has a lot
36:07of control over his people.
36:09He can take casualties.
36:14But the war also
36:16showed up
36:16some of his shortcomings.
36:18Afraid of giving power
36:19to the generals,
36:20Saddam insisted
36:21on directing the war himself,
36:24but he was
36:24a military disaster.
36:26He tried to broker
36:27a peace
36:27with the Ayatollah Khomeini,
36:29but was rejected.
36:31He handed the war
36:32over to the generals,
36:34and they won it.
36:37The man laying the wreath
36:39is Adnan Tofa,
36:40Saddam's wartime
36:41defense minister.
36:43They were cousins.
36:44They'd grown up together.
36:45But by the end of the war,
36:47Saddam saw Adnan
36:48as a problem.
36:49Adnan was considered
36:55by the army
36:56as the real hero
36:57of that war,
36:58and Saddam felt
36:59that his growing reputation
37:00and his ability
37:02could make him a rival
37:03for the leadership.
37:04I think that Saddam
37:05saw Adnan's popularity
37:06as a threat
37:07to him personally.
37:09There were rumors
37:11Adnan would be dismissed.
37:13Instead,
37:13in April 1989,
37:14a convenient helicopter crash
37:17solved the problem.
37:23At first during the war,
37:25Saddam,
37:26an avowedly secular ruler,
37:28had scorned
37:29the Iranian Ayatollah's
37:30Islamic rhetoric.
37:33But as the war dragged on,
37:35Saddam grew anxious
37:36that Iranian fundamentalism
37:38might undermine
37:38his own people's loyalty.
37:40He suddenly claimed
37:43an ancestral link
37:44to the Prophet Muhammad,
37:46and even his military briefings
37:48took on a distinctly
37:49Islamic tone.
37:54President Saddam Hussein
37:56who chaired
37:57the military meetings,
37:58they were full of
37:59quotations from the Quran
38:00and poetry.
38:02But I realized
38:03why he used to give out
38:04that kind of briefing.
38:05It was not directed
38:06primarily at us generals,
38:08but at the public
38:09who were very moved
38:10by its rhetorical fervor.
38:19Saddam also used
38:21history and myth.
38:23This film about
38:24the Arab hero Saladin
38:25reaches back
38:26to the 7th century
38:27before the Islamic divisions
38:29when Arabs united
38:31to defeat Persia.
38:36Saddam identified
38:36with Saladin
38:37who was from
38:38his ancestral village,
38:40Takrit.
38:46Saddam was also promoted
38:48as the new Nebuchadnezzar,
38:49the Babylonian conqueror
38:51of the Jews.
38:52He set out
38:53to rebuild
38:53ancient Babylon.
38:55Bricks are inscribed,
38:57the Babylon of Nebuchadnezzar
38:58was reconstructed
38:59in the era
39:00of Saddam Hussein.
39:02But in 1989,
39:03he was facing
39:04more current
39:05reconstruction problems.
39:06He was trying to deal
39:08with what were serious
39:09economic problems,
39:11political problems,
39:13having been seen
39:14to have made a deal
39:15and not really won
39:17the war with Iran
39:18despite all that he said.
39:20But in the end,
39:22he was,
39:24at the bottom,
39:25his problems were
39:26how was he going to
39:27rebuild his economy,
39:29repay his short-term
39:30commercial debts
39:31to Europe,
39:31keep up his creditworthiness
39:33in order to
39:34develop his infrastructure,
39:37his civilian economy.
39:38But the civilian economy
39:40took second place
39:41to the military.
39:44Despite an $80 billion debt,
39:46Saddam kept adding
39:47to the military machine.
39:52He was more concerned
39:53about the world outside,
39:55and particularly
39:56his longtime sponsor,
39:58the Soviet Union.
39:58Given the changes
40:00in Eastern Europe,
40:01given the changes
40:02in the East-West relationship,
40:03the Soviet Union,
40:04his mounting economic problems,
40:06the fear
40:07of Israel's preponderance,
40:09and at that time,
40:10the Israelis
40:10were talking about
40:12the need
40:12to contain Iraq.
40:16So,
40:17so there were
40:19many
40:20real reasons
40:22for concern
40:22for him.
40:23in addition
40:25to his sense
40:25of being besieged
40:27and giving
40:29his own paranoia
40:30to begin with.
40:32Years of surviving
40:34in the paranoid world
40:35of his own politics
40:36only added
40:37to his certainty
40:38that others
40:39were planning
40:40a conspiracy
40:41against him.
40:43It runs something
40:44like this,
40:44that Iraq
40:45is the only strong
40:46Arab country,
40:47or the strongest
40:48Arab country,
40:49and a group
40:50of outsiders
40:51are trying
40:52to weaken it.
40:52Israel is always
40:53at the head of this,
40:54the United States,
40:55and assorted
40:55local allies.
40:57Earlier on,
40:58it was Iran,
40:59now it's Kuwait
41:00and Saudi Arabia.
41:02They're trying
41:02to weaken Iraq
41:03by various means.
41:05The United States,
41:06for example,
41:06is trying to weaken
41:07them by economically,
41:09not giving them credits,
41:10by squeezing them
41:11in terms of technology.
41:13It may seem
41:14bizarre to us,
41:15but gradually,
41:16I think,
41:17that this particular
41:18theory has gotten
41:19quite a grip
41:20on Saddam's mind
41:22in the United States.
41:24Let's not forget
41:25that two years ago,
41:26three years ago,
41:27he was being cheered
41:28by people in the West.
41:30This is the man
41:31who was supported
41:32by American credit,
41:34intelligence information,
41:36dual-use,
41:37quote-unquote,
41:38material.
41:39He was provided
41:41with technical support
41:43from the Germans,
41:45the French,
41:46the French and the Soviets,
41:48and the Chinese
41:48provided the mode weapons,
41:49and he was given
41:50a great deal of money
41:52from the Saudis
41:53and the Kuwaitis.
41:55Now he believed
41:56they all wanted
41:57to bring him down.
41:58And so,
41:59at an Arab League meeting
42:00in early 1990,
42:02he demanded debt relief,
42:03higher oil prices,
42:05and land concessions
42:06from Saudi Arabia
42:07and Kuwait.
42:09Iraq's argument
42:10with Kuwait
42:10over oil and land
42:12was an old one.
42:13In 1961,
42:15President Qasim
42:15had threatened
42:16to seize Kuwaiti oil fields.
42:19The British
42:19had sent in the troops.
42:23Now, perhaps,
42:24Saddam would do
42:25what Qasim
42:25had failed to do.
42:28In 1990,
42:30Hussein felt
42:31the U.S.
42:31had forced Kuwait
42:32to overproduce oil
42:34in order to lower
42:35world prices
42:36and thus
42:37to strangle Iraq.
42:38I think he came
42:42to believe,
42:42I know he came
42:43to believe,
42:43because they've said
42:44it in their official documents,
42:46that Kuwait
42:47was overproducing oil,
42:48not in its own interest,
42:49but because it was
42:50goaded into that
42:51by the United States
42:52in an effort
42:53to weaken Iraq.
42:55And that's what he means
42:55when he says
42:56that was tantamount
42:57to war.
42:59In fact,
43:00in April,
43:01a group of U.S.
43:02senators visited
43:03Hussein
43:03in an attempt
43:04to convince him
43:05the U.S.
43:05wanted to strengthen
43:06ties with Iraq.
43:07Senator Alan Simpson
43:09remembers Saddam's
43:11state of mind.
43:12He started right off
43:14saying that there
43:15was a conspiracy
43:16against him
43:16created by the
43:18United States
43:18and England
43:19and that they
43:20had effectively
43:21created an
43:22international conspiracy
43:24against him
43:25and that he was
43:26a peace-loving man
43:28and used the
43:28word peace
43:30about every
43:3117 seconds
43:32for three hours.
43:33Before the invasion
43:34of Kuwait,
43:35he's been confiding
43:36to many people
43:37and sometimes
43:38not in secret
43:39that he was saying
43:41that the Americans
43:42were trying
43:44to get rid of him.
43:45I don't know
43:46how much this is true
43:47but he didn't like
43:48the window of change
43:50in the area,
43:51the window
43:51of democratic winds
43:53in the eastern bloc.
43:55He was terrified
43:56of them.
43:57so he
43:59maybe he wanted
44:02real, real
44:04assurances,
44:05heart-to-heart
44:05assurances
44:06from the Americans
44:06that they will
44:07not do anything
44:11to weaken him
44:12or destabilize him.
44:14But Washington
44:15was not sending him
44:16either strong enough
44:17assurances
44:18or a clear warning.
44:20At a State Department
44:23daily briefing
44:24in late July,
44:25he was told
44:25the U.S.
44:26would keep
44:27its distance.
44:28Do not have
44:29any defense
44:29treaties with Kuwait
44:31and there are
44:32no special defense
44:33or security
44:34commitments
44:35to Kuwait.
44:36But even that message
44:39was qualified
44:39in the same briefing
44:41in answer
44:42to a question
44:43minutes later.
44:45We also remain
44:46strongly committed
44:47to supporting
44:47the individual
44:48and collective
44:49self-defense
44:50of our friends
44:51in the Gulf
44:52with whom we have
44:53deep and long-standing
44:54ties.
44:55The next day,
44:56Hussein summoned
44:57the American ambassador
44:58April Glaspie
45:00to explain
45:01the statements.
45:02The impression
45:03that Ambassador
45:04Glaspie
45:05got from the meeting
45:07is that Saddam
45:08was going to try
45:11to find a peaceful
45:12solution to the crisis.
45:14Elaine Cialino
45:15of the New York Times
45:16is the only journalist
45:17to interview
45:18Ambassador Glaspie
45:19who apparently
45:20tried to convince
45:21the annoyed Hussein
45:22that Washington
45:23felt that Iraq's
45:25dispute with Kuwait
45:26was an Arab,
45:27not an American affair.
45:29She had instructions
45:30to go in
45:31and say to Saddam,
45:32we want to improve
45:34relations with you.
45:35We want to make sure
45:37that you understand this.
45:38She repeated it.
45:39She said,
45:40President Bush
45:41is not going
45:42to impose sanctions.
45:43He wants you
45:44to realize this.
45:46He wants better
45:47relations with Iraq.
45:48The fact is
45:49that what April
45:51Glaspie said
45:52is really a case
45:53study in appeasement.
45:55It was also
45:56an approach to Hussein
45:57that was recommended
45:58by others.
45:59The Egyptians
46:00and the Saudis
46:01told Bush
46:03don't antagonize things,
46:06don't aggravate
46:06the situation,
46:08lay low,
46:08keep a low profile,
46:09don't say anything
46:10that could
46:11make things worse,
46:13that could threaten
46:13things even more.
46:15Eight days later,
46:16just as he'd been
46:17threatening for weeks,
46:19Saddam Hussein
46:20invaded Kuwait.
46:23Whatever was in his mind
46:25when he made the decision,
46:26he still took the world
46:28by surprise.
46:29I don't think
46:30we understand the man.
46:31His personality,
46:33his brinkmanship
46:33is something
46:34that we're really
46:35not used to
46:36dealing with.
46:37I think the reverse
46:38is true as well.
46:40And I am not yet convinced
46:44that without giving him
46:48actually some things
46:50that I think the West
46:51was unprepared to give him,
46:53that he would have
46:54backed down.
46:54Neither the West
46:57nor his neighbors
46:57would give him
46:58what he wanted,
46:59so he took it.
47:01But it wasn't just
47:02his economy at home
47:03that sent him
47:04into Kuwait.
47:05Saddam Hussein
47:06wanted more.
47:07I'll tell you
47:08what I think
47:08he really wanted,
47:10one way or the other.
47:11He wanted recognition
47:12of his role
47:13as the leading
47:14regional power.
47:17He wants,
47:17in my view,
47:18he wants to survive.
47:19That not only means
47:20physical,
47:20he's a brave man.
47:22I don't cast any aspersions
47:23on his courage.
47:23When we say survival,
47:25we mean political survival.
47:26He wants to survive
47:27and his regime,
47:28he wants his regime
47:29to survive in Iraq.
47:31The invasion seemed
47:33to have considerable
47:34support from Iraqis,
47:35but for the West,
47:36it was his personal ambition
47:38that would define
47:39the conflict.
47:40We have no argument
47:41with the Iraqi people,
47:45none at all.
47:46Our problem is
47:47with Saddam Hussein alone.
47:49George Bush
47:50and Saddam Hussein
47:51hail from two
47:52different cultural
47:53and social backgrounds.
47:54Yet,
47:55in one respect,
47:56both of them
47:57dealt with this issue
47:59in strikingly
48:00similar fashion.
48:02Each claimed
48:03that he represents
48:04righteousness,
48:05light,
48:08in a mortal struggle
48:09with the other
48:10who represents
48:11darkness
48:12and decadence
48:13and evil.
48:14Appeasement
48:15does not work,
48:16as was the case
48:17in the 1930s,
48:19we see in Saddam Hussein
48:21an aggressive dictator
48:22threatening his neighbors.
48:38We're dealing with
48:39Hitler revisited,
48:41a totalitarianism
48:43and a brutality
48:44that is naked
48:45and unprecedented
48:46in modern times.
48:49And that
48:50must not stand.
48:52Was it
48:52a smart thing
48:53for George Bush
48:55to both personalize
48:56and mythologize
48:59Hussein?
48:59Absolutely not.
49:01Absolutely not.
49:03Because
49:03it
49:04betrayed
49:05an incredible
49:07lack of knowledge
49:08about the region,
49:11certainly about
49:11the regime in Iraq,
49:12about the individual
49:13involved,
49:14what Saddam Hussein
49:14and where he comes from.
49:16Did Hussein
49:17misread George Bush?
49:20Oh, I think so.
49:21He misread George Bush
49:22and the American people.
49:25Why did he misread him
49:26so much?
49:26I think it's his own mindset,
49:28a lifetime of misreading
49:30the world around him,
49:32looking at the world
49:33in terms of the Ba'ath Party
49:34climb to power
49:36and then fight
49:38to stay in power
49:38in the very complicated,
49:41in many ways,
49:42heterogeneous
49:43Iraqi political climate.
49:45If there was one thing
49:46Saddam Hussein
49:47had learned
49:48from Ba'ath politics,
49:49it was how to go
49:50one-on-one
49:51with a rival.
49:52When he succeeded
49:55in involving
49:56George Bush
49:58in a more personalized
50:01combat,
50:02not just Iraq
50:03versus the United States,
50:05but Saddam Hussein
50:06versus George Bush,
50:08this played
50:09extremely well
50:11in the Arab world,
50:12especially,
50:13to the weak,
50:17dispossessed,
50:18alienated individuals,
50:19especially the Palestinians.
50:20Here was this man
50:21who had the courage
50:22to stand up
50:24not only against
50:24the most powerful
50:25nation on Earth,
50:26but against the president
50:27of the most powerful
50:28nation on Earth
50:29and engage him
50:29in one-on-one combat.
50:39Saddam Hussein
50:40probably never expected
50:41George Bush
50:42to go to war,
50:44convinced that he
50:44wouldn't risk
50:45American lives.
50:50But he also had
50:53few illusions
50:54about the firepower
50:55he was facing.
50:59In the days
51:00before the invasion,
51:01one senior Iraqi official
51:03told me that
51:04Saddam saw himself
51:06very much
51:07as the new Nasser
51:08and thought that
51:10maybe he could
51:11lose militarily,
51:13but still,
51:14the people of Iraq
51:15would come to the streets
51:16the way the Egyptian people
51:17did with Nasser
51:18and raise him up again
51:20and that he could
51:21reemerge
51:22as the leader
51:23of Iraq
51:23even with
51:24a military loss.
51:28While he may never
51:30have taken it for granted,
51:31Saddam had come
51:32to expect
51:33the power and prestige
51:34he enjoyed at home.
51:37Now,
51:38in much of the Arab world,
51:39from Morocco
51:40to Jordan,
51:41he gained from the war
51:42what he could never
51:43have engineered alone,
51:45the support
51:46not just of the masses
51:47but of the elite
51:49like these
51:50university professors
51:51in Amman.
51:53He is a patriot,
51:55he is a shrewd,
51:56he is the leader
51:57who is going
51:58to lead us
51:59to victory.
52:00This is another
52:01problem.
52:04It should be left
52:05to the Arabs
52:06to solve it.
52:08The British,
52:09the Americans,
52:10the rest of the coalition
52:12paid for
52:13by the Saudis.
52:15they have nothing
52:16to do there.
52:18This is our land,
52:19our country,
52:20our problem,
52:21our issues,
52:21our culture,
52:23our civilization.
52:24For Arabs,
52:40to bomb Baghdad
52:42is to strike
52:42at the heart
52:43of Arab culture.
52:46It is what
52:47bombing Athens,
52:48Rome,
52:49or Paris
52:49would mean
52:50to Europeans.
52:58Iraqi TV
52:59showed Saddam Hussein
53:01in his bunker
53:02with his generals.
53:04Was he,
53:05as the West hoped,
53:06beaten,
53:07unable to respond,
53:09or was he waiting
53:10with something else
53:11in mind?
53:12Unlike some other
53:14leaders who,
53:15once they make a decision,
53:16will pursue it
53:17to the end,
53:18on a number
53:19of crucial occasions
53:20when Saddam
53:21has miscalculated
53:22and the decision
53:24he has made
53:25has proven
53:25counterproductive,
53:27he has been able
53:27to reverse himself.
53:28Now,
53:29he doesn't view this
53:30as an error
53:30in decision making.
53:31He views this
53:32as adaptively responding
53:33to a dynamic situation.
53:36After months
53:37of defiance,
53:38he began to maneuver.
53:39In the name
53:40of the Revolutionary
53:41Command Council,
53:43spreading the responsibility,
53:44he offered
53:45to withdraw
53:45from Kuwait
53:46on condition
53:47that the Israelis
53:48leave the West Bank.
53:51His announcement
53:52was greeted
53:53with celebration
53:54in the streets
53:55of Baghdad,
53:56but he was playing
53:58a more complex
53:59geopolitical game.
54:02By sending
54:03Tariq Aziz
54:03to Moscow,
54:04he drew
54:05the Russians in,
54:06promising them
54:07a role
54:07in a post-war
54:08Middle East.
54:09and forcing
54:10President Bush
54:11to reject
54:12the Russian proposal
54:13and set
54:14another deadline.
54:20Throughout
54:21the long
54:21confrontation,
54:23Saddam Hussein's
54:24decisions
54:24have consistently
54:25surprised his enemies.
54:30Now,
54:31instead of fighting
54:32the mother of battles,
54:34he is relinquishing
54:35Kuwait
54:36while claiming
54:37victory
54:38at home.
54:40He's already
54:41emerging
54:41as a hero
54:43in the Arab world
54:43for having
54:44withstood
54:45an air campaign,
54:47having lobbed
54:48missiles in,
54:49he's really
54:50deriving a great deal
54:52of psychic
54:53benefit from this
54:54as a hero.
54:55So I guess
54:56the question
54:56we have to ask
54:57ourselves,
54:57if he has enough
54:58psychic,
54:59if he's left
55:00with a lot
55:01of psychic benefits,
55:02even if he hasn't
55:03got an army,
55:03he hasn't got
55:04an economy,
55:06if he's stirred
55:07this dignity
55:08and pride,
55:10it's possible
55:10that the Iraqis
55:11might let him survive
55:12and the Arab world
55:14might let him survive.
55:15This man is
55:16the quintessential
55:17survivor.
55:18We must remember that.
55:19And I think
55:20it is quite possible
55:21for him
55:21to be highly creative
55:23and innovative
55:24in his struggle
55:26to survive
55:27and survive with honor.
55:28It isn't just a matter
55:29of surviving
55:30and breathing.
55:31He needs more
55:32than vital signs.
55:33He needs to survive
55:34with his reputation
55:35not only intact
55:36but magnified.
55:39Saddam Hussein
55:40surviving the war,
55:42coming out alive
55:43with honor
55:44and control intact,
55:45has been described
55:46as the nightmare scenario.
55:49Kuwait will be liberated
55:50and Iraq devastated.
55:53But if Saddam survives,
55:54he may actually retain
55:56the one thing
55:57that ever really mattered
55:59to him.
56:00Power for its own sake.
56:57Funding for Frontline is provided
57:07by the financial support of viewers like you
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57:16Frontline is produced for the documentary consortium
57:19by WGBH Boston,
57:20which is solely responsible for its content.
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