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Documentary, 25 Million Pounds
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00:00I'm here to introduce a fabulous new game. It's called Banking. Everyone's doing it.
00:08All you need to play it with are one of these, one of these, one of these, and one of these.
00:16Like many in the 1980s, Nick Leeson wanted to be rich and successful.
00:34But Nick Leeson was also a very strange man.
00:38He had an extraordinary ability to manipulate and deceive those around him.
00:42This is his story.
00:43It is also the story of those he deceived.
00:47They willingly entered into a dream he wove, lured by the prospect of vast sums of money.
00:52And together they lost 830 million pounds.
01:00In 1986, Mrs Thatcher deregulated the City of London.
01:07The old division between banks and stockbrokers was removed.
01:11The gentlemanly image of the banker was replaced by that of the trader.
01:16Nick Leeson was working as a clerk for the giant American bank, Morgan Stanley.
01:19On the surface, he appeared just like everyone else in this new world, a boy from the suburbs who wanted to be a trader.
01:28It's very easy for me to get on with people.
01:30But I don't necessarily have to like you or any of the people that I work with to get on with them.
01:36So I come in, I do my job, I do it to the best of my ability.
01:40And then at the end of the day, if you're going to ask me out for a drink, I'm not going to go out for a drink with you because I don't like you.
01:47But I'm not going to tell you that.
01:48There's no reason for there to be any animosity during the day.
01:51I just didn't like the people that I worked with.
01:55And so I would go in, do the work, be very, very friendly.
01:58Everybody would probably say that they thought they were my best friend.
02:01And if they have the knowledge, then I will attempt to get that knowledge through, whichever way is best.
02:08And if the friendship is that method, then friendship is the method that I would use.
02:13In 1989, Leeson asked to become a trader, but Morgan Stanley refused.
02:18He decided it was time to move.
02:20This time he chose a British bank.
02:23It wasn't a money thing.
02:25I could have stayed at Morgan Stanley for an extra five grand.
02:28But, you know, if they've stopped me doing something once, who's to say they're not going to do it again?
02:32And so I moved to Berend's.
02:33At that stage, I probably would be happy to say that I'd never heard of Berend's.
02:40But it was a famous old bank.
02:43So, there's no Berend's in Watford.
02:47Berend's was the oldest merchant bank in Britain.
02:50It had been run by the Berend family for over 200 years.
02:54They were related to practically everyone, including Princess Diana and Tiggy Legg-Burke.
03:00Working for the bank was a family tradition.
03:02I decided to be a banker, not a very conscious decision, when I came down from Oxford in 1950 and had to earn my living and was able to go into Berend's and try my hand there.
03:24Berend's power was its name.
03:25It could raise capital on the best of terms, because everybody knew that its clients were the cream of British society.
03:32Even the Queen held an account at Berend's.
03:35It was a discreet, safe bank with a deep sense of superiority.
03:41Berend's had a wonderful franchise, particularly in Britain.
03:44But it was certainly smug.
03:46It was certainly arrogant.
03:47It had always been at the heart of the establishment.
03:51It had always been regarded very, very special.
03:56I think probably the Bank of England gave it considerable indulgence, because it was Berend's brothers.
04:02But Berend's had a terrible secret in its past, something that even today the family are reluctant to talk about.
04:11A hundred years ago, the bank sent a young clerk to Argentina.
04:15It was the emerging market of its time, and the clerk persuaded Berend's to invest in the building of sewers underneath Buenos Aires.
04:22Berend's sent millions of pounds, hoping to sell the shares in Europe.
04:28But no one wanted them, and the bank crashed.
04:33Berend's was rescued by the Bank of England.
04:36But Edward Berend, the head of the bank, was ruined.
04:39He never recovered, and his son and grandson went to live in solitude on an island off the Irish coast.
04:46Accompanied only by three wallabies, bought from London Zoo.
04:49The name of the clerk who ruined the bank was Nicholas, Nicholas Bauer.
05:00Nick Leeson went to work for Bering Securities.
05:04Six years before, they had been a small team of stockbrokers.
05:07Now they contributed over half the profits of the bank.
05:11But behind this 80s success story, Leeson found an operation run on a shoestring.
05:16It was just a totally different environment.
05:21There was, you know, at Morgan Stanley, everything was new.
05:25You know, all of the equipment was new.
05:28The furniture was new.
05:30At Berend's, everything is, you know, just tacky, I suppose.
05:34I can't describe it any other way.
05:36The Futures and Options Department was operating on a PC and on a software program that was written by one of the people that I worked with.
05:45It was very much on the back of matchbox type things.
05:49And there were a lot of problems.
05:51Leeson had joined an organization falling apart after the boom of the 80s.
05:57He worked as a bookkeeper trying to keep track of the bank's money.
06:01And he was good at it.
06:02Soon he was sent overseas to sort out problems.
06:06In Jakarta, he found huge sums of money owed to the bank by its clients.
06:10It was typical Bering's.
06:11Bering's had paid for a lot of stock and hadn't actually received anything back from the customs.
06:16The figure was £100 million.
06:19They just didn't have the right people in place to control it and monitor the settlements.
06:23You know, they'd go in and do the dealing and everything okay, but then just the back office would fall apart all the time.
06:28You know, it was typical Bering's.
06:30In Jakarta, Leeson met another clerk working for Bering's, Lisa Sims.
06:36You don't sort of wake up one day and think, I'm attracted to Nick, because you just grow on each other.
06:42Things that, you know, things that Nick could make me laugh.
06:44I mean, he is quite funny.
06:46He does make you laugh.
06:48And he is quite friendly.
06:50How ambitious was he?
06:52Very.
06:54You could just tell the minute you, like I said, you're in the, working with Nick.
06:58He was in control of everything and very ambitious and he wanted to get things done.
07:04In March 1992, Nick married Lisa.
07:09Ten days before the wedding, he had received some good news.
07:12He was to be a trader at last.
07:15Bering's wanted him to go and run their futures operation in Singapore.
07:20Leeson asked Lisa to leave her job and come with him.
07:23And she agreed.
07:24I thought, yeah, I want to spend the rest of my life with Nick.
07:29All I wanted was my little house, a car, 2.4 children and to be happy.
07:38What everyone wants, really, just to be comfortable.
07:41And I thought that's what Nick wanted, too.
07:43Leeson was going to trade in one of the newest and most exciting of the financial markets, futures.
07:56He went to work on Symex, Singapore's international monetary exchange, in the heart of the city's financial district.
08:05Leeson's job was to buy and sell futures.
08:08These are bets on the way a market will move in the future.
08:12He traded on the Nikkei, the Japanese stock market.
08:16He was acting under orders from both the bank and its clients.
08:19If the market moved the way they had predicted, they made money.
08:23If it didn't, their losses mounted rapidly.
08:26Nikkei is a really cool person on the floor.
08:29You won't believe it.
08:30And everybody is all excited and anxious.
08:35And he would be just holding the line.
08:37And then he just reports the figure to the line, on the other line.
08:41And then the next moment, once he gets instruction of selling or buying,
08:44he would go shouting to the boy on the floor.
08:47And they would all listen to him.
08:49And they would do it very fast.
08:51And maybe within a minute or whatever, he could have buy 500 and sell 500 lots.
08:57He's real cool.
08:58Real cool.
09:00It was hard work, you know.
09:02There was a lot of pressure.
09:03I prefer the pressure, you know, more than anything else.
09:06Whether it was excitement, I can't really say.
09:09In the summer of 1992, the market fluctuated violently.
09:14In the chaos, Leeson's team began to make serious mistakes.
09:19Mistakes are always done by very new traders, new linemen.
09:25When the customer says, sell one lot.
09:28And then she went, buy one lot.
09:30You know, instead of putting here, sell one lot like this.
09:32And she put like that.
09:34So instead of selling one lot, now you have to sell 11 lots.
09:37Well, do you cover it or don't you cover it?
09:39And at the same time, the market was sometimes up 1,000 points.
09:43There were four or five days when it was going up 1,000 points in a row.
09:46So if you're out of 500 contracts and you're looking at 1,000 points,
09:49you're looking at $2.5 million.
09:52It's an awful lot of money.
09:53And they always go, boss, I make a mistake.
09:57And then Nick will go, okay, I'll settle it.
10:01There's not a lot I can do about it at 11 o'clock on a Friday night.
10:04And, you know, by the time Monday comes around,
10:06the market's probably opened up a little bit higher.
10:09So now the loss has increased.
10:11The normal response of a trader would be to tell head office.
10:15But instead, Leeson hid the losses.
10:17He didn't want to go back to being a clerk.
10:21He put the losses into a computerised account called the 5-8 account
10:24and altered its software so London wouldn't see what he was doing.
10:29His only problem then were margin payments.
10:32These are small down payments made on every future.
10:36The bank later gets the money back from its clients.
10:39The only way to get this money was to ask London.
10:42So Leeson took a chance.
10:44He told head office it was for futures he had bought for clients.
10:48But the clients didn't exist.
10:50It was a blatant lie.
10:52From the first time I do anything,
10:54I'm not expecting to survive anything more than two days.
10:58As you obviously, as you get past the two-day period,
11:05then you start to get more confidence because it isn't being found.
11:08If it's not found after two days, when is it going to be found?
11:11To me, it's obvious.
11:12If they can't see it after two days,
11:14then who says they're going to see it after 200 days, 500 days, 1,000 days?
11:20You know, so you start to get a little bit...
11:22You don't get confident, but you're getting away with it.
11:26It's easy.
11:28As the weeks passed, London carried on sending Leeson money.
11:33They failed to notice that there was no equivalent money coming in from clients.
11:39Leeson had discovered a weakness in the system.
11:41He would hide his mistakes and trade out of them in his own time.
11:45And no one would ever know.
11:51But the weakness that Leeson had discovered
11:53was just one crack in an organisation that was falling apart.
11:57Bering Securities was in crisis.
12:00By the summer of 1992, its operating losses were £39 million.
12:05The parent bank decided to move in a traditional banker.
12:08His name was Peter Norris.
12:11How shocked were you by the lack of control in that,
12:14when you got in there and began to work there?
12:18I was shocked.
12:20Erm...
12:21I was shocked.
12:23Because I didn't feel that it should have been allowed to...
12:35to reach that point.
12:38It was a clash of cultures.
12:41Peter Norris was a merchant banker.
12:43He believed in control and good bookkeeping.
12:46The culture he met in Bering Securities was that of the 80s,
12:50a buccaneering spirit where controls were seen as a hindrance.
12:53They stopped you making money.
12:56But as Leeson had discovered, this attitude bred chaos.
12:59There was a culture which said that businesses of that type operated far better
13:04in an informal environment than a formal environment.
13:07I think that that was a significant error of judgement.
13:10Sir Leeson's not completely wrong.
13:12No.
13:14Bering Brothers decided to take over Bering Securities.
13:18The cowboys of the 80s were kicked out,
13:20and Peter Norris moved his own team in.
13:23They set about counting the money and imposing controls.
13:26Norris became the chief executive.
13:29If he didn't stop the losses, Bering Securities might go bankrupt.
13:33If operating losses had continued at the level they were,
13:40that could have had a very serious effect
13:42on that business's ability to finance itself.
13:46Maybe derailed because of that.
13:48It was a bad time.
13:50Frightening?
13:51I find it quite frightening, yes.
13:56But the bank's losses were actually much higher than Norris realised.
14:02Leeson's deception had gone badly wrong.
14:09Throughout the end of 1992, the market had gone against him.
14:13As it did so, the losses he had hidden mounted up.
14:16The secret 5-8s account turned into a monster with a life of its own.
14:20At one point, it held losses of 4 million pounds.
14:24A massive loss.
14:30I mean, it was a massive loss.
14:33But, you know, and the margin payments were increasing.
14:38The market was going against me on a daily basis.
14:42And something had to be done about it.
14:44The loss was just accelerating.
14:46You know, it starts to get pretty frightening.
14:48You know, I'm not sleeping at night.
14:50But Leeson decided to go on.
14:54He took the classic gambler's strategy.
14:57He doubled up.
14:59Secretly, he bought hundreds more futures.
15:01It was incredibly dangerous and against all the bank's rules.
15:04But it meant that if the market did move his way,
15:07he would make a great deal of money and wipe out his losses.
15:11Why did I choose to go on?
15:14What is the option to choosing to go on?
15:17To deciding to go on?
15:19You know, you have to realise the loss.
15:20I didn't want to cause bearings to lose all this money.
15:24So I'm operating in the belief that I can get it back.
15:28You know, maybe it goes back to the confidence thing.
15:31I don't know.
15:32I mean, I'm confident I can get it back at that stage.
15:35I suppose.
15:35Then suddenly, in the spring of 1993, the market did move his way.
15:47Day by day, he made hundreds of thousands of pounds.
15:50And in July, he wiped out his losses.
15:55Success.
15:56You know, I was elated.
15:57You know, I mean, we had a barbecue at home with some friends
16:03and then playing a stupid game afterwards,
16:05Pictionary or something like that,
16:06all getting pretty drunk around my apartment in Singapore.
16:10And, you know, I was happy.
16:13The nightmare was over.
16:14There was a big group of us, but we were out on the...
16:16We had like a little balcony.
16:18And Nick just said that he'd been under a lot of pressure at work
16:21and that he'd lost money.
16:23And...
16:24But now, you know, he'd recouped the losses
16:27and everything was OK.
16:29And then he said...
16:29I said, well, how much did you lose?
16:31And Nick said a million pounds.
16:33I just told her that we'd had a problem
16:34and, you know, I'd been covering up a few trades
16:37and just told her a figure.
16:40I don't know what I used, a million dollars or something.
16:43But then reading the book, I find out it was six million.
16:46I mean, just as well he didn't tell me it was six million at the time
16:48because I think I would have hit the real one, fainted first
16:51and, you know, he scraped me up first
16:53and then I would have sort of torn him off.
16:56But I just think, you know, it was just...
17:00It's unreal, that money.
17:02I mean, six million...
17:04One million pounds was terrible to...
17:06You know, I thought, oh, Nick, you know, think...
17:10You know, think about us in the future.
17:11Then we'll have them protecting them.
17:14And don't do it again.
17:16And on the Monday he did it again, by all accounts.
17:21Why do you think he did that?
17:24Because I don't think he wanted to be seen as a failure.
17:27As...
17:28I suppose...
17:29Like I said, everyone wants to be seen as a success.
17:32I suppose he thought, well, I've done it before
17:34and it worked out, OK, maybe I can do it again.
17:36I don't know why he did it.
17:37That's questions I need to ask, Nick.
17:39You've just lived through nine months of what you described as a nightmare.
17:44And here you are, started it again.
17:46I'm not a psychologist, I can't explain it.
17:49But, um...
17:52Yeah, I think we'll let the people down.
17:55Leeson started his deception again.
17:58But this time it was not to cover up other people's mistakes.
18:02It was a deliberate fraud.
18:04He began to use his secret account to give his clients cut-price deals.
18:08He sold them futures at unreal prices, making a loss for himself.
18:13He then took these losses and hid them away in the secret account.
18:16My concerns were, here's something that we've...
18:19that we're seeing, which we weren't expecting to see,
18:23where the profitability is growing,
18:25and one needs to be cynical about growing profits
18:27and know exactly how they produced.
18:29And Mayo went down there and met the people that were there.
18:32What struck you was that he was a complex guy.
18:35There was no doubt when you met Nick that he was complicated
18:38and that there were things going on below the surface
18:40that didn't come out naturally in conversation.
18:47Um, I suppose that my overriding impression
18:50was of somebody who was very polite, somewhat, um...
18:53overly deverent.
18:54The man standing in front of Baker
19:04was actually hiding losses of £94 million.
19:08Throughout the end of 1993,
19:10chaotic world events had pushed the market against Leeson.
19:13He had tried to double up, but this time it hadn't worked.
19:17He was now at the mercy of the market.
19:18On some days, he lost more than a million pounds.
19:22It was out of hand, you know.
19:24The market movements that I'm allowing are increasing at the same time.
19:27Everything is increasing, you know.
19:29My, um, capability to, um, accept the loss.
19:35The capability to accept a larger market movement.
19:39Uh, the capability to accept a larger position.
19:42Everything increases during the period, you know.
19:45Everything's building.
19:46I felt we needed to investigate, um, the operation,
19:50and I felt that he as an individual seemed immature
19:54and a guy who was, who was, who was struggling with, um,
19:59with his changing role, but, um...
20:02Did you think he was hiding something?
20:04No, I didn't think he was hiding something.
20:06I thought he was somebody who was having trouble adjusting
20:08to the need to talk to senior people about what he did.
20:13Leeson was also being noticed by those in charge of sending him money.
20:17As his losses mounted, he told the usual story.
20:20The money was for clients.
20:23Ah, dear, dear.
20:24But the new man had noticed there was something wrong.
20:27These clients weren't paying their bills.
20:30For the first time, an internal audit was being done,
20:33and they told the auditors of the problem.
20:35In July, the auditors flew to Singapore.
20:40By this time, the secret 5-8s account
20:42held losses of more than £100 million.
20:44You have to expect, um, everything to be found.
20:50They're supposed to, you know,
20:52the nature of an audit is that they're supposed to test information
20:55and test documents.
20:57Now, if you picked up any document,
20:58it had the 5-8s account on it.
21:00You know, in some way or form,
21:01any document had the 5-8s account on it.
21:04So, of course, I'm worried.
21:04They come in and they don't test any records.
21:14So I can't be happier.
21:16They didn't test one record.
21:19One report.
21:21You know what I mean?
21:21It's not an audit.
21:22Leeson says that he was convinced
21:23he was going to be discovered,
21:25and it would have been easy to discover him.
21:27And they didn't.
21:28Right.
21:33He portrays himself
21:34almost as a passive figure.
21:39Do you think that's true?
21:40No.
21:42Uh, I mean, it's only my...
21:46It can only be my, uh...
21:49uh...
21:51speculation about it, of course.
21:53But...
21:54I think he conducted
21:58a determined,
22:02completely unscrupulous,
22:05and ultimately extremely successful campaign
22:08to avoid discovery through that audit.
22:12Yeah, it's complete amazement.
22:14But, um,
22:15as you get to know the people at Berings,
22:16you can then understand the amazement.
22:18A lot of them are just bumbling fools.
22:20And that's not me saying that with hindsight.
22:23I think if anybody met them,
22:24um, they would get that impression.
22:26They come out of some of the reports quite well,
22:28because they're allowed to say what they like,
22:30and I don't have an opportunity to answer back
22:32and make their comments look stupid,
22:34which they are.
22:37Well, I...
22:38I think he's a...
22:39he's a highly intelligent...
22:44creature
22:46with a very
22:48highly developed skill
22:50in manipulating
22:52people around him
22:54in a quite extraordinary way.
22:58It's like a virus
22:59that gets into the workings
23:00of something that does work
23:02and perverts it utterly.
23:05He's an agent of destruction.
23:06The auditors returned to London
23:12full of praise for Leeson.
23:14They worried about his dual role
23:16as both trader and bookkeeper,
23:18but they completely failed
23:19to spot the most obvious evidence
23:20of his fraud.
23:22The money being forwarded to Leeson
23:24every day
23:24was not being repaid to the bank.
23:27There were no clients,
23:28but the auditors hadn't noticed.
23:30Was it Nick,
23:31or was it the auditors?
23:32I think it's the auditors
23:33in the end.
23:34Nick would probably
23:35have been clever,
23:36probably distracted people,
23:37but at the end of the day,
23:39there's a job there to be done.
23:41It seems to me
23:42that they began
23:44to associate
23:44the commercial success
23:46of the organisation
23:47somehow or other
23:48with a lack of controls.
23:51You ran a London investment bank
23:52with pristine controls,
23:54which you polished regularly,
23:57but a global stockbroker
23:59was a very different business,
24:01and maybe that was a business
24:02in which you let it rock and roll
24:06a little bit more
24:07than you did with the Merchant Bank,
24:11because that was the way
24:12that business had been successfully run.
24:16The people that were sent in
24:17to fix the controls
24:19were seduced by the commercial success
24:21of the organisation
24:22and lost their way.
24:24To the traditional bankers
24:26from Barings,
24:27the 80s culture they had taken over
24:28was strange and alien,
24:30but it was one
24:31that was making them
24:32a great deal of money,
24:33far more than they had made
24:35as merchant bankers.
24:37But what made that money
24:38was a willingness
24:39to cut corners
24:40and cheat customers.
24:42It was a culture
24:42that Leeson knew well,
24:44where extra profits
24:45were often skimmed off
24:46clients' accounts.
24:47There's a lot of funny stuff
24:50that goes on.
24:52You see it in the back office.
24:53I mean, at Barings,
24:54for instance,
24:55they have so many different
24:56suspense accounts
24:57where trades are fed through
24:58so that they can book
25:00the profits off
25:01to different accounts,
25:02especially on the futures
25:03and options side.
25:04If they looked at
25:05those specific accounts,
25:06I think that there could be
25:08something there
25:08that is illegal.
25:10Some of the charges
25:11that I am currently
25:12going to be tried on
25:14in Singapore
25:15and it's standard practice
25:17in the industry.
25:18And who wins out of that?
25:19The company, Barings.
25:22The audit reassured
25:24Leeson's new bosses.
25:26He was now seen
25:26as a clever trader
25:27living the high life
25:28in Singapore.
25:30But by the autumn of 1994,
25:32his secret losses
25:33totaled £160 million
25:35and he found himself
25:37in a terrible trap.
25:39To stop London
25:40being suspicious,
25:41he had to seem
25:42to be making huge profits.
25:43In fact,
25:44his profits were small.
25:46So he did something
25:47extraordinary.
25:49He used his secret account
25:50to buy futures
25:51off himself
25:52at fantastic prices.
25:54By doing this,
25:55he was able
25:55to fake huge profits.
25:58But his hidden losses
25:59grew even more.
26:02It was a vicious circle.
26:03He kept on having
26:04to do irrational things
26:05that would lose money
26:06on the exchange
26:08in order to produce
26:09the accounting effect
26:10necessary to continue
26:11to conceal.
26:12And so long as he could
26:13continue to get the cash,
26:15then it didn't matter
26:16whether he did things
26:17that were unprofitable
26:18because in his own
26:19fantasy world,
26:20he was a star.
26:23You had almost
26:25a psychotic sort of figure
26:26toward the end of 1994.
26:29On the one hand,
26:30the powerful trader
26:31supposedly making profits.
26:34On the other hand,
26:35the reality
26:36of the continual loser
26:38and having to do
26:39irrational things
26:40that would lose money.
26:42Leeson was now
26:43on a merry-go-round.
26:44He couldn't get off.
26:46Each time he declared
26:47more profits,
26:47he became more of a star.
26:49But in reality,
26:50each time he did this,
26:52his losses grew.
26:53It was an absurd situation,
26:55but on the surface,
26:56he was supremely self-confident.
26:59This film,
26:59taken at the end of 1994,
27:02shows everyone
27:02looking anxiously
27:03at the screens,
27:04except for one man
27:05on the right,
27:06Nick Leeson,
27:07who was now known
27:08as the king of the exchange.
27:10Yeah, it does make you
27:11look back and think,
27:12obviously,
27:12I don't know Nick.
27:13I thought I did.
27:15I thought I knew him
27:15really well.
27:17Obviously, there's a side
27:18to Nick that I didn't know.
27:20I only knew his colleagues
27:22and the friends of ours
27:23that worked on the floor.
27:25And they only ever fed me
27:26with success stories
27:26saying how well Nick was doing,
27:28what a good trader he was.
27:30So I just thought
27:31things were fine.
27:32The fifths,
27:36the lies,
27:37that's what makes me angry.
27:40Why lie?
27:42I'm his wife.
27:42I mean,
27:43I'm his wife.
27:44Why should he lie?
27:47I mean,
27:47I suppose lots of wives
27:48think that when they find out
27:49their husbands
27:49have been having an affair
27:50and they think,
27:51well, you know,
27:51they've been leading
27:52a double life.
27:53And that's what it feels like.
27:54Not that Nick's had an affair.
27:56It feels like Nick,
27:57well, Nick was leading
27:58a double life.
28:00Leeson was now trapped
28:01by his own fake success.
28:03It was escalating
28:04out of his control.
28:06In September,
28:07the Singapore exchange
28:08celebrated its 10th anniversary.
28:11The guest of honor
28:11was Lee Kuan Yew,
28:12the country's leader.
28:14That night,
28:15he announced Singapore's
28:16own version of the Big Bang.
28:18Due partly,
28:19he said,
28:20to Symex's recent successes.
28:21And now Symex celebrates
28:23its 10th anniversary.
28:2510 years of continuous growth
28:27in liquidity.
28:28Everyone knew
28:29that the man behind
28:30much of this success
28:31was the king of the exchange,
28:33Nick Leeson.
28:34And Barings was to receive
28:35two awards that night.
28:37So it was like
28:39a glory day for Barings.
28:42Everybody was so happy
28:44and so proud of ourselves.
28:46We thought that Nick
28:47is the one that's going
28:47to receive the prize
28:48on stage.
28:50But Nick wouldn't go
28:51on stage to receive
28:52the award.
28:53I mean,
28:53I know it's a lie.
28:55But,
28:56how did I feel?
28:59I mean,
29:01you know,
29:01again,
29:02it's another thing
29:03that's increasing
29:04the pressure inside me
29:05because it's being
29:06opened up to a wider circle.
29:08And they're seeing
29:09this same image,
29:10which I know
29:11to be so false.
29:14Because they want
29:16true prophets.
29:17the five-eighths account
29:19would have totally
29:19wiped out the profits
29:21that were being reported.
29:22So you were a fraud?
29:25Correct.
29:27So I don't think
29:27he ever really was a traitor.
29:28I think that was the fantasy.
29:30And to keep the fantasy going,
29:32he needed two things.
29:33One was the cash from London
29:34and the other one
29:35was the concealment
29:36of the losses.
29:37So the concealment
29:39let him continue
29:42to enjoy the fantasy.
29:44But when the fantasy broke
29:47and he was forced
29:47to come back
29:48and deal with
29:49the fact that
29:50he really was
29:51a loser,
29:53what nourishes
29:54and sustains him
29:55is his ability
29:56to fool people.
29:58To be able to
29:59be one step ahead.
30:02To be able to
30:04make them believe
30:05in something
30:08that's
30:08created by him
30:10as an illusion.
30:11Everyone now believed
30:24the illusion
30:24that Leeson had created.
30:27In December
30:28he was flown to New York.
30:30Bearings was holding
30:31a conference
30:31for many of its traders
30:32from around the world
30:33and Nick Leeson
30:35was the star.
30:36He had made,
30:37it appeared,
30:38£28 million
30:39turnover that year.
30:41He was held up
30:42as the model
30:43for the future
30:44of the bank,
30:45the Symex model.
30:47Lots of people
30:48were there.
30:48It was probably
30:49the biggest sort of
30:50thing on this sort
30:51of basis
30:51that they'd done
30:52for Bearings
30:52and it really was
30:53I presume
30:54on the back
30:54of the profits
30:56that I was
30:56reporting out
30:57of Singapore.
31:01And there's all
31:02these people
31:02doing these presentations
31:03and they're thinking
31:04shit we're going
31:05to make a load
31:06of money this year
31:07look at how much
31:07money Singapore's got.
31:09Now do I need that?
31:10No.
31:11Leeson faced
31:13an audience
31:14of executives
31:15who badly
31:15wanted to believe
31:16in him.
31:17All of them
31:18were to get
31:18vast bonuses
31:19that year.
31:20Some like
31:21Ron Baker
31:21of nearly
31:22a million pounds.
31:24Much of this
31:25was to come
31:25from Leeson's profits.
31:29But there were
31:30traders in the audience
31:31who didn't believe
31:32Leeson.
31:33They couldn't see
31:34how such fantastic
31:35profits
31:35could come
31:36from low risk
31:37trading.
31:38But Bearings
31:39executives
31:39dismissed
31:40their worries.
31:41Is it possible
31:42to make such
31:42profits
31:43for what Leeson
31:43was supposed
31:44to be doing?
31:45Yes.
31:47And I think
31:47if we had
31:49had somebody
31:50that was skilful
31:51that was earnest
31:53and that was
31:54attempting to
31:55fulfil that
31:55commercial strategy
31:56as honestly as
31:59they could
31:59within Symex
32:00during that year
32:00that we would
32:01have made
32:01money,
32:02decent money
32:02out of that
32:03activity.
32:05Would we have
32:05made 28 million
32:06pounds?
32:06I think it's
32:08possible.
32:10It is simply
32:10not the case
32:11that it's
32:13impossible
32:14for institutions
32:16like Bearings
32:17to make
32:19very considerable
32:20profits
32:20from
32:21financial
32:23transactions
32:24with very
32:26little or
32:26virtually no
32:27risk.
32:27So when people
32:28say they should
32:29have known
32:30that it was
32:31impossible to
32:31make high
32:32profits with
32:32low risk,
32:33they're wrong?
32:33I think they're
32:34wrong, yes.
32:34The reason
32:36that Bearings
32:37executives believed
32:38there was no
32:38risk was yet
32:39another deception
32:40by Leeson.
32:41They thought he
32:42had offset all
32:43his futures.
32:44This meant that
32:45for every bet he
32:46had made,
32:47Leeson had an
32:47insurance policy.
32:49He had made
32:49an equal bet
32:50on the market
32:50moving the
32:51other way.
32:52But like all
32:53of Leeson's
32:54activities,
32:54this too was
32:55a lie.
32:56None of his
32:57futures were
32:57offset.
32:58I'd never
32:59queried for an
33:01instant the
33:03basic premise
33:05of this business
33:06which was
33:08that it was
33:08an offset.
33:11It never even
33:12occurred to me
33:12that that
33:16fundamental
33:16point was
33:23untrue.
33:25Leeson's
33:25positions on
33:26the exchange
33:27were now
33:27vast.
33:28Every night
33:29he asked for
33:29hundreds of
33:30thousands of
33:30pounds in
33:31margin payments
33:32and Barings
33:33paid it.
33:35Yet those in
33:35charge of
33:36sending him
33:36this money
33:37knew there
33:37was something
33:38seriously wrong.
33:40The bank's
33:40treasurer,
33:41Tony Hawes,
33:42knew that there
33:42was nothing
33:43like this amount
33:43coming in from
33:44clients.
33:45He worried,
33:46but he didn't
33:47do very much.
33:49Those who ran
33:49Barings were not
33:50only mesmerised
33:51by Leeson's
33:51profits,
33:52they didn't
33:53understand the
33:53very basics of
33:54the business
33:55they had taken
33:55over.
33:57Mr Hawes has
33:58declined to be
33:59interviewed.
33:59So senior
34:02managers within
34:03Barings Bank
34:04knew that
34:05there were
34:06vast differences
34:08between what
34:08Leeson was
34:09asking for and
34:09what you were
34:10being given,
34:11yet you were
34:12never told?
34:14Yeah.
34:16Should you
34:16have been told?
34:19Well, of course,
34:20you say,
34:22yes, I should.
34:23I should.
34:24Why didn't you
34:25know?
34:25Well, fundamentally
34:28because it wasn't
34:29raised in that
34:30way.
34:32Why not?
34:37I don't know.
34:40I don't know.
34:43But why didn't
34:45those people who
34:45ran Barings come
34:47to you and say,
34:47what are you doing?
34:48Because they're
34:49stupid.
34:50They don't
34:51understand the
34:51business and they
34:52should never have
34:52been in the
34:53position that they
34:53were in, especially
34:55people like Tony
34:56Horse.
34:58He was supposed
34:59to be controlling
34:59the global treasury
35:01function.
35:01He was supposed
35:02to understand
35:03derivatives.
35:04He didn't.
35:06And he would
35:07pay the money
35:07every single day
35:08and would accept,
35:10you know, pretty
35:11ridiculous explanations
35:12from me.
35:13It wouldn't happen
35:13at Morgan Stanley.
35:15At Barings, they
35:15had a lot of
35:16idiots basically in
35:17every one of the
35:18controlling functions.
35:19they were asking
35:21questions, but they
35:22weren't going deep
35:23enough.
35:23They didn't
35:23understand the
35:24basics of the
35:25business.
35:28And you were
35:28creating a large
35:29amount of profits?
35:32Fictitiously, yeah.
35:40But they were also
35:40paying me an awful
35:41lot of money that
35:42they couldn't
35:42justify.
35:43So, if you were
35:48thinking that the
35:49profits were real
35:49and yet you were
35:50still paying ten
35:51times as much in
35:52money that you
35:53couldn't account
35:53for, what is the
35:55natural conclusion?
35:57Something is wrong.
35:59By the end of
36:001994, the
36:01equivalent of
36:02three quarters of
36:03Baring's capital
36:04had been sent to
36:05Leeson.
36:06The oldest
36:06merchant bank in
36:07Britain had placed
36:08330 million pounds
36:10on the activities
36:11of one man.
36:13Such was the
36:14power of the
36:15illusion that
36:15Leeson had
36:16created that the
36:17men who ran the
36:17bank began to
36:18entertain strange
36:19dreams.
36:21The chairman,
36:21Peter Baring,
36:22believed his
36:23family bank had
36:24returned to the
36:24glories of its
36:25past.
36:26It had recaptured
36:27the global position
36:28it had lost a
36:29hundred years ago.
36:36That Christmas,
36:37Leeson went on
36:37holiday to Ireland
36:38with his wife.
36:40He decided to
36:41tell her they
36:41weren't returning
36:42to Singapore.
36:44I'm trying to
36:45tell Lisa that
36:46I don't want to
36:46go back.
36:48Pressure's too
36:48much.
36:50What does she
36:50say?
36:53Um, you know,
36:55she knows what
36:56the bonus figure
36:56is.
36:57The proposed
36:57bonus figure is
36:58supposed to be
36:58£450,000.
37:00It was just
37:01this bonus.
37:01Imagine,
37:02£450,000 is
37:03such a lot of
37:04money, you know,
37:05it would have
37:06set us up for
37:06the rest of our
37:07lives.
37:07every week.
37:09I'd scratch my
37:11six numbers to
37:13think I could
37:14have a chance
37:14of winning that
37:15kind of money.
37:17You dream about
37:18that kind of
37:19money.
37:20And to think
37:21that Nick had
37:22worked so hard
37:23to achieve it,
37:25and then he
37:26said he didn't
37:26want to go back,
37:27I couldn't
37:27understand it.
37:28But he couldn't
37:29tell me why,
37:29and he didn't
37:30tell me.
37:30I just can't
37:31face it to him.
37:33I don't know,
37:34you have to ask
37:35a psychologist.
37:40It's the thing
37:40of letting people
37:41down, I just
37:42can't do it.
37:45You know,
37:45maybe I tried
37:46too hard to
37:47please.
37:49I can't give
37:50you an explanation.
37:52So Leeson
37:52returned to
37:53Singapore.
37:56For a few
37:57days in January,
37:58things went his
37:58way.
37:59He had
38:00thousands of
38:00futures hidden
38:01in the secret
38:02account.
38:03Provided the
38:03market kept
38:04steady, they
38:05could still
38:05make a lot
38:06of money.
38:07The effect
38:08of the Kobe
38:08earthquake on
38:09the Japanese
38:10stock market
38:10was disastrous.
38:12Immediately,
38:12the Nikkei
38:13began to
38:13plunge.
38:15It was bad,
38:16you know.
38:18But again,
38:19it's living to
38:19fight another
38:20day, really.
38:21I mean, what
38:22did I feel?
38:22I didn't go
38:23home and cut
38:23my wrists.
38:24I didn't go
38:25and jump out
38:26of a building,
38:26you know.
38:27Some people
38:27would do that.
38:28But,
38:29you know,
38:31without the
38:33choice of
38:34running away
38:34from it,
38:35you know,
38:35I had to,
38:38Barings was
38:38still paying
38:39me money.
38:40Don't forget,
38:40they were still
38:41paying me
38:41masses of
38:42money, you
38:43know.
38:43I mean,
38:43we'd ask
38:44sometimes for
38:44$100 million,
38:45they'd pay it.
38:47Leeson decided
38:48to take one
38:49last desperate
38:50gamble.
38:51Using Barings'
38:52money, he
38:52bought thousands
38:53more futures.
38:55He was
38:55single-handedly
38:56going to try
38:56and hold
38:57the market
38:57up.
38:59If you're
38:59desperate enough
39:00and you're
39:01that frightened
39:02of a huge
39:02loss, you
39:03take the leap
39:04of faith and
39:05try to hold
39:05up the entire
39:06market.
39:06You can feel
39:08it slipping
39:08away, you
39:10can feel it
39:10slipping out
39:11of your
39:11hands, but
39:12you know,
39:14you can't
39:15exactly pull
39:16it back.
39:19You do
39:20something
39:20desperate like
39:21try to buy
39:22thousands of
39:24futures of
39:24contracts and
39:25hold the
39:25market up.
39:27In the
39:28days following
39:29Kobe,
39:29Leeson took
39:30a terrifying
39:30switchback ride
39:32on the
39:32futures market.
39:33If the
39:34market moved
39:34up only a
39:35few points,
39:36he made
39:36millions of
39:37pounds in
39:37seconds.
39:38So the
39:39numbers scared
39:39me.
39:40You know,
39:40I wasn't
39:40I didn't
39:42really want
39:42to know
39:42what the
39:43numbers were.
39:45I was
39:46hiding from
39:47the numbers
39:47as much
39:47as possible.
39:48I just
39:49really, it
39:49was out of
39:50hand, you
39:50know.
39:51It had just
39:52gone completely
39:53crazy.
39:53How it was
39:54continuing to
39:54go on a
39:55day-to-day
39:55basis, I
39:56just can't
39:56explain to
39:56you.
39:58But
39:58Leeson's
39:59strategy failed.
40:00The market
40:01began to
40:01fall again.
40:03His losses
40:03were catastrophic.
40:05On one
40:05day alone,
40:06he lost
40:0650 million
40:07pounds.
40:08But he
40:08kept going.
40:09To do
40:10so, he
40:10needed vast
40:11margin
40:11payments from
40:12London.
40:14Every day
40:15that I make
40:15one of these
40:16requests for
40:16additional money,
40:17I never
40:17expect it to
40:18come.
40:18I expect
40:19somebody to
40:19say, look,
40:20what the
40:21hell's going
40:22on?
40:22We've got
40:2230 million
40:23pounds from
40:24our customers,
40:24and yet you
40:25need 300
40:25million to
40:26finance them.
40:27How do you
40:27explain that?
40:29You can't.
40:30You literally
40:31cannot.
40:32Why do you
40:33need that?
40:33What possible
40:34explanation could
40:35there be for
40:35needing 300
40:36million pounds to
40:37finance a business
40:38that has a total
40:39exposure to the
40:40market of 30?
40:41You can't do
40:42it.
40:43So, you
40:44know, but
40:44again, it
40:46happened.
40:48But Leeson was
40:49more than the
40:50passive figure he
40:50portrays himself
40:51as.
40:52To get this
40:53money, he kept
40:54on declaring
40:54fake profits,
40:55but now on a
40:56phenomenal scale.
40:58In one week, he
40:59declared $10
41:00million profit.
41:02It was something
41:03that no one had
41:03ever seen before,
41:05but Barings
41:06believed him.
41:07I can't explain
41:08it because it's
41:09not a commercial
41:10reaction.
41:12I mean, a
41:13commercial reaction
41:13said, well,
41:14how on earth is
41:16this man making
41:16this money?
41:19Nobody else on
41:21earth is doing
41:22it this way.
41:24It defies
41:24imagination.
41:26A trader would
41:27know that that
41:29could not be
41:29achieved.
41:30There was either
41:30something fundamentally
41:31wrong with the
41:32market, or the
41:34man was taking
41:35risks, very, very
41:37big risks.
41:38So how, and
41:39it's not just
41:39Peter Norris, but
41:40Peter Baring, the
41:42whole board, looked
41:42at these results,
41:45and appear
41:46completely to have
41:46believed them?
41:48I just don't
41:49understand it.
41:50I was pleased at
41:52the success of that
41:53business over that
41:54period, of course.
41:55you know, Mad
42:02Hatter's Tea Party.
42:05By now, Barings
42:06were scouring the
42:07world's money
42:07markets to find
42:08the money to fund
42:09Leeson.
42:10But on the 24th
42:11of January, they
42:12went over their
42:13overdraft limit with
42:14Citibank, and a
42:15meeting was called
42:16to discuss Leeson.
42:18Worries were
42:19expressed about the
42:20size of his
42:20positions, but the
42:21bank's executives
42:22agreed amongst
42:23themselves that
42:24Leeson was doing
42:24rather well.
42:26His profits were
42:26high, they told
42:27one another, precisely
42:28because of the
42:29Kobe earthquake.
42:31It had produced
42:31chaos in the
42:32markets, which
42:33Leeson was
42:33cleverly exploiting.
42:36In retrospect,
42:38one has to say
42:40that virtually
42:41everything about
42:41that discussion
42:43was absolutely
42:44mad, and that
42:47we were, we
42:49were living in
42:51a, in a, in a,
42:54in a, in a world
42:55through the
42:55looking glass
42:56where logic was
42:59apparent, but was
43:00actually completely
43:02perverted.
43:03It seems completely
43:05bizarre.
43:06A group of rational,
43:08intelligent, experienced,
43:10competent people were
43:12dealing with a matter
43:14in this, in a way
43:15which was total
43:16variance with reality.
43:19You mean they were
43:20blinded by the
43:21prophets?
43:23Well, you say,
43:25yes, it's a
43:27question of degree.
43:28I think it's more
43:29that critical
43:31faculties were,
43:33were less engaged
43:35than they might
43:36have been, to put it
43:40at its least, because
43:41there were profits.
43:44But even when the
43:45truth stared them
43:45in the face,
43:46Baring still kept
43:47sending Leeson money.
43:49The bank's auditors
43:50now discovered a
43:51£50 million loss
43:52which Leeson hadn't
43:53managed to hide.
43:55Using scissors and
43:56glue at home,
43:57Leeson concocted
43:58paperwork that showed
43:59it was a loan to
44:00another bank.
44:02He faxed it through
44:02to the auditors.
44:04He forgot that on the
44:05top would be printed
44:06from Nick and
44:07Leeson.
44:08Completely
44:09ludicrous, you
44:11know, and it
44:11doesn't hold up to
44:13investigation, but it
44:14was accepted.
44:16I don't know how,
44:18but, you know, it
44:19was accepted.
44:20Why?
44:22I don't know.
44:23I mean, maybe I'm a
44:24believable person.
44:25I don't know.
44:27But then finally, on
44:28the 17th of February,
44:30a clerk working for
44:31Baring's found strange
44:32discrepancies in
44:33Leeson's accounts.
44:35For six days, Leeson
44:36eluded him.
44:38On the 7th, Leeson
44:39decided it was time
44:40to go.
44:42So I come up with
44:43this story about
44:44Lucy not being well
44:45and I need him to
44:46go home to see her.
44:48And I'd be back in
44:4945 minutes.
44:51And we'd tie up a few
44:52loose ends that we
44:53had to do.
44:54And then we'd leave.
44:55I mean, it was a fight
44:56getting Lucy to leave.
44:58I'm telling her that
44:58it was a problem.
45:01I didn't go any
45:02further than that.
45:03He said, you know,
45:04I need to have a
45:05chat.
45:05Fine.
45:06So we had to
45:07drive in the car
45:08and he said that
45:10he's under lots of
45:10pressure at work.
45:11If he didn't get away
45:12and think about
45:13things, he'd have a
45:13nervous breakdown.
45:14That's how I
45:15rationalised it in the
45:17end to get her to
45:18agree to come.
45:18We took some golf clubs
45:25back that I'd borrowed
45:26the week before to
45:27one of Lisa's friends.
45:30I went to a shop and
45:31picked up a deposit
45:32that we'd had for
45:33laser discs.
45:34Picked that up.
45:37Had a cup of tea and
45:38some chocolate biscuits.
45:39I went home, packed the
45:45suitcases and we took
45:47off to the airport.
45:49Good evening.
45:50Crisis talks have been
45:51going on all day at the
45:53Bank of England to work
45:54out a deal to save
45:55Britain's oldest
45:55merchant bank.
45:57Bearings is facing
45:58bankruptcy after one of
45:59its traders lost nearly
46:00400 million pounds on
46:03dealings in the Far
46:04East.
46:04He has now vanished.
46:05The Bank of England is
46:09racing to arrange a
46:10rescue before the
46:11Tokyo stock market
46:12opens in a few hours
46:14time.
46:15Lisa and his wife had
46:16fled to a luxury resort
46:18on the Malaysian coast,
46:20Kota Kinabalu.
46:21We just spent a normal
46:22weekend in Kota Kinabalu.
46:24You told me so?
46:26No.
46:29Still waiting to see
46:30what the situation is.
46:32I never expected
46:33Bearings to go past.
46:35Did you ask yourself
46:39at that point why
46:41this had all happened?
46:43No.
46:46It was, you know,
46:47a combination of
46:48errors.
46:51You know, I should
46:52have referred it to
46:55people.
46:56I didn't and it
46:57escalated.
46:59I don't think that
46:59there is a simpler
47:00explanation.
47:02Late on the Sunday
47:03night, the Bank of
47:04England decided it was
47:05impossible to save
47:06Bearings.
47:08Next day, traders
47:09pushed the market
47:09down.
47:11Leeson's losses
47:11doubled from over
47:13400 million pounds to
47:15830 million in one
47:17day.
47:18And the oldest
47:18merchant bank in
47:19Britain was no more.
47:22Two days later,
47:23Nick and Lisa left
47:24Kota Kinabalu for
47:25Frankfurt.
47:26Do you talk on the
47:29flight?
47:30No.
47:31No, we didn't
47:32talk.
47:32Actually, I don't
47:33really talk on a
47:34flight anyway.
47:35Wherever I'm going,
47:36I'll just watch the
47:37film and sleep.
47:40I'm not being funny,
47:41but I didn't want to be
47:44talking about it.
47:45I didn't want to know.
47:47I just didn't.
47:48Why not?
47:50Because I suppose I
47:50didn't want it to be
47:51real.
47:56For a boy from
47:57Watford to bring a
47:58grand firm down, I
48:00mean, it was a
48:01social insult as well.
48:03It wasn't even one of
48:04their own kind.
48:07Which is where I
48:08suppose the smugness
48:09comes in, isn't it?
48:10It could just simply
48:11can't happen to
48:12Chappos and they're
48:12like us, you know,
48:13in Bearings.
48:15Well, things like that
48:16didn't happen.
48:17I mean, just didn't
48:19happen.
48:21to Bearings or to
48:23Banks?
48:25Well, it does happen
48:26to Banks.
48:28Not always the same
48:30way, but it does.
48:32No, to Bearings.
48:43We found one of Nick's
48:45photograph in the drawer
48:46and we put Nick's
48:48photograph up and we
48:49say, Nick, we do
48:50respect you.
48:52He can do it.
48:53Who can do it?
48:54Nobody else can do it
48:55to bring down such a
48:56big bank.
48:58And remember, he
49:00spoke to some of the
49:01traders and they all
49:03say, oh, what would
49:04you like to be?
49:05And he say, I would
49:06never want to be rich.
49:08I want to be famous.
49:10I want to be well
49:10like.
49:11Nick.
49:12And so when things
49:13happen, we say, oh,
49:14Nick, you made it.
49:22What would be your
49:23message tonight to
49:28Peter Baring, if he's
49:29watching?
49:29I don't know.
49:33I mean, I don't really
49:35have a message to
49:35Peter Baring.
49:36I felt the Frost
49:38interview was very
49:38controlled.
49:40I think we're still
49:41probably seeing mirrors
49:42and we're probably still
49:44seeing somebody who
49:45feels powerful in his
49:47ability to fool us.
49:48and it's sustained by
49:51that.
49:52And however naive and
49:55stupid this may sound,
49:56I was always working in
49:58the best interests of
49:59the bank.
50:00I think he's a guy who
50:03is living out a dream,
50:06playing out his fantasy
50:07as the rogue trader,
50:10when in reality, he's
50:11just an accountant
50:12cooking the books.
50:14You keep making
50:15excuses.
50:15That's all we keep on
50:16doing is making
50:17excuses.
50:17And sometimes I'm
50:18cheesed off, we keep
50:19making excuses.
50:20And I think, why
50:21should we keep making
50:22excuses?
50:25You know, I just
50:27want to ask Nick.
50:29It's no good us keep
50:30saying what I think
50:31is.
50:32No one knows unless
50:33Nick, until Nick
50:35actually says, well,
50:36the reason I did it
50:37was.
50:39Maybe he doesn't even
50:40know himself.
50:41I really don't care
50:41what people think.
50:42I don't care what you
50:43think.
50:43I don't care what the
50:44average man in the
50:44street thinks.
50:45I think that they are
50:46typically on my side.
50:48That's the impression I
50:49get from the letters
50:50that I receive while I'm
50:53in here.
50:53But it's not something
50:55that really matters to
50:56me.
50:56Why are they on your
50:57side?
50:58I don't know.
50:59Ask them.
51:00What are you then?
51:01If you don't care about
51:02what people say, what are
51:02you like?
51:03Why does it matter?
51:08You know, the only people
51:09that really, to answer that
51:12question, the only people
51:13that I'm really answering
51:14that question to are the
51:15people who matter to me.
51:17And, you know, I don't
51:18think it's a question that
51:19is worth answering.
51:20Double your money and try to
51:26get rich.
51:27Double your money without any
51:29pitch.
51:30Double your money, it's your
51:32lucky day.
51:34Double your money and take it
51:36away.
51:36Double your money.
52:06Double your money.
Recommended
52:29
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