- 8 months ago
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00:00In northern Minnesota, a commuter crash kills everyone on board.
00:05The deadliest U.S. plane crash in more than a year and a half now.
00:09Investigators face intense pressure to find the cause.
00:13The tragedy that has occurred puts a real focus on what we need to do.
00:17Want to go?
00:182040?
00:19Okay.
00:20The cockpit voice recording raises disturbing questions about an inexperienced pilot.
00:25Why isn't the first officer making his altitude call-outs?
00:28What had happened here?
00:30What was his role?
00:31But when investigators dig deeper, they uncover a darker truth.
00:36Check twice or we don't have your authorization.
00:38I was amazed when I read that.
00:40A deadly sequence of events that began months before the plane ever left the ground.
00:50Amazing, amazing.
00:58Northwest Air Link Flight 5719 cruises across the skies of Minnesota.
01:21First officer Chad Erickson is two months into his first airline job.
01:31I'm sure that Chad was excited.
01:34That was the first step in getting the job.
01:36That would lead you to the big job to fly the big iron at big pair lines.
01:40This is the first time he's flown a route with an overnight stay.
01:48Do we get our own room?
01:53No, you're going to have to room with me.
01:55It's only a single bed, so you'll have to curl up at my feet.
01:58Of course you get your own room.
02:03You're under contract now.
02:06Erickson's captain is Marvin Fallitz.
02:09The captain grew up in New York City.
02:11He was described as having a personality that was somewhat at odds with a Midwestern personality.
02:17It was a very outgoing personality and a sarcastic sense of humor.
02:23Breaking the coffee tastes like piss.
02:25The first officer had a different background and upbringing than the captain did.
02:31He grew up around Minneapolis, and the Midwest's sense of humor, I think, is perhaps more understated.
02:38Oh, see that falling star?
02:42Either that or a plane falling out of the sky.
02:44Captain Fallitz and first officer Erickson are flying a Jetstream BA-3100, a small twin-engine turboprop.
03:00The Jetstream was a handful to fly, and we had to fly it by hand all the time.
03:05Craig Railsback is a former Northwest Air Link pilot who also flew the BA-3100.
03:10It was fairly unstable.
03:14It was like balancing a beach ball on top of a Coke bottle.
03:18The upside of flying an airplane like that was you were incredibly proficient.
03:22I mean, we got to be really good at instrument flying, and we flew in some really, really difficult, challenging conditions,
03:28which, you know, for a young guy, it was great fun.
03:30It's the start of the Christmas season, and many of the 16 passengers are flying home to spend time with their families.
03:47Flight 5719 took off from Minneapolis shortly before 7 p.m.
03:53Its first destination is Hibbing, Minnesota, about an hour away.
03:57After that, it's scheduled to continue on to a final stop in International Falls.
04:10Twin City 719, Hibbing weather.
04:13Sky partially obscured, freezing drizzle.
04:17Hibbing's a small airport that does not have a control tower.
04:19At about the 20 miles from the airport, they'll clear you for the instrument approach if the weather is below visual limits.
04:28And at that point, once you're cleared for the approach, you're pretty much on your own.
04:32Expect vector to the ILS.
04:33Final approach course at Hibbing.
04:36Okay, thanks a lot. Twin City 719.
04:39Can't take the ILS 3-1.
04:41Because of the snow on the runway?
04:45What?
04:46Because of the snow on the runway?
04:49I mean, that's why, right?
04:51Because you can't land on a tailwind with a snowy runway?
04:54I don't like to land with a tailwind anyway.
04:57Tell them we'll take the localizer back course to 1-3.
05:01The captain decides to approach Hibbing's runway from the other side.
05:05This approach is not equipped with the instruments needed to fully guide the pilots to the runway.
05:12It is known as a non-precision approach.
05:17We'd like the back course up to 1-3.
05:20Roger, proceed.
05:21But you're on your own.
05:26Non-precision approaches are, in fact, more demanding than the precision ones.
05:31It's for the reason that you have to monitor the descent rate, the descent altitude, the navigation where you are laterally across the ground.
05:39So there's actually quite a bit more going on.
05:42We're clear for the localizer back course approach.
05:45Twin City 719.
05:49Non-precision approaches are more challenging.
05:52And as a result, they have a higher rate of accidents than precision approaches.
05:59Call a company and tell them we're going to have to fuel up.
06:03Op 719.
06:05Say Hibbing.
06:06Hibbing, go ahead.
06:08Yeah, Hibbing, this is 719.
06:10In range, we're going to need some more fuel.
06:12Okay, in range.
06:14Positive fuel.
06:15See you in a bit.
06:18Ladies and gentlemen, we've begun our final descent for landing at Hibbing.
06:22For passengers continuing on to international falls.
06:25It'll be a few minutes on the ground, and we'll be off shortly.
06:28Thanks.
06:29Okay.
06:30In range checklist.
06:34Pressurization set.
06:37The pilots make their final preparations for landing.
06:41Altimeters, 2986 set, right?
06:45Set, left.
06:46The accuracy of altimeters is something that has to be checked very carefully.
06:52If you believe you're at 1,000 feet, when in fact you're at 800, you're much closer to an obstacle or the ground than you anticipated.
06:59So, there's a constant cross-check that goes on for a faulty altimeter.
07:06Just before 7.50 p.m., flight 5719 starts descending into the clouds and the blowing snow of a cold Minnesota night.
07:21Gear down.
07:23Gear down.
07:24Did you click the airport lights?
07:33An airport like Hibbing that does not have a lot of traffic, in an effort to save money, because the light bulbs are very expensive,
07:41they are what's called pilot-controlled lighting.
07:44You click it?
07:45Uh, I, um...
07:46The pilots with a series of clicks from their radios can turn the lights up and down.
07:52Uh, uh, clicked it seven times.
07:56I've got it now.
07:59The runway lights are not what the pilots see next.
08:02The runway lights are not what the pilots see next.
08:3220 minutes pass.
08:51Twin City 719, have you landed yet?
08:54By now, air traffic controllers should have received confirmation from flight 5719 that it has landed.
09:00Twin City 719, please come in.
09:04Twin City 719, please come in.
09:05Twin City 819, please come in.
09:07Twin City 719, please come in.
09:09Twin City 719, please come in.
09:13Twin City 819, please come in.
09:16One hour later, emergency responders locate the crash site, two miles northwest of the airport at Hibbing, Minnesota.
09:29Twin City 719, please come in.
09:31Twin City 719, please come in.
09:32There are no survivors.
09:37They just said that there had been a plane crash on Vic Powers Park and that one of our family members was on the plane.
09:49Many of the passengers were from Hibbing, a town now devastated by grief.
09:55The community is left desperate for answers.
09:58In northern Minnesota tonight, investigators are looking into the cause of the deadliest U.S. plane crash in more than a year and a half now.
10:09The fatal crash of Flight 5719 mobilizes experts from the National Transportation Safety Board.
10:16I got a call from the comm center and the plan was for the GO team to mobilize in the early morning hours to arrive at the accident scene by dawn the next morning.
10:28Systems investigator John DeLisi has been with the NTSB for just over a year.
10:37The snowy hillside outside Hibbing is one of the most gruesome crash sites he's ever seen.
10:45The wreckage was up on a hill, so it was in a precarious position and some of the bodies had been ejected.
10:53Many were still inside the fuselage.
10:55It was the holiday season, so many folks that were traveling had brought Christmas presents.
11:10They were scattered in the debris.
11:15There was blood in the snow.
11:19It really was one of the most difficult accident sites I'd ever been to.
11:23The task now is to figure out what brought down Flight 5719, so that the deadly crash is never repeated.
11:32The tragedy that has occurred puts a real focus on what we need to do, bringing pieces of the puzzle together quickly.
11:41The flight recorder should be back there.
11:44Come on.
11:45I was stepping over some of the victims to get to the aft cargo compartment.
12:00He knows that on a plane of this size, he'll likely find only one of the black boxes, the cockpit voice recorder.
12:10Here's the CVR.
12:11At the time, commuter airplane with 19 or less seats, only a requirement for a cockpit voice recorder, not a flight data recorder.
12:19Like I thought, no data recorder.
12:27All right.
12:29Let's go.
12:30With no FDR, the difficult job of understanding the crash just got harder.
12:36An FDR is very helpful.
12:39It can give you speeds and altitudes and all the flight controls.
12:43You can check and see if anything malfunctioned by looking at the data.
12:48When there's no flight data recorder, it puts us in a bit of an old-school type of investigation,
12:53where the analysis of the physical evidence becomes so much more critical.
13:06All right.
13:07Let's see what the data tells us.
13:09As the team waits for the CVR, De Lisi turns to radar data from approach control.
13:16He tracks Flight 5719's descent path.
13:19The radar data itself was very valuable for us.
13:24It showed the profile, the flight path, that the airplane took to get to the accident site.
13:30So we quickly began to analyze that.
13:34Right away, he spots something highly unusual.
13:38Look at this rate of descent.
13:39It's ridiculous.
13:41The rate of descent was double what we normally see.
13:45It should be about 1,000 feet per minute.
13:47Now, in this case, it was over 2,000, some more times up at 2,200.
13:54They're supposed to be over here, but they're all the way up here.
13:58What are they doing?
14:02A look at the approach chart for the back course into Hibbing
14:05reveals that the turboprop didn't fly the standard approach.
14:09Instead of following a gradual step down to the runway,
14:16Flight 5719 remained level for five miles, then descended rapidly.
14:22Why did they start their descent so late?
14:25A normal approach is going to fly a relatively stable glide path
14:32with a slow and steady rate of descent to get to the runway.
14:36But this airplane seemed to stay high for a long time
14:40and then have a very high rate of descent to the impact.
14:44We need to hear what the pilots were saying.
14:48Do we have the CDR yet?
14:52Me, as a pilot, it does make you wonder
14:56because the later you start the descent,
14:59the faster you're going to have to descend to get down.
15:02And the faster you descend,
15:04the harder it is to break that rate of descent.
15:06One of the real tragic aspects about this accident
15:16was that some important new safety technology
15:19was coming online,
15:20the Ground Proximity Warning System.
15:23It's just a shame that that system
15:25was not yet installed on this particular airplane.
15:29The Ground Proximity Warning System
15:32uses an onboard computer
15:33that senses when the plane is too low
15:36and warns the pilots.
15:39That technology was required by the FAA
15:41and it had to be in all commuter airplanes
15:44by April of the following year.
15:47So this airplane was scheduled
15:49to come out of service for maintenance
15:51to get the Ground Proximity Warning System installed
15:55within a month or so of the accident.
15:58Investigators know the Northwest Airlink pilots
16:01could not have heard a low-altitude warning.
16:04But they still don't understand
16:06why the plane was descending so rapidly.
16:09They wonder if weather conditions
16:11may have played a role.
16:13It was important to determine
16:15if there was anything atmospheric
16:16like a buildup of ice
16:18that might have contributed
16:19to this exceedingly high rate of descent.
16:22They check the temperatures
16:28and the type of precipitation
16:29encountered by the turboprop.
16:32They make an important discovery.
16:37These are prime conditions for icing.
16:39The plane would have descended right through it.
16:43The buildup of ice,
16:44particularly on the wings of an airplane,
16:46can kill the lift
16:48that the wings are capable of generating.
16:51So sometimes an airplane
16:52with a rapid rate of descent
16:54might be indicative
16:56of an out-of-control motion
16:58caused by a buildup of ice.
17:02De Lisi reviews the accident history
17:04of the Jetstream 3100
17:06and makes a disturbing find
17:09about the aircraft's
17:10winter weather performance.
17:13The Jetstream had been involved
17:15in some previous accidents
17:16in which the buildup of ice
17:18contributed to a loss of control.
17:20The Jetstream had a history
17:22of what they call
17:23tailplane icing problems
17:24where you could actually end up
17:25in a position
17:26where you couldn't flare the aircraft
17:27for landing,
17:28which obviously would be important.
17:30So therefore,
17:32if there's any indication of icing,
17:34that does lead you towards
17:36looking into that in more detail.
17:40Investigators need to know
17:41how bad the icing conditions were
17:43just before the crash.
17:47I'm just wondering
17:48if you have a couple of minutes.
17:49They talked to other pilots
17:50who flew into Hibbing that night.
17:52So you were aware
17:53of the potential for icing
17:54during your approach into Hibbing?
17:57The pilots tell De Lisi
17:58they faced moderate icing conditions.
18:02But why would these two pilots
18:03start their descent so late?
18:05They also describe a common technique
18:08used to prevent ice accumulation.
18:12In talking to other pilots
18:13at Northwest,
18:14we began to learn about
18:15what they referred to
18:17as a slam dunk approach.
18:20A slam dunk approach
18:22was described as one in which
18:24while you have to pass
18:25through an area of icing,
18:27crews want to minimize
18:28the time they spend there.
18:30So they may hold their altitude
18:32close into the airport
18:34and then very rapidly
18:36do a steep descent
18:37to get through the altitudes
18:40in which there was icing
18:41as quickly as possible.
18:42That's not a standard technique.
18:45But as we began to hear about it,
18:47it matched what we were seeing
18:48on the air traffic control radar.
18:51It now seems the rapid descent
18:53was not due to a loss of control
18:55caused by icing.
18:58Instead, it looks like
18:59it was part of a deliberate strategy
19:01to avoid icing.
19:02It's something professional pilots
19:06deal with a lot
19:06and it requires a lot of skill
19:09and aircraft handling
19:10to get the airplane down quickly
19:13without having the speed go up
19:16to an unacceptably high level.
19:19Marvin Fallitz was an experienced captain
19:22who'd flown in winter weather conditions
19:24countless times.
19:26He was more than capable
19:27of safely performing
19:28a slam dunk approach.
19:29So what went wrong
19:34on Flight 5719?
19:41While he waits to hear
19:43what the cockpit voice recorder
19:44will reveal,
19:45John DeLisi tries to figure out
19:47why the pilots of Flight 5719
19:49didn't slow their rapid descent
19:52into Hibbing.
19:54They should have leveled off
19:56right here.
19:59We've got to get our hands
20:03on those altimeters.
20:05As some of the pieces
20:07began to develop
20:08in this accident,
20:10it fit into the category
20:11of what we refer to as CFIT,
20:13Controlled Flight into Terrain,
20:16a perfectly good airplane
20:17that hits the ground.
20:19Very important for us
20:21in an accident like that
20:22to understand what altitude
20:24the crew believed
20:25the airplane was at.
20:27The Jetstream BA-3100
20:30has two cockpit altimeters.
20:34Got it.
20:35DeLisi wants them both checked
20:37for any sign of malfunction.
20:39Put this altimeter
20:40with the other one.
20:41Let's get them tested right away.
20:44Had there been a malfunction
20:45of the altimeters,
20:46it might have indicated
20:48to the crew
20:48that the airplane
20:49was still well above the ground
20:51when in fact it wasn't.
20:53Nothing other than
21:00impact damage, huh?
21:03Let's look at the pivot
21:04on this one.
21:06So we did a thorough examination
21:08and teardown
21:09of both the captain's
21:10and the first officer's altimeter.
21:14But the analysis
21:15turns up nothing.
21:17There was no evidence
21:18of any malfunction.
21:19Both altimeters
21:20seemed to be working just fine.
21:23Let's see what the rest
21:24of the wreckage tells us.
21:27Well, you look closely
21:28at the engines.
21:28You want to recover the engines.
21:30You want to do
21:31what testing you can.
21:33Sometimes you're able
21:33to restart the engines.
21:35A lot of times not.
21:36But you can see
21:37if there's any malfunctions
21:38that are obvious.
21:40Definitely spinning
21:41when they hit the ground.
21:43A loss of power
21:44could have led
21:44to a loss of control.
21:46Might have contributed
21:47to a high rate of descent.
21:49Thrust levers
21:53are functioning properly.
21:54No sign of a jam.
21:57Once again,
21:58they find no clues
21:59to the cause of the crash.
22:01There was no evidence
22:03of engine malfunction.
22:05Both engines
22:05appeared to be
22:06working just fine.
22:08Are we ready with the CVR?
22:13Assemble the team.
22:14I'll be there in a minute.
22:17Finally, investigators
22:18get the evidence
22:19they've been waiting for.
22:21The cockpit voice recording.
22:24All right.
22:24Everybody ready?
22:27Play the tape.
22:30I cancel on 127.4.
22:33We're cleared
22:34for the low-fledger
22:34back course approach.
22:36Twin City 719.
22:37They listen
22:38as Captain Fallitz
22:39and First Officer Erickson
22:40prepare to land in Hibbing.
22:42Okay, what altitude
22:44can we go down to?
22:46Uh, 2040.
22:47Okay, put it in there.
22:50They soon hear
22:51a conversation
22:52that confirms
22:53their theory
22:53about the slam dunk approach.
22:56So you...
22:57you're just gonna
22:58stay up here
23:00as long as you can?
23:01Yes.
23:04They definitely knew
23:05what they were doing.
23:07It's clear
23:08that the pilots
23:08were in the midst
23:09of a slam dunk approach
23:10when something went wrong.
23:12But what was it?
23:14Investigators listen closely.
23:16Localizer's alive.
23:17Final approach fix
23:17is at 14.
23:19Roger.
23:20Gear down.
23:22Speed checks.
23:23Gear down.
23:24What they hear
23:25is baffling.
23:27Flaps 20.
23:28In the flight's
23:29final moments,
23:30there's no sign
23:31of trouble.
23:31We didn't hear
23:34either crew member
23:36express any concern
23:37about the airplane.
23:38There were no issues
23:40being raised.
23:41There were no warning lights
23:42that they discussed.
23:43There was no aircraft
23:44malfunction
23:45that they were addressing.
23:47If they were in control
23:48of the plane,
23:49why the hell
23:49did they slam it
23:50into a hill?
23:53Did we miss something?
23:56All right.
23:57Rewind the tape.
23:57Looks like I can't go
24:03lower than 2040.
24:06Yeah.
24:06Take a look at it.
24:08Minimum descent altitude
24:10is the lowest altitude
24:11that the pilot
24:12can descend to
24:13until they see
24:14the runway.
24:14It's a critical altitude
24:15because that's as close
24:17to the ground
24:17as you can get
24:18and still be
24:19in the clouds.
24:21Boost pumps run.
24:22The investigators
24:23listen carefully
24:24to the recording.
24:26Before final checklist
24:27complete.
24:27It's what is not said
24:29that alarms them
24:30the most.
24:38Why isn't the first officer
24:39making his altitude
24:40call-outs?
24:43First officer Ericsson
24:44should be telling
24:45his captain
24:46how close they are
24:47to their minimum altitude
24:48and warning him
24:49when they descend
24:50past it.
24:52But he does neither.
24:55We didn't hear
24:56the regular call-outs
24:58about 2,000,
24:591,000 feet
25:01distance from the airport.
25:03It seemed as if
25:04the first officer
25:04didn't really know
25:06what was going on
25:06in the approach.
25:08Call-outs are
25:09very important
25:09and
25:10the higher the rate
25:13of descent
25:13the more important
25:14they are.
25:15You're down?
25:17Blast 20.
25:17He never told the captain
25:21how close they were
25:22getting to the ground.
25:25Captain Fallitz
25:26has his hands full
25:27landing the plane.
25:28He expects his first officer
25:30to keep an eye
25:30on their altitude.
25:32That's 20.
25:33In an airliner cockpit
25:34there's a division
25:35of duties.
25:36One person's going
25:37to physically fly
25:38the airplane.
25:39The other one
25:40has several duties.
25:41One is to monitor
25:43the way that the airplane
25:45is being flown.
25:47But on this flight
25:48the first officer
25:49never once reports
25:50the altitude
25:51as the plane speeds
25:52closer and closer
25:54to the ground.
25:56Call-outs would have
25:56been standard.
25:57Something that they
25:58would have rehearsed,
25:59practiced in the simulator.
26:01And when we didn't
26:02hear them,
26:03those calls,
26:04we knew something
26:05wasn't progressing
26:05the way it was briefed.
26:07Ah!
26:10Ah!
26:10Ah!
26:10Ah!
26:10Ah!
26:10Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:11Ah!
26:13Ah!
26:22The CVR
26:24leads investigators
26:25to wonder
26:25did the loss
26:26of 18 lives
26:28in the Hibbing crash
26:29stem from the failings
26:31of an inexperienced
26:32young pilot?
26:34He was a new guy.
26:35Maybe he just
26:36wasn't aware.
26:39Ah!
26:39Ah!
26:40Ah!
26:40Ah!
26:41Ah!
26:41Ah!
26:41Ah!
26:42Ah!
26:42Ah!
26:43Ah!
26:43Ah!
26:46Ah!
26:47Material released
26:47today in Washington,
26:48D.C.
26:48indicates that the NTSB
26:50is now focusing
26:51on the crew's performance.
26:53Malcolm Brenner
26:54is an NTSB aviation psychologist.
26:58My role in the investigation was to serve as human performance investigator.
27:03So human performance, we look at human issues such as the background of the pilots,
27:07their training, their interaction, company pressures,
27:11any sort of issues that will give us a broader perspective.
27:151.93.
27:18Investigators need to learn all they can about the 25-year-old first officer
27:22who failed to make critical altitude call-outs during the flight's descent.
27:28Well, we found out that the first officer was relatively new.
27:32He had put himself through training. He had no military background.
27:36Do we get our own room?
27:38As a new pilot, you're overwhelmed with just the job itself,
27:42and you're really struggling to keep up because things are happening at a very fast pace.
27:47Okay, in range checklist.
27:49Okay, pressurization set.
27:52There's nothing in Erickson's record that points to a pilot
27:56who was struggling with the pressures of the job.
27:59In fact, it's quite the opposite.
28:02This guy graduated number one in his class.
28:08When he got the job with the airline, he said it was his dream job.
28:11The first officer had prepared index cards with aviation data for every airport that the airline flew to.
28:20This was above and beyond what was normally required.
28:23He was doing special studying so he could be prepared and be a better pilot.
28:27Everybody that flew with him thought he was an excellent pilot.
28:36So that doesn't explain it.
28:39Nope.
28:40Wasn't the first officer.
28:43Then you look for other.
28:44Why would he not make those call-outs?
28:46What would cause him not to make those?
28:48So, what do we know about the captain?
28:55Then they expect you to work on your days off.
28:58It's ridiculous.
29:00Yeah, sure.
29:00Get yourself to International Falls.
29:02Just so you can fly back to where you just came from.
29:05And then rush to get another flight to God knows where.
29:08You know, I think it's going to take three hours before I'm sitting behind the wheel of my first flight of the day.
29:12Man, oh man, what a life.
29:14Huh?
29:15You first look at pilots that had either flown with him or knew of his flying capabilities.
29:24Show me that file.
29:25Was there anything that jumped out that indicated there was something not normal with him?
29:31The captain was described by his friends as being intelligent and an engaging personality.
29:40Let me see his test records.
29:42Captain Fallitz was known as a skilled senior pilot.
29:46But a deeper look reveals a man with a troubling record.
29:51When we looked at the captain's training records, we began to understand that he had some previous issues in his flight training.
29:59Boom, boom, boom.
30:03Soon after he joined the company, he failed his oral exam.
30:07He failed two more proficiency exams in his career.
30:09That's unusual for a professional pilot to fail that many times.
30:15The problems hadn't been tracked by anybody in the organization because they had failed at different locations.
30:24So nobody put everything together until we did.
30:31Some of the instructor pilots were noting that his cockpit resource management wasn't up to par,
30:37and they had a tendency to be domineering in the cockpit.
30:40Well, he had an issue with dealing with other people.
30:45Are all these formal complaints against Captain Fallitz?
30:50Marvin was the first captain I flew with after my OE, my initial operating experience.
30:55And he tended to be a little bit domineering and would berate you and was intolerant of mistakes and really not a particularly great instructor pilot.
31:08Wow.
31:10Perhaps the most disturbing complaint against Captain Fallitz is that he once physically struck a colleague in anger.
31:17For a professional pilot to physically have an altercation or attempt to, quote, discipline a fellow employee is totally unacceptable.
31:32I don't get it.
31:35What was making this guy so angry?
31:39You gotta be freaking kidding me.
31:41According to people who knew him, Captain Fallitz's morale took a big hit when Northwest Air Link instituted a new residence policy for their pilots.
31:52About a year before, the company, for cost-saving purposes, started a new policy where they required the pilots to reside at their outstations.
32:02These would be small towns outside of Minneapolis.
32:06Why are we even doing this trip?
32:10I don't know. Where are we?
32:12Maybe someone called in sick.
32:14It was received very poorly by the pilot community because it meant they had to move.
32:19While they had roots in Minneapolis and children going to school and spouses working and mortgages to pay, on short notice, they had to move to these small outstations.
32:30The relationship between the company and the pilots was poor.
32:34And some of us were extremely unhappy.
32:36And I think Marvin was very unhappy with the company.
32:38He had gotten used to living in the Minneapolis area.
32:43He had friends there.
32:44He had a social life.
32:45The captain fought very hard to remain in Minneapolis.
32:50He did not want to move.
32:51And the only way he could do it was by downgrading.
32:55It meant a 12% cut in his salary.
32:57What time were we out of the gate?
33:0152.
33:01According to your watch or the clock?
33:05It's the same.
33:07I think my watch or the clock.
33:10He was a very intelligent man.
33:11But I think he was troubled in the sense that his life had not worked out maybe the way he wanted it to work out.
33:23Investigators make another disturbing discovery.
33:26Captain Fallitz would sometimes be deliberately rough with the flight controls.
33:30His way of getting revenge in the company was to sometimes take it out of the passengers.
33:39I was amazed when I read that, to tell you the truth.
33:41And I was amazed that a person would intentionally make a rough flight to make people mad.
33:50Because what good does that do?
33:52This guy, from what I understand, he did it because he wanted to punish the airline.
33:57As more and more details about the captain's personality emerge,
34:03investigators are forced to consider a troubling question.
34:07Could his anger somehow have caused this crash?
34:16They learn that one of the airline's customer service agents had a run-in with the captain shortly before he boarded the doomed flight.
34:25We need to hear this woman's story.
34:27I remember every word.
34:31It's like it happened yesterday.
34:35Hello, dear.
34:37Deadheading this flight.
34:38Marvin Fallitz.
34:40Deadheading is when the airline will position pilots and flight attendants at a different city
34:46so that they can then act and actively fly a flight later.
34:49So you may go from point A to point B as a passenger.
34:53And then from there, then you will act as a flying crew member on a separate flight.
35:00Sorry, but I don't see your name on the list.
35:03Check again.
35:04Marvin Fallitz.
35:06F-A-L-I-T-Z.
35:10I checked twice, sir.
35:12We don't have your authorization.
35:13The paperwork that the agent had did not include a deadheading clearance for the captain.
35:21Look, it's not rocket science.
35:24Pick up the phone and call dispatch.
35:27I'm real busy, so how about you call them?
35:33How do you live with yourself, knowing that you are completely useless?
35:40He effectively refused.
35:42He insisted that she should do it and stormed off.
35:44I've never seen a pilot that angry before.
35:48As a good professional pilot, he should be able to maintain professional performance,
35:55even though he has things in his life or has these disturbances going on.
36:00This captain did not.
36:04There's mounting evidence that Captain Fallitz had serious anger management issues.
36:09What puzzles investigators is why a bright young pilot like First Officer Erickson
36:14didn't intervene if his captain was behaving recklessly.
36:19Hello?
36:20They receive a phone call from a ramp service agent at Minneapolis Airport.
36:25He claims to have important details regarding the pilots who flew Flight 5719.
36:32Why isn't the exterior pre-flight done?
36:35I was...
36:36You didn't check the damn exterior lights.
36:40The service agent witnessed Captain Fallitz berating First Officer Erickson over a pre-flight check.
36:45I was going to check the lights from inside the cockpit.
36:49That's not how you do it.
36:50You have to go outside and see it with your own stupid eyes.
36:55Is Northwest even screen you guys anymore?
36:58No, screw it.
36:59I'll do it myself.
36:59The captain was being very, very critical of the first officer.
37:07And the first officer was a relatively new pilot.
37:09So, you know, you're going to make mistakes.
37:12So there was a better way to handle it.
37:14And the captain did not take the better way.
37:16If we're late for departure, it's on you!
37:18This happened immediately before the flight.
37:23So it set the tone for the two of them working together, which was a bad way to do things.
37:33Communication between flight crew members is an essential component of aviation safety.
37:38We call it crew resource management.
37:40And it makes sure that everybody in the flight deck is agreeing with what the airplane's doing and what the intent is to do.
37:47Okay, thanks.
37:50Let's get that CVR back in here.
37:52We need to find out what was going on between those two pilots.
37:58All right.
37:59Queue it up.
38:00After uncovering stunning details about Captain Fallitz's sometimes rude and even aggressive behavior,
38:08investigators listen to the cockpit recording in a new light.
38:11Call company and tell them we need to fuel up.
38:14In listening to the CVR, the captain makes a lot of corrections or directions to the first officer of very simple things.
38:24Ops 719.
38:25Say Hibbing.
38:26Hibbing, go ahead.
38:28Uh, uh, Hibbing, uh...
38:30It was intimidating and not constructive.
38:33Positive fuel.
38:34See you in a bit.
38:34You can't just say ops.
38:36You have to specify who you're supposed to answer.
38:39Hibbing, Sioux City, Duluth.
38:42Before I was an airline pilot, I was a flight instructor.
38:45And one guaranteed way to have that guy shut down and not be able to perform was to berate them, humiliate them, embarrass them.
38:52Uh, do we get our own room?
38:56No, you're gonna have to room with me.
38:58That's only a single bed.
38:59So you just have to curl up at my feet.
39:01The captain's tune was not very receptive and was aggressive and led to a breakdown in proper management with the first officer.
39:13Um, you've got nine miles to the arc?
39:16Just put it up in your clipboard and talk me through it when I need information, okay?
39:20So the captain was talking down to him.
39:24No, this thing, that's what this is for.
39:32He was paralyzed with fear.
39:36That's why I didn't make his call-outs to the captain.
39:38He was...
39:39He was terrified of it.
39:41The danger of an aggressive attitude is that it breaks down crew performance.
39:48I'd be reluctant to speak up, too.
39:59Investigators think they finally understand all the events and circumstances that sent a Northwest Air Link commuter plane speeding headlong into the ground near Hibbing, Minnesota.
40:12It was disturbing to hear about the captain's background and his anger management issues.
40:17How do you live with yourself knowing that you are completely useless?
40:22You have to go outside and see it with your own stupid eyes!
40:26And when we pieced that together with the environment that we heard him set in the cockpit on the cockpit voice recorder, things began to add up.
40:36You, uh, you're just gonna stay up here as long as you can?
40:41Yes.
40:42The captain had a plan, but because it wasn't the standard plan, the first officer didn't know what it was.
40:50Did you click the airport lights?
40:52Uh...
40:52While they were inside the final approach fix with a rate of descent at over 2,000 feet per minute...
40:58Click it.
41:00Clicked it seven times.
41:01Uh, yeah, I, uh...
41:01The captain seems to be berating the first officer about clicking the radio button to turn on the runway lights.
41:09Got it now.
41:11He was afraid to do anything.
41:13So, that kind of explained why he was silent a lot of the time.
41:22The first officer wasn't able to participate in monitoring the airspeed and altitude.
41:30The first officer was really just along for the ride.
41:33Flying for the most part, the stakes are very high.
41:52And when you see what happens in the aftermath of an accident, um, it brings home just how serious this job is...
42:01...and how serious everybody involved in the airline business needs to take it.
42:05The crash of Flight 5719 exposed deficiencies in crew resource management training...
42:13...500...
42:14...and highlighted the importance of interpersonal relationships in flying.
42:19Airline flying's a team sport.
42:21Minimums?
42:22Got it.
42:23It's important to have a team attitude.
42:26Well, this accident in many ways has become a case study in just how valuable it is...
42:31...to empower either crew member to be assertive and to speak up when something isn't going right.
42:37Pressurization set.
42:38A first officer, even though they may be new and very junior, is not only given permission...
42:45...but is encouraged to ask or question a very senior captain when they get uncomfortable.
42:51Ma'am or sir, I don't know why we're doing this. I'm not comfortable here.
42:55Among the NTSB's recommendations is closer oversight of pilot training programs.
43:01...so that airlines can address potential issues before an accident occurs.
43:07Do CRM training on a regular basis.
43:12Make sure that they're monitored.
43:14Go, you know, fly with their crews every once in a while just to see what's going on.
43:19There's a lot of things that can be done.
43:20One way some airlines deal with a personality conflict is they have a no-pairing list.
43:26In other words, if you have a personality conflict with a certain pilot, you can check off a box and they won't make you fly with that person.
43:34It's one of those accidents that we learned a lot from and it became a good means to show failures within the system that could be corrected.
43:48So I would say that we learned from it and as a result, the aviation industry is safer.
43:54Yeah.
43:55...
43:56...
43:57...
43:59...
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