00:00On the 5th of July 2009 at the Walt Disney World Resort in Florida two
00:17ride trains collided, resulting in the death of one staff member. This fatal
00:23crash, however, did not take place on a roller coaster or other thrill ride, but
00:29instead on the resort's monorail system, designed to transport guests around and
00:35between the parks. The monorail system at Walt Disney World was installed in 1971
00:43and expanded several times during the 1970s and 1980s. By the end of 1988 it
00:51consisted of three loops with a total of six stations along the way, a
00:56configuration that has remained unchanged ever since. Two of these loops
01:02are dedicated to the Magic Kingdom section of the resort. One of these
01:07carries an express service that ferries guests between Central Transportation
01:12and Ticket Hub and the Magic Kingdom itself. The other is a resort line which
01:18stops at several locations around the Magic Kingdom. The third loop is separate
01:24from these two lines and serves the Epcot section of the resort. As a
01:30passenger if you wish to go from the Epcot loop to either of the Magic
01:34Kingdom loops you must disboard and change trains through the Transportation
01:38and Ticket Center. However, for the purposes of managing the system it is
01:43possible to move trains between the loops. This is done on a routine basis
01:48using a switch in the track and a joining spur between the different lines.
01:52A number of parties are responsible for managing these track switches. On board
01:59each monorail train is a pilot who is, of course, responsible for driving the train.
02:04A supervisor based in a central control room is responsible for providing the
02:09pilot with instructions, and a panel operator in another control room is
02:14responsible for switching on and off power in the track and activating the
02:18track switches. All parties are in constant radio contact. The incident took
02:26place at 2 a.m. on the 5th of July 2009. While most parts of the park were
02:33generally closed by this time of night the monorails continued to run in order
02:38to allow guests to get back to their hotels. Three trains were in operation on
02:43the Epcot line at the time. Monorail Pink, Monorail Purple, and Monorail Coral.
02:51Monorail Pink was ready to be taken out of service for the night. To be able to
02:56get back to the maintenance area, where trains were usually parked when not in
03:00use, it would need to move from the Epcot line to the Magic Kingdom Express line.
03:05The first part of this operation went smoothly. Monorail Pink moved past the
03:12spur track joining the two lines and came to a complete halt, then reported
03:17in to the supervisor that it had done so. The supervisor in turn contacted the
03:22panel operator and asked them to switch the track so that Monorail Pink could
03:27back up onto the spur line. This is where something went wrong. The panel operator
03:33cut power to the Epcot line, ready to make the switch, but was then distracted
03:38by two almost-simultaneous radio calls relating to other trains. After dealing
03:45with these the panel operator returned power to the Epcot line, incorrectly
03:49thinking that he had already made the switch. He had not. The panel operator
03:56contacted the supervisor. The supervisor contacted Monorail Pink and cleared the
04:01pilot to back up onto the spur line. The pilot of Monorail Pink began to back up.
04:07Of course, since the track had not actually been switched, the train didn't
04:13back up onto the spur track, but instead moved back along the Epcot line. Running
04:20along the Epcot line in a conflicting direction was Monorail Purple, which had
04:25a single pilot and six passengers on board. The pilot of this train would not
04:31have had long to react, but in the few moments he did have he put the train
04:35into reverse. His final act was clearly intended to protect the passengers on
04:41board from danger. At 2 a.m. the trains collided and came to a halt, partially
04:48inside the ticket and transportation center. The rearmost cab of Monorail Pink
04:54and the front cab of Monorail Purple were crushed and entangled, trapping the
04:59pilot of Monorail Purple. Despite the best efforts of passengers and staff he
05:05could not be saved. The victim of this incident was 21-year-old Austin
05:11Wennenberg. He was a popular and well-liked young man, described by those
05:16who knew him as a genius and a perfect son. Following his death he was remembered
05:22fondly by family, colleagues, and even by hundreds of guests who had the pleasure
05:27of meeting him during their time at Walt Disney World.
05:32Disney were quick to determine that no part of the ride system was
05:36malfunctioning. The monorail was up and running again the very next day, even as
05:43an investigation took place. The National Transportation Safety Board compiled a
05:49report noting that there were many things which could, and perhaps should,
05:53have prevented the collision. For example, the monorail was, like many attractions,
06:00fitted with a computerized blocking system which would prevent two trains
06:05from entering the same block of track. However, this system routinely had to be
06:10deactivated when reversing a train onto the spur track between loops, and so
06:15could not prevent this accident from taking place. Equally, the supervisor
06:20might have been able to determine that the switch had not gone as planned, had
06:25they been in the control room at the time of the accident. Unfortunately they
06:30had been out of the room, possibly at a nearby food outlet, and had been relying
06:35on radio contact only to manage the few trains on the system. Perhaps the pilot
06:42of Monorail Pink might have noticed that they were on the wrong track, but the two
06:47tracks were visually very similar. Combined with partially fogged up
06:52windows and low ambient light it was determined that it would have been very
06:57difficult for the Monorail Pink pilot to realize that they were on the wrong
07:02track. Even then guidance existed stating that before backing up a monorail train
07:09pilots should move from the cab at the front end of the train to the cab at the
07:14rear. However, this was not a practice that was typically required or requested
07:20by supervisors, even though it was technically on the books. Accordingly it
07:26was not done on this occasion. Finally, the panel operator might have noticed
07:33that they had not correctly switched the track, as they had access to a video feed
07:38of the switch. However, it was established practice to check this only before
07:44making the switch to ensure that no train was in the way. The panel operator
07:49had never been briefed to check the video feed after making the switch to
07:54ensure that they had done so correctly. At every stage there was an opportunity
08:00to avert disaster, and at every stage this opportunity was narrowly missed. A
08:07slew of changes were made by Disney in the aftermath of the accident. A spotter
08:13is now required to be present in the rear-facing cab whenever a monorail
08:18train reverses. All staff receive extra training, window defoggers are used, more
08:25live video feeds covering switches have been installed, and a second shop panel
08:30operator must verify each switch visually before the go-ahead can be
08:35given for a pilot to move. As a precaution the practice of allowing
08:39guests to ride in the front cab of the monorail has also been discontinued. All
08:46these changes, and more besides, make the monorail at Walt Disney World safer than
08:52it ever has been. Interestingly, only a small portion of each train involved was
08:59destroyed in the incident. The undamaged portions were repurposed, becoming
09:04Monorail Teal and Monorail Peach, both of which remain in service to this day.
09:11Since the 5th of July 2009 the system has transported almost 150,000 people
09:18per year without another deadly incident.
09:24That's the story of the one fatal crash in the Walt Disney World monorail's
09:29history. Compared to other attractions within the resort the monorail seems
09:34like a relatively simple and unassuming machine. There are no sharp gradients, no
09:40special effects, only moderate speeds, and a very simple route. But this
09:46simplicity is deceiving. Even the most basic ride is in fact an incredibly
09:52complicated network of procedures and systems... systems which must, as this
09:58incident demonstrates, be as carefully managed as any other.
10:10you
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