00:00On the 2nd of August 1973 three boys were playing on the miniature golf
00:17course outside the Summerland Leisure Center on the Isle of Man. They ducked
00:22into an empty ticket booth so that they could share a cigarette. The oldest boy
00:27in the group was just 14. Their only worry at the time was being caught
00:32smoking, but they would soon have bigger concerns. A dropped match started a fire
00:38which grew rapidly out of control. Panicking, the three boys fled. They would
00:44live to see another day, but dozens of people who were inside Summerland when
00:49the fire began would not.
00:53Constructed in 1971, Summerland was a unique complex considered extremely
00:59advanced for its time. The building, large enough to accommodate 10,000 people,
01:04consisted of a swimming pool, also known as the Aquadrome, multiple restaurants
01:09and bars, a miniature golf course, a solarium, a theater, an underground disco,
01:14a sauna, a roller skating rink, a small fairground, and an amusement arcade. All
01:20of this was set across five floors in an ultra-modern building constructed
01:25mainly from metal and plastic, the bold design of which, a promotional pamphlet
01:29boasted, would set the architectural world alight. It was intended to be a
01:37one-stop centralized holiday location, one that could compete with sunnier
01:42destinations abroad. Inside Summerland it never rained, the wind never blew, and the
01:48temperature was never anything less than perfect. Visitors could spend the
01:53entire day inside, basking under an artificial sun, swimming in artificial
01:58pools, and enjoying a round-the-clock roster of entertainment. There was
02:03nothing else like it in the world. Of course, people flocked to the venue...
02:09500,000 in its first year. From 1971 until 1973 many happy memories were made
02:17within the plastic walls of the complex. It was hailed by the British Tourist
02:22Authority as an outstanding tourist enterprise, a destination that was close
02:27to home and yet offered boundless entertainment and a tropical climate. For
02:33a few short years Summerland thrived. Then, at the height of summer in 1973, the
02:41complex burned. At around 7.50pm on the 2nd of August three boys on holiday
02:47from Liverpool accidentally started a fire while sneaking a smoke on the
02:51miniature golf course. Panicking, they fled the scene, and the fire they had
02:56started consumed the kiosk they had been hiding in, causing it to slump against
03:00the wall of Summerland. Staff were called to the scene by worried patrons, but
03:07their response was less than ideal. They could see that the fire was licking
03:11against the outside wall of Summerland, but as far as they knew the walls were
03:16fireproof. To them, then, this fire wasn't a serious issue. It was relatively small,
03:23and it was outside the complex... certainly no cause for a mass evacuation.
03:29Instead staff tried to fight the fire with extinguishers, hoses, and poles. A
03:34lack of any real fire safety training meant that none of them placed a call to
03:39the fire brigade. They simply weren't sure whose responsibility it was to do
03:43so, and were in any case sure that they could handle things themselves. Little
03:50did these staff members know that the fire was already inside the building,
03:54feeding on flammable building materials in a hidden gap between the outer and
03:59inner walls. There, unseen, it spread outward and upward, and burned hotter and
04:06hotter until, very suddenly, it burst through into the main building. At this
04:13point in time, despite the fire outside sending a huge plume of smoke into the
04:18air, new guests were still being admitted through the entrance turnstiles. The fire
04:24brigade had still not been called by anyone at the complex, although the sight
04:28of smoke had prompted people miles away to raise the alarm. Indeed, one call came
04:34via the harbormaster, who was alerted by the captain of a ship out at sea. No
04:40guest inside the complex could have known that there was any cause for alarm...
04:44until, with shocking suddenness, flames erupted from the walls and raced along
04:50the ceiling of the arcade. A panicked scramble for the exits began. In many
04:57cases staff members, who'd barely had any fire safety training, were of little
05:02help. A ride operator fled the fairground without switching off the rides, leaving
05:08several children to be rescued from a moving carousel by their parents and
05:12other onlookers. Elsewhere an entertainer confidently assured patrons that the
05:18smoke was from nothing worse than a chip pan fire, and convinced them to remain in
05:23their seats... only to realize the severity of the situation just moments
05:27later, and begin screaming for people to run. Conditions within the building
05:32quickly became unimaginable. Firstly, the nature of the complex meant that many of
05:39the people within were part of family groups... but family groups that had felt
05:44quite happy to separate. While children enjoyed a magic show, parents might have
05:50gone up to another floor to relax in the solarium. When the fire burst into the
05:55building proper, then, many people began to frantically search for their families
06:00rather than to evacuate through the nearest exit. Secondly, there were only a
06:05small number of exits readily available. The rest were locked, and in some cases
06:11chained shut, ostensibly to prevent people from sneaking in without paying
06:16the entrance fee. Keys for emergency exits were supposed to be stored in
06:21glass-fronted boxes beside each set of doors, but in many cases these boxes were
06:27empty, or were situated so high up on the wall that they were out of reach for
06:31most people. In one instance a set of fire doors was blocked by a parked car
06:37outside the building... a car that, with horrible irony, belonged to Summerland's
06:43safety officer. In many cases in order to escape guests had to smash windows
06:49and batter open doors with whatever was available. Finally, escaping guests had to
06:56contend with the material from which Summerland was built. The majority of the
07:01building was clad in a kind of plastic sheeting known as oroglass. Survivors
07:07would later come to refer to it as horror glass. During the fire it melted,
07:13dripping down and burning people who were trying to flee the smoke and flames.
07:18The vast majority of deaths occurred within the main part of the building.
07:23Being open plan in design there was nothing to stop the spread of the fire,
07:28or to offer protection from smoke and hot gases. Many people died or were
07:34injured as they tried to descend from one level to another down staircases
07:39that were narrow and unprotected. Such was the crush around the few available
07:44staircases that some parents threw their children from the balconies in the hope
07:49that someone below would catch them. Many people jumped, with a few brave staff
07:54members remaining at their posts until the last possible moment to catch people
07:59jumping from upper levels. One staff member even doused himself in water from
08:04a fire extinguisher so that he could stay inside the building and assist
08:08escaping guests for longer. Throughout it all no alarm sounded. The fire had burned
08:15through the control circuit before it could be triggered. The fire service
08:21arrived and tackled the blaze, using water from the swimming pool and then
08:25from the sea to damp down the flames. The injured were ferried to a nearby
08:31hospital by ambulances which operated like shuttles, moving back and forth for
08:36two solid hours until the last seriously injured victim had been transported. By
08:42midnight the rescue operation was over and the fire service turned to the
08:47retrieval of bodies, a harrowing process that would take several days. In the end
08:5450 people lost their lives in the fire and 80 more sustained serious injuries.
09:02An investigation was launched and identified a wealth of failings. Exits
09:08should not under any circumstances have been chained shut. Staff should have been
09:14given fire safety training. The fire service should have been called within
09:18one minute of the fire outside the building being discovered. Mistake after
09:23mistake had been made, but the greatest errors had taken place long before
09:27Summerland was even open to the public. Because of budgetary issues during
09:33construction multiple firms had worked on the building. The company which built
09:38the outer shell hadn't known with any certainty how the interior would be
09:42divided up, and so hadn't been able to place fire exits appropriately.
09:47Additionally it is believed that the firm which handled the interior fitting
09:51out of Summerland might have inadvertently undone some of the
09:54fireproofing carried out by the firm which built the exterior. As well as this
10:00materials had been chosen that were cost-effective but which weren't
10:04sufficiently fireproof. Auroglass, for example, had been approved despite its
10:09flammability on the basis that it would soften and fall out of its frame in the
10:14case of a fire, facilitating escape. The fire safety budget had been a matter of
10:20contention, with owners repeatedly seeking cheaper options. Sprinklers were
10:25not installed because to do so throughout the building would simply
10:29cost too much. Again and again communication had failed, and decisions
10:36had been taken which prioritized convenience or cost reduction over human
10:40life. But despite all this the investigation concluded that nobody was
10:46to blame. There were no villains, said the report, only many human errors and
10:52failures. This judgment, incidentally, was applied equally to the three boys who
10:58started the fire. They were identified and brought before a judge, where they
11:04were fined three pounds each... about 30 pounds each in today's money. The burned
11:11shell of Summerland was eventually demolished and rebuilt. The new
11:16Summerland was smaller and constructed from traditional materials, with a
11:21state-of-the-art alarm and sprinkler system. It eschewed the open plan design
11:26of its predecessor and opted instead for a lower and more compartmentalized
11:31building. This new Summerland was a reflection of the impact that the fire
11:36had on the construction industry. Every lesson learned and new rule implemented
11:41was reflected in its design. The new Summerland epitomized a changed attitude
11:47towards fire safety in leisure and entertainment buildings. However, a flood
11:53in 2002 gutted the new complex, leading to its eventual demolition. Now all that
12:00remains of Summerland is a scarred cliff face. It should be hoped that the lessons
12:05learned from the fire, at such great cost, do not disappear so easily.
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